That point being, there is danger in trying to partially violate NOMA by mixing science and philosophy.

As a wise man once told me: my friend, there's danger in everything.

An instance of danger being: in thinking that the demarcation lines between science and philosophy are clear, and thus in thinking that it's always clear what even constitutes a violation of NOMA.

I've given two examples of where this demarcation problem is likely to arise:

1. The concept of mind

2. The concept of laws of nature

It's especially acute when one thinks about the notion of a mind designing laws of nature. And it's also acute when one thinks of the notion of what, if anything, science can discover about what, if any, laws govern the nature of minds.

My 'proposal' is that we continue doing science and continue doing philosophy, and see if we can get any clearer an understanding of these issues; though perhaps that's too modest an ambition to merit the title of 'proposal, as you use that term.

Well modest or not, I think it is reasonable.

But to make sure we are actually communicating.

You said…

"if science is meant to explain and investigate everything…"

In my terms, that reads "If we want to determine the single, OMA Truth…"

This with your other statement, translates to…

"If we want to determine the single, OMA Truth we will need a better toolset. Until that toolset is available we will have to get by with separate NOMA toolsets with their separate, associated Truths."

Even if we are communicating, there are some unsettled differences. You wrote…

I think there's loads of scientific evidence that life on Earth isn't exclusively for [your life]. But I also think there's no scientific evidence that your life was not intended by any intelligent designer of life on Earth.

Please excuse to placement of "[your life]" for "that purpose", but I think it is appropriate paraphrasing and help explain the point.

That point being, there is danger in trying to partially violate NOMA by mixing science and philosophy.

Regards,
TP

Is there scientific evidence that life on Earth isn't exclusively for the purpose of creating Thought Provoker?, no

I think there's loads of scientific evidence that life on Earth isn't exclusively for that purpose. But I also think there's no scientific evidence that your life was not intended by any intelligent designer of life on Earth.

Additionally, I think the problem with the OMA/NOMA idea is that there is as yet simply no agreement or consensus among rational people about whether a science is or isn't possible that would be capable of determining whether a physical object of any sort—-the universe, the Empire State building, electrons, a tree, a golf ball, a black hole, the Pyramids, or a bacterium—is or isn't the result of being designed by a mind. I posted about this before. If I may quote myself:

…… If science aims to investigate the whole of reality…., then there ought to be a general science of intelligence and a general science of design, since we take those things to be real. Part of those sciences will explicate the notions of 'evidence of intelligence' and 'evidence of design'. There will be some level of material complexity and /or functional performance that will generally count as evidence of intelligence and/or count as evidence of design.

3. When those sciences give well-established, scientific criteria for intelligence and design (it's clear that they are nowhere near being mature enough sciences to have done so yet), then we can ask the question of whether the biological data furnish us with types of evidence that meet those criteria.

4. In the meantime, it is premature for either IDers or Darwinians to say that there definitely is, or that there definitely is not, evidence of intelligent design in the biological data, because there are no established sciences for those concepts. We typically think that the existence of computers and computer code indicate intelligence and design. We need to make that inference more precise in order to be able to make, or rule out, a similar inference regarding biological data, if only because those data include computer codes, apparently.

5. It is not a good objection to say that we 'know' that computers and computer code are intelligently designed because we can see people at work doing the designing, and that this is why those cases are different from the evolution of species case, and that is because we don't, in fact, physically observe anyone's intelligent consciousness. What we literally see when we look at a computer scientist at work is complicated material bodies in various states of mathematically intelligible motion. That's also what we see when we observe any life form or investigate its history. In other words, the cases of intelligent design that we 'know' about are no different in terms of physical observation from the cases in biology, except for the precise form and kinds of complexity involved. So, if science is meant to explain and investigate everything, there must be a scientific way of making precise what types of material motions and complexity of structure and function license an inference to intelligent design, and what types do not.

6. The necessary degree of precision has not yet been established. ID in principle is essentially asking that scientific criteria of intelligence and design be established, and then used to evaluate the biological data we have, to see if those data license an inference to intelligent design.

My 'proposal' is that we continue doing science and continue doing philosophy, and see if we can get any clearer an understanding of these issues; though perhaps that's too modest an ambition to merit the title of 'proposal, as you use that term.

I was a little surprised by your answers to my science questions. It looks like you and I think more alike than I had thought. However, let me focus on our differences…

You asked…

Let me ask another question: is the claim, "For any pair of contradictory philosophical beliefs, they are equally likely to be correct", itself a scientific claim; or is it itself a philosophical one?

I consider it a philosophical claim. Equality, in the scientific sense, would require something quantifiable (i.e. something we can measure).

Let me guess where you are going. I do not have a good answer as to where logic fits in. It is a fundamental part of my personal philosophy, but that doesn't mean it is applicable to all philosophies.

I'm interested in how you think about ethical obligations. I'm assuming there are some folk who honestly think ID is science. For folk like that, I imagine they feel ethically obligated to try to have it taught in public schools. You oppose that.

Careful now. I actually agree that people who believe ID is science have an obligation to attempt to make their case that it should be taught in school.

As long as they make their case honestly and comply with governing laws. I probably wouldn't try to stop them.

However, I am sure there are people who would be ethically obligated to try and stop them. As long as they make their case honestly and comply with governing laws, I probably wouldn't try to stop them either.

I would probably watch the resulting conflict with interest. This is what I did with the Dover case.

Since ethical beliefs are philosophical, is it not te case that these conficting ethical convictions are, on your own account, equally likely to be correct? And if so, I'm wondering how you justify your opposition without implying that the proposition I mentioned earlier"”"For any pair of contradictory philosophical beliefs, they are equally likely to be correct""”is actually false.

I am human, with limited capabilities. All I can do is try my best. Whether right or wrong, I will make my case the best I can based on my personal belief. And, yes, there are a lot of paradoxical land mines in the philosophical realm.

I can easily understand why a lot of other people latch on to philosophies that don't require them to constantly question their own philosophy.

And I'm wondering about that because you invoke so strongly the value of consistency. It seems to me your position may not in fact be consistent.

I can but try my best. But I won't latch onto a philosophy just for the sake of being consistent. Last Thursdayism would do that. I also won't give credit to Billions of people telling me which is the right one. My personal philosophy is personal. It is one of those practical reality that I have to be open to other ideas, but I draw the line at accepting "trust me" as an answer. I am also wary of purposely entering mental states that are conducive to suggestion and/or hallucinations.

The two cases are not alike.

Is there scientific evidence that the universe existed before you did? Yes. It being logically possible that it didn't in no way makes it the case that there is no evidence for it having existed before you did.

Is there scientific evidence that life on Earth had no intelligent designer? No. Indeed Hoyle thought, apparently on scientific grounds, that it did have intelligent designer(s), didn't he?

Let's try two simpler questions…

Is there scientific evidence that life on Earth had no intelligent designer?, no

Is there scientific evidence that life on Earth isn't exclusively for the purpose of creating Thought Provoker?, no

This is where the NOMA comes in.

If you are trying to use the science tool-set to somehow validate a philisophical belief, you have overlapped your magisteria. This discussion takes on a whole different flavor if we are talking about a single, OMA Truth.

The rules change entirely starting with the rule that no mutually contradictory beliefs (philisophical or otherwise) can be allowed to peacefully coexist.

If you are interested in submitting a single, OMA proposal, I would gladly post it on my modest Blog. (feel free to borrow any or all of my proposal as a starting point).

Provoking Thought

What do you think of this"¦

This is the Christian Science Statement of Being,

Taken as a whole, I think it's false.

ME
But, regardless of whether the entailment you allege holds, is it your belief that ID is as likely to be correct as evolutionary naturalism?"

TP
Based on what I think your definitions of the terms are, they are both on the philosophical side of the NOMA divide. So yes.

Let me ask another question: is the claim, "For any pair of contradictory philosophical beliefs, they are equally likely to be correct", itself a scientific claim; or is it itself a philosophical one?

Did you check out my blog?

Yes. I'm interested in how you think about ethical obligations. I'm assuming there are some folk who honestly think ID is science. For folk like that, I imagine they feel ethically obligated to try to have it taught in public schools. You oppose that. Since ethical beliefs are philosophical, is it not the case that these conficting ethical convictions are, on your own account, equally likely to be correct? And if so, I'm wondering how you justify your opposition without implying that the proposition I mentioned earlier—"For any pair of contradictory philosophical beliefs, they are equally likely to be correct"—is actually false.

And I'm wondering about that because you invoke so strongly the value of consistency. It seems to me your position may not in fact be consistent.

In another thread, I am having a discussion with Salvador, I am stipulating that the impossible may be required. As in, something (Ultimate Observer) outside the multidimensional space-time continuum may have to exists in order to maintain internal consistency of that continuum.

That's an interesting idea, and quite similar to the ideas of the eminent Oxford logician and philosopher, Michael Dummett which I've posted about here and here and here.

There is a question I pose at times like this. Can God transcend logic?

Descartes thought so, but most theists believe he was wrong about that. Instead, they mostly hold that logical norms, like rational, moral, and aesthetic norms in general, are intrinsic to and naturally inherent in mind as such, including God's mind.

ME
What is also useful to discuss is the tendency of some within the scientific community to not limit themselves to scientific statements, but to attempt to imply that science 'proves' or otherwise supports the belief that life on Earth had no intelligent designer"”a belief that I regard as having strictly speaking no scientific support whatsoever.

TP
You were fine up to the last part. Science can't "prove" a negative. Even Dawkin is reasonably careful to say God could exist. Of course you have to pile on with "a belief that I regard as having strictly speaking no scientific support whatsoever".

We are talking about the Ultimate Truth here. Could God have created the Universe specifically designed so that in 1956, I would be born. Yes, that is a possibility. Could science prove that is incorrect? No, it can't.

Science could hypothesize and present evidence of my ancestral line going back it a Mitochondrial Eve and beyond.

However, if I choose to believe the universe was created at the moment on my birth and someone tried to tell me that science supports a belief that counters that, I could maintain it is ""¦a belief that I regard as having strictly speaking no scientific support whatsoever."

The two cases are not alike.

Is there scientific evidence that the universe existed before you did? Yes. It being logically possible that it didn't in no way makes it the case that there is no evidence for it having existed before you did.

Is there scientific evidence that life on Earth had no intelligent designer? No. Indeed Hoyle thought, apparently on scientific grounds, that it did have intelligent designer(s), didn't he?

Now, it might help if you outlined your scientific view. For example, how old do you think the Earth is?

Between 4 and 5 billion years, as measured in our frame of reference.

Did you accept the Mitochondrial Eve hypothesis?

I found it intriguing. I wouldn't say I believe in it firmly, or disbelieve it firmly.

Do you accept the Common Descent hypothesis?

Yes, though I'm agnostic about whether a specific 'rational ensoulment' event, also took place some time in the last 200,000 years or so. Deciding for or against this possibility depends crucially on what is the correct philosophy of mind.

But even without waiting for a definitive philosophical resolution about the nature of mind, I think there are scientific data that give me reason to think that something like that took place some time within the last 50,000 years or so.

What do you think of this…
There is no life, truth, intelligence, nor substance in matter. All is infinite Mind and its infinite manifestation, for God is All-in-all. Spirit is immortal Truth; matter is mortal error. Spirit is the real and eternal; matter is the unreal and temporal. Spirit is God, and man is His image and likeness. Therefore man is not material; he is spiritual

This is the Christian Science Statement of Being,

I was raised as a Christian Scientist, I recited the above quote over countless Sundays and quite a few testimonial Wednesdays. I still agree with some aspects of this religious statement.

You wrote…

I disagree that the unknowability of the 'Truth' entails that all beliefs have an equal chance of being correct (including the belief implied by my disagreement. To me, disagreement just is the assertion of inequality in the Chances of Correctness Sweepstakes.)

But, regardless of whether the entailment you allege holds, is it your belief that ID is as likely to be correct as evolutionary naturalism?"

Based on what I think your definitions of the terms are, they are both on the philosophical side of the NOMA divide. So yes.

you wrote…

And is it your belief that you, or anyone else, ought to try to prevent ID from being taught in the science classes held in US public schools?

Yes, at least until the U. S. constitution is changed. In other comments we have been touching on the consistency concept. This is fundimental to my code of ethics. It is resonable to expect organisations and people to do what they say they will do. Therefore, for the reasons outlined in the Dover decision, ID (as embodied in the book Of Pandas and People) should be prevented for being taught by the entity (U.S.Government) that made a promise to prevent this kind of activity.

And, if so, what kind of fact does that latter belief refer to"“in particular the 'ought' part of the belief; in what part of the NOMA quadrant would the existence, if any, of an 'ought' kind of fact fall into?

I consider it a valid point that teaching existance in school implies a claim to the single, OMA truth. That is why I have been expending effort in exploring thus. Did you check out my blog?

They believe that God exists in no possible world. Your idea implies that the relevant beliefs of van Inwagen and of these atheists are both correct in a suitably extended conception of reality"“a metaphysical multiverse in which every possible world exists. But, as noted, the beliefs of van Inwagen and the atheists are beliefs about what exists, or does not exist, in every possible world. And they are contradictory beliefs. 'Contradictory' means there is no possible world in which these beliefs are both true. Which I, not I think idiosyncratically, regard as a 'reductio ad absurdum' of your notion of all beliefs being correct, even in a metaphysically extended multiverse.

In other words, I regard such talk as literal nonsense, and hence as serving no useful function. So I'm somewhat puzzled by your seeming addiction to engaging in such talk.

I don't claimed philosophical discussion is easy. Quite the opposite. It is too open for consideration of what our common senses would consider absurd.

In another thread, I am having a discussion with Salvador, I am stipulating that the impossible may be required. As in, something (Ultimate Observer) outside the multidimensional space-time continuum may have to exists in order to maintain internal consistency of that continuum.

We can word-smith these concepts in an attempt to tailor them to our biased viewpoints, but without constraints, without ground-rules, anything goes. There is a question I pose at times like this. Can God transcend logic?

There is a dispute about what phenomena should and shouldn't be included under each magisterium. I don't see that argument as being futile. The magisteria don't define themselves automatically or ab initio.

And I can agree with that. That is why we are having this argument.

The concept of mind, (and the related concepts of reason, consciousness, intentionality, etc) is currently the focus of an intense dispute about whether it can or can't be naturalized"”that is, about whether mind is correctly deemed as being wholly or in part a possible object of natural science, and concomitantly about what its nature really is. This bears rather directly on which magisterium mind should belong to, and on whether ID can be a science even in principle. I think it's useful to discuss that.

And we are.

What is also useful to discuss is the tendency of some within the scientific community to not limit themselves to scientific statements, but to attempt to imply that science 'proves' or otherwise supports the belief that life on Earth had no intelligent designer"”a belief that I regard as having strictly speaking no scientific support whatsoever.

You were fine up to the last part. Science can't "prove" a negative. Even Dawkin is reasonably careful to say God could exist. Of course you have to pile on with "a belief that I regard as having strictly speaking no scientific support whatsoever".

We are talking about the Ultimate Truth here. Could God have created the Universe specifically designed so that in 1956, I would be born. Yes, that is a possibility. Could science prove that is incorrect? No, it can't.

Science could hypothesize and present evidence of my ancestral line going back it a Mitochondrial Eve and beyond.

However, if I choose to believe the universe was created at the moment on my birth and someone tried to tell me that science supports a belief that counters that, I could maintain it is "…a belief that I regard as having strictly speaking no scientific support whatsoever."

Now, it might help if you outlined your scientific view. For example, how old do you think the Earth is? Did you accept the Mitochondrial Eve hypothesis? Do you accept the Common Descent hypothesis?

FYI, I am interested in verifying internal consistency of such proposals. Mine can be seen here.

Provoking Thought

I meant consistent as in logically consistent, not stuck-in-the-mud consistent.

Sorry for the confusion.

Oh, I don't believe I was confused. Actually, I was assuming 'consistent' was meant in the sense of logical consistency. I didn't give a thought to the other sense you mention.

And I was asking if you believe that (logical) consistency is better than, or preferable to, its opposite; and, if so, what kind of fact, if any, such a belief refers to, or is about—a physical or a nonphysical fact. The reason being, I wanted to know whether you are willing to help yourself to nonphysical facts while choosing to discuss only physical facts.

It is getting late and I have been adding to my blog. You might be interested in the NOMA post I just put up. Here is the link.

Please excuse any abrubtness in my reply but I didn't want to wait until tomorrow.

I wrote…
Your reply was pretty much what I expected you would say. Please take that as a compliment. You are consistent.

Does that imply that you believe that one ought to keep one's beliefs consistent? That consistency is better than inconsistency? If so, would you describe such a belief in the merits of consistency as referring to, or being about, a physical fact or a nonphysical fact? Or as being a belief about no fact at all?

I meant consistent as in logically consistent, not stuck-in-the-mud consistent.

Sorry for the confusion.

I wrote…
When I say "Atheist", I don't mean I-know-God-doesn't-exist, because I don't. In fact, an argument could be made that I am "Agnostic" since I am open to the possibility of the existance of God along with fairies and orbiting tea-pots.

What I'm less clear about is why you place yourself in the atheist camp. Is there, for example, a reason for that self-designation? Or did you flip a coin about it, or adopt that view to please a girlfriend when you were 17 or 18?

My practical choices are to say "I believe in God", without defining the term. "I am Agnostic", which is essentially the same as the first choice. Or, "I am an Atheist", which is more provocative and usually forces people to ask me why. I have learned not to be the one to bring up religion first, so I let others do it.

I didn't start answering with "I am an Atheist" until late in my adult life. I don't believe I ever used "I am an atheist" as a pick-up line.

At 17 I was a practicing Christian Scientist (as I raised). If you don't know the religion, you may find that its beliefs about mind over matter interesting. Even though Christian Scientists are more open to questioning than most religions, I felt constrained in my exploration. Therefore, I investigated many religions (visiting many churches). I found Unitarian Universalism and Judaism to be then most compatible religions. However, even they had some drawbacks.

I wrote…
Now you suggest we debate to "evaluate which beliefs are worthy of acceptance". This is probably the source of our differences. I have what I call "ethics". They are not based on belief, they are based on a self-imposed code I feel is "rationally warranted, or justifiable, or defensible, or plausible or otherwise adequate from our admittedly limited epistemic vantage point".

I'm not sure why you use the word 'feel' in that last sentence…

Let me correct the paragraph…
Now you suggest we debate to "evaluate which beliefs are worthy of acceptance". This is probably the source of our differences. I have what I call "ethics". They are not based on religious belief, they are based on a self-imposed code I beleive is "rationally warranted, or justifiable, or defensible, or plausible or otherwise adequate from our admittedly limited epistemic vantage point".

better?

Although I could say my code based on Unitarian Universalism belief if it would make you feel better to think of me as religious.

I will answer the rest tomorrow.

Regards,
TP

Hi Stunney,

Your reply was pretty much what I expected you would say. Please take that as a compliment. You are consistent.

Does that imply that you believe that one ought to keep one's beliefs consistent? That consistency is better than inconsistency? If so, would you describe such a belief in the merits of consistency as referring to, or being about, a physical fact or a nonphysical fact? Or as being a belief about no fact at all?

Unfortunately, it makes for an unexciting debate since I see nothing to argue.

Well, let me try…

When I say "Atheist", I don't mean I-know-God-doesn't-exist, because I don't. In fact, an argument could be made that I am "Agnostic" since I am open to the possibility of the existance of God along with fairies and orbiting tea-pots.

It would be no big news if we discovered that a Russian cosmonaut had brought a tea-pot on board the International Space Station. So I venture to suggest that you deem the existence of an orbiting tea-pot to be much more liable to be worthy of belief and something to which you're much more open, than the existence of fairies. But maybe not.

What I'm less clear about is why you place yourself in the atheist camp. Is there, for example, a reason for that self-designation? Or did you flip a coin about it, or adopt that view to please a girlfriend when you were 17 or 18?

Now you suggest we debate to "evaluate which beliefs are worthy of acceptance". This is probably the source of our differences. I have what I call "ethics". They are not based on belief, they are based on a self-imposed code I feel is "rationally warranted, or justifiable, or defensible, or plausible or otherwise adequate from our admittedly limited epistemic vantage point".

I'm not sure why you use the word 'feel' in that last sentence. If you wrote the same sentence but substituted 'believe' for 'feel', would it not amount to the same thing? Of course, you would probably then want to omit the initial clause, 'They are not based on belief', in order to avoid self-contradictoriness (assuming you believe self-contradictory sentences ought to be avoided).

In other words, why not simply say that you have a self-imposed code that you believe is rationally warranted, or justifiable, etc? Or, if you don't think it's appropriate for you to state that you believe that, is it because you really believe that your self-imposed code is not rationally warranted, justifiable, etc?

Part of that code is that since no one can know the Truth (capital "T") all beliefs have an equal chance of being correct.

I disagree that the unknowability of the 'Truth' entails that all beliefs have an equal chance of being correct (including the belief implied by my disagreement. To me, disagreement just is the assertion of inequality in the Chances of Correctness Sweepstakes.)

But, regardless of whether the entailment you allege holds, is it your belief that ID is as likely to be correct as evolutionary naturalism? And is it your belief that you, or anyone else, ought to try to prevent ID from being taught in the science classes held in US public schools? And, if so, what kind of fact does that latter belief refer to–in particular the 'ought' part of the belief; in what part of the NOMA quadrant would the existence, if any, of an 'ought' kind of fact fall into?

If we extend the multiverse into the metaphysical then all beliefs are correct.

This may be the source of one puzzle I have about the utility and meaningfulness of such ideas. I was reading the other day the splendid book version of Peter van Inwagen's 2003 Gifford Lectures, 'The Problem of Evil'. In the chapter on 'The Idea of God', van Inwagen asserts his belief that God exists in all possible worlds (see pages 30 and 33, also 22-26 for background on the modal concept of possible worlds).

Well, taking your idea that in an metaphysically extended multiverse all beliefs are correct, then van Inwagen's belief that God exists in every possible world is correct. However, some atheists have argued not merely that God doesn't exist, but that God cannot exist—that God is an impossibility. They believe that God exists in no possible world. Your idea implies that the relevant beliefs of van Inwagen and of these atheists are both correct in a suitably extended conception of reality–a metaphysical multiverse in which every possible world exists. But, as noted, the beliefs of van Inwagen and the atheists are beliefs about what exists, or does not exist, in every possible world. And they are contradictory beliefs. 'Contradictory' means there is no possible world in which these beliefs are both true. Which I, not I think idiosyncratically, regard as a 'reductio ad absurdum' of your notion of all beliefs being correct, even in a metaphysically extended multiverse.

In other words, I regard such talk as literal nonsense, and hence as serving no useful function. So I'm somewhat puzzled by your seeming addiction to engaging in such talk.

It could be that you simply don't wish to engage in discussion of philosophical issues for your oft-mentioned Socratic reason, and use this (in my view rather transparently disingenuous) egalitarian attitudinizing towards philosophical beliefs to ward off such discussion. But this blog cannot help discussing such things. For example, the question, 'Should ID be taught in public schools', raises moral issues (note the 'should' in there); and it raises questions about what counts or qualifies as science and what doesn't, and why (which are central questions of the philosophy of science).

And, rather more importantly in my view, since the concept of an intelligent designer is closely connected to the concept of mind; and since that latter concept is a mainstay of contemporary philosophical disputes, and by implication of disputes over the criteria any science (such as biological science) should use to determine whether there's evidence for a mind or minds other than our own having ever been active in this world, then I don't see how one can pursue intelligent discussion of this blog's central topic without addressing philosophical issues.

And I think we can do that without thereby claiming to Know the Truth, just as Socrates did it in his day.

With NOMA, argument is futile since we will never know.

There is a dispute about what phenomena should and shouldn't be included under each magisterium. I don't see that argument as being futile. The magisteria don't define themselves automatically or ab initio.

The concept of mind, (and the related concepts of reason, consciousness, intentionality, etc) is currently the focus of an intense dispute about whether it can or can't be naturalized—that is, about whether mind is correctly deemed as being wholly or in part a possible object of natural science, and concomitantly about what its nature really is. This bears rather directly on which magisterium mind should belong to, and on whether ID can be a science even in principle. I think it's useful to discuss that.

I think it's also useful to discuss the possibility of a radical revision of the concept of science itself, a possibility canvassed by David Chalmers and Galen Strawson (I provide relevant quotes from their writings below), which again bears heavily on the whole topic of ID and on what the correct boundaries are for each magisterium.

What is also useful to discuss is the tendency of some within the scientific community to not limit themselves to scientific statements, but to attempt to imply that science 'proves' or otherwise supports the belief that life on Earth had no intelligent designer—a belief that I regard as having strictly speaking no scientific support whatsoever.

Here are the promised quotes from Chalmers and Strawson, in that order, with emphases added:

I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental. We know that a theory of consciousness requires the addition of something fundamental to our ontology, as everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness. We might add some entirely new nonphysical feature, from which experience can be derived, but it is hard to see what such a feature would be like. More likely, we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. If we
take experience as fundamental, then we can go about the business of constructing a theory of experience.

At this point I give up. You can obviously make chalk from cheese because if you go down to the subatomic level they are both the same stuff; but I don't think you can make experience from something wholly non-experiential. And since we know with certainty that experience exists, it seems we should assume that whatever else there is either experiential, in some manner, or proto-experiential, whatever that may mean. So I reach the same conclusion as Eddington. 34 `To put the conclusion crudely', he says, `the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. As is often the way with crude statements, I shall have to explain that by `mind' I do not here exactly mean mind and by `stuff' I do not at all mean stuff"¦. The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our individual conscious minds; nevertheless, he believes, `we may think of its nature as not altogether foreign to the feelings in our consciousness . The realistic matter and fields of force of former physical theory are altogether irrelevant"”except in so far as the mind-stuff itself has spun these imaginings. The symbolic matter and fields of force of present-day theory are more relevant, but they bear to it the same relation that the bursar's accounts bear to the activity of the college. Having granted this, the mental activity of the part of the world constituting ourselves occasions no surprise; it is known to us by direct selfknowledge, and we do not explain it away as something other than we know it to be"”or, rather, it knows itself to be. It is the physical aspects of the world that we have to explain"¦. [276-7] Eddington summarizes his position as follows: `To put the conclusion crudely"”the stuff of the world is mind-stuff.' `As is often the way with crude statements', he continues, `I shall have to explain that by "mind" I do not here exactly mean mind and by "stuff" I do not at all mean stuff'; `the mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our individual conscious minds'. Nevertheless, he believes, `we may think of its nature as not altogether foreign to the feelings in our consciousness.'134 Something along these lines seems to me to be the most parsimonious, plausible and indeed `hard-nosed' position that anyone who is remotely realistic about the nature of reality can take up in the present state of our knowledge. So this, I propose, is what real materialism looks like.

P.S. I am cleaning up and adding to my blog (though "blog" is an overstatement). Here is the link.

I checked it out. There was some interest in that blog entry. I noticed an old nemesis there.