Consider for example the following three propositions:
A. Something has always existed and is the cause of our present existence.
B. Scientific evidence suggests that this alway existing something transcends our present finite conception of space, time and the universe.
C. It is logically possible that whatever it is that transcends and caused our universe is intelligent.
In summary, it is entirely reasonable to believe our present universe was caused by a transcendant intelligence.
This is not a proof. It is only an argument for reasonableness.

Because of his irreligion, Dawkins might be sent to the inner circles of Hell. How so? In his "Inferno" Dante proposes the pagan's (philosophers)afterlife is spent in "Limbo" because they at least believed in the immortality of the soul. (whew, my handle is platolives) But Epicurius, which did not believe in the soul's immortality is sent right to the 6th inner circle of hell. Can we surmise Dawkin"s stance is similar to Epicurius'? If he is a Platonist he would understand the immaterial attribite of presriptive information and especially that information is something other than itself. (Because it exists for the sake of something else, some goal or end)(See "The Enlightenment: The Making of the New Paganism" by Peter Gay, Norton Press.)

My version of that is that there is a perfect ontological proof that is capable of convincing anyone that God exists.

Why ought we to think that a perfect proof of anything whatever must be such that it be capable of convincing anyone of what it proves?

Ontological perfection simply deals with ontological status, not with any putative unrestricted epistemic causal potential of arguments invoking it. Indeed, Aquinas' criticism of the ontological argument rested on his view that God's nature—that is, the nature of ontological perfection (as against the fact of its existence)— could not be intellectually grasped by finite minds.

One could put this by saying that the ontological argument invites us to think of God, and if we then hypothesize that the object of this thought doesn't exist, it tells us that we have not in fact succeeded in thinking of God. Whereas Aquinas tells us that we systematically can't form an adequate thought of God, the ontological argument tells us that if we could, then we'd understand that God must exist.

Anyhow, defining 'perfect' in this context to include 'having the property of being capable of convincing anyone' seems too strong as a definition given the likelihood of the existence of incorrigible irrationality, stupidity, self-deception, intellectual pride, etc.

only that which can be emperically demonstrated is a rational postion.

Unfortunately for Dawkins & Co., this proposition cannot itself be empirically demonstrated.

The strongest claim being made by the likes of PZ Myers or Richard Dawkins is that theists do not shine the harsh light of rational thinking on their theism.

I dont think this is where they are coming from. My take is that their core posiion is that only that which can be emperically demonstrated is a rational postion.

Vivid

Leaving the peculiarities of Godel's mental health to one side, what about Dummett, who held the position of Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford for 13 years quite recently. Or Liebniz. Or Newton. Or Pascal. Or Galileo. Or Swinburne. Or Plantinga. Or van Fraassen. Or Miler. Etc. Can any of these folks constitute a counter-example that would show that the argument-form

1. All theists are irrational
2. Person X is a theist.
Ergo, Person X is irrational

is unsound because its major premise is false?

I can't believe there's a discussion of an ontological proof, and no one's mentioned the greatest jelly donut yet.

grendelkhan,

My version of that is that there is a perfect ontological proof that is capable of convincing anyone that God exists. There has to be one; if it didn't exist, it wouldn't be perfect. I wonder why noone's found it yet.

I was saving that for later, to spice up the thread, but you preempted me by deploying the jelly donut.

And the children of those Nazi supporters could be monitoring this blog, deciding who to snuff out next.

You are stretching the idea far beyond its breaking point. Avoiding the fact that Godel could have had very good reason to suspect there were some who sought to kill him isn't the same as showing he was being irrational; and exponentially exaggerating a possible rationale into sheer foolishness isn't going to win over many to your side. Sorry.

Douglas, Gödel starved himself to death to avoid being poisoned. Does that not strike you as paranoid, or at the very least, somewhat irrational?

Yes. But perhaps by that point, he preferred to die than endure the torment of fear of being poisoned. At least in starving himself to death, he was in control. Note, though, keith, that I am not arguing that there were people out to kill him, nor that his reaction to perceived malice towards him was the most rational behavior in which he could have engaged. I am merely trying to point out that, given his unique circumstances, his behavior wasn't necessarily all that irrational.

We all know that when you talk about the big bang, you are making arguments for the existence of God.

Only if you take a remarkably open-minded position on what is meant by "God". For instance, please explain to me what the Big Bang has to do with (a) forgiving sins, (b) defining marriage, (c) establishing morality, (d) listening to prayers, (e) smiting the unworthy, and (f) creating a place of eternal torment for those who violated the rules defined back in (c).

You're left with essentially a really weak kind of deism, there, and deism hasn't been in style since the early nineteenth century. Plus, you can't get any exciting political ramifications out of deism.