An Argument from Realism Against Naturalism about Human Beings
Posted in Guest Post, Philosophy of Mind on June 11th, 2008 by MikeGeneThe following essay was written by Jim Madden and the views/arguments contained within do not necessarily reflect the views of Mike Gene. Mike Gene hosts such essays simply to provoke thought and promote discussion and communication.
Here's how I define "nominalism" and "realism":
The Realism Thesis (RT): There are some predications, say Px, such that 'P' refers to a property of x which is identical to all other instances of P.
The Nominalist Thesis (NT): For any predication, Px, 'P' means only that x is a member of a set of contingently associated individuals (or sense images of individuals) with nothing intrinsically in common.
[Of course NT could (should) be worked with more. It basically assumes a sort of crude set nominalism, as opposed to an exemplar or similarity view (Berkeley) or somebody who analyzes away similarity in terms of something more fundamental (Hume in the Treatise). I do, however, believe the argument can be adjusted for more sophisticated versions of nominalism.]
To get a sense of my way of thinking of RT vs. NT consider the following proposition:
(1) Pa and Pm.
One who subscribes to RT analyzes (1) as saying something (being P) is identical between a and m. The proponent of NT would analyze (1) as saying that a and m (taken either as material individuals or sense images of such) are contingently associated as members of a set, 'P'. Membership in P is accounted for not in terms of intrinsic properties of a and m, but in terms of social convention, pragmatic conditioning, prior neurological wiring, etc.





