Two Views
by MikeGeneLet me quote a portion from Barrow and Tipler's book, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle:
Kant's notion of teleology had an enormous influence on the work of German biologists in the first half of the nineteenth century. Like Kant, for the most part these biologists did not regard teleology and mechanism as polar opposites, but rather as explanatory modes complementary to each other. Mechanism was expected to provide a completely accurate picture of life at the chemical level, without the need to invoke 'vital forces.' Indeed, Kant and many of the German biologists were strongly committed to the idea that all objects in Nature, be they organic or inorganic, are completely controlled by mechanical physical laws. These scientists had no objection to the idea that living beings are brought into existence by the mechanical action of physical laws. What they objected to was the possibility of constructing a scientific theory, based on mechanism alone, which described that coming into being, and that could completely describe the organization of life. . . . In Kant's view, a mechanical explanation"¦could be given only when there is a clear separation between cause and effect. In living beings, causes and effects are inextricably mixed. . . . ultimate biological explanations require a special non-mechanical notion of causality - teleology - in which each part is simultaneously cause and effect. Parts related to the whole in this way transcend mechanical causality.
And:
The limitation of explanation in terms of mechanical causality can perhaps be best understood by comparing a living being to a computer. As Michael Polanyi has pointed out the internal workings of the computer can of course be completely understood in terms of physical laws. What cannot be so explained is the computer's program. To explain the program requires reference to the purpose of the program, that is, to teleology. Even the evolution of a deterministic Universe cannot be completely understood in terms of the differential equations which govern evolution. The boundary conditions of the differential equations must also be specified. These boundary conditions are not determined by the laws of physics which are differential equations.
Now consider the words of Phillips and Quake:
Understanding collective effects in the cell will require merging two philosophical viewpoints. The first is that life is like a computer program: An infrastructure of machines carries out arbitrary instructions that are encoded into DNA software. The second viewpoint is purely physical: Life arises from a mixing together of chemicals that follow basic physical principles to self-assemble into an organism. Presumably, the repertoire of available behaviors is more limited in the latter. The two viewpoints are complementary, not incompatible: Either one could best describe cell behavior, depending on the particular situation.
Complementary, not incompatible.
May 30th, 2006 at 11:36 am
I think the problem is that the Kantian notion leaves teleology as _redundant_. I think they are complementary (in some degree), but that the purely physical viewpoint is incomplete — not having sufficient causal efficacy to produce the effect.
I take Polkinghorne's notion that the laws of physics are "open" — that they do not fully determine the effect. I view our bodies as being essentially "teleology amplifiers", which take the combined open-ness of numerous reactions (on whatever levels they are open) and direct them towards a specific end.
As Polkinghorne pointed out, classical physics appeared deterministic because it only dealt with very stable systems. You can _create_ stability, but most systems are not so stable. It is very likely that most of physics is open to a small degree. And the body can amplify such openness to make a will have effects in the world.
The Kantian notion takes it as physics being fully deterministic. While not being totally incompatible with teleology, it does make it redundant. I think the view of an "open physics" makes better sense of both worlds.
Comment by johnnyb — May 30, 2006 @ 11:36 am
May 30th, 2006 at 12:59 pm
Hi johnnyb,
I looks like there is a growing consensus among physcists that the reductionist view of science represents an inadequate approach. According to Paul Davies and Nobel physicist Robert Laughlin we are entering a new age of science where the focus will be on the dynamics of emergence. This approach takes seriously top-down causation. Laughlin also talks about a collective instability in things like gene expression. This means that systems that are collectively unstable can be very sensitive to small inputs from the environment (or intelligence?). Autocatalysis is another area where "one time events" are prevalent and "open".
The import of all this, at least to me, is that intentionality need not be introduced "in the gaps" but could an inherent part of the unfolding of reality.
Comment by Steve Petermann — May 30, 2006 @ 12:59 pm
May 30th, 2006 at 9:18 pm
[...] Telic Thoughts has two quotes from Barrow and Tipler's The Cosmological Anthropic Principle on Kant, biology, and teleology. Kant's notion of teleology had an enormous influence on the work of German biologists in the first half of the nineteenth century. Like Kant, for the most part these biologists did not regard teleology and mechanism as polar opposites, but rather as explanatory modes complementary to each other. Mechanism was expected to provide a completely accurate picture of life at the chemical level, without the need to invoke 'vital forces.' Indeed, Kant and many of the German biologists were strongly committed to the idea that all objects in Nature, be they organic or inorganic, are completely controlled by mechanical physical laws. These scientists had no objection to the idea that living beings are brought into existence by the mechanical action of physical laws. What they objected to was the possibility of constructing a scientific theory, based on mechanism alone, which described that coming into being, and that could completely describe the organization of life. . . . In Kant's view, a mechanical explanation"¦could be given only when there is a clear separation between cause and effect. In living beings, causes and effects are inextricably mixed. . . . ultimate biological explanations require a special non-mechanical notion of causality - teleology - in which each part is simultaneously cause and effect. Parts related to the whole in this way transcend mechanical causality. [...]
Pingback by Darwiniana » Kant and biology — May 30, 2006 @ 9:18 pm