How do you come up with so much material to blog with?…

Daniel: Yes, but the mutation would never have arisen had its resulting function not been selected for, due to the survival and reproductive fitness it conferred.

Joy: ??? Are you telling me that you believe origins are in fact telic? Somehow, I am reluctant to buy that you really mean mutations occur because their resulting functions convey survival advantage and reproductive fitness. Because if that IS what you meant, you're promoting ID. So I'll go ahead and presume you've phrased yourself badly.

Oh, it's even more delicious than that! We're talking time-travel here. We're talking the future determining the past, we're talking effects being their own causes.

Surely, you've noticed how frequently 'moden evolutionary theorists' in a pinch resort to such reasoning?

Deuce: Nevermind, I see that by "arise", you mean an existing trait being fixed in a population.
Daniel: I'm not so sure, because biologists generally wouldn't use the term "arise" to describe the freak occurence of a defect or other mutation, they'd use it to describe that trait becoming commonplace for a species.
Yeah, I like the way that sounds - "occurence" of a trait, versus "arisal" of a trait.
Deuce: I think both are sloppy and imprecise, for the purposes of what we're trying to describe, which leads to fuzzy and imprecise thinking. Really, that use of the terms seems to me almost custom-made to cause equivocal thinking!

Bibgo! (As you surely know, having been around the block a time or two)

Sometimes, I wonder if the confusion isn't caused by materialists actually not being conscious.

Of course you don't *really* wonder that (it would be self-contradictory, after all).

The confusion is because 'materialists' are denying the thing they know to be true, the truth which is the foundation of all possible knowledge a person may have.

To be true to the "logic" of 'materialism,' they *must* deny the thing they know to be true. But, they cannot admit it. To admit that they are denying the thing they know to be true would be to affirm the thing they know to be true.

There is no way out for them — except to cease to be a 'materialist.' Or to attempt to brow-beat 'a-materialists' into silence.

'Materialism' is the ultimate irrationality. It is utterly impossible to have a rational argument with irrationality (yet we keep trying). It is utterly impossible for any argument you (or I) could possibly make to change the mind of a 'materialist' concerning 'materialism' — they already *know* the truth of your arguments; they are actively, consciously, intentionally denying the truth they already know.

There is nothing you can do, nothing you can say, that will free 'materialists' from their self-imposed delusion; they must themselves decide to free themselves. At best, you can hope that in attempting the impossible (that is, to have a rational argument with a 'materialist' about 'materialism') the "argument" — the utter irrationality of the 'materialist' position — will open the eyes of impressionable minds which are being swayed but haven't yet wholly committed to the seductions of 'materialism.' And, that's no small thing, after all.

Our starting assumption as scientists ought to be that on some level consciousness has to be an illusion.

Humphrey declares that our starting assumption as scientists ought to be that on some level consciousness has to be an illusion. I disagree.

Now, aside from the circularity of his total "argument," which you've already noted, when you analyze this one statement, you see that the assertion is that consciousness is both an illusion and not an illusion. This is, of course, both an illogical and an irrational assertion … but what's to be expected of an "argument" the purpose of which is to dispense with rationality?

Humphrey gives what he thinks is a rational reason for the starting assumption that "on some level consciousness has to be an illusion." He states:

The reason is obvious: If nothing in the physical world can have the features that consciousness seems to have, then consciousness cannot exist as a thing in the physical world.

The reason is not so obvious. Why should scientists believe that nothing in the physical world can have the features that consciousness seems to have? Should not the starting assumption be, that consciousness exists, that consciousness exists in the physical world, and that therefore there is something in the physical world that can have the features that consciousness seems to have? Why should that not be our starting assumption as scientists?

Let's look at the "obvious" reason a bit more closely:
"If nothing in the physical world can have the features that consciousness seems to have, then consciousness cannot exist as a thing in the physical world."
The statement appears, upon casual inspection, to be true, as far as it goes. That is, the statement appears to be a tautology (however one happens to be using 'thing'), it appears that it *must* be true, that it cannot be not-true. But, whether the statement *means* anything is another question entirely — and, of course, it is not at all up to the task to which Humphrey is attempting to put it. This is what Humphrey is attempting to assert as a logical truth:

"If nothing in the physical world can have the features that consciousness seems to have, then consciousness cannot exist as a thing in the physical world."
THEREFORE:
"Our starting assumption as scientists ought to be that on some level consciousness has to be an illusion."

But, of course, the THEREFORE does not follow from the IF-THEN. He left out the step in which he shows that it is indeed true that "nothing in the physical world [has] the features that consciousness seems to have." He left out the step in which he proves that he (and I, and you) do not exist and/or that he (and I, and you) do not possess the "feature" or property or characteristic or quality or attribute that we term 'consciousness.' Of course he left out that step; that step utterly impossible to prove: it can be "proven" only by self-contradiction — which is to say, cannot be proven true because it is logically false.

As Mung and others in this thread have pointed out, this "reasoning" is circular: he assumes the truth he concludes and justifies the assumption by the conclusion. (Moreover, as *everyone* immediately knows, the truth he assumes and concludes is not and cannot be actually true, for follows from self-contradiction.)

But, again, back to Humphrey's "obvious" reason:
"If nothing in the physical world can have the features that consciousness seems to have, then consciousness cannot exist as a thing in the physical world."
It seems clear to me that when he speaks of 'consciousness' existing or not "… as a thing in the physical world" he means as a physical thing, as a thing made of matter/energy; as an object rather than as a state or property (or "feature").

What I'm trying to bring to your attention is that his statement, his "obvious" reason, which seems upon casual inspection to at least be a truism, begins to fall apart upon closer examination.

But, of course, if 'consciousness' exists as an object, rather than being a state or property (or "feature"), then by definition "nothing in the physical world can have … consciousness" as a property (or "feature") — I think this unstated assertion is what we're supposed to get out of all this by supplying the assertion ourselves — though it does not follow that "nothing in the physical world can have the features that consciousness [if it were an object] seems to have." AND likewise, IF "[any]thing in the physical world can have … consciousness" as a property (or "feature"), then by definition 'consciousness' does not exist as an object, for it is a property/quality/characteristic/etc.

It seems clear to me that Humphrey expects those who read his "obvious" reason to do the mental gymnastics for themselves. That is, it seems clear to me that Humphrey expects those who read his "obvious" reason to turn "If nothing in the physical world can have the features that consciousness seems to have, then consciousness cannot exist as a thing in the physical world" into "If consciousness cannot exist as [an object] in the physical world, then nothing in the physical world can have the features that consciousness [is asserted] to have."

It seems clear to me that Humphrey's *real* syllogism (which is still illogical) is this:

"If consciousness cannot exist as [an object] in the physical world, then nothing in the physical world can have the features that consciousness [is asserted] to have."
It is self-evidently true (being true-by-definition) that "consciousness cannot exist as [an object] in the physical world,"
THEREFORE:
"nothing in the physical world can have the features that consciousness [is asserted] to have,"
THEREFORE:
"Our starting assumption as scientists ought to be that on some level consciousness has to be an illusion."

But, *who* has ever claimed that 'consciousness' exists as an object, rather than being a state or property (or "feature")? (And why would anyone pay any attention to such a fool?)

Humphrey:

"¦if we were to come across an impossible to create object "¦ we would have to conclude that it had been created supernaturally.

I disagree. We would have to conclude that it was not an impossible to create object.

Our starting assumption as scientists ought to be that on some level consciousness has to be an illusion.

Humphrey declares that our starting assumption as scientists ought to be that on some level consciousness has to be an illusion. I disagree.

First, what about non-scientists? Should the starting assumption of non-scientists be different? If so, why should the starting assumption of scientists be any different from the starting assumption of the non-scientist? Do scientists live in a different reality from the rest of us?

Humphrey gives what he thinks is a rational reason for the starting assumption that "on some level consciousness has to be an illusion." He states:

The reason is obvious: If nothing in the physical world can have the features that consciousness seems to have, then consciousness cannot exist as a thing in the physical world.

The reason is not so obvious. Why should scientists believe that nothing in the physical world can have the features that consciousness seems to have? Should not the starting assumption be, that consciousness exists, that consciousness exists in the physical world, and that therefore there is something in the physical world that can have the features that consciousness seems to have? Why should that not be our starting assumption as scientists?

Is there any other field of science which would deny that the features of something that exists in the physical world could actually exist in the physical world, and therefore the thing which has those features must be an illusion? Or is this strange mode of thinking peculiar to Humphrey's own field?

Humphrey's argument is flawed from the beginning. He has not rationally justified his starting assumption and actually wants to assume that which he desires to prove. His argument is fallicious.

As an aside, how is it that science can justify what "ougth" to be the case?

So while we should concede that as conscious subjects we do have a valid experience of there being something in our minds that the rules of the physical universe doesn't apply to, this has to be all it is - the experience of something in our minds."

More unintelligible "reasoning."

If, as conscious subjects, we have a valid experience of something in our minds, why would we assume, think, or believe that these valid experiences are something that "the rules of the physical universe doesn't apply to?" Humphrey gives no rational justification for this claim and I can think of no good reason to accept that it is true. None at all.

…biologists generally wouldn't use the term "arise" to describe the freak occurence of a defect or other mutation, they'd use it to describe that trait becoming commonplace for a species.

Joy:

You know, I find myself getting irritated every time you guys pull this sleight-of-mind to try and convince us that origin is the same thing as selection.

Having now come full circle.

How do new traits arise?

By being spread in a population by the forces of drift and selection.

How do new traits originate?

Sure you can - if those people aren't providing evidence to back up their claims. Science isn't some profession where anyone's point of view automatically has weight to it just because it sounds neat.

How do "you" keep researchers' points of view out of science? [slaps forehead] Oy!

Phenomenon: Wave-particle duality.
Investigation: A century's worth of polarized light going through slitted targets, 70+ years' worth of smashed atoms.
Finding: We always observe that which we decide to measure, we never observe the opposite - but equally weighted - probability.
Conclusion: 1. Consciousness collapses wave-particle superpositions [Copenhagen]. 2. Wavefunctions do not collapse, superpositions generate alternative universes [Many Worlds].

The point of view of the researcher/theorist is reflected by the conclusions s/he reaches, though his/her point of view existed prior to the project and dictates its design, thus pre-determines the conclusion drawn. Just as the choice of *what* to measure pre-determines the form of that which is measured.

What the "Chief Science" believes it knows at this point in time: Reality is a point of view. There is evidence that reality is 'real', and an equal amount of evidence that it's not. Tegmark claims that it's not - his point of view. Penrose claims that it is - his point of view. Which point of view will you claim has no 'weight' and must not be allowed in science?

You can't keep people's individual points of view out of science, whatever those points of view are.

Sure you can - if those people aren't providing evidence to back up their claims. Science isn't some profession where anyone's point of view automatically has weight to it just because it sounds neat.

1. The structures in question perform a function, which, if it functions well for an activity that aids reproductive success, it is conserved/selected for/incorporated into the pre-existing design. It doesn't "serve" anyone's aims.

"…an activity that aids reproductive success." Who's goal is that? You'd say nobody's, but I'd laugh at the sheer amount of biodiversity, the rock-history demonstrating it has been thus for 500 million years, and the obvious directionality of this on-stage march of life forms. To each his/her/its own, I always say.

2. Um, actually, I'm trying to keep theism (or atheism) out of science. Thank the IDers for trying to return biology to the days of Paley.

Who's this "Paley?" [yes, I'm kidding. An interesting thinker.]. You can't keep people's individual points of view out of science, whatever those points of view are. I can't even imagine why you'd bother to try. Maybe when the AI guys get whatever it is they're aiming for - and they most certainly are aiming for something, so this is 'Intelligent Design' Deluxe - you'll find there's no longer a need to fight about it. Or maybe the theologians will 'win' and it'll be at least 200 years before y'all are trying to sell consciousness-in-a-box again. Personally, I hope television has gone the way of the dinosaur by then… §;o)