As a Scot, I am used to, and am not at all offended by, the stereotype of Scots as being tightfisted. Let me assure you all that it's only those miserly bastards from Edinburgh and especially Aberdonians who deserve that epithet.

I used to live and work in Edinburgh. Most of my colleagues at uni were English though (why do you suppose that is?), and not tightfisted at all. So you might be right. We did spend a lot on 'drink' and used to say 'eating is cheating'. I had a great time there except for the wind and rain.

I apologize unreservedly to all who found it so.

As a Scot, I am used to, and am not at all offended by, the stereotype of Scots as being tightfisted. Let me assure you all that it's only those miserly bastards from Edinburgh and especially Aberdonians who deserve that epithet. We Glaswegians hold money in contempt and can't wait to get rid of it as soon as we have any—provided it's spent on 'drink'.

I don't have time this weekend for more debate but I knew I'd written a post recently that more clearly shows that, contrary to mtraven's flight of fancy, I am not the born-again empiricist fundamentalist he portrayed me as being. It's this one.

stunney: There are three possibilities open to materialists, as I've already explained:

1) Materialists can commit the genetic fallacy. 2) Materialists can deny that there are any objective moral facts. Or 3) Materialists can be inconsistent.

It may be impossible to fairly evaluate this claim due to confusion with the various terms, in particular, "objective". I'm sure most materialists would reject the concept of "objective moral facts", but would agree that humans have a well-developed moral sense as part of a repertoire of cultural adaptations.

(The statement I originally argued against used the phrase "cognitive validity" rather than "objective". Even then, it took a while to determine that stunney agreed that the belief that someone has a pain is "cognitively valid".)

Science is not really "grounded in human experience". Yes, we start from human observation, but build from there into theoretical structures that are very much removed from bare experience. "Human experience" tells us that the earth is flat, the sun moves around the earth, that animal species are separate and unchanging, objects are solid, and many other things that turn out to be wrong once we investigate further.

All systems of human belief start with human experience and go on from there to build conceptual edifices. The difference between science and other kinds of human thought is that with science we conduct experiments to test and falsify our conceptual edifices.

Someone who conducts and reads about these experiments and tests is doing science, and someone who refuses to is engaged in dogma-building.

grendelkhan: I've asked you before, and I ask again: how did you come to be aware of this objective morality, what does it consist of, and how do you know that you're right?

stunney: How does anyone become aware of any objective truth, what it consists of, and how does anyone know they're right?

In general, by rational reflection upon ineluctable experiences.

This is another example of where the differing meanings of "objective" leads to conflation. Most people read "objective" as the antonym of "subjective". Yet, you claim that you find objective truth in rational reflection, a subjective process. In science, objectivity refers to the consistency of empirical observations among different observers in similar situations.

It would behoove you to choose your words in such a way to avoid this conflation, perhaps even explaining how you are using certain words.

stunney: Write an article whose conclusion is that there are no objective truths in mathematics because mathematicians use axioms in proving their theorems.

Zachriel: In mathematics, axioms are not objective, but assumed. They are considered *arbitrary*. Theorems are proven from axioms.

stunney: And what's hilarious is that I just said that mathematicians use axioms in proving their theorems.

Yet, you say that you "take" certain moral precepts as axiomatic. Hence, they are not derived (theorems), but assumed (axiomatic). Even if we were to use the word "objective" to refer to the logical process of deriving theorems, this usage does not apply to axioms. In mathematics, axioms are *arbitrary*.

You are also still conflating different uses of the word "objectivity". You could simply clarify your terminology by offering clear definitions. But after repeated requests, you continue to refuse to do so.

objectivity, of, relating to, or being an object , phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers

stunney: You are implying that morality is a matter of human predilections. I think this is both false and explanatorily vacuous.

You have simply ignored my argument and repeated yours. People do not exhibit random behavior. There are discernable patterns with regards to human concepts of morality that can be harnessed to help explain human cultural adaptation, including the complexities of morality and ethical systems.

stunney: In other words, it was taking you too long to grasp the fact that I know, and expect other people to know, that science doesn't prescribe moral principles or values and that the latter do not reduce to scientific statements.

I reread the exchange. I'm fairly certain no one thinks that you believe science prescribes moral principles. I clearly stated my own position from the beginning.

That you have presented a false dichotomy is also evident. You have claimed that a materialist is either committing a genetic fallacy by investigating the origins of morality, or they must deny that moral beliefs have any real cognitive validity.

You have stated that the belief that one is in pain is cognitively valid. Such a pain could be a phantom pain, spiritual anguish or pangs of conscience. Those pangs of conscience are an aspect of the moral sense. Hence, it is possible for a materialist to find that moral beliefs have cognitive validity. They can simultaneously study the evolutionary reasons why people experience pain; pain when they hurt themselves, pain when someone they love dies, and pain when they have betrayed a trust.

No, it isn't. Materialism is a form of monism. It's theists who seem to have a problem with oneness, since they are metaphysical dualists.

There are some theists who are dualists, and many others who are monists.

I would not call myself a "theist" per se, but I am also a monist, of idealist stripe. I would say that "God" is just another word for the fundamental Oneness that is everything. The debate between atheists and non-atheists is whether that Oneness is fundamentally "dead matter" (that ends up looking more and more like something mental as you go into quantum mechanics) or more like mind and consciousness.

I don't know how to respond to this, you seem very confused about the nature of physics, both quantum and classical.

You don't like my terminology, but it does fit the dictionary definition of holism. If you have a specific item that you think I am confused about, let me know.

Molecular machines are mostly driven by electromagnetic forces, which are just as "holistic" as gravity.

You are right, I am using holism in a way that is confusing you. Holism describes properties of a system that go beyond that of the component parts. In the case of quantum mechanics and the basic forces of nature, it is shown that the notion of "component parts" is itself false and illusionary, and that the whole system is all that is real. I also use holism to refer to additional organizing principles which you believe do not exist, and this is causing you confusion.

Both fit the dictionary definition for holism, but I should distinguish between the holism of the known physical fields and the holisms under dispute that organize protein folding, epigenesis, organism behavior and other higher-level holons, since people like you are in agreement with the holistic behaviors demonstrated by quantum mechanics and gravity, and in disagreement about holistic behaviors that organize higher-level systems. I am sorry for using terminology in a way that is confusing to you.

Probably a better approach for me to use would be to refer to the "agreed-upon holisms" of quantum mechanics and gravity and the "disputed holisms" that organize higher-level holon behavior.

In any event, the models of the agreed on holisms and disputed holisms all look similar in that they are non-local and field-like, and not much at all like the contact mechanics of molecular machines which are usually viewed similarly to human engineering machines. Of course, even human-engineered machines use electromagnetic fields and the like, but the typical "mental model" is much more of a contact mechanics, protein into receptor vision of how morphogenesis happens (since it is clear that electromagnetic fields in themselves will never account for the kinds of morphogenesis we see in nature).

And what's hilarious is that I just said that mathematicians use axioms in proving their theorems. You even quote me. To which you inanely replied by stating that theorems are proven from axioms.

It would be a bit like me saying that some Germans drink beer, and having you reply, no, beer is drunk by some Germans.

Actually, it would properly be like you saying that some Germans use beer for drinking (with the reply as you outlined). See, I'm good for something around here.

Are you a mid-Westerner by any chance?

I've been fairly silent about your namecalling for a while, but this is simply ridiculous. It's one thing when you resort to psychoanalyzing materialists for their own worldview (as though materialists aren't sincere in their efforts to find truth); it's another when you use prejudicial stereotyping (even in jest, which would be a tiny bit better) to insult people. Grow up.

stunney is confused about science, among other things:

You're the confused one. Which is not surprising since materialists can't help being confused given how incoherent materialism is.

Science is not really "grounded in human experience". Yes, we start from human observation, but build from there into theoretical structures that are very much removed from bare experience.

This is fun to watch.

I go on since the day I got here about the irreducibility of mathematical reason to matter or to any act of physical observation. I go on about the fact that the concept of empirical observation presupposes the concept of a rational mind to do the observing. And now you're telling me that because I go on about the fact that the experience of conscience is even more liable to generate a particular moral belief than observational experiences are liable to generate beliefs about evolutionary science, suddenly I'm too zealous an empiricist? Hahahaha. Er, hahaha.:lol:

You guys are a fucking scream. As in, an orgasmic yell.

Have a nice holiday weekend.:cool:

I'm not quite sure what you mean by a "fundamental human experience".

Well, as they say in New York:

Buddy, if you don't know, I can't explain it to ya.

P6. If the fundamental human experience referred to in P5 is illusory, then no fundamental human experience can be taken as epistemically sound.

raevmo:
Why not?

Because a world in which Berkeleyan idealism is true is much more readily conceivable than a world in which burning human children for fun is not immoral.

Or, using the customary philosophical idiom: there is a possible world in which Berkeleyan idealism is true; but there is no possible world in which burning human children for fun is not morally wrong.

Alternatively, 'Matter exists' is not a necessary truth. 'Burning human children for fun is immoral' is a necessary truth.

Zachriel wrote:

stunney: Write an article whose conclusion is that there are no objective truths in mathematics because mathematicians use axioms in proving their theorems.

Z
In mathematics, axioms are not objective, but assumed. They are considered *arbitrary*. Theorems are proven from axioms.

Yes, I know that.

And what's hilarious is that I just said that mathematicians use axioms in proving their theorems. You even quote me. To which you inanely replied by stating that theorems are proven from axioms.

It would be a bit like me saying that some Germans drink beer, and having you reply, no, beer is drunk by some Germans.:roll:

And I went on to say that if you think that fact about the need for axioms undermines the objectivity of mathematics, you should probably alert mathematicians, lest any bridges 'n' stuff fall down. It would be on your conscience otherwise.

That is not necessarily so. E.g., A naturalist can reasonably believe that moral beliefs have validity based in *intrinsic human nature*. In fact, science points to exactly those sorts of intrinsic moral predilections to help explain primate behavior, including humans.

As I've pointed out before:

You are implying that morality is a matter of human predilections. I think this is both false and explanatorily vacuous. Why? Because humanity also has a well known predilection for immoral behavior. Hence a) appealing to human predilection does nothing to distinguish moral from immoral behavior; and b) it explains nothing, because whatever humans do can be attributed to human predilections. You remember, the old falsifiable hypothesis that makes specific empirical predictions Thingie? 'Course you do!

Zachriel: Science doesn't determine the correctness of a moral view; it only describes it.

stunney: I didn't count up the number of posts it took you to get there, but it was too many.

Z
How many is too many? Is one too many? How about my very first post; my very first declarative sentence on this thread. "No."

Er, you missed out a bit. This bit:

"That last question was rhetorical…"

Do you know what a rhetorical question is? Apparently not, because when I posed it originally, you answered it right away.

You're not supposed to do that with rhetorical questions, and I was ironically observing the fact that it was taking you forever to cotton on to the fact. But as usual, I was a bit too subtle and was also as usual, amused that it was still whooshing right over that (allegedly) large-brain container of yours.

In other words, it was taking you too long to grasp the fact that I know, and expect other people to know, that science doesn't prescribe moral principles or values and that the latter do not reduce to scientific statements. Indeed, in the original post, I had just pointed out that the 20th century was the most scientifically advanced, the bloodiest, and the most polluted in human history. Therefore science per se is not going to make the world a better place. Instead of letting that obvious fact be the obvious fact that it is, you chose to 'teach' me that, no, science does not determine correct moral beliefs, etc.
You were 'teaching' me the very point I had just made using the rhetorical question "Did science tell you why?"

Are you a mid-Westerner by any chance?

You had asserted that materialists were either committing a genetic fallacy or claiming that moral beliefs lack cognitive validity. That is not necessarily so. E.g., A naturalist can reasonably believe that moral beliefs have validity based in *intrinsic human nature*. In fact, science points to exactly those sorts of intrinsic moral predilections to help explain primate behavior, including humans.

There are three possibilities open to materialists, as I've already explained:

1) Materialists can commit the genetic fallacy. 2) Materialists can deny that there are any objective moral facts. Or 3) Materialists can be inconsistent.

If materialists believe that certain moral beliefs are objectively correct, then they believe that there are objectively correct moral propositions. But if there are such propositions, then materialism itself must be false, since the objective validity of those propositions isn't a material object, nor a material fact, nor a component of any complete and true physical description of the world. And that's because validity is an irreducibly normative property, not a property of matter.