Jerry Coyne gave a presentation on Creationism and ID at The Rockefeller University on May 1. You can watch the video here.

What's troubling about the presentation is the last 5 minutes or so, where Coyne focuses on religion and basically sides with Dawkins, Hitchens, and the New Atheist movement. He propagates the war between religion and science viewpoint and argues that we need to "get rid of religion." He plugs the books by Dawkins and Hitchens. He argues that we need to more publicly express the opinion that religion is the enemy of science. And then he turns to the NCSE position and says, "At least do not pretend that religion and science are alternative and compatible ways of looking at the world." He claims the National Academy of Science's recent statement is "soft-pedaling the dichotomy" and describes Gould's NOMA as "hogwash." He even contrasts religion and science by peddling the stereotype that religious people "blow each other up" while scientists behave in a civilized manner.

Coyne really should stick to genetics and evolution.

In their paper, "A Disconfirmation Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments," psychologists Kari Edwards and Edward Smith (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1996, Vol. 71, No. 1, 5-24) explore this tendency. They begin their article as follows:

When evaluating an argument, can one assess its strength independently of one's prior belief in the conclusion? A good deal f evidence indicates the answer is an emphatic no. This phenomenon, which we refer to as the prior belief effect, has important implications. Given two people, or groups, with opposing beliefs about a social, political, or scientific issue, the degree to which they will view relevant evidence as strong will differ. This difference, in turn, may result in a failure of the opposing parties to converge on any kind of meaningful agreement, and, under some circumstances, they may become more extreme in their beliefs.

Read the rest of this entry »

The SA essentially states that, given the potential for posthumans to create a vast number of ancestor simulations, we should probabilistically conclude that we are in a simulation rather than the deepest reality.

Most people give a little chuckle when they hear this argument for the first time. I've explained it to enough people now that I've come to expect it. The chuckle doesn't come about on account of the absurdity of the suggestion, it's more a chuckle of logical acknowledgment — a reaction to the realization that it may actually be true.

But this is no laughing matter; there are disturbing implications to the SA. We appear to be damned if we're in a simulation, and damned if we're not.

Here

Bradford originally posted an article about naïve realism:

Naïve realism is the conviction that one sees the world as it is and that when people don't see it in a similar way, it is they that do not see the world for what it is.

Over the years, I have tried to help people see that this contentious debate is not purely a matter of "the evidence," but instead deeply involves such things as stereotypes, confirmation bias, disconfirmation bias, and tribalism. We can now add naïve realism to the pot, as it may play a central role.

Read the rest of this entry »

HERE

HERE

There are a couple of things about the Monod quote* that caught me eye. First, I was struck by the similarities to ID101. I'll let readers see if they can spot any points of convergence.

Second, and more importantly, this sentence stands out:

Hence it is through reference to our own activity, conscious and projective, intentional and purposive-it is as makers of artifacts-that we judge of a given object's "naturalness" or "artificialness."

Maybe it is simply not possible to make such judgments without accessing this subjective element. After all, recognizing design may indeed be akin to recognizing another mind. For how do we recognize other minds if not by recognizing what they design?

*BTW, the quote is from the first three paragraphs of chapter 1.

The difference between artificial and natural objects seems immediately and unambiguously apparent to all of us. A rock, a mountain, a river, or a cloud "“ these are natural objects; a knife a handkerchief, a car "“ so many artificial objects, artifacts. Analyze these judgments, however, and it will be seen that they are neither immediate nor strictly objective. We know that the knife was man-made for a use its maker visualized beforehand. The object renders in material form the preexistent intention that gave birth to it, and its form is accounted for by the performance expected of it even before it takes shape. It is another story altogether with the river or the rock which we know, or believe, to have been molded by the free play of physical forces to which we cannot attribute any design, any project, or purpose. Not, that is, if we accept the basic premise of the scientific method, to wit, that nature is objective and not projective.

Hence it is through reference to our own activity, conscious and projective, intentional and purposive-it is as makers of artifacts-that we judge of a given object's "naturalness" or "artificialness." Might there be objective and general standards for defining the characteristics of artificial objects, products of a conscious purposive activity, as against natural objects, resulting from the gratuitous play of physical forces? To make sure of the complete objectivity of the criteria chosen, it would doubtless be best to ask oneself whether, in putting them to use, a program could be drawn up enabling a computer to distinguish an artifact from a natural object. Read the rest of this entry »