Epiphenomalism and Evolution
by BilboThe problem of consciousness is one that materialism hasn't been able to solve. The most popular explanation is Epiphenomenalism — that consciousness is just a by-product of the physical activity of our brains. It has no causal efficacy in and of itself. This seems to be a problem when we consider the most popular explanation of how we got here — Darwinian evolution. According to that theory, we are the product of a blind process that favored organisms that could survive and reproduce more effectively than their competitors.
So what's the problem? The problem then for Epiphenomenalism, is that our conscious beliefs have no causal effect upon our physical states. If we need to avoid a part of the jungle, because a tiger lives there, then it doesn't matter what we consciously believe. As long as we don't go into the jungle, we can believe anything we want to believe. We could even believe that we should not avoid that part of the jungle. In other words, there is no good evolutionary explanation of why any of our conscious beliefs need be true, given Epiphenomenalism. So whatever explanation we offer for the relationship of conscious beliefs to actions, Epiphenomenalism shouldn't be it.
September 8th, 2009 at 6:14 pm
I'm going to take this opportunity to chide mainstreamers for inserting ill-defined emergence concepts and hazy evolutionary pathways into the gaps of our knowledge about human conscousness.
Comment by Bradford — September 8, 2009 @ 6:14 pm
September 8th, 2009 at 6:21 pm
Bradford:
When very little is known, an ill-defined concept or hazy pathway may be the best that an unenlightened mainstreamer has to offer. Once it is offered, others can suggest improvements or replacements. These suggestions may lead to additional knowledge. As more is known, pathways may become less hazy, and concepts may be better defined.
If an intelligence that is not amenable to experimental investigation is inserted in to the gap, it is not particularly useful for inspiring improvements.
Comment by congregate — September 8, 2009 @ 6:21 pm
September 8th, 2009 at 6:27 pm
There's always the option of holding your peace when you do not know or acknowledging that this is completely speculative.
Or may lead us down a dead end path.
Who sez not amenable? Surely not such dignataries as Penrose and TP.
Comment by Bradford — September 8, 2009 @ 6:27 pm
September 8th, 2009 at 6:28 pm
Bradford,
Consciousness is a notion introduced in philosophy of mind. I am not sure we should be looking to science in order to solve a philosophical problem. That rarely works.
Science may come up with its own avenue of studying this subject but it will likely not operate in precisely the same terms. Philosophers may simply be asking the wrong questions, to which one simply cannot give valid, objective answers.
Just to explain what I mean by this, let me point out to the old theory of combustion involving phlogiston. It is simply wrong to ask how much phlogiston this or that substance contains: there is no such thing. Likewise, consciousness may be too vague and subjective a term to be of any use in science.
Comment by olegt — September 8, 2009 @ 6:28 pm
September 8th, 2009 at 6:29 pm
As to the OP, consciousness and epiphenomenalism are not my areas of expertise, so I'm quite likely missing something. I hope Bilbo or someone else can point it out to me.
If there are a variety of beliefs among the population, some of which lead individuals to avoid the tiger's turf, and others which do not, won't those holding the first set of beliefs eventually come to dominate the population, as their fellows are eaten up?
And so those whose conscious beliefs are true would have an advantage?
Comment by congregate — September 8, 2009 @ 6:29 pm
September 8th, 2009 at 6:36 pm
Good point Olegt. This is one of the reasons why I have utilized posts to debunk notions like the "evolution of religion" or other such social phenomenon. At the very least such highly speculative ideas, attempting to link such things to a mutation/selection process, could very well be based on fundamental misunderstandings of actual causes leading to consciousness. The pathway to consciousness in turn likely explains many other things as secondary causal features. Then again I admit my notions are in the realm of the highly speculative.
Comment by Bradford — September 8, 2009 @ 6:36 pm
September 8th, 2009 at 11:16 pm
"Consciousness is a notion introduced in philosophy of mind. I am not sure we should be looking to science in order to solve a philosophical problem. That rarely works."
Interesting.
The problem here is that
a) most notions of 'science' involve analysis of physical phenomena only whilst
b) 'philosophy' as practiced in the West and nowadays most modern societies deals only with abstract conceptualisation.
I think we should return to the root meaning of 'science' and revisit more of the extensive work done by 'contemplative tradition' schools in which there were/are rigorously developed, continuously practiced and refined methodologies for examining the nature of mind and phenomena together rather than separating them (artificially). It has been done, it is being done, much therein is 'known' but it has to be experienced by each person doing the 'knowing' for themselves.
Comment by ash — September 8, 2009 @ 11:16 pm
September 9th, 2009 at 3:19 am
The term "conscious belief" is simply the observation that we are aware of our own thoughts. The survival advantage of being aware of our own thoughts is that we can analyze them and express them to others.
Whether or not those conscious beliefs are epiphenomena of physical processes, or are the activities of a supernatural mind, has no bearing on the question of how conscious beliefs came to be. After all, even if we stipulate that conscious thought is simply the activity of some undetectable mind stuff, we're still left with the question of how conscious thought developed within that mind stuff. And, interestingly enough, even with mind stuff, evolution provides a very convincing explanation.
You deny epiphenomenalism by introducing an additional, undetected component, "mind", a component unnecessary to explain anything we've observed. That results in an answer that's more complicated while being far less complete.
Comment by don provan — September 9, 2009 @ 3:19 am
September 9th, 2009 at 3:28 am
Don nails it! Exactly! No-one, AFAIAA, has scratched the surface of how brain activity at the level of individual neurons might scale up to the thinking process. There is no scientific need yet to consider immaterial processes (whatever they might be!) when the physical processes of mind and consciousness are still so poorly understood.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 9, 2009 @ 3:28 am
September 9th, 2009 at 11:03 am
You mean you don't believe you are currently conscious?
The problem with Epiphenomenalism is that it denies the causal efficacy of beliefs. So even if one correctly believes that there is a tiger in the jungle, this belief won't be able to make them avoid going into the jungle.
Yes, if being aware (or conscious) of our thoughts can cause us to analyze and express them, then there would certainly be an advantage. But Epiphenomenalism says that awareness or consciousness of our thoughts has no causal efficacy, and therefore can't cause us to express them. So no advantage.
No where in my OP did I use the term "mind." I did introduce the term "conscious beliefs." You could deny that we have conscious beliefs. Some philosophers do that. I find that difficult to swallow.
Comment by Bilbo — September 9, 2009 @ 11:03 am
September 9th, 2009 at 2:55 pm
Being aware is the advantage. How that relates to consciousness or epiphenomenalism is irrelevant to the issue of survival advantages.
We know that our awareness of our thoughts results in us physically doing things, such as talking. One explanation is that epiphenomenalism is wrong. Another explanation is that although epiphenomenalism is correct that the epiphenomenon itself cannot have causal efficacy, the physical processes from which epiphenomenon arises do have the required causal efficacy.
In short, the observed problem doesn't actually help us resolve either the question of epiphenomenalism, true or false, or the question of material explanation, possible or impossible. My take on the OP is that it is simply getting those two questions confused, and that leads us nowhere.
(I actually think I'm saying the same thing as olegt, I'm just being way more confusing about how I put it.)
Oops, sorry. My bad. I should have said, "You deny epiphenomenalism, and some people would see that as justification for 'mind'," etc. I apologize for not acknowledging that you avoided introducing that even more pointless alternative to epiphenomenalism.
We have conscious beliefs. The question is whether what we call "conscious beliefs" are epiphenomena or something else.
Some philosophers are nihilists, and they can't figure out why everyone else isn't a nihilist, too.
But in this case, philosophers that deny we have conscious beliefs are probably trying to say that the epiphenomena we call "conscious beliefs" have no physical reality, not that the physical reality that gives rise to what we call "conscious beliefs" doesn't exist. If so, the question to ask such philosophers isn't "How can you say conscious beliefs don't exist?!", but, rather, "What do you mean by 'exists'?" This is the kind of hair splitting that can be used to separate laymen from experts in philosophy, by the way.
Comment by don provan — September 9, 2009 @ 2:55 pm
September 9th, 2009 at 3:20 pm
Alan, tell me…when WOULD there be a "scientific need to consider immaterial processes"?
And while you're at it, what in the world IS a "scientific need to consider immaterial processes"?
Comment by chunkdz — September 9, 2009 @ 3:20 pm
September 9th, 2009 at 3:25 pm
To the contrary, the mind is the explanation. It is neural activity that is superfluous in addition to being poorly understood and not linkable to an explanation for consciousness.
Comment by Bradford — September 9, 2009 @ 3:25 pm
September 9th, 2009 at 5:29 pm
What does that explanation tell us that we didn't already know?
Not at all. If I blow your brains out, we will no longer be able to detect your mind in any way. Already we're one step above the null hypothesis.
Comment by don provan — September 9, 2009 @ 5:29 pm
September 9th, 2009 at 5:35 pm
re: "Being aware is the advantage. How that relates to consciousness or epiphenomenalism is irrelevant to the issue of survival advantages."
Survival advantages are important, but are mainly an animal level concern. There is much more to life – especially human life – than mere survival. Assuming the latter is just buying into the mechanistic, or animal realm, view adopted by the anti-religious dogmatists of the modern era, aka Darwinianists, Marxists etc.
Comment by ash — September 9, 2009 @ 5:35 pm
September 9th, 2009 at 8:20 pm
The objection was that self-awareness had no survival advantage, which is false for the reasons I've pointed out. Recognizing its survival value does not require denying that there's a higher purpose, in addition.
Comment by don provan — September 9, 2009 @ 8:20 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 7:42 am
Not possible unless the "glitch" that prevents me posting more than a sentence or two can be sorted.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 10, 2009 @ 7:42 am
September 10th, 2009 at 7:56 am
It points out the limits to what you know. Pretending physiological brain processes explains consciousness is wishful materialist thinking. We understand the mind by observing behavior.
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 7:56 am
September 10th, 2009 at 8:12 am
Where else can consciousness exist apart from a physiological process in the brain? The lack of a brain guarantees lack of consciousness.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 10, 2009 @ 8:12 am
September 10th, 2009 at 8:18 am
Bradford wrote:
That sums up nicely what ID is. It is not intended to generate any new knowledge. It just says you can't know how [insert your favorite subject] arose, so it must have been designed. Is this a fair interpretation?
Comment by olegt — September 10, 2009 @ 8:18 am
September 10th, 2009 at 8:31 am
No. That was a corrective measure intended to keep subjective interpreters from steering scientific results off course. What we know about intellect is revealed through behavior. The behavior relevant to teaching is revealed through test taking. You don't measure neural synapse activity to determine what your students have absorbed about your instruction. You are entitled to believe that their learning process is reducible to brain biochemistry but if it is we are a long way from making useful predictions of human congnitve facilities and linking specific reactions to the dynamics of specific thought patterns.
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 8:31 am
September 10th, 2009 at 8:58 am
Many insights into cognition have been gained by studying people with various brain lesions and injuries, plus stimulation of parts of the brain when exposed during operations. Frontal lobotomies were once considered a way of treating various mental illnesses.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 10, 2009 @ 8:58 am
September 10th, 2009 at 9:27 am
I agree. I'm a dualist with respect to the function of minds.
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 9:27 am
September 10th, 2009 at 1:04 pm
No, sorry. We already knew the limits of what we know. Besides, the explanation "mind" doesn't saying anything whatsoever about what we know or its limits. In fact, it says nothing at all. That's the point.
Again, if I blow your brains out, your mind ceases to work. That immediately raises the claim to a level above wishful thinking, even if it doesn't provide any insight into any actual explanation.
We understand the mind by observing the behavior of physical beings. Your observation supports the idea of a physical explanation. But you think it somehow refuts it.
Comment by don provan — September 10, 2009 @ 1:04 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 1:12 pm
That's right. You measure what they write down on their test paper, a process that follows an entirely traceable path from measurable neural synapse activity down to the point of the pencil. When we're testing them, we don't care about that path, but we could, if we wanted, notice that it tracks back to physical things going on in the brain, not to "mind".
I haven't seen aiguy around lately, so I'll fill in for what I imagine he might say here: you'd be surprised how far we've come over the last decade in making useful predictions of human cognitive facilities and linking specific reactions to the dynamics of thought patterns. This hiding place is getting smaller every day.
Comment by don provan — September 10, 2009 @ 1:12 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 1:24 pm
Materialism is not science. Neurobiological research findings say nothing about consciousness and explain little about cognitive functions. We evaluate intellects by assessing the capacities of a mind and this in turn is done by evaluating behavior. Intellectual capabilites are abstractions, materialism notwithstanding. You are welcome to challenge this by posting detailed brain biochemical pathways linked to specific intellectual endeavors.
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 1:24 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 1:29 pm
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 1:29 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 1:32 pm
Is this the best materialists come up with? The above is not an argument, you're just begging the question; Consciousness depends on the brain because without a brain there is no consciousness. You can't get more circular than that.
What you really seem to be saying is you see no evidence of dead people (physically) interacting with our world (debatable, too) therefore consciousness does not survive death, but you have not proven this presumption to be true, so it does not stick.
Of course, neurological evidence from NDE events, which would be the best way to defeat the above presumption, is waved away all to eagerly. Consciousness surviving after brain activity has stopped, can't have that now can we?
Comment by Jean — September 10, 2009 @ 1:32 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 2:35 pm
Then just use multiple posts. It's not such a complicated question to answer.
Comment by chunkdz — September 10, 2009 @ 2:35 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 4:25 pm
It's a start.
This is a funny thing for someone to say who's using this as a reason to support an alternative about which nothing specific can be said, and with which absolutely no meaningful predictions can be made.
We know more about how the brain works than I think you understand, but even if our knowledge were as primitive as you imagine, it's still just a fact that the results of blowing your brains out are specific and meaningful in respect to the hypothesis of a physical basis for thought. Do we get anything even that tiny from the hypothesis of a mind?
Comment by don provan — September 10, 2009 @ 4:25 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 4:39 pm
All meaningful predictions are based on thought. Thought is deciphered through behavioral manipulation of physical objects. That's what is occuring right now. It is not the brain being analyzed. It is thoughts expressed through physical mediums.
As I said before I'm a dualist. I don't refute a physical association with thought. But physical brains do not explain thoughts. You are conflating distinctive things.
The mind is what you are thinking as you read this.
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 4:39 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 4:39 pm
You keep saying this, and I keep pointing out that the behavior is driven by physicial processes, not by "a mind".
Exactly. They're abstractions, labels we've created for purposes of discussion. "Fast" is an abstraction. Does that mean physical objects can't be fast? "Herd" is an abstraction. Does that mean there's some supernatural reality to a herd beyond the physical cows?
And you are welcome to support the idea of "mind" by providing any clue whatsoever, detailed or not, specific or not, how we can produce the same information for it that you are demanding from me.
Really, this "you don't know, so i'm right by default" nonsense is weak enough in the ID argument. It's senseless here.
Proponent: "Bigfoot exists."
Critic: "I doubt it."
Proponent: "You are welcome to challenge Bigfoot by providing specific, meaningful predictions."
Critic: "Huh?"
Comment by don provan — September 10, 2009 @ 4:39 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 4:46 pm
This is scientifically vacuous. The x factor is driven by physical processes. Wow. That sure says a lot.
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 4:46 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 5:30 pm
About a year ago I came in possession of a small orange cat. He is the first pet that I have ever had as an adult so I have developed something of a semi-scientific curiosity in his behavior.
One of the things I’ve noticed is that he has something of a mechanical aptitude. For example, he knows how to open boxes and bags and he knows that sometimes there are goodies inside. He also knows that with a little effort that he can open a partially closed door. So often I’ll prop open the screen door and leave the inner door ajar. He’ll let himself in or out, depending whether he is inside or out. The down side of this for me is that I have to then get up and close the door after him.
However, a few weeks ago he did something totally new and novel. I was here working on the computer. He was on the floor a few feet away staring at the door. Because it was a very nice day outside I had the inner door open and the screen door closed. It was closed but I hadn’t noticed that it was not latched. I assumed that he wanted to go outside, but for some reason, he seemed to be behaving differently. He was staring at the door like he was in deep thought. So out of curiosity I decided to watch. Suddenly he bolted for the door at full speed. Then at the last possible moment he reared up, caught the lower door panel with his front paws and pushed as hard as he could. The door swung wide open and he outside free to chase butterflies.
Here’s what amazes me. I didn’t train him to do that. That is something he figured out to do himself without going through a trial and error operant conditioning type process. That ability was clearly the result of some type of cognitive process.
So explain to me how does an undirected, unguided process evolve that kind of ability?
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 10, 2009 @ 5:30 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 5:30 pm
I'm forced to state the obvious because you are pretending it isn't there. Please, feel free to say we haven't established that the mind is epiphenomena. And feel free to use that to suggest another possibility: that the mind has a reality that isn't physical. But don't pretend that it isn't obvious that any measure of anything a human does cannot be traced back as far as we can trace it without leaping out to "the mind".
You're pretending there's a direct connection between human behavior and "the mind", but that's the one thing we can concretely and positively say is not the case.
Comment by don provan — September 10, 2009 @ 5:30 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 6:04 pm
JOHN_A_DESIGNER said
Nice anecdote about your cat. I recognize very similar clever behavior in my own cats. You may think your cat is your possession, but you just don't realize he owns you.
Seriously though, you are incredulous that such capabilities could have evolved. Why? It's obvious that it has adaptive value. It's less obvious what genes affect such abilities, although selection experiments in animals can affect animal "personalities", thus showing there is genetic variation for "creativity" if you like.
I also wonder what you mean by "unguided" and "undirected". If the environment favors a certain phenotype over others and selection changes the phenotype to match the environment, isn't the environment "guiding" the process?
Comment by Jure — September 10, 2009 @ 6:04 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 6:12 pm
The same way it produces mountain ranges. They're amazing, too.
Comment by don provan — September 10, 2009 @ 6:12 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 7:27 pm
Is this an example of your blind faith? Because you are either not thinking or you think that your thoughts are the same as some unknown configuration of atoms. Sounds like voodoo psychology. Are you aware that studies indicate that thoughts can induce physical changes in the brain? But perhaps the absence of thought accounts for resistance to design. Those synapses are configured in an anti-design state.
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 7:27 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 7:32 pm
Don't you know it was a physical process. I mean what the hell is wrong with you? Evolution dunnit. Unguided processes explain everything even if we can't identify what they r. Are u anti-science or sumpthin?
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 7:32 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 9:07 pm
I have said nothing that assumes anything about my thoughts. I have simply pointed out that between behavior and thought there is, for sure, a physical connection in the form of nerve impulses that cause our bodies to perform the observed behavior. You can't disagree with that no matter what you think the nature of thought is.
I think you're missing that in order to support your position of physical brain plus "mind", you have to actually say something about "mind". No amount of complaining about incomplete knowledge of the physical brain makes any difference since you've already conceded that the physical brain plays a role. But for some reason you can't get off denying what you've not only already accepted, but actually require.
Comment by don provan — September 10, 2009 @ 9:07 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 9:09 pm
Don't you know it wasn't a physical process. I mean what the hell is wrong with you? An intelligent designer dunnit. Guided processes explain everything even if we can't identify what they r. Are u anti-science or sumpthin?
Comment by don provan — September 10, 2009 @ 9:09 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 10:04 pm
There's a physical connection between my keyboard and the screen. What does that have to do with the source of the design? Nerve impulses lead to forearm muscle contractions. What does that have to do with the source of the letter sequencing conveying meaning to a message. You're making trivial biomechanical points.
Not a problem. A mind is able to solve this:
Consider a substance that decays exponentially. After 3 days 10 grams remain. In 2 more days only 6 are left. What was the total amount of the substance at the start of the first day? A mind can render the correct answer. A mind can explain how the answer was derived. The accuracy of the mind can be independently assessed. No knowledge of brain biochemistry required. No biochemical explanation is able to account for the correct answer and none is able to distinguish efforts yielding a faulty answer from ones yielding a correct answer.
IOW neurobiological details are superfluous to my test of mind function.
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 10:04 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 10:07 pm
Not very original. Besides, I got the copyrite.
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 10:07 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 10:48 pm
Here are some quotes from Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, chapts. 2 & 3.
I don’t think that anything he is describing here is a guided process. How can you have guidance without a goal?
P.S. While I was writing this my cat jumped up on the desk and pawed this:
7u7yhhhhhhhhw
Just think with enough computers, enough cats and enough time you could…
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 10, 2009 @ 10:48 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 11:35 pm
The point, of course, is that your own position is subject to exactly the objections you are making about the epiphenomenal position.
And more, since your argument is that you don't even bother to define the guided process, let alone try to identify it.
Comment by don provan — September 10, 2009 @ 11:35 pm
September 10th, 2009 at 11:48 pm
Ha, ha, ha. Thought processes devoted to solving math problems are inherently guided processes. The goal is the correct solution and the methodology guided by the logic needed to derive the solution.
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 11:48 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 4:22 am
It seems as if you're confusing two different conversations.
Comment by don provan — September 11, 2009 @ 4:22 am
September 11th, 2009 at 9:03 am
The problem of consciousness is one that materialism hasn't been able to solve.—Bilbo
The problem materialism of is one that consciousness hasn't been able to solve. LOL
The most popular explanation is Epiphenomenalism — that consciousness is just a by-product of the physical activity of our brains. It has no causal efficacy in and of itself.—Bilbo
I don’t believe this is an accurate statement. You couldn’t find anyone around this blog to defend epiphenomenalism, could you? (Anyone?) So maybe were are not representative? But maybe we are. Maybe epiphenomenalism is indefensible?
As I understand it, epiphenomenalism is the assertion that consciousness is a byproduct of brain activity in the same way that methane is the byproduct of digestion. Consciousness is a brain fart. LOL
You may find some philosophers will defend the fart theory of consciousness. But, I dare say, you’ll be hard pressed to find many contemporary neurobiologists investigating consciousness who will defend the position. Epiphenomenalism doesn’t appear to be very popular. (Maybe neurobiology is the wrong place to look. Try instead scientists investigating global warming?)
However, there is another form of “epiphenomenalism” that is quite popular, and I’m sure I don’t understand it, but let me give it a shot: Consciousness is spiritual and brain activity is an epiphenomenal byproduct.
Anyone care to defend? (Or correct me?)
Comment by Rock — September 11, 2009 @ 9:03 am
September 11th, 2009 at 10:45 am
Likewise, consciousness may be too vague and subjective a term to be of any use in science.
Comment by olegt — September 8, 2009 @ 6:28 pm
Neurobiological research findings say nothing about consciousness and explain little about cognitive functions.
Comment by Bradford — September 10, 2009 @ 1:24 pm
A belief shared by natural antagonists? What neither of you knows constitutes the very basis of the science of consciousness. Read any good books lately?
One of the most popular theories of evolution has an “epiphenomenalism” problem (quite apart from matters of consciousness): Life in its origin and continued evolution is a byproduct, epiphenomenal of natural forces working independently, i.e., randomly wrt the existence of life.
I choose not to defend this theory, which I believe is pop-sci quackery.
Obviously, I’m not an epiphenomenal kinda guy.
I agree with Bradford: I'm going to take this opportunity to chide mainstreamers for inserting ill-defined emergence concepts and hazy evolutionary pathways into the gaps of our knowledge about human conscousness [and biological evolution].
But I bet Bradford won’t agree with himself. LOL
Comment by Rock — September 11, 2009 @ 10:45 am
September 11th, 2009 at 12:50 pm
I haven't really looked into what people promoting epiphenomenalism say, but my impression is simply that it's misunderstood. It does not, to me, seem to be the metaphysical assertion the IDers are seeing it as. What I'm reading into it is the simple statement that the term "thought" is just a label we put on an abstract result of physical processes, just as "herd" is the label we put on a group of cows. The OP focuses on what I might call the conclusion of epiphenomenalism: that epiphenomenon do not affect physical processes. The OP takes this as meaning there's some metaphysical block there, and makes comments along the lines of (paraphrasing), "How silly is that to think that thoughts don't affect reality?" But I think that misses the point, which is that "thought" is an abstract concept, and it's a mistake to think the abstract concept, rather than the actual physics it labels, that impacts the world around it. Again, if we spoke of a herd eating the grass in a field, that doesn't elevate "herd" to a physical reality; what we're really saying about physical reality is that the cows in the herd ate the grass.
Let me make clear that I'm only saying that makes the OP's objections wrong. Epiphenomenalism starts with the assumption that thoughts are epiphenomena: from what I've seen, it doesn't actually prove that's the case. So don't take what I'm saying as being an argument against dualism, because I don't think it amounts to that.
Again, the important point is that no matter how ill-defined you might think these concepts are — I'll leave you to discuss that with experts — you cannot ignore that they are head-and-shoulders above anything dualists or IDers produce, which is nothing. Dualists and IDers haven't even gotten to the point of admitting that they need to define anything at all or identify any pathways whatsoever.
Comment by don provan — September 11, 2009 @ 12:50 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 1:19 pm
Is materialism a problem? If it is, then maybe we should eradicate it.
Comment by chunkdz — September 11, 2009 @ 1:19 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 1:44 pm
Impressions obtained without looking into a matter is a good way of describing preconceptions.
All words are labels. A language is a succession of labels strung together to convey meaning. The label herd is falsifiable by observation. If you label a single cow a herd one can point to an error. That gives it some untility. Ascribing a label to a putative unidentified physical process tells us nothing other than that you are linking a vague concept existing in your mind to an actual existing entity- thought. There is nothing falsifiable as nothing is specified in detail. Therefore your analogy falls short of the mark and nothing of practical value flows from this.
Comment by Bradford — September 11, 2009 @ 1:44 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 1:54 pm
This is a logical counterpart to consciousness being an epiphenomenal byproduct. There is nothing to correct in that no obvious error is evident in presenting this possibility.
Comment by Bradford — September 11, 2009 @ 1:54 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 2:35 pm
Well, Bradford, I do stand corrected. Epiphenomenalism, as the “logical counterpart” of the view stated by Bilbo, is quite popular.
Which also addresses don provan’s argument that one form is “head-and-shoulders” above the other, when they are equal—logical counterparts.
I remain skeptical of both. Either way, my skepticism is just an epiphenomenon. A brain fart.
[Excuse me.]
Comment by Rock — September 11, 2009 @ 2:35 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 3:08 pm
If I were hosting a party I would want a bunch of Rocks around. Your comments are both interesting and amusing.
Comment by Bradford — September 11, 2009 @ 3:08 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 3:19 pm
I'm not sure what the two forms are you've detected, but being skeptical is reasonable. In this blog entry, I'm taking epiphenomenalism as the contrary position to dualism. (In practice, I think epiphenomenalism has some added nuance that isn't part of the conversation, but the OP seems to ignore that and instead put up epiphenomanlism as the materialistic position, not as one philosophy that differs in specific ways from other positions based on materialism.)
Anyway, there's no evidence for not-dualism any more than there's evidence for dualism, so you should be skeptical of them both. All we have evidence for is a physical component.
Comment by don provan — September 11, 2009 @ 3:19 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 3:28 pm
I had beer, brats, and Boston baked beans 4 lunch.
Nonetheless, Guts still loves me!
Comment by Rock — September 11, 2009 @ 3:28 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 4:00 pm
My intuition says you are wrong.
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 11, 2009 @ 4:00 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 4:03 pm
wha? hehe
Comment by Guts — September 11, 2009 @ 4:03 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 4:05 pm
I like parties, Bradford, but you didn't address the argument that spiritualism or dualism is just another form of epiphenomenalism.
IDers originally scored a sympathy point with me by noting that their IDears were being excluded on the basis of philosophy and not science. They lost the same point (on my scale of rationality, analogy, etc.) by arguing ID is just another philosophy. Adding to the philosophical din of confusion, just another "philosophy."
Unlike so many IDers (and their critics, it is fair to note), I haven't given up on science.
If this is really the issue, then science, not philosophy, must be able to decide…
If not?…
Comment by Rock — September 11, 2009 @ 4:05 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 4:09 pm
I am still curious how some who believes that Darwinian evolution can explain how my cat acquired his amazing problem solving ability. Jure is suggesting that somehow it’s “the environment ‘guiding’ the process.” But exactly how in this particular case? I mean I understand when I see my cat stalking birds and butterflies that that ability was that was acquired from millions of years of slow gradual evolution. But screen doors with pneumatic door closers don’t exist in exist in the natural environment where the ancestors of the modern domestic cat lived.
In fact, they have been around less than 150 years. Metallic screening used in screen doors and windows was patented (#297,382) on April 22, 1884 by John Golding of Chicago, Illinois, and Louis C. Norton of Boston Mass. invented the pneumatic door closer about the same time. Obviously, this complex ability (at least for a cat) must have been acquired within that time period… Right?
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 11, 2009 @ 4:09 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 4:18 pm
This is true, and interesting to me. But it is more interesting to me how people tend to put their own consciousness aside when they consider the issue.
IMO, there is no problem at all because "materialism" is a product of thought and is perceived by consciousness as a product of thought. What kind of evidence could anyone ever devise that could prove that something "out there" in nature is more primary than my own consciousness? At best, inferences about nature "out there" can never be more than indirect, because, well, they are inferences. That's what an inference is. But the reality of consciousness is immediate and non-derived. Consciousness Is.
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 11, 2009 @ 4:18 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 4:19 pm
"I am still curious how some who believes that Darwinian evolution can explain how my cat acquired his amazing problem solving ability."
Not all of us are believers in "Darwinian evolution," JAD.
I have no problem with your cat figuring out how to open a door, anymore than i have a problem with me being able to figure out the same operation.
I have a theory: If learned behaviors contribute to fitness they will be assimilated genetically. They will automatically (genetically) be transferred to the next generation, which will not learn (or relearn) the behavior and perform it unerringly under the appropriate conditions, until conditions require re-learning.
Evolution is just a learning process.
Comment by Rock — September 11, 2009 @ 4:19 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 4:22 pm
Btw, your cat still hasn't learned to perform the inverse operation–close a door. When it does, let us know.
Comment by Rock — September 11, 2009 @ 4:22 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 4:24 pm
Careful. Rivets start popping out of the prototype when stressed too heavily. Darwinian evolution can't "explain" anything beyond " certain variations happened and were selected by the environment, and this happened in a certain order" Uh huh.
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 11, 2009 @ 4:24 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 4:53 pm
We have invented the label "thought" (or "mind" or "consciousness") for discussion. It is ascribed to an abstract concept, not to a physical process or to a supernatural something. You are trying to do the latter while claiming that I am doing the former. But I'm not. I'm perfectly happy to agree that we do not know what "thought" is. It might be an epiphenomenon. It might be something supernatural. Ascribing the label to either is unjustified.
On the other hand, and I've pointed out several times now, one thing we must agree on is that there's a physical component, as you've already conceded. We do not have to agree that there's also something else, as much as you might wish we did.
Comment by don provan — September 11, 2009 @ 4:53 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 4:55 pm
The lord knows how I’ve tried. I’ve tried my darned best to train him. Of course I don’t really expect him to pull the door shut when he is going out. There,is no way for him to do that without shutting the door on his paw. But, it would be so easy for him to push the door shut after he comes in, and WIPE OFF his muddy paws after its been raining, but he refuses to learn. I've even lectured him, "Can you help me out this little bit…Please!" Maybe it is beneath his dignity to be trained like a dog. But, he is a very smart cat, just not very teachable.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 11, 2009 @ 4:55 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 5:02 pm
I have a prediction along those lines. Go back to this comment presenting a math problem. There are of course neurological events occurring as the mind solves this riddle. We have succeeded in identifying localized brain regions and correlating them to specific activity. That includes math which appears to be centered in a particular region of the brain. If dualism is false we should expect neurological activity uniquely correlating to distinguishable events. For example, let's say a student attempts to solve the problem and fails by incorrectly analyzing the relevant logic. Associated neurological activity is labeled x. Suppose though that same individual had correctly nailed the answer. Maybe he got laid that morning. We find associated neurological activity labeled y. But suppose we found that whether or not that individual solved correctly or made errors x and y were the same. Invariant neurological activity for two distinct cognitive results. That would not be inconsistent with dualism but would make no sense within an epiphenomenalistic framework.
Comment by Bradford — September 11, 2009 @ 5:02 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 5:04 pm
But I thought it could explain just about everything. Isn’t evolutionary psychology based on Darwinian theory. Can’t we explain ethics, morality and culture using Darwinian evolutionary theory?
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 11, 2009 @ 5:04 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 5:05 pm
What is the difference between "being aware" and "being conscious of"?
If awareness is the same thing as consciousness, and I see no reason to think it isn't, then this would falsify Ephiphenomenalism.
Comment by Bilbo — September 11, 2009 @ 5:05 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 5:06 pm
The problem with your logic is that thought is real and can be the quintessential non-physical candidate.
Comment by Bradford — September 11, 2009 @ 5:06 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 5:21 pm
[...] Epiphenomalism and Evolution [...]
Pingback by Darwiniana » Epiphenomenalism — September 11, 2009 @ 5:21 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 5:33 pm
Sure, you can make up stories that are "consistent" with a DET ideology, or other ideologies . People do it all the time. I just turn my hearing air off when they get to talkin'.
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 11, 2009 @ 5:33 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 6:29 pm
JOHN_A_DESIGNER,
Think of it this way: I am standing in a hilly landscape, holding your hand to guide you. Since I am very shortsighted I cannot see where I am going beyond a few meters, but I stick to the guiding rule that every step I make is uphill. However, the landscape has the somewhat discomforting property that after I guide you one step uphill, the landscape may shift a little bit, such that what used be an uphill direction may become a downhill direction and vice versa. Yet every step we make is uphill. Although I am your guide, I use strictly local information about the geometry of the environment to guide you, without a long-term goal in mind. It's almost as if the environment is your guide.
Brains can generalize. Your cat's wetware probably simulated a number of scenarios until it hit upon one that lead to the desired outcome. Then your cat replicated the scenario as he remembered seeing with his "minds eye". Cats may do a very similar thing when they try to figure out how to get a mouse out of a hiding place. It's quite beneficial for cats to have this capability, although sometimes curiosity kills the cat.
Comment by Jure — September 11, 2009 @ 6:29 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 7:05 pm
Jure:
… except for the long term goal of moving up the hill perhaps. If you have no criteria for how you will move, then you are doing no better than a random walk. Furthermore, if that criteria isn't applied correctly to the right type of environment, then again you will do no better than a random walk and no specific pattern will result. Is it your goal to move up the hill? Is that why you are intelligently paying attention to the slant of the ground and including that information in your decision making? But how do you know that the slant will help you in the first place? What if the environment consists of a bunch of small molehills and you "get stuck" atop one of them in your attempt to reach the top of the hill — if that is indeed what you are attempting to do.
Comment by CJYman — September 11, 2009 @ 7:05 pm
September 11th, 2009 at 11:26 pm
That sounds like we are lost. It also sounds like you want to use the word guided because it makes your point of view sound more reasonable or palatable.
Dawkins writes: “Natural selection is the blind watchmaker, blind because it does not see ahead, does not plan consequences, has no purpose in view.” Do you agree or disagree.
My observation is that my cat has more adaptability and problem solving capability and than he needs to survive in the wild. This simply does not make sense from a selfish gene perspective.
Alfred Wallace who independently developed a theory of evolution by natural selection also noticed this latent surplus capability but not in animals like my cat but in humans.
According historian Roy Davis, “Had Alfred Russel Wallace sent his letter of March 1858 not to Charles Darwin but to the editor of the Annals and Magazine of Natural History, it is likely that we would today talk about Wallaceism rather than Darwinism” (p. 161).
“What is Wallaceism?” asks Michael Flannery, “In brief it is teleological evolution. Instead of Darwin’s radical materialism, Wallaceism is a very different kind of evolutionary theory. It was first announced when Wallace made his break with Darwin’s metaphysical presumptions. Wallace simply couldn’t agree that the human intellect could be explained by natural selection; something else, a higher spiritual force or power had to be invoked. When Darwin read Wallace’s paper in the April 1869 issue of The Quarterly Review saying as much, he viewed it as a “murder” and scatched an emphatic “NO!!” in margin of his copy.”
http://www.uncommondescent.com/biology/science-or-monkey-business-a-review-of-roy-davies-the-darwin-conspiracy/
The first problem with the materialism, that Darwin and his modern counterparts advocate, is that it just doesn’t explain that much. The second problem is that they have a very hard time explaining it.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 11, 2009 @ 11:26 pm
September 12th, 2009 at 4:27 am
Seems a lot of interest in GA's has been stirred up recently. The controversy seems to be whether they are of any use or if they just end with a predetermined result. While as far as I understand, Weasel was made just to simulate and demonstrate the effect of selection wrt fitness.
At
http://pandasthumb.org/archives/2009/08/of-weasels-and.html#comment-193372
an interesting comment was made:
As far as I understand, that seems to be a fine example of the usefulness of computer simulations. So what's the problem?
Comment by Satolep — September 12, 2009 @ 4:27 am
September 12th, 2009 at 5:10 am
JOHN_A_DESINGER,
Yes, we are lost. Or didn't you know that guides can get lost, too? Why would use of the word guided make my point of view more reasonable or palatable? Because your point of view is that the universe is under divine guidance perhaps? No, I was trying to make you think about the meaning of the word guided, which you did not define when you brought it up.
The point I am trying to get across is that the environment of a population of organisms "directs" or "guides" the short-term direction in which a population evolves – and it does that by causing non-random survival/reproduction. I am using the word environment in a very broad sense here: it includes both abiotic and biotic components, and even the composition of the focal population itself.
I agree. Instead of the word blind the words very shortsighted might be more accurate, but that just doesn't make for a nice sound bite.
I wonder, though, why you ask me to give my approval to the words of Dawkins. I'm left with the impression that Dawkins is seen by some as a kind of high priest of evolution, an infallible pope, a prophet. As if a demonstrable error by Dawkins can bring down the whole scientific enterprise of evolutionary biology. It seems like a bad case of projection.
I wouldn't call that an observation but rather an unfounded assertion. If you could think of an experimental procedure to remove that capability from a sufficiently large sample of cats and compare their survival in the wild with a control group of cats, then you might be in a better position to support your claim.
What is much? Whatever, it explains a lot more than immaterialism which explains nothing. That which cannot interact with matter cannot be detected. As soon as something can interact with matter it falls under the domain of materialism.
Comment by Jure — September 12, 2009 @ 5:10 am
September 12th, 2009 at 12:23 pm
According to David Berlinski, “Wallace argued, that characteristic human abilities must be latent in primitive man, existing somehow an unopened gift, the entryway to a world the primitive man does not possess and would not recognize.”
Is there any evidence for this? I think there is. Let me cite a couple of examples:
The Hawaiian islands and people were isolated from the outside world till the islands were discovered by British Capt. James Cook in 1778. Though Cook was killed by the natives the Hawaiian King Kamehameha I decided, with British help, to modernize his kingdom. About a century later when an American pro-annexation propaganda tried to portray the Hawaiian people and their rulers as savages incapable of ruling themselves the American press was stunned when a Hawaiian princess toured the US to plead her peoples cause.
Instead of meeting a “‘heathen Princess‘, the clownish ‘Princess Koylani’ of pro-Annexation skits and cartoons, the backward ‘barbarian’ or ‘savage’ anti-Monarchy propaganda-merchants tried to paint her, proved quite a surprise as she traveled across the United States following her education; instead of the caricature cannibal expected, the paparazzi of the day were confronted by an exquisite Royal Princess wearing the latest Paris gowns and speaking cultured English (or Hawaiian, French and German, if the occasion demanded). The continual attempts to present all those of Kanaka Maoli heritage as illiterate ‘children’ incapable of ruling themselves backfired… (As a San Francisco Examiner reporter would snort reprovingly in print, ‘A barbarian princess? Not a bit of it. Not even a hemi-semi-demi-barbarian. Rather the very flower – an exotic – of civilization. The Princess Kaiulani is charming, fascinating, individual.’”
Another, even more dramatic, example is that of the Waodani indians of the western Amazon. The Waodani were a very isolated and savage stone age tribe that continued to rely spears and blow pipes for hunting well in the 1950’s and 60’s. They compounded their isolation by attacking and killing any outsiders including other tribes with little or no provocation. In 1956, for example, they attacked and killed 5 American missionaries who had landed their plane on a beach near one of their villages.
Fifty years later the one of the sons of one those martyred missionaries is teaching the grand children of his fathers killers to build (from a kit, it‘s much cheaper) maintain and fly their own airplanes.
According to Berlinski, “the idea that a biological species might possess latent powers makes no sense in Darwinian terms. It suggests the forbidden doctrine that evolutionary advantages were front loaded far away and long ago; it is in conflict with the Darwinian principle that useless genes are subject to negative selection pressure and must therefore find themselves draining away into the sands of time.” (The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and its Scientific pretensions, p. 159)
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 12, 2009 @ 12:23 pm
September 12th, 2009 at 1:26 pm
The majority of humans believe in some form of God.
Does religious belief offer an evolutionary advantage?
Comment by Daniel Smith — September 12, 2009 @ 1:26 pm
September 12th, 2009 at 5:30 pm
Satolep:
The problem is that the simulation you cite has nothing to do with the evolution of complex and specified information. The patterns that result from the simulation that you are referencing are able to be described in terms of a combination of regularities (law) and randomness (chance).
Jure:
The environment "guides" the organisms to what — mere survival? The environment can only keep what is fit to that environment and destroy that which isn't fit. There is no guidance to anything distant, or even short term, in mere survival. That is merely a "here and now" action. There is a missing component. From whence come the fit and how do the fit become more complex in function?
Jure:
Define "non-random" so that I know how you are using the term. So far as I understand, you seem to be incorrect. If the environment is random and the result of random processes, and if it can change randomly, then any selection at any time will also be random.
Do you have evidence that a process of "guiding" non-lawful, non-random patterns to higher and higher functionally specified complexity can be accomplished without any foresight — basically modeling the future and generating future targets.
Comment by CJYman — September 12, 2009 @ 5:30 pm
September 12th, 2009 at 7:38 pm
CJYman,
Yes, the environment selects those that are fitter to that environment in the here and now. This changes the phenotype distribution of the population. Then there's a round of reshuffling, mutation and otherwise modification of genes and gene complexes, which expands the phenotypic distribution, and the cycle starts again. In a relatively constant environment, this can lead to quite predictable "stable" phenotypes, such as the very similar hydrodynamic shapes of dolphins and fish that occupy similar ecological niches.
Ultimately the fit come from reshuffling, modification, duplication and fusions of existing genes and collections of genes. I thought that was pretty much accepted.
The fit do not necessarily become more complex. But they can and they do sometimes. Nothing mysterious about it either. Genes can duplicate and diverge into playing different roles during different parts of the life cycle, for example. Isn't that the case with hemoglobine? Embryos utilizing different duplicated versions of the same ancestral gene as adults do. I'd call that an increase in complexity, wouldn't you?
Non-random in the sense that survival/reproduction is correlated with phenotype. That is actually a definition of selection. It doesn't matter whether the environment changes randomly or deterministically (which can be indistinguishable from each other – random number generators usually being deterministic), as long as the environment doesn't change too quickly or drastically.
I am not sure what you mean by "functionally specified complexity". Could you please explain what that means? But that a process without foresight can lead to complex adaptation – yes, I believe that's exactly what genetic algorithms have shown is quite possible. Didn't the experiments of Lenski (or some such name) on thousands of generations of bacteria show such increases in functional complexity as well?
Comment by Jure — September 12, 2009 @ 7:38 pm
September 12th, 2009 at 8:45 pm
re: "The lack of a brain guarantees lack of consciousness." by Alan Fox.
1. There is a famous story from decades ago about the guy who did a deal with his executioner: if he could – after being decapitated – get up and run along the line of his fellow soldiers next in line to be beheaded – and touch them, any man that he touched would be spared execution.
After being beheaded, he ran past all of his comrades before collapsing.
(I have no idea if this is true, though I read it in an old article years ago and the author believed it true, but it's a good story.)
In any case, the 'is the mind a brain-fart or is the brain-body a mind-fart' is possibly impossible to answer. We can only view that which is on the physical plane. However, one could still argue – as I have done here – that the body-mind organism is essentially a mechanism/process whereby consciousness can manifest in particular place and time, i.e. assume a particular territory. The territory seems to exist in a so-called 'objective fashion' in that up, down, front and back are the same for a beetle as a mastadon, but apart from that each being seems to view territory in very personal/mental/emotive ways depending on their various motivational styles, or character. A predator perceives things quite differently from the prey. Insects with very different sense perception structures no doubt perceive movement in light very differently from us, so although the external objective situation might seem solid and 'real' to us, the bug flying through the living room is seeing a totally different notion of that same reality, no doubt both temporally as well as spatially.
John A: as to your cat and Darwinianism, although basically I am on your side with this, a simple argument is that the cat is a relatively complex/sophisticated mammal which, over the past X,000,000 years has developed fast reflexes, ability to strategise as part of hunting prey, ability to analyse situations in order to determine the best modes of attack, fight or flight and therefore, to make a long story short, has a problem-solving cognitive capability.
Air is invisible. If it were not for wind/movement many might not believe that it is there. But it works more as an analogy. It is everywhere around all solid objects and beings but is invisible. Mind is very similar. In terms of experience, mind is continuously ubiquitous, it permeates all aspect of physical form and function, not to mention both conscious and non-conscious experience, including the 'mind' used by kidneys, for example, in processing various functions in conjunction with emotive and other criteria being processed non-stop 14/7 throughout the life cycle. Moreover, there is more synaptic activity in the 'lower brain' area than the cerebellum but because nowadays we are so fixated on the materialist belief system and we know that thoughts and brainwaves seem to have some sort of link, we believe that mind only exists in the brain, not in the blood, the organs, in space etc. and therefore have become rather rigid and narrow in approaching the topic.
I think Don Provan you are actually arguing your materialist/physical view very well and you make good sense. Ultimately, though, I think it comes down to perception/belief rather than 'science' alone. For some of us, the notion that mind is only a physical process akin to how the letters on this post are merely the result of typing in certain keys on the keyboard triggered only by physical processes in a cerebellum, that the abstract meanings in such words and language are irrelevant – albeit pleasurable – extras, icing on the cake of the physical universe so to speak, that the ongoing experience of awareness behind all mental and sensory experiences all the time, to call that all merely chemical processes no different from the first random amoeba that accidentally sprang into being in an un-minded, unpeople universe with presumed rocks, waters, planets etc. though without living beings creating the space-time-consciousness matrix to knit such 'physical' properties together, is simply not believable.
You can't believe the non-materialist view just as the non-materialist can't 'believe' your view. Ultimately, this is a quarrel over belief systems.
Comment by ash — September 12, 2009 @ 8:45 pm
September 12th, 2009 at 9:41 pm
ash,
The problem I have with that argument is it's ultimately not saying much. It's certainly not offering much in the way of detail JAD seems to be asking for, which is 'How did this develop?' More than that, I think JAD is highlighting a pretty interesting problem: Whatever developed for the cat over those millions of years, it is not some narrow innovation limited to solving a very particular common problem in its environment. Unless there's been a recent, radical change in the cat's cognitive abilities, it's been in possession of an ability that allows it to encounter downright foreign obstacles and figure out (blindly or not) novel approaches to them. And that, frankly, seems like "preadaptation" to a tremendous extreme.
In the space of 50k years, humanity has gone from bone flutes to Mars landers. Apparently they accomplished this with essentially the same physical equipment. That's worth pondering, and at least for me, the ponderings lead me to greater sympathy with Wallace (and telelogical views of evolution in general) than Darwin.
As for materialism – it ain't what it used to be. John Searle would supposedly identify as a materialist, but critics mount a compelling case that Searle's own writings would more properly commit him to a view like property dualism. Strawson, my favorite example, advocates "real materialism" – it just happens to be panpsychism. And I've seen some compelling arguments that insist, if things like 'information' and 'algorithms' are considered to be objective parts of the universe, the result isn't materialism/physicalism – it's some kind of hylemorphic dualism. And of course there's the greater 'naturalism' umbrella, which can apparently fit anti-physicalists like Chalmers and Kim as well.
Comment by nullasalus — September 12, 2009 @ 9:41 pm
September 13th, 2009 at 12:13 am
I am just trying to establish what you mean by guided. Dawkins definitions gives us a starting point– nothing more, nothing less. It sounds like "the blind leading (or guiding) the blind" is what you mean by “guided“. What empirical, or experimental proof do you have that that type of process leads anywhere? What empirical, or experimental proof do you have that that type of process leads to the kind and degree of biological complexity that we see in the world around us?
How do you distinguish your definition of guided or directed from someone like Michael Denton who describes his teleological view as “directed evolution?” Is there a difference between directed and guided?
No, it is something I observed. It piqued my curiosity. I don’t think my observation is any different than Charles Darwin’s observation of the Galapagos finches. Sure it is anecdotal. But in principle it is also repeatable. It seems to me that your view is that my cats problem solving ability is something unremarkable because this is something that probably can be explained by existing theory. Is that how science is supposed to work? We disregard certain interpretation if it doesn’t fit our subjective a priori commitment about how the world is supposed to be?
So mind and consciousness are something material? You can reduce them to a material process? I disagree, I think our consciousness and the consciousness we infer that exists in animals is something that science barely comprehends let alone understands. It is something that just doesn’t fit very well in the so called material world. I think that no one has stated this better than David Chalmers in his book, The Conscious Mind. He writes:
Ironically, even Haldane believed that there was something unique and different about mind and consciousness.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 13, 2009 @ 12:13 am
September 13th, 2009 at 3:59 am
If you or John want more details, you should go somewhere where evolution is the topic. TT is an ID blog, so you shouldn't expect answers with any more detail than "It was intelligence" or "front loaded somehow", since that's the level of explanation ID provides.
Why do you expect it to be? There are many ways to enhance survival. It's no surprise at all that most species maximize their advantages in many different ways. A limited approach is what we'd expect to see in an intelligent design because an intelligent design might be inclined to focus on specific techniques. It isn't what we'd expect to see commonly from evolution where the pressure is the extremely general one caused by differential survival which rewards species with more skills.
I have no idea why you say that. Yes, the basis for the cat's intelligence is the mammalian brain which developed somewhat before modern cats, but there's no indication it was some kind of magic preadaptation. It's just a huge survival advantage, for exactly the reasons you're impressed by it.
Human progress is almost entirely due to human intelligence. The contribution of evolutionary changes to that advancement is negligible.
Comment by don provan — September 13, 2009 @ 3:59 am
September 13th, 2009 at 5:04 am
Religion is a meme. Memes don't spread by conveying their host with an evolutionary advantage.
Comment by don provan — September 13, 2009 @ 5:04 am
September 13th, 2009 at 5:21 am
I'm not arguing any materialist/physical view. I'm only pointing out that dualism is entirely unsupported. I don't have to argue a physical view: we all accept the physical part because we all understand what would happen if I blew Bradford's brains out.
The physical part comes from perception and science. Dualism is simply an added belief, yes.
And I really don't care what you choose to believe. Nor do I care what you can or can't imagine, which I think is more to the point. I only ask that people acknowledge that dualism is an unsupported opinion, not something we should base science on.
I see no reason to choose a side by picking any belief that isn't well supported. I am neutral on the matter. This isn't a quarrel over equally unsupported belief systems; this is some people insisting their unsupported belief system be accepted as fact.
Comment by don provan — September 13, 2009 @ 5:21 am
September 13th, 2009 at 5:32 am
This is an interesting hypothetical, but we already know it's impossible because as long as X and Y are two different answers, they will result in the undeniable difference in the neurological activity between physically moving the hand to write down the answer "X" or the answer "Y".
Comment by don provan — September 13, 2009 @ 5:32 am
September 13th, 2009 at 6:42 am
Don Provan,
Uh, Don. We have ID critics here, and full-blown proponents of 'unguided, unintelligent' Darwinism as well. I'm asking them. If this is your way of saying 'Hell, I don't know!', well, alright. Didn't think so.
And I say a 'limited approach' is exactly what we're expect in an unguided scenario, because that would be the essence of gradualism. A tiny improvement to a very specific problem or influence that gets honed over long periods of time. Instead what we're seeing is apparent cognitive capabilities that able to handle vastly more than the immediate problems they could have possibly been narrowly selected for.
In other words, it positively reeks of front-loading. Or, I'm sorry, preadaptation. Or better yet, exaptation (gotta make it sound as non-teleological as possible, dontcha know, all appearances to the contrary.)
Actually, there is plenty of indication it was some kind of preadaptation (what does magic mean anymore?), precisely for the reasons JAD pointed out. Yes, it really is a huge survival advantage. The flexibility of the 'advantage' is what stands out here. Nature provided a capability that wasn't suited to a single problem encountered in nature, but even for ones in very alien environments/situations.
You're right, Don. Something happened in human development that made us capable of rocketing forward in capability, comprehension, knowledge and otherwise in time scales that are less than a blink of an eye where evolution is normally concerned. Seems rather like we got ahold of a trait that had terrifying amounts of preadaptation built into it.
Incidentally, physicalism is as 'entirely unsupported' as dualism or otherwise is once we're talking about science. Someone dying (or at least their body no longer functioning) when they're shot was never news to dualists of any variety, much less idealists or the other esoteric types. Science is science, philosophy is philosophy. If anyone's taken it on the chin due to science, it was – oddly enough – the materialists themselves. Their 19th century conception of 'material' was decimated when quantum mechanics came along. Now they don't really know what to define physical as beyond "Whatever the physicists say is real".
Physicalists can say their their views are entirely consistent with the finding of science. Fantastic! So can idealists. Hell, so can solipsists. Basic compatibility with experimental data ain't hard to come by in philosophy.
Comment by nullasalus — September 13, 2009 @ 6:42 am
September 13th, 2009 at 6:52 am
Can't say I've seen to many of those here recently. I wouldn't consider myself a critic of ID for instance, as the accepted view here is that ID is not scientific, which is all I really object to about ID. As wishful thinking it is harmless.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 13, 2009 @ 6:52 am
September 13th, 2009 at 7:00 am
Sez the materialist..
Comment by Jean — September 13, 2009 @ 7:00 am
September 13th, 2009 at 7:07 am
Funny though that "they" (read: materialists) don't see it that way if the posts by Fox or Provan are anything to go by. Amusing too how NDE investigations are swiftly ignored when mentioned or waved away as not being "evidence". I wonder what evidence for dualism would look like to them. So far no answer, I guess they do not have one.
Comment by Jean — September 13, 2009 @ 7:07 am
September 13th, 2009 at 9:06 am
Give me an example of evidence for dualism. As a materialist, having seen none, I find it difficult to imagine what such evidence might consist of.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 13, 2009 @ 9:06 am
September 13th, 2009 at 9:19 am
NDE = "near death experience"?
Comment by Alan Fox — September 13, 2009 @ 9:19 am
September 13th, 2009 at 9:23 am
Alan Fox:
Invariant neurological activity for disparate thought processes.
Comment by Bradford — September 13, 2009 @ 9:23 am
September 13th, 2009 at 9:51 am
It seems reasonable to suppose that brain activity, if viewable in sufficiently fine detail, would show some correlation with whatever sensory inputs, outputs and processing (thinking etc.) were occurring at that moment. I believe this process is a useful tool in such experiments.
I guess the two extreme puzzling results would be;
1) that brain activity always showed the same pattern, whatever. (I am sure this is not the case and has been demonstrated not to be the case).
2) that brain activity appeared to be random with no correlation to input stimuli. (I am sure this has been shown not to be the case).
So what result is Bradford suggesting could indicate an immaterial aspect of mind and why?
Comment by Alan Fox — September 13, 2009 @ 9:51 am
September 13th, 2009 at 10:48 am
No discernable differences in neural function for distinctive cognitive outputs.
Comment by Bradford — September 13, 2009 @ 10:48 am
September 13th, 2009 at 11:07 am
I never could find that quote from either Hume or Locke which was an initial critique of the emerging form of empirical science. His criticism was that it still ultimately all boiled down to belief, even going so far as to state – if I remember correctly – that even when confronted with contrary evidence, many would simply ignore or discount it.
My point above with the air analogy to mind was poorly made. The point was that even though is is ubiquitous it is invisible and as such is analogous to mind/consciousness/awareness/intelligence. It is right there in the foreground/background of all experience so much so that it is invisible, especially since it's the non-material element in experience and the emphasis now is on the material.
That said, there is a certain value to sticking to physicalist guns in terms of science if we assume that science as we now use the term, is the discipline of analysing the physical realm. Ultimately, I don't think you can split body and mind or the physical domain from the awareness/intelligence – based spacetime continuum in which all observable physical phenomena exist.
If you come from the older 'mind-only' schools, you can convincingly argue that all phenomena, including the physical, are ultimately part of a mental/awareness based continuum. For example, the solidity we perceive in rocks does not exist on the particulate level and depend upon a bodymind perceptual/cognitive matrix to perceive them as such. This is analogous to our having tuned ourselves to a particular perceptual radio station wherein such solidity works. But on the quantum level, all such things are totally porous and it can be argued that the solid 'real' world we perceive is more like a dream than anything else.
But that said, if you DO stick to the physicalist guns, you will end up doing alright because if I am right that ultimately you can't truly separate so-called mind from so-called body, then it is not inaccurate either to say that 'all is physical' or 'all is mind' since the two views are not actually contradictory fundamentally speaking.
Just as quantum particle work found out decades ago that there seem to be para-local properties to particulate behaviour, so also physical scientists might at some point be able to incorporate the notion of 'continuum' etc. as being part of the underlying framework in which intelligence can exist and function 'para-locally' or in a way that seems to transcend mundanely perceived physical boundaries on the super-particulate level, i.e. at our ordinary level where rocks and tables are solid and if you bump into them you will feel it and it will hurt!
I think Don your repeating that there is absolutely no need to prove anything about the physicalist case in terms of mind being rooted in the brain as an open-and-shut case is simply not born out even by contemporary evidence. You might want to look into the enteric brain ( I was mistakenly calling it 'the lower brain' in earlier posts – sorry), or the solar plexus brain.
I read a couple of things this morning from a Google search, none very good or up to the standards of this forum, but in one it mentioned how scientists have 'recently discovered' that there is not only sophisticated nervous activity down below but that
a) things can originate down there which only manifest in the brain later, i.e. it is not that first the brain says to do something (in this case raise the arms) and then the signal flashes down to the enteric brain and then the arms are raised
b) the stomach nexus of ganglia store memories and have something to do with certain types of pleasure-pain response especially – but not only – to do with food obviously
c) the heart also has memory functions.
I found this both interesting and amusing because the old chinese medical texts have reams of details on all this from around 200 BC (when it first began to be written down so of course it comes from much earlier). The heart stores long-term memory, the kidneys short-term memory, the stomach-spleen emotional memory.
According to those old boys, and also old Indian systems from even earlier, there are far more synaptic-type operations in the abdominal than the cranial brain. Most systems go along with roughly what is called the 'chakra' system – although that has other ramifications than purely physical functions – in which the lowest one is around the genitals but is not much commented on, the lower abdomen beneath the navel is 64,000 but I think this also includes the one in the stomach area, the Heart nexus is 8,000 the Throat nexus is 16,000 and the brain nexus is 32,000 – to give an idea of the ratios. Years ago I read in a western scientific article that the abdominal area demonstrated more synaptic (?) activity than the cerebellum but again this is the sort of thing which tends to be ignored by most modern people today who have been indoctrinated into believing that the brain is the seat of all intelligence. It is not. It is the main sense perception switchboard for sure, is the main seat of intellectual/abstract intellect etc. but it is not the only source of functioning intelligence or even perception. There is an old school for the blind in South East Asia (Java?) that trains congenitally and newly blind people how to navigate through space and around objects etc. using their abdominal intelligence, which is the same nexus trained by asian martial artists to work in actual combat situations wherein the cerebral intelligence is far too slow and cumbersome to be of any practical use. The best martial artists do not need their eyes to anticipate and perceive attacks/moves against them. Too slow.
Most of us when feeling emotions, especially strong ones, notice a very strong corresponding physical reaction. Again, it's one of those things that is so obvious that it is overlooked and ignored by those who have solidified their view around a certain received paradigm.
None of the above necessarily negates or confirms the various different evolution theories of course, but what is interesting is that once someone has a fairly hardened view, one way or the other, they tend to ignore contradicting evidence or simply dismiss it as a childish, naive irrelevance.
To me what is important about the evolution theory – of whatever ilk – is that even though ultimately it can rightly be regarded as speculative on some level, really what it does is articulate a belief system about the nature of reality. I guess this is getting into so-called 'scientism' in that I am one of those who feels that the way physicalism/materialism is presented and bought into represents no more than a current belief system, akin to a superstition, but those who hold such a belief system believe it is not a belief system, that they have transcended such things and only deal with verifiable facts. And so it goes.
Comment by ash — September 13, 2009 @ 11:07 am
September 13th, 2009 at 2:05 pm
I think you have made some good points here, Ash. But, it raises a question in my mind. Is there any objective way to choose between belief systems? I think there is.
Let’s compare and contrast a couple of quotes. The first is by S. J. Gould whose view of evolution is dys-teleological, to use Erst Haekel’s term. The second is by Michael Denton who has a teleological view of evolution.
Is Gould justified concluding scientifically that, “we might be an insignificant little twig that was never meant to be and is here only by accident, which I think is right” or is that a metaphysical interpretation? In my opinion I think that it’s clearly the latter. When you begin talking about our meaning and purpose(or no meaning and purpose) here in the universe you are speaking metaphysically. However, if you ask what it would take to prove something like that empirically I would argue that you would have to go back through evolutionary history and in step-by-step detail (with each step having no goal or purpose)explain how each one of a chain of very lucky accidents happened.
In contrast in his book, Nature’s Destiny: How the Laws of Biology Reveal Purpose in the Universe, Michael Denton writes:
I would argue that this is also a metaphysical interpretation. Is it any less reasonable? Based on what we presently know, which is the better explantion?
Gould has to argue that nature is sufficient in and of itself to explain the origin and evolution of life as well as mind and consciousness. My question is when has that ever been proven?
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 13, 2009 @ 2:05 pm
September 13th, 2009 at 5:49 pm
Indeed, and what a surprise. You think the subject has been debunked by pointing to the atheist internet infidels summaries? Seems to me that is is precisely what you _want_ to believe. Made up yer mind, don't bother with the facts. Funny how all those self-professed atheist "skeptics" are skeptical of everything but their own beliefs, harhar.
So Alan, tell me again, what would be evidence of immaterial consciousness?
Comment by Jean — September 13, 2009 @ 5:49 pm
September 13th, 2009 at 7:00 pm
JOHN_A_DESIGNER,
There is plenty of direct experimental evidence that natural selection and mutation etc can lead to novel adaptations. More ancient selection (directional, purifying) or lack thereof can be inferred from comparative analysis of DNA sequences. If you haven't seen such evidence, and you want to see it,
you might want to consult some textbooks. West-Eberhard 2003 (Oxford University Press) is a fascinating book to start with.
I have no idea who Michael Denton is. Is he some kind of scientist? Perhaps you can explain in your own words what Denton means by directed evolution and refer me to some evidence.
You wrote earlier:
I expressed my doubts about that, but you insist:
Really, how can you have observed that? Did you leave your cat in the wild for a while and noticed how he didn't use the capabilities that allowed him to open your door? Pardon my incredulity.
I agree it is remarkable, yet not in violation of existing theory in any obvious way. What interpretation do you feel is disregarded and why?
Yes, I think that mind and consciousness can be explained by nothing but material processes, but I agree that science has barely scratched the surface. It seems to fit just fine in the material from where I'm sitting. Do you know of any immaterial processes that might shed some light here?
Haldane:
What was he smoking?
Comment by Jure — September 13, 2009 @ 7:00 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 2:47 pm
You are free to ask whomever you want, of course. I'm just pointing out that if you really are interested in the answer, you should ask someone that knows. You could ask you mother, too, but why would you bother unless she's a biologist?
I quite regularly admit I know very little about biology. And even if I did know, I might not be the best person to explain it to you. Furthermore, there's no reason for you to think I know. Specifically, if you ask the question here and you don't get an answer you can accept, that tells you nothing about whether there's an answer.
The point being that if you aren't going to supply that level of detail in an ID proposal, there's no reason to expect an ID critic to provide that level of detail for any other proposal. ID criticism doesn't require that level of knowledge.
This is just false. Limits are by no means the essence of gradualism.
"Honed" is your own misconception, based on this pervasive mistake that evolution has specific targets that we should expect development to zero in on.
But that's not how it works. The only "goal" is survival. That allows for the process of gradual refinement, which is what you are expecting, can go past a tipping point to become rapid development in a different direction, which you apparently are not expecting. Biologists that study these things believe that's exactly what happened as humans diverged from the human/chimp common ancestor and went past the tipping point between more and more clever and wholesale abstract thought. There's no reason to think there's some huge, unachievable leap in that process. The only limit is your imagination.
Sorry, I don't see it. Perhaps you could make a case to help me instead of just asserting that it's obvious. Wouldn't frontloading would imply a detectable leap, something significant enough that we should be able to see it in a sudden change in physical remains or in a coherent block of genetic changes? Instead, all we see is gradual, although rapid, changes in body type and tool usage, and sporatic mutations that can be be described as randomly distributed.
Biologists reached their conclusions based on what they've actually seen, not on what you hope they would see.
How does frontloading explain Neanderthals? I can understand the idea of frontloading successful species, but why frontload dead ends, too?
You assume without reason that flexibility cannot be accomplished through a gradual path, as if flexibility is not seen anywhere else in nature. But, of course, flexibility happens all over at all layers. It's a natural result of a process that subjects the species to ever changing conditions.
It's really much more like going over a tipping point. Is there any dividing line between more and more clever and able to think abstractly just a little bit? If there is, I don't see it. And once the line is crossed, the spiecie's relation to its environment changes radically, and the movement changes from more and more clever to better and better at abstract thought.
As I understand it, the prevailing theory is that intelligence got tied into sexual selection. Females prefer males that are better at thinking abstractly, for example. We know from other examples that getting hooks into the mate selection process can lead to rapid development of a trait. Think of peacock tails.
Exactly my point. Dualists are happy to admit the physical when it suits them, but try to point out that dualism is the claim that there's something undetectable in addition to the physical, and all of a sudden they try to pretend that the claim of "physical only" has the same burden of proof as their claim of physical plus something else.
You'd think that, with this insight you have, you'd just abandon the term "materialist" because it's a position that's untenable. But instead "materialist" is regularly applied to anyone who objects to dualism or ID because those claims cannot demonstrate the existence of the causes they require, whether in light of quantum mechanics or not. Why is that? Could it be an attempt to associate critics with an obviously outmoded metaphysical position?
I have no problem with ID as a religious belief.
Comment by don provan — September 14, 2009 @ 2:47 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 3:04 pm
As I already pointed out, we know this evidence doesn't exist since the neural function would be different between giving the correct answer and giving the incorrect answer.
To step back and explain the problem from a better perspective, collecting such evidence would involve posing a question and getting an answer. The neural activity would be the same at the beginning because the question is invariant. The neural activity is different at the end as the brain directs the hands to write "true" or "false". If we were to follow the chain of neural events, we could conceptually point to a place where the events before were the same and the events after were different. We know all that for a fact no matter what. Detecting that, for some of the path, the neural function is the same tells us nothing about dualism since we expect it to be true in any case. Sorry.
Comment by don provan — September 14, 2009 @ 3:04 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 3:14 pm
Jean asks;
Tell you again? How can I tell you again? I am certainly not a dualist and have no conception what immaterial consciousness means, let alone what evidence could possibly demonstrate immateriality. Try asking Bradford. He"s the dualist par excellence around here.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 14, 2009 @ 3:14 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 3:17 pm
@ Don
Like your answer!
Comment by Alan Fox — September 14, 2009 @ 3:17 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 3:53 pm
Cite the studies with neural data correlating to correct and incorrect answers.
Comment by Bradford — September 14, 2009 @ 3:53 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 4:17 pm
Don wrote:
That makes no sense, why in the world would we expect a sudden leap from front-loaded evolution ?
Don:
You must think that front-loading implies that changes are directed and forced in a direction. Changes are "nudged" not forced. It's sort of what you see if you were to throw a bunch of pebbles in the direction of a hole in the wall. Some will get in, but some will fall by the wayside.
In my opinion we see this with Neanderthals. There is some evidence that they buried their dead, we see that they made tools not only for use but also as artefacts, all independant of H. Sapiens. In otherwords evidence of a "target" for evolution that was trying to be reached.
Don:
No, the process that subjects species to ever changing conditions could be a natural result of the existing organism which constrains (and vice versa)it's own variation. And here we are talking about the "conserved core processes". This capacity is independent of the medium in which the adaptive system resides. After the origin of multicellularity and simple nervous systems, we had neural networks connected by synapses. What was amazing about the next innovation was the emergence of simple synaptic strength modification rules (e.g. the Hebbian plasticity) that allowed brains to form internal representations during a single animal's lifetime. So the building blocks moved from intracellular regulatory networks to neural networks that are coupled to highly sensitive sensory systems.
Brains themselves exhibited large-scale driven trends towards complexity increase. It's a general trend among pretty much all terrestrial vertebrates.
Comment by Guts — September 14, 2009 @ 4:17 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 5:06 pm
Don Provan,
It's a win/win for me, Don. I'm asking the people I'm discussing things with here. If they have an answer, that's great. If they don't, well, that illustrates something as well. I'm sure you see where I'm coming from here.
I'd expect that an essence of gradualism is… gradualism. Not advances that anticipate (preadapt to) a variety, even a tremendously large variety, of situations and problems, many of which were not encountered in the original environment.
Of course, maybe gradualism doesn't mean much of anything anymore.
That's at best a bold and unsupported assertion, or a description of a pragmatic model. Not a statement that reflects reality. Indeed, it's very easy to infer that more goals than simple "survival" are at work in the process.
There's plenty of reason to think that, Don. 50k years. Bone flutes and mars landers. I don't have to imagine that this happened – plenty of supporting evidence from archaeology is there. And of course, there's always the more limited example of JAD's cat.
And who's saying big, unachievable leap? I said nothing of the sort, if you're implying I'm saying evolution could not play a role in such things. Only that massive potentialities were present before they were being wholly tapped. And that, my word, it certainly looks a lot like preadaptation. Massive preadaptation.
What, do you think preadaptation is a dirty word or something?
Gradual, although rapid. I love it so!
That there is no rapid, sudden change in body type is pretty much my point, Don. (Of course, you can only identify so much from 50k+ bones.) But a leap is present: 50k years. Bone flutes. Mars landers. There's your detectable leap. Your response has been "that was intelligence, not evolution". The amusing thing is, my response can be damn similar to that.
What makes you think the only value of a species is if it continues to reproduce for all time? Or the only way purpose can be present for a species is if the same comes to pass?
Again, I could say something damn close to that. A potentiality that goes vastly beyond narrow and specific experiences in a given environ.
No, Don – their view absolutely requires the physical right from the start. If physicality were disproved across the board, it would mean dualism is wrong and idealism or neutral monism or the like is right.
Dualists of all stripes (and there's more than one type, with very grave differences between each other) entails the existence of the material/physical. This isn't a concession, it's an essential component for the view.
Actually, there's debate about just what "materialism" and "physicalism" (they're commonly swapped with each other) means anymore even among physicalists/materialists themselves. From critics, there's a number of views. Stapp comes to mind as one guy (I'll say he's operating in a philosophical capacity here) who insists that quite a lot of the "physicalists" seem unaware of that change from pre-20th century physics to post-. For others, it's enough to simply point out the new problem facing physicalists in their own attempts to figure out a definition of what they mean (Hempel's dilemma comes to mind here.) And then other problems. Should information and algorithms be considered an objective and real constituent of the universe? Some physicists seem to lean towards this view. But if that route is taken, then "physicalism" is back to an Aristotilean/Aquinas' picture of the world.
Have you ever thought that maybe most materialists/physicalists really are working with an incomplete picture of reality? (And I'd object to the idea that 'anyone who objects to dualism or ID' gets labeled a materialist. Plenty of explicit non-materialists criticize ID. Plenty of non-materialists criticize dualism.)
Comment by nullasalus — September 14, 2009 @ 5:06 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 5:17 pm
Reality is defined by what can be observed, measured, detected, however indirectly. This correlates with the limits of scientific endeavour, too. I guess materialists lack the imagination to imagine the imaginary.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 14, 2009 @ 5:17 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 5:34 pm
Alan Fox,
And the idealists turn around and laugh, pointing out that no materialist has ever observed, measured, or detected the material in his life. All they have, and all they can ever have, are phenomenal experiences.
The panpsychists laugh, pointing out that the one thing we're sure of is that matter has subjective experience – we do, after all – and that it's arbitrary to decide this is not a fundamental property of matter.
And everyone else laughs, because that little qualification of 'or indirect detection' puts all of them in the running. And as pointed out above, it's the materialists who've really suffered with that sort of definition because they pinned their justifications on 19th century science and speculation – and then science whipped around and bit them on the ass. Jaegwon Kim didn't want to leave physicalism behind, you know. But nevertheless, kicking and screaming…
Comment by nullasalus — September 14, 2009 @ 5:34 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 5:38 pm
But what about the incomplete reality?
Comment by Alan Fox — September 14, 2009 @ 5:38 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 5:41 pm
nullasalus wrote:
That sums it nicely up why these debates are completely meaningless. Why anyone would still pay attention to them is a good question.
Comment by olegt — September 14, 2009 @ 5:41 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 5:43 pm
Guts:
EXCELLENT thought on the matter! I myself have for some time also thought that a specific form may not be the pre-designed target, but rather a specific function would be the goal "in mind." Convergent evolution would be an example of the targets within the evolutionary history of life.
That idea of aiming for a pre-designed function in order to arrive at the correct, unknown form, is much like how evolutionary algorithms are utilized. Let's take the example of a more efficient antenna. The programmers don't know before-hand the exact form (how it will look), yet they know the problem which needs to be solved — the function which needs to be obtained –, the initial conditions necessary, and the conditions which need to be met in order to arrive at the desired function. Thus, the pre-set goal is indeed the efficient antenna, the algorithm is front-loaded to efficiently find that antenna, and law and chance do the grunt work, eventually finding the right form which matches the desired function.
Thus, evolution is an amazing example of intelligence, law, and chance working together.
Comment by CJYman — September 14, 2009 @ 5:43 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 5:49 pm
olegt,
The debate is meaningless, but debating why people debate is a good question.
Oh olegt. You're the gift that keeps on giving!
Comment by nullasalus — September 14, 2009 @ 5:49 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 5:49 pm
I'm not debating, nullasalus, I'm making a definitive statement.
Comment by olegt — September 14, 2009 @ 5:49 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 5:52 pm
Really? Looks an awful lot like navel-gazing, olegt. But what can I say – reality is defined by what can be observed, measured, or detected, however indirectly.
Comment by nullasalus — September 14, 2009 @ 5:52 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 5:56 pm
Maybe you could tell us where the bit of reality is that we need to complete the picture.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 14, 2009 @ 5:56 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 6:00 pm
olegt:
… which is the question that I'm sure olegt would be able to answer for himself … or at least ask himself and then answer for us who have the same question. Yes, olegt … why do you still pay attention?? Is it for the same reasons that you may watch a sporting event? If so, great, it is a pleasure to have you on the sidelines. Maybe you would consider cheerleading for someone here, just to get a little more involved?
I am quite interested in the subject matter for those reasons that nullasallus stated:
… so it seems that subjective experience may be fundamental. I personally find that, and the possible implications, quite fascinating even though my mind tends to the more objective, measurable, testable aspects of reality.
Comment by CJYman — September 14, 2009 @ 6:00 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 6:07 pm
Is there a difference between "reality" and "that which exists?" I'd like some clarifications on this.
Anyone here ever measured subjective experience? Does subjective experience exist? Is it true that "no materialist has ever observed, measured, or detected the material in his life. All they have, and all they can ever have, are phenomenal experiences."
Comment by CJYman — September 14, 2009 @ 6:07 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 6:08 pm
It should be obvious!!!
Comment by Alan Fox — September 14, 2009 @ 6:08 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 6:22 pm
I fear you will only get opinions. Mine is that real things are observable. There may be (I might just as well say are) things that exist beyond the reach of our instruments, in the absolute elsewhere outside the light cone of our particular point in the universe but we have no way of knowing. We can imagine them though.
Thoughts are real and amenable to scientific study, in principle at least. Functional NMR allows us to follow neurone activity indirectly (by observing the difference in spectra of haemoglobin compared to deoxyhaemoglobin which is related to energy consumption changes in the cell due to increased activity). This can currently be done at quite a high (1mm^3) level of detail. It's a long way from getting to the nub of solving how the brain works but it's a start.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 14, 2009 @ 6:22 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 6:46 pm
How do you measure another person's consciousness? Since this cannot be done, according to your definition above, it is not part of "reality."
Science does not correlate with all knowledge that is perfectly known by humans. I know that I love my wife. How would science prove that I love my wife?
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 14, 2009 @ 6:46 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 6:53 pm
CJYMan,
I was quoting that back partly for fun, I admit, so I'm not sure how to take that question!
I actually have some sympathy for a healthy skepticism of philosophy. One problem is that a lot of skeptics don't realize that it's not really skepticism of philosophy if you're dismissive of all philosophy you disagree with and think the one you agree with is obviously true.
Well, that gets into subjects like direct versus indirect realism.
By the indirect realists' and the idealists' measure, I've certainly measured/observed subjective experience. I'm doing it now. In fact, in a way it's all I can ever do – alas, I can only observe mine. That's part of what makes it subjective.
The indirect realists say there are material objects out there I'm indirectly perceiving. The idealists say all that exists are thoughts and observations, period. The indirect realists say that's preposterous, and there has to be something 'out there' which is leading to these thoughts we have of things seemingly external to thought. The idealists point out that the indirect realists agree that whatever is 'out there' is getting represented by thought – and that the representation is all they have. So what's this stuff 'out there' beyond representation? Because whatever it is, we have no hope of meaningfully talking about it – all we can ever do is talk in terms of representation/thought.
Now, you do have eliminative materialists arguing that eventually things we take to exist – qualia, or beliefs, or pain, etc – will in time be shown to not really exist. Most physicalists seem to regard eliminativists as off their rockers – it's a minority view, to put it lightly. Of course, the non-materialists also tend to think that these physicalists hold positions that either collapse to eliminative materialism, or to something that isn't really physicalism after all. And then there's guys like McGinn who go, 'Materialism is true, but it's impossible for us to see why.'
It's a helluva subject.
Comment by nullasalus — September 14, 2009 @ 6:53 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 6:58 pm
I would suggest consciousness is a function of brain activity. It is an eminently observable phenomenon. I don't quite follow why you think my definition of reality means consciousness is not real.
Well, you say you love your wife. But a scientist would discount your assertion and look for corroborating evidence. Do you remember her birthday? Share the chores? Take her breakfast in bed?
Comment by Alan Fox — September 14, 2009 @ 6:58 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 7:08 pm
IMO, philosophical utterances are "merely" a window into the mind of the philosopher who utters them. If nothing else, it shows how different thought processes can be amongst us humans. Perhaps philosophy should be a considered a branch of psychology. When good old olegt dismisses philosophy he's just uttering his own: "all those philosophies, and the arguments about them, are meaningless (even though mine isn't.)" My guess is that olegt is not a very intuitive person, and probably isn't the life of any parties. But that's just a non-scientific wild-ass guess based on little data. In any event, the world needs his type just like all the rest.
But that's just part of my philosophy.
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 14, 2009 @ 7:08 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 7:19 pm
A suggestion is not an observation. Can you show me where inside the brain this thing called consciousness is?
I'm sure you think you are observing effects produced, however indirectly, by consciousness. But that's only because you assume other humans are just like you. How do you know they are? How can you tell the difference between a philosophical zombie and a person with consciousness? How could science prove it?
I might be doing all of that to get what's left of her inheritance after she kicks the bucket. I might do it because I think God will punish me if I don't, or for a dozen other reasons. You can look at what I do and guess at a motive. How do you prove it by science?
Now, you can get all pragmatic (like most people, including myself), and just go ahead and assume other people are conscious, but that's not "knowledge", and it's certainly not "science." It's intuition and philosophy.
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 14, 2009 @ 7:19 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 7:33 pm
Alan Fox,
The more fundamental question is how do you demonstrate anything outside of our own consciousness is "real" in the sense that you think it is. The old brain the vat idea. Science is of no use to you there.
The point is, science has limitations to what it can determine is "true." Yet, I suspect that your own operating philosophy accepts that some things beyond the reach of science are indeed true despite this.
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 14, 2009 @ 7:33 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 7:36 pm
You can easily demonstrate that consciousness is a function of brain activity by a simple knock out experiment. Have your brain removed and observe the instantaneous loss of consciousness. Actually you will need a second person as an observer.
Yes, science has to make some unwarranted assumptions, like the properties of matter are consistent across the observable universe. It's just a working hypothesis, but it works better than solipsism.
Seriously, there is some interesting stuff around how human social behaviour, language, poetry, music, painting could have evolved as a simple matter of differential survival. I have recently read arguments that sexual selection by mate choice could have been an important factor. And scientific theories are only ever provisional and subject to falsification.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 14, 2009 @ 7:36 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 7:55 pm
Alan Fox,
It's hard to tell if you're being serious. No one 'observes the loss of consciousness' in that situation. If I'm not conscious, how am I observing? If I wake up later and don't recall the time, was I not conscious or did I simply loss the ability to remember? The second observer can't observe my subjective experience whether or not you remove my brain – they're observing objective behavior, not subjective experience. (Indeed, just changing the brain's location won't be enough, if you think the brain generates or is merely intimately linked with consciousness.)
The best you can do is say 'I correlate consciousness to behavior X' – but correlations aren't the issue. Even Chalmers won't deny correlations are possible/expected. The subjective experience itself is, now what take to be hints that one is taking place.
A solipsist can make unwarranted assumptions too (indeed, some would argue that's just what a solipsist does). The one thing a solipsist couldn't do without contradiction is investigate another person's subjective experience. Of course, then comes the reply that subjective experience isn't properly part of science anyway. (I'd love to see some evolutionary papers talking about the beliefs of the very LUCA, or the subjective experience of the original life-form in the OOL. Fun!)
Comment by nullasalus — September 14, 2009 @ 7:55 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 8:01 pm
[silly but somewhat amusing segment knocked out]
Right. Intuition and philosophy (pragmatic inductivism) pick up where science leaves off.
I consider that to be mere unsubstantiated story-telling emanating from deep within the bowels of a particular ideology. All bun no beef.
Agreed. What falsifiable scientific theories about consciousness exist?
Consider the following conjecture:
A) Johnny has consciousness
B) Johnny does not have consciousness
Are either of these falsifiable conjectures?
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 14, 2009 @ 8:01 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 8:03 pm
kornbelt888,
That much I can certainly get behind. Not to say I don't value philosophy, mind you. I just have a healthy skepticism of the field, even if I have my own philosophical preferences and beliefs. I feel the arguments of Aristotle, Aquinas, etc are compelling. But I still can appreciate the joke about the university president complaining how the nuclear research program is always asking for such expensive equipment to do what they do, while the math department gets along just fine with nothing but a budget for pencils, papers and wastebaskets. And the philosophy department is even better – they don't even need wastebaskets!
There is something damn funny about a person asserting 'all philosophical arguments/claims are nonsense', though.
Comment by nullasalus — September 14, 2009 @ 8:03 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 8:05 pm
Alan Fox,
BTW, consciousness is not something I "observe" in myself. It's what I am, the foundation. It is primary, and all things, even thoughts (which are particular states of consciousness) stream into it. To deny that would be to deny everything, including materialism, and Mother Goose.
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 14, 2009 @ 8:05 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 8:10 pm
Right, me too, which is why I put "merely" in quotes.
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 14, 2009 @ 8:10 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 8:26 pm
Let me predict the result of kornbelts brain removal experiment. Irrevocable loss of consciousness. He would indeed be unable to observe this himself, being, well, dead. Hence the need for the second observer.
But I think it is uncontroversial to state from a scientific standpoint that consciousness, mind, if you will, is simply a function of brain activity. I fully accept that we are far from being able to hypothesize about how, for instance, a childhood memory involving images, sounds and smells, say, is specifically retained and accessed in the brain. But because of rather than in spite of the the current lack of any detailed and specific explanations, I see no justification for including a supernatural element to consciousness or mind.
And I'd be one of them. We Brits often remark that Americans seem immune to irony. I'll try to remember to use more smilies.
As the late Professor Joad often remarked "It all depends what you mean by subjective experience". If you are not a solipsist, you can at least compare notes with your peers.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 14, 2009 @ 8:26 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 8:33 pm
Fair enough. I won't bother with a link, then.
Can I ask Johnny a few questions before replying?
Comment by Alan Fox — September 14, 2009 @ 8:33 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 8:34 pm
That's all for tonight, it's past 2am here.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 14, 2009 @ 8:34 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 8:46 pm
Alan Fox,
What does 'supernatural' mean anyway? Spooky action at a distance, perhaps? Violations of typically understood causality? The simulation hypothesis? Especially when, as I've said, the very definition of 'physicalism' (not to mention 'naturalism'!) is a still-debated question now that the old meaning of materialism has been quietly jettisoned (or is supposed to have been). Sounds more like a derisive name and nothing more.
And it's controversial because science deals with the objectively measurable. What's more, storing memories is far less the problem than accounting for the phenomenal experience itself (though intentionality is another damn big question). "From a scientific standpoint", consciousness is a pragmatic name for an objective appearance. There's no scientific test to disprove or prove panpsychism, much less idealism, dualism, "physicalism", or otherwise. If an uncontroversial scientific claim simply means 'many scientists in or out of the relevant field have this philosophical opinion', it's as interesting to me as hearing 4 out of 5 physicists prefer Wrigley's to Bubbleyum.
No thanks, we all know what the Big Book of British Smiles looks like.
I suppose it depends on what you mean by science at that point too.
Comment by nullasalus — September 14, 2009 @ 8:46 pm
September 14th, 2009 at 9:23 pm
This, of course, assumes that consciousness cannot exist apart from brains. You may be right, but you may be wrong. How do we settle it scientifically?
Given that science assumes a methodological naturalism, that's not saying much. But I disagree that consciousness is uncontroversial among scientists studying the "hard problem."
At any rate, what does "simply a function of brain activity" really mean? The answer to the question may involve a radical overhaul of physics to explain, in which case "simply" would certainly not be a fitting adjective.
The brain could "merely" be an interface and organ of thought that consciousness uses to interface with spacetime. (Or maybe not. The jury is out.) But it isn't difficult, given our understanding of computers, to conceive that memories can be accumulated and recalled from a physical medium such as the brain. But understanding how a brain processes memories is not the same question as whether or not consciousness is "simply a function of brain activity."
Given the state of the object evidence, and my own subjective experience, the way I see it, either consciousness is "wholey other" (I don't care for the ambiguous term "supernatural"), i.e., outside of the known properties of spacetime, and is associated with, but not dependent on, brains for its existence. Or else physics as we know it will have to undergo a radical overhaul. As it stands, physics – and thus the physics of brains – is utterly incapable of bridging the gap. The question, "what is consciousness", has no scientific answer based on physical/natural processes and forces.
Being a solipsist or not is irrelevant. Regardless of what you believe (for intuitive and philosophical reasons), how do you decide scientifically whether a given person is a philosophical zombie or not?
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 14, 2009 @ 9:23 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 11:01 am
nullasalus:
What we are discussing here, null, reminds me of the question Morpheus asks Neo in the movie “The Matrix.”
"Have you ever had a dream, neo, that you were so sure was real.
What if you were unable to wake from that dream? How would you know the difference between the dream world and the real world?”
This question in my view asks one of the fundamental questions in philosophy. Do we really exist in a “real world“, or, are we conscious agents inside an ever lasting dream, or “brains in a vat” being fed a simulated reality by some invisible super computer, or even “sims”–simulated conscious agents that are actually created by the computer within the computer (which are indeed themselves self conscious), there is no way to get outside our reality to see if it is really an independently existing reality, or if it is the only reality? We are limited by our minds and consciousness to the reality which we perceive.
If we follow this line of reasoning to its conclusion it suggests to me that there are definite boundaries or limits to scientific knowledge. Science can only objectively and empirically study the world it assumes to be real. That there is a real, independently existing, world out there is a metaphysical assumption.
Science can never look beyond the veil to see what is really behind it all.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 15, 2009 @ 11:01 am
September 15th, 2009 at 1:13 pm
Of course I've understood where you're coming from from the beginning: you are coming from a predetermined answer. So you waste our time trying to use sophomore rhetorical tricks to win points as if you're in a high school debate. My point was that if you really wanted to discover the truth, you'd ask people that could answer your questions. Instead, you ask people that you hope cannot answer your questions, but if they did answer, you could just ignore the answer since, after all, they aren't experts.
Does that about sum it up?
Comment by don provan — September 15, 2009 @ 1:13 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 1:24 pm
dp to nullasalus:
The pot calling the kettle black.
As JAD accurately pointed out:
Comment by Bradford — September 15, 2009 @ 1:24 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 1:49 pm
Another key question is: what is consciousness?
As Chalmers argues I know about consciousness because my “knowledge of consciousness…comes from my own case, not from any external observation. It is my first-person experience of consciousness that forces the problem on me.”
Furthermore, we have no way to prove anything else in the world is conscious except by inferring what I know about consciousness from my own experience. For all I know, Don could be a sim (or simulated conscious agent) residing on a server somewhere. How would we know? In other words, I believe that Don is conscious because I am conscious.
However, could a computer generated sim really be self conscious? I think making that determination is somewhat problematic because it might be soon (or already) possible to make sim that is so good that we really can’t tell. Indeed, there is very good reason for the telecommunications industry to develop such software.
For example, increasingly when I have made travel plans over the past few years, I have found myself talking to a computer which is using voice recogniton software. However, these programs are still quite limited in what they can do. Besides that, I still hate talking to a machine. So, there is good reason for industry to develop software that will make me feel comfortable.
Let’s call this progam a virtual travel agent (or, VTA). And let’s take it one step further and give this program a name, Halley, after 2001’s HAL and the actress Hayley Mills (“Pollyanna“ & “The Parent Trap“) . In fact, Halley’s creator has modeled Halley’s voice on a more grown up Hayley Mills.
Now when I call up to plan my vacation I think that I am talking to a very pleasant and patient person with a very pleasant voice who really understands my wants and needs. And I am totally fooled, I think Halley really is another person.
However, is Halley really conscious? I would argue emphatically no. Mimicing consciousness is not the same thing as being conscious. Furthermore, if I know enough about Halley I can reduce what she does as a function of cleverly pre-programmed scripts that responds to my questions through equally sophisticated voice recognition software.
Consciousness is something that is irreducible; it cannot be reduced to a physical process. Consciousness is something that is unique and of itself. If you think a physical process can explain consciousness, explain to me how it can.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 15, 2009 @ 1:49 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 2:06 pm
JOHN_A_DESIGNER wrote:
This is about as logical as saying "positive numbers are greater than zero by definition. If you think they can be negative, explain how that can be."
Comment by olegt — September 15, 2009 @ 2:06 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 2:39 pm
Maybe it's not about logic. If I describe my feelings the first time I saw my newborn son one might say to me that there was surely neural synapse activity correlating to those feelings. The observer might get even more detailed and add that some proteins were expressed at that time within brain cells and others not. While the linked physical data is noteworthy it explains far less about my feelings than a simple analogy comparing the emotional reaction to another human experience. This may be a classic apples/oranges scenario where biological associations are substituted for "explanations." A mathematical relationship can yield to an explanation citing an equation. The quality of poetry is not so easily explained.
Comment by Bradford — September 15, 2009 @ 2:39 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 2:48 pm
Nothing to me, which is why I prefer to use "real" for observable phenomena and "imaginary" for concepts that have no observable reality, or that might exist but are not located within the light cone of our bit of the universe.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 15, 2009 @ 2:48 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 3:05 pm
Geoffrey Miller has a go in his book on sexual selection by mate choice The Mating Mind. See chapters 10 and 11.
ETA typo
Comment by Alan Fox — September 15, 2009 @ 3:05 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 3:32 pm
It is obvious that the first two sentences summarize his views. The last sentence is a challenge for your to overthrow his views.
Why don't you attempt that instead of
"correcting
his logic" your misunderstanding?Comment by kornbelt888 — September 15, 2009 @ 3:32 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 3:45 pm
So then, other people's consciousness are "supernatural" by that definition, since you cannot observe them, only its presumed effects.
OK
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 15, 2009 @ 3:45 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 4:19 pm
Consciousness is a real and observable phenomenon (depending of course on what we each mean by the word). Are you sure you aren't talking about a person's soul rather than their consciousness? I would suggest a soul is imaginary and unobservable.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 15, 2009 @ 4:19 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 5:40 pm
I mean it in this sense, which is not observable, except for your own (which I assume you have for non-scientific reasons, but I do not know.)
I don't know what you mean by "soul", so, no, I wouldn't be talking about that.
Comment by kornbelt888 — September 15, 2009 @ 5:40 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 5:51 pm
Don Provan,
Not even a little, Don. You're getting awfully worked up and defensive over.. what, me asking a question that you/others don't know the answer to? Indeed, the very prospect of getting someone to admit they don't know the answer (despite utter confidence that such an answer exists and is complete and right!) is some kind of cheap high school debate tactic? Do you realize appeals to authority and bluffing (I'm sure this is right but I can't say why!) are cheap debate tactics?
Ah well. I love it so!
Comment by nullasalus — September 15, 2009 @ 5:51 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 6:39 pm
I don't need to cite studies. The hand writes "true", or the hand writes "false". Surely you understand the hand must get different neural signals in order to perform two different tasks.
Comment by don provan — September 15, 2009 @ 6:39 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 6:55 pm
Is this just a gratuitous insult, or do you have an example? I always try to seek the truth, so I'd appreciate any suggestions you have to improve my technique.
When demanding answers to scientific questions, it makes no sense to question science and its limits.
Comment by don provan — September 15, 2009 @ 6:55 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 8:08 pm
I understand that is what you think. I asked you to back up your opinions with empirical data and see that you are unable to do so. Unsurprising.
This is simply moronic.
Comment by Bradford — September 15, 2009 @ 8:08 pm
September 15th, 2009 at 8:52 pm
If you think that's an opinion, there's not much I can do. Science has worked out how muscles move. I'm sorry you didn't know that yet won't take my word for it.
Comment by don provan — September 15, 2009 @ 8:52 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 2:43 am
Bradford, Don is suggesting that the brain sends signals to different muscles to move the hand, for example when writing, in different directions. Ergo if the hand is moved by the musculature through a different pattern of movements to produce a different set of written letters, then the brain has sent different sets of impulses, which given the right observational equipment, could be distinguished.
Do you seriously argue with that?
Comment by Alan Fox — September 16, 2009 @ 2:43 am
September 16th, 2009 at 10:18 am
Alan Fox:
In the context of invariant neural causal scenarios this is a vacuous explanation. A bit like me pointing out that a spelling misteak in this comment entails a different set of neural impulses to the muscles involved. Of course it does. The muscle nerve impulses are secondary causal factors. The erroneous process causing the generation of such signals preceded this. That process is the relevant one by which invariance must be assessed.
Comment by Bradford — September 16, 2009 @ 10:18 am
September 16th, 2009 at 10:32 am
Bradford, are you saying that the brain can make the hand do two different things by sending the same signals. You can't mean that, surely???
Comment by Alan Fox — September 16, 2009 @ 10:32 am
September 16th, 2009 at 10:45 am
Alan Fox:
This is not that difficult Alan. I've seen this occur and so have others. A decision is made to execute plan x to solve problem y. The executiion involves neural impulses to muscles. This is easily seen in attempts to make mechanical repairs. The intended action is apparent before the act is completed. If the action is ill-conceived i.e. mechanically flawed, the resulting mistake may not become apparent for minutes. The thought process which engendered the erroneous idea led to the impulses which are simply efforts to direct muscles in pursuit of an already ill-conceived idea. Until you provide the data on the neural genesis of that flawed idea you have no distinguishing data on the causal source.
Comment by Bradford — September 16, 2009 @ 10:45 am
September 16th, 2009 at 1:41 pm
@ Don
Was re-reading the thread prior to responding to Bradford's latest comment and I came across your:
My:
looks like plagiarism but I hadn't read all the previous comments.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 16, 2009 @ 1:41 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 2:17 pm
Brain essentiality is a straw man where dualism is concerned. Noone disputes that brain cells are an element of function.
Comment by Bradford — September 16, 2009 @ 2:17 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 2:27 pm
If I thought you were stealing from me — i.e., if, for some strange reasons, I thought the suggested experiment wasn't obvious — then I'd just be honored that you borrowed something I said.
Comment by don provan — September 16, 2009 @ 2:27 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 2:36 pm
Then I take it you're withdrawing your suggestion that "brain essentiality" could be used to indicate an immaterial aspect of mind. To remind you where we came from:
But when Alan and I both questioned you about this lack of disernable difference, you complain we're bringing up brain physics that appear, to us, to make your suggested indication impossible, a priori.
Comment by don provan — September 16, 2009 @ 2:36 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 2:43 pm
Just been pointed to this paper, BEHAVIOR, PURPOSE AND TELEOLOGY elsewhere. Seems quite relevant to the current discussion.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 16, 2009 @ 2:43 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 2:46 pm
Cite the quote where I made that claim.
Comment by Bradford — September 16, 2009 @ 2:46 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 3:15 pm
JAD: thanks for input/post back on Sep 13th.Now I've read through the rest of the comments, can no longer recall it and in any case the thread has moved on.
Re: 'Reality is defined by what can be observed, measured, detected, however indirectly.'
Any such 'thing' (the root of the word) involves consciousness to perceive it. That's the rub.
Earlier, JAD in Sep 13 concluded nice long post wondering if anything on the metaphysical level can ever be proven. Nullasus Sep 14 goes through how physicalists-materialists-dualists etc. often come to both conflicting and convergent views endlessly. Later on JAD states: "Consciousness is something that is irreducible; it cannot be reduced to a physical process." Some objected to this of course, and somewhere along in there along these lines somebody pointed out that thoughts are actually brainwaves, electrical impulses etc. that can be measured, observed etc., the inference being that they are not thoughts as we perceive them subjectively, rather in 'reality' they are chemical events essentially.
OK.
First, I am sort of amazed by this blog because I see playing out here various philosophical schools that I only marginally studied thirty years ago (unfortunately), albeit in this case they are from the buddhist tradition, most of these debates having been hammered out incessantly (and still are in graduate academies) about a thousand years ago. So to JAD I have to say that I agree that even though scientists like to think they are not dealing with metaphysics, philosophy or beliefs, in fact they are, and they are using data to shape, confirm or negate them.
In terms of the thoughts = chemical reactions: that too is, fundamentally, an expression of a metaphysical view, in this case the physicalist interpretation. Why? Because such mechanically recorded data points, although evidenced along with thought activity, are essentially a parallel process. The fact that electrical events occur in the brain along with thought processes does not prove that such events are the sum total of what constitutes a thought. This is unknowable. It also does not prove that this is even the sum total of the physical processes. As I mentioned above earlier, there have been many experiments showing that the enteric brain leads the cranial – including moving the hands, so along with studying the brain the enteric synaptical activity must also be studied, along with various elecromagnetic fields throughout the mind-body system, including the blood. Endless. And still doesn't prove anything necessarily.
JAD asks how he can really know that consciousness is real? Provan likes to point out that if you blow out someone's brain, see what happens to their consciousness! Well, apart from the cheap rejoinder to the latter that a) wait til you die and find out and/or b) see what your consciousness is like after someone rips your heart out and c) how do you explain the memories of the donor that heart transplantees have recorded in considerable numbers now, for JAD I reply: try to imagine an experience of any sort without the presence of consciousness in the mix. I think it is fair to say that without consciousness there is no experience and without experience there is no life.
However, to try to go a little deeper with this, I think what we are really bumping up against is not so much the 'limits of science' or 'as yet incomplete knowledge' rather the limits of what can be observed and measured in that the latter process necessarily involves creating an artificial (on the quantum level at least) separation between subject and object.
This also gets into language, which uses the building blocks of various concepts to articulate particular logical/intellectual/cognitive aspects of a continuous experience in order to artificially – but very effectively – construct various different views, conclusions, referents etc., but as has often been pointed out, although we all know what is meant by the word 'moon', for example, the word is not the moon.
Similarly the word 'thought' is not a thought. And more importantly, and no less similarly, a mechanical output of a brain impulse is also not a thought, rather a parallel occurrence in this case somewhat analogous to how the concept of thought parallels but does not equal a thought itself.
The finger of concept can point at the moon but it cannot either
a) be the moon or
b) point at itself.
That said, contemplative traditions of yore did allow themselves, albeit skeptically and with rigor, to begin at the beginning with consciousness as a working basis in that it is always there throughout every moment of living experience. And although we often are not aware of it because we are so busy navigating through sensually and conceptually processed data building blocks, it can actually be observed 'nakedly' as it were, although this takes training and patience, not because it is so hard but because it is so deeply, fundamentally easy that it is hard to spot. We are doing it all the time, in other words, but just aren't aware of it.
Still, I go back to an earlier sentence up there: can you postulate any event in 'reality' that happens without consciousness being involved in there somewhere? Sure, but only hypothetically. As a scientist you will not be able to set up experiments and evaluate data without consciousness being involved in doing so from beginning to end. No paper can be read without consciousness. No language can be spoken and understood without it. No 'fact' can be determined.
So even though it cannot be measured, and even though our immediate access to it is both personal and therefore subjective, it seems a little perverse when studying the nature of reality – including speculating origins – to posit that we can study only physical things and not the organs of perception and awareness via which they are experienced as such. And just saying that consciousness is not 'real' seems to me a cop out because again, just as with Don Provan's brain-blowing business, try to come up with one single scientific fact that can be proven without it.
Can't be done. Gravity is 'real'. And yet without consciousness it cannot be spoken about, measured, felt, verified. Without beings to experience it we cannot know if even exists at all as such, any more than the seeming solidity of planetary bodies and their orbits.
Therefore, I would go so far as to say that any scientific method that denies the existence of consciousness is ultimately only interested in developing a meta-language. Perhaps that is why modern science has become mainly fixated on developing un-natural, aka mechanical, fixes, addenda, supplements, but has not actually made much progress in fundamentally better understanding the nature of human, animal, plant and mineral life.
Comment by ash — September 16, 2009 @ 3:15 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 6:25 pm
Fox, that paper is from 1948. Then again, I've always known that materialists cling to an outdated philosophy.
Speaking of relevant links, there might be some interesting ones here.
Comment by Jean — September 16, 2009 @ 6:25 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 6:41 pm
I thought it was from 1943. Cling to an outdated philosophy? Surely all philosophy is outdated. What have philosophers ever done for us materialists?
Comment by Alan Fox — September 16, 2009 @ 6:41 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 6:45 pm
You mean that isn't what you meant by the quote I cited right there in that post to illustrate what I was saying: "No discernable differences in neural function for distinctive cognitive outputs"? When you pointed us to "discernable differences in neural function", I assumed you were talking about the brain. So what did you mean?
Comment by don provan — September 16, 2009 @ 6:45 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 6:47 pm
Alan Fox, here is how Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg feels about philosophy.
Comment by Hammerstein — September 16, 2009 @ 6:47 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 7:24 pm
Good, I am out of moderation. Thank you. Just so you know where I am coming from: I am a German economist, a 'hardcore materialist', and I am here to debate a bit against ID because I think it is just a form of creationism and has no place in science. Having said that, I prefer a civil conversation, so I will not engage in insults.
Comment by Hammerstein — September 16, 2009 @ 7:24 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 7:25 pm
Thanks for the link, Hammerstein. I'll print out the PDF as bedtime reading.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 16, 2009 @ 7:25 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 8:41 pm
While we are talking about Weinberg, here is what he has to say about the subject of consciousness:
I agree with everything that Weinberg says here, because it is an honest statement of what we presently know. However, Weinberg isn’t content to leave it there. Later on the same page he writes that, “it seems reasonable to suppose that these objective correlatives to consciousness can be studied by the methods of science and will eventually be explained in terms of the physics and chemistry of the brain and body.”
However this is not something that Weinberg knows it is what he believes. Materialists need to come clean and admit that materialism is not science (knowing) but a belief system. A belief system that requires as much faith as any religion.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 16, 2009 @ 8:41 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 9:14 pm
Wow, Hammerstein, your first post and already you're engaging in stereotypes.
What a surprise for a self-professed "hardcore materialist".
Comment by Jean — September 16, 2009 @ 9:14 pm
September 16th, 2009 at 9:52 pm
J_A_D,
I don't know the context of that quote, but I'll point out that it's a bit misleading as given. Examining the "objective correlatives to consciousness" – in other words, studying the brain/body – isn't the same thing as examining consciousness, certainly not as Weinberg himself just described it. Even Chalmers will point out that much – we can correlate as much as we please, and we'll still have a problem on our hands.
Of course, there are possible ways to address the problem. Deny it altogether (the eliminative materialism route), but that's a solution so superficially bonkers that even many physicalists have trouble with it. Entertain panpsychism, idealism, or dualisms – but that likely means putting the issue beyond science, unless we redefine science in some fundamental ways (either in terms of science's scope, or our idea of the physical. The former clearly is dangerous, and it's hard to tell where to draw the line re: the latter.) Or some variation on a Mysterian route, but that would require philosophers and scientists to unite in admitting they don't even have a clue on the issue – good luck with that consensus.
And I have a hunch about what the popular trend is going to be: Physicalists embracing something that's indistinguishable from panpsychism or neutral monism, and pretending this is what materialism/physicalism really meant right from the start.
Comment by nullasalus — September 16, 2009 @ 9:52 pm
September 17th, 2009 at 1:42 am
Professor Weinberg wrote:
"Impenetrable jargon" fits nicely with my experience at reading some comments couched in philosophical terms. So maybe "what have philosophers ever done for us" is a fair question if applied to the explosion of scientific knowledge over, say, the last two centuries.
The aqueduct?
Comment by Alan Fox — September 17, 2009 @ 1:42 am
September 17th, 2009 at 3:39 am
Alan Fox,
Impenetrable jargon? What, "indirect realism"? "Phenomenal"? Everyone else seems to understand what we're talking about in this thread. If you've got a question, ask.
As for the uselessness of philosophy, as I've said before – I can sympathize with a healthy skepticism of the field. But I'm noticing this pattern of scientists or the supposedly scientific-minded grumbling about the worthlessness of philosophy.. and then whipping around to engage in it at length.
Comment by nullasalus — September 17, 2009 @ 3:39 am
September 17th, 2009 at 9:23 am
What has philosophy done for us? It has helped us to separate logically inconsistent (and thus necessarily false) frameworks for interpreting data from logically consistent (and therefore potentially true) frameworks. That is an exercise in philosophy.
Anyone remember two basic aspects of science:
1. Measuring/collecting data.
2. Utilizing a philosophical tool such as inference to interpret the data and create a logically sound (there's that philosophy again) argument? Does anyone remember separating sound arguments from unsound arguments in first year philosophy class?
Furthermore, on "what has philosophy done for us," let's look at wikipedia's article on "philosophy:"
"The following branches are the main areas of study [of philosophy]:
* Metaphysics investigates the nature of being and the world. Traditional branches are cosmology and ontology.
* Epistemology is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge, and whether knowledge is possible. Among its central concerns has been the challenge posed by skepticism and the relationships between truth, belief, and justification.
* Ethics, or 'moral philosophy', is concerned with questions of how persons ought to act or if such questions are answerable. The main branches of ethics are meta-ethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Meta-ethics concerns the nature of ethical thought, comparison of various ethical systems, whether there are absolute ethical truths, and how such truths could be known. Ethics is also associated with the idea of morality. Plato's early dialogues include a search for definitions of virtue.
* Political philosophy is the study of government and the relationship of individuals and communities to the state. It includes questions about justice, the good, law, property, and the rights and obligations of the citizen.
* Aesthetics deals with beauty, art, enjoyment, sensory-emotional values, perception, and matters of taste and sentiment.
* Logic deals with patterns of thinking that lead from true premises to true conclusions, originally developed in Ancient Greece. Beginning in the late 19th century, mathematicians such as Frege focused on a mathematical treatment of logic, and today the subject of logic has two broad divisions: mathematical logic (formal symbolic logic) and what is now called philosophical logic.
* Philosophy of mind deals with the nature of the mind and its relationship to the body, and is typified by disputes between dualism and materialism. In recent years there have been increasing similarities, between this branch of philosophy and cognitive science.
* Philosophy of language is the reasoned inquiry into the nature, origins, and usage of language.
* Philosophy of religion is a branch of philosophy that asks questions about religion.
Most academic subjects have a philosophy, for example the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of law, and the philosophy of history. In addition, a range of academic subjects have emerged to deal with areas which would have historically been the subject of philosophy. These include psychology, anthropology and science."
Does ethics and political philosophy affect society? Are some political systems better for achieving certain ends than others? Could the value of life be significantly different and affect us more negatively or positively if our society as a whole adopted a different philosophy of ethics?
… oh, and look at that. Logic is a category of philosophy. Anyone ever use logic in mathematics or science?
Comment by CJYman — September 17, 2009 @ 9:23 am
September 17th, 2009 at 10:27 am
CJYman,
I am afraid your philosophy exercise is an exercise in faulty logic. One can be right for the wrong reasons, after all. Nowadays we use statistics to analyze data. Some (including I) will argue that the still popular frequentist approach is logically inconsistent (being a collection of ad-hoc devices), in contrast to bayesian analysis. Yet, one cannot deny the immense usefulness the frequentist approach has offered science.
Comment by Hammerstein — September 17, 2009 @ 10:27 am
September 17th, 2009 at 12:11 pm
re nullasus' : "unless we redefine science in some fundamental ways.."
Well I think we/you SHOULD redefine it and precisely in fundamental ways, i.e. go back to fundamental science, fundamentally speaking.
Leave aside the materialist-dualist deal for a moment: let's go with science being the discipline that studies 'reality'. In terms of this consciousness thingy, I suppose the first step is to determine whether or not it can be regarded as a phenomenon. If so, it should be a valid object of scientific analysis. If not, then science can definitely put out there that as far as science is concerned, consciousness does not exist.
Doing this, however, requires defining what consciousness is or is not which requires analysing it scientifically.
Bit of a conundrum eh? Perhaps philosophers need to decide this one?
Comment by ash — September 17, 2009 @ 12:11 pm
September 17th, 2009 at 12:23 pm
Since we are on the subject of the value of philosophy vs. science, here is my position that I have stated many times since I have begun posting here at Telic thoughts.
The bottom line, unless science has already answered the questions that I have listed above, the discussion for the present time is basically a metaphysical, or philosophical one.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 17, 2009 @ 12:23 pm
September 17th, 2009 at 1:02 pm
Hammerstein: thanks for the link to that Weinberg article. Personally, although I am not quite sure I understood all of his points, I took away from it that there are indeed many aspects of 'science' that involve hashing out opinion, viewpoint, linguistical considerations and so on such that various theories can emerge as being perceived generally as more or less accurate, i.e. 'true', but that definitive proof of anything is far more elusive than the widespread repeating of the term 'scientific truth' or 'objective reality' leads most of us to (pardon the expression:) believe.
Comment by ash — September 17, 2009 @ 1:02 pm
September 17th, 2009 at 1:16 pm
From Weinberg:
"rapidly being accepted as the correct theory of the strong nuclear forces.
Originally it was assumed that gluons had not been observed to be produced in elementary particle collisions because they are heavy, and there had not been enough energy available in these collisions to produce the large gluon masses. Soon after the discovery of asymptotic freedom a few theorists proposed instead that the gluons are massless, like photons. If this were true, then the reason that gluons and presumably also quarks are not observed would have to be that exchange of the massless gluons between quarks or gluons produces long-range forces that make it impossible in principle to pull either quarks or gluons apart from each other. It is now believed that if you try, for instance, to pull apart a meson (a particle composed of a quark and an antiquark) the force needed increases as the quark and antiquark are pulled farther apart, until eventually you have to put so much energy into the effort that there is enough energy available to create a new quark-antiquark pair. An anti-quark then pops out of the vacuum and joins itself to the original quark, while a quark pops out of the vacuum and joins itself to the original antiquark, so that instead of having a free quark and antiquark you simply have two quark-antiquark pairs— that is, two mesons. The metaphor has often been used that this is like trying to pull apart two ends of a piece of string: you can pull and pull, and eventually, if you put enough energy into the effort, the string breaks, but you do not find yourself with two isolated ends of the original piece of string; what you have are two pieces of string, each of which has two ends. The idea that quarks and gluons can in principle never be observed in isolation has become part of the accepted wisdom of modern elementary particle physics, but it does not stop us from describing neutrons and protons and mesons as composed of quarks. I cannot imagine anything that Ernst Mach would like less.
The quark theory was only one step in a continuing process of reformulation of physical theory in terms that are more and more fundamental and at the same time farther and farther from everyday experience. How can we hope to make a theory based on observables when no aspect of our experience—perhaps not even space and time—appears at the most fundamental level of our theories?.."
First, notice how often words like 'belief' and 'assumption' crop up. Seems to me like much of the endeavour involves coming up with plausible explanations for observed phenomena doing things that are not yet understood. So interpreting the behaviour/data examined is clearly not only an objective process – if such a thing exists at all of course.
More importantly, not only in the above excerpt but many sections, it occurred to me that the seeming split between philosophy and science might be illusory. Just as various notions of classical reality were overtaken by more recent discoveries that obliged us to correspondingly change 'paradigms' – aka viewpoints – so also it seems to me that many of the objects of philosophical enquiry have changed over the centuries in response not only to various culturo-religious factors, but also scientific input, such that in many of the arguments about scientific theory exemplified in this article are in fact philosophical arguments, albeit expressed in scientific and mathematical language. They are efforts involving observing phenomena and coming up with plausible, consistent explanations that stand the test of time in further experimentation and experience. The debates about the conclusion revolve around fine-tuning assumptions, conclusions, verifiability of method and data analysis and so forth. All of these things are essentially within the domain of so-called 'philosophy', even if not formally recognised as such within the current paradigm.
Perhaps we can say that most such scientists are in fact hashing out physical/materialist philosophy. Just as philosophers of yore got stoned by experiments with water displacement in bathtubs, or the speed of objects falling from leaning towers and so forth, nowadays they are in laboratories and observatories peering into ever smaller or larger phenomena but essentially doing exactly the same thing, namely trying to answer the question: 'what exactly is going on here?'
Comment by ash — September 17, 2009 @ 1:16 pm
September 17th, 2009 at 3:42 pm
How about we just understand what science actually is and use the existing definition, instead?
Sorry, wrong answer. Science is a method of studying observations. Science isn't defined by reality. But to a very large extent, we define reality by observations. Consequently, there is a large overlap between what science tells us and what we all consider reality (at least, when we aren't in our sophomore philosophy class studying nihilism).
To the extent you or anyone else feels that some unobservable is, nonetheless, real, you are diverging into metaphysics. No problem with that, but don't mistakenly think your questions about reality are relevant to science, 'cuz science really doesn't care about metaphysics. Science only cares about what we observe.
Again, you're approaching it backwards. You are thinking of consciousness, and then trying to decide how that relates to science. If you want to studying consciousness scientifically, you need to make statements about observables which you feel relate to consciousness. Anything you come up with, science can study. Anything about consciousness that cannot be confirmed by observation will be beyond science. If you think that science's relation to consciousness is black and white, you don't really understand science.
This is more on the right track. In a sense, it's correct. The problem with this thinking, though, is that it pretends that there can be some single definition of consciousness. Scientists ignore such issues, and just say what they can and can't observe, and leave it to others to decide how their observations and the resulting theories relate to any particular use of the term "consciousness".
No, not really. Science itself really is clear cut. The debate is about how we approach science, how we perform science, and what we should take away from science.
Comment by don provan — September 17, 2009 @ 3:42 pm
September 17th, 2009 at 4:13 pm
Hammerstein:
… which shows that you have no idea what "logically inconsistent" means and my previous comment still stands.
Comment by CJYman — September 17, 2009 @ 4:13 pm
September 17th, 2009 at 6:13 pm
Provan, fair enough about 'observations versus reality' but earlier on Alan Fox had mentioned, in the context of what is science I think, that reality is 'what can be observed, measured, detected.'
You need to define 'observation'. I don't know about you, but I 'observe' consciousness 24/7. Don't you? The problem seems to be one of measurement, not observation. It is very hard to pin down any 'consciousness' phenomenon in particular place and time, that is the problem. Where does the mind begin or end? If you, for example, put your hand in front of you and face your palm towards your face and then waggle your forefinger up and down, observing this as you do so, where does the mind (which you imagine to begin in your brain I gather) begin or end in that chain of thought/intention to finger moving? That said, clearly such a phenomenon is as easy to observe as…. the finger on your hand!
I was on a somewhat silly political site just now and in the context of analysing propaganda and the notorious (and usually misquoted) 'big lie' principle, the following excellent paragraph:
"As a young man in the early years of the 20th century, Michael Polanyi discovered the explanation for chemical absorbtion. Scientific authority found the new theory too much of a challenge to existing beliefs and dismissed it. Even when Polanyi was one of the UK's ranking scientists, he was unable to teach his theory. One half-century later his discovery was re-discovered by scientists at UC, Berkeley. The discovery was hailed, but then older scientists said that it was “Polanyi's old error.” It turned out not to be an error. Polanyi was asked to address scientists on this half-century failure of science to recognize the truth. How had science, which is based on examining the evidence, gone so wrong. Polanyi's answer was that science is a belief system just like everything else, and that his theory was outside the belief system."
by Paul Craig Roberts.
I think there are many examples of this in 'science'. Yet scientists insist that there's is a hard-core no ifs, ands or buts fact-only-based discipline where things either are true/provable or false/falsifiable.
If this were true, there would be no real debate about evolution. But it is not provable because it involves theorising about what may or may not have happened in the past. As such, it is not a valid object of scientific enquiry and should remain mainly in the domain of philosophers, intellectuals, metaphysicians etc.
Or: if one takes the approach that I recommend, rather than indulging in hypothetical hypotheses about the past, simply take the straightforward approach of delving deeper into the ongoing creation that is occurring moment by moment right now. Science really should be studying more about the nature and difference between minerals, plants, animals, humans. And to study the latter properly, clearly one has to study awareness/consciousness. Not doing so is absolutely and utterly absurd.
I think philosopher-scientists from two thousand years ago would regard the dogma that insists that anything involving the mind cannot be included as part of a discipline studying how things work, the nature of reality etc., as an enormous step back in human cultural evolution.
And they would be right!
Comment by ash — September 17, 2009 @ 6:13 pm
September 17th, 2009 at 7:23 pm
To his credit Weinberg doesn’t misunderstand or underestimate what a problem it is to explain consciousness reductively. However, it is equally apparent that he believes that even the more reductive sciences like physics and chemistry will eventually be able to give us such an explantion.
A quote from the next page makes this clear.
“Suppose then,” writes Weinberg, “that we will come to understand the objective correlatives to consciousness in terms of physics (including chemistry) and that we will also understand how they evolved to be what they are. It is not unreasonable to hope that when the objective correlatives to consciousness have been explained, somewhere in our explanation we shall be able to recognize something, some physical system for processing information, that corresponds to our experience of consciousness itself, to what Gilbert Ryle has called 'the ghost in the machine.' That may not be an explantion of consciousness, but it will be pretty close.” (p. 45)
As I wrote earlier, “this is not something that Weinberg knows it is what he believes. Materialists need to come clean and admit that materialism is not science (knowing) but a belief system. A belief system that requires as much faith as any religion.”
All I can add is that “hope springs eternal.” I guess that is true for even the committed materialist.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — September 17, 2009 @ 7:23 pm
September 17th, 2009 at 9:02 pm
John A: I propose that a new branch of science be developed:
'Noetic Science'.
Leave the evolution debate to specialists. It's not a valid avenue of enquiry anyway since absolutely NOTHING that happened in the past is provable in the present.
One could argue that inferences can be drawn to make predictions and if such predictions are consistently reliable then the inferences can be assume to be more or less accurate so no need to get knickers twisted about whether or not they are ultimately 'provable'. Fair enough. But if evolution theory is accurate, then right now there should be a plethora of intermediate forms somewhere or other. There aren't. It's predictive capabilities seem somewhere between zero and non-existent. It's an unprovable and unproven hypothesis.
Time to move on.
Personally, although I have no doubt that most who argue for materialism ( or whatever term one prefers) are sincere but also they are both victims and perpetrators of a huge hoax that has become the modern-day equivalent of a superstition. Whose main purpose is to distract and side track.
The unfortunate, conspiratorial truth is that there are – as there have usually if not always been – concerted Powers that Be for whom increasing knowledge and wisdom in the population is anathema. But rather than blame these mythical perpetrators, all of us 'not in the know' have only ourselves to blame since ultimately false beliefs are insulators we use to shield ourselves from the uncomfortable – but inevitable – process of confronting learning, which nearly always involves unlearning, unmasking, peeling away layers of ignorance, including those very same insulators we have surrounded ourselves with.
And so it goes!
Anyway: time for the discipline of Noetic Science to step forth. It will include examination into every and all aspect of phenomena, both physical and mental, anything to do with perceivable, experiential phenomena but especially focused on that which we can perceive with the senses. However, in examining organisms such as plants, humans and animals, for example, their intelligence quotient and processes can be deliberately considered rather than relegated to the distracting dustbin of continuously swirling materialist persiflage.
!
Comment by ash — September 17, 2009 @ 9:02 pm
September 17th, 2009 at 9:33 pm
Yes, so you should clarify that with Alan. As you probably know, some people consider nothing real other than what can be observed, so Alan might be one of those. Or he may have been using "reality" somewhat casually, as people sometimes do, in the sense that some things, like "God", might exist yet be considered beyond reality. In any case, the issue is how you and Alan choose to define "reality", not what science is.
I'm using "observation" casually, but that doesn't mean it isn't clearly defined in the context of scientific investigation. There can be arguments about which activities meet the criteria to be criteria, of course.
No, neither of us "observes consciousness". We are conscious. We observe other people that we think are conscious. We observe our fingers moving.
And, yes, in a scientific context, "observation" requires reporting, and reporting typically involves measurements. In addition, scientific observations are validated by independent observations, so even if we really thought we observed our own consciousness, the observations are beyond validation.
But these are issues concerning our understanding of science. None of them imply that science is somehow poorly defined or arbitrary.
Polanyi is speaking of science as a community. Since (we presume) the observations confirming Polanyi's theory were there for all to see, the failure is not a failure of science, but a failure of execution. Scientists couldn't make the correct observations because of their own failings.
Yes, there's no doubt there will always be failures, although I think this is less and less of a problem, as time goes by.
It's one thing to observe that some people, scientists or not, might be more convinced or insistent of something than they should be. But that doesn't justify the conclusion that nothing is certain, or that some things aren't very well established, or that all objections of "not falsifiable" are invalid.
While some claims of black and white are over stated, the fact is that black and white is still the gold standard of science.
Rubbish. There's nothing dubious about how the scientific method is applied to historical events, so you can't dismiss evolution on logical grounds. No, I'm afraid you'd have to look at the evidence and give actual reasons to doubt the conclusions.
What do you care?
Scientists are doing that, as well, of course.
Do you really think scientists aren't studying awareness and consciousness? Don't confuse objections to sophomore presentations of "the mind" as an explanation such as we see around here with some kind of blanket prohibition against studying anything that might have anything to do with consciousness. As I've been explaining to you, the only question is about what we can observe. Contrary to the ID mantra, there are no arbitrary limits set by human defined categories such as "the mind" or "consciousness".
But, of course, there is no such dogma, except in the imagination of ID adherents. On the other hand, much of the dogma those same philosopher-scientists inflicted on the world has been eliminated through the careful application of the scientific method.
Comment by don provan — September 17, 2009 @ 9:33 pm
September 17th, 2009 at 9:36 pm
More power to you, ash!
I will only note that everything that has happened is already in the past, so according to your logic nothing can be proven.
Comment by olegt — September 17, 2009 @ 9:36 pm
September 18th, 2009 at 6:48 am
I've decided that the label that best describes me is "scientific realist".
There may be more than reality but we have no way of knowing and whether we believe there is more or not just doesn't matter, FAPP. Anything we do know about or can observe, detect, measure, however indirectly, is real, and reality expands with knowledge. Anything that is outside our past and future light cone is incapable of having had or going to have any effect on our universe and it doesn't matter one jot whether we choose to believe there is stuff in the absolute elsewhere or not.
Hope that helps.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 18, 2009 @ 6:48 am
September 18th, 2009 at 6:50 am
To clarify, I mean by "know" connaitre not savoir.
Comment by Alan Fox — September 18, 2009 @ 6:50 am
September 18th, 2009 at 7:11 am
It's hard to avoid the conclusion that you are being deliberately obtuse. Of course I was referring to the brain when citing the possibility of discernable differences in neural function and distinctive cognitive outputs. I've also cited the fact that dualists credit brain function but do not limit consciousness solely to it. You then put forth the non-sequitur "I take it you're withdrawing your suggestion that "brain essentiality" could be used to indicate an immaterial aspect of mind." Having asserted a belief that brain function is part of duality and having further suggested invariance in neural function as a test, how do you confuse differences in brain states with brain essentiality?
Comment by Bradford — September 18, 2009 @ 7:11 am
September 18th, 2009 at 11:58 am
This gets right to the heart of the matter. On this blog, we can all predict which side of an issue the atheists and Christians will come down on. The agnostics are a different matter though. Perhaps we should leave all science to them! Of course then there's the complication of people like don provan – an atheist who thinks he's an agnostic. We may have to set up a panel or something.
Comment by Daniel Smith — September 18, 2009 @ 11:58 am
September 18th, 2009 at 12:11 pm
That's right: "gradual" doesn't mean "slow", either. And before you make another mistake, it doesn't mean linear, either, either in the sense of moving in a single direction or moving in a straight line. If you can shed these misconceptions about what "gradual" implies, maybe you'd understand the issue better.
Comment by don provan — September 18, 2009 @ 12:11 pm
September 18th, 2009 at 12:12 pm
You really have no idea what I am or what I think I am.
Comment by don provan — September 18, 2009 @ 12:12 pm
September 18th, 2009 at 12:31 pm
That's funny: I almost said the same thing about you, but then I realized it would obstruct the conversation instead of advancing it.
Yes, I thought I understood that you are accepting the brain, and you are even invoking "neural function" as a possible source of confirming evidence for dualism. But then when I made the simple point that we know for a fact that the neural function is, at some point, different because the muscles were moved two different ways to write down the two different answers, you seem to be claiming the observation is invalid or irrelevant.
When you said, "Brain essentiality is a straw man where dualism is concerned," I thought you were saying that our observations that the neural signals moving muscles differently was a red herring since dualism itself doesn't involve neural signals. Yes, that seems like a reversal to what you'd said previously, which is exactly what I was asking about. So what did you mean?
Bradford, whenever we talk, I always make sure to quote exactly the passage I'm referring to. Maybe it would help if you reread the passage I'm quoting and see if you can see how I misinterpretted your position on the way to forming my response. This "where did I say that?" crap gets really tiring when I go out of my way to quote right in the message what you said that led to my response.
Comment by don provan — September 18, 2009 @ 12:31 pm
September 18th, 2009 at 12:48 pm
Neural impulses causing muscle contractions result from prior decisions whose neural activity centered in the brain would be a distinct neural pathway.
Comment by Bradford — September 18, 2009 @ 12:48 pm
September 18th, 2009 at 2:26 pm
The problem is that point of decision. You said, "No discernable differences in neural function for distinctive cognitive outputs." But now you're retreating to no discernable difference up to the point of decision. Well, guess what: physicalism also calls for no discernable difference up to the point of decision. So that doesn't demonstrate dualism at all.
Comment by don provan — September 18, 2009 @ 2:26 pm
September 18th, 2009 at 6:53 pm
You're not using your brains. What do you think cognitive refers to? It's not muscle contractions. The initial example was centered around a math problem that would be challenging for many. The correct or incorrect answer is already in the head by the time the hand is directed to write it.
Comment by Bradford — September 18, 2009 @ 6:53 pm
September 18th, 2009 at 7:32 pm
Oh I've got an inkling!
Comment by Daniel Smith — September 18, 2009 @ 7:32 pm
September 18th, 2009 at 7:39 pm
You seem to think the brain has some concrete barrier between congnitive functions and muscle control. There simply is no such barrier.
Comment by don provan — September 18, 2009 @ 7:39 pm
September 18th, 2009 at 7:40 pm
So you think.
Comment by don provan — September 18, 2009 @ 7:40 pm
September 18th, 2009 at 7:51 pm
I never claimed there is a barrier but if you wish to isolate neural pathways related to decision making it makes sense to distinguish between decision processes and impulses sent to muscles for the purpose of acting on decisions.
Comment by Bradford — September 18, 2009 @ 7:51 pm
September 18th, 2009 at 9:14 pm
I don't want to isolate them. I'm not even sure they can be isolated. But you have to isolate them in order to establish which neural functions to look at for discernable differences.
Anyway, the bottom line is that "no discernable differences" isn't well defined. You could try "no discernable differences except the exact muscle signals sent to the arm," but I can pretty much guarantee you that won't be good enough: there will always be flurry of signals within the brain involved in figuring out how to move the hand before the actual signals are sent, for example. In fact, I'm reasonably sure you'll find different signals going to the motor cortex. So now you're somewhere upstream where decisions are made, yet without having found your dividing line yet.
I don't deny you might be able to find the dividing line with enough research, but once you found it, you'd need to look at it to see if there's a physicalist explanation for it. Your "no discernable differences" are irrelevant.
Comment by don provan — September 18, 2009 @ 9:14 pm
September 18th, 2009 at 10:34 pm
Why not? If it is about science you should be curious enough to want to see the research conducted and the ensuing results.
That's the idea.
No differences in neural activity related to the decision process which can be detected.
The point of looking for distinguishing neural activity is a search for a physical explanation for different mental processes. If they are not found a dualist perspective is very much strengthened.
Comment by Bradford — September 18, 2009 @ 10:34 pm
September 19th, 2009 at 1:08 pm
Because I think they're a figment of your imagination.
So we've gone from "no discernable differences" to "no discernable differences except the exact muscle signals sent to the arm", then past "no discernable differences except for what gets sent to the motor cortex", and now we're at "no differences that are related". Now we see the real problem, which is figuring out what is and isn't related to the decision. How do you propose to do that?
OK, so you seem to have given up on "no discernable differences" as actual support for dualism, but are now only suggesting that it can be used to figure out where to look for a physical explanation. That seems OK to me, although I doubt it's a new idea.
Nope, sorry. Once again you're on the wrong side of positive evidence. If no physical explanation is found found, then we will say "we must be missing something, but what?", not "and therefore the unsupportable hypothesis that Bradford wants must be the correct answer." Yes, we could be failing to detect a supernatural explanation such as your "mind", but we could just as well be failing to detect something physical.
Of course, if you had some actual definition of "mind" other than "that which fills the gap in our physical explanation", things would be different.
Comment by don provan — September 19, 2009 @ 1:08 pm
September 19th, 2009 at 1:36 pm
I think your OOL ideas are figments of the imagination but I do not object to research. Are you anti-science?
It's not easy and entails correlating neural activity to specific thought patterns. There is timing involved as decisions can take place within narrow windows of time. Challenging but not without benefits.
No. This is about causality. If physical conditions are invariant then something else must be causing observable behavioral distinctions. That something is the mind (i.e. thoughts) whose effects we can empirically gauge.
There is nothing supernatural about a mind. We all have thoughts. Don't be a denialist about something every human being experiences.
I've defined it on multiple occassions by referencing a capacity to generate results such as a solution to the specified math problem. All observable, quantifiable stuff.
Comment by Bradford — September 19, 2009 @ 1:36 pm
September 19th, 2009 at 2:26 pm
Fun stuff about brains:
This one shows the picture of a civil servant in France (note not ALL French civil servants have brains that look like this although this has not yet been proven because not ALL French civil servants have had the expensive scans!), whilst the second pic shows a normal brain:
http://tecfa-bio-news.blogspot.com/2009/03/petit-cerveau-mais-bien-dans-sa-vie.html
Here is an article with a pdf link to part of a Lancet report on the same case:
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2007-07/l-tbn071807.php
I do not mean to imply that these cases intimate that consciousness is not controlled by the brain – as most of you seem to believe – but they do intimate that there might be some gaping holes in current understanding about its role in intelligence. But in any case, they playfully take up Don's challenge in this regard viz. consciousness after being shot in the head etc.
It would be nice to interview the officer who saved his men by touching them after he was decapitated but for obvious reasons – including a) he has been dead since a few seconds after decapitation and b) without either functioning ears or mouth aforementioned interview would be hard to conduct – such an interview can never now take place so we will never know what was going through his headless 'mind' as he ran past the line of his amazed and grateful comrades shortly before giving up the ghost.
More seriously, these sorts of anecdotes and scientific snapshots/anomalies tend to confirm the classical Chinese medical theories that state such things as long term memory being stored in the heart, short term in the kidney, emotional in the stomach/spleen, will power being in the kidney (energy complex), intention in the stomach/spleen (energy complex) and so forth.
Which implies also that consciousness does not reside in one spot or can be viewed as a singular function derived from a particular event-driven physical process alone, or at least that physical processes are interdependently linked, in which case the medium of linkage is something to be further looked into even if it is difficult to directly 'observe' or 'measure'.
Comment by ash — September 19, 2009 @ 2:26 pm
September 19th, 2009 at 2:38 pm
I have no ideas of my own. I'm here entirely to point out the problems in your ideas. I'm sorry that you don't appreciate my help, but if you'd stop thinking that i'm here to foster some contrary notion, you might actually be able to focus on what's wrong with your ideas and fix them.
Comment by don provan — September 19, 2009 @ 2:38 pm
September 19th, 2009 at 2:57 pm
We're getting to the source of your problem.
You're not qualified to do this until you can get some thoughts of your own. Zombies are not good error detectors.
It would take a better man than you to "fix" the ideas in this thread.
Comment by Bradford — September 19, 2009 @ 2:57 pm
September 19th, 2009 at 6:44 pm
The picture's getting clearer!
Comment by Daniel Smith — September 19, 2009 @ 6:44 pm
September 20th, 2009 at 2:01 pm
Another couple of fun things around consciousness, this from the animal realm.
Nkisi the talking psychic parrot:
http://www.sheldrake.org/nkisi/nkisi1_text.html
http://www.sheldrake.org/nkisi/
And I lost the link about Nyota the talking ape.
In each case they evidence far more ability than mere mimicry or stimulus/response. More importantly with Nkisi in the psychic experiments whose results were thoroughly analysed with probability analysis etc. (and similar experiments have been done with humans with similar results), although personally I don't find investigating psychic stuff all that interesting since I'm not psychic myself, the inference from the scientific data gathered from the controlled experiments indicates that there is a way in which intelligence can be communicated/shared that is not dependent upon the usual senses. This in turn intimates that intelligence has certain seeming trans-local aspects.
One could argue – quite reasonably – that perhaps there is something invisible but nonetheless physical along the lines of a radio wave that we can pick up on even though as yet we have not found a way to detect it physically with instruments. Similar to how Tesla drove his Pierce Arrow without external power by tapping into the self-existing energy in the 'aether' as he put it. There is little question that he did this, but theoretically he did not publish the hows and whys for a variety of reasons, most to do with having been screwed too many times by powerful entrepreneurs.
That said, it is also possible that intelligence works in ways that are not purely bounded by physical form similar to how certain quantum experiments revealed the ability of various particles to react over distances simultaneously, suggesting there is a medium or 'field' that, although not physical in the sense of having particular components or chains of linked components, nevertheless exists on some level since there is a shared 'experience field' as it were in which the various particles were inter-related.
I continue to feel that one of the main underlying functions of intelligence in organic beings is that of helping to both create and perceive the space-time field which we all share. And many of the same elements in that particular intelligence are the same fundamentally as the underlying space-time continuum which, although it depends upon living beings for its existence, as it were, nevertheless has many qualities that are beyond individual being, i.e. are impersonal and to a certain extent 'objective'. One of those characteristics is that everything within the same spacetime continuum is linked naturally in that there is no separation in the field from centre to fringe, top to bottom etc; the entire thing is 'one'. So it is a bit like space/emptiness. Fundamental energy that arises from that space initially seems to come in the form of some sort of ying-yang style polarity, as also revealed by the smallest quantum particles whose name eludes me right now.
That polarity is a relationship of here-there which is the birthplace of spacetime, since space is where here and there (locality) exist and time is duration which is another way of saying 'change' or progression, something which happens as soon as you can navigate in space from one spot to the next.
We see this in the development of a foetus: first the single egg, then combined egg and sperm, then four, eight, sixteen and so on, but from the beginning – or very early on at least – 'it' has a sense of where the top, bottom, front, back etc. will be and although each forming cell shares the same DNA software instructions, cells that will end up in the nose do different things than those that are foot bone cells. That 'knowledge' of where they go and belong seems to derive from sort of of overall 'field awareness' that is communicated throughout the organism all the time, and yet which is clearly not a form of intelligence in any conscious sense any more than a butterfly consciously designs it intricate wing colorations to resemble an owl or whatever. In any case, this initial differentiation between top, bottom, front back (also evidenced in quark characteristics I gather), is part of this initial polarity-with-the-continuum dynamic.
Underneath/before energetic polarity which is the womb or placenta of the realm of form, you have the primordial space principle and I suspect this same principle, or perhaps we could also call it an element, is that which demonstrates seeming non-local characteristics both in the study of certain types of particle behaviour/connections, as well as in certain aspects of sentient intelligence which is 'tuned into' that same space element. Not so much tuned into, of course, simply that intelligence is that aspect of sentient intelligence in which the space element is most involved.
This sort of view would provide some basis for explaining how intelligent the 'design' quotient is in living systems, for example. Many studying these in depth (I gather only from reading since I have not done so myself unfortunately) have brought back reports that show the marvellous depth and intricacy of so much, from snowflakes to bacteria to sells etc. So many members of the animal kingdom live in physical containers that are veritable miracles of complexity, efficiency – genius level creations basically. Like the eye of the housefly, the tail of the peacock etc. etc.
Clearly it is not the intellectual prowess of the animal in question (we too lack sufficient intelligence to design our own bodies), and yet there is sufficient 'intelligence' to have created such bodies/beings, and I believe this is that aspect of those beings that is connected with the underlying continuum. Such connection has to exist since such beings dwell in the same continuum which itself is in touch, as it were, with all other inhabitants in the same continuum, or at least all the rules of engagement that exist.
Perhaps the continuum can be likened to a ball of dough; when you push in on one part and created a depression, the rest of the dough accomodates this new element (or creation) and at the same time the entire rest of the dough throughout changes a little bit, the entire thing happening simultaneously across the dough continuum. There is no conscious intelligence involved with this but there is consistent relationship throughout the continuum.
From spending time on this blog the past two months, I seem to be coming to the point of view that there is less 'wrong' with a purely physicalist/materialist approach than I had previously thought; however, there are clearly many levels of intelligence involved in how that approach is pursued and articulated.
Indeed, the entire thing boils down to how intelligent the analysis and discussion is. And there is no scientific method that on its own can ensure intelligence. So again we have the intelligence quotient which clearly IS in the mix/matrix, but which remains and illusive – if all-pervasive – element to pin down. To do so seems to require the presence of clear philosophical/logical quotients and I am not sure if the scientific method, as currently taught, has sufficiently included this as a sine qua non of the discipline.
Comment by ash — September 20, 2009 @ 2:01 pm