http://www.youtube.com/watch?v...

Who cares about your science?

Scientists, science teachers, etc.

Seems like a fair question. One must look at both Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, to find the official accounts on their sciences. Otherwise, we note that science is intelligently designed, but the said intelligent designer goes undeclared making Dembski smile. One must set the standard for debate, with the official takes on an official science that comes with real intelligent designers. Otherwise we fall back on my science, and your science. And that leaves Wiki grasphing at straws.

My science is the same science as that of all other scientists. Yes, it is intelligently designed. So what? I have no idea what your point is.

My science has three levels of error recognition, which is an improvement over Popper's science that only has one level for inductive errors.

I will stick with real science, as done by scientists. I think it has achieved a lot. If you think it has missed errors that your science would have caught, feel free to give an example. Otherwise, why should anyone give a fig about your science?

Your science, how ever you define it to be, finds itself consistent with 4 of 5 tenets of scientific materialism.

Again, so what?

There is a big difference between your science, and my science. And I say this without judgment, I am only disclosing that which has become self evident.

Could you list the tenets of your science then? Or point me to the post where you did that?

Seems like a fair question. One must look at both Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, to find the official accounts on their sciences. Otherwise, we note that science is intelligently designed, but the said intelligent designer goes undeclared making Dembski smile. One must set the standard for debate, with the official takes on an official science that comes with real intelligent designers. Otherwise we fall back on my science, and your science. And that leaves Wiki grasphing at straws.

My science has three levels of error recognition, which is an improvement over Popper's science that only has one level for inductive errors.

Your science, how ever you define it to be, finds itself consistent with 4 of 5 tenets of scientific materialism.

There is a big difference between your science, and my science. And I say this without judgment, I am only disclosing that which has become self evident.

That inductive skepticism is separated from Popper's science by Popper's demarcation; I was not saying that Popper's science rejects the truth of inductive skepticism. Indeed, Popper accepted Hume's inductive skepticisim, and used it to design his falsification principle.

Pixe, Popper's falsification only rejects wayward induction, the rest of falsification is only a demarcation. To say that Popper's criterion rejects metaphysical claims by demarcation is NOT to say that those metaphysical claims are false, or true. The demarcation is only saying that the metaphysical claim is separated from Popper's science.

It is strange how science has done so much then…

Hume's inductive skepticism is a metaphysical claim, one that Hume thought that he deduced. Stove tells us that Popper accepted inductive skepticism, so Popper developed the perfect system to falsify induction. Popper's science assumes Hume's inductive skepticism even as inductive skepticism (with all other metaphysical claims) is separated from Popper's science by demarcation. Nevertheless, inductive skepticism is the operative hypothesis within Popper's science. Therefore, in the way that really matters, the treatment of inductive skepticism as a truth claim, we find that Popper's science accepts inductive skepticism as a true statement. Gone now is the said "rejection," but note that rejection is in quotations. Rejection could mean the simple demarcation I noted in the past, but here the intended meaning points to Popper's agreement with Hume. So inductive skepticism provides a very good example of something Popper's science cannot, and did not, reject.

Then forget Popper's science, and talk about real science. In real science, inductive skepticism cannot be falsified. Therefore inductive skepticism is rejected from real science. I think the rest of your post is therefore irrelevant.

Perhaps I should have been clearer that I am arguing about real science, not Popper's science.

Hume's inductive skepticism is a metaphysical claim, one that Hume thought that he deduced. Stove tells us that Popper accepted inductive skepticism, so Popper developed the perfect system to falsify induction. Popper's science assumes Hume's inductive skepticism even as inductive skepticism (with all other metaphysical claims) is separated from Popper's science by demarcation. Nevertheless, inductive skepticism is the operative hypothesis within Popper's science. Therefore, in the way that really matters, the treatment of inductive skepticism as a truth claim, we find that Popper's science accepts inductive skepticism as a true statement. Gone now is the said "rejection," but note that rejection is in quotations. Rejection could mean the simple demarcation I noted in the past, but here the intended meaning points to Popper's agreement with Hume. So inductive skepticism provides a very good example of something Popper's science cannot, and did not, reject.

To reject inductive skepticism as a truth claim we need something other than the simple demarcation. This is a two step rejection in my view:

(1) First note that inductive skepticism does not follow from deduction; Stove noted this. Therefore, Hume's deduction failed. This would be enough to show inductive skepticism false if the acceptance of inductive skepticism were merely a wayward deductive claim. However, it is possible that inductive skepticism is accepted as a stand alone, a statement of faith, and so we need to look for something extra to reject inductive skepticism.

(2) Stove notes that inductive thinking can be supported in a positive sense. First we must disclose our belief in inductive skepticism, discovered and deduced to be a stand alone, and this starts emotional error recognition. The truth of induction comes to us starkly. Deduction comes with beginning prepositions, most of which can only be provided by inductive thinking. Bayesian statistics provide much positive support for a belief in inductive thinking. Natural selection is a claim that genes act inductively, and so it is possible for the favored genes to continue their favor in the future where we find adaptations. And Popper's science, ever angry of induction, could not continue its work if inductive hypotheses were removed from their valuable service. In the face of this onslaught, what happens to our full disclosure, stated as Hume's inductive skepticism? One day we find the emotions to see inductive skepticism for what it is: merely a fancy belief that does not relate to broad reality. That is, inductive skepticism falls because induction is self evident as revealed by emotional error recognition.

Pixie, you are trying to claim that inductive error recognition is enough to catch deductive errors, and other emotional errors, and it is not.

No, I am not claiming that at all. Are you reading my posts?

Your arguments are based on an equivocation that you fail to correct, even as I point it out.

No there are not, as I pointed out.

Inductive skepticism being rejected from Popper's science …

What I am saying is that this contradicts what you said previously, and that you do not have the honesty to admit it.

…says only that metaphysical beliefs are excluded from consideration in Popper's science;

That would seem a good thing to me.

… this rejection says nothing about the truth, or falsity, of the belief.

Agreed.

But in the case of inductive skepticism you were previously using that as an example of something that Popper' falsification fails us, when the truth is that inductive skepticism should be rejected, and that is what Popper' falsification does. Inductive skepticism is actually an example of Popper' falsification getting it right!

In fact, to unravel inductive skepticism we need to introduce both deductive error recognition and emotional error recognition. The blind application of Popper's falsification principle to exclude from consideration the non-inductive belief statements leads to the concealment of errors, rather than their revelation. And so deductive and emotional error recognition remain important, and they are beyond Popper's science.

Why? I have rejected inductive skepticism because it fails Popper' falsification. You have rejected it for other reasons. We both agree we should reject it. Your argument seems to come down to whining that I reject inductive skepticism for what you consider the wrong reason, even though you agree it should be rejected.

I cannot help but think your argument would have more substance if you could find an example of something Popper' falsification fails to reject, but is demonstratably false. Only then can we look at how Popper' falsification fails, and what errors it has concealed by doing so. And whether that is sufficiently god grounds for scrapping it. To try to use as an example a claim that both sides agree is is ludicous.

You are claiming that rejecting inductive skepticism from Popper's science is the same as rejecting inductive skepticism as a truth statement;…

You are very keen to inform me what I believe. Actually, I am not claiming that.

… but your claim is false, and therefore you are unable to see your own deductive error given your attachment to an idealistic concept of science.

Those straw men are so easy to know down!

And you have found a need to disclose 4 of 5 tenets that underwrite scientific materialism.

I will spin that the other way. Those four tenets of the caricature of this vague thing you label "scientific materialism" happen to coincide with the well-known tenets of science.

It is important to remember that Popper's philosophy emerged from the Vienna school of logical positivism.

No it is not. Popper's falsification stands and falls on its own merit. We do we need to know its historical roots to judge its value?

I have also maintained that ID is not religion.

Tell that to William Dembski:

"Intelligent design is just the Logos theology of John's Gospel restated in the idiom of information theory,"

-William Dembski

FWIW, I sort of agree with you that ID is not religion. More precisely it is a stalking horse for religion.

A stalking horse is someone or something whose role is to become the focal point for, or the initiator of, a debate or challenge. In reality, however, their leadership role may be an illusion, and the stalking horse is really working to promote a challenge or debate that will benefit a third party whose identity remains a secret.

It was very clear in the Wedge Document what the purpose of ID was. You could argue that Dembski and the Discovery Institute's ID is not your ID, but in that case you're trying to coopt a fairly established term.