Cognitive scientist: "There is no spoon"
by KrauzeRichard Dawkins wasn't the only one to tell Edge about his "dangerous idea". Here's cognitive scientist, Donald Hoffman, on why a spoon is like a headache:
Suppose I have a headache, and I tell you about it. It is, say, a pounding headache that started at the back of the neck and migrated to encompass my forehead and eyes. … Of course no one but me can experience my headaches, and no one but you can experience yours. But this posed no obstacle to our meaningful conversation. … Suppose I hand you a spoon. It is common to assume that the spoon I experience during this transfer is numerically identical to the spoon you experience. But this assumption is false. No one but me can experience my spoon, and no one but you can experience your spoon. … Is there a "real spoon," a mind-independent physical object that causes our spoon experiences and resembles our spoon experiences? This is not only unnecessary but unlikely. It is unlikely that the visual experiences of homo sapiens, shaped to permit survival in a particular range of niches, should miraculously also happen to resemble the true nature of a mind-independent realm. Selective pressures for survival do not, except by accident, lead to truth. … There are no public brains, only my brain experiences and your brain experiences. These brain experiences are just the simplified visual experiences of homo sapiens, shaped for survival in certain niches.
I only have one question: Are the images of brain scans that Hoffman and other cognitive scientists talk with each other about "mind-independent physical objects" Or are they also just "simplified visual experiences of homo sapiens" [sic]?
January 15th, 2006 at 3:00 pm
I was following Hoffman's description right up to the point where he switched from experience of "spoon" to "spoon" itself. He seems to take a flying leap off the deep end of the pier on this, so the whole rest of what he says gets lost in the water.
Haven't we all wondered whether you see "green" the same way I do, or whether what we identify as "green" is simply something we were all taught to agree upon in pre-kindergarten? But regardless of whether the experiential quale of "green-ness" is identical in each of us, we DO agree on what's "green" and can even objectively measure the specific range of wavelengths that comprise shades, hues and tints of "green."
We even know some people are born unable see or distinguish between green or red, meaning they might agree with us that summer leaves on a poplar tree are "green" and that a "green" light at an intersection means it's okay to go through. But we're certainly reserved about letting those people drive in places where educated-beyond-competance traffic engineers think it's okay to mix up traffic lights so "green" isn't always on the bottom!
I am synesthetic. That doesn't mean I don't see what you see, it means I might hear "green" as well as see it, or taste "red" as well as see it. My qualia include crossover frequencies. The trick there is to leave off the extras when coming to agreement on the basic definition of "green" as a color rather than a sound. It's an addition rather than a deficit, but also something purely on the experiential level that says nothing about objects that are agreeably "green."
So while I'd concede that spoons don't grow on trees (need human design and manufacturing to exist), the spoon most certainly does objectively exist regardless of whether you experience its "spoon-ness" the same way I do. Hoffman may just have written his piece badly, getting his concepts confused. If not, then maybe we should take this as a hint that the cog-sci guys just might be nuttier than fruitcakes!
[disclaimer: this expressed suspicion assumes that fruitcakes exist, and contain nuts.]
Comment by Joy — January 15, 2006 @ 3:00 pm
January 15th, 2006 at 6:51 pm
Hi Joy,
"But regardless of whether the experiential quale of "green-ness" is identical in each of us, we DO agree on what's "green" and can even objectively measure the specific range of wavelengths that comprise shades, hues and tints of "green.""
Indeed. Hoffman's argument only works because he uses such an impoverished definition of "talking about". Imagine telling your friend about your headache, when he replies, "No, your headache didn't start at the back of your head, but right behind your eyes."
Not so likely, huh? But it is these kinds of discussions we can have about spoons, brain scans, and everything else out there in the "mind-independent" reality.
Comment by Krauze — January 15, 2006 @ 6:51 pm
January 16th, 2006 at 5:02 am
Sorry, but I disagree with you, if you are starting from the perspective of the observer. How can you tell the difference between your experience of a spoon and the spoon itself? You ask about these brainscans - how do I know that your experience of what you observe on a brainscan is the same as my experience of what I observe on a brainscan?
The bottom line is that if you start from the observer, you ultimately have no sound epistemological basis. It may "work" - but if you push it far enough, the only basis that you have is that it "works", not that it is true.
Now if your epistemological basis is an external absolute … ah, that's a different story.
Now excuse me - I think I just heard Francis Schaeffer come in the back door muttering something about presuppositional apologetics.
Comment by Exile From Groggs — January 16, 2006 @ 5:02 am
January 16th, 2006 at 7:15 am
I dropped my spoon into my garbage disposal - I'm not sure if it still exists or not.
Comment by Douglas — January 16, 2006 @ 7:15 am
January 16th, 2006 at 8:52 am
Hi Exile,
"You ask about these brainscans - how do I know that your experience of what you observe on a brainscan is the same as my experience of what I observe on a brainscan?"
Because we can talk with each other about them. If you point at the activity in one area, I can recognize it myself.
"The bottom line is that if you start from the observer, you ultimately have no sound epistemological basis. It may "work" - but if you push it far enough, the only basis that you have is that it "works", not that it is true."
Isn't that also the premise of presuppositional apologetics? That you should have a worldview that doesn't just make logical sense, but that you can live with - i.e. that works?
"Now if your epistemological basis is an external absolute "¦ ah, that's a different story."
My epistemological basis is an external absolute - the mind-independent physical reality.
Comment by Krauze — January 16, 2006 @ 8:52 am
January 16th, 2006 at 9:40 am
Hey guys, I think I'd have to disagree with both Exile and Krauze a bit. First, my disagreement with Exile: As I see it, you have no choice but to start from the perspective of the observer. After all, you can't observe things as anything other than an observer, and you can't reason except with your own reason. I agree that this points to an external absolute, though I don't have the time to sketch that out here.
I would disagree with Krauze that we can all know an external reality because we can point to the same thing. You see, the only reason I know that you are pointing at the same thing is that I experience you pointing at the same thing, and I infer that you are having an experience that is related to the same external reality. However, if I've gotten into the habit of doubting that my experience represents the real world, I would just doubt that my experience of you seemingly experiencing the same thing represents anything in the real world. Maybe natural selection just shaped me to think that others agree with me, because it was good for my survival or something.
Now, I happen to agree with both Krauze and Exile that the above view is completely nuts, just for different reasons. If my concepts don't represent the real world, then what about my perception of reproduction, and the concept of natural selection? Presumably this holds for them too. Hence, Hoffman's entire rationale for doubting our own senses, taken to its conclusion, undercuts itself. Ultimately, we have to trust that our experience is giving us information about something real, and that our rational faculties are capable of discerning truth. Any theory that starts out being anti-realist about the self will end up being anti-realist about everything else, and thus contradict whatever its own rationale was. Hoffman's "dangerous idea", btw, is a good case study in how the seemingly cold, hard, objectivist materialism of modernism gave way to the anti-realism of post-modernism. It was simply the result of following the logic and applying it to the mind.
Comment by Deuce — January 16, 2006 @ 9:40 am
January 16th, 2006 at 1:03 pm
Great discussion. I would like to add that Mr Hoffman contradicts himself during the spoon speil. He denies the appearance of an external common reality, yet accepts the existence of another intelligence the 'appears' to share it.
Deuse says(hope this works…):
Comment by Mertens — January 16, 2006 @ 1:03 pm
January 16th, 2006 at 1:14 pm
I messed up. I was trying to respond to the following quote:
Comment by Mertens — January 16, 2006 @ 1:14 pm
January 16th, 2006 at 1:35 pm
Deuce: "If my concepts don't represent the real world, then what about my perception of reproduction, and the concept of natural selection? Presumably this holds for them too. Hence, Hoffman's entire rationale for doubting our own senses, taken to its conclusion, undercuts itself. Ultimately, we have to trust that our experience is giving us information about something real, and that our rational faculties are capable of discerning truth. Any theory that starts out being anti-realist about the self will end up being anti-realist about everything else, and thus contradict whatever its own rationale was."
I quite agree with Deuce. Victor Reppert's book, "C.S.Lewis's Dangerous Idea," makes clear that this was part of Lewis's point. A very good book, which I highly recommend.
Comment by Bilbo — January 16, 2006 @ 1:35 pm
January 16th, 2006 at 4:06 pm
Hoffman is an interesting guy; he thinks that consciousness is fundamental.
Comment by Anteater — January 16, 2006 @ 4:06 pm
January 16th, 2006 at 10:31 pm
Hoffman wrote:
I'm going to go out on a limb here and say that spoons exist.
Comment by poster child — January 16, 2006 @ 10:31 pm
January 16th, 2006 at 11:17 pm
As I see it, you have no choice but to start from the perspective of the observer. After all, you can't observe things as anything other than an observer, and you can't reason except with your own reason. I agree that this points to an external absolute, though I don't have the time to sketch that out here. –Deuce
Actually, I think we do have a choice, and even an duty, to start with the external. Awareness, or consciousness, is always of something. It is itself dependent on external reality. Gilson (Methodical Realism) and Owens (Cognition: an Epistemological Inquiry) argue and defend this tenet. So I just wanted to put in my 2 moderate realist cents!
Matt
Comment by matt_nadler — January 16, 2006 @ 11:17 pm
January 17th, 2006 at 10:26 am
I agree that it is dependent on external reality. But trusting in that external reality is predicated on trusting your experience of that external reality. After all, all of your evidence of that external reality comes through your observation of it. When I say we have no choice but to start from the perspective of the observer, I mean it in the strong sense that we don't have the ability to do otherwise.
Comment by Deuce — January 17, 2006 @ 10:26 am
January 17th, 2006 at 1:22 pm
The pre-modernist/pre-postmodernist(sorry)/theist approach (I think) starts from the proposition that our observations are meaningful and correspond to something that is really there because there is an external absolute (i.e. God) who is there. We can have confidence in our observations because they aren't dependent upon us as observers, but upon the being that created them, and he has not only made the universe, but also revealed his nature in it (in general) and later on more specifically revealed his nature in a verbal form.
Of course, you still have the problem of how this external absolute got there - but (as Francis Schaeffer says) even if you don't, you still have to explain the fact that you exist and have consciousness.
This worldview hasn't been refuted, as far as I know - but it places the observer at a lower level than this proposed external absolute - which is something that is profoundly offensive to our senses, and our reasoning. Christianity explains this offensiveness by saying that our natures are intent on rejecting the external absolute.
I'm conscious of being a minnow amongst sharks, here.
Comment by Exile From Groggs — January 17, 2006 @ 1:22 pm
January 17th, 2006 at 3:18 pm
Hey, Exile, I seem to be causing some confusion here. I'm not arguing that the observer is ontologically at a higher level than an external absolute, or that it is not dependent. In fact, I don't think that's the case myself. It's self-evident that we are contingent beings. I'm arguing that the observer is more epistemologically primary to the observer, because all our knowledge about external reality comes to us through our own observations, and our reason. Hence, if you deny those, you can't have any rational justifaction for your beliefs about anything else.
Comment by Deuce — January 17, 2006 @ 3:18 pm
January 18th, 2006 at 11:27 am
Assuming I understand your meaning, again, I think that doing otherwise is possible. The observer is aware of external reality epistemologically prior to the act of cognizing about his own awareness of external reality. I am arguing for epistemological priority given to an external reality, in that the self-reflexive act about cognition is itself dependent on the external. The same cannot be said in reverse - the external object is not dependent on our knowledge of it for any real existence. Self-awareness occurs in one and the same act of awareness of external reality, of course, but without the cognizing of something external, there simply would be no cognizing. So I think we should give epistemological priority to the external object - for that study is only valid retrospect to external objects. There is no science of the knower apart from the existence (and knowledge of existence) of the thing known.
What follows is a matter of method. That is, I think it is a choice, not a necessity, to give the epistemological priority to thought before things in one's philosophy. I choose otherwise.
If the external objects are more basic to our epistemology than our own cognitive faculties are, than this seems to be a moot point (since no one is denying reason or observations per se). The issue is, why isn't this the case? Do you have thoughts or observations that are not epistemologically dependent on an external reality?
Good discussing this with you, Deuce.
Comment by matt_nadler — January 18, 2006 @ 11:27 am
January 18th, 2006 at 6:25 pm
Let's see if I can understand what's going on here. Matt seems to be saying that knowledge of the thing observed comes before knowledge that we are observing. In other words, the awareness of an apple comes before the awareness that I am looking at it. Deuce is arguing that self awareness is a prerequisite for observation through which we gain all knowledge of external reality. In other words, I cannot see the apple before claiming ownership of the experience of seeing.
I wonder if those studing early child development would say about this issue.
Comment by Mertens — January 18, 2006 @ 6:25 pm
January 18th, 2006 at 6:26 pm
I wonder 'what'.
Comment by Mertens — January 18, 2006 @ 6:26 pm
April 13th, 2006 at 6:46 am
This is why people who don't know anything about philosophy should avoid saying anything about philosophy.
Comment by T. Scrivener — April 13, 2006 @ 6:46 am