Deuce: I think a proper definition of the "scientific method" should only include those things that can at least theoretically be tested by experiment.

Not necessarily experiments, but *observations*. We propose a hypothesis. The prediction must be a specific and distinguishing *observation* which is entailed in the hypothesis.

Theories of the origin of the Solar System and the Cosmos are scientific theories that concern claims about history. We can't recreate the Big Bang, but we can nonetheless propose hypotheses and test them against the evidence.

With human history, it's a bit different, because we are often working within a well-established historical narrative, and the evidence often consists of documents. Historians still propose hypotheses and test them, e.g. an historian might ask how common horse ownership was in 19th century Europe, and then look at sales records to help make this determination. Anomalies are generally expected to be made to fit, but sometimes they cause a significant change in the narrative.

As to the Pyramids, we have strong scientific reasons to believe the Pyramids were built by humans several millennia ago. Archaeologists (the science that studies human cultures through the recovery, documentation, analysis and interpretation of material remains) have even found their homes.

It's not merely rational, but empirical. It's just that the methods are much different than those in other fields of research.

Yep. No argument here.

You're conflating the scientific method with its subset, experimental science.

Actually, since I was talking to David, I was just assuming David's definition of science, which seems to be pretty much restricted to experimental science.

But, I will say that, for the sake of clear terminology, if you think that something uses the scientific method, then you ought to refer to it as science. And if you don't consider something to be science, then your definition of the scientific method shouldn't apply to it. For my part, I don't consider history to be science because it is neither experimental (like applied physics), or even potentially experimental (like theoretical physics). I think a proper definition of the "scientific method" should only include those things that can at least theoretically be tested by experiment.

And we resolve this just as we resolve any scientific question, by proposing hypotheses, and then testing them, in this case, perhaps by archaeological studies.

Well, not just as we resolve any scientific question. You can't do an experiment to see who built the pyramids, and you can't do much in the way of prediction either, like you can with some theory about how some law works. So the manner of testing is different. They're similar inasmuch as you can lump all the different ways of confirming or disconfirming a hypothesis together as "testing".

Deuce: The whole point of that part of my post was that historical evidence is rational despite not being science.

It's not merely rational, but empirical. It's just that the methods are much different than those in other fields of research.

Deuce: You can't construct some predictive experiment such that if your historical hypothesis is true, this will happen, and if it's not, it won't happen.

You're conflating the scientific method with its subset, experimental science. It's just that much of the historical narrative is strongly supported, while the areas of current interest are often tenuously supported. A typical historical question might be, who built the pyramids, and how? And we resolve this just as we resolve any scientific question, by proposing hypotheses, and then testing them, in this case, perhaps by archaeological studies.

Thanks, but you're telling me something I already know. The whole point of that part of my post was that historical evidence is rational despite not being science. And yes, historical hypotheses can be tested in a manner of speaking, but not in the same way that scientific hypotheses can be tested. You can't construct some predictive experiment such that if your historical hypothesis is true, this will happen, and if it's not, it won't happen. Instead, you amass circumstantial evidence that makes your hypothesis seem more or less plausible over time.

David Heddle:

…even if all the scientific evidence was explained away, there would still be the same characteristics of nature that have awed believers for the ages. It’s mere existence, the fact that there is something instead of nothing, its vastness, its beauty, the fact that mathematics works and that the laws of physics are simple enough that we can actually understand them and solve them, at least approximately.

Thanks, that's what I (and I think Bradford) was getting at. What you seem to be saying is that even if the arguments from physical specificity (fine tuning, IC, etc) were knocked down, there would still be rational philosophical reasons (beauty, vastness, mathematics, etc) to conclude that the universe was intended (and "designed" is actually just a synonym for "intended"), and that humans were also intended to be able to understand it.

Would there be anything that would make you conclude that there were no rational reasons to believe in design, such that belief that the universe was intended was entirely a matter of fideistic faith (ie, faith without reason)?

Deuce: For one example, there is good evidence that Martin Luther started the Protestant Reformation, but there's no way to design an experiment to test this fact that would make a unique prediction if it's true (your stated standard for what constitutes scientific evidence).

The methods of historical research are usually considered quite distinct from science. But, you can still define those methods in terms of the scientific method. The evidence, in this case, is largely found in historical documents. And the hypothesis is one aspect or another of the overall historical narrative.

First, you establish the provenance of the documents, then determine if they fit in the larger, established historical narrative. It may not look like science on the surface, but if a newly discovered fact or document doesn't seem to fit with the established historical narrative, then an attempt is made to understand this new fact. It may be false, irrelevant, or it may require a revision in the historical narrative.

And yes, hypotheses are constantly being tested. That's why archaeologists dig into ruins. Or why scholars love to discover old manuscripts.

I’m not exactly sure what you mean, but even if all the scientific evidence was explained away, there would still be the same characteristics of nature that have awed believers for the ages. It’s mere existence, the fact that there is something instead of nothing, its vastness, its beauty, the fact that mathematics works and that the laws of physics are simple enough that we can actually understand them and solve them, at least approximately. A universe without ID does not suddenly become a boring place.

The bottom line is, we are not believers because there is physical evidence that God created the universe. Instead, as believers first, we appreciate nature differently—we appreciate it in the context of our certainty that, ultimately, God is responsible. ID is a fascinating but ultimately unimportant subset of that—it is the comfortable but not crucial idea that certain physical realities, such as the fine tunings, are good candidates for being inexplicable.

That wouldn't disprove God, but would effectively eliminate the idea that he left behind scientific evidence of his handiwork.

Hey, David, that's pretty close to what I was trying to get at, but I'd like to clarify just a bit more. In particular, would this mean that there was no scientific evidence, or no rational evidence at all? The latter is what I (and Bradford) was asking about specifically.

There's certainly such a thing as rational evidence that isn't scientific evidence. For one example, there is good evidence that Martin Luther started the Protestant Reformation, but there's no way to design an experiment to test this fact that would make a unique prediction if it's true (your stated standard for what constitutes scientific evidence). The evidence for it is historical, not scientific.

So, would the kinds of discoveries you mention show only that there was no scientific evidence for design, or would it show that there was no rational grounds for supposing life/the universe to be designed at all? If it didn't do away with all rational grounds for supposing that anything was designed, what grounds would remain?

Deuce: what type of evidence would convince you that ID has no plausible future in the realm of legitimate, rational philosophy?

As philosophy often delves into speculation, there is no reason that cosmic purpose can't be discussed within that realm of thought.

Deuce: what would convince you not only that design is unscientific, but that it is vacuous -

Science can and does study design, e.g. archaeology. If by 'design', you mean ID, the claim that there is scientific evidence of telic causation in biology, then most everything ever written or said in support of ID demonstrates its lack of scientific merit.

Deuce: - that there isn't and will never be any rational grounds to infer that anything (life in particular) is designed?

Universal negative. An exhaustive search will never be possible. Perhaps aliens, long ago, placed a pebble in the Solar Nebula to seed the formation of the Earth, or angels nudged a comet out of orbit causing the extinction of dinosaurs, or the monolith still awaits humanity's rebirth near Europa, but there is no evidence of any of this.

1) The detection of another universe, or

2) evidence that the fine tuning of the physical constants is an illusion, or

3) a confirmed (by experiment) explanation for the OOL.

That wouldn't disprove God, but would effectively eliminate the idea that he left behind scientific evidence of his handiwork. This would, for me, “falsify” ID as a legitimate philosophy or apologetic.

This is the type of detailed response I anticipated when I posed the initial question. I suspect the reason others have avoided a similarly detailed response is a desire to maintain the contention that design is utterly without merit even as an unestablished concept.

I have a question concerning #1. How do we detect another universe? I gather it is theoretically possible to do so, at least indirectly, correct? Also, how would multiple universes be falsified?

So, let me phrase Bradford's question another way: If you are an IDist what type of evidence would convince you that ID has no plausible future in the realm of legitimate, rational philosophy? That is, what would convince you not only that design is unscientific, but that it is vacuous - that there isn't and will never be any rational grounds to infer that anything (life in particular) is designed?

1) The detection of another universe, or

2) evidence that the fine tuning of the physical constants is an illusion, or

3) a confirmed (by experiment) explanation for the OOL.

That wouldn't disprove God, but would effectively eliminate the idea that he left behind scientific evidence of his handiwork. This would, for me, “falsify” ID as a legitimate philosophy or apologetic.