Mark Frank Says:…There is a fact/value distinction. You can't deduce an "ought" from an "is".

Quite right. Which is one reason why a scientific study of evolution can never draw a moral conclusion, and is therefore morally sterile. You cannot pull "ought" into the conclusion where it did not exist in any of the premises.

This also shows why it is pointless to suggest reason as an alternative to replace faith. There is no line of applicable reasoning that can stand without axioms — propositions accepted without proof. In particular, to draw moral conclusions, there must exist moral axioms.

The book "The Abolition of Man" by C.S.Lewis touches on all these matters. Highly recommended to anyone interested in this topic.

Regarding evolution, since evolution is obligated to account for all manner of behaviors of the creatures it produces, it can hardly say that any of those behaviors produced and sustained over the centuries is "wrong". They are (supposedly) all the product of the same unguided process. Even extinction is not the same thing as saying something was morally "wrong". Evolution is mute with regard to the question of morality.

So the problem you raise is not peculiar to moral statements or statements about other minds. And, of course, it has been confusing philosophers for centuries.

But how does faith solve it?

Oh, I don't think faith does 'solve' it; nor do I think it's something that needs 'solving'. Which is why I never said faith 'solved' it.

That, indeed, is the point I was making: faith is epistemically unavoidable; but that fact does not entail irrationality.

Harris was claiming that beliefs based ultimately on faith are ipso facto irrational. I argued against Harris by saying that Harris's own belief in the normativity for human thought and action of reason and morality ultimately is not provably true or provably warranted either logically or empirically. And given how he and you were defining faith, such a belief would ultimately rest on faith.

If you think 'willingness to play certain Wittgensteinian language-games' is a preferable term to 'faith', that's fine. Go ahead and call it that. But the substance is really the same. We used to call it Wittgensteinian fideism.

Logic and evidence are what we mean by a justification for a statement.

So where does evolutionary naturalism fit into this? Nowhere. The rules of logic and evidence would hold even if there were no living creature in the universe.

What the rules of logic and evidence are is a matter of great dispute among humans.

But even if there were a solid human consensus on such matters, this consensus would be species-specific. We would, given evolutionary naturalism, have no rational ground for believing that human cognition, and hence human conceptions of logic and evidence, was the best, or even especially good, as forms of cognition go.

Given EN, we have no reason to think that in the nearest 100 million galaxies, there aren't, say, 64,189 species of life that are as superior from a cognitive point of view to us, as we take ourselves to be in comparison with, say, cats.

Indeed, just the last 200 years of human civilization has brought about (so we believe) astonishing advances in human knowledge. But given EN, we would have no warrant for thinking that the last 200 years of human civilization was particularly special as regards the development of cognitive power in our local galaxy cluster. In fact, given EN (and basic biological and cosmological science), we'd have reason to suppose that it wasn't special at all.

Of course, deep down, physicists don't really believe any such thing. Deep down, they really believe in the cognitive 'specialness' of the last 200 years or so of human scientific findings, no matter how improbable it is, on an EN perspective, that human science since 1807 is particularly good, cognitively speaking.

You wrote

Hence belief in reason and morality ultimately is based on faith. What is even more to the point, evolutionary naturalism holds that both are the results of unintentional material forces"”-the same mechanisms that generated all life-forms on the planet. We thus have no rational basis, given EN, that our belief in reason and morality is any more warranted than a 'belief in', say, the 'cognitive states' of bats or bees or snakes or plankton or fruitflies or whatever may happen to be the most reproductively successful species to date since life first began on our planet.

I am going to have a go at responding. But please can we do this on the basis of mutual respect? Also "“ I apologise for the length. It is a complex subject and I don't have the time to write it concisely.

You are talking about the justification for statements about right and wrong (and statements about other minds "“ but this is long enough without getting those). You are right that whatever basis we choose to justify these statements, someone can always insist that the justification needs justifying and eventually you will come to a point where you can go no further. For example, suppose I say "slavery is wrong because it is wrong to restrict someone's freedom". Someone could reply "yes but why is it wrong to restrict someone's freedom?" And eventually you are going to come to a point where one person says "well I am sorry I just think that's wrong". In fact you can use this technique on any statement - not just the difficult ones like moral statements and other minds. Imagine this short dialogue:

A: The sun is shining
B: How do you justify that assertion?
A: I can see it is shining
B: How do you know that what you think you see is actually happening?
A: In the past on almost every occasion I think I see something it has turned out to be true
B: But just because that is happened in the past why should it happen in the future?

And you are rapidly into the problem of induction.

So the problem you raise is not peculiar to moral statements or statements about other minds. And, of course, it has been confusing philosophers for centuries.

But how does faith solve it? All it does it add one more couplet to the dialogue above.

A: Because I have faith that what has happened in the past will happen in the future
B: But how do you know that it will happen just because you have faith in it?

You use the word rational a lot. I think you are looking for a rational justification of logic and evidence which, to avoid circularity, is not itself logic and evidence (if this is twisting your words please say so - I am trying my best). However, to me rational means in accord with the rules of logic and evidence. So any other sort of justification could not be rational. Maybe you can help me here?

There is one school of philosophical thought that says that logical statements (e.g. the square root of 4 is 2) and fundamental laws of evidence (e.g. if something has always happened before that is a good reason for supposing it will happen again) are fundamental and need no further justification. I belong to that school. Logic and evidence are what we mean by a justification for a statement.

So where does evolutionary naturalism fit into this? Nowhere. The rules of logic and evidence would hold even if there were no living creature in the universe.

Having said all that, there are some specific problems with moral statements. There is a fact/value distinction. You can't deduce an "ought" from an "is". If someone says "torturing babies is a good thing" then you can't disprove it by logical deduction from the facts about babies, nor can you disprove it by saying "well torturing babies in the past has always turned out to be wrong so it is probably wrong this time". It is a different type of argument. You have to win it by appealing to the compassion of the speaker or by pointing out inconsistencies in the speakers approach - e.g. "so would it have been OK to torture your own baby?"

Moral statements are logically tied to action. It would be a very odd to say "I know I ought to do this - but that's not a reason for doing it". Someone who says that, doesn't know what "ought" means. It is reasonable to say "I know I ought to do this but I am too tired" i.e. the moral imperative is outweighed by another. But to deny that "ought" is any kind of reason for doing something would be madness.

So when you make a moral statement what is happening? Is it true or false in the sense that "the sun is shining" is true or false? And what counts as a justification? That's where I turn to Wittgenstein and language games. He makes the point that our language is not just a map of reality but is more of a tool in set of "games" we play. For example, the simple statement "Queen takes rook" in a chess game makes no sense without the entire rules of chess including the objectives of the game. It is not just a linguistic map of the movement of a piece of wood or plastic. In the same way there is an ethics game. We have a whole set of behaviours where there are some things we find morally reprehensible and others we find morally laudable. This is partly built-in and partly cultural. The language of "good" and "bad" and of "right" and "wrong" is built on those behaviours. That's why they have a logical tie to action. "Good" expresses a certain set of things we luckily mostly approve of and it expresses the desire to promote or continue those things. The built-in part of those behaviours evolved and was probably adaptive under the circumstances under which they evolved. However, that does not mean

* these moral behaviours are always adaptive under all circumstances
* they are adaptive under current circumstances
* there aren't other, more selfish, behaviour patterns which also evolved which sometimes result in conflicting motives and sometimes prevail

Wow "“ that was virtually an essay. My objective is simply to illustrate

* faith does not help explain some of these problems
* there is an alternative explanation which is not irrational

Cheers

Since none of the latter vivid experiences indicate that Jesus is not resurrected, the first person still has no reason to disbelieve that Jesus is risen.

Now suppose that someone has a vision of some supernatural being saying Jesus is not risen. Even if the person who has the Jesus-as-risen vision were to become aware that someone else had had this latter vision, it would not logically follow that the Jesus-as-risen vision provided no reason to the person who had it to believe that Jesus was risen. On the contrary, the person who had the vision of Jesus as risen would still have a reason to believe that Jesus is risen.

Since I know someone who had such a vision, Harris's claim that no-one on this planet has any reason to believe in Chrisianity is straightforwardly false.

I knew a perfectly sane man in London who once saw Jesus Christ, risen, and received a profound awareness of how much Jesus knew him and loved him.

Regardless of what was the true nature of that experience, it would be ludicrous to assert that it didn't provide that man with a good reason to believe that Jesus rose from the dead.

Sane people in Riyadh, Varanasi, Beijing and Kinshasa have also had vivid religious experiences. Yet collect all these "revelations" and compare them, and you'll find that they are contradictory.

What gives the London man's vision epistemic priority over the others?

I have never had a revelation and I can't imagine what it would be like - so I really can't comment - clearly it is a bit different in nature from a randomised controlled trial which is they kind of thing I consider evidence.

Which randomized controlled trials constitute evidence for the proposition that evidence is solely comprised of randomized controlled trials?

It seems your notion of what constitutes evidence is self-referentially incoherent.

As I've pointed ou before before, Harris, like most atheists, believes in the normativity for human thought and action of reason and morality. But no randomized controlled trial proves that Harris's beliefs in reason or morality are true or warranted.

Mark Frank previously said in response:

I believe that we are by and large compassionate because we evolved that way. But I don't justify morality because it is successful for the species. I justify it by appeal to our moral sensibility - period. This sounds subjective and in a sense it is - but the fact is that by appeal to Kantian logic we can usually find some common ground in moral discussion.

Well, this is, by Frank's own definition, a faith statement. It goes beyond what can be established by evidence garnered from any randomized controlled trials. Moreover, the validity of 'Kantian logic' cannot be established by such trials, and any logical theorems presuppose and do not prove the axioms from which they derive; likewise, rules of inference are presupposed and not proved by any given logic.

One must start with epistemic faith in something which is not itsef provable logically (axioms), or justifiable empirically (sense-perceptions). Otherwise one ends up with a merely circular argument. Logic cannot justify belief in the validity of logic; and sense-perception cannot justify belief in sense-perception. In short, reason cannot demonstrate that belief in reason is rational without cicularity.

So much for faith in reason. Hence, when it comes to morality, reason can't justify moral beliefs without assuming its own validity which, as we just saw, is something that cannot be demonstrated without circularity.

Hence belief in reason and morality ultimately is based on faith. What is even more to the point, evolutionary naturalism holds that both are the results of unintentional material forces—-the same mechanisms that generated all life-forms on the planet. We thus have no rational basis, given EN, that our belief in reason and morality is any more warranted than a 'belief in', say, the 'cognitive states' of bats or bees or snakes or plankton or fruitflies or whatever may happen to be the most reproductively successful species to date since life first began on our planet.

Here's some reflections of mine about the non-provable-but-still-rational character of subjective experience:

How can you prove someone loves you?

How do you prove that there is at least one conscious mind other than your own and that this mind loves you?

Subjective experience perhaps tells you so, but there is no physical experiment that can prove either the existence of conscious minds or that any of them love other conscious minds.

Have people been mistaken in believing that another person loves them? Sure. Can everyone who knows from personal experience that they are loved prove it? No. Does that mean that everyone who believes that someone loves them is wrong? No.

How can you prove to someone who's never experienced an orgasm that there is such an experience or convey its pleasurable nature? How can you prove that there is such a thing as the way Scotch tastes or convey its specific nature? Some things are only known through subjective experience.

But it would be ridiculous to deny the reality of orgasmic or Scotch-tasting experiences just because you had met a woman who mistook her menstruation for an orgasm, or someone who thought they had tasted Scotch when they had in fact drunk vodka that had been poured into the wrong bottle.

Is there such a thing as what it's like to be you? I'll assume so. But only you know, and only you can know, what it's like to be you. Your inner conscious life is unique, and only you have cognitive awareness of it. It's not accessible by third parties. Does this mean you in fact don't know that you have an inner conscious life, because you cannot prove it?

So, some things have to be personally experienced. But unlike Scotch or orgasms, your inner conscious life including experiences of personal love is not physically reproducible or subject to predictable experimental control. Love, for example, involves other minds, and other minds do not act fully predictably. So it may be impossible to prove to an unloved person that there is such a thing.

Moreover, there are people whose belief they are loved is illusory. Nonetheless, some people know they are loved.

Only mentally ill people insist that no-one is loved just because some claims to being loved are false, or because we can't scientifically prove the existence of other minds or love-relations between them.

Perhaps the Richard Dawkins Foundation will launch some projects (if it ever gets itself certified *as* a charity). But let's face it… we'd all be surprised if its projects weren't just more evangelization of their belief system and denigration of other belief systems. Quite the narcissistic bunch, from all I'm able to tell. It's the whole "I am God's gift to mankind" thing, only without the God.

This reminds me of a biography that I read several years ago. The bio was about a prominent atheist who was in charge of one of the major atheist organizations who began thinking that atheists were never going succeed unless they became more humanitarian and more involved in charitable work. His idea was that atheists needed to be at least as compassionate as the religious organizations that they regularly criticized. His proposal, however, was only received with skepticism and indifference from his fellow atheists. As a result, to make a long story short, he had a change of heart and ended up converting to Christianity"¦ I remember reading the book but because it was so long ago, mid to late 80's, I think, I can't remember the man's name. Does anyone out there remember the same story, and the name? It has momentarily slipped my mind.

You responded:

Not familiar with it, John. But do what I do to work around my 'old-timer's disease'"¦ input the query, it'll come to you eventually. Probably in the middle of the night when you're least expecting it! §;o)

I now remember the name: William Murray (not to be confused with Bill Murray the comedian). He was the son of the well known atheist Madelyn Murray O'Hair (now deceased) and for a while helped his mom head up her organization. At the time I read his book, My Life With Out God, I remember thinking that it was ironic that none the standard apologetic arguments seemed to have any effect on his thinking. Evidently he found the moral argument so compelling the he just skipped over all the other supposed philosophical and intellectual problems that Christianity presents to "modern scientific thought". The bottom line was that he converted to Christianity because he found atheism (at least his and his mother's version of it) to be morally bankrupt.

(can I call you John for short?)

If you wish, yes. Just make sure that it is clear from the context. There is, at least one other John, Johnny B. who regularly posts here as well. BTW there are also a Doug and a Douglas who are regulars. One of them, for some reason, insisted a few weeks ago that he not be confused with his namesake. Just keep that in mind.

Would most people call this type of committment "faith" I don't see that at all. Faith is a specific sort of committment - a committment to believe even though the evidence is absent or pointing the other way. But it is not the only type of committment and it is not the only committment that leads people to make sacrifices for others. The atheist graduate who decides to forsake a career in the city to join a charity is showing a similar committment - but it is not faith. Almost any mother makes immense sacrifices for her children whatever her beliefs. It is because she is human.

I have to disagree with you about how you define (or maybe don't define) faith. Jesus himself always linked faith with moral action and good deeds. That is what he was talking about when he talked about the mustard seed: "If you had the faith of a mustard seed you could move a mountain." He wasn't talking about mere intellectual assent, believing in Gods existence, for example, he was talking about doing something, performing some great deed or act. It could be a miracle, or it could be some great act of love and compassion. The implication is that more faith one has then greater the resulting act or deed, and the greater the good. Most Christians and theologians I know, or know about, I believe would define faith this way.

Earlier on this thread (the 15th post from the beginning) I talked about Steve Saint who sold his business, outside of Orlando, Fla. and moved his family (his wife and two teenage children) down to one of the most isolated corners of the Amazon Rain Forest to help the Waodani Indians, a tribe of traditional hunter and gatherers, who needed to learn how to deal with the outside world that had started to encroach on their domain. Just think of the challenges he faced: he moved his family from a very nice upper middle class American home to a rough hewn lumber home with a simple plastic tarp for a roof, and no running water, no modern sanitation, no stores, and no way to communicate with outside word except short wave radio. You don't think doing something like that requires faith? For me, like a lot of people I know, doing something like that would be like stepping out boating and trying to walk on water.

In his book, The End of the Spear, he certainly makes it clear that thought it was an act of faith. By the way, Hollywood recently (2006) did a movie also called, The End of the Spear, which is based on incidents that took place earlier in Steve's life (see my original post above.) Steve's book is actually a kind of a sequel to the movie.

Mark, you seem to be arguing for the Sam Harris' idea about faith: faith is superstition and dangerous to both society and individuals. Great acts of compassion and moral courage– well that will somehow all take care of itself. I don't see it that way. I think if we want a better world it will require more faith.

I pretty much agree with you - except I think it can be simplified to…

No, "do unto others…" is a translation of a higher moral edict that people can rationalize and put into practice if they care to, but it tends to be limited to immediate sociopolitical formalities and sometimes can't be made to apply even in one's own family. There's a distributional bell curve in the midrange, some exceptionally 'good' and exceptionally 'evil' people on the wings.

It's a simple enough command by all indications of the many 'Holy men' who have brought it back with them from their seeking and translated it for their times and circumstances. It isn't so simple a practice that it's ever actually ruled human relationships.

Axeman:

And thus as evolution, from an outside perspective each ethic is co-equal until one dies out, right?

No, people may eventually start thinking for themselves beyond authoritarian edicts, and if enough of them understand that an expansion of principles is warranted (humans should not own other humans, humans as property isn't a very moral/ethical thing to do) they can eventually change a long tradition. Like slavery.

Pretty soon the kind of discrimination and bigotry that views the slave class as 'less than' human is the minority, and over time that too may change if that view is not tolerated by the broader society.

Now, from an outside perspective it might appear that the slave class itself has been broadened to include more people, and the slave-owner class shrinks to become much richer than they ever were when they were responsible for slave food, shelter, clothing, health care, etc. Now the slaves can be made responsible for their own upkeep, but paid too little to accomplish that. Result: bad for slaves, good for the owners of production: Laissez faire.

We have a historical pattern for this: sometimes civilization goes away.

And it can of course happen again. Sometimes, it may be the best thing that could happen. Given the amoral propensities of scientists and politicians.

Had we not stormed the beach at Normandy (a bloody, bloody bravado act "” just throwing bodies at them, pretty much) Von Braunn just might have had enough time to make atomic fire drop out of the skies.

But we did, and got von Braun all for ourselves, and managed to drop atomic fire on the Japanese without his help. §;o)