Behe: ID rescues Common Descent
by BilboOver at Behe's amazon.com blog, in the question and answer section, this question comes up:
In Edge of Evolution you indicate that some of the evidence supporting common ancestry is pretty persuasive. Yet a number of scientists have questioned some of the evidence for common ancestry. Do you think it is beyond the pale for them to do so? In your mind is it scientific to question common ancestry?
Behe's response is intriguing:
In my view it is certainly not "beyond the pale" for a scientist to question anything. Questioning and skepticism are healthy for science. I have no solutions to the difficult problems pointed to by scientists who are skeptical of universal common descent: ORFan genes, nonstandard genetic codes, different routes of embryogenesis by similar organisms, and so on. Nonetheless, as I see it, if, rather than Darwinian evolution, one is talking about "intelligently designed" descent, then those problems, while still there, seem much less insuperable. I certainly agree that random, unintelligent processes could not account for them, but an intelligent agent may have ways around apparent difficulties. [my emphasis] So in judging the likelihood of common descent, I discount problems that could be classified as "how did that get here?" Instead, I give much more weight to the "mistakes" or "useless features" arguments. If some peculiar feature is shared between two species which, as far as we can tell, has no particular function, and which in other contexts we would likely call a genetic accident, then I count that as rather strong evidence for common descent. So, if one looks at the data in the way that I do, then one can say simultaneously that: 1) CD is very well supported; 2) grand Darwinian claims are falsified; 3) ID is confirmed; 4) design extends very deeply into biology.
So objections that would most likely be raised by Young Earth Creationists against Common Descent are answered by Behe by Intelligent Design. As I said, intriguing. And perhaps a way of generating teleological hypotheses that could possibly be tested.
[Oh yeah. I still haven't figured out that link thingy. Could somebody help me out?]
July 5th, 2007 at 5:59 pm
Here is what you embed into your text…
<a href="http://telicthoughts.com">link to here<a>
Here is what you get…
link to here
Comment by Thought Provoker — July 5, 2007 @ 5:59 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 6:06 pm
OK, TP, let's see if I can do this:
link to here
Um…it doesn't seem to work. I can't get the pointer to click onto it.
YES! YES! YES! It worked!!!
Comment by Bilbo — July 5, 2007 @ 6:06 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 6:46 pm
change
to
<a href=http://www.amazon.com/gp/blog/A3DGRQ0IO7KYQ2/ref=cm_blog_pdp_blog /102-8594431-0527313">this works</a>
this works
P.S. angryoldfatman is correct. The first example should have ended with /a
Comment by Thought Provoker — July 5, 2007 @ 6:46 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 6:50 pm
at the end.
Comment by angryoldfatman — July 5, 2007 @ 6:50 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 6:51 pm
Oops
Comment by angryoldfatman — July 5, 2007 @ 6:51 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 6:53 pm
The end tag needs a forward slash before the "a" is what I was trying to say.
Comment by angryoldfatman — July 5, 2007 @ 6:53 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 9:07 pm
Bilbo,
Behe seems to be making a classic gap argument. Running into trouble explaining something naturalistically? Invoke the Designer.
The problem is that anything can be explained that way, whether or not it really is the product of design.
Explain everything and you explain nothing.
Comment by keiths — July 5, 2007 @ 9:07 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 9:43 pm
Keiths:
But the issue is whether the problem at hand lends itself to an intelligent solution or one that would simply result from blind forces of nature. If the former better fits the evidence then it would be stupid to insist on the latter. Gapping has nothing to do with this unless the gapping is auto resorting to a vague non-ID explanation when we come up against an unknown.
Comment by Bradford — July 5, 2007 @ 9:43 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 9:49 pm
Depends on what is meant by "common ancestry". Monophylogenous or polyphylogenous? What degree of polyphylogeny? Do humans have a common ancestor? Sure. Do cucumbers have a common ancestor? Sure. How about humans and cucumbers? Yes, they have an imaginary common ancestor. If we include all the imaginary common ancestors (a la Haeckel), then monophylogenous common descent works just fine.
Comment by Vladimir Krondan — July 5, 2007 @ 9:49 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 9:53 pm
Keiths:
No one, including Behe claimed ID "explained everything".
The so-called "classical gaps" argument to which you refer is also a non-starter. The very concept of "gaps" in that context really means "something for which have yet to find a naturalistic explanation", which, of course, implies that all natural phenenomen must have a natural cause (read: undirected, unintelligent) cause. But what if, contra your comment above, the actual explanation doesn't fit that mold and a purposeful, intelligent cause is the actual case? As I've asked you before and now ask again: how do you know scientifically that the properties of the cosmos are such no apparent design can be actual design, even in principal? If you can provide a scientific answer to that question, then claims of "classical gaps" arguments are bluster as far as I can see.
Comment by DonaldM — July 5, 2007 @ 9:53 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 9:54 pm
If you're an atheist, use prophetic materialism.
Anything can be explained by prophetic materialism. Prophetic materialism is like a tube of caulking, a great gap-filler. Can fill the gap in your head too (i.e., mind.)
Comment by Vladimir Krondan — July 5, 2007 @ 9:54 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 9:57 pm
DonaldM:
It looks as if non-design is a definitional property of their arguments. It must be assumed. When there is no default option design looks eminently reasonable.
Comment by Bradford — July 5, 2007 @ 9:57 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 10:39 pm
You have a choice.
A. You can use a question begging set of definitions and rules for science that require design to be excluded, regardless of the evidence.
B. You can allow that real design is a real possibility, in which case one must distinguish between real design and apparent design.
If you want to defend option A, what would be the basis for essentially closing one's eyes regardless of any evidence?
If you take option B, you are correct that anything could be attributed to design. The consequence is that we can only legitimately infer design when we have reasons to believe (tentatively, as always) that unguided processes cannot do the job, i.e. there is a gap that we have not been able to make unguided processes cover.
This is exactly why Dembski's design filter first considers law and chance explanations before reaching a design inference. It is also the process Behe is using, i.e. observing the many things unguided processes can do as well as what they cannot do, in order to better define The Edge of Evolution.
Unless you want to try to defend permanently covering your eyes against the possibility of real design, Behe is doing exactly as one should do by looking at design possibilities when there are reasons to believe unguided processes cannot do the job.
Comment by eric — July 5, 2007 @ 10:39 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 10:59 pm
Eric said…
And there is a Third Choice.
Comment by Thought Provoker — July 5, 2007 @ 10:59 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 8:34 am
That is not the only way. It's not even a way (though it might be sufficient to form a hypothesis).
We infer design by finding the causal link between the designer, the mechanism of manufacture and the artifact. We might look at Stonehenge and think it must be "designed". After all, it looks a lot like other lithic monuments that humans have made. So we look for and discover evidence of manufacture, from chisel marks to stone quarries. And evidence of the "designers" in the form of other artifacts directly associated with humans.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 8:34 am
July 6th, 2007 at 8:40 am
Bradford:
Of course, this isn't anything new. The default position of science as currently practiced is so-called methodological naturalism as you know. But since MN is virtually indistinguishable from full-blown philosophical naturalism, the result is the same: enforcement of MN on scientific practice MUST assume PN is the truth. Eliminate MN and design becomes a live possibility with tons of evidence to support it.
Comment by DonaldM — July 6, 2007 @ 8:40 am
July 6th, 2007 at 9:21 am
As designers are subjected to scientific investigation (there are entire fields of such study), then it clearly isn't an intrinsic assumption. However, the invocation of entities without empirical implications are scientifically extraneous, at best.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 9:21 am
July 6th, 2007 at 9:58 am
Zachriel wrote:
Are you in training to enter this year's Beg The Question In Naturalism's Favor As Blatantly As Possible In As Few Words As Possible Competition? If so, I'd say you've got a good chance of taking the Gold.
The question is: are there any non-human designers?
Zachriel proposes to answer it by implicitly defining 'designer' to mean 'human designer', and implicitly defining 'evidence of design' to mean 'evidence of design by humans'; from which definitions he then confidently derives the conclusion that there aren't any non-human designers.
Anyone else find this strategy risible, er, in the extreme?
It's like that other great marvel of 'bright' argumentation: if someone has a religious experience, it's due to just a certain type of human brain state, not to God. Why? Oh because 'religious experience' is defined as an experience due to that type of brain state, not to God.
Thus, there are no appearances of design nor of divine presence that can even be allowed to count as evidence of design nor of divine presence, by definitional fiat.
And to think that 'brights' accuse religious people of blind faith, fundamentalism, dogmatism, not being willing to go wherever the evidence leads, and harboring unfalsfiable ideas.
Hilarious, it really is.
Comment by stunney — July 6, 2007 @ 9:58 am
July 6th, 2007 at 10:12 am
Zachriel:
I'll just keep asking this question until someone provides a scientific answer. Zachriel, how has it been confirmed or established scientifically that non-material entities are incapable of interacting with the material cosmos in any manner that would produce empirical, detectable consequences, even in principle?
Where can I find these research studies in the peer reviewed science journals? Who did the studies? Under what conditions? How might they be falsified?
I eagerly await your citations. Thank you.
Comment by DonaldM — July 6, 2007 @ 10:12 am
July 6th, 2007 at 10:15 am
Stunney:
Yes, the brights really are DIM when it comes to this, aren't they? Dawkins is a Dim; Dennett is a Dim. Kinda rolls right off the tongue, doesn't it?
Comment by DonaldM — July 6, 2007 @ 10:15 am
July 6th, 2007 at 10:21 am
Does the presence of numerous, interdependant parts working together to yield a specific function carry no weight what-so-ever?
Mechanism of manufacture is the causal link you're looking for…. what need to infer design then? It should be readily apparent in those situations…. quite the mundane task then.
Comment by Doug — July 6, 2007 @ 10:21 am
July 6th, 2007 at 11:30 am
Of course not. That is also the advantage of a methodological definition of science. There is no such distinction. However, we do consider entities *without* empirical, detectable consequences as scientifically extraneous.
Sure. It might lead to a valid hypothesis. The Monsoons are a complex mechanism for pumping water over Asia. Storms are complex mechanisms for generating lightning to punish the wicked. The intricate dance of planets, they say, portend the rise and fall of Kings. But what specific and distinguishing predictions can you make?
Genesis 2:7: The LORD God formed the man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living being.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 11:30 am
July 6th, 2007 at 11:59 am
Zachriel, what is the significance of this response? Are you looking for empirical evidence related to a religious passage and if so why?
Comment by Bradford — July 6, 2007 @ 11:59 am
July 6th, 2007 at 12:07 pm
It's at least some attempt at describing a mechanism.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 12:07 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 12:17 pm
Bradford: Zachriel, what is the significance of this response? Are you looking for empirical evidence related to a religious passage and if so why?
Is it really? How much can you tell about the mechanism I use to transmit this message. Did I type it myself or use the services of another who typed my spoken words? If I typed it am I a two finger typist or conventional? I've used the example of home building in the past since I became somewhat familiar with the details of the process through a good friend of mine who does it for a living. The point of intelligent input is the mechanism is usually one of choice rather than necessity. The end product cannot reveal the actual mechanism in such cases even if it can reveal intelligent input through the nature of the end product.
Comment by Bradford — July 6, 2007 @ 12:17 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 12:38 pm
We can investigate the process. That's the point. There is a causal mechanism that connects the entity we know as "Bradford" with the message.
To elaborate, let's suppose "Bradford" is a disembodied entity. We can still investigate the source of the signal. Where does it enter the Internet? What causes the signal to appear at that point? What is the IP-address of Heaven?
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 12:38 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 12:41 pm
Hi Bradford,
You wrote…
I believe the point was that science allows for these multiple mechanistic choices. Here, you have an embarrassment of riches…
God, the Life Giver, continually breaths life into non-life via mysterious ways.
God, the Ultimate Engineer, created a universe so perfect it runs itself.
God, the Quantum Mechanic, uses non-deterministic, non-random quanglement.
And God is just one metaphysical Truth, there are many others, each with their own set a scientific hypotheses. And if your truism about Occam and metaphysics is correct, everything is equally "the Truth".
P.S. to Zachriel, please excuse me for stepping on your response, but I thought my examples might help inform the discussion.
Comment by Thought Provoker — July 6, 2007 @ 12:41 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 12:46 pm
Bradford: How much can you tell about the mechanism I use to transmit this message.
Depending on what it is you are investigating you could already have the answer. If ruling out a random cause, like a pet walking over a keyboard in favor of intelligent input, is the objective, then it is satisfied with the evidence you already have. You can investigate the actual physical mechanism but you are unlikely to ever obtain an answer.
Comment by Bradford — July 6, 2007 @ 12:46 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 12:48 pm
But the relevant question is which choices, if any, are subject to empirical studies.
Comment by Bradford — July 6, 2007 @ 12:48 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 12:48 pm
What specific and distinguishing predictions can I make from your sarcastic examples of 'numerous, interdependant parts working together to yield a specific function'?
The specificity of the functions that you mentioned are of a much different type than that of the intraflagellar transport system.
You're taking natural occurrences (storms, lightning, movement of planets) that are governed by physical laws (the source of which betrays the point you were intending) to which you ascribe (in jest) some arbitrary function (punishing the wicked).
How does this negate the inference to design when one is faced with a molecular mechanism that contains numerous, interdependant parts working together to yield a specific function?
This, like the 1st part of your response doesn't address my point.
You are saying that we can infer design when we:
The mechanism of manufacture is a causal link between the designer and the artifact. What other causal link could you be referring to? Photographs taken, a diary that was maintained, and a jar with a clear liquid labeled "Sweat From Brow"
Comment by Doug — July 6, 2007 @ 12:48 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 1:01 pm
Hi Bradford,
You wrote…
That depends on the acceptance of NOMA. People who reject NOMA are, for all practicle purposes, declaring everything is subject to empirical studies, including whether or not
an Intelligent DesignerGod exists.Accepting NOMA, implies a recognition that science has a limited toolset. I think most people would agree science is limited to understanding things that can be understood (i.e. are deterministic).
To me, non-deterministic implies metaphysical and it would be foolish to attempt to subject such things to empirical studies.
Comment by Thought Provoker — July 6, 2007 @ 1:01 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 1:17 pm
Typically because we have experience with other such artifacts. When we examine a likely arrowhead, we compare it to our library of other such artifacts. When blogging, we already know that most bloggers are featherless bipeds.
Let me answer a different way. Whenever we make a scientific claim, there are implications of the claim. We can investigage these implications, and that is what we call science. If you want to say to yourself that it looks designed and that's good enough for me, then you are not working within the scientific paradigm.
"Bradford" doesn't type randomly. In fact, his messages are in English and are being communicated via an electronic medium. We already know a lot about the entity "Bradford". A bit more investigation will reveal his IP, geographic location, and that he purports to like Baseball and Chess.
In the vast majority of cases, random has nothing to do with determining if something is designed. The gods of the Monsoon pump water over South Asia quite non-randomly.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 1:17 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 1:33 pm
Franklin showed that "Storms are complex mechanisms for generating lightning" is due to static electricity in the atmosphere. His experiment with the kite was the best in foolhardy empirical research. Other investigators have shown that the Earth's atmosphere works as a giant heat engine.
But that is precisely the God of the Gaps argument that constitutes most ID reasoning. Just because we may be ignorant of the causes of lightning, doesn't allow us to reach a scientific conclusion that an angry Sky God hurls lightning. The physical laws which explain these phenomean only came after centuries of ignorance and fallacious reasoning.
It's not a valid inference, any more than claiming that the clockwork motions of the planets is a clock. It's a claim"”at best a hypothesis. Now, make the causal connection between the designer, the mechanism of manufacture and the artifact. What are the empirical implications? Turns out that planets orbit according to their mutual graviational attraction. But even today, no one knows if the Earth's orbit is stable over the long run.
I don't know. It's not my claim. If it is to have scientific validity, then that is what you need to provide. Sweeping declarations that you can't imagine how it could have evolved does not a scientific theory make.
Try looking at how science actually makes such determinations. Consider the Antikythera Mechanism. What can we conclude based on what we know?
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 1:33 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 1:47 pm
Zachriel:
Zachriel:
What, exactly, is the advantage of a methodological definition of science?
Which entities are without empirical, detectable consequences and how has that been established scientifically?
Comment by DonaldM — July 6, 2007 @ 1:47 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 1:54 pm
Among other reasons, because it doesn't make a distinction between natural and supernatural phenomena. It also doesn't require any specific mindset or philosophical predisposition. As long as there are observable consequences, it is subject to scientific investigation.
Anything without empirical, detectable consequences is not subject to scientific investigation. Philosophy is outside of scientific investigation, though philosophy is informed by science. Subjective experience is still largely outside scientific investigation, though science is not completely mute on the subject.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 1:54 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 2:11 pm
Zachriel:
I beg to differ. First of all, there's really no such thing as a "methodological definition" of science. Rather, science (or at least many scientists and philosophers of science) promote the concept of methodological naturalism, which very much does make a distinction between natural and supernatural phenomenon. MN says, in effect, for the sake of 'doing science' we'll pretend that nature is a closed system of natural cause and effect, which is basically what full-blown philosophical naturalism is all about. So, far from not distinguishing between the natural and the super-natural, MN assumes PN, thus eliminating even the possibility that a supernatural cause or entity could act in such a way as to have empircally detectable consequences in the natural (i.e. material) realm.
That is the consequence of your so-called 'methodological definition' of science. It requires a very specific mind-set and philosophical predisposition, mainly in favor of PN, or something very much like it.
I sort of agree here, but this doesn't really answer the question I asked you. What I asked was what supernatural entities are without empirical consequences in the natural realm?
Comment by DonaldM — July 6, 2007 @ 2:11 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 2:24 pm
Zachriel:
We also have experiences with "artifacts" like nucleic acids and can tell much about their properties and conditions in which they are generated.
Exactly. The fact that you are able to draw that conclusion has implications extending further than this example.
Comment by Bradford — July 6, 2007 @ 2:24 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 2:32 pm
Sure there is. I provided such a definition consistent with how scientists normally work, and consistent with many definitions provided in academia and in philosophy. That's why scientists can have such a wide variety of philosophical views, Jews, Christians, Muslims, New Agers, Buddhists nihilists, and still contribute to the process.
I have found that the distinction between natural and supernatural is not useful or well-defined. Hence, I have offered a leaner definition consistent with scientific practice.
My "so-called 'methodological definition' of science" That is incorrect. If you want to make that point, please don't conflate my definition with others you may have heard.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 2:32 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 2:34 pm
Yeah, they act like molecules. And they are generated through chemical processes everyday.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 2:34 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 2:38 pm
Chemical processes that are dependent on preexisting functional genomic systems. What chemical processes generate the encoding conventions and sequence specificity associated with function?
Comment by Bradford — July 6, 2007 @ 2:38 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 2:42 pm
Hi Zachriel:
The inference becomes more pronounced the more we understand. The more knowledge we accrue regarding the nature of certain biological machines and mechanisms - the more likely it appears that NS working on RM is bankrupt in being that mechanism to yield such a biological artifact. Such as the case with the cilium. Initially the stumbling block to a blind and random search was nexin linkers, dynein motor and microtubules. But now, fundamental to the existence of the cilium itself, is the intraflagellar transport system.
Our understanding increases the plausibility of RM+NS decreases.
You are assuming that the existence of God (for our sake I'll be focusing on the Judeo-Christian notion of God) was invoked initially for explanatory purposes.
Ancient observer: "I wonder why the sky lights up with a flash which is then followed by a loud rumbling….hmmmm. I've got it! There's an entity, in my image, that transcends the natural order and he's the one who does it!! It all makes sense now."
How is this the same? You're comparing the functions of the two, not the source of the constituent parts. You've compared an arbitrary function that you superimposed over the movement of the planets to a very real function carried out by a molecular machine. I don't see your point.
This just brings us back to the initial point: are these the only criteria that will be accepted before design can be considered valid or even possible?
So, regardless of how impressive, intricate, specific and detailed the artifact is ..the inference of design must be withheld and the declaration that it came about randomly must be assumed.
How did you come to such a conclusion? Did the observation itself inform you of this? You are allowing only one hypothesis, regardless of the fact that you have never seen nature (no foresight and random) form such a machine. That pattern doesn't seem very warranted.
Comment by Doug — July 6, 2007 @ 2:42 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 2:42 pm
Assuming you are referring to origin of the genetic code, then that is not known with any certainty at this time.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 2:42 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 3:07 pm
Use your "inference" to make a specific and distinguishing empirical prediction. All you're saying is that's its complicated. As there is only very scant evidence of the origin of the cilium, and whose history is largely lost in intervening eons of time, it's just a convenient Gap.
Whenever we make a scientific claim, there are implications of the claim. We can investigage these implications, and that is what we call science. If you want to say to yourself that it looks designed and that's good enough for you, then you are not working within the scientific paradigm.
Planetary orbits are impressive, intricate, specified and detailed.
You also may want to quit with the strawman "random". Almost nothing in nature is random, certainly not evolutionary adaptation.
Nope. Not at all. I am not disallowing any particular theory. But if you make a scientific claim, then you need to tell us what specific and distinguishing empirical predictions are implied.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 3:07 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 3:10 pm
TP:
I'll agree with you strongly that there are postulations that don't enter the realm of science, thus constitute a NOMA of specified beliefs. Zach's example of Genesis 2:7 is not one of these, because "dust of the ground" is matter. It's all sorts of available matter from all the stellar death events that produced the abundance of elements from which 'mud' is made. The only thing arguable about this postulation (and its interpretations in light of science) is the God-attribution. Which is NOMA (science can't prove the negative, religion can't prove the positive).
But non-determinism needs to be examined in light of the type of mechanisms you've discovered - such as the quantum calculators in life that appear to be universally requisite to life. To whom, exactly, is the result non-determined?
IOW, in an extended EAM-ish model (that would account for quantum mechanisms), the results might not be so undetermined for the organism at all. It's just that science must take the ensemble, and an ensemble of what is not determined by outside agency can only be probablistic. Yet probability isn't precisely random either. Science does have a statistical manner of accounting for it, it just can't say anything about the individuals in which effects are manifest (or what's probable to them).
Empirical studies are conceivable. But this crosses a previously-drawn line science likes to ignore. As more and more empirical evidence accumulates from psi studies, it might someday be scientifically relevant to consider the subjective on the individual level. At which point things will not look so non-deterministic at all. IMHO.
Comment by Joy — July 6, 2007 @ 3:10 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 3:14 pm
TP writes:
I have to disagree. I reject NOMA because it is a self-refuting concept. Is NOMA a principle of science or theology? If science, then clearly science is dictating the boundaries to theology. Vice-versa if its a statement of theology. Either way, it violotes its own principle of non-overlap. Or perhaps NOMA is neither a principle of either science or theology — then from whence does it arise? Philosophy? Which philosophy would that be, and why does THAT philosophy get to dictate the limits to either science or religion.
No! NOMA just doesn't cut it as a principle of anything as far as I'm concerned.
Comment by DonaldM — July 6, 2007 @ 3:14 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 3:17 pm
Zachriel:
Guessed I missed it. I've looked up thread, but don't find what you're referring to. Could you kindly re-post?
Thanks!
Comment by DonaldM — July 6, 2007 @ 3:17 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 3:25 pm
Zachriel:
Like NOMA, I find the entire concept of God of the Gaps (GoG) untenable. As normally used, GoG seems to imply that 'gaps' are details to be filled in later by a 'naturalistic' explanation. The implication is that all 'gaps' in our understanding of observed phenomenon in nature can ultimately be explained with reference to natural causes only, at least in principle. If that isn't the implication of 'gaps' in the phrase God of the Gaps, then dismissing something as merely a GoG argument doesn't have much force, since God could indeed be the 'gap' filler. If the term 'gaps' in the phrase does, in fact, mean what I stated above, then we're back to sneaking philosophical naturalism in the back door of science. Either way, the dismissive phrase GoG doesn't fare too well and looks pretty anemic.
You may as well speak of a "Naturalism of the Gaps" and be done with it.
Comment by DonaldM — July 6, 2007 @ 3:25 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 3:33 pm
Well, this discussion certainly went in a different direction than I imagined it would. I found the Behe quote intriguing, because Behe was defending the Darwinian theory of Common Descent against Young Earth Creationism, and he was using Intelligent Design as his weapon. Some might call that Irony. Am I the only one who sees it?
Comment by Bilbo — July 6, 2007 @ 3:33 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 3:46 pm
Zechriel, "What is the IP-address of Heaven?"
Could be every quantum superposition.
Comment by kornbelt888 — July 6, 2007 @ 3:46 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 3:51 pm
To address Keiths initial objection: Behe isn't proposing a "God-of-the-Gaps" argument. He's saying:
1) There is already good evidence that much of the natural history of life was intelligently designed.
2) There is good evidence for Common Descent.
3) However, there is also good evidence against Common Descent by Random Mutation.
4) But since I (Behe) already believe in ID, I am able to accept Common Descent, even though it wasn't by Random Mutation.
5) Therefore, I can reject the YEC objections to Common Descent.
Comment by Bilbo — July 6, 2007 @ 3:51 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 3:55 pm
Bilbo:
I'm sorry, Bilbo. Active discussions do tend to crossover. I'm not that big a fan of common descent beyond the class limit. Heck I'm not that fond of it at OOL either, since I do like Woese's HGT Field hypothesis. Worse, I see some serious neglect of HGT further on in the process even though horizontal inheritance became predominant. What matters is what counts for real evolution, not just recombinant variation and occasional accidents, which account for disease way more often than they account for evolution.
So I'm not convinced that ID rescues common descent. In its strictest terms, of course. But then again, I haven't read the book so what do I know? §;o)
Comment by Joy — July 6, 2007 @ 3:55 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 4:00 pm
Joy:
I'm not convinced, either. I don't even understand the problems with it that Behe refers to in the initial passage. Nevertheless, the fact that Behe would use ID to rescue Common Descent from those problems is, I think one must admit, intriguing. And I think that opens up the possibility for testable hypotheses: How would one overcome the problems mentioned by use of design? Does it match what we find in Nature?
Comment by Bilbo — July 6, 2007 @ 4:00 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 4:22 pm
Bilbo:
I don't even know what the YEC objections are, so I don't know if I reject them like I reject the whole "random" misnomer on evolutionarily significant genomic alterations.
Perhaps this is a result of not having a brain that works just like everybody else's. There had to come a time in my young life where my "difference" didn't make me anathema to myself. Like when my father raged at me one night for not understanding a mathematical concept he'd been trying hard to impart, telling me I was just "stupid."
Of course it crushed my self-esteem. My older sister and younger brother both got it (or acted like they did) without hardly trying. I was completely asea, and wanted him to MAKE me understand! He couldn't, so it must have been my fault (and I already knew I was 'different').
Cried myself to sleep, then woke up with the sure understanding that I was NOT stupid! Maybe my mind had fed me self-reaffirming pablum all night - I don't recall. I do recall coming to the firm conclusion that he was sadly mistaken. I was every bit as smart as my siblings, I just required a different approach to abstracts than they did. My brother re-explained it to me the next day (because I threatened to beat him up if he didn't), as I knew he was synesthetic as well. Better at hiding it than I was. Then I confronted my father with it. He said he was sorry for calling me stupid, because I took it a step farther and confirmed something only barely tickling the corners of his mind at the time. An extrapolation that made perfect sense, if the original conception was understood in a certain way.
He was a noted scientist, engineer and inventor. Of course the most brilliant man I ever knew (because he was Daddy), against whom I've weighed all the other brilliant men and women I've known. I've known some. I learned a valuable lesson. Sometimes the brilliant are as wrong as the rest of us, and/or handicapped to take it further than their concretizations.
I'm not a YEC. I don't believe Genesis is a science textbook, nor that it needs to be. Anything in there can be made to coincide with human history as we know it, complete with the metaphors of creation. It makes perfect theological sense (as does everything else in the collection) because it makes perfect historical and sociological sense. It never had to be science in the first place.
Doesn't mean I don't think life is intelligently designed, though. I just seat the causal impetus interior more than exterior.
Comment by Joy — July 6, 2007 @ 4:22 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 5:01 pm
Sorry about that. It was on another thread. I'll repeat the discussion here, but will attempt to address Bilbo's thread topic more directly in a later post.
A valid scientific methodology can be built on the mechanics of making a record of an observation (memory). From this we can derive objective patterns as the consistency of records across observers. We then add appropriate definitions of hypothesis, theory and parsimony and call this procedure "science".
The hypothesis is the amazing component of the process. The hypothesis can formed randomly, by happenstance, by deep-thought, through extensive familiarity with the evidence, a hunch, or even from the murmurings of Muses. But whatever the source of the hypothesis, it must lead to specific and distinguishing empirical predictions.
From this methodological vantage, you don't have to accept scientific conclusions. You can reject the reliability of records (e.g. Last Thursdayism), or reject the meaningfulness of observation (e.g. Solipsism). But when we say "Eppur si muove!", this remains a valid statement *within* the scientific paradigm. As does this statement:
NATIONAL ACADEMY of SCIENCES: "The theory of evolution has become the central unifying concept of biology and is a critical component of many related scientific disciplines. In contrast, the claims of creation science lack empirical support and cannot be meaningfully tested."
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 5:01 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 5:24 pm
Joy:
Why not? You are a bigger fan of beyond the order limit?
Comment by Raevmo — July 6, 2007 @ 5:24 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 5:40 pm
There is little reasonable doubt about Common Descent (as it applies to most taxa). I'm not sure a hypothesis has been proposed that can distinguish between common descent by mechanisms which are observed, and common descent via unseen and disembodied teleological mechanisms.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 5:40 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 5:48 pm
God of the Gaps is an argument from ignorance; the Gap being filled with God or some other preferred metaphysics unless and until some other explanation is found.
But, the Gap is just an area of ignorance. A scientist might tentatively assume there is a material cause, but absent evidence, it remains just that"”a Gap. If you prefer, you can fill it with some other presupposition; but to call it science, you have to use the hypothesis to form predictions and make confirming observations.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 5:48 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 5:56 pm
Why are you so certain that there are no gaps? If a gap in material causes really does exist then would it still be an argument from ignorance? Or it is only an argument from ignorance because you assume that only material causes exist? So there really is no 'tentatively' assuming there is a material cause if there only are material causes - simply known material causes and unknown material causes.
Wouldn't confirming observations be the existence of other gaps? What if our understanding grew and a material cause seemed less and less plausible? This should serve as a confirming observation.
Comment by Doug — July 6, 2007 @ 5:56 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 6:24 pm
Of course there are Gaps. There is far more not known than known.
It's a Gap of Ignorance until you fill it in with knowledge. You are more than welcome to fill it with whatever metaphysical paste you want. Just don't claim that yours is the only worthy brand of paste. To be considered science, that means specific and distinguishing empirical predictions.
I'm not sure what you mean here, but each discovery enlarges our knowledge of the universe. The more we know, the more we realize how much we still have to learn. The universe of a Bronze Age goat herder only reaches to the firmament. Cook sailed to Tahiti to fix the size of the Solar System.
No problem. Just propose an alternative explanation. However, if you want the imprimatur of science, then your explanation has to entail specific and distinguishing empirical predictions.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 6:24 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 7:55 pm
Zachriel wrote:
What specific and distinguishing empirical predictions does the hypothesis that unintelligent, unintentional, undesigned processes are responsible for biological species make that would not turn out true in the null case?
Anybody know?
Comment by stunney — July 6, 2007 @ 7:55 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 8:13 pm
Actually, I would say that the primary and foundational YEC objections to Common Descent are theological more than scientific (though not disregarding they also raise scientific issues). So I don't think there is any likelihood that Behe's observations could put their concerns to rest.
To take one key example, many YEC would interpret the Bible to indicate that all death came as a consequence of man's disobedience. So any progression of descent through many generations of birth and death, leading up to mankind, would be unacceptable even if it depended on intelligent design.
(An aside: Others who are not necessarily YEC would understand the statements about death coming through sin to be in reference to its affect (not physical only) on Adam and Eve and their descendants.)
To tell the truth, when I didn't know who Allen_MacNeill was and he first started complaining about how Behe's approach to design implied a designer who worked through many generations of death, I thought at first that he might be a YEC.
Another aside: If we are nothing more than advanced animals from a long line of birth and death, it's a somewhat odd thing that we should find death not merely unwelcome but also a moral issue. It's interesting how often atheists will point to death as morally objectionable. It's almost as if we intuitively recognized our death as an aberration, as though it ought not to be so and we ought to expect something else.
Not a proof. Just musing.
Comment by eric — July 6, 2007 @ 8:13 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 8:29 pm
All your protestations are terminally undercut by one obvious observation.
I will safely guess that almost none of us have undertaken an investigation of how "Bradford" connects to these posts. Nevertheless, it is obvious beyond doubting that Bradford is an intelligent agent. We make the inference with complete assurance and without any of the extraneous steps you want to require.
How do we do it? Because we know with confidence that complex, coherent symbolic messages require intelligent agents. There is no other observed source.
You can go on protesting (and on and on), but don't expect that anyone will take seriously that one needs to find the designer before we can recognize a message as a message.
So if we found what most people would consider a spacecraft, a true scientist could not infer a designing intelligence until he found the aliens who designed it, or at least until he understood their causal relationship? And if that is not available, he would have to do what? Perhaps assume it is the result of natural processes?
There simply is no way you are going to succeed in making a convincing case out of claiming that we cannot infer design from a designed artifact itself even without access to the designer or the designer's methods. — though I am not going to hold my breath waiting for you to concede what is obvious to most people.
Comment by eric — July 6, 2007 @ 8:29 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 8:49 pm
eric wrote:
Hi eric,
Actually, that makes sense in Darwinian terms. Being death-averse keeps us alive longer, and therefore fitter in the Darwinian sense.
That's why the cow who wants to be eaten, in the second book of the Hitchhiker's Guide series, strikes us as so comical.
Comment by keiths — July 6, 2007 @ 8:49 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 9:03 pm
eric wrote:
eric, you might be interested in this series:
Some Introductory Thoughts on Animal Suffering
Animal Suffering and the Fall of Man (Part One)
Animal Suffering and the Fall of Man (Part Two)
Comment by stunney — July 6, 2007 @ 9:03 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 9:05 pm
Sorry, I wasn't clear enough. I'm not questioning the fact that death is unwelcome or that we are death-averse. As you say, that is completely reasonable from an evolutionary perspective.
I am musing (not proving, mind you, just musing) about the interesting fact that there is this sense that it is morally objectionable, as though for some reason we ought to expect to not die. What in the history of life tells us that?
There can be plenty of reasons why someone should want to live, but none of them need be a reason why they should expect — not just factually, but even to expect morally — never to die.
Being averse to our own death is one thing. Thinking death itself ought not to be is quite another.
Comment by eric — July 6, 2007 @ 9:05 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 9:33 pm
eric wrote:
I think it's not surprising that we have an aversion to our own pain and extinction.
What is surprising is that we that we have any aversion to the pain and extinction of other species, and that we have less of an aversion to being causes of pain and extinction to members of our own species than other species seem to have to intra-species pain and extinction.
What is also surprising is that we can anticipate our death long in advance.
Also surprising is our capacity for experiencing moral value, our capacity for religious experience, our capacity to study history, our capacity to translate Finnish into Japanese, our capacity to grow wheat for export, our capacity to not believe our species merely lucked out to become so unique across so many different dimensions of experience. Et cetera.
For instance, we can imagine a mathematically talented species which knew nothing of morality or aesthetics. Or a very ethical species which was hopeless at math. Or a wonderfully artistic species which was also amoral. But we got all three?
Hmmm.
Comment by stunney — July 6, 2007 @ 9:33 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 9:39 pm
The Turing Test was posed by Professor Alan Turing in the 1950 paper "Computing machinery and intelligence" as a test for artificial (e.g. machine/computer) intelligence (A.I.). When could we say that a programmed computer has become intelligent?
The test works by having someone engage in conversation with a pair of unseen counterparts. One is a human and the other is the candidate A.I. If the tester cannot reliably tell which one is the actual human, the A.I. passes the test.
For our purposes, let's call this prospective A.I. the "Bradford" program.
A blog would be a very natural vehicle for running a Turing test. Instead of typing keys at a keyboard, the Bradford program could be running on a distributed network of servers without need of keyboard or monitors.
So, do we know the means by which the Bradford posts are generated? No, we do not.
Do we know that Bradford is a human. Strictly speaking, no we do not. For all we know, the Bradford posts we have been seeing might be from a successful A.I. program, rather than from a human.
What can we know having only these posts? We know that Bradford is intelligent. As Turing realized in 1950, we can infer intelligent agency from the messages themselves, without any access to the source or the means of production.
Note also that this test was proposed before we knew that life itself was built upon the essential foundation of symbolic messages. It is not an ad hoc invention of the I.D. movement. The fact that coherent, complex, semantically meaningful messages indicate intelligence was recognized long before its relevance to living cells was known.
Comment by eric — July 6, 2007 @ 9:39 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 10:13 pm
Many materialist philosophers of mind think that each type of animal conscious state is a necessary concomitant of the relevant animal brain states. They think, in short, that it's logically impossible to have one without the other. Hence, on their view, necessarily (that is, in every possible world in which it exists), a rat-brained creature, say, caught in a rat-trap will experience, well, whatever it's like to be a rat caught in a rat-trap.
If this materialist thesis is true and generalizes to cover the whole animal kingdom, it suggests that it's impossible both to have animals exist and to ensure the avoidance of significant animal suffering and extinction.
But suppose the animal kingdom's existence is required for the existence of the human species, which is pre-destined to share in the Designer's glorious life. That is, suppose the materialist thesis about the necessary connection between the conscious states of physical creatures and their brain states is true, and suppose also that the existence of the species homo sapiens depends upon the engineering by evolutionary algorithms of the requisite brains, and suppose that evolution takes a long time because the raw materials require stars to make them, and that stars require a universe that's very big and lasts a long time. Then, why would it be surprising that intelligent design requires evolution by common descent with modification? I suspect that might be the type of question at the back of Behe's mind.
We're familiar with intelligent designers who are intent on a final product, who are very patient, and who harness the probabilities inherent in known physical properties to achieve their purpose. Why should a non-human designer be any different?
Comment by stunney — July 6, 2007 @ 10:13 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 11:14 pm
Donald M wrote:
What is a material entity? Answers to this question tend to generate amusing paradoxes.
If a material entity is one that has empirically detectable consequences, and if God created the universe, and if the universe is empirically detectable, then God is a material entity.
And consider this. Zachriel wrote:
This would include all mind-independent material entities.
Comment by stunney — July 6, 2007 @ 11:14 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 11:40 pm
Because we know of no other source of English language blogs but humans (or their proxies). And that is precisely how we make those determinations. We have extensive experience with humans, and the causal mechanisms by which they communicate messages. "Bradford" is one of a class; humans who blog.
We do it the same way that we recognize a pit of dried clay as a pottery shard. Because we have experience with pottery shards that we have already determined a causal connection to the designer. We can look at a pottery shard and determine the culture and time period it was made. (This is a typical methodology in archaeology to date other artifacts found in the same level as the pottery shards.)
If we made a tentative inference of design, it would probably be by similarity to human designed artifacts. An 18th century imagined extraterrestrial craft was a balloon. And yes, we would immediately use our tentative claim to devise additional tests to determine more about the designers. The scientific method is not an end-point, but a process of investigation.
You could try to provide an example. The fictional examples are based on human fantasy, so most people imagine a flying saucer made of something like aluminum, and a control panel with funny inscriptions that look like runic Chinese. In real-life science, we always compare purported artifacts to known examples, then attempt to identify characteristics of the artisan or art. That's how it's done. Try the Antikythera mechanism. What can we determine?
Well, we already know that people have repeatedly made erroneous conclusions about design by filling Gaps in human knowledge with some sort of designer. Angels pushing planets on crystal spheres. Demons causing disease. Faeiry Rings. An angry Sky God hurling lightning bolts.
Skepticism is the proper scientific stance. The answer to skepticism is scientific evidence.
Comment by Zachriel — July 6, 2007 @ 11:40 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 5:03 am
Zachriel, the Question-Begging Maestro Illustrissimo, wrote:
Funny how you don't apply this to codes, O Majestically Rancid Nincompoop.
Comment by stunney — July 7, 2007 @ 5:03 am
July 7th, 2007 at 9:07 am
Zach:
This makes no sense, Zach. I see some superfluous information here, but I don't see error. Except perhaps an error of discrimination, violating the metaphysical boundary around scientific knowledge as a subset of all knowledge.
IOW, planets do appear to move, and a 'sphere' describes a circular motion. 'Crystal' might be synonymous with aether, or some substance in which the planet is embedded and/or through which it moves. Disease is 'bad', uncomfortable state and often takes the life of its victims. Certain fungi propagate in such a way as to produce clearly defined rings of fruit, as opposed to a more haphazard growing habit. When the sky is 'angry' - choked with dark clouds threatening wind and hail and hard rain - it often comes with damaging, fire-causing lightning and deafening thunder.
All of these things are observations of natural phenomena human beings have lots of experience with and have developed lots of beliefs about over the millennia. Each phenomenon is empirical. The superfluous add-ons to causation - angels, demons, fairies, gods - are there due to humanity's desire to understand the empirical conditions of their existence, as well as the causes for those conditions. Science wasn't around to claim otherwise when these causes were put forward by kings, clerics or elder folk when the children asked "who?" and "why?" And to this day science doesn't attempt to answer those questions outside seriously proscribed practice.
When the folk causes of phenomena offered nothing by which to understand and control them, more formal investigations were launched. It's only been 150 years since bacteria became known, viruses not so long ago as that. We've gained slight control over some agents (tiny 'demons' of disease), but they then work around our controls and disease still kills millions of humans and animals every year. Lightning still isn't understood very well, we can't control it or the wind and rain that comes with. And it still kills thousands of people and animals every year. We do understand that the fairy ring is circular because that's how the spores are cast, but wise folk still tell their children to avoid them - the fungi can be deadly. Still, humans and animals die every year from poisonous mushrooms and micotoxins. Science tells us this year there is no aether, then suggests the next that there must be, perhaps one day it will make up its collective mind. But the planets still orbit, crossing our night sky just as they always have. We don't know what gravity *is* or what causes it (because we cannot account for mass), so it might as well be principalities of the air. Science knows no different.
Whenever y'all start belittling humanity for not having modern science until modern science came along, do you even recognize that you belittle yourselves right along with the rest of us?
Skepticism isn't the stance, dismissing final causes is the stance, in favor of FAPP proximate causes. Science is intelligently designed to account for knowledge about things-in-themselves, with a hopeful eye to invention of controls and useful applications. It is circumscribed with a boundary between it and popular beliefs about the phenomena it tackles, as science is not charged to address beliefs. We have other, more ancient and familiar systems of formalizing knowledge about beliefs. The fact that science ignores final cause does not mean final causes do not exist, or that people do not feel a need to hold beliefs about final causes.
Comment by Joy — July 7, 2007 @ 9:07 am
July 7th, 2007 at 11:00 am
Surely, the sense is plain. And conflation certainly is an error. Let me respond broadly to your points.
The scientific method was developed over long stretches of time. We certainly don't expect Bronze Age goat herders to understand what we mean by science. However, in science, argumentum ad ignorantiam is fallacious. Such arguments are extraneous and without empirical consequent, so they are methodically cast off.
Skepticism IS the proper scientific stance. You can claim anything you want, but for it to be considered scientifically valid, it must lead to specific and distinguishing empirical consequences. A methodological approach to science does not preclude final causes, but science has not been particularly adept at understanding many areas of interest, nor is it universally applicable.
Comment by Zachriel — July 7, 2007 @ 11:00 am
July 7th, 2007 at 11:18 am
So the point of the angels, demons stuff is what? Noone believes in angels pushing planets on crystal spheres and if this is a reference to historic beliefs then Joy is right in that this is denigrating to humanity and more than a little arrogant.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 11:18 am
July 7th, 2007 at 11:21 am