Egnor vs. Novella and its Consequences
by BradfordDualism Dueling With Science? is the title of the linked blog entry at Thinking Christian. Tom Gilson starts with this opening paragraph:
There is a lively debate going on regarding two views of the mind: dualist vs. materialist. Last month’s New Scientist article, “Creationists Declare War Over the Brain,” prompted responses from several quarters, including one of my own. Dr. Steven Novella wrote a two-part response (Part One, Part Two), taking the opportunity especially to make swipes at Michael Egnor of the Discovery Institute who has written on the topic more than once.
Indeed he has written more than once about this topic. Here and there a piece featuring Egnor's views appears. Tom Gilson quoting Novella:
It is crystal clear . . . that this is about ideology, not science. ID proponents feel that their spiritual ideological world view is threatened by the findings of modern science, and so have decided to undermine it. They want this to be an ideological and cultural war, because in the arena of science they lose. So they claim that science (at least those sciences with which they feel uncomfortable) is nothing more than the ideology of materialism. They want to frame the conflict as that between the traditional, moral, and god-fearing spiritualism on one side, and cold, amoral, mechanistic materialism on the other. This is an emotional fight they feel they can win.
I actually agree with Novella when he states that this is about ideology and not science. Novella is unable to scientifically document the central claim of opponents of mind/brain duality namely, that the mind is an emergent property of matter and that all activities of the mind are reducible to underlying biochemical events. The artillary leveled at mind/brain dualists is ideological and not scientific. If science must proceed under the assumption that matter and energy and the laws by which they are governed must, of necessity, be a comprehensive explanatory basis for the mind, then epistemological considerations are the driving force behind conclusions. A stubborn insistence that science says more than what it can predict and empirically document, is an ideological position and not a scientific one.
Novella may think he is on the winning side of a culture war but that is his non-scientific view even if he is unable to make a distinction. If you look at Novella's writings you see it is he who is intent on emotional digs. There is no need for emotion when one is calmly able to point to experimental evidence backing one's claims. Gilson again quoting Novella:
Does science require methodological naturalism? Yes. This is the real debate going on between mainstream science and various ideological groups who wish to promote a non-naturalist belief system. But this philosophical fight was fought in centuries past – and the naturalists won. The fight is over. But the anti-materialists (really anti-naturalists) want to resurrect this fight, and since they cannot win it in the arena of science they want to fight it in the arena of public opinion and then the legal and academic realms.
Novella glosses over limitations inherent to scientific investigations whose rules render materialistic conclusions inevitable even when empirical data is insufficient to support them. He can only assert a materialist view by backing it with his faith in naturalism as opposed to knowledge of empirical evidence documenting his metaphysical perspective on the mind.
November 25th, 2008 at 11:28 am
This part from Novella is telling:
This gives away the store. It's an admission that the question is one of philosophy, not one of science, even if Novella thinks that the naturalists have already "won" and that everyone else should just shut up and go away.
I was also amazed by this part:
Say what? The usual definition of "methodological naturalism" is simply that it's a method (usually argued to be necessary for science) by which a researcher considers only "naturalistic" explanations, and ignores non-naturalistic ones. It's a method, not an assertion about the world, or about what it is possible to know.
Novella, however, seems to define it as naturalistic epistemology – the belief that only "naturalistic" things can ever be known. And this renders his assertion that the question has been "settled" ridiculous. Only a complete philosophical incompetent would assert that the question of whether only naturalistic things can be known has been "settled" in "centuries past", and that the naturalists have decisively "won" and the debate is over.
In fact, very nearly the opposite is the case. The position that Novella describes as "methodological naturalism" is actually almost identical to logical positivism, a theory of epistemology that really has been abandoned by nearly every professional philosopher for over 50 years. Novella has embarrassed himself. I don' t know any nicer way to put it. He's demonstrated both philosophical and historical ignorance, and he seems to be working under the theory that the less you know what you're talking about, the louder and more assertively you should say it to compensate.
Comment by Deuce — November 25, 2008 @ 11:28 am
November 25th, 2008 at 12:30 pm
I went to read Novella's post and expected to add my support to your reply. However, I don't think you're reading Novella correctly. He draws a clear distinction between methodological naturalism and philosophical naturalism.
Comment by Zachriel — November 25, 2008 @ 12:30 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 12:45 pm
The distinction between natural and supernatural can be somewhat arbitrary, though the common meaning of "naturalism" does help draw a useful distinction; no souls, gods or ghosts.
But on the issue of methodological naturalism, the term "naturalism" can be deemed extraneous. We can just call it "scientific methodology". As long as parsimonious hypotheses are proposed with entailed predictions, and the observations can be replicated by independent observers, then we can say the results are scientific.
Comment by Zachriel — November 25, 2008 @ 12:45 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 3:22 pm
"Knowledge" has multiple meanings. Metaphysical discussions about what we know are lots of fun and all, and that's what this article is about.
But there's another class of knowledge which we might call "knowledge we would bet our lives on," or, more precisely, knowledge we're allowed to bet other people's lives on. That's the class of knowledge we allow when we approve bridge designs. That's the class of knowledge we allow when we determine whether brain surgery is safe. That's the class of knowledge that requires empirical verification.
Whether you want to label that verification "materialistic" or you want to label things that cannot be verified "supernatural" doesn't really matter. We verify the safety of brain surgery based on the physical processes of the brain because that's what we can examine and verify. We do not allow the safety of brain surgery to be based on something we cannot verify, such as a claim that the mind is more than the physical properties of the brain.
It doesn't matter how truly I believe in dualism or how devoted I am to it. It doesn't matter if my entire world view is based on duality of the mind being true. It doesn't even matter if I would be willing to risk my life on dualism. In the impartial consideration of the safety of brain surgery, all that matters is what I can demonstrate to everyone else — everyone else — beyond all reasonable doubt. And the extra-physical nature of the mind has not been demonstrated to that degree; in fact, no one's even come up with a way of demonstrating it after thousands of years of pondering the question.
In other words, as much as I might hate it, the question of brain surgery safety must be determined on purely materialistic grounds. That's science. But that practical observation doesn't invalidate any metaphysical position I might have about dualism.
Comment by don provan — November 25, 2008 @ 3:22 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 3:35 pm
If that were really the case, he wouldn't have any beef with Egnor, which he clearly does. Egnor doesn't claim that dualism is some scientific finding he's made. He argues for the irreducibility of the mind on philosophical grounds based on our knowledge of 1st person experience, and points out that materialist theories of the mind fail to address these problems. He's not arguing that dualism is science and that materialism isn't. He's arguing that materialism is false, incoherent, and logically incompatible with what we know from 1st person experience.
But, in response to that, Novella makes the following complaint:
See the game he's playing here? He's arguing that science must follow methodological naturalism and that it has nothing to say about how the world actually is, but at the same time he's arguing that philosophical questions are meaningless because they aren't science, so that science is the only source of actual knowledge.
In the passage I quoted previously, he defines methodological naturalism such as to make it the conflation of these two assertions, and claims that it's a settled question. I don't think he can help himself. It's clear that the real bee in his bonnet is Egnor's non-materialist philosophy. He wants to argue in favor of materialistic philosophy, but he wants to sound like he's just defending scientific methodology from interlopers. And so he tries to solve this dilemma by conflating arguments for the latter with arguments for the former.
Comment by Deuce — November 25, 2008 @ 3:35 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 3:41 pm
Don Provan,
The materialism v dualism v etc debates don't only (or really, even primarily) come down to brain surgery. And I doubt Egnor, being a neurosurgeon, turns a blind eye to the physical properties of the brain when it comes to brain surgery.
Jeffrey Schwartz did a good job of illustrating the other side of what a materialist commitment to the mind/brain can lead to. To hear him tell it, it wasn't too long ago where the 'bet your life' materialist strategy with OCD treatment involved repeatedly forcing patients into contact with filth from a subway toilet because behaviorist ruled the day. Schwartz relied on communicating with patients, teaching them how to think about themselves and their problems in ways that let them reprogram their minds – this has apparently been a successful approach, based on a 'mind is more than the brain' attitude.
The response could be 'well, if it did work, Schwartz's methods could still be fit under a broadly materialist/physicalist paradigm too!' And sure, maybe they could. But it does illustrate an important aspect of these debates – dualism v materialism doesn't only touch on whether physical features should be investigated and paid attention to (even the most ardent dualists don't believe 'the mind is all immaterial' – they're dualists, the physical is always a partial component to existence.) It can also touch on whether surgery is the most appropriate avenue for a given problem.
If you and I have a disagreement and I think you're wrong, does that suggest some surgery is in order?
Comment by nullasalus — November 25, 2008 @ 3:41 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 4:00 pm
The response is that Schwartz's work was confirmed through normal, materialistic, scientific methods that do not depend on duality.
Duh. I can't believe you thought that's what I was suggesting.
Comment by don provan — November 25, 2008 @ 4:00 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 4:18 pm
Don provan:
That's a poor comparison. I'm far more convinced of my own consciousness that I am of the soundness of any bridge in the world. Nevertheless, if I'm going to be driving over a bridge, I'd much prefer that its architect know the principles of structural integrity than that he agrees with me about the existence of my mind. He can be a complete fool who believes himself to be the only conscious being for all I care.
It's got nothing to do with certainty, and everything to do with relevance. When it comes to the structural integrity of a bridge, what matters is knowledge relevant to the structural integrity of bridges.
If there were, somehow, some procedure that might turn me into a zombie (of the philosophical variety), I'd much prefer to take my advice from someone who didn't think my 1st person experience was "meaningless". I'd rather be dead than a zombie.
I'd also like to point out that this whole discussion is rather irrelevant. By all accounts, Egnor is an extraordinarily good neurosurgeon, one of the best in New York in fact. The questions being discussed here don't really impinge on that. However, as a matter of fact, since we're discussing knowledge you'd bet your life on, if I do ever find myself in the unfortunate position of requiring neurosurgery, I'd much prefer that my surgeon possess knowledge of the philosophical problems with materialism. I'd want him to remember that there's a subjective consciousness there, not just the slimy gray stuff that he can see, and that it's not just a matter of making the slimy gray stuff "operational", because what he does to my neurons could radically affect things for that person's (my) subjective experience. I want my neurons treated respectfully.
Comment by Deuce — November 25, 2008 @ 4:18 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 4:42 pm
That's why I wouldn't want you making any decisions that I need to depend on.
You are confusing the metaphysical position of the individual with the metaphysical underpinnings of the process. Yes, his metaphysical position is irrelevant, but that's because he works within the confines of scientific knowledge in the way I am describing.
I'm not sure I know who you're talking about. First person experience is both demonstrable and important. Whether the mind is a physical process or not has nothing to do with that.
To heck with respect: I'd rather he did the best job he could. If that calls for him looking at my brain as nothing but slimy gray stuff, I could really care less.
If you want to limit your choices to surgeons that show your mind respect, I don't mind. If you want to have a choice of surgeons that includes those that use unverfied ideas that depend on duality, then please make sure that I cannot get one of them by mistake for my surgery. Is that OK?
By the way, I really seriously doubt that Egnor falls into that last catagory. Do you agree?
Comment by don provan — November 25, 2008 @ 4:42 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 4:51 pm
The point of the blog entry is that the metaphysical underpinnings of naturalism, when incorporated into the interpretation of empirical data, lead to conclusions constrained by metaphysics rather than data. Ruling out duality a priori makes a materialistic interpretation of consciousness inevitable although not necessarily correct.
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 4:51 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 5:31 pm
Don Provan,
There's nothing thoroughly 'materialistic' about the methods that confirmed them, and 'materialism' did not inspire them. You may be able to rationalize them in a materialist framework that Schwartz himself emphatically disagrees with. It just shows the faded value of materialism on this subject.
It's easy to be mistaken, considering you're yammering on about the importance of the material without realizing A) Dualists accept the reality of the material, and that it plays a role (even a tremendous role) with regards to mind, and B) it isn't news to Michael Egnor that the material part of brains has, y'know. Something to do with his job.
Then again, there's no point in talking to you about this – why, that could imply entertaining dualism! Clearly the source of our disagreement is your brain. I'll wait for that to be physically fixed, then everything will be hunky dory.
Comment by nullasalus — November 25, 2008 @ 5:31 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 5:52 pm
What does "best" mean in this context? I hear that lobotomies do a splendid job of making people act more peaceful-like.
Comment by Deuce — November 25, 2008 @ 5:52 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 6:00 pm
Hi folks –
Long time no talk. If you recall, I had previously argued that the entire notion of ID rested squarely on a commitment to substance (Cartesian) dualism, and that the truth of dualism could not be evaluated scientifically, and that was precisely why ID can't be considered scientific. In contrast, theories like evolutionary theory have no connection to these metaphysical issues one way or the other: Any scientifc theory can be true if dualism is true, and they can also be true if dualism is false. If dualism is false, however, all of ID's arguments against mechanical ("unguided") processes producing complex form and function fail, because in that case all design would be seen to result ultimately from just such processes (since there are no other types).
Though they defend dualism every chance they get, Egnor, Dembski, and others in the Disco gang have worked hard on rhetoric to hide this critical dependency, because they they are still pretending ID is a scientific theory. Even so, the problem for ID is worse than Egnor understands. Even if one were to believe, as Egnor does, that something in addition to the brain (i.e. res cogitans) is required for thinking to take place, it is still clear from all of our experiments and experience that complex physical machinery (i.e. brains) are a necessary component for thought to take place. To offer conscious thought as the explanation for complex biological features, when complex biological features are seen to be required for conscious thought, makes for a theoretical non-starter.
Comment by aiguy — November 25, 2008 @ 6:00 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 6:13 pm
aiguy,
ID's a larger collection of understandings, suggestions, and possibilities than this, so it hardly seems to matter in the long run. Even Behe, everyone's favorite rant-target with regards to evolution, has said he's willing to imagine a front-loaded scenario that unfolds naturally.
Besides, it's trivial to point out that ID is not 'scientific' under currently accepted measures of science. I think even some at the DI would admit to that. Their answer would be that what's accepted as scientific is a scope that must be changed, and it could well include dualism being regarded as 'scientific' itself.
Mind you, I disagree with them. But it doesn't accomplish anything to argue that dualism isn't scientific and some ID theories depend on dualism so now ID isn't science. Not when the definition of science itself is one of the things at issue.
Comment by nullasalus — November 25, 2008 @ 6:13 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 6:32 pm
Hi Nullasalus -
Even Behe, everyone's favorite rant-target with regards to evolution, has said he's willing to imagine a front-loaded scenario that unfolds naturally.
"Front-loaded" seems (around here anyway) to mean "prepared by a conscious mind". But of course even if one amassed evidence to show that evolution was front-loaded (in the sense of "implicitly containing the information required to generate life forms we see"), there is nothing (except religious sensibilities) to say that a conscious mind was involved.
Besides, it's trivial to point out that ID is not 'scientific' under currently accepted measures of science. I think even some at the DI would admit to that.
I agree it is obvious. I disagree that the DI admits it; their primary spokespeople (Luskin, Dembski, Egnor, Klinghoffer, etc) all claim that it is a scientific alternative theory.
Their answer would be that what's accepted as scientific is a scope that must be changed, and it could well include dualism being regarded as 'scientific' itself. Mind you, I disagree with them. But it doesn't accomplish anything to argue that dualism isn't scientific and some ID theories depend on dualism so now ID isn't science. Not when the definition of science itself is one of the things at issue.
If certain people want to drop the requirement for observational evidence from scientific inquiry, then they're just fringe dwellers that I for one will choose to ignore completely. In that case there is no difference between science and anything else – in other words, there is no science. My argument is not directed to these misguided few. However, for all of those (most of the DI folks) who attempt to cast ID as an alternative theory to modern evolutionary biology, I think the fact that ID critically entails an untestable metaphysical claim constitutes a definitive refutation.
Comment by aiguy — November 25, 2008 @ 6:32 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 6:48 pm
Zachriel
The clear distinction referred to is:
followed by some further explantion…but this is the gist. Well, not to be Johnny Raincloud, but given Novella's definition, there is no clear distinction between MN and PN. All Novella is saying is that for the sake of "doing science" we'll all just pretend PN is true, whether or not it is. Under that restriction, its pretty darned hard to see how that isn't sneaking full blown PN right into the heart of science and scientific practice.
Not only that it sneaks in a major presupposition that all natural phenomenon have a natural explanation — that, at least, is the upshot of MN, even if we're only pretending PN is true. But, that strikes at the heart of what science is and what it ought to be about. Some think science is merely about the business of developing the best natural explanation for any observation. But, should it turn out that something beyond nature had more than a little to do with states of affairs in nature, that doesn't help science discover the truth of what really happened or how things came to be. Indeed, the restriction of MN guarantees that science will be utterly blind to any such possibility, even if it is the true explanation.
For that reason alone I continue to contend that MN = PN and there's not getting around it. The only possible justification for MN is if we know a priori that the properties of the cosmos are such that nature is a completely closed system of natural cause and effect where the blind, purposeless forces of matter and energy acting through chance and/or necessity can account for everything…abosolutely everything. But we don't know any such thing a priori or otherwise. There's certainly no scientific basis for thinking that and lots of good philosophical reasons for rejecting the very notion of it.
I have to take the view that Novella has not drawn a clear distinction between MN and PN because no such distinction is functionally possible.
Comment by DonaldM — November 25, 2008 @ 6:48 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 6:50 pm
I have no problem with any metaphysical position you want to adopt so long as you don't claim it is or should be considered "science". Science is what it is no matter who derives what metaphysical conclusions from it or about it.
If ID was nothing more than the metaphysical position that science shouldn't be considered the final answer to all questions, I'd consider it quite reasonable. But it is more than that, right?
Comment by don provan — November 25, 2008 @ 6:50 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 6:52 pm
aiguy,
Nothing scientific in a falsifiable sense, perhaps – to either rule it in or rule it out (and 'religious sensibilities' would be in play in either direction). I don't think such questions are the stuff of science, personally. I'm sure you remember.
On the other hand, a thoroughly reductive materialism for minds, to me, wouldn't obviously rule out ID. Any more than a thoroughly reductive materialism rules out a simulation hypothesis. (In fact, it would seem to add strength to such.)
While also typically calling into question methodological naturalism as a ground rule for science. There's nothing stopping them from claiming it's a scientific theory and that the standards for 'scientific' should be changed, at once.
But they could also argue what qualifies as 'observational evidence' – I'm certain there are ID proponents, biological and cosmological and otherwise, who could and would cite given and verifiable scientific facts towards inferring an ID cause/involvement. It's that interpretation and where they take it that the problems come in.
Comment by nullasalus — November 25, 2008 @ 6:52 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 6:58 pm
Bradford writes:
I have to agree totally with this. This is why MN is restrictive to the practice of science. If the true explanation for any observed phenomenon lies outside the boundaries of the restriction of MN, then science is forced to concoct an alternative explanation within the restriction and rule out a priori any explantory resources that don't meet the restriction. How is that anything other than importing full-blown PN into the heart of science. MN is PN in a cheap lab-coat.
Of course, science is a human enterprise, and as such humans are free to create whatever rules and limits on this enterprise they wish. What we can NOT do, however, is construct a picture of the world based on these limits and restrictions and then pretend what we've constructed within those limits represents the truth or reality or the actual complete explanations or is self-correcting or anything of the sort. If the real explanations fall outside the restriction, so much the worse for the restictions!
Comment by DonaldM — November 25, 2008 @ 6:58 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:06 pm
It's not a sneak: it's a proudly proclaimed definition.
I think perhaps we're using "natural" too loosely here. What is being claimed, by definition, is that the only a certain class of explanations can be confirmed empirically. Since science requires empirical confirmation, that leaves other explanations outside science. This is not an opinion or an arbitrary dictate, but a requirement for science to produce the reliable results we depend on.
Whether one wants to believe in something even in the absence of empirical confirmation is a personal decision.
Correct. Since they cannot be confirmed in any way, science is blind to them. The question you should be asking yourself is how you could be sure it was the true explanation. Well, more to the point, how could I be sure it was the true explanation if you required me to depend on it by claiming it was science?
Comment by don provan — November 25, 2008 @ 7:06 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:15 pm
DonaldM:
That's right. But so far dualism has been a complete failure in generating testable predictions. It's simply useless in practice, no matter what philosophers say.
Comment by Raevmo — November 25, 2008 @ 7:15 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:18 pm
It makes no difference what inspired them. But I defy you to show me what was not materialistic about their confirmation, assuming they are now accepted science.
Of course you accept materialism. Science is based on what we all accept and refuses to consider things that we can disagree about. That's the point.
Get this into your head: I have no problem with dualism; I only have a problem with you pretending dualism is undeniable.
Comment by don provan — November 25, 2008 @ 7:18 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:29 pm
Yes, and we can agree that isn't "best" without invoking dualism, can't we?
Can we also agree that being freed from our corporeal prison would be "best"?
Does discussing the fact that "best" is relative to goals have any bearing on materialism? Did we realize that lobotomies weren't such a good idea because we saw the mind shrivel up and die? Or was it because we empirically verified through materialistic processes that consciousness could not be detected? Did we wait until we had a lobotomy to make the determination because personal experience is the only knowledge we really trust?
Comment by don provan — November 25, 2008 @ 7:29 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:30 pm
What science becomes, if it precludes reasonable inferences from data, is dogma.
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 7:30 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:31 pm
Don:
Only empirical explanations can be confirmed empirically. Not much of a claim but thats not really whay you want to claim is it? you want to say
Can you confirm the following statement empirically?
“non empirical explanations can not be confirmed in any way”
If you can’t you are just imposing your Metaphysics into science. It’s this imposition that is the issue.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 25, 2008 @ 7:31 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:31 pm
Hi Nullasalus -
Nothing scientific in a falsifiable sense, perhaps – to either rule it in or rule it out (and 'religious sensibilities' would be in play in either direction). I don't think such questions are the stuff of science, personally. I'm sure you remember.
Yes, I remember. If you recall, my sensibilities aren't opposed to mind as primary; I just don't like when people pretend there is a way to decide who's right by scientific reasoning.
On the other hand, a thoroughly reductive materialism for minds, to me, wouldn't obviously rule out ID. Any more than a thoroughly reductive materialism rules out a simulation hypothesis. (In fact, it would seem to add strength to such.)
Reductive materialist versions of ID rules out certain versions of ID, namely theism.
While also typically calling into question methodological naturalism as a ground rule for science. There's nothing stopping them from claiming it's a scientific theory and that the standards for 'scientific' should be changed, at once.
My point here is that they need to be explicit (instead of covert) about what they are claiming. While they pretend that the "intelligence" they offer as an explanatory construct is that which we commonly observe and detect with forensics, archeology, cryptography, and so on, this is not the case at all. The "intelligence" of ID is res cogitans, for which there is no method of observation or detection at all.
If instead they honestly laid out what their claims were, it would be a very different situation. That would mean saying "We claim that immaterial minds are real, even though there is no observable evidence to support that claim. Furthermore, we claim that an immaterial mind is responsible for creating life, though there is no observational evidence for that either. And finally, we claim that these claims are all scientific, even though that is not how science has proceeded for centuries.
Comment by aiguy — November 25, 2008 @ 7:31 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:34 pm
Wrong. Change one's attitude and hormonal reactions follow. Mind changing biochemistry. Watch the dogma that follows this comment which will be ill-disguised as science.
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 7:34 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:44 pm
I had to look up that term and found this:
Thinking entities of different possible description associated with material bodies. You're not claiming this is undetectable are you?
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 7:44 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:48 pm
Bradford:
Sigh. I guess I should have said distinguishing testable predictions. Changing one's "attitude" (whatever your operational definition of that) having an effect on hormone titers is incompatible with materialistic "dogma" how exactly?
Comment by Raevmo — November 25, 2008 @ 7:48 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:49 pm
You are brilliant Donald.
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 7:49 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:54 pm
Bradford,
Wrong. Change one's attitude and hormonal reactions follow. Mind changing biochemistry. Watch the dogma that follows this comment which will be ill-disguised as science.
These phenomena are equally consistent with physicalist and dualist philosophies; they do nothing to recommend one over the other.
I had to look up that term and found this:
res cogitans: Humans are thinking things ( a res cogitans ), spirits or souls, somehow associated with material bodies.
Thinking entities of different possible description associated with material bodies. You're not claiming this is undetectable are you?
In dualism, res cogitans is the immaterial substance (spirit or soul) which is responsible for thought and conscious experience. It is (somehow) supposed to be associated with material bodies, but it is itself non-material. Yes, I've pointed out that the existence of res cogitans is undetectable by any means.
Comment by aiguy — November 25, 2008 @ 7:54 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 7:55 pm
Wrong. Change one's attitude and hormonal reactions follow. Mind changing biochemistry. Watch the dogma that follows this comment which will be ill-disguised as science.
Yeah, we might have to await more advanced technological tools. Stop the sighing melodramatics or is that part of your European culture? I'm feeling authoritarian tonight. Germanic? European? God forbid.
Did I say incompatible? That's what has to be tested. If biochemical reactions give rise to changing thought patterns then the reverse would indicate the need for a fundamental revision of your thinking.
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 7:55 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 8:00 pm
Consistent with dualism- yes. How is it consistent with the belief that chemistry gives rise to functions of the mind such as what one believes or imagines? This looks like a sequential issue. How is it not?
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 8:00 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 8:06 pm
Who or what is manning the control levers for the rudder of this thinking entity? If it is a mind then changes- even radical ones- in thinking should be theoretically possible without underlying changes in brain biochemistry.
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 8:06 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 8:09 pm
Where are you Tom Gilson?
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 8:09 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 8:10 pm
Why would this not be consistent with physicalism?
"A physical mechanism in my physical brain initiated a physical process which physically altered my brain. To a physicalist, this statement is synonymous with "I changed my attibute and hormonal reactions followed." or "I changed my biochemistry with my mind."
Comment by aiguy — November 25, 2008 @ 8:10 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 8:12 pm
Bradford:
Really? Please explain how correlations between thoughts and biochemical reactions favor dualism over physicalism.
Comment by Raevmo — November 25, 2008 @ 8:12 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 8:15 pm
Consider this. A change in thinking results in the initiation of a physical process which leads to a cascade of biochemical reactions and further changes in thought.
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 8:15 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 8:15 pm
In what way does this support duality? Only non-physical minds can change physical biochemistry? If anything, that seems more like a counter example.
Comment by don provan — November 25, 2008 @ 8:15 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 8:19 pm
C'mon. C'mon. C'mon. This is about causes and effects, not correlations.
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 8:19 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 8:22 pm
Change one's attitude and hormonal reactions follow. Mind changing biochemistry.
This is a sequential scenario. Keep that in mind and explain to me how how a thought could cause a physical change. Materialism would suggest the reverse.
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 8:22 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 8:26 pm
Gotta leave the temple of materialism behind for a time. Life is intruding on fun.
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 8:26 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 8:38 pm
In physicalism, the word "thought" is synonymous with "a particular type of physical process". Thus, if physicalism is true, you are asking how it could be that a physical process can cause a physical change; the answer should be obvious. Of course you do not believe in physicalism, and so for you "thought" and "a particular physical process" are not synonymous. But hopefully you can see that physicalism is perfectly compatible with minds having physical effects.
Comment by aiguy — November 25, 2008 @ 8:38 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 8:39 pm
If dualism is false, a thought is just another physical process causing physical changes just like all other physical processes. It's only if dualism is true that there's an unexplained disconnect between cause and effect.
Comment by don provan — November 25, 2008 @ 8:39 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 9:16 pm
Bradford
Gosh..golly…aw shucks!!
Comment by DonaldM — November 25, 2008 @ 9:16 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 9:29 pm
Don Provan
First, Hi Don. Haven't responded to you in a long, long time. Probably not since somewhere back on ARN. Hope you are well.
Now, as to this comment, I don't think anything close to pretending is required regarding dualism. It is a matter of logic if one is to be intellectually consistent. If we take the purely materialistic (or naturalistic) approach, we run into a rather sticky thicket for materialists. (BTW, for purposes here, I view materialism and naturalism interchangeably as the nuanced differences are irrelevent to the discussion). Suppose materialism is true and all our thoughts really are little more then the end product of certain bio-chemical processes within our brains and further, that there is no matter-independent mind where thoughts originate. That is the upshot of the purely materialistic approach. Well, what follows from that is that we'd have no reason at all to suppose that any thought we have, resulting as they do from purely bio-chemical and physical processes, are giving us true beliefs…including the belief that materialism or naturalism is true. Indeed, on such a view, it is difficult to see how we can claim to reliably "know" anything, since every thought we have is merely the result of some purely physical material bio-chemical process over which we excercise no control. On such a view, it almost seems silly to suppose we could claim to really know anything. At best we'd have to be agnostic toward any belief we hold as being true, since we'd never know if the bio-chemical processes from which those beliefs sprung were evolved to a state where they reliably create true beliefs.
Thus it is no pretense or pretending to say dualism is true, even undeniably true. Because if that isn't the case, the opposite, the materialistic view, gets us no where. Matter independent minds make a whole lot more sense if we also claim to hold true beliefs about ourselves and the world. Beliefs orginating from purely material processes can not come close to doing as much.
Comment by DonaldM — November 25, 2008 @ 9:29 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 9:40 pm
Don Provan
I have to disagree here. There doesn't seem to be any good reason to suppose that immaterial entities could not act in a such way as to cause empirical consequences in nature that we can observe. While we may not be able to observe the empirical entity directly, if the consequences of certain actions of such an entity leave empirical markers and consequences that we can observe, then science can surely study that. Further, if those empirical consequences bear characteristics that could be reasonably associated with an immaterial entity of certain attibutes, and if further we have no good reason to suppose that unguided, unintelligent causes are capable of producing the empirical effect under investigation, then there's no reason to say its unscientific to infer such a cause for such an effect. Such a cause is confirmed empirically by the effect we observe.
Only the arbitrary restriction of MN puts this out of reckoning.
Comment by DonaldM — November 25, 2008 @ 9:40 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 9:52 pm
And how does duality help us with this problem? As far as I can see, supposing duality changes only one thing: it eliminates all known explanations. Now that doesn't concern me, but I don't understand why you think the theory with no conceivable explanation is more logical, let along the only logical choice.
How do you figure? The matierialistic view has told us everything single thing we know about the mind and thinking and knowing. And there's every reason to think it will tell us more. How does dualism get us anywhere?
Comment by don provan — November 25, 2008 @ 9:52 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 10:10 pm
Hi Donald,
I've never understood how this argument holds sway for anybody. Either our minds are capable of discerning true beliefs, or they are not (and of course I'd say the truth of the matter is that our minds are sometimes capable of discerning truth and sometimes we are fooled). Now, if our minds are capable of knowledge (justified true belief) then your argument is moot, since our beliefs would be true whether or not they arose soley from brains. On the other hand, if our minds were incapable of reliable thought (because they arise soley from brains), then we wouldn't have a reliable mind with which to understand this state of affairs!
But of course the physicalist believes we excercise control over our thoughts (again, I think we sometimes do and sometimes don't). Why is it so hard to understand what physicalism entails and does not entail? For the physicalist, the "we" you refer to are perfectly physical beings, excercising control by perfectly physical means.
As I've pointed out, this worry applies whether we're dualist or not. After all, we might decide that dualism was true with minds that are unreliable, in which case dualism may be false. Sorry, but the central problem of epistemology is unsolved, and adopting dualism doesn't help.
Comment by aiguy — November 25, 2008 @ 10:10 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 10:29 pm
aiguy:
That's an assumption which in no way addresses the duality alternative.
Of course but whether it is true is clearly the issue I was alluding to.
Not an issue. The blog theme centers on a purely physical paradigm wherein properties of minds are viewed in emergent terms vs. duality where complete reductionism would not be possible although some sort of interface is obvious.
Comment by Bradford — November 25, 2008 @ 10:29 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 10:43 pm
Bradford,
I've been away from the computer and Internet most of the past two days. Thanks for the link. I'll be trying to catch up with all this tomorrow morning.
Comment by TomG — November 25, 2008 @ 10:43 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 11:24 pm
Don Provan
No surprise I'm sure that I would strongly disagree with this statement. If mind truly is matter independent, then the materialistic view has not told us every single thing we know about mind and thinking and all the rest. Indeed, the materialistic view has led in the completely wrong direction if minds are matter independent. All we really know are what some of the bio chemical reactions and processes are that associate with different mental/emotional states. We really do not know what causes those states, materialistic explanations not-with-standing.
Comment by DonaldM — November 25, 2008 @ 11:24 pm
November 25th, 2008 at 11:51 pm
aiguy:
How do you know such a quality is undetectable by any means? No human being has ever seen a proton, neutron, electron, quark, gluon, or any other denizen of 'The Zoo'. There are entire schools of physics that understand these things are not actually, physically existent objects at all, but specified properties of – something – we call fields. Or, that's a good enough explanation for gub'ment work. Since we have to pour a lot of energy in just to observe effects, we can't be confident that the explanatory tales we weave describe what's actually true. This is deemed to be acceptably "scientific" by the chief of sciences, so there is no real requirement that anyone believe that science is about actual truth or that its methodology leads to knowledge of actual truth. We hope it can get us close enough to effectively make use of what knowledge we do have. For our practical human purposes.
In fact, the always-present primary limitation on the knowledge science delivers from its methodology is that it is provisional. Misconceptions and incomplete inferences/deductions can and often have served as place-holders until new data is forthcoming toward a more useful picture of efficient cause and observable effect. There are enough examples of dramatic revolutions in science to make this point, all easily accessible on the internet.
A goodly number of scientists involved in the attempt to quantify the material mechanisms of consciousness are dualists. Even though most fully expect to find material mechanisms through which consciousness operates. There are even more involved scientists who prefer to describe the mind as a sort of global emergent property of the physical mechanisms through which it operates. Deal is, the concept of bottom-up "emergence" is empirically equivalent to the concept of an immaterial substance that operates the mechanisms top-down. We can't measure it or reduce it to a substrate directly either way. Yet both describe a phenomenon we both experience directly and observe by its effects on the mind/body and its ability to communicate its states to observers.
IOW, the appeal to emergence doesn't save the materialist philosophy you place at the very core of science. Hand-waving magical poof-dom is not proper science (it's just a place-holder taped to an unknown), and where it is present as metaphysical 'necessity' the science arising will be corrupt. It will pretend to some sort of inviolable absolute truth and be perverted to shore up a priori metaphysical commitments. Fortunately, die-hard metaphysical materialists/physicalists are a minority of scientists involved, and they seem to think their job is mostly to whine a lot, dismiss logical arguments with the usual dishonest tactics, and insist to one and all that the entire endeavor is a waste of resources. Interested and intrigued participants pay them little mind.
As ID has been promoted by those with a priori religious metaphysical commitments, it does not qualify as proper scientific. But the theoretics of the most corrupted of sciences (judging by its frequent, apparently obligatory use for the purpose of evangelizing atheism, its protectionist goon squads, the existence of "dogma" and "tenets," etc.) suffer exactly the same disqualification based on your own assertions here.
If the "random" qualifier in evolutionary theory is there primarily to shore up a metaphysical position, it is every bit as illegitimate as the "intelligent" qualifier in design theories.
Comment by Joy — November 25, 2008 @ 11:51 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 3:33 am
Bradford,
Yes, that's right. Physicalism is an assumption (an untestable hypothesis), as is dualism.
Well, dualism is not the only metaphysics that rejects "complete reductionism". And the interface between immaterial mind-stuff and the physical body is anything but obvious. But in any event, can we agree that nobody has any idea how we might go about empirically deciding if dualism is true or false? And can we also agree that without the assumption of dualism, ID cannot press its arguments regarding the impossibility of "blind, unguided" mechanisms generating complex form and function?
Joy,
Can you suggest a way to detect it?
In that case, using "mindstuff" as a placeholder is worse than holding mind-brain identity as a placeholder. At least the latter is more parsimonious, and at least we know for sure that brains exist.
You know I know this; I assume you're providing some background for others. And you know that I will reply that there are dozens of different theories floating around, of every conceivable combination of claims regarding the ontological status of various components and functions of mind. And you also know that my point is simply this: since nobody agrees on what it is we're referring to when we talk about "mind", offering "mind" as a scientific explanation of phenomena just isn't helpful.
We've been over this ground before as well: In evolutionary theory, "randomness" is not proposed as the cause of anything. "Random mutations" mean "mutations caused by various physical phenomena that have no correlation with the needs of the organism". In contrast, "intelligence" (or "mind") is offered as a causal explanation in ID. Now, maybe mutations aren't random after all, but that isn't a matter of metaphysics.
Comment by aiguy — November 26, 2008 @ 3:33 am
November 26th, 2008 at 3:40 am
Easily demonstrated: what do we know about the mind and thinking and all the rest that did not come from science?
No problem. The important point wasn't what science has done, but the question "How does dualism get us anywhere?"
Comment by don provan — November 26, 2008 @ 3:40 am
November 26th, 2008 at 4:16 am
Logically, immaterial entities could have detectable consequences, of course. The problem is that since they themselves are immaterial — by which I assume you mean beyond empirical confirmation — how can we tell whether it's immaterial entity A and not immaterial entity B?
Do you have some proposal for what attributes the dualist mind has that would generate such characteristics? As far as I know, dualism says nothing more than "the mind is not material", so the only attribute you have to work with is the fact that it's immaterial. What consequences should we look for?
Comment by don provan — November 26, 2008 @ 4:16 am
November 26th, 2008 at 7:28 am
No. A capacity to see things, that could not be physically observed from the vantage point of an individual undergoing a near death experience, could indicate a mind/brain duality.
Comment by Bradford — November 26, 2008 @ 7:28 am
November 26th, 2008 at 7:36 am
aiguy:
Why would presumptions about duality be determinative in assessing initial causality for this universe?
Comment by Bradford — November 26, 2008 @ 7:36 am
November 26th, 2008 at 8:18 am
aiguy to Joy:
But we don't know that minds exist although in the absence of them this discussion would not be taking place? Concepts are held and pondered by minds. Any conclusions derived relating to this subject matter are most accurately evaluated by exploring your thoughts. That is not accomplished by peering at your brain cells.
Comment by Bradford — November 26, 2008 @ 8:18 am
November 26th, 2008 at 8:20 am
Joy:
Well said Joy.
Comment by Bradford — November 26, 2008 @ 8:20 am
November 26th, 2008 at 8:41 am
And that is called philosophy, not science, and includes aesthetics, ethics, logic, politic philosophy. Philosophy works by find common understandings and experiences, and reasoning from these precepts. Until modern times, philosophy has been the only avenue for understanding the mind.
Comment by Zachriel — November 26, 2008 @ 8:41 am
November 26th, 2008 at 8:48 am
There's more to this than philosophy unless you've given up on mind/brain issues and empirical means of evaluating them. My comment was in response to a statement that at least we know that brains exist. We know that minds exist too.
Comment by Bradford — November 26, 2008 @ 8:48 am
November 26th, 2008 at 8:58 am
Science informs philosophy, but your current comment is inconsistent with your previous comment.
Comment by Zachriel — November 26, 2008 @ 8:58 am
November 26th, 2008 at 9:01 am
How so?
Comment by Bradford — November 26, 2008 @ 9:01 am
November 26th, 2008 at 10:01 am
Provan
I think you misunderstood my point. What I was trying to say is that if there are aspects of mind that lie outside the boudnaries of MN in our scientific studies, than claiming the a materialistic view has told us every single thing we know about the mind is misleading at best. It has only told us what possibilities lie within the enforced restriction of MN…not what may be the real truth of the matter.
What difference would it make? It may be an interesting question, but totally separate from whether or not the data we can empirically observe are indicative of the actions of an immaterial intelligence or agent.
The fact that we have actual thoughts that we take to be true or approximately true and rational. It is hard to see how to build a case for our own rationality or the truth of our own thoughts if they are the end product of the blind, purposeless forces of matter and energy acting through chance and/or necessity. Consider Charles Darwin's comment that ""With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?" (Darwin 1887) Why would Darwin have such doubt? Because he can see the problem of claiming to obtain rationality from irrational processes. Philosopher Alvin Plantinga takes much further. Consider:
I would hold that if we take our actual thoughts to be true and rational, then claiming we arrived at them through a material, bio-chemical process over which we have no control gives us no basis for thinking they are in fact true or rational.
On a materialistic or naturalistic worldview (interchangeable for our purposes here), evolution or something like it is the only game in town to explain the very arrival of ourselves, including our brains and the minds. There is no alternative explanation. Therefore, everything…absolutely everything…must be explained in those terms, including our own rationality. Darwin was wise to have his horrid doubt.
Comment by DonaldM — November 26, 2008 @ 10:01 am
November 26th, 2008 at 11:43 am
Bradford,
I don't see how remote viewing of objects supports the idea that minds exist separate from brains. Why isn't it instead indicative of an ability by embodied human beings to see things without using their eyes? In any event, people have been trying to demonstrate paranormal abilities of all sorts for a very long time, and the results are always pretty hard to interpret.
I'm agnostic about psychic abilities, but even if they could be demonstrated, I don't see how dualism would explain them or why dualism would be more consistent with them then physicalism would be.
The intelligent mind of ID is either embodied, or it is dismebodied. If it is embodied, then ID does not answer the question it purports to answer, viz how do complex biological bodies come to exist in the first place? That leaves the hypothesis that a disembodied mind (immaterial mindstuff) was responsible, which entails dualism. Since we don't know if dualism is true or not, and can't design any experiment to answer the question, ID remains a theological speculation that can't be evalauted scientifically.
Nobody is arguing that minds don't exist, obviously. The word "mind" must not come loaded with your preconceived answer to the mind/body question, however. Mind might be res cogitans, or it might be what brains do.
Of course we can't understand all of psychology by looking at neurons; we need to observe behavior at all levels. This doesn't mean that minds exist independently of brains, however.
Comment by aiguy — November 26, 2008 @ 11:43 am
November 26th, 2008 at 11:55 am
Donald M,
If we assume we are rational, then Plantinga's argument is irrelevant. If we assume we are irrational, then all arguments are irrelevant.
Comment by aiguy — November 26, 2008 @ 11:55 am
November 26th, 2008 at 1:31 pm
aiguy:
Well, the deal with NDEs is that they apparently occur when the body is dead and there is no high level brain activity. If it were simply projection, telepathy or some other 'paranormal' ability still tied metabolically to the operations of the brain, the experiences would not occur during clinical death, would they?
So it does seem to me that if ever there are positive evidences of mind-sans-body experience during clinical death, it would go a very long way toward establishing the likelihood of substance duality. There are of course other manifestations that are even more mysterious, and probably not so easily confirmed as with pictures on top of ER shelves, which also suggest a substance duality may be present. It doesn't seem very 'scientific' to dismiss such reports and direct, empirical experiences just because they aren't shared with others directly. We directly share precisely NONE of our personal empirical experiences, yet for those that (given leeway from perspective) we still consider to be 'real' because we can communicate them and appeal to other people's direct empirical experience with same or similar phenomena.
In the end, 'science' may reject anything it cannot physically control for purposes of power. It can always further limit its purview and applications, to its collective heart's content. But that won't serve to bolster the silly idea that scientific knowledge is the only knowledge that matters. Or the only knowledge of the world that can be considered 'real'. Rejecting the anomalous does not support the exclusivity of the norm. And no theoretic that cannot explain the anomalies as well as the norms has any legitimate claim on big-t Truth.
Comment by Joy — November 26, 2008 @ 1:31 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 1:36 pm
Aiguy
On what basis do you assume that you are rational? That’s is the question. I could assume that the product of a random number generator is a rational code but such an assumption is not warranted
That a mind that is the result of unguided evolution can’t be counted on to be rational is not an assumption but a strait foward inference from the evidence.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 26, 2008 @ 1:36 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 1:47 pm
Joy,
To stay on topic, rather than debate NDEs here (you have the other thread for that), I think we should just make sure the dependencies have been made clear. Let's say here that maybe dualism is true, and maybe NDE experiments will someday provide good evidence that dualism is true. At that point, then, we would have good reason to say that disembodied minds exist, and that they can at least percieve and remember if not design and build complex structures. In this case, ID would have some support for positing that some type of disembodied mind existed which was responsible for designing living things.
But of course if we find no evidence that thought, memory, and perception can take place without the benefit of a working brain, ID would be back where it started – without reason to believe that intelligent design can be accomplished by anything but a complex life form (meaning, of course, that the original complex life forms cannot be the result of intelligent design).
So I'm not saying dualism is false, and I'm not saying that various mysterious phenomena aren't actually taking place. All I'm saying is that ID needs to admit that it critically depends on the truth that these phenomena actually represent the activity of disembodied minds, and all this talk about forensics and archeology "detecting design" is beside the point.
If you don't believe in substance dualism and the reality of disembodied minds, then you cannot believe that ID answers the question "How did complex life forms come to exist in the universe?". I think this is perfectly obvious, but lots of people don't, and I think it generates a lot of confusion.
Comment by aiguy — November 26, 2008 @ 1:47 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 1:53 pm
Hi FMM,
I am not making that assumption. Read my argument once again. I said IF we assume we are rational, not that we should assume such a thing.
No, it is not a straightforward inference of course! (I happen to think that evolution may be perfectly capable of producing rational minds, since rational minds ought to be able to help organisms survive to reproduction!).
But I think you just haven't understood my counter-argument. Simply put: Either our minds are rational or they are not rational. But we cannot possibly know which is the case, because if our minds are not rational, we can not use rational thought to know this.
Comment by aiguy — November 26, 2008 @ 1:53 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:28 pm
aiguy,
This seems obviously false – ID doesn't necessarily touch on the question whether a mind is embodied or disembodied, only that the workings of a mind can be inferred (however strongly) by looking at a given material states of affairs. If design is inferred, it doesn't follow that the designer's mind is disembodied – whatever that may mean. Only that a mind was involved.
Comment by nullasalus — November 26, 2008 @ 2:28 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:30 pm
I don't see why you think this is misleading. Discussing all we know says nothing about how much there is to know. Do you think I mean to claim that science knows everything? I'm not even saying that science could tell us everything.
Oh, maybe this is the key. We aren't talking about possibilities, we're talking about certainties. Remember? How to build a bridge that won't collapse? How to do safe and effective brain surgery? For such questions, we are not interested in what might be, only what is.
What's the point, then? If it's impossible to tell whether it's A or B, what point is there in saying it is A? Never mind that it's simply illogical to say A: it's also entirely useless.
I don't find it hard to see how to build that case at all. On the other hand, I do find it hard to see how to build a case for our own rationality or the truth of our own thoughts if we can no clue whatsoever what they are the end product of.
But that's why our imaginations are not considered scientific evidence.
I'm not trying to fool you, so listen carefully: everything you say is built on a fundamental assumption that you are something more than your physical body. I can see this in statements like, "chemical process over which we have no control", a statement that presupposes that we exist as something outside those chemical processes. Physicality proposes that we are those physical processes, so it makes no more sense to speak of controlling them than it does to discuss how a river interacts with its water molecules.
Comment by don provan — November 26, 2008 @ 2:30 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:36 pm
Hi Nullasalus -
Well, I think this underlines the confusion at least. Once again:
1) Either the Designer posited by ID is embodied or disembodied.
2) If the Designer posited by ID is an embodied life form, then ID has not answered the question regarding how embodied life forms originated. Perhaps ID might try to answer some other question (such as how life forms came to Earth), but it cannot be offered as an explanation of the origin of biological structures. Of course, such theories (like Crick's panspermia) have been around for a long time, and aren't really very interesting at all, both because there is no evidence for them and because they fail to answer the central question of how life originally got started.
3) That leaves the option that the Designer posited by ID is disembodied – whatever that may mean.
Comment by aiguy — November 26, 2008 @ 2:36 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:37 pm
Aiguy
Plantinga's argument can't be dismissed in two sentences. The full argument comprises two chapters of his book Warrant and Proper Function. Those two chapters so unnerved the philosophical naturalists in the academy that they became the subject of an entire book entitled Naturalism Defeated?, with a final chapter by Plantinga himself. While interesting points were raised by some of Plantinga's critics, his core argument, which is the essence of what I quoted here, remains unrefuted. It isn't a matter of what we assume. It is a matter of what provides warrant for our belief that we are rational and that we have true beliefs. What doesn't provide warrant is a completely materialistic explanation…and that is Plantinga's point. That view comes with its own defeater. So does physicalism for the very same reason.
Comment by DonaldM — November 26, 2008 @ 2:37 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:37 pm
aiguy,
A consequence of Plantinga's argument seems to be that if we consider ourselves rational, we should ask ourselves what we should expect of the world (including our mind's development) to make that true.
Keep in mind that Plantinga isn't arguing that evolution is incapable of producing rational minds. It's more the kind of evolution that would most justifiably do that. The issue doesn't get dismissed with a simple assumption of rationality, but what even that assumption likely implies.
Comment by nullasalus — November 26, 2008 @ 2:37 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:43 pm
First, the link referenced a study of the phenomenon not some undocumented claim. Remote viewing would completely upset known scientific explanations involving sensory pathways. It would be as if the mind could receive an image without the requisite photons hitting the retina. This isn't revision of convention physical explanations. This would call for radical adjustments. The mind correctly perceiving environmental data without sensory pathways. How do minds sense things with accuracy without senses? No imaginings when detailed mental images match reality.
Comment by Bradford — November 26, 2008 @ 2:43 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:44 pm
I've asked you a few times now, but I'll plead with you this time: please put my mind at ease. What does dualism offer that explains things in any terms. You grasp duality like a warm blanket, convinced it protects you from these terrible conclusions even as I point out to you that you've still got all the same problems, but in spades because you've rejected the only source of explanations.
I will stipulate that materialism is flawed in any way you wish me to accept. Let's leave the question of materialism's validity completely behind. Now what? What do you actually have to offer? You think you're arguing for one theory over another, but all I see you doing it shooting down one theory so you can replace it with one that has all the same flaws and, in addition, is vacuous.
Comment by don provan — November 26, 2008 @ 2:44 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:46 pm
aiguy,
If design is inferred, design is inferred, period – maybe the source was disembodied. Maybe it wasn't. It's the inference of design that ID concerns itself with expressly. Identity and composition of the designer is a wholly other question.
I would think that whether or not a given mind is 'embodied', the very question of design with regards to our own existence is one worth pursuing – if not scientifically, then certainly philosophically/metaphysically. Arguing that either the design is unimportant (purely because it would be embodied) or unprovable (because if it's disembodied, it could never be scientifically proven) doesn't seem like a good way to handle this.
Comment by nullasalus — November 26, 2008 @ 2:46 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:47 pm
aiguy:
Depends on whether or not the physics involved in quantifying consciousness must extend into the realm of the quantum and beyond, present in the equations that serve to establish what the variables are and how fine-tuned the constants. If consciousness (or panprotoconsciousness) looks likely to be a fundamental parameter of manifestation, then we will have to start looking at all things physical – including or especially life and all its many forms – in a different way.
There is already the inescapable duality of all things physical at the quantum level, complicated by the apparent ability of consciousness to determine form. Biology cannot forever ignore physical reality in order to prop up any of its self-serving metaphysical corruptions related to the process of evolution. And the origin of life in the universe. Some intervention by consciousness in the manifestation of reality may be found necessary in the end. It won't establish anybody's personal God/gods, but it will put to rest the misuse of science to make unwarranted metaphysical claims. I think that would be a good thing.
Comment by Joy — November 26, 2008 @ 2:47 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:48 pm
Don Provan
You're right, I do think we are something more than our physical selves. I don't just base that I what I believe to be true, I also base it on logic and reasoning. Every form of matrialism, naturalism or physicalism that tries to explain rationality through blind, unguided, unintelligent processes falls prey to the same problem: self-refutation. The Christian view that we begin with an ultimate mind that imparts our minds to us doesn't have that problem. And it does no good to say that we can demonstrate that scientifically, because there are many things we hold to be true as humans that can't be demonstrated scientifically. If there's anything that's true about how we think and reason it is that we can acertain truth by means other than scientific method. Philosophical reasoning is one of those means. Indeed the justification for scientific method itself can only be arrived at through philosophical reasoning. There's no non-circular way that science can justify its methods through scientific method.
If our minds are matter independent, as I believe they are, then we have a strong basis to claim that we can control, originate and reorganize our thoughts. If they are not matter independent, than we have little if any warrant for believing our thoughts to be rational, or that we have true beliefs. Indeed , there's no non-circular way to both defend physicalism or materialism or naturalism and claim rationality at the same time.
Comment by DonaldM — November 26, 2008 @ 2:48 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:50 pm
This is not any complexity. It is specific with reference to human rationality. I do not presume the sufficiency of evolutionary pathways for that.
Alternatively it leaves you (plural and a with future time frame in mind) with the option of constructing the capacity for human reason, in all that entails, by using material parts. Materialism has a theological component.
Comment by Bradford — November 26, 2008 @ 2:50 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:50 pm
The link references the proposal of a study, not some documented claim. Is that what you meant?
Comment by don provan — November 26, 2008 @ 2:50 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 2:57 pm
Don Provan
I guess I thought I've made this pretty clear already. You claim that by embracing dualism like a warm blanket I've rejected the only source of explanations. By that I presume you mean scientific method. But, as I've said elsewhere, I don't accept that science and the scientific method is the only source for proper explanations. If one thinks only science is the source of explanations, then one has to explain that premise by science as well. But clearly that commits the fallacy of assuming the consequent (or begging the question) and becomes a self-refuting argument. Clearly there are other means to obtain explanation then the scientific method.
Logic and reason alone provide more than enough warrant to reject materialism, naturalism or physicalism and embrace dualism as explanation for our minds. It does not require a lab experiment any more than I need a lab experiment to tell me that my wife loves me.
Comment by DonaldM — November 26, 2008 @ 2:57 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 3:01 pm
I apologize for not taking a personal interest in you, but I don't care what you think or why you think it. I only want to know what brain surgery techniques are safe and effective. If all you have to offer are opinions, you'll forgive me if I choose not to stake my life on them.
Furthermore, you are incapable of imagining anything else, so you are not actually evaluating the alternative, you are just rejecting it as a fundamental assumption.
Again, we if they are matter independent, we have absolutely no warrant whatsoever for believing our thoughts to be rational or that we have true beliefs.
OK, one more time, then: what's the non-circular way to defend dualism and claim rationality at the same time?
You need to come to grips with the fact dualism has all the same logical flaws you are complaining about in materialism. Or explain to me what I am missing that makes dualism immune to them.
Comment by don provan — November 26, 2008 @ 3:01 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 3:05 pm
You embrace dualism because you do not apply the same logic and reason to it. If you did, you'd see that dualism has exactly the same logical faults and should be rejected for exactly the same reasons.
Comment by don provan — November 26, 2008 @ 3:05 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 3:09 pm
A pertinent philosophical paper for this dualism/materialism debate about minds.
Comment by nullasalus — November 26, 2008 @ 3:09 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 3:18 pm
Hi Donald,
I'm aware of the history of Plantinga's argument. At the risk of a failure of humility, I believe my counter-argument to be sound. If you disagree, let's argue about it rather than appeal to authority.
The point is not what we assume, that's correct. The point is whether or not we can know we are rational, and I claim that we can not (because if we are not we might irrationally believe we are).
I actually think you misunderstand Plantinga. He does not attempt to support the assumption for our rationality. Rather, he says that if we are to believe we are rational, and if we believe that the probability that our rationality evolved naturally is low, then our beliefs are in conflict (our belief in our rationality is self-defeating). The problem with Plantinga's argument, in my view, is then twofold: First, I don't believe we know the probability of evolution producing rational minds is low, and second I don't believe we can know we are rational.
Nullasalus,
I didn't dismiss the issue by assuming rationality. I do not assume rationality, because I think we have no grounds to do so. Since we cannot assume rationality, it does no good to start with rationality and ask what must be true in order for our rationality to exist.
Well, no, not "period". The law of the excluded middle ensures that I am correct: ID is either talking about embodied life forms or not. I show that either of these scenarios are problematic for ID, for reasons I've explained.
No, that is a specious argument. No matter how you answer the question of the nature of the Designer, you run into problems. If you answer "embodied" then you have admitted ID can't answer the question of how bodies originated. If you answer "disembodied" you need to think about how to evidence the existence of disembodied entities that can think like life forms do and build physical structures.
And people have been pursuing these thoughts for thousands of years of course.
I think it's a good way to show that ID can't start with human intelligence and suggest that the same thing is responsible for the design of biological complexity. That reasoning simply assumes that biological complexity is not itself required for human intelligence.
Comment by aiguy — November 26, 2008 @ 3:18 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 3:38 pm
aiguy,
If you can't assume rationality, then you have no argument against Plantinga. Any argument would assume rationality from the outset.
Only by insisting that ID's project be something other than what ID's own proponents say they are.
My understanding of ID is that it doesn't attempt to 'answer' problems definitely, only infer. Again: If design is inferred, then design is inferred. Asking whether the designer was embodied or not is an additional project. Argue that all ID can argue is whether design can be inferred in the case of /our/ bodies, and you're still left with something of interest.
Of course they can. You even seem to implicitly admit that they can do so, which is possibly a step further than even I'm willing to go. Your conclusion is that if design is inferred, then it's either disembodied (and thus cannot be proven) or embodied (and thus you insist the revelation is uninteresting.) The latter is the one that's really throwing me here. Forget that ID isn't only concerned with biological structures – there are cosmological ID arguments as well. But you're saying that if ID is capable of detecting design, even if detection is accurate, it somehow doesn't matter because you can still ask a larger question about the ultimate origin of intelligence.
You could lodge a similar argument against origin of life studies. Any origin of life scenario could be an event orchestrated by an intelligent force, and neither intelligent nor unintelligent causation could be demonstrated. So at best the OOL would demonstrate 'at some point, life on earth began' without shedding any light on the 'ultimate' origin of life. Therefore the OOL can never demonstrate what it intends to (the actual, ultimate origin of life) and is therefore uninteresting.
Comment by nullasalus — November 26, 2008 @ 3:38 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 3:56 pm
Nullasalus,
If none of us can assume rationality, then none of us have any arguments at all. So we can assume rationality, but we cannot claim that this as a fact we can evidence. For all we know, we are all irrational, but we can't see it because… we are all irrational.
Again, I think it is obvious that the state of affairs is just as we see it: We are sometimes rational, and we are sometimes irrational. Each of us is rational or irrational about different things to different extents. When we're being irrational, we don't necessarily know that we are; sometimes somebody else can point it out, and then we can see it. All of this fits what we would expect of a naturally evolved mind.
ID proponents try to dodge the problem by leaving the issue open. I point out why that doesn't help.
ID presents "intelligent causation" as a proposed best explanation of how various features of life forms (and the universe) came to exist. If that is not their project, what is it?
Sorry, but this doesn't work. If design is inferred, then the designer is either a life form or not – you really can't wiggle out of that one. By looking at both of these possibilities independently, we see the sleight-of-hand of defining "design" as something unrelated to what is doing the "designing".
If ID posits that intelligent life forms created life on Earth, they join Francis Crick and the Raelians (and Scientology?) and all sorts of folks who have envisioned alien life forms seeding life on Earth. Maybe you find that stuff interesting; I don't, because there has never been any evidence that any such thing happened.
I don't follow you here. If we could mix some ammonia and methane (or something) in a vat and out popped some living critters, I'd say that was a pretty interesting development in OOL studies: It would tell us that if only ammonia and methane was somehow found together on Earth, that would result in the creation of living things. The concept of "intelligence" would not be relevant at all.
Comment by aiguy — November 26, 2008 @ 3:56 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 3:58 pm
B being analogous to C is not saying that B is the same thing as C.
Saying that seems to assume that intelligence and rational thought is completely reducible to the firing of neurons.
Comment by GringoRoyale — November 26, 2008 @ 3:58 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 4:02 pm
aiguy:
And if the chemical mixing comes up empty time and time again then that also gives us a message. The chemical sufficiency argument for life's origin has a mirror opposite or it is dogma, not science.
Comment by Bradford — November 26, 2008 @ 4:02 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 4:04 pm
Hi GringoRoyale,
I agree that analogies are not identities. But if the "intelligence" if ID is not supposed to be the same thing as the "intelligence" in humans, why does ID use the same word? And what exactly is the same, and not the same, between the two different things? (please don't simply say they both can create complex form and function)
Who is saying that? Not evolutionary biology certainly…
Comment by aiguy — November 26, 2008 @ 4:04 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 4:07 pm
I'm not arguing that we understand OOL of course – I was refuting Nullasalus' objection that my criticism of ID applies to OOL.
Comment by aiguy — November 26, 2008 @ 4:07 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 4:14 pm
aiguy,
What we would expect of a naturally (as in, utterly unguided) evolved mind is more than that, and 'sometimes rational, sometimes not' could just as easily fit in under a 'designed but fallen' scenario. I don't see this as engaging Plantinga, but whatever – it can be set aside.
Your 'pointing out' amounts to insisting that their project is other than what they say it is.
Because it only deals with our universe, and with life forms on earth. You're insisting that their project 'really' has to be an explanation of any and all intelligent life whatsoever, arguing that this isn't possible, and that therefore nothing can be accomplished.
Wiggle out? I'm saying it doesn't matter at all. Assume that the designer is an embodied being. Assume that the designer is a disembodied being. You still end up with a being that performs intelligent acts, and said acts may stand out as particularly noticeable/detectable against typical 'noise'.
Francis Crick would have apparently disagreed with you at one point, re: evidence. So too would ID proponents. As for Raelians and Scientologists- are you really playing the 'bad association card' here? I've heard tell that many ID critics are filthy godless communists, aiguy. Are you sure you want to be among their number?
It would tell us that an intelligent agent can reasonably (even strongly, considering the experiment) be envisioned as playing any role in the origin of life. Therefore any proposed OOL could never be offered as an -actual- OOL: If life began on earth as the result of an intelligent project, then it wasn't really the origin of life, now was it?
In which case, OOL is not a legitimate field of scientific inquiry, going by your standards. At most it's an engineering issue.
Comment by nullasalus — November 26, 2008 @ 4:14 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 4:19 pm
Hi aiguy,
I don't see how this is any different than classifying a rickshaw and a SR-71 as vehicles. But the two aren't the same. We could possibly be only familiar with a rickshaw, describing it as we typically do with the word 'vehicle'…. then one day see an SR-71 (eventhough we don't know that it is an SR-71) and refer to its activity as a vehicle in the same manner we do when we refer to our rickshaws.
We would know where the similarities lay, but it would also be evident where the two are not the same.
I may have misunderstood you. I thought you were saying that biological complexity would be a prerequisite for intelligence. Pointing to humans and saying that there is an example of biological complexity and intelligence…. therefore intelligence needs biological complexity.
Comment by GringoRoyale — November 26, 2008 @ 4:19 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 5:00 pm
This is very insightful. I've never seen anything that suggests ID is applying an analogy rather than an identity. Where can I see the analogy laid out?
Comment by don provan — November 26, 2008 @ 5:00 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 5:09 pm
Nullasulus,
The problem for Plantinga is this: He wants to believe that P(R | NS) is low, but as you yourself point out, we don't have good reason to believe this. That is one reason his argument fails. The other reason is we don't have good reason to believe we're rational.
Come on, Nullasalus, I'm not making this up – this is just what ID proponents say: ID asserts that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection. This is obviously not restricted to "how life got on Earth". Take a look at ID's arguments – CSI, conservation of information, IR, and so on. Each of these argues that biological complexity cannot derive from "unguided" mechanism. They propose an explanation which they believe circumvents this problem and thus represents a solution to the problem of the origin of biological complexity – not just on Earth, but explaining the actual origin of CSI-filled, IR biological structures.
We know living things have behaviors we call intelligent. We imagine there may be other life forms like us elsewhere in the universe. Maybe life on Earth was seeded by one of them. None of this goes one iota toward explaining what ID proponents claim to explain: How complex form and function such as we see in biology can arise. It really doesn't help to say that life can come from other life – we already know that, right?
No, not really. Have you actually read his book?
Obviously. Unfortunately they mistake gaps and negative arguments against evolutionary and cosmological theories as positive evidence for the existence of a conscious mind that created life and the universe. Very confused, that.
Ok. I'm not filthy.
Point being: ID isn't interested in panspermia any more than the rest of us are. They are absolutely, positively intent on arguing that intelligence transcends physical mechanism and accounts for the existence of life. The structure of ID's argument is exactly that: unguided physical mechanism cannot do the job, so a guided process must be involved. Guided by what? A necessarily non-mechanical/non-physical mind.
I still don't get it. The experiment shows that a few chemicals mixing around makes life. This means that if we posit those chemicals existed together, life is explained. We are then left with the mystery of how those chemicals existed together, a much different problem than what we started with. In contrast, if you explain the origin of life on Earth by life from somewhere else, you are left with exactly the same problem you started with, namely the origin of life.
GringoRoyale,
The problem with this is that we know all about rickshaws and SR-71s, and we can enumerate all the ways in which they are similar (as vehicles) and all the ways they are different. None of this applies to the use of the term "intelligence" in ID, where no attempt is made to characterize what we might actually be talking about. I believe you can't tell me anything about what is the same and what is different between the "intelligence" of human beings and the "intelligence" that ID describes.
I am saying that for all we currently know this appears to be the case, because all instances of designers in our experience critically rely on their brains to do their designing.
Well, no, I'd say neuroscience has progressed a bit beyond noting that brains and thought simply co-occur. Even Egnor admits that brains are necessary (though he insists not sufficient) for human minds to function (I can find the reference for this if you'd like). Weirdly, Egnor does not understand that even this admission dooms ID.
Comment by aiguy — November 26, 2008 @ 5:09 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 5:57 pm
aiguy,
That we don't have a good reason to believe we're rational if naturalism and evolution is true is Plantinga's point. If your reply to Plantinga is 'Well, we don't have a good reason to believe we're rational', that's fine – it's a concession. If you want to argue that we're rational in any real way, sense has to be made of how to justify that. If you don't want to argue we're rational in any real way, that's fine – plenty are willing to engage Plantinga on that point out of a realization of the importance of the argument.
And those 'certain features' happen to be 'features we are currently aware of and thus are capable of investigating'. No, aiguy, I'll say this flat out: Insofar as you insist that the ID project must be to explain not just particular incidents of biological complexity on earth (insofar as ID investigates biology) but the 'actual origin' even of imagined CSI/IR we don't even have direct access to witnessing, you are misrepresenting the ID case. And I say this as someone who doesn't believe ID is scientifically valid.
'As we see in biology'. And it's not an explanation total, but an inference about a type of cause. Further, not 'can arise' but, specific to the question, 'most likely did arise'.
As for whether it helps, that depends. If the best explanation for a given material structure or event is 'direct intervention' or 'guided development' or otherwise, yes, I think something important and interesting is being asserted.
Yes, really. This line inevitably comes down to an argument about what qualifies as evidence towards an inference. Crick did not pull the thought of directed panspermia utterly out of his ass, though he certainly pulled his explanations for the rationales of such direction from said place.
You're mixing the personal convictions of some, even most, ID proponents in with what they claim ID itself is able to infer. If you're arguing what I think you are here – that despite all claims to the contrary, ID is about specifically detecting non-physical mind at work in the universe rather than mind, period – then there's no point in even pursuing this further. ID proponents admit their methods can only infer intelligence, not prove God or immaterial minds, but they don't really mean it. ID critics argue their main concern is that ID is bad or improper science, it isn't that they're afraid of having their philosophies or politics challenged, but they don't really mean it.
Well, that's pretty much the point, now isn't it? You're 'left with the mystery of how those chemicals existed together', and that mystery can always entail intelligence/life being present at any point where life 'began' on earth. You haven't 'explained life', certainly not the origin of life. You can't rule out the latter, so you never get the former. There is no 'origin of life' science – it can't be a scientific investigation, because the actual origin can never be certain. The historical question is off the table, and you're left with an engineering problem. Unexciting. Uninteresting.
Comment by nullasalus — November 26, 2008 @ 5:57 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 6:11 pm
Aiguy
If you assume you are rational you need to justify that assumption that’s what I’m saying.
!
Of course it is. Evolution does not always or even rarely produce a rational mind. The strait forward inference from this fact is that a mind that is the result of unguided evolution can’t be counted on to be rational. There is nothing controversial in that statement.
(I happen to think that evolution may be perfectly capable of producing rational minds, since rational minds ought to be able to help organisms survive to reproduction!).
It’s possible that evolution might produce a rational mind but such an event is extremely unlikely. Not a single other species in the history of life on earth has achieved this feat
This is a false dilemma these are not the only choices the question should be worded thus
either our minds are reliably rational or they are not their is a wole spectrum of possibilities.
It very possible that a usually irrational mind might have a stroke of rationality now and then.
Or conversely a rational mind might have occasional irrational thoughts.
The question is are our minds reliably rational
If a particular process (unguided evolution) can’t be counted on to produce reliably rational thoughts then we can’t rely on it to produce such thoughts. It only take one second of lucidity to see this
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 26, 2008 @ 6:11 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 6:15 pm
aiguy
Well, then, if you really believe that, why do you bother debating and discussing the subject here. It seems contradictory to employ rational arguments to say we can't know we're rational. If you really, truly believe we can't know whether or not we're rational, then why think anything at all, let alone discuss anything you think.
At least you admit to the dilemma that physicalism poses for rationality, and I give you props for that! But I differ with you in that I beleive we can know we are rational because I believe we can know God, who is the source of our rationality. That belief is based on a whole range of things from personal experience, to reason and logic, to science and, yes, even faith (informed faith, not blind faith).
I understand that Plantinga's argument deals mainly with the low probability of rationality given N and E. If you're second point is correct, then the first is irrelevent. That aside, I strongly disagree with your first point. Of course we can know that the probability is low because we have no reason to think otherwise. We have no evidence whatsoever that the blind, purposeless forces of matter and energy evolving over eons of time through chance and/or necessity are capable of producing minds that produce rational thoughts and true beliefs. It wouldn't do to claim that here we are, with our rational minds, so there's the evidence, because that assumes the very point at issue. And it doesn't help to say we can not know, because then there's no point to discuss whatsoever. We're left with, well, nothing whatsoever. With no upside and significant downside, the probability of R on N&E seems very low. But the dilemma for the naturalist, materialist or physicalist is how to even admit that in a non-contradictory way because one would have to assume rationality to even make a response.
I find it most interesting that that seems to be exactly what you're doing in responding to me (or Bradford or anyone else) at all! Don't get me wrong. I appreciate your responses and engagement in this and other discussions. What I don't see, though, is why bother if rationality itself is in doubt. That seems like spitting in the wind.
Comment by DonaldM — November 26, 2008 @ 6:15 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 6:20 pm
aiguy
Are you rational or irrational when you make that statement? If rational, how do you know. If irrational, why believe it. If you can't know, then why bother making it all? This simply makes no sense.
Comment by DonaldM — November 26, 2008 @ 6:20 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 6:33 pm
Don Provan
You lost me. What does the issue of safe techniques for brain surgery have to do with dualism or physicalism? Of course, when undergoing brain surgery, I want my surgeon to know every physical detail of the organ housed in my head called the brain. What does that have to do with mind? Whether the mind emerged from the brain, or is matter independant doesn't change the physical make-up, cell structures and bio-chemistry of the brain.
No, I don't agree at all. I would be interested to see how you reason to that conclusion.
Comment by DonaldM — November 26, 2008 @ 6:33 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 7:25 pm
I guess I should have used "build a safe bridge" instead so as not to confuse you.
The point is that there are things, like bridge building and surgery, that we cannot leave to matters of opinion. Science is the technique we use to discover them. When you start with, "I think….", you aren't doing science. Your arguments for dualism were starting with "I think…"
I'm afraid I'm not in the mood to do it for you, but all you have to do it take any of the arguments that you've used in this thread to question "materialism" and substitute "dualism". You'll find that they all make exactly as much sense because nothing you've said about materialism doesn't apply just as well to dualism. If you think I'm wrong, tell me why and we'll proceed from there.
Comment by don provan — November 26, 2008 @ 7:25 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 7:29 pm
For the same reason he eats.
Comment by don provan — November 26, 2008 @ 7:29 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 9:18 pm
Good question. The bottom line is, most of us pragmatically assume we are rational, and then proceed ahead. To insist on a proof that we are rational is like looking for a proof that proofs are true, or a proof that proofs are false. It's nonsense. Rationality is the starting point. And I think we all really, really believe we are rational, down deep in our bones, whether we admit it or not, and regardless of the sophomoric pissing contests we engage in. If you deny it, then stick with pragmatism and jettison naturalism, which is a huge (unreliable) inference. Or accept it, and try to account for it without a transcendent source. (Good luck.) That's the choice. C.S.Lewis wrote a good little book which deals with the subject, naturalism in general, and the Incarnation specificially, which I recommend: Miracles.
Comment by kornbelt888 — November 26, 2008 @ 9:18 pm
November 26th, 2008 at 9:36 pm
nullasalus
No, it isn't. Let's all get this straight:
1. Plantinga first says we have reason to believe that P(R|N&E) is low. In other words, we have reason to think that it is unlikely that both of the following propositions are true: our minds evolved naturally, AND our cognitive faculties are reliable.
There are two problems with this first premise.
1.a The first problem is that there is no reason to assert that our cognitive faculties are either uniformally reliable or uniformally unreliable; in fact, this is almost certainly false. Joan's cognitive faculties may be quite rational when it comes to designing software, but patently irrational when it comes to investing her money. John's faculties may be reliable when he's cooking a meal, but he may lose any semblance of sanity when it comes to dating women. We all know this to be the case – people are neither 100% reliably rational nor 100% irrational.
1.b The second problem with the first premise is that we have no reason to think our minds are unreliable just because they evolved via natural selection. It could well be that rational minds confer a very important reproductive advantage. Moreover, for all we know, reliable ratiocination is relatively inexpensive to achieve via evolution, perhaps because there are (unknown) weak methods of cognition that are straightforward to implement in neurological media that enable reliable cognitive faculties. Since none of us know how we actually achieve our rationality, it is simply unfounded to speculate that evolutionary processes would likely result in unreliable minds.
So Plantinga's first premise is quite problematic, which is enough to defeat his entire argument. But let's move on anyway.
2. Plantinga then argues that IF we accept evolution, AND we accept that P(R|N&E) is low, THEN we are compelled to reject R. But this does not follow because (as described above) we do not accept that P(R|N&E) is low, nor do we accept that either R or ~R accurately reflects human mentality.
3. Plantinga goes on to claim that if one cannot have confidence in one's mental faculties, then one must doubt all of one's beliefs. But again this makes the mistake of assuming people are uniformally rational or irrational, which is surely untrue.
4. Plantinga concludes that belief in N&E undermines belief in R which in turn undermines belief in all of our beliefs, including N&E. What Plantinga misses at this step is that ~R undermines belief in ~R as well! If we accept ~R, then we can neither accept nor reject any argument at all…. but this does not mean R is true!
And so Plantinga's argument fails. Maybe we're reliably rational, and maybe we're not (and maybe, of course, we are sometimes rational and sometimes not). But none of this can tell us if evolutionary theory is true or not.
I've made no concessions here. I've pointed out that our beliefs about evolution can't tell us if we are rational or not, and that simply claiming that we are rational does not make it so.
I believe lots of folks have challenged Plantinga on all of these points, actually. I don't really think that anybody believes that people are either completely rational or not; any realistic assessment shows that people are subject to all manner of cognitive illusions.
Let's look at two different theories:
1) Life on Earth was designed by other living things from outer space.
2) Life on Earth is descendent from other living things from outer space.
Even if ID convinced us that no physical theory of abiogenesis could account for life on Earth, I would say the evidence (biological complexity) was equally consistent with both #1 and #2. But theory #2 is actually a slightly better theory than #1, because we already know that living things reproduce, while we don't actually know of any living things capable of designing living organisms (at least not yet).
We might ask, then, why don't ID proponents argue for theory #2 instead? I think you know the answer to that: ID argues that life can't arise from non-life without the transcendent properties of mind to generate CSI, and so somewhere along the line a conscious mind must have been involved in designing life.
Now, here are two versions of ID:
1) Life on Earth was designed by some other embodied, living thing
2) Life on Earth was designed by something disembodied
You want to say that ID is not obliged to say which of these two versions is true. But there is surely nothing wrong with unpacking the two and considering them seperately to evaluate their merits. That is all I'm doing.
What we find is that version #1 is an old idea that has languished for decades for lack of evidence and for lack of interest. If ID wants to pursue this hypothesis, they should be researching astrobiology and trying to understand what sorts of living things might be capable of designing life (e.g. do they need big brains?) But of course nobody in ID does this, because ID is not about version #1 at all. Instead, ID arguments focus on trying to prove that no physical mechanism can generate the complex form and function we see in living things. This has nothing to do with living things designing life – it is instead soley an attempt to argue for version #2 instead.
Yes, that is what is going on. Again, if ID was interested in figuring out what caused life on Earth, they would be at least as interested in other types of exogenesis, like panspermia. But they are not; they are interested only in talking about intelligent designers. Moreover, if ID was open to physical mechanism as the basis for embodied intelligence, then ID arguments (conservation of information, NFL, etc) would not attempt to show that physical mechanism is incapable of resulting in CSI-bearing structures.
Sorry, I think you aren't making sense on this point. Science succeeds by reducing mysteries, explaining disparate phenomena in terms of the simplest possible causal models (entities and relationships). Since life is complex and those chemicals are simple, showing how the latter proceeds by reguarities to produce the former would be a huge advance in our understanding. The fact that God may have put the chemicals here just has nothing to do with it. In contrast, if you explain life on Earth by appeal to life elsewhere, we would have gained no understanding of how life comes to exist.
fifth monarchy man,
Well I'm not, so I don't.
It is highly controversial, and I will disagree. How do you propose we settle our disagreement? I think there is no empirical way we could possibly decide. That means we don't know if evolution produces rational minds or not.
Sorry, but this is a particularly bad argument. Not a single other species has produced menopause, either, but that doesn't mean it is extremely unlikely to have evolved (you can say this about any unique feature of any species of course). Besides, how do you know our minds are rational?
FMM, I agree completely with this (please see my response to Nullasalus above). I believe this undermines Plantinga's argument.
We can hope our thoughts are reliable, but disbelieving in evolution won't make it so.
DonaldM
I like debating.
I don't think it is contradictory at all.
If we're not rational, then my argument might not be rational. But if we are rational, then I think the argument is rational (and sound). So if we are rational then we can't know if we are rational, and if we are not rational, we can't know it either. So we can't know if we are rational.
I tell this joke often:
WAITER: What will you have?
PHILOSOPHER DINER: I'm a determinist. Let's just wait and see what happens.
Just as we have no choice but to choose, we have no choice but to think.
Right – we don't know if evolution can produce reliable cognitive faculties. But as I've said, deciding not to believe in evolution isn't going to magically cause us to develop reliable cognitive faculties if we don't have them already!
What else is there to do?
Seriously, my belief is that it is completely wrongheaded for Plantinga to suggest that our minds are either rational or not; rather, our minds seem pretty good at certain tasks, pretty lousy at others, and our rationality varies across time, moods, age, experience, and so on. Our minds are what we have to work with here, and it isn't going to help us to do or understand anything if we decide that everything we think is likely insane. So even though we can't put epistemology on an objectively sound footing, we muddle ahead as though modus ponens was true, and our thoughts and memories correspond to real things in a real world.
Comment by aiguy — November 26, 2008 @ 9:36 pm
November 27th, 2008 at 12:42 pm
aiguy,
No, it's enough to warrant a response from Plantinga even if your criticisms held. And honestly, they don't. Plantinga's argument has been replied to, he's replied to the replies, and so on. I don't find your case here compelling for reasons I'll explain.
And where does Plantinga argue that if naturalism is not true, we're 100% rational – or that we're 100% irrational if naturalism is true? Instead he frames the question in terms of whether such minds can be expected to reliably grasp the truth by a given measure. So pointing out from the outset that we're not meeting the 100% rational/irrational standard has nothing to do with Plantinga's argument.
Plantinga argues part of this case based on the 'invisibility' of truth to thoroughly materialist descriptions of the world. Under such a scenario, truth is epiphenomenal at best – all that matters is behavior. Now, you can twist here and argue that naturalism is not necessarily tied to materialism, and then start providing other hypothetical scenarios where evolution can reasonably be expected to produce rational beings. But then you're encountering another aspect of the problem – at what point does a 'naturalist' depiction of evolution start to look downright teleological? Aristotle's metaphysics could arguably be called 'naturalist', but if naturalism has to look like that to seem plausible, well, then the EAAN is accomplishing another task.
So no, we do have good reason to question the ability of NS to produce truth-reliable minds if we walk into the discussion with certain naturalist-common understandings of how evolution 'should' play out. Remember, Plantinga's case isn't just against naturalism here, certainly not just against NS, but a conjunction. He can accept modifications to these concepts – that such may be forced by his inquiry is, I think, part of the point in his making the argument.
This isn't an argument against evolution. It's an argument against evolution of a specific type, operating under given philosophical restrictions. Plantinga is more than capable of accepting evolution – it would simply be guided, or under a suspiciously modified 'naturalism' scenario. And again, this isn't about 100% rational or 100% irrational.
Plantinga's point is that if you accept a conception of biological development that necessarily provides low confidence for believing in reasonably reliable rational capabilities, then you have a reason to doubt what you accept – including that particular conception of biological development. Accept a different conception of such development and the question changes.
Inconsequential. Plantinga's argument primarily touches on what's required to form a consistent worldview compatible with a reasonable belief in reliable R, and how (in his view) something has to give way. Oddly the question tends to get framed in such a way that suggests Plantinga is trying to suggest people reject evolution, but that doesn't seem to be his goal at all. He's pointing out the problem of a particular type of evolution, conjoined to (particular type(s) of?) naturalism (since he particularly stresses materialist formulations of N.)
Plantinga's argument is not against evolutionary theory.
Plantinga's argument does not hinge on 'completely rational or not'. It's about consistency of belief coupled with a belief in one's rationality based on worldview. Yes, Plantinga has been challenged – Plantinga has responded to the challenges. It's an interesting debate.
This is a tremendously weak link in the chain here.
First, we're entirely capable of 'designing living organisms'. Dog breeds, genetically modified foods, etc. The list goes on, and is expanding by the year. Now, maybe you have a point that we don't actually and currently have technology capable of creating life from non-life. How much money do you want to bet that that limitation will hold? I don't think even the most ardent OOL skeptics will take the risk.
Further, who says ID has to convince anyone that 'no physical theory of abiogenesis' could account for life? It could be a physical theory that implies or requires intelligent guidance/intervention.
Actually, some ID proponents do to a degree. The one that first comes to mind is Rob Sheldon – he's a minor player at most compared to Behe, Dembski, even Mike Gene. But he's offered up what amounts to a panspermia view of evolution/life. Interesting stuff.
I don't know of his specific take on the OOL, but he's certainly very friendly to the 'life originated from outer space' scenario without a clear distinction between 1 and 2.
As near as I can tell, ID arguments focus on trying to prove that no physical mechanism -sans agent input- is the best explanation of given events and features within the natural sciences. Your insistence keeps coming down to ID being fundamentally based on somehow identifying the designer in some way, but it just doesn't work. It's not what they say. It's not what their investigations demand. Yes, I'm very certain that many ID proponents think God can explain the curious situations they see (though ID does have some agnostic, even atheist defenders. I'll be throwing up a post about that eventually.) They also tend to keep their 'science' distinct from those claims.
Again, I've seen ID interest in panspermia previously – Rob Sheldon even presented a paper over at UD which was found to be of interest by others there, myself included. ID's criticisms of physical mechanism, as near as I can tell, are based on the assumption of 'unguided/agent-free' physical mechanisms. They disagree amongst themselves about where 'guidance' does show up in the grand scheme of things.
ID is, in my opinion, growing and spreading intellectually. There is a disenchantment with the DI, but the general gist – even if it's primarily philosophical or intellectual, rather than scientific, in those eyes – is appealing. It's a mistake to conflate the DI with ID as if they're one and the same. Then again, I also think it's a mistake to write off all of even what the DI says. They do have interesting perspectives or make interesting points at times, and I feel grateful to them for adding a new and interesting perspective to viewing science.
I'm applying what I see as your standards and insisted consequences to the OOL argument. If we're going by your standards – where identifying or inferring design in life on our planet is 'uninteresting' because the real question is what the actual origin of life is – then OOL studies are misnamed. They can't possibly identify the 'origin of life', because any possible nonlife-to-life development could have been mediated by a living force, either directly or indirectly (front-loading scenarios, etc.) Trying to find the actual origin of life is therefore unscientific and scientifically uninteresting – and the whole field is reduced to mere engineering questions.
And, Happy Thanksgiving to everyone.
Comment by nullasalus — November 27, 2008 @ 12:42 pm
November 27th, 2008 at 2:24 pm
DonaldM,
I'm feeling charitable, so here's your original argument. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think you've modified it over the course of our conversation:
Let's see if that holds up if I apply it to dualism:
"I do think we are nothing more than our physical selves. I don't just base that I what I believe to be true, I also base it on logic and reasoning. Every form of dualism that tries to explain rationality through unknown, non-physical processes falls prey to the same problem: self-refutation. The physical view that we begin with an ultimate physical existence that imparts our minds to us doesn't have that problem."
Mind you, I would never make that argument: the point is that it's every bit as logical and consistent with everything we know as yours is. Since the two otherwise equivalent arguments directly contradict each other, it's safe to say there's something wrong with this reasoning.
(When you're ready to move on: what's wrong with these arguments is that they secretly assert a metaphysical assumption. Yours assumes the existence of "an ultimate mind", my version, the existence of an emergent mind. It's no accident that these secret assertions align precisely with what each statement is seeking to prove.)
Comment by don provan — November 27, 2008 @ 2:24 pm
November 27th, 2008 at 6:41 pm
But Don,
Materialism is an unproven assumption. The only way to prove materialism within materialism is to use material evidence. But material evidence for a material universe is a hoplessly circular argument. With nothing more that a circular argument to go on materialism must be embrace on FAITH.
On the other hand I know that minds exist. If there were no minds I would not be experiencing anything. Skepticism, Occam's razor and valid (non-cirular evidence all come down on the side of "Mind-ism," not "Material-ism."
Comment by William Brookfield — November 27, 2008 @ 6:41 pm
November 28th, 2008 at 1:20 am
…he types on an unproven material keyboard.
Good thing I have no interest in proving materialism, then.
A faith we use all the time, every day.
What does this have to do with whether said mind is material or not?
…he types in on his Occam's Razor excluded material keyboard.
Occam's Razor has no application here: assuming a non-corporeal mind is no simpler than assuming the physical mind.
Comment by don provan — November 28, 2008 @ 1:20 am
November 28th, 2008 at 1:30 am
Hi Don,
Unproven indeed. My keyboard in not a material structure, it's an *information* structure — and so is yours.
Comment by William Brookfield — November 28, 2008 @ 1:30 am
November 28th, 2008 at 1:53 am
Somethings wrong here. Alas whenever I try to edit my typos my/the system crashes?!
What I meant to say was…
Unproven indeed. My keyboard is *not* a material structure, it's an *information* structure — and so is yours.
Comment by William Brookfield — November 28, 2008 @ 1:53 am
November 28th, 2008 at 2:19 am
Most people would consider it insane, literally, for you to believe your keyboard is not material.
Anyway, I just thought it was funny that you're using the material world to tell us the material world isn't proved. It reminds me of that old philosophy joke: "I'm a nihilist, and I don't understand why everyone else isn't a nihilist, too." But it has nothing to do with the conversation: I'm not supporting materialism, I'm just explaining why the arguments being made for dualism aren't holding any water.
Comment by don provan — November 28, 2008 @ 2:19 am
November 28th, 2008 at 2:28 am
Don
I am not "using the material world." There is no material world. You are *assuming* that there is a material world. That's your assumption. How can you prove there is a exists a material world to skeptic like me? besides calling me "insane." I could just as well call you insane for believing there exists a "material world."
Comment by William Brookfield — November 28, 2008 @ 2:28 am
November 28th, 2008 at 2:30 am
nullasalus,
But Plantinga fails to explain how the truth can be reliably grasped by any measure. This idea of a "reliable mind" is something that bears no relation to psychology as we know it; Plantinga cannot demonstrate that reliable minds exist, or even that they are possible. What we can observe is our actual human cogntive faculties – full of odd quirks and foibles, prone to illusion, and clearly unable to grasp truths very reliably at all (otherwise we would not be arguing amongst ourselves in this forum!)
One may question what features NS will or won't produce, but there is no theoretical framework available to decide these questions; the answer is indeterminate. Not only are we unable to assess the likelihood of NS producing reliable minds, we have no way to assess whether or not our minds are in fact reliable, however they may have come into existence.
Again, there is no reason to accept any estimate of confidence regarding how reliable our ratiocination may be. But the important point here is that the question of whether our minds are reliable is a question about the world, and the answer cannot be contingent upon what we believe about naturalism and evolution. No matter what is true about origins and ontology, our minds are what they are, and "changing the question" does not change the answer.
To summarize my position on this topic, then: Plantinga can't tell us if our minds are reliable or not. So, even if he argues successfully – and I'm certain he does not – that P(R|N&E) must be low, we can't know if it is N&E that is false, or R, or both. But questioning R simply doesn't get anybody anywhere, any more than questioning realism itself.
Of course I was talking about abiogenesis and not dog breeding, and of course I do not doubt that we are fairly close to being capable of creating something with the hallmarks of life (metabolism, reproduction, etc). I said that theory #2 (descendents) was a "slightly" better theory than intelligent design, not the only possible theory.
By "physical theory" I meant a theory that did not refer to "intelligence" as something transcending physical causation (if "intelligence" is not characterized as transcending mechanism, then in this context it means nothing other than "unknown physical process").
You've tried to shuffle past my point here, but I'm going to reiterate: If ID was truly about evaluating theories of origins against evidence, rather than primarily an exercise in theistic apologetics, then the "descendent" hypothesis would be at least as attractive (and justifiably more so) than the intelligent designer hypothesis. The fact that you can name only one person – whose work I couldn't even find on the net! – who has considered this hardly refutes my charge.
ID is not about establishing that life may have come from other life; it is wholly focussed on establishing the existence of an immaterial creative mind responsible for life. The ploy of including panspermia is exactly that for most ID apologists – a ploy, and nobody I've ever encountered in any of these debates anywhere has ever actually investigated it in good faith. If I was wrong about this, the ID movement would not be called "ID"; it would be called "alternative theories of origins" or something, and feature panspermia as the most likely alternative (since it requires the fewest ad hoc assumptions). But no, that's not what is going on at all.
I've never said anything about "identifying" anyone! It is not about identity of course – it is about what is actually meant by the word "designer". The "agent input" as you call it means in ID-speak "mental causation that transcends physical cause", which I am roughly equating to substance dualism here. So I point out that ID depends on dualism – on immaterial creative mind – but they fail to make that dependency explicit (and complain when I do).
Please: A lone, unknown UD blogger talking about panspermia does not counter my charge that the "Intelligent Design" movement is concerned with "Intelligent Designers" rather than descendents of life from elsewhere. And all this talk about "guidance" inevitably boils down to a position resembling substance dualism. I've never seen any IDer attempt to describe what "guidance" might mean except as a fundamental feature of the universe that transcends physical cause and has the power to do… whatever is needed to do to explain things that we otherwise cannot explain.
I'm grateful that the ID movement caused these forums to crop up where people argue about this stuff. Aside from that, my take is a bit different from yours. In my opinion, ID – and the DI in particular – is for the most part a sterile, futile exercise in bad theology and worse biology (and a cognitive science and philosophy of mind that is missing entirely!) that brings nothing new to any of these inquiries and serves mostly to confuse the lay public regarding the status of scientific knowledge.
I think I've made this pretty clear, but I'll try again.
No theory goes all the way back; there will always be brute facts that we start with to understand anything.
Now, we all want to know how life came to exist. If we could explain how physics and chemistry produces living things, that would be a great advance, despite the fact we did not explain how physics and chemistry came to exist. In contrast, if we could demonstrate that life did not originate on Earth at all, but first came to exist someplace else, that would be interesting enough, but it would not answer the question we set out to answer.
ID sets out to answer the very same question, and nobody in the ID movement (with the exception, perhaps, of this Rob Sheldon fellow) has any interest in any answer that doesn't involve an "intelligent designer". I know you disagree, but you failed to answer my challenge: If I'm wrong, why is this theory/movement called "Intelligent Design" in the first place? Why is this site called "Telic Thoughts"? Why not "Life Came from Outer Space"?
HAPPY THANKSGIVING!!!
Comment by aiguy — November 28, 2008 @ 2:30 am
November 28th, 2008 at 2:34 am
Sorry about that Don. You did not call me insane. Unfortunately, I cannot edit my posts without crashing the system.
Comment by William Brookfield — November 28, 2008 @ 2:34 am
November 28th, 2008 at 12:06 pm
Don Provan (in a re-write of my original comment)
The difference between my argument and yours is the word "unknown". While it may be perhaps true that this extra-natrual agent is unknown to you, it does not follow that he is unknowable to anyone. In fact, I've made it quite clear that based on experience, reasoning and whole range of other things that he is quite knowable. Perhaps you mean "unknown to science", but that doesn't help much either, because it wouldn't follow from that either that he is unknowable, unless you are taking the epistomological view of scientism, that we can only know that shich we can obtain through the scientific method. But that isn't useful either, since it, too, is self-refuting. If we can obtain true knowledge (and here I mean true in the sense of the correspondance meaning of truth) about the world by means other than the scientific method, then I see no reason why knowledge of God should not be at the top of that list.
But, I do not intend to wander too far off the purpose of this thread to debate the existence of God. My only point is that it is NOT a given that under the dualism view that the power responsible is unknown (and by extension unknowable). Indeed, a fairly strong case can be and has been made throughout history that a mountain of evidence, personal experience, reason and even science provides strong warrant for the opposite case. Obviously some reject such evidence or reason or experience for a variety of reasons, but that doesn't give warrant to the claim that he is unknown.
Comment by DonaldM — November 28, 2008 @ 12:06 pm
November 28th, 2008 at 12:40 pm
aiguy
Cute. I'll have to remember this one.
I very much disagree. Changing the question very much changes the answer or at least how the answer is understood. That is why at the outset of this thread it was correctly pointed how important worldviews are to these sorts of discussions.
Comment by DonaldM — November 28, 2008 @ 12:40 pm
November 28th, 2008 at 1:51 pm
don:
don, I have previously mentioned the actual duality at the very heart of all things physical. This has been known – irregardless of relative abilities to understand – for a full century, and it was right there upon meeting face-to-face with duality that materialism died its richly deserved death. Every desperate remnant to this day is just… desperation, human reluctance to admit their metaphysics is all wet.
William is correct that all things perceived are informational, even if it's only life forms participating here on this lonely planet with the capacity of decoding it and turning it into apparently material reality. It's an illusion, constructed of interacting energy and made 'real' by intervention of mind.
Even high school physics-I students are usually informed at some point that the chairs they're sitting upon and the walls that seem to so solidly enclose them aren't really solid objects at all. Yes, it can be mind-blowing, but it is true. Even the sci-fi concept of 'phasing' through solid objects ala Kitty Pryde [X-Men] is theoretically consistent with physical reality as-we-know-it. If we chose to lend any credence at all to eyewitness reports about the notorious WW-II Philadelphia Experiment, humans would seem to have been so 'phased' through solid metal (though not completely, which didn't turn out well).
Now, I do live my life in trust that my perception is reliable and physical reality is real enough for all practical purposes of my living. But I don't pretend to any philosophy or metaphysics that insists against all physical evidences that a material universe is some sort of Absolute All-There-Is. Probably because I know better, based on sound modern science.
"Insanity" insists that what is known not to be true must be Absolute Truth. You'll get nowhere around here with such a pretense.
Comment by Joy — November 28, 2008 @ 1:51 pm
November 28th, 2008 at 2:29 pm
Don
I should just let you know that, as a Monistic Idealist, I do not hold to any form of dualism. I am convinced that the entire universe is an information structure and that there is no such thing as a material universe. In spite of this I can still tie my shoelaces, play tennis and compose and produce symphonies. I am convinced that the world is orderly and I relate to and work within this cosmic order. My position is parsimonious in that I do *not* go the extra step and claim that reality is *both* orderly and material. Materialism as I see it, is a restrictive and utterly unnecessary myth.
Comment by William Brookfield — November 28, 2008 @ 2:29 pm
November 28th, 2008 at 2:32 pm
WB:
That sounds a bit like new age mumbo-jumbo to me. What do you mean, exactly, with an "information structure"?
Comment by Raevmo — November 28, 2008 @ 2:32 pm
November 28th, 2008 at 4:11 pm
DonaldM,
Consider two possibilities:
Possibility #1: Our minds are not reliable
In this case, if we decide that our minds are the product of natural evolution, that belief will not be reliable. Likewise, if we instead decide that our minds are the creation of God, that belief will not be reliable either.
Possibility #2: Our minds are reliable
In this case, if we decide that our minds are the product of natural evolution, or if we instead decide that our minds are the creation of God, our belief would be correct.
Unfortunately, we have no way to decide which possibility is the case.
This is what I meant when I said that no matter what is true about origins and ontology, our minds are what they are. Changing what we believe about God or evolution or minds will not affect the reliability of our cognitive faculties. In the end, Plantinga's argument can't tell us anything – it can't tell us if our minds are reliable, and it can't tell us if our minds evolved naturally either.
Comment by aiguy — November 28, 2008 @ 4:11 pm
November 28th, 2008 at 4:48 pm
I mean "not empirically demonstrated."
I am not in any way suggesting something here is unknowable. Science is limited to what is known. Feel free to add things to science by making them known, but don't expect science to accept something you think you know until you can demonstrate it to everyone else.
I am pointing out that the scientific method produces a body of knowledge with an important quality: it is reliable enough to risk each others lives on. What other knowledge there is, perhaps more important but certainly less reliable, is another topic unrelated to science.
Do not mistake me for discouraging your quest for "true knowledge". Knock yourself out. Convince all the other people you want. I really don't care.
All I care about is that none of your "true knowledge", whatever it is and whereever you find it, leaks into science and undermines the reliability of the class of knowledge that our society depends on for building safe bridges and approving safe medical procedures.
I think you've described the situation perfectly: you believe in God, other people don't. Science doesn't allow statements based on a belief that is not shared by all. That's the end of your argument for dualism as a scientific concept.
Comment by don provan — November 28, 2008 @ 4:48 pm
November 28th, 2008 at 5:03 pm
Being impartial, I don't hold to any specific view point. I guess you'd call me a "pragmatist": I don't care what's actually going on, I only care about what difference it makes.
So I have no problem with your beliefs. I just don't understand why calling what you're describing "material" is in any way detrimental to the position. As far as I can understand from this one paragraph description, you are simply denying the label "material" for what we've always called "material", even though whether we use the word or not makes no difference in any interaction we have with the world.
From my point of view, you're just insisting we use a new term, "information structures", but that's doesn't actually change anything we know about this stuff we currently call "material".
Anyway, for the purposes of this conversation, it is sufficient that you concede "orderliness": that's all the scientific method depends on. Materialism is just a convenient simplification so we don't have to keep saying things like, "the information structures we think of as 'atoms' but which we really cannot demonstrate have a material existence." Science doesn't assume materialism, it merely doesn't waste time questioning whether it is actually the basis behind the discovered orderliness.
Comment by don provan — November 28, 2008 @ 5:03 pm
November 28th, 2008 at 5:25 pm
actually science tells us that belief in God is shared by all
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 28, 2008 @ 5:25 pm
November 28th, 2008 at 5:53 pm
Hi Don
thanks for your comment.
By invoking "material," as being both utterly mindless and the (mindless) source of mind, you are generating an artificial mind-body problem. In Monistic Idealism "matter" is a form of order/information and an epiphenominon or by-product of "conciousness/mind." In my view "matter" is not utterly mindless or dead — it is an orderly, informational projection of mind(s). In materialism the order is reversed and "mind" is seen by materialists (not idealists) as a byproduct of "matter."
Comment by William Brookfield — November 28, 2008 @ 5:53 pm
November 28th, 2008 at 9:33 pm
aiguy
I think you're missing the point entirely. The issue is what basis do we have for thinking our minds are reliable at all. The materialistic worldview (or naturalism or physicalism) doesn't give us much to go on. The theistic worldview does. Put another way, on the theistic worldview we have much better grounds for thinking our minds are reliable than the converse.
If our minds really are NOT reliable…that is really can NOT give us true beliefs, then neither of us can claim to know anything at all and this entire discussion is pointless.
Comment by DonaldM — November 28, 2008 @ 9:33 pm
November 28th, 2008 at 9:48 pm
Don Provan
Even here I must disagree. All this means is that you reject what others have accept as empirical evidence FOR thier thiestic belief. It also presupposes that the only empirical demonstration possible is that which falls within the abritrary restriction of so-called methodological naturalism. I reject that notion competely. There is no way to justify an all encompassing statement that no one anywhere on the planet has ever under any circumstances observed or had empirical evidence for theism.
me:…
Don P
That depends on what is meant by "demonstration". One needs to be careful here lest they fall prey to the problem of "scientism", which doesn't get us very far. Thiestic belief aside, there are all sorts of things we take to be true that are not acquired through the scientific method, but most people on the planet would hold them true anyway. For example the simple statement "I exist". I assume you take the fact of your own existence to be true. But by what means would you "demonstrate" it to yourself? There's no non-circular way to it. You'd have to assume your own existence in order to claim any of the relevent experiences required to justify your belief in your own existence.
But if we take the fact of our own exitence to be true without any real demonstration in some scientific sense, then why could there not be other facts about reality that are in the same category? What's really at issue with the requirement of demonstration is what one is willing to accept as being a demonstration. If it were straightforward and just obvious what those things are, there would be little controversy. But, it is clearly a worldview laden issue.
Comment by DonaldM — November 28, 2008 @ 9:48 pm
November 29th, 2008 at 1:37 am
Donald,
I understand the point completely. Now, please try to understand what I'm trying to say. I will use an analogy from Plantinga himself to try and make this more clear.
From Plantinga:
So here is how Plantinga's analogy maps out: Obviously the thermometer is our mind, and the factory of questionable quality is natural evolution. Once we learn the factory (N&E) makes unreliable thermometers (minds), we have reason to doubt our thermometer (mind).
Oh, no – we can't trust our thermometer! What might be the remedy for this lamentable situation? Why, all we have to do is simply discard the thought that the thermometer was manufactured by the faulty factory, and instead choose to believe that the thermometer was created to be reliable by an omniscient God instead! Brilliant! Now we have no reason to doubt that our minds are unreliable!
Can you now see how fallacious this reasoning is? You think the God hypothesis would mean we would have reliable minds, and the N&E hypothesis would mean our minds are unreliable. Fine. But the mistake you (and Plantinga) make is that you think that our rejecting the N&E hypothesis will somehow make it more likely that our minds are reliable! This is nonsense! Our minds are either reliable or they are not, and what we choose to believe at this point about where our minds came from is not going to alter the facts about the reliability of our minds!
We simply can't ever know if our minds are reliable or not, no matter what we hope, and no matter what we choose to believe about God and naturalism and evolution. If our minds are unreliable, there is no use discussing anything – but since we will never know if our minds are unreliable or not, we have nothing to lose by living as though we were actually making sense.
Comment by aiguy — November 29, 2008 @ 1:37 am
November 29th, 2008 at 4:51 am
I don't "invoke" the term "material", I merely use it in its normal place in the English language. You are trying to argue that material objects are something other than what we think they are, which is fine, but I consider it confused (if not outright subterfuge) to pretend that we cannot use an existing term because you feel it carries baggage that interfers with your case.
Anyway, regardless of the technique you're using, it has no bearing on this scientific question. Science simply doesn't care whether what we're looking at is "material" or "information structures". Even though you think the mind causes the brain instead of the other way around, you still cannot demonstrate it empirically.
Comment by don provan — November 29, 2008 @ 4:51 am
November 29th, 2008 at 5:03 am
Are you just confused, or are you being intentionally deceitful? The study shows that people are predisposed to believe in God, not that they all actually do believe in God. Richard Dawkins discusses this in The God Delusion. He also provides possible explanations based on evolutionary theory and discusses various reasons that make him think this predisposition is both false and detrimental. Check it out.
Nice try, though. Did you really think claiming science proved we all believed would make all the people here that don't believe change their minds?
Comment by don provan — November 29, 2008 @ 5:03 am
November 29th, 2008 at 5:53 am
Correct. I reject their evidence (which isn't empirical or they could show it to me) as justification for a scientific claim. I don't care what they do based on the evidence they accept, I just will not let them force me to accept the opinions they've formed based on that evidence.
This isn't rocket science. You wouldn't allow someone to build a bridge that was too weak by scientific standards simply because the bridge designer claimed it would stand up based on "empirical evidence" involving the great anti-gravity god, evidence that, unfortunately, non-believers cannot experience. Why do you expect me to allow you to build a bridge based on some claim about "their" evidence for dualism?
On the contrary, my existence can easily be demonstrated. Most people would consider this exchange demonstration, but if you had doubts, you could come meet me in person.
Science ignores the problems of epistomology. The bridge falls down or it doesn't: science doesn't care what the metaphysical reality of the bridge is. You want to claim this is a bias, but I claim it's because it keeps bridges from collapsing.
We're straying off topic since this has nothing to do with dualism: you're arguing that physicalism is just as bad as dualism, but that doesn't help dualism from being bad. But since you're trying so hard to be reasonable, I'll go ahead and give you this puzzle piece:
Epistomology tells us we can't really know anything about the metaphysics of reality. This alone would doom physicalism and dualism, alike, as well as science and everything else. (Aiguy is currently using the fact that rationality itself is similarly extinguished as an example.) If you think that's important, you can just sit in a room and wait to die.
So why don't you? Because you do, in fact, assume you exist. We all assume all of us exist. In fact, we all assume reality is really what we think it is. Even while Mr. Brookfield wants us to deny material reality and conclude that everything is "information structures", he still sticks his toe in the water to see how cold the pool is.
We all share these assumptions. We don't care what epistomology tells us about it because epistomology doesn't help us put food on the table.
Science is based on this shared pool of assumptions. It's no more or less than that.
Comment by don provan — November 29, 2008 @ 5:53 am
November 29th, 2008 at 6:10 am
People that advocate for additional assumptions beyond what we all share say things like this, as if someone that uses a thermometer to judge whether meat is cooked is doing something no more useful than asking God whether the meat is cooked. Yet when they go to a restaurant, they'll still demand that a thermometer be used, not the religious belief.
The fact is that science is obvious and there is no controversy about it. You've been misled on this point.
Comment by don provan — November 29, 2008 @ 6:10 am
November 29th, 2008 at 10:55 am
Don
.
We have similar predispositions to believe that induction and the law of non contradiction are valid. I’ve met folks who deny both but science still relies on both beliefs and assumes they are universal.
I read the God delusion but had a hard time wading through the straw man arguments to get to the nub. I’ve seen similar arguments made for discarding induction and the law of non contradiction but science has no problem in assuming the validity of these beliefs.
No I honestly believe that everyone here believes in God and are deceiving themselves and others when they claim otherwise. So no change of mind is necessary
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 29, 2008 @ 10:55 am
November 29th, 2008 at 11:56 am
aiguy
If this were how the argument ran, then yes it would be fallacious indeed. But that is NOT how the argument goes. First of all, you begin with the premise that we can't know if our minds are reliable or not. I reject that premise. My premise is that we already know our minds are reliable…capable of forming true beliefs and capable of comprehending the world. We know this from personal experience confirmed by information and input from hundreds of other minds around us that we encounter every day. Without reliable minds we could not even conduct science or do medicine or even build a bridge. But we do all these things because thousands of minds can study and comprehend the same information and replicate processes described by others to achieve an indentical or similar result. We also do that individually, employing our memories. I am able to type this message because my memory is reliable to tell me that these little black buttons in front me with the symbols on them are letters and those letters are in a certain order, and I always remember where they are and can press in the exact sequence I need to type a sentence…like this one. If our minds were not reliable, then this would simply not be possible. No, I reject entirely the premise that we can not know if our minds our reliable or not. We already know it and accept it as true.
The ONLY question is what gives warrant for that reliability. THAT is the issue and that is the gist of of what Plantinga is dealing with. The starting question is not "are our minds reliable?"; rather the starting question is "what provides warrant for knowing our minds are reliable?"(i.e. in other words for what we already know and take to be true about our minds), which is a very different question.
Comment by DonaldM — November 29, 2008 @ 11:56 am
November 29th, 2008 at 4:52 pm
Donald,
Well, your argument here surely seems rational enough to me… but of course, my mind might be unreliable, and so I might mistake complete nonsense for a rational argument. That might be the case, but if it was, I would never know it.
I would say we do accept this, yes (we have no choice).
Huh? You just wrote a long paragraph giving all sorts of warrant for that reliability – you know, personal experience, confirmation, interaction with other minds, our functional competence, etc. If, as you just got through saying, you already know and accept R as true because of all the reasons you gave, then we obviously need no other warrant for believing it.
First you argue that these reasons (personal experience, etc) are good reason to believe R, and so you (and Plantinga) start by assuming R. If, as you say, you are already justified in believing R, then you need no additional warrant for your belief – it is already justified.
So Plantinga's argument tells us nothing about minds, and nothing about naturalism or evolution either. And this remains true even if you accept, as you do, that we are already justified by personal experience in believing our minds are reliable.
Comment by aiguy — November 29, 2008 @ 4:52 pm
November 29th, 2008 at 6:34 pm
I'm not sure those have been proved to be predispositions, but science doesn't suggest we use them because they are predispostions. Science starts by observing that we share these assumptions, regardless of where they came from or, for that matter, whether they are in some metaphysical sense "valid". You can verify that claim right at this very moment by observing the assumptions we are sharing to have this conversation.
I'm speaking of chapter 5 which is about the origins of religious beliefs, so there shouldn't be any opportunity to have any strawmen there.
I don't know which is more bizarre: that you think that's true, or that you think it makes sense as part of a supporting argument for dualism. Well, come to think of it, the very idea that someone could have a belief they didn't believe in is pretty strange, right out of the box.
Comment by don provan — November 29, 2008 @ 6:34 pm
November 29th, 2008 at 9:40 pm
In case anyone has missed, or wants to respond to, my response to Plantinga, here it is in summary:
Plantinga's argument:
1.P(R | N&E) is low.
2. Anyone who accepts N&E and sees that (1) is true has a defeater for R.
3. Anyone who has a defeater for R has a defeater for any other belief she holds, including N&E itself.
Therefore
4. Anyone who accepts N&E and sees that (1) is true has a defeater for N&E; hence N&E can't be rationally accepted.
My counter-argument:
5. If R is defeated for the believer of N&E, then R is also defeated for the believer of ~(N&E) (since R refers to minds of humans in general, not just the mind of the one who believes in ~(N&E))
6. Therefore ~(N&E) can't be rationally accepted either
Thus, whether or not one believes that our minds can justifiably be called "reliably rational", Plantinga fails to defeat N&E.
Comment by aiguy — November 29, 2008 @ 9:40 pm
November 29th, 2008 at 10:05 pm
This premise has been discussed before at this blog. Without this premise Plantinga's argument fails. Can we at least agree about that? If so, we can discuss the merits of the premise. If not, explain why not.
Comment by Raevmo — November 29, 2008 @ 10:05 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 10:35 am
Don
Exactly and the very fact that we are having a discussion is proof that you believe in God whether you admit it or not. The belief in God is more basic than the law of non contradiction or the principle of induction it’s the grounding for those beliefs with out it rational thought is impossible. Notice at this point I’m making no claims to the validity of this belief only observing that you share this assumption
I’m not sure why this seems bizarre to you. Like the belief in God, belief in induction and the law of non contradiction the belief in an immaterial self is universal as the "poofjoy" thought experiment clearly illustrates.
We know these things undeniably and absolutely. Science that purports to show otherwise is incomplete on its face.
Self deception and cognitive dissonance are odd that’s why they are big part of what keeps Psychiatrists in business
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 30, 2008 @ 10:35 am
November 30th, 2008 at 10:47 am
Hey Raevmo
There are lots of ways to illustrate this fact but the best is this IMHO
In the history of life on earth there have been millions of species (perhaps 100 million alive at present) and out of all those only one has rational thoughts.
That rationality is unlikely is an understament.
Peace
PS hows the reading comming
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 30, 2008 @ 10:47 am
November 30th, 2008 at 11:20 am
Can you provide us a non-circular definition of "rational thought"?
Comment by Zachriel — November 30, 2008 @ 11:20 am
November 30th, 2008 at 11:32 am
Zach:
hows this? See especially number 4
rational
adjective
Definition:
1. reasonable and sensible: governed by, or showing evidence of, clear and sensible thinking and judgment, based on reason rather than emotion or prejudice
2. able to think clearly and sensibly: able to think clearly and sensibly, unimpaired by physical or mental condition, strong emotion, or prejudice
I can't be rational when so many people give me conflicting advice.
3. in accordance with reason and logic: presented or understandable in terms that accord with reason and logic or with scientific knowledge
a rational explanation
4. able to reason: endowed with the ability to reason, as opposed to being governed solely by instinct and appetite
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 30, 2008 @ 11:32 am
November 30th, 2008 at 11:41 am
#4, reason as opposed to governed solely by instinct and appetite.
Many non-human animals can reason, not on the same level as humans, but reason nonetheless.
Comment by Zachriel — November 30, 2008 @ 11:41 am
November 30th, 2008 at 12:03 pm
Zach:
Claiming something does not make it so
Please list them and the (scientific) way you determined that their thoughts are not the result of instinct and appetite.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 30, 2008 @ 12:03 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 12:19 pm
How do I know your thoughts are not the result of instinct and appetite? Maybe you're just a bot. Thinking may be just an instinct that is highly developed in humans. But the definition you provided is using the term instinct to mean programmed responses, as opposed to reason.
instinct, a largely inheritable and unalterable tendency of an organism to make a complex and specific response to environmental stimuli without involving reason.
So, let's start with humans. If we take a practical view, then we have a lot of ways to determine that humans can reason, such as the ability to solve problems. So, if we have a banana suspended out of reach, and a few boxes in the corner, a hungry human would reason that stacking the boxes would acquire the reward. That is not mere instinct, but the use of rational thought to solve a novel problem.
Comment by Zachriel — November 30, 2008 @ 12:19 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 12:49 pm
Zach:
You don’t know scientifically. Yet you assume rationality in me but not in a bot. Why is that?
If it is then it’s not rational and Plantinga’s point is made
Exactly if our responses are programmed (by instinct and appetite) they are not rational. That is my and Plantinga’s point.
Computers can solve problems are you saying that they are not programmed? Youre not making a lot of sense Zach
It is nothing but instinct combined with appetite.
No rational thought at all is involved in this task
I can program a bot to do it can’t I?
Now if the human weighed the benefits of receiving the reward against the metaphysical implications of being viewed as an irrational creature of instinct and decided to forgo the banana to make a Philosophical point.
That would be rational thought
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 30, 2008 @ 12:49 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 1:22 pm
Very well. In other words, you can't substantiate your previous claim that humans are the only organisms capable of "rational thought", can't even provide a non-vacuous definition of what you mean.
Your position is knotted. Do you understand the difference between holding to a view, and making an argument?
Though I don't think you're a bot, that doesn't mean I assume you are "thinking rationally".
Comment by Zachriel — November 30, 2008 @ 1:22 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 2:44 pm
Zach:
Everyone assumes that human’s are capable of rational thought If they are not then Plantinga’s point is made.
It’s you who are claiming that other organisms are also capable of this feat. It’s up to you provide support for your extraordinary claim.
You use that term "vacuous" a lot I’m beginning to doubt that you understand what it means. The dictionary definition of rationality is non-vacuous or we would not be having this discussion.
How so? It seems pretty straightforward to me.
I do and I think the merits of my argument are obvious. Your inability to make a coherent response is evidence to that fact.
If you were attempting to have a rational discussion with someone you don’t believe to be rational I would question your sanity. We have places for folks who believe they can have rational conversations with non rational things like machines or animals.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 30, 2008 @ 2:44 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 2:57 pm
So now we need a definition of "able to reason". For your purposes, the best definition for "reason" in my dictionary is, "2. to form conclusions, judgments, or inferences from facts or premises", so that would mean we'd need definitions for conclusions, judgments, and inferences."
I'm not going to continue, but it seems likely that those words are going to find their way back to something that looks remarkably like "rational thought".
Now this makes perfect sense to me, since I understand "rational thought" as a concept stemming from the needs of our language. But you are proposing that "rational thought" is something that has some kind of actual reality that we should be considering in our scientific investigations. For that, you need to be able to define somewhat more precisely and from a significantly different angle than anything I'm familiar with from its use in the English language.
This is a normal part of doing science. If you wanted to use the word "breeze" scientifically, you'd have no problem demonstrating that it was a meaningful term in our language, but to use it scientifically you'd have to come up with a scientific definition, presumably one that describes air movement in a specific way, so that anyone could confirm whether an observed set of conditions was "a breeze". You want us to accept "rational thought", but you refuse to even try to define it in a way that would allow us all to agree on whether it was present or not in any particular situation. I don't claim it cannot be done, though, just as I don't claim that "rational thought" is inherently unscientific. I am only observing that you are being unscientific.
Comment by don provan — November 30, 2008 @ 2:57 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 3:03 pm
Good one! If I attempt to have a rational discussion with someone that may be insane, I'm the one that should be declared insane. Funny.
Comment by don provan — November 30, 2008 @ 3:03 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 3:18 pm
You said, "In the history of life on earth there have been millions of species (perhaps 100 million alive at present) and out of all those only one has rational thoughts."
You are apparently conceding that you can't justify your assertion. You haven't been able to provide an empirically usable definition of "reason" that includes humans.
You call a cat a toad, then say a cat doesn't catch mice but flies.
Dictionary definitions are often circular. At some point we have to point at something and agree as to what it is.
I pointed to an instance of problem solving that I considered the use of reason. You rejected it out of hand. Apparently, there is a difference in our understandings of the term. Do you actually mean "abstract thought" when you say "rational thought"?
You made the claim that "In the history of life on earth there have been millions of species (perhaps 100 million alive at present) and out of all those only one has rational thoughts." While you *assume* humans have rational thoughts, you *demand* empirical evidence that other organisms do. You are clearly conflating two different definitions.
The hallmark of a valid argument is that anyone can follow the reasoning—even if they disagree with the premises.
As I pointed out above, your position is knotted, irrational. You may be perfectly rational in other aspects of your life, but that is outside our purview.
I post primarily for the benefit of our readers.
Comment by Zachriel — November 30, 2008 @ 3:18 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 3:18 pm
Don
What ever gave you that idea? I could care less what you do with your science. It’s already been demonstrated to be a pretty weak tool. I’m discussing Philosophy here.
It’s a lot better for discussing things I view as important like the truth of Dualism or validity of the Theory of evolution.
Exactly in order for the definition to have meaning to your materialist “science” it must be defined in a materialist way but defining it thus removes its meaning a meaning that is plain to every one. Like I said your “science is pretty weak
Your participation in this discussion shows that you agree that rational thought is present in this particular situation.
I have no interest in conforming myself to your “science” Like I said It’s pretty weak. I’m more interested in the truth of theories like MET and your “Science” can’t tell me that
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 30, 2008 @ 3:18 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 5:30 pm
aiguy
So, on the one hand I have a rational argument, but on the other hand you can't tell? But you can tell…how many bridges have you driven over? How many times gone to a doctor and received good diagnoses and medicine for whatever ailed you? How many times flown a jet plane or even driven your car? How many times used a cell phone or had a conversation with a friend?
If not for the obvious rationality of minds, none of this could be the case!
That is not correct. The issue is not whether or not we know are minds are rational…we do…for the reasons I stated earlier. BUT, that doesn't explain why that should be the case. Plantinga is dealing with the fact the R on N/E gives no good reason or warrant to explain R.
You seem to be confused as to what Plantinga's argument is actually dealing with. He is not asking "are our minds reliable"…he, and everyone else already knows and accept that they are. He is saying the R on N/E is not warranted or justified. That eliminates an entire category of potential cause for our minds and our rationality. But leaves open, indeed strengthens the possibility that the cause of R is something beyond…way beyond… the merely natural or physical. Plantinga is not making a case FOR thiesism or even rationality. He is making the case that R is NOT explained by N/E, or at least provides little warrant for it.
But we have still have our rationality. The question isn't IF but WHY?
Comment by DonaldM — November 30, 2008 @ 5:30 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 5:38 pm
aiguy
Your attempt to defeat Plantinga fails because you are not arguing against what he is actually arguing. As I said earlier, the issue is not IF our minds are rational, but WHY. Plantinga is showing that the "why" question is not answered through N&E. In fact R on N&E seems to be self-refuting. The obvious conclusion is that R comes from something else, but Platinga's argument doesn't go that far. You're arguing against the IF…but that is not where Plantinga's argument lies. Against the "why" question, your argument makes no sense at all.
Comment by DonaldM — November 30, 2008 @ 5:38 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 5:45 pm
Zachriel:
How can you conclude a person's position as "irrational" as well as stating people may be "perfectly rational in other aspects of life" unless you also fully accept humans to be rational?
Fmm don't get knotted in Zachriel's silly word games
Comment by willo — November 30, 2008 @ 5:45 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 6:06 pm
I didn't say anything about his thoughts. I said his position was irrational. I can observe his position, and his argument, but not his thoughts. I would be happy to discuss whether humans have "rational thoughts" once we agree to a definition, preferably one with some utility.
Fifth monarchy man argues that we *assume* humans have "rational thoughts" for the purposes of this very discussion. That is incorrect. I not only don't *assume* he is having "rational thoughts", I don't even *assume* he is human (though I may make some tentative inferences in this regard).
Returning to his statement:
The count of species is clearly scientific. Fifth monarchy man then attempts to categorize each of these species into those who have "rational thoughts" and those that don't. He can't provide a definition of "rational thoughts" that allows us to do this consistently though. Rather, he applies a different standard to humans (*assumes* "rational thought") and to non-human species (*demands* empirical evidence). This argument is faulty on its face.
Comment by Zachriel — November 30, 2008 @ 6:06 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 6:07 pm
DonaldM:
I understand that Platinga has nearly divine status among believers, and that you cannot believe that a guy on the internet could possibly refute him, but it seems to me that Plantinga knows very little about evolution and that he has no good reason to suppose that R on N&E is very unlikely (or even self-refuting as you say). Could you explain in your own words why R on N&E is self-refuting?
Comment by Raevmo — November 30, 2008 @ 6:07 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 6:26 pm
Zachriel:
So tell us how can you have an irrational position without irrational thoughts? Or how can simply conclude a person as irrational, without comming to that conclusion through a thought process?
Comment by willo — November 30, 2008 @ 6:26 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 6:34 pm
Fifth monarchy man's 'millions of species' argument was clearly fallacious. It takes no theory of mind to determine this.
Comment by Zachriel — November 30, 2008 @ 6:34 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 6:46 pm
Zach:
I don’t need to justify it you have already demonstrated you agree with me. If you did not you would be discussing dualism with your cat instead of me.
If you believe your cat to be rational it’s up to you to provide evidence for that belief
So now instead of a non circular definition you want a empirically usable one. Sorry but that is the whole point in contention.
Every non circular definition relies on immaterial assumptions. Godel has conclusively shown that this is the case. There is no getting around it.
The nonmaterial assumption in my definition is that humans are rational. You have repeatedly demonstrated that you share that assumption. So there is no point in denying it now.
I'm reasonably sure that even you don’t know what that sentence means but we both know what rational thought is or this conversation would not be happening.
Of course and we both agree on what rational thought is as evidenced by this conversation
I gave you a perfectly good dictionary definition that we both agree to what else do you want?
Everyone including you assumes that humans have rational thoughts. No one that I know of thinks this about other organisms You are the odd one out here you need to justify your extraordinary claim.
I’m not hung up on empirical evidence you are You can present non empirical evidence if you like but that will be making Plantinga’s point for him.
The fact that you continue to engage in dialogue is evidence that you are following my reasoning. Despite your puny attempts to deny it.
That’s the nature of self evident truths Like…….
“contradictory statements cannot both at the same time be true”
“Humans have rational thoughts”
The fact that you can deny them is proof that you accept them
Once again how so? It seems pretty strait forward to me
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 30, 2008 @ 6:46 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 7:01 pm
Raevmo
Did you read my response? If evolution is responsible for the diversity of life on earth then it is very unlikely to produce rationality. As witnessed by the obvious fact that it only did it once.
You don’t need to know all the ins and outs Of Met you just have to look around
What part of that do you disagree with?
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 30, 2008 @ 7:01 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 7:25 pm
fmm:
I disagree with two parts. First, I disagree that it only did it once. What makes you think all other animals (besides humans) are not rational? Second, even if it only did it once, why does that make it unlikely? We know of only one planet where life evolved, and in that single instance rationality did evolve. That's a 100% score. How do you conclude that evolution is unlikely to produce rationality?
ps On page 80 now.
Comment by Raevmo — November 30, 2008 @ 7:25 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 7:33 pm
Zachriel:
LOL, nice rational deduction, clearly fmm is thinking irrationally isn't he Zachriel?
Comment by willo — November 30, 2008 @ 7:33 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 7:49 pm
Raevmo
Because I’ve never met an animal that had thoughts that were more than instinct and appetite have you?
I’m all ears though please present your evidence that other animals are rational.
The Cambrian explosion also happened only once does that make it likely evolutionarily speaking? It seems that an event happening just once out of millions of tries is the definition of unlikely.
Unless you could show that evolution is weighted to produce rational thinking eventually. But such evidence would make Plantinga’s point for him would it not ?
Because one out of millions is long odds by anyones definition
Peace
PS
cool
The suspense is killing me I can't wait to hear what you think of his arguments
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 30, 2008 @ 7:49 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 9:07 pm
Donald,
As I've explained already: Your argument seems rational to me, but if our minds were unreliable in a way that made nonsense seem rational, we would have no way of telling.
You have again made an argument that, to my mind, seems perfectly rational. I agree with you completely: It is rational to believe that our minds are rational. We might both be under the illusion that we are being rational, however.
Let's just agree that our minds are rational then, OK? That should help move this forward.
But all this means is that Plantinga doubts that evolution is capable of producing our minds. Well, duh – Plantinga (and all other IDists and creationists) doubt that evolution is capable of producing our eyes or our flagella too. All this other nonsense is superfluous.
Again – we've agreed that our minds are reliable. Great.
Right – just like flagella or peacock's tails are not "warranted or justified" by N&E. That's just an old argument about evolutionary theory.
Yes, yes – God made our eyeballs and flagella and our minds too. This does not seem to be breaking any new ground in the evolution/ID debate.
The "rationality" angle to his argument is simply a red herring. Evolutionists believe evolution can account for our minds, and IDists don't. We know this.
We still have our eyeballs, too. Same question. Same answer. Plantinga's argument adds nothing whatsoever to the debate.
Nothing but the same old "evolution can't do it" argument. (I happen to agree, by the way, that random mutation and natural selection is not a sufficient explanation for our minds).
NO!!!! It is not self-refuting! It is only refuted by Plantinga's opinion that evolution can't result in minds.
Remember- we have already agreed that our minds are reliable, for all the reasons you listed. Now we both know that R is true, and we don't have to worry about that any more. Let's look at Plantinga again:
P(R | N&E) is low? Since we now agree that P(R)=1, what this means is that Plantinga is simply claiming that N&E is false. This is nothing new.
Comment by aiguy — November 30, 2008 @ 9:07 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 10:05 pm
I provided a simple test of reasoning ability. You rejected it out of hand. Then refused to further clarify what you meant.
It is sufficient that you say you won't justify your position.
Possibly. But fifth monarchy man might just be trolling or a bot of some sort. All we have to go on are fifth monarchy man's comments, and fifth monarchy man doesn't seem capable (or willing) to support them. They certainly read as fallacy, but it's possible they're just gibberish. I won't venture a guess.
Comment by Zachriel — November 30, 2008 @ 10:05 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 10:15 pm
Willo:
Zachriel:
So just on the off chance he's not a troll or a bot, you concede he may be thinking irrationally… now how would you know that?
Comment by willo — November 30, 2008 @ 10:15 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 10:31 pm
Fifth monarchy man's position depends on a flawed premise, such that he has to distort the argument so much that he actually assigns his beliefs to others, even when they repudiate those beliefs. As to what goes on in his head, I won't venture a guess. He simply refuses to justify his position, so it's a moot point.
Comment by Zachriel — November 30, 2008 @ 10:31 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 10:43 pm
Zach:
I’m sorry I thought the reason for my response was evident
How about I spell it out for you
Accouding to the dictionary to be rational is to be not reducible to instinct and appetite. The test you gave fails to prove rationality because the behavior in question can easily be reduced to instinct and appetite.
I’m not sure how I could be clearer
This statement once again demonstrates that you consider a human to be rational as apposed to a bot or a troll.
Once again there is no need to support a position that we all agree with. I don’t ask you to support the law on non contradiction because we both assume it in order to communicate. If I did you would know that I was just being disingenuous to so.
The same goes with the statement
"Humans have rational thoughts."
Perhaps but in order to produce a fallacy my thoughts must be not be reducible to instinct and appetite.
A bot does not produce logical fallacies because He does not think. He only spews out preprogrammed responses to stimuli
Trying to communicate with an entity that only produces gibberish is a sure sigh of insanity Zach. I don’t think youre insane
So I’ll assume that you’ve at least ventured a guess on this one.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — November 30, 2008 @ 10:43 pm
November 30th, 2008 at 11:24 pm
You never met my cat. I do feed her and care for her in other ways but she shows affection when not hungry and I do not attribute it to instinct. Rather her love for me strikes me as eminently rational, lovable creature that I am.
Comment by Bradford — November 30, 2008 @ 11:24 pm
December 1st, 2008 at 12:18 am
Zachriel:
Another rational deduction oh dear
Comment by willo — December 1, 2008 @ 12:18 am
December 1st, 2008 at 4:00 am
OK. I'm only here to talk to people that think telic concepts such as ID are science. Sorry to bother you! I promise, I wouldn't have, except you posted in a discussion about "Dualism Dueling With Science?", so I mistakenly thought you wanted to discuss Dualism dueling with Science. My bad.
Comment by don provan — December 1, 2008 @ 4:00 am
December 1st, 2008 at 8:12 am
Bradford
I understand there have been times when I wanted to attribute rationality to my hunting dog and even my pickup truck. Luckily we have a handy universal test that we can give to establish whether any entity is rational.
Simply provide fluffy with a medium (modeling clay or paint would work) and see if she produces any CSI. If she does she’s rational if not she is a creature of instinct and appetite
I find that five year old children have no problem producing CSI but it’s a feat to difficult for animals computers bots or pickup trucks.
Funny how all of this ID stuff is related
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — December 1, 2008 @ 8:12 am
December 1st, 2008 at 8:21 am
Don
I’ll save you some trouble I think you’ll find that no one here claims that ID is "science". We would have told you if you'd just bothered to ask.
You are again very mistaken this thread is about Dualism Dueling with Materialism these are philosophical concepts not scientific ones.
I do note your confusing materialism with science. If you realy believe the two to be the same thing it’s no wonder you are so threatened by ID
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — December 1, 2008 @ 8:21 am
December 1st, 2008 at 9:32 am
This is the definition you provided. Notice it says not solely governed. Reason is the distinguishing characteristic, not instinct.
rational, 4. endowed with the ability to reason, as opposed to being governed solely by instinct and appetite.
It is a simple problem in reasoning. A banana suspended out of reach, and a few boxes in the corner, a hungry human might reason that stacking the boxes would acquire the reward.
If the human just threw the boxes around in a rage and sometimes they ended up in the proper position, that might be just instinct. But that is not what the human does. First, there is the insight that boxes have something to do with bananas. Then it requires mentally manipulating the objects to form a plan, then executing the plan.
This is why I asked you whether you understood the difference between a position and an argument. You have stated your position repeatedly, but you have made no argument whatsoever.
I don't agree with your position. I think your use of terminology is faulty. Ascribing views to others is not an argument. And your reasoning, as pointed out repeatedly, depends on circular reasoning.
The law of non-contradiction is an axiom in certain logics. I have no problem with accepting the use of standard logic in normal discourse. If there is any ambiguity, then I will ask. If you then refuse to answer, I'll point your refusal.
Let's return to the scene of the crime.
You have made two claims. The first is reasonably based on scientific findings. The latter divides the species into two groups. Rational and non-rational. All I've asked for is a clear rule for making this categorization. You respond with the fallacy of *assuming* humans are rational, and *demanding* empirical evidence for the others. If you can't support your statement, then you should withdraw your statement and we'll be done with it.
The question is one of reason, not just instinct. Read your definition again. People are quite capable of irrationality. Indeed, it's an endearing characteristic in some people.
Of course a bot can produce fallacies. Fallacies are easy.
Psychiatrists are insane?
I'll pass your comment on to the Archangel. She'll be happy to hear it.
Comment by Zachriel — December 1, 2008 @ 9:32 am
December 1st, 2008 at 2:52 pm
HI Don,
One of the main reasons I am taking an info-dynamic (ID) approach is that the framework appears to provide solutions to outstanding problems in physics and philosophy that remain unresolved in a materialistic paradigm. For instance, the longstanding Poincare Recurrence Paradox in thermodynamics can be resolved in infodynamics by pointing to system *finiteness* as an imposition of "form" upon the system's contents. "Form" is a seminal concept regarding theories of "order/form," disorder and in-FORM-ation. Within an informational framework therefore the longstanding (since 1890) Poincare Recurrence problem is solved. In materialism the problem is eternal.
Similarly it appears that both the second law of thermodynamics and the Second law of Black Hole dynamics can be reformulated into a single law of information loss, in which info-dynamics provides the unifying conceptual framework. Work on this is ongoing in the literature, see perhaps here. Quantum gravity is another area in which I am having success in using a non-materialist infodynamic approach. Of course, for a devout materialist none of this work is science because for such individuals materialism and science are one and the same. For me however "materialism" is just a core hypothesis that is open to scientific/logical skepticism and falsification just like every other hypothesis (core or otherwise).
Comment by William Brookfield — December 1, 2008 @ 2:52 pm
December 1st, 2008 at 4:20 pm
Hi, William,
It sounds like we're beyond Egnor's position. I, personally, have no concept of "material" beyond the scientific implications of empirical verification. If you want to propose that material reality and materialism mean something other than empicial verification, that's OK with me: I'm not hung up on the term, I just don't really understand what it means if it doesn't mean "demonstrable".
My concern is that when you use an entirely different word, you are suggesting that none of our thousands of years of experience based on the older term applies. Rather than throwing it all out, I'd rather use an approach that identifies specifically what is wrong with the old term, allowing us to sort out which experiences are still reasonable and which we misunderstood.
Can you be more explicit about which of your results have empirically verifiable consequences that science could not previously see? I admit I've never heard of the "Poincare Recurrence Paradox" before, but it sounds like a metaphysical problems that arises from the scientific results. Are the other issues similarly tangential? (I suppose I should just come over to your web site rather than discuss these issues here. Or do you think there's a relation between Egnor's points and yours?)
Comment by don provan — December 1, 2008 @ 4:20 pm
December 2nd, 2008 at 12:00 pm
aiguy
I disagree. If P(R | N/E) is low or inscrutable, then any resulting claim about R given N/E could not be considered reliable. It would be self-refuting to claim otherwise.
No, Plantinga is saying P(R | N&E) is low or inscrutable. He goes into a lot more depth on this, by the way, in his Warranted Christian Belief…somewhere around page 225/26 I believe.
Also, he is not saying evolution per se is false. He is saying that evolution coupled with naturalism doesn't give us reason to think we have true beliefs. He'd probably say that P(R | T&E) is high, though I don't recall that he actually said that. He is saying that P(R | N&E) gives us strong reason to doubt naturalism, though.
Then, are we even having this discussion? I mean one of us could be under the delusion that we're having a discussion using something called a computer, connected something called the internet, on which resides something called a web-site entitled Telic Thoughts. Why am I suddenly reminded of the movie The Fight Club?
Under naturalism RM/NS is all we have to work with. So are you saying you agree that P(R | N&E) is low or inscrutable? If RM/NS is insufficient, then to what do you appeal for explanation?
Comment by DonaldM — December 2, 2008 @ 12:00 pm
December 2nd, 2008 at 4:01 pm
Donald,
First you say that we accept R is true, for all the reasons you've given. Then you say the "resulting claim about R given N/E" is unreliable. This makes no sense.
But as you yourself have argued, we do not need additional reasons to think we have true beliefs. Remember, you said that we already know we have true beliefs because of personal experience and communication with others and… so on.
We can obviously take skepticism all the way to solipsism if we'd like to, but that is ultimately too boring to bear. So we accept realism, and we accept other minds, and we also accept that our minds are rational. We accept all of these things without proof, and we go from there.
As I said, it really doesn't get us anywhere to doubt the rationality of our minds, and you have already argued that we can rest assured that our minds are rational. None of this gets Plantinga the slightest traction in trying to cast doubt on naturalism, though.
How did you ever get that idea? ID offers some completely unspecified non-naturalistic cause to explain life. Analogously, naturalism can offer some completely unspecified natural cause. RM/NS is one particular idea, but there are others (e.g. structuralism), and it might be some new natural cause that we haven't identified yet. But since your alternative is a non-naturalist cause that you haven't identified yet, I think it's a bit unfair to say that naturalists must commit to RM/NS!
I'd say it was inscrutable, not low.
If RM/NS is insufficient, then I believe we have no explanation at all (sometimes that happens, you know). But of course this means absolutely nothing with regard to our confidence in the rationality of our minds, since we agree that your arguments for believing that our minds are rational are good arguments.
Comment by aiguy — December 2, 2008 @ 4:01 pm
December 3rd, 2008 at 12:00 pm
aiguy
Well, I was being a bit tongue-in-cheek
Comment by DonaldM — December 3, 2008 @ 12:00 pm
December 3rd, 2008 at 12:12 pm
aiguy
Well, I was being a bit tongue-in-cheek with some of that. Yes, let's not be solopsists!!
I have to disagree with your assesment of PLantinga, though. Quite the contrary, his argument has all sorts of traction. As I said earlier, the issue is not if our minds our rational but how did they come to be so. Plantinga's argument deals with the 'how' not the 'if'. For the naturalist (or materialist) who accepts that she has a rational mind, Plantinga is saying that naturalism coupled with evolution doesn't account for how that state of affairs came about…that P(R | N&E) is low or inscrutable. Therefore the proper attitude for the naturalist toward N&E to account for the rationality they already accept as being true is to either reject it or be agnostic toward it. To state "naturalism is true" becomes self-refuting since the naturalist has strong reason to doubt or reject that their rationality came about through N&E. Rationality is not in question: what brought it about is. That is where Plantinga has all sorts of traction.
Comment by DonaldM — December 3, 2008 @ 12:12 pm
December 3rd, 2008 at 1:18 pm
Donald,
Since we all agree that R is true – i.e. P(R)=1 – Plantinga's claim reduces to "P(N&E) is low or inscrutable". All this means is that he doesn't see how N&E could result in working rational minds. Seems to me this brings nothing new to the debate whatsoever, since anti-evolutionists don't see how N&E can result in much of anything.
Sure… except for the scientific evidence that has convinced ~99% of all biologists that N&E is true. We do not believe in N&E just because we believe our minds are rational, of course!
Obviously I'm missing something here, because it seems to me you keep saying the same thing without ever explaining what you think Plantinga brings to the argument. Sure, he doesn't believe natural evolution could build a rational brain/mind. I'm sure he also does not believe N&E could build a functioning eyeball either. Neither of these opinions make a belief in naturalism self-refuting, however!
Here is a completely non-self-refuting position on naturalism: Naturalism is true, and somehow (e.g. by evolutionary processes) produced our obviously rational minds. If you (or Plantinga) doubts this position, you may attempt to refute it. But it is not self-refuting.
Comment by aiguy — December 3, 2008 @ 1:18 pm
December 3rd, 2008 at 1:19 pm
aiguy
Well, I'm not trying to be unfair, so let me try to unpack what I mean a little better. There's two things in your response here, so let me try to respond to those in turn.
First, you said "ID offers some completely unspecified non-naturalistic cause to explain life." That's not entirely correct. ID specifies intelligence as a cause, but leaves the source of the intelligence unspecified and lets others (the philosophers and/or theologians, etc) worry about that.
Second, why would I say that a naturalist must commit to some form of RM/NS for explanation and am I being unfair to suggest it? Under naturalism every event in time and space, absolutely all of it, is the product of blind, purposeless forces acting through chance and/or necessity in a completely closed system of natural cause and effect. With respect to biological systems, that means that evolution or something very much like it is the only game in town. And, RM/NS is the main framework of evolution, so it is in that sense that I said that for the naturalist RM/NS (in some form) is all there is to work with.
This isn't a new idea by any means, and one I have seen put forth by some rather well known evolutionary biologists and thinkers, such as Dawkins and Dennett. At least, its from them and a few others like that, that I got the idea.
Is it unfair to say that? I don't know…maybe so. But there doesn't seem to be anything else to which to appeal for explanation if one holds rigidly to naturalism as the a priori worldview. In one form or another, to explain any phenomenon in a biological system, including rationality in humans, under the framework of PN, its going to come back to some form of evolution with RM/NS.
I'm not sure why you brought up structuralism. I see no reason why RM/NS does not fit within a structuralist framework of explanation. Indeed, structuralism itself doesn't refer to any actual natural mechanisms to explain something, though does refer to structures as the real things upon which other things depend. How that applies to biological systems, though, and how those systems came to be, isn't entirely clear, and certainly doesn't take RM/NS off the table. It would seem more likely to be argued, that RM/NS is part of the deep structure. In any case, I'm not sure its an 'either or' choice.
I should add that I don't think structuralism rules out ID either, because design itself could be part of the deep structure of nature. But let's not sidetrack on structuralism!
Comment by DonaldM — December 3, 2008 @ 1:19 pm
December 3rd, 2008 at 1:27 pm
That sounds "unspecified", even before we consider that what "intelligence" means is unspecified, and that saying "intelligence did it" isn't really "a cause" at all. Even taking everything you're saying for granted, "something unintelligent did it" is precisely as well specified and supported by your arguments.
Maybe I'm not aware of some nuance of "naturalism", but doesn't it accept humans? They are not blind and purposeless, so how can you say naturalism says every event in time and space is the product of blind, purposeless forces?
Comment by don provan — December 3, 2008 @ 1:27 pm
December 3rd, 2008 at 2:21 pm
Donald,
Specifying "intelligence" is a vacuous ploy until and unless one says what the term "intelligence" is supposed to mean in the context of ID theory. Nobody is willing to provide the canoncial definition for this term as used by ID proponents, so saying the cause was "intelligent" means nothing (except of course "capable of producing the result in question"). My experience in these debates is that what people really mean by "intelligence" is consciousness, but it typically takes a long time to get people to see that is really what they mean.
So, care to take a crack at providing a definition for what this word is supposed to mean in this context? Once you do, we can actually discusss the evidence for the particular characteristics you are talking about. For example, most psychologists would say that learning is an essential part of what we mean by "intelligence". Since we have no evidence that whatever caused life to exist had to learn how to do it (rather than doing it by instinct, for example), it would appear that by that definition we have no evidence that the Designer of life was intelligent after all. (Interestingly, evolutionary processes can be said to learn by trial-and-error, so if "learning" was part of your definition of "intelligence", then evolutionary processes might be properly considered "intelligent"!)
Not at all. There may be (and I think probably is) a very different game in town that we do not understand – natural laws of cause and effect that we simply have not figured out yet. Just as you wish to claim a non-natural process that you cannot identify is responsible, I believe a natural process that we cannot identify is the cause.
I'm not talking about (much less defending) Darwinian evolution here; I'm talking about naturalism and Plantinga's argument.
I myself (and plenty of others too, like Stuart Kauffmann) believe that our understanding of evolution (and especially abiogenesis) is fundamentally incomplete, and new ideas about physical chemistry are needed to understand what happened.
I meant the term as it is sometimes used to refer to folks (like Kauffmann) who think there are (currently not-understood) natural laws and properties which account for the emergence of complex forms. I don't believe much progress has been made, but of course not much progress has been made identifying the non-natural cause of life either
Nothing could ever possibly rule out ID. Even if someone figured out what chemicals existed on primordial Earth, tossed those chemicals in a vat, and living creatures started jumping out… that still would not rule out ID! That's kinda the problem…
Comment by aiguy — December 3, 2008 @ 2:21 pm
December 3rd, 2008 at 5:40 pm
Don Provan
Well, that's sort of the subject of this entire thread. If minds are the product of naturalism (to use shorthand here), then how can we be sure we're not "blind and purposeless?" Of course, as I mentioned earlier (and I think aiguy agrees), we have good reason to think otherwise. But how this state of affairs came about is the issue. This is, I think, the crux of the problem with naturalism: blind, purposeless forces somehow evolved beings with meaning and purpose. In the completely closed system of natural cause and effect, meaning and purpose don't seem to have much meaning apart from some arbitrary assignment of it on the part of some humans. But does something really have meaning just because I or someone else says it does?
As far as I can tell the claim that humans are not blind and purposeless (thereby implying we have meaning and purpose) is incompatible with the claim that naturalism is true.
aiguy
I've read some of Kauffmann and I do agree with your point here. But, I will add that even with a more complete understanding, within the worldview of PN, there doesn't seem to be any way to avoid some form of RM/NS as the main framework of what happened.
Well, I think we can go a little further than that. Surely we can draw a distinction between blind, unguided causes on the one hand and intelligent causes on the other, even if we know little about intelligence itself.
I guess that would depend on who you ask. As far as I can tell, the evidence of nature and all that we know of of the cosmos and ourselves point directly to the need for a supernatural creator. The only candidate supernatural being that fits the requirements is the one described in the Judeo-Christian tradition. I realize that science qua science doesn't take that into account. But that doesn't mean that the data we can observe through scientific means doesn't provide a strong basis for thinking that…even if we can't write it up that way in our scientific journals!
Of course, I have a whole bunch of other reasons beyond what science can tell us for thinking this, but that's another discussion in another thread, or even another blog!
Comment by DonaldM — December 3, 2008 @ 5:40 pm
December 3rd, 2008 at 5:42 pm
aiguy
Well, under that scenario, there would be the chemicals to explain and how they got tossed in and all that!:smile:
Have we beat this one to death yet?
Comment by DonaldM — December 3, 2008 @ 5:42 pm
December 3rd, 2008 at 6:23 pm
That was my point.
This is assuming your conclusion.
We observe that humans have purpose. It has nothing to do with whether naturalism explains how they came into being. This is the ID fallacy: there is no "thermodynamics of purpose" and no reason to think purpose is required in the process that produces humans just because humans have purpose. No reason at all. It makes no more sense than claiming that green things must be responsible for the creation of all green things. Yet it is a fundamental claim behind many anti-evolution arguments calling themselves "telic thoughts" or "ID advocacy".
Comment by don provan — December 3, 2008 @ 6:23 pm
December 3rd, 2008 at 7:36 pm
Donald,
I think there's no doubt natural selection is central, and I think even now there other mechanisms that are known to be involved in generating variation. Anyway, nobody can say what we might discover in the future in terms of natural laws that somehow result in complex form and function.
You can try to draw that distinction, but it may not be to your liking. The basic problem is that you are not able to say how intelligent causes are able to generate CSI when unintelligent causes can't.
First, what does it mean for a cause to be "blind"? Don't you really mean "unconscious"? And how about "unguided" – what sort of "guidance" are you talking about?
Next, let's see what sorts of things might distinguish intelligent causation from all other cause. Do you think that intelligent cause can be reduced to mechanism (e.g. can computers think)?
How about various other facets of intelligence? For example, would you agree that intelligence necessarily entails learning (adapting one's behavior in response to novel situations)? If so, can you suggest any way to decide if the Intelligent Designer is capable of learning? If not, do you really believe that something incapable of learning anything should be called intelligent?
Like learning, "foresight" – the ability to generate plans – seems to be a critical component of intelligence. But you only need to generate a plan in order to do something that you don't already know how to do. A termite colony does not have to make a plan in order to build its complex nest, and a spider does not have to make a plan for its ingenious web, and a thundercloud does not plan a lightning bolt either – even though humans would need to plan each of those tasks. What if the Designer of Life is not actually capable of generating a plan, but rather only creates form and function by virtue of its "blind, unguided" nature like a spider or a termite colony or a thundercloud?
What about consciousness? Do you think that something which could learn and solve problems but was not consciously aware of what it was doing should be called intelligent? If so, then you should probably call RM&NS "intelligent". If not, how might we go about deciding if the Intelligent Designer was conscious?
Here is my point: People have intuitions about minds, and they have very vague, unreflected ideas about what they mean when they say "intelligence". Again, what people actually mean is usually "something that experiences conscious thought like I do". That's just fine as a definition, but I think it's clear that we have very little reason (and no evidence) to assume that whatever caused life to exist "experiences conscious thought like we do".
Comment by aiguy — December 3, 2008 @ 7:36 pm
December 4th, 2008 at 4:29 pm
By the way, Egnor today agreed with what I have been saying on this topic for about the last five years:
http://www.evolutionnews.org/2008/12/consciousness_and_intelligent.html
His answer to this question is ill-conceived, but he's right about the question: The very coherence of the notion of ID rests on the idea that minds somehow transcend physical causation.
Comment by aiguy — December 4, 2008 @ 4:29 pm
December 4th, 2008 at 5:05 pm
Egnor has, once again, jumped the shark completely on this latest post. Incredibly, he completely misinterprets Chalmers, confusing the "easy" and "hard" problems. Egnor is the only ID "theorist" willing to admit (he even emphasizes) the critical dependence of ID on dualism, but his apologetics on the issue would earn failing grades in freshman philosophy.
It's worth reading, just to see how confused and ill-informed ID "theorists" in general are about the whole philosophy of mind issue:
http://www.evolutionnews.org/2008/12/consciousness_and_intelligent.html
(remember – the "easy" problem deals with mental function, and the "hard" problem deals with phenomenology)
Comment by aiguy — December 4, 2008 @ 5:05 pm
December 4th, 2008 at 5:13 pm
aiguy:
I just looked it over quickly. Will spend more time on it later.
We'll see about who it is that is confused.
Comment by Bradford — December 4, 2008 @ 5:13 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 12:57 am
Bradford,
But "Darwinism" (the belief that biological complexity is explained by Darwinian evolution) is completely compatible with any theory of mind, whether or not the mind "lawfully depends" on physical processes. Evolutionary theory simply makes no commitment at all to any metaphysical proposition regarding mind and consciousness.
Here, Egnor fails to understand what Chalmers said, even though Chalmers made it perfectly clear:
So all this nonsense about our inability to establish lawful dependence is not only irrelevant to the question of Darwinism, but Egnor's completely confused about what it means. Nobody (not even Egnor) doubts that if we soak our brains in alcohol, we reliably experience a change in our consciousness. That is all Chalmers is saying.
Nobody is suggesting that we ought to be able to quantify and predict mental experiences or behaviors. We can't predict the weather either, but this doesn't indicate that immaterial weather-stuff is involved. If he doesn't believe we can talk about our subjective experiences and how they change with brain changes (e.g. reporting memories evoked when electrodes are activated in our brain) then I'm not sure he should be allowed to perform neurosurgery.
The lawful dependence of behavior on brain matter would not explain the hard problem because the hard problem is not concerned with behavior. Rather, it is concerenced with our subjective experience. Good grief.
So while Egnor concedes here that behavior does in fact correlate with brain function, he denies that brain function is associated with any of our states of consciousness!?!? As though we can't make someone feel happy or sad or fearful or aroused simply by activating some neurons in their head (we can). As though we can't reliably alter someone's conscious experience simply by changing their brains with chemicals, magnetic fields, blunt-force trauma, or other physical stimuli (we can). What the heck is this man trying to say?
Here Egnor correctly identifies the critical issue. If the answer is yes, then the essential claims of ID are incoherent.
This is awfully dumb. First, if "agency" is material, then what might Egnor mean when he says living things are "replete with evidence for agency". Does he mean "living things move around and do things"? And while it is quite true that most people believe and have always believed that agency is immaterial, this is obviously and utterly beside any point that he might be trying to make. Most people believe and have always believed in all sorts of things that are demonstrably false. Does the fact that most people believe the gambler's fallacy mean it isn't a fallacy?
He's right about this, but what he doesn't realize is while Darwinism might still be true without physicalism, ID can't possibly be true without dualism. That is why evolutionary theory is scientific and ID is metaphysical.
And if the blog post was created by virtue of physical causation, then ID really has nothing to offer. Egnor gets this, but doesn't seem to be bothered that ID reduces to the claim that substance dualism is true. He just figures if that what it takes for ID to be true, then it must be true too!
Comment by aiguy — December 5, 2008 @ 12:57 am
December 5th, 2008 at 2:14 am
I read and pondered Egnor's post. I intended to blog on it before encountering this comment. I am only reinforced in that determination after reading this. Since you have an obvious interest in this subject matter that should agree with you. I've snipped out one section of your comment to reply to it now. I reserve the option of incorporating responses to other parts within the blog entry itself.
If the agency is immaterial we have evidence that an immaterial mind could preceed a material universe. That in turn implies that the universe could be ordered by a mind. If the material universe itself is deemed to have given rise to rational minds by virtue of its properties and the laws by which it functions then we can investigate the properties of the universe to assess whether or not the universe shows evidence of having been ordered by a mind. The material vs. non-material issue would remain sidelined within a metaphysical realm.
We can rationally infer that our universe has properties uniquely suited for the life we find on our planet. The birth of the universe operating in accord with finely tuned constants, a location within a suitable galaxy, the formation of the solar system, the earth and then life itself all have arisen within constraints indicating an unbelievably fortuitous series of events or a guiding hand. The material option can be indirect evidence of an immaterial mind. But there are more direct means of implicating immateriality. In any case Egnor is right to conclude that evidence for agency exists. The evidence is nothing so trivial as your suggested "living things move around and do things" In addition to the cosmic series of events previously described (finely tuned constants, anthropic principle etc.) the evidence within life itself lies with cellular constructs. most specifically nucleic acids themselves.
Your point about false beliefs of people overlooks one important matter. People are experts about minds. They have them, operate them, experience them and observe (indirectly) others do the same. If they believe in immaterial thoughts and minds they have a reasonable basis upon which to make the conclusion.
Comment by Bradford — December 5, 2008 @ 2:14 am
December 5th, 2008 at 3:44 am
Bradford,
So if substance dualism is true, you think that makes it more plausible that a conscious mind preceeded and created the universe. I would say yes, but only by a little bit. Here's why: Even substance dualists like Egnor know that the brain is necessary for mind, even if it isn't sufficient. Res cogitans might be real, but based on all of our experience, it appears to be only one part of what is needed for an actual mind. Since it's hard to imagine that the creator of the universe had a brain, I'd say we wouldn't be too much closer in pinning down the likelihood that mind preceeded the universe.
On the other hand, if substance dualism is false, we obviously know that mind did not preceed/create the universe.
If mind is material then our minds would operate according to nothing but physical cause. In other words, all intelligent causation would be nothing but blind, unguided, natural processes. The central claim of ID (that certain features of life and the universe are best explained by intelligent causation rather than blind, unguided natural processes) then becomes incoherent.
Moreover, if mind is material then anything without an organ similar to our brains (in some critical way) would not be able to think. So if mind is material, it is impossible that mind preceeded the physical universe, or designed the first brain.
I was with you up until "guiding hand" (the metaphor is a bit anthropocentric for me). In any event, I believe there are currently a number of different explanations for anthropic coincidences, and no way to determine if any of them are correct.
Even if multiverses or cyclic universes or whatever were all shown to be false, there would still not be a way to decide if our single finely tuned universe was a brute fact of existence, or the product of a mind that was conscious like our minds are. Or maybe it was the product of something that wasn't a mind at all, and it wasn't physical cause either, but instead it was something we cannot begin to conceive of. I'm pretty sure this is well into religious thought at this point…
If by "the material option" you mean materialism, then obviously no, that would mean there is no immaterial mind. If instead you mean Darwinian evolution and abiogenesis, then… well, I don't see how those would evidence immaterial mind either.
I asked what he meant by agency that was not immaterial. How does one provide evidence of that? (In other words, the word "agency" here already implies dualism).
And here I could not possibly disagree with you more strongly. There really is a huge literature that denies what you have said in countless ways.
Sometimes we believe that we are controlling something with our free will (a hand, a machine) when we are not. Sometimes we believe that we are not controlling something (like an Ouija board pointer) when in fact we are. Our personal memories are sometimes fabricated, or coopted from other people's experience. Some sensory experiences are delayed so that we experience things after they happen rather than as they happen. Our decisions to act spontaneously can be predicted by machines before we consciously make the decision. We can easily be fooled into having the feeling that we inhabit the body of someone else, or even a mannequin’s body. And so on…
None of these things were discovered by laypeople – those who you call "experts about minds"! All of these things, and so much more, have been discovered by scientists, who constantly discover mind-blowing things about our minds that none of us "mind experts" ever imagined.
Comment by aiguy — December 5, 2008 @ 3:44 am
December 5th, 2008 at 1:21 pm
aiguy:
An assumption that the mind is completely reducible to physical causes does not mean that physical causes themselves are blind, unguided processes. That's what a front loading perspective is designed to do- distinguish a blind, unguided process from one that is not. In the case of life, that front loading can be viewed as having occurred at the inception of the universe itself. You also wrote:
A fact of existence is not a cuasal explanation. Neither is one which posits a result on a series of extremely unlikely events. Extremely improbable scenarios suggest a likelihood of design. But since none of the options can be documented one can pick and choose the one he likes. Just don't refer to it as an empirically favored choice.
Comment by Bradford — December 5, 2008 @ 1:21 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 2:11 pm
Bradford,
I'll have to take your word for this, since I have never been able to understand what this "blind, unguided" thing was supposed to mean. When I use the term, what I mean is "conscious". What do you mean when you say it?
Obviously the word "blind" here is metaphorical… but can you cash that out in real terms? And it seems to me that pretty much everything (except perhaps single quantum events) is "guided" by something or other. Given a purely physical cause, how exactly does one decide if it is a blind, unguided cause or a not-blind, guided cause?
Some facts of existence must be accepted as "brute facts" – without causal explanation – because every explanation has to start somewhere. If, for example, you say that a mind created the universe, the axiomatic brute facts that you accept are the existence of that mind and its power to create our universe. If I say instead that the physical universe resulted in minds, the brute fact I accept is the universe and its laws (which we know exists) and its power to create minds.
I believe this is the essential fallacy of all "design theorists". Improbable scenarios suggest that we have not figured out the scenario yet; it does not suggest what the actual scenario might have been. You would like to believe that if we can't figure out a probable scenario, this means that a conscious mind exists and somehow made it happen. But it means nothing of the sort.
Comment by aiguy — December 5, 2008 @ 2:11 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 2:49 pm
Hi AI guy,
Don't you mean to say "Improbable scenarios suggest that we have not figured out the (Material/Non-Design) scenario yet;" Otherwise, I am not sure what you are saying here.
"Blindness," being blind to form, is necessarily deviod of form or form producing abilities by definition. "Unguided" is just another word for randomness — the absence of order/plan/form/guidance. Spiders, termites, at very least are guided by instinct (form) and the laws (form) of physics. Thunderclouds are guided by the laws (form) of physics. Your last statement therefore does not appear to be logical. ID'sts are saying that "form" is being produced by "a form producing agent." You appear to be saying that formlessness can do the trick.
Comment by William Brookfield — December 5, 2008 @ 2:49 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 3:39 pm
aiguy:
You've never lit a candle? You can describe the resulting combustion in purely chemical terms. And you can also pretend that any chemical reaction must of necessity yield to blind forces of nature. When I read the objection to a blind, unguided thing I'm looking at an argument from personal incredulity.
Extremely improbable scenarios suggest a likelihood of design.
So I'm arguing that things like fine tuning arguments, about which much is known about the relevant constants, imply improbability. Your response is that some unknowns explain improbabilities. I argue based on known data and you on a faith that the unknowns will indicate the favored view (from your perspective).
Comment by Bradford — December 5, 2008 @ 3:39 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 4:04 pm
Hi William,
I meant just that – we don't know. We might insist that some unidentified "intelligent agent" was responsible, or that some unidentified "material process" was responsible, but I don't think either of those claims would constitute "figuring it out".
But we know things are guided in the world by regular (knowable) physical causality; this is not randomness.
You seem to imply that "instinct" is not the same as (reducible to?) physical law. Is that what you think?
Where did I say something not logical?
Obviously all form is produced by something that can produce form, William. This does not seem helpful
Comment by aiguy — December 5, 2008 @ 4:04 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 4:04 pm
Bradford,
I'm afraid we talked past each other here. Again: I honestly do not know what you mean when you say something is "blind" or "unguided". Obviously by "blind" you do not mean "cannot visually perceive electro-magnetic radiation in the visible spectrum". So what do you mean?
I think with the candle analogy you are saying that we can look at things at different levels of abstraction. Still, I'm asking you to explain what – even at a high level of abstraction – you are talking about when you say something is "blind" or "unguided".
Actually what I say is slightly different, which is that we do not know what explains them.
No, this is completely mischaracterized. I have no faith. I do not know how life and the universe got started. When I do not know, I say "I do not know", and I'm quite content to have made that determination properly.
In contrast, you have faith that a mind preceeded and created the universe, and consciously planned living things. These are huge leaps of faith that do not follow from any evidence. There's absolutely nothing wrong with your faith, Bradford, except your trying to argue that it follows from "known data".
Comment by aiguy — December 5, 2008 @ 4:04 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 4:36 pm
And we have thousands of years of history showing humans making this mistake over and over. "It's extremely improbable that the Sun crosses the sky in exactly the same pattern year after year, so Apollo must pull it."
Comment by don provan — December 5, 2008 @ 4:36 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 5:02 pm
aiguy:
Do you know what would be needed to generate a prebiotic nucleic acid, having encoding properties and a means of expressing the genetic information in the form of enzymes, based on chemical logic? If the answer is anything other than no then you merit a Nobel Prize. So either laws of chemistry and physics are sufficient to supply the answer and we are simply unaware of what they are or the laws do not suffice to explain the observed outcome. If the latter is the case then a guided process is the logical inference.
Comment by Bradford — December 5, 2008 @ 5:02 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 5:04 pm
An ancient Greek would have rightly considered this absurd.
Comment by Bradford — December 5, 2008 @ 5:04 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 5:51 pm
Bradford,
Let's see… uh, no. Do I get some nice parting gifts for playing?
No, you are still making the same two mistakes:
Mistake #1) You seem to believe that we already understand the totality of "the laws of chemistry and physics", and also that we understand all of the implications of all these laws. I think it is obvious that neither of these things are true. If there are things that we can't explain by means of our current understanding of physics or chemistry (and there are plenty of them) then it may be that we will discover some new laws in the future that account for them. We have no idea how bizarre these new laws might be (the last big go-around in the early 1900's shook things up pretty good).
Mistake #2) You seem to believe that saying "a guided process" constitutes some sort of meaningful explanation, but it doesn't. I've asked you twice here in this thread to explain what you mean by "guided" and I still have no idea whatsoever. You might as well say "magic" – it means the same thing to me, and when you get right down to it, I think it means pretty much the same to you too.
Let's take one more look at all the options to explain the universe, life, and everything:
1) An unidentified unconscious thing
This doesn't tell us anything useful, and it can't be tested. It is not an explanation.
2) An unidentified conscious thing
This is what ID says. It is also useless and untestable, and not an explanation.
3) An unidentified result of physical causes that we already understand
This is what many mainstream scientists think. I don't agree, because I think our understanding of evolution and abiogenesis is fundamentally incomplete.
4) An already identified physical process
i.e. believing that our current theories are already sufficient. I guess some people think so.
5) An identified conscious agent
This would be the theological answer.
6) We don't know
This is my answer. I'm right.
Comment by aiguy — December 5, 2008 @ 5:51 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 6:27 pm
So either laws of chemistry and physics are sufficient to supply the answer and we are simply unaware of what they are or the laws do not suffice to explain the observed outcome. If the latter is the case then a guided process is the logical inference.
Here is your analytical mistake. If laws are sufficient, but not understood, an understanding of them could implicate results that were loaded so as to occur as opposed to being the result of indifferent processes. Why were laws so mathematically fine tuned at the outset in a way that is favorable to life? Infinite numbers of universes and we get the winning ticket? Perhaps. Sheer luck that was against unbelievably long odds. Perhaps but that is hardly a rational let alone scientific explanation. Techne's blog entry indicated that our understanding of underlying of realities could be shaken again a la quantum physics. If physical reaility itself were code like in nature would you then claim that the universe mimicks an intelligently designed concept through unconscious laws of nature. I know many would claim exactly that but not based on anything more rational than the existence of an intelligence antecedent to the universe itself.
Guided would be purposeful manipulation to generate an outcome not otherwise occurring. That happens with nucleic acids which I previously mentioned. We can splice and reorder them to change genomic properties. Magic? Miracles? Naw. But neither would this qualify as a blind process.
Comment by Bradford — December 5, 2008 @ 6:27 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 7:01 pm
So you agree that we should rightly consider similar ideas absurd today if they are based on nothing but a lack any concrete explanation?
Comment by don provan — December 5, 2008 @ 7:01 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 7:11 pm
We do not know.
Not this again. What do you mean by "purposeful"?
Comment by don provan — December 5, 2008 @ 7:11 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 7:12 pm
Probability assessments tend to be based on real data.
Comment by Bradford — December 5, 2008 @ 7:12 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 7:16 pm
Is that your definition of a miracle?
Luck and ignorance can be used to explain any unknown. Nothing distinguishing about them.
As long as pot luck can be used for causal explanations laws cannot be ruled out.
Comment by Bradford — December 5, 2008 @ 7:16 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 8:07 pm
Bradford,
Wrong again, I'm afraid. If the latter is the case, then the logical inference is that we don't know.
(If you ever figure out what you mean by "guided process", we can discuss it. Otherwise, you are saying nothing at all).
I think I've covered this – there are a number of answers, and we don't know which is correct.
You don't understand the multiverse scenario at all, I guess. If there is an infinite number of universes, then the odds are not long at all, so no luck is required: It was certain that our universe would arise.
Why is this not rational? Imagining an infinitely powerful, infinitely knowledgeable God is rational, but not an infinite number of universes? I think you're playing a little loose here… Anyway, I'm pretty sure there is no reason to believe that any of these ideas is actually true, at least currently.
No, I would never say that. Why not? Because the term "intelligently designed concept" is a meaningless string of words here.
Guided? Guided by what? Sounds like magic to me. Something you can't explain? Magic did it! Or… guided processes did it! No difference at all. Unless you can say what a guided process is, so that we can divide processes up into guided and unguided ones by looking at them, then we can never know what you're talking about, or if you are right.
Right: HUMANS DO THIS. HUMAN BEINGS! But human beings couldn't have created the universe and first life, so you're out of luck there. Maybe some other life form? No – how could a life form create the first life, or the universe?
Unless the human being had lost their eyesight, of course.
Comment by aiguy — December 5, 2008 @ 8:07 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 8:55 pm
Exactly.
Comment by don provan — December 5, 2008 @ 8:55 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 9:07 pm
No. Is it yours?
Exactly. As with intelligent agency.
It's logically impossible to rule out unknown laws, or even unknown effects of known laws. Pot luck has nothing to do with it.
But I can see why you'd want to eliminate any other vacuous arguments, such as pot luck, in order to make your vacuous argument look special.
Comment by don provan — December 5, 2008 @ 9:07 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 9:38 pm
Luck and ignorance can be used to explain any unknown. Nothing distinguishing about them.
Bzzzt. Wrong answer. Nobody rules in intelligent agency to explain a pencil falling to the ground. Gravity suffices. That's instructive when pondering how nucleotides align to form coded genetic messages in prebiotic environments. Genetics and chemistry do not suffice. Ruling out ID (which is done) as an option is ignorant and forces the pot luck/promissory note options as the only alternatives.
As long as pot luck can be used for causal explanations laws cannot be ruled out.
I can see why you wish to rule out ID to make your vacuous faith in unknown materialistic explanations palatable.
Comment by Bradford — December 5, 2008 @ 9:38 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 10:03 pm
That happens with nucleic acids which I previously mentioned. We can splice and reorder them to change genomic properties. Magic? Miracles? Naw.
The life form would have to pre-exist the universe and exist outside it as well. Existing outside the universe? How absurd. Science… Wait a second. Isn't that what multi-universes do? Exist outside our universe. Science is catching up to ID.
Comment by Bradford — December 5, 2008 @ 10:03 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 10:14 pm
No one uses dumb luck to explain a pencil falling to the ground, either. So intelligent agency and dumb luck are identical in this respect.
Who ruled out ID? No one here. We're just pointing out it's no more interesting than dumb luck as an explanation.
You mistakenly think I care what the answer is. It makes no difference to me whatsoever. I fully accept that we do not know, and am quite content with that answer. You're the one that's trying so desperately to add "…and therefore it must be an intelligent agent."
Comment by don provan — December 5, 2008 @ 10:14 pm
December 5th, 2008 at 10:39 pm
That's why you spend so much time at this blog. You could care less? Who are you kidding? Yourself.
No desperation. I pose it as a rational option.
Comment by Bradford — December 5, 2008 @ 10:39 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 1:18 am
Hi aiguy,
You "aiguy" are yourself an "unidentified conscious thing." Should I be taking your "existence" seriously? I am reasoning on the basis of the forms that you produce that you do indeed exist. Is it foolish or unscientific of me to think that you exist?
I suspect that you might protest "but we know other humans exist therefore my existence is probable." Humans however, are themselves *patterns* and those who don't relate to these patterns are called "autistic." It seems to me that at some point, a design inference based upon patterns is required for our very functioning as humans.
Comment by William Brookfield — December 6, 2008 @ 1:18 am
December 6th, 2008 at 3:30 am
You can't even imagine someone impartial, can you?
Comment by don provan — December 6, 2008 @ 3:30 am
December 6th, 2008 at 3:33 am
You're really losing it, William. Aiguy is identified. If you do not understand the difference in quality between aiguy as an explanation for something and "intelligence" as the explanation for something, you're really not even trying to think anymore.
Comment by don provan — December 6, 2008 @ 3:33 am
December 6th, 2008 at 4:07 am
Where does Egnor agree that 'if substance dualism is false, ID is incoherent'? Where does, in fact, Egnor out and out identify himself as a substance dualist (this before realizing dualisms come in a number of forms.)? And why is it so hard to understand that ID is a broad and expanding set of ideas, proposals, and interests – such that disproving one claim no more disposes of the whole spectrum than disproving one evolutionary hypothesis wrecks evolution as a whole?
Reading over what Egnor has to say about these issues, it seems his claim is the opposite: Namely that if materialism is false, darwinian evolution (whatever that may mean to him) is dead in the water.
By the way, just out of curiosity: Is anyone in this thread an actual materialist with regards to the mind? Aiguy, I clearly recall you tending towards neutral monism or the like. Loathe as you are to admit it, it seems like you'd normally be onboard with some of the criticisms Mario B, Egnor, Stapp, Schwartz and others make of materialist explanations of the mind, if it weren't for the suspected politics of at least Egnor and Schwartz, possibly Mario.
Comment by nullasalus — December 6, 2008 @ 4:07 am
December 6th, 2008 at 11:48 am
If this is a serious question, and not an opening gambit in employing the"no true scotsman" fallacy, (what is an "actual" materialist?)(and assuming "in the thread" includes reading as well as contributing*) I do not believe the mind is anything more than what the brain does.
*Having just read through the thread from the beginning (admittedly not all comments, thoroughly), it is hard to disagree with Aiguys' cool logic.
Comment by Alan Fox — December 6, 2008 @ 11:48 am
December 6th, 2008 at 1:06 pm
Color me unimpressed.
Comment by Jean — December 6, 2008 @ 1:06 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 2:06 pm
Aiguy is the one that points this out. And he explains why he says it. At no point does he claim the idea came from Egnor or leverage any other authority on the point, so feel free to engage his ideas directly.
It's easy to understand why you would think that, but aiguy's point is that no matter how varied you imagine ID to be, it all rests on this one unsupported and unsupportable assertion. If you disagree, all you have to do is point out the exceptions that aiguy is missing.
Comment by don provan — December 6, 2008 @ 2:06 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 2:43 pm
hi nullasulus,
Well, here, he comes out and says "I'm a dualist":
http://www.evolutionnews.org/2008/05/acceptist_materialist_dr_steph.html
Now, it's pretty clear Egnor does not actually understand the difference between various flavors of dualism. His inept descriptions of dualism locates him pretty squarely in the Cartesian camp, however. For example:
http://www.evolutionnews.org/2008/01/materialist_neuroscience_and_t.html
Just as the ideas of common descent and RM&NS (in some role) are common to all variants of evolutionary theory, there must be at least one single idea that is common to all flavors of ID; otherwise, it is a false category. That common idea, it appears, is that some conscious mind is responsible for designing form and function in the universe. That is the idea I take issue with.
He says this too, and of course that's just as confused as everything else he says. Darwinian evolution is quite clearly 100% compatible with dualism or any other metaphysics. In contrast, ID can only be true if dualism is true.
I am a neutral monist. I believe the hard problem of consciousness is indeed hard, contra the functionalists like Dennett (or various other neuro-philosophy types). I also believe that evolutionary theory is fundamentally incomplete.
However, I honestly think that Egnor, Mario B., and Schwartz make the most absolutely childish errors imaginable when they write about mind. They are – the three of them – beyond naive, as though they have never taken a philosophy course. Stapp is your typical "consciousness is weird, and QM is weird, so the weirdness must be connected" sort of physicist; I don't pay much attention to him. Penrose is obviously very smart, though, and he and Hameroff have more interesting ideas, although Hameroff comes out with some howlers sometimes, and Penrose seems to have never caught on about what was wrong with Lucas' Godelian arguments in the first place…
Comment by aiguy — December 6, 2008 @ 2:43 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 3:38 pm
Ah yes, the old "I'm smarter than everyone else" canard. Here's a clue aiguy. If you believe their whole case to be faulty – asside from the fact that it's no shame to come up with a hypothesis which is later disproved – why don't you directly go to the cause of the arguments, the authors themselves? Fire up some emails, if done in a friendly fashion I can see no reason why they would ignore. Makes more sense than to hammer strawmen on some blog those authors never read.
One more comment. Saying that their arguments are so childish and naive they should read up on philosophy presumes that philosphy can give definite answers to certain questions or that philosophy knows no opposing views. Those who hold this latter view are in my opinion childish and naive to a degree unimaginable.
Comment by Jean — December 6, 2008 @ 3:38 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 3:59 pm
I can but you are not that person.
Comment by Bradford — December 6, 2008 @ 3:59 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 4:01 pm
I can't force anyone to comprehend how the manipulation of a genome for a specified purpose would qualify as a directed result. But I won't tolerate claims that this has not been explained.
Comment by Bradford — December 6, 2008 @ 4:01 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 4:07 pm
Hi Don,
Unfortunately all I seem to have on aiguy, at this time, is the amount of specified complexity he/(she?/it?) has produced. The same applies to you. I just have letters on my computer that consistently conform to independently given patterns, the complexity of which indicate (gasp) intelligent design.
Could you perhaps explain this "difference" in scientific/mathematical/logical terms? Why does the language here indicate intelligent design whereas the language of DNA does not.
At this point I am convinced (though I could be mistaken) that DNA, as a designed language, is just *culturally* unacceptable at this time — just as Galileo's observation of the moons of Jupiter was culturally unacceptable in his time.
Comment by William Brookfield — December 6, 2008 @ 4:07 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 4:39 pm
aiguy,
Alright. So Egnor isn't laying down any 'substance dualism must be true or ID is incoherent' line at all. In fact he's practically precluded from doing so because according to you he doesn't even understand the differences between the various types of dualism besides.
So the 'Egnor secretly thinks that substance dualism is utterly essential to the ID case' claim goes right down the toilet, certainly in a conspiratorial sense.
Alright – then evolutionary theory has been falsified, because horizontal gene transfer circumvents the RM&NS and CD models alike and seems to play a large role in the history of evolution on this planet. We'll just have to call the theory that integrates everything something new. The 'common idea' in ET can be so watered down, it hardly seems to matter.
Considering that many of the more theistic ID proponents would imagine the 'designing mind' as eternal and unchanging, I think that question gets pretty complicated. And the less theistic ones would more likely embrace varieties from platonism to simulation theory to even aliens. And don't discount the ability of the theists to see things in fundamentally different ways even on this level.
In fact, the explanations I've seen of ID never start out with 'a conscious mind is responsible for designing' anything in the universe (at least aside from the obvious, uncontroversial 'designs') but 'mind/design is sometimes the best explanation for a given thing, and said design can be inferred scientifically'. That sounds similar, but is vastly broader and more humble in at least an 'standard' starting scope.
This is where it becomes important to realize that 'darwinian evolution' is a pretty slippery definition – it means different things to different people in this debate. Egnor may see DE as fundamentally married to materialist metaphysics, just as others see it as inseparable from atheistic metaphysics – though I typically disagree with both views. While I utterly disagree that ID is irrevocably hooked up to dualism, much less some narrow and specific substance dualism in particular, I will wholeheartedly agree that ID – at least the DI brand – is thoroughly aligned against materialism.
In other words, in some fundamental way, these crazy ID types have some justification in their (non-political) intellectual endeavors? I'm sure you'd see it as more feral and instinctual, but nevertheless, let's cede that much.
Even if I were to grant that – is Novella is honestly that much better? Or Gefter? Or the other usual suspects here?
Schwartz's claims have primarily been that his approach to the mind fits neatly with a theory of mind that is immaterial in part, and to point out the serious (and rather disturbing) flaws that were present in the previous big 'materialist theory of mind' – the major criticism with him has always been 'Well, materialism can kinda-sorta account for that too in an awkward manner! And behaviorists haven't been popular for around two decades so no fair talking about them!' Mario's more or less fit into the same category. Egnor, oddly enough, mostly spends his time talking about how utterly inadequate materialism is as a general metaphysic, particularly with regards to mind – he spends much lest time boosting dualism.
Stapp's characterization, I'll object to. He's not associated with the DI in any way as far as I know (You didn't imply this, but it's worth pointing out), and the 'consciousness is weird, and QM is weird, therefore they're related' summary skips over the fact that one major reason QM is seen as 'weird' is because of its implied interaction WITH an agent/mind/consciousness straightaway. Even Chalmers had to go back and correct himself for a similar characterization of the association between the two.
As for Penrose/Hameroff, I'll say little more than the same camps that tend to savage Egnor & company will, in my experience, typically give P/H the same treatment.
Comment by nullasalus — December 6, 2008 @ 4:39 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 4:44 pm
aiguy:
So an unconscious mind was responsible or "it just is" becomes a more satisfactory way of viewing this?
Comment by Bradford — December 6, 2008 @ 4:44 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 5:54 pm
So Aiguy
Neutral monist, eh? Have you been tempted by Buddhism? It's about the only significant religion that hasn't been exploited in some history of conquest or genocide.
Comment by Alan Fox — December 6, 2008 @ 5:54 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 6:04 pm
Well, so long as you ignore the Japanese neatly integrating it with a very martial and militaristic national project. Or the arguably exploitative regime under the tibetan lamas. Or a number of other 'incidents'. All while realizing that buddhism, compared to the other 'significant religion's, is far smaller in terms of adherents – and that it's difficult for a religion with minority status in a given country to be exploited for conquest or genocide. Not that this stopped some incidents with atheism, of course.
Not to dump on buddhism, mind you. Just about every religion is open to and has been abused to various ends. But the 'buddhism has been pure' line falls apart upon study. It's not immune to being hijacked for other causes.
Comment by nullasalus — December 6, 2008 @ 6:04 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 6:13 pm
Thanks for the response, nullasalus. I think aiguy is capable of answering questions directed at him, though I am sure he will express his gratitude for your helpful intervention. So the Japanese invoke the teaching of the Buddha to justify their conquest of Manchuria. I did not know that. I will look into it.
The Chinese were liberators. I did not know that.
Yes?
Was that my claim? Have you studied the issue?
(Some irony was employed in the writing of this post)
Comment by Alan Fox — December 6, 2008 @ 6:13 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 6:29 pm
Alan Fox,
Where did I answer for aiguy at any point? I focused on a line you threw out that was unrelated to whatever aiguy's views may be, and which I found unsustainable.
And where did I say this? I said that buddhism was 'neatly integrated with a very martial and militaristic national project' in Japan. You deny this?
I said the Chinese were liberators? Can you please quote my line saying this?
Your claim was "It's about the only significant religion that hasn't been exploited in some history of conquest or genocide." I think 'buddhism has been pure' is a fair, casual approximation of exactly this, yes.
Have I studied the issue? Yes, enough to be aware that 'buddhism has not been exploited' does not hold true, and that the question of exploitation is itself complicated. You need only go so far as World War II and the tradition of zen buddhism in Japan to see examples of violations – there are more than that.
I threw out some fairly uncontroversial and, in my view, politely stated objections to a claim you made. Your response was to throw up a strawman so quickly I have to wonder if you own a farm.
Weird.
Comment by nullasalus — December 6, 2008 @ 6:29 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 6:33 pm
Link
It seems there was some effort by the Japanese to develop an alliance with Mongolia via their Buddhist monastery infrastructure to assist their takeover of Manchuria. Apologies, Nullasalus.
Comment by Alan Fox — December 6, 2008 @ 6:33 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 6:41 pm
So it appears. But, I seem to have stumbled on a subject that has not had much exposure in the West. Thanks for the serendipitous result.
Comment by Alan Fox — December 6, 2008 @ 6:41 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 6:45 pm
Oh and, the phrase:
The Chinese were liberators.
contained a typo. It should have read:
The Chinese were liberators?
Comment by Alan Fox — December 6, 2008 @ 6:45 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 6:55 pm
Alan Fox:
So what? Invoking religious teachings reflects poorly on the manipulative invokers. If you don't think so then perhaps I should begin invoking the beliefs of ID critics and then go on a rampage of bad behavior making people think ID critics are to blame.
Comment by Bradford — December 6, 2008 @ 6:55 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 6:58 pm
Nullasalus
The zen-shinto subset of Buddhism may arguably described as different enough from Buddhism as practised in mainland Asia so as not be a significant religion in World terms.
Comment by Alan Fox — December 6, 2008 @ 6:58 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 7:04 pm
If you mean exploiting religions to indulge in conquest, genocide or oppression is reprehensible, I agree.
If you feel the need, go ahead. You don't need my permission.
Comment by Alan Fox — December 6, 2008 @ 7:04 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 7:25 pm
Alan Fox,
These incidents of corruption/abuse are not limited to Japan – it's just one of the nearest examples. Other entanglements are documented.
Either way, I'll set this aside.
Comment by nullasalus — December 6, 2008 @ 7:25 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 7:29 pm
An example?
Generous concession.
Comment by Alan Fox — December 6, 2008 @ 7:29 pm
December 6th, 2008 at 10:52 pm
Raevmo,
Oh, lighten up. Do you think I was arguing that HGT actually falsified ET? I was criticizing what I think is an inappropriate standard of judgment on aiguy's part. I've been critical the sort of standards Egnor (apparently) and others have with regards to 'darwinian evolution' for a while now. So your yappy little dog routine fails even on that marginal standard. Shoo.
Alan Fox,
The old tibetan entanglement with the mongols comes to mind as the next most obvious display.
Comment by nullasalus — December 6, 2008 @ 10:52 pm
December 7th, 2008 at 12:48 am
My education has been lacking on the history of Tibetan/Mongolian conflict, and Google does not seem to shed much light on the subject of Buddhism being exploited by Mongols to conquer Tibet (is that what happened?) so I will bow to your superior knowledge and concede the point.
I guess not even Buddhism was immune to exploitation as a means of social control and oppression.
I would have still been interested in aiguy's answer, but judging from his last comment, now in the memory hole, he won't be responding further here.
Comment by Alan Fox — December 7, 2008 @ 12:48 am
December 7th, 2008 at 12:59 am
Alan Fox,
No, not conquer Tibet. More of an entanglement, with some good ol' school v school fun thrown in. I'm not claiming to be a historical expert here, but at one point I got curious if buddhism was all roses and sunshine (the depiction was common with folks I was talking with at one point), and checked up on it. The result was about what you'd expect.
And no aiguy comment was holed as near as I can tell. He's probably just busy at the moment, I'm sure he'll reply if he feels like it.
Comment by nullasalus — December 7, 2008 @ 12:59 am
December 7th, 2008 at 5:23 am
You have letters on your computer from the intelligent designer of life on earth and the universe? Gee, that changes everything! Why didn't you say so?!
Well, sure. I'm surprised you don't know, but I'll help with that since you're obviously willing to listen.
Aiguy has a specific definition which, to our super skeptical eyes, is limited to messages posted to this board as coming from aiguy.
The messages have a physical source, this web site, and the web site clearly identifies which came from the login identity "aiguy".
We could investigate this physical source and trace it back to an originating computer. Assuming aiguy is not intentionally trying to conceal his location, this is trivial with the cooperation of the web site.
We might even be able to arrange a meeting in order to study him in person.
We can also analyze his messages, studying them for features of interest, perhaps picking up hints about his personal life from time to time, perhaps even getting a glimpse of his opinions about, say, ID. Who knows?
In contrast, for the intelligent designer, we have nothing. No where to start at all. There are no messages intended to convey information to you, let along labels telling us which messages are from an intelligent designer.
ID supporters point to things and claim they are the equivalent of labels, but an impartial evaluation will show you that their claims amount to nothing but opinions based on "it looks like that to me" and "what else could it be?" There's nothing even remotely similar to "Comment by aiguy".
It boils down to this: aiguy has an existence that we can both point to on our computer screens and agree on. Whether he is human or has a physical body or is in any other way what we think of him is unimportant. We're currently discussing him: you cannot deny we agree on what we're talking about.
On the other hand, there is nothing you and I can point to and expect to agree that it is the intelligent designer. There is simply no characteristic of the intelligent designer that we have to agree on. We cannot even agree on existence. If we could, we still couldn't agree on "intelligence" since we have different ideas about what that means.
Pardon me for saying so, but, frankly, it's incompetent for you not to already know this. If you cannot tell the difference in quality between an explanation of "aiguy" and an explanation of "intelligent designer", you really shouldn't be wasting people's time.
Comment by don provan — December 7, 2008 @ 5:23 am
December 7th, 2008 at 7:01 am
It's here. He finishes by saying:
which I took to mean he wouldn't be commenting further. I see he has commented in the later Egnor thread.
I was thinking more jihads, pogroms, crusades, that sort of thing.
Comment by Alan Fox — December 7, 2008 @ 7:01 am
December 13th, 2008 at 3:21 pm
Hi Don,
It is important for you to realize that you are under no obligation whatsoever "waste time" replying to my "incompetent" comments.
There is however a longstanding problem in philosophy that has not been solved, but can indeed be solved by an ID approach. John Horgan (ex Sci-Am writer) discusses this problem in his book "The End of Science" under the sub-heading "How do I Know You're Conscious?" page 180 pb Chapter 7. The problem is that of the non-transferability of subjective experience. While I am certain that I am conscious, how do I know/prove that someone else (such as aiguy) is conscious?
The problem is not that people lack faith regarding the consciousness of others (almost everyone *believes* that others have conscious experiences). The problem is “how can this faith be rigorously (scientifically/logically/mathematically/skeptically) proved?” The solution, as I see it, is *specified complexity* (and its holistic nature). Through the use of the "mind's eye," (with its forsight, hindsight and insight), conscious entities are able to overcome probabilistic hurdles that mindless processes cannot. Conscious agents, with their internal HOLISTIC vision of the WHOLE "structure-to-be," are able to pull together the appropriate/pertinent elements for complex integrated structures. These probabilistic divergences are detectable. Mindless entities (that see and know nothing) on the other hand, never pull complex holistic structures together for any reason. Without the specified complexity that aiguy has produced I would have no rigorous proof of his existence as a *conscious* entity.
For many people (myself included) CSI is real evidence. I.E., the existence of functionally integrated, nano-technology in the cell, is evidence for (some kind of) a nano-technician (ID). The existence of nano-technology (or just plain technology) on the moon would also constitute evidence (the prior activity) of an intelligent designer/technician. Technologies and minds that produce them are both holistic entities. Thanks to specified complexity we can identify aiguy (from statistical analysis of his literary output) as a *conscious* agent. Without specified complexity however we "cannot know that aiguy is conscious" and therefore cannot *rigorously* identify him.
The process of going from nebulous FAITH (that others are indeed conscious) to mathematical CERTAINTY (via Dembski’s specified complexity) is the movement of science. Without this scientific certainty, aiguy cannot be identified with certainty as belonging to any of the categories he has provided. While we cannot (as yet) identify whether of not aiguy (or God) lives in Texas, any solution to this particular “identity problem” would be trivial. Such a “solution” would not answer any longstanding questions in science or philosophy. With CSI in hand however, we can be certain that both aiguy’s writing and DNA are the product of conscious (CSI generating) agents.
Comment by William Brookfield — December 13, 2008 @ 3:21 pm