Please tell me, what exactly is it about my "claim" that you don't agree with?

Well this entire statement, for starters. . .

consciousness is a property of information processing systems such as the brain that have a spatial concept of self.

1) You haven't established that the brain is primarily an "information processing system".

2) What is the relevance of a "spatial concept of self", exactly? What do you mean by it, exactly?

3) You haven't established that even if the brain is primarily an "information-processing system", that subjectivity is a result of the information processing.

4) Consciousness is not a matter of "degree". Either subjective states are occurring, or we are dealing with a zombie / robot. No in-between. And we do not in fact know that other human beings have subjective states, we impute them to humans and other higher animals due to behaviors we observe. So it would be easy to impute these states to organisms as simple as paramecium, just based on behavior.

Of course, that contradicts the neural network theory of consciousness, so people like Dennett typically claim that a paramecium is a robot with no subjectivity, even though it displays complex behaviors.

do you think animals other than humans have consciousness? Rupert Sheldrake (I bet he is one of your heroes, or would be if you knew his work) seems to believe so, since he thinks there is telepathy between dogs and their owners. If you accept that, what is the lowest form of animal that still has consciousness? And what are the immaterial properties responsible for such consciousness?

I don't know Joy's views on that, but I explain mine in some detail here, if you're interested.

Bradford, I don't know if you saw that one. It was initially a request to you, though perhaps it's not close enough to what your main focus is.

Perhaps you haven't noticed that the "degree" of consciousness that we can observe in animals is closely correlated with the complexity of their material brain?

Raevmo, noone is arguing that there is not an association between brains and consciousness. That however is not sufficient to show that the latter is an "emergent property" of the former.

Do you plan to offer any evidence whatsoever for this claim?

Please tell me, what exactly is it about my "claim" that you don't agree with?

Perhaps you haven't noticed that the "degree" of consciousness that we can observe in animals is closely correlated with the complexity of their material brain? Not to mention the lack of consciousness in organisms without nervous systems. People in a coma are often compared to vegetables.

Raevmo: Roughly speaking, consciousness is a property of information processing systems such as the brain that have a spatial concept of self.

mcromer: Do you plan to offer any evidence whatsoever for this claim?

Or is the fact that Daniel Dennett believes it enough for you?

When information processing systems become aware of their own existence and begin informing us of this of their own free will, Dennett's views will not matter.

Roughly speaking, consciousness is a property of information processing systems such as the brain that have a spatial concept of self.

Do you plan to offer any evidence whatsoever for this claim?

Or is the fact that Daniel Dennett believes it enough for you?

So. I'm forced to wonder yet again how believers-in scientism - and its 'promise' of machine-based immortality [someday, maybe] - can expect any religious or spiritually-inclined person to believe they've somehow proven the non-existence of consciousness, when they depend on the separability of [causal] consciousness from physical brains in order to craft this monumental deception.

Why do you claim that I and my fellow "scienticists" (as you like to call them) deny consciousness? I certainly don't. Roughly speaking, consciousness is a property of information processing systems such as the brain that have a spatial concept of self. Primitive animals with relatively simple brains have consciousness, so it seems reasonable to me to assume that a sufficiently complex computer program could simulate it. And if a computer can mimic it, who's to say that such a computer does not have consciousness? What would it take to convince you that a computer is conscious?

Joy, do you think animals other than humans have consciousness? Rupert Sheldrake (I bet he is one of your heroes, or would be if you knew his work) seems to believe so, since he thinks there is telepathy between dogs and their owners. If you accept that, what is the lowest form of animal that still has consciousness? And what are the immaterial properties responsible for such consciousness?

You are using an objective word "mind" to refer to subjectivity. However the objective cannot contain the subjective. The subjective contains the objective "” ie everyone subjectively experiences everything, including all notions of "objectivity".

Strictly speaking, I would say that verbal communication is the objectivization of the communicator's subjective thoughts. There is no way around this. When I post something, I have to hope that readers will understand what I mean. There is no guarantee that they will. All I can do is try my best to convey my meaning in non-obfuscatory language. I hope that the readers will try to understand my meaning. There is no guarantee that they will. I'm not sure what your meaning is here. Yes, my idea of mind is subjective. But I objectivize it when I mention mind in a sentence that you can read. I'm not sure what your point is regarding this.

Who is the "you" to whom you are referring? You are referring to subjectivity as if it were an object, again.

Specifically, the "you" here was grendelkhan. Grendelkhan, I'm sure, thinks of himself as a real person, and hence a real entity.

Ultimately that is all "you" actually are, pure subjectivity, pure experiencingness, associated right now with a particular name, set of memories, thoughts, sensations, and emotions.

I have faith that there is a world of objects, some of which I interact with. Yes, all of my thoughts are necessarily subjective. However, I do not question your existence, because as I said I've postulated a world full of objects, living and non-living. There is no guarantee that what I think is right. I have no guarantee that my reasoning is correct. One way that I can use to determine if my thoughts are sound is by objectivizing them via communication. To see what people think of them. This is what I do here at this forum when I post a comment.

I'm not sure why you see a "you-ness" problem. You, like the other personal pronouns me, him, she, and her, are substitutes for the personal names of people. By convention, we don't only refer to the name of a person when we are directly communicatiing with them. "You" is an unambiguous substitute (well, that's how I meant it) for the name of grendelkhan, whom my comment was directed to.

But each mind is still distinct, composed of distinct parts, with distinct subjective experiences.

You are using an objective word "mind" to refer to subjectivity. However the objective cannot contain the subjective. The subjective contains the objective — ie everyone subjectively experiences everything, including all notions of "objectivity".

What good does it do you to have this clone, when you die, unless your consciousness, and your own self awareness had also been transported into your clone?

Who is the "you" to whom you are referring? You are referring to subjectivity as if it were an object, again.

The "you" that counts here is the subjectivity, that has been associated with a particular name and body. But the name and body are not relevant. What is relevant is the subjectivity.

Ultimately that is all "you" actually are, pure subjectivity, pure experiencingness, associated right now with a particular name, set of memories, thoughts, sensations, and emotions.

thechristiancynic, does this mean that you believe that if you duplicated (via hand-wavey magic) an entire brain, in a living body, that it would simply fail to function? In what way would it fail? Why would you think so?

I'm more than a little bit at a loss as to why this question is even addressed to me. I'm not a materialist, and I've stated (or implied) more than a few times in the comments here that I don't buy mind-brain reductionism.

With that in mind, I think you're asking the wrong question: Would a duplicated brain "fail to function" No, I think it would probably work from a biological perspective. Do I think it would hold the consciousness and thoughts of the person from whose brain it was duplicated? I highly doubt it.