Ilíon: The unclarity in what you said follows directly from the fact that "¦ even though your thoughts are certainly on the right track, even though you certainly seem to correctly understand what you're talking about and mean to say "¦ you are expressing your thoughts in imprecise (and inaccurate) language.
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Deuce: You are right, but there's always a tradeoff involved. Extreme precision makes a post a lot longer, which can distract people (especially those not philosophically-minded) and cause them to lose sight of the main point, or can make a post tough to read for most people, whereas too much brevity can fail to communicate necessary distinctions, and cause me to be misinterpeted by those who are honestly trying to understand me. What's really at issue is the meaning behind the words rather than the words themselves, of course. What I aim for is to make my posts on topics like this pithy and "plain English" enough that people will understand me, but precise enough that those interpreting my words in good faith won't misunderstand me. Your paragraph about compound propositions shows that you got my meaning exactly, so I figure that's a sign that it worked.

Yes, communication always involves a trade-off involved between "extreme precision" and brevity, and speaking to (as opposed to at) the intended audience, and other important objectives. Depending upon the situation "extreme precision" may certainly hinder effective communication (as I also alluded above).

"What's really at issue is the meaning behind the words rather than the words themselves, of course."
But, we can't get at "the meaning behind the words" absent the words themselves. We not only communicate via words, we mostly think via words, via an internal dialog with ourselves. Surely most people have experienced, at least once, a flash of understanding, a wordless "Ah-ha!" But to hang on to that understanding, just as to communicate it to another, requires words. And not merely to hand on to it, but to "grow" it; for that flash of understanding is often but the beginning of knowing or understanding the thing.

"What I aim for is to make my posts on topics like this pithy and "plain English" enough that people will understand me, but precise enough that those interpreting my words in good faith won't misunderstand me."
And that's a good aim. But does that mean you cannot strive to improve your aim?

This is what you said:

""¦the only answer that makes sense is that inference makes us reasonably confident that our generalizations are true, or contain part of the truth, which means that inference is about truth after all."

As I said earlier: "Even though what you said was unclear (it was imprecise), it wasn't *that* unclear, it wasn't *that* imprecise. No reasonably intelligent person who can read English can fail to have grasped the thought you meant to convey. Even though what you said was imprecise, it was near enough to what you meant that one would have to intend to misunderstand it …"

Would it really have thrown off your aim to not have said "… or contain part of the truth …?" Especially considering that that misstatement allows distraction from your main point: "… which means that inference is about truth after all?"

Now, we all misspeak, we all are quite capable of generating grammatical infelicities. It's not merely that you said "… or contain part of the truth …" that led me to say what I said. It's that in responding to Allen MacNeill's post you 1) misidentified the souece of the lack of clarity in what you'd said and 2) then went on to repeat to same problem in almost the same verbiage.

"Your paragraph about compound propositions shows that you got my meaning exactly, so I figure that's a sign that it worked."
But I already *know* the truth of what you were trying to get across. Allen MacNeill doesn't, apparently. Because I already know what you meant to say, it was no great stretch for me to "translate" what you'd said into what you'd meant. For all that Allen MacNeill has a great deal more formal education than I, it *appears* that these concepts are new or foreign to him [and that thought is all but mind-boggling to me!]. To say nothing of The Lurkers.

We thought about that possibility, too, but rejected it for this reason: all too often people judge comments (and articles, books, etc.) not on the basis of content, but rather on the basis of who wrote it. I would greatly prefer to have readers on our course website judge the comments appearing therein on their content, rather than authorship (this is why genuine peer-review is always anonymous, on both sides - reviewers and content reviewed).

Anyone who has been following the course blog will no doubt find the above statement of interest.

But if we don't know who wrote something, how can we judge their motives for writing it? I guess we could look at what they wrote and try to judge their motives from that, but isn't it so much easier if you know their motives going in because you know who they are?

The unclarity in what you said follows directly from the fact that "¦ even though your thoughts are certainly on the right track, even though you certainly seem to correctly understand what you're talking about and mean to say "¦ you are expressing your thoughts in imprecise (and inaccurate) language.

You are right, but there's always a tradeoff involved. Extreme precision makes a post a lot longer, which can distract people (especially those not philosophically-minded) and cause them to lose sight of the main point, or can make a post tough to read for most people, whereas too much brevity can fail to communicate necessary distinctions, and cause me to be misinterpeted by those who are honestly trying to understand me. What's really at issue is the meaning behind the words rather than the words themselves, of course. What I aim for is to make my posts on topics like this pithy and "plain English" enough that people will understand me, but precise enough that those interpreting my words in good faith won't misunderstand me. Your paragraph about compound propositions shows that you got my meaning exactly, so I figure that's a sign that it worked.:wink:

Dang! Get a dictionary, look up the words. Dictionaries aren't infallible, of course. But unless the entry on some particular word is way out in left field, a person willing to *think* about the offered definition should be able to see past the imprecision and generally circular definitions which plague dictionaries.

"Absent controlling post content or quantity, perhaps you could consider a way of identifying posts made by students in the class to distinguish them from the peanut gallery. I think that would be interesting."

We thought about that possibility, too, but rejected it for this reason: all too often people judge comments (and articles, books, etc.) not on the basis of content, but rather on the basis of who wrote it. I would greatly prefer to have readers on our course website judge the comments appearing therein on their content, rather than authorship (this is why genuine peer-review is always anonymous, on both sides - reviewers and content reviewed).

If people want to identify themselves along with their comments, that is of course their prerogative. However, I prefer to let people make up their own minds about how to do this, including the option of using a pseudonym (if, for example, they fear reprisal for presenting or supporting a comment or post that "goes against the grain"…in either direction). Obviously there are at least two people posting at the site who's identities (and most likely affiliations) will be known to all: Hannah Maxson and me. However, given that we are at the same time collaborators on this project (the course website) and loyal opponents on opposite sides of the evolution/ID controversy at least lends a kind of balance to it all. Admittedly, I am a person in a position of "authority" (as the professor for the course), whereas Hannah is "merely" an invited participant (and student). However, I haven't noticed this supposed "assymetry of power" dampening either her spirits nor her ability to make a cogent argument.

So, for now at least, I still think we are doing this (mostly) right…

Deuce: ""¦the only answer that makes sense is that inference makes us reasonably confident that our generalizations are true, or contain part of the truth, which means that inference is about truth after all."
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Allen MacNeill: Interesting: so "truth" can either be entirely "true" or can be "part of the truth" at the same time?
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Deuce: No, it can't, but I could've been a little clearer there, by including an "either".

An explicit "either" wouldn't have made a difference; there is already an implied "either" (you did write "or," after all). What Mr MacNeill objects to is the conclusion: "which means that inference is about truth after all," which is something he seems to want not to know.

Even though what you said was unclear (it was imprecise), it wasn't *that* unclear, it wasn't *that* imprecise. No reasonably intelligent person who can read English can fail to have grasped the thought you meant to convey. Even though what you said was imprecise, it was near enough to what you meant that one would have to intend to misunderstand it get out of it what Mr MacNeill implies he got out of it.

There are three possibilities here: 1) Mr MacNeill is not a reasonably intelligent person (we can dismiss this possibility); 2) Mr MacNeill intentionally "misunderstood" what you wrote; 3) Mr MacNeill intentionally pretends to misunderstand as a means to prompt you to clarify.

Option 1) is a non-issue. If the truth is option 2), nothing at all that you can say can possibly make any difference; rational discussion is impossible. If the truth is option 3), you may never get Mr MacNeill to accept the truth of what you're saying, or you may; rational discussion is not impossible.

The unclarity in what you said follows directly from the fact that … even though your thoughts are certainly on the right track, even though you certainly seem to correctly understand what you're talking about and mean to say … you are expressing your thoughts in imprecise (and inaccurate) language. The language you are using is muddled; and due the the nature of the way we think, muddled language leads to muddled thinking (even when the original thinking was un-muddled) … which leads right back to apologizing for an unclarity that wasn't there while continuing the unclarity that was. For instance:

I meant to say that inference makes us reasonably confident that our generalizations either are true, or contain part of the truth, not both at the same time. An example of what I'm talking about in the latter case is the following proposition: The moon revolves around the earth, and the earth revolves around the sun, and the sun revolves around Jupiter. That's a false proposition, but it contains part of truth, by which I mean it is partly made up of propositions that are true on their own.

This is inaccurate. It's inaccurate because it's imprecise and muddled.

There is no such thing as "partly true" or "part of the truth." 'Truth' is not a quantity, it cannot be divided; 'truth' is a quality, a state.

The false proposition in your example does not "contain[] part of truth;" it is not "partly made up of propositions that are true on their own." Rather, it is entirely made up of other propositions (i.e. it a compound proposition), some of which are true and some of which are false. Because the truth-value of at least one of the subsidiary propositions is false, the truth-value of the compound proposition is false. To be more precise, the compound proposition employs AND (exclusively) to join the distinct subsidiary propositions; therefore their truth-values must all be 'true' for the compound proposition to be true; thusly: 'true' AND 'true' AND 'false' = 'false.'

[Though, one could quibble, were one to wish to quibble, that my (conventional) assignment of 'true' to the first proposition is incorrect, since since it's not *really* true that "the moon revolves around the earth"]

Even though what you said, as phrased, is inaccurate due to the way it's phrased, when we get rid of the imprecision of your phraseology we see that what you're thinking and what you meant to say is correct. As it was all along.

But hey! Who wants to quibble over words, just because words are our means of communication? (in case that wasn't clear enough, it's a side comment on someone's silly earlier attempt to dismiss something I'd said as "quibbling about words.")

Also, you changed my words around …

What a shock!

Interesting: so "truth" can either be entirely "true" or can be "part of the truth" at the same time?

No, it can't, but I could've been a little clearer there, by including an "either". I meant to say that inference makes us reasonably confident that our generalizations either are true, or contain part of the truth, not both at the same time. An example of what I'm talking about in the latter case is the following proposition: The moon revolves around the earth, and the earth revolves around the sun, and the sun revolves around Jupiter. That's a false proposition, but it contains part of truth, by which I mean it is partly made up of propositions that are true on their own.

Also, you changed my words around. I said that generalizations (which was your word, originally) could contain part of the truth. In repeating it back, you read me as saying that the truth can be part of the truth, which makes no sense. Whazzup with that?

Regardless of whether one uses "classical" predictive/analytic statistics (a la Fisher et al) or one uses Bayesian inference, the validation process is the same: one calculates a measure of confidence (BTW, "confidence" in this case is strictly mathematically defined, and has nothing to do with the colloquial sense of "confidence")

They aren't unrelated. There's a reason that statistical confidence was named after confidence in the colloquial sense. First of all, in the colloquial sense, confidence is a cognitively empty term on its own. Confidence is always confidence in something - that something being the truth of some proposition. Confidence in yourself, for instance, is belief in the proposition I am competent.

In making inferences, our confidence in the truth of various explanations is a result how well the world matches our expectation of what the world would be like if that explanation were true. Statistical analysis allows us to put a numerical value on how well things match a given expectation, which gives us a numerical approximation of how justified our confidence in the truth of a given explanation should be. That's why statistical analysis refers to confidence. To say that confidence has nothing to do with truth, as you have, is to kick out the rational underpinning from underneath statistical science. If it were really true, it would mean that science was no more a reliable guide to reality than pure guesswork. It also empties the word "confidence" of any cognitive content, making it a meaningless term, since confidence is confidence in the truth of something by definition. A "confidence level" is an empty concept, with no context, unless it refers to a level of confidence in something.

…but it also looks like you should have restricted the class blog to the students (or imposed some type of posting limit on outside commentators).

Absent controlling post content or quantity, perhaps you could consider a way of identifying posts made by students in the class to distinguish them from the peanut gallery. I think that would be interesting.

I have a visceral dislike of censorship in academic debate, reserving it only for cases of clear ad hominem attacks and irrelevent babbling (neither of which have been a problem as yet).

Well, I've been posting there and haven't been censored yet, so I must be doing something wrong =P.

Some great discussion going on in this thread. I love it. Deuce, you make some great points. Joy is informative and thought-provoking as usual. Allen, nice to see you here. I hope you find yourself challenged in your thinking :).