Keep in mind nothing I am proposing here suggests the DM approach is flawed in terms of how you score things, I just think you perhaps have too simplistic a view of what you expect the resulting data to show and how would expect to be able to use that data.

There is probably a kernel of truth to this, as the DM is not intended as a final word but more as a first step. If someone has a better approach, let’s see it.

It seems silly to look at a bunch of examples from the right side of the evolution bell curve and try to claim, "these few examples are more likely to have been designed."

This is a straw man representation.

Even adding in you additional correction factors simply adds one more dimension (all the other factors basically boil down to "analogy to human artifacts") which may or may not even correlate to designed verse evolved artifacts.

Yes, the DM does not deliver certainty and entails taking the risk of being wrong. But none of this is a serious problem. The significance of the four criteria is explained on pp. 269-271.

Now lets consider an extreme case. Lets assume for a second that there is a strong selective pressure against kludges and lets also assume that the designer is really really dumb.

We can assume this, but a moment’s consideration tells us it is not likely to be relevant. First, from a serious investigative perspective, it’s unlikely we are dealing with a really really dumb designer because we’d be dealing with a designer that was able to accomplish something we are still a long way from doing – designing life. So I don’t think we need to seriously worry about a designer that is dumber than we are. Secondly, I see no serious reason to think strong selective pressure against kludges exist, at least at a frequent enough level to skew the analysis to the extent that it is worthless. As I have explained above, kluges are the very hallmark of the blind watchmaker’s design output. You are effectively suggesting that the blind watchmaker selects against the signature output of the blind watchmaker.

My point here is that individual examples don't tell us anything because they don't show the shape of the curve.

Then you are missing the whole point of the analysis, as it is not about determining the shape of the curve. This score assumes the shape of the curve based upon what we know about the two different types of designers. So let’s skip to the main issue here.

To visualize this, the designer has a narrow bell curve tightly grouped at the upper end of the scale. Sure the designer doesn't always get things perfect, but he is consistently performing very well. In fact it would be extremely rare for the designer to score a negative score since the scale of his curve is so small.

We are in good agreement here. Of course it is possible a very rational design may appear irrational because we don’t understand it or have experience with this form of design, but the DM never promised to free us from false positives and false negatives. Thus, we can proceed with the working assumption that this curve is, on balance, reliable.

And what would it mean? First, we have a metric, independent on any concerns about the blind watchmaker, for assessing a design inference. Since we do not expect kluges from an intelligent watchmaker, we have a method of moving away from a design inference. This also opens the doors for research possibilities, as the kludginess of a design may only be apparent and a deeper analysis may extract a hitherto unrealized rationality embedded within the system. For example, at first glance, the incorporation of the mutable base cytosine may look kludgy, but as I show in my book, this need not be the case. In fact, I uncover a pattern that, as far as I have been able to tell, has not be appreciated by anyone before (see figure 7-2). Again, let me stress that all of this can be had without any consideration of the blind watchmaker.

Now, if we turn and bring the blind watchmaker into the picture, we add another dimension. And that gets to your point:

Evolution, on the other hand, has a much wider curve. It's average score might be zero but its curve is very wide. This means it frequently stumbles across both absolute kludges and brilliant solutions. The shape of this curve explains why I expect mostly kludges but also some really good solutions. If there is a selective pressure against kludges that might push the location of the curve towards the rational end but the blind search mechanism should still generate a large scale curve with many examples across the whole range.

Yet you are doing nothing more than restating what you believe rather than describing what is there. I would argue that the curve is more narrow than you think and situated further to the left than you think. I explain and document why in my previous comment. (I like the interview with Marcus, who when asked, “Why do you think that the mind is a kluge?”, explains, “There are two answers to that. The first is a general argument about evolution: that if you look at evolution it makes a lot of kluges. Evolution tends not to optimise things; it simply tinkers with what's already there. So it tends to make things better but there's no guarantee that it will make the best.”) ->It is the blind watchmaker which understandably leads him to expect the mind is a kludge.

And let’s not overlook that this problem becomes more acute if exaptation is invoked at the base of the explanation, because this effectively attempts to credit chance for rationality.

So what we have here are two different assumptions about that non-telic curve and that’s as far as we can get. So what, thus far, has the DM helped us to see?

1. The approach you advocate is much like a mirror image of YEC – the YEC rationalizes kludges and you rationalize rational solutions. Your approach safely protects the blind watchmaker from the data.

The DM is different, employing much greater methodological constraint, where kludges count against design and rational solutions count for design. This approach will appeal only to the open-minded investigator and not the apologists from either side of the aisle who don’t want anything to count against their favorite origins story.

2. Since blind watchmaker works like a bricoleur rather than a cunning engineer, I see no justification for your non-telic curve. What you need is some independent evidence to support the contention that the blind watchmaker, which blindly jury rigs and cobbles from what is immediately available, is likely to produce rational designs. This may be difficult, as it won’t help to identify a rational system and simply assume that only the blind watchmaker was behind it just because it evolved.

3. At the most, what you have is a concern about false positives, which, in your mind, is likely to be so common that it invalidates a highly positive Rationality Score as a further clue that points toward design. Yet even if somehow a massive body of evidence were to pour in to support your perspective, as I explained above, the DM already effective controls for that and we end up back where we started - ambiguity.

Your main criticism is weak

I think the primary difference in our viewpoints can be extrapolated by this single question you asked:

If you expect to find mostly kludges, why would you expect a rational solution from a process that produces mostly kludges?

I will attempt to use standard terminology from probability theory in my answer, please let me know if you want clarification on any of these terms. If you plotted the 'rationality' along the X axis and the number of designs along the Y axis then I would expect the curves for both a designer and evolution to follow some form of continuous probability distribution when you plot all the things they have designed. This curve has two parameters, location and scale. Just for illustrative purposes lets assume both follow a normal distribution curve, this means the location is also the mean and the median. The larger the scale the "wider" the normal distribution curve would be. I would expect:

Designer: high location, small scale
Evolution: zero location, large scale

To visualize this, the designer has a narrow bell curve tightly grouped at the upper end of the scale. Sure the designer doesn't always get things perfect, but he is consistently performing very well. In fact it would be extremely rare for the designer to score a negative score since the scale of his curve is so small.

Evolution, on the other hand, has a much wider curve. It's average score might be zero but its curve is very wide. This means it frequently stumbles across both absolute kludges and brilliant solutions. The shape of this curve explains why I expect mostly kludges but also some really good solutions. If there is a selective pressure against kludges that might push the location of the curve towards the rational end but the blind search mechanism should still generate a large scale curve with many examples across the whole range.

My point here is that individual examples don't tell us anything because they don't show the shape of the curve. Further even a whole book full of +5 rationality examples tells us nothing. You seem to claim that enough +5 examples will push you through the explanatory continuum towards plausibility but that's simply not good enough. Given your subjective scoring method a statistical analysis is required to reach any sort of reasonable conclusion. First this means you need to gather enough data points that the shape of the curve starts to present itself. Second you need a method of gathering data that avoids cherry picking just the +5 examples. Third, you are trying to separate individual cases into "likely designed" and "likely evolved" but you have a data collection method that can only make any sense of things by looking probabilistically at a large number of data points all at once; this creates a fundamental conflict.

Now lets consider an extreme case. Lets assume for a second that there is a strong selective pressure against kludges and lets also assume that the designer is really really dumb. This designer consulted his horoscope and it said, "Sugar, your lucky numbers today are 4 and 20," so he designed life with 4 nucleotides on a sugar backbone with 20 amino acids. This theoretical designer might only be smart enough that the location of his curve is 2 on the rationality scale. And since this theoretical world has a strong selective pressure against kludges the evolution curve might also have a location of 2 on the rationality scale. Both design and evolution in this scenario end up scoring the same average. I would still expect those curves to have different scales, though. I would still expect evolution to have a large scale and a designer to have a small scale. My point in this example is that "evolved" verse "designed" is not necessarily even determined by the average value. You seem to claim that you can simply average up all these values and conclude design if the average is high enough, I don't think the average tells us nearly as much as the shape of the curve would tell us.

Keep in mind nothing I am proposing here suggests the DM approach is flawed in terms of how you score things, I just think you perhaps have too simplistic a view of what you expect the resulting data to show and how would expect to be able to use that data. It seems silly to look at a bunch of examples from the right side of the evolution bell curve and try to claim, "these few examples are more likely to have been designed." Even adding in you additional correction factors simply adds one more dimension (all the other factors basically boil down to "analogy to human artifacts") which may or may not even correlate to designed verse evolved artifacts.

I already said who, in this case it's Mike but its common among ID supporters. The claim that a highly rational design cannot be achieved by evolution is a metaphysical claim that evolution is somehow limited against creating a highly rational solution.

I do not claim that rational design cannot be achieved by evolution. If that was the case, there would be no need for a scoring system and one could develop this argument in accord with the traditional template. It’s a question of what counts for and against design. The metaphysical claim is the one that explains all possible data in these regards – the blind watchmaker supposedly crafts both kludges and rational designs.

On the other hand, if you agree that evolution can create a highly rational design than the Rationality score of the DM is not useful for separating evolution from a designer.

No, you would have to show that the blind watchmaker most commonly crafts things that would be subjectively recognized as rational by rational beings.

Obviously that's exactly the claim I'm questioning, so simply restating the claim doesn't help.

If you read the part I was replying to, you seemed to be under the impression that the Rationality Score was intended to show that front-loading was required. So yes, I do think it helps to point out that this was not the case as the Rationality Score simply helps us tease apart the blind watchmaker from an intelligent watchmaker.

did not claim that, I claim it tells us nothing.

From your comments above, it seems clear that you argue a kludge counts against design. That’s more than nothing.

I would expect evolution to be more likely then a designer to result in a kludge but I would expect evolution to create some really cleaver solutions as well.

So the blind watchmaker explains everything – both kludges and rational design – allowing you to credit the blind watchmaker for everything. All bases are covered such that the Duck absorbs all data.

Likewise even a YEC could justify a kludge by rationalizing why their imaginary designer might have created it or what hidden benefit it actually has.

Yes, the approach you advocate is much like a mirror image of YEC – the YEC rationalizes kludges and you rationalize rational solutions.

The DM is different, employing much greater methodological constraint, where kludges count against design and rational solutions count for design. This approach will appeal only to the open-minded investigator and not the apologists from either side of the aisle who don’t want anything to count against their favorite origins story.

I'm surprised to hear you say that as it seems to show a fairly significant misunderstanding about MET. Even given the axiom that kludges would be selected against what leads you to claim there is no selective pressure against kludges just because some kludges exist?

It is your position that the blind watchmaker selects against kludges, thus your burden to demonstrate this.

Perhaps it would help to pause and define a kludge. Let me quote from Gary Marcus, who defines it as follows:

A kluge is a clumsy or inelegant solution to a problem that gets the job done, but not necessarily in the best way possible.

Good definition. And note the vital ingredient as far as the blind watchmaker is concerned – “gets the job done.” That is all that is needed. As long as a solution gets the job done (and getting the job done is simply about reproductive success), it gets selected. That’s all. The blind watchmaker is blind because it cannot see if a solution is clumsy or inelegant; it only sees whether or the not the job is done. This is why we expect kludges from the blind watchmaker.

But let’s add more. Marcus is told, “But we tend to think of evolution as something that produces the best possible solution to a problem.” Note his reply:

And that's just not true. Darwin didn't actually say "survival of the fittest"; I think that was Huxley, but people take that as their crude approximation to evolution. They think that must mean that the fittest thing that could possibly be will survive, but really it means the fittest of the available options. Evolution can't take a step back and ask what the best option would be; it just works with what it has. And that's what leads to tinkering and ultimately the kluges.

The blind watchmaker is about tinkering and kludges. http://bio3520.nicerweb.com/" rel="nofollow">Peter Chen puts it this way:

Natural selection is the process by which less fit phenotypes are culled from the population (e.g., by predation events, competition, or failure to reproduce). Thus, only organisms possessing traits that aid in survival and reproductive success are able to contribute to future generations. Natural selection can operate only on existing variability, which may have arisen through any number of mutations, genetic recombination, or migration of new phenotypes (and their underlying genotypes) into the population. Just as a tinkerer is restricted to the parts he has in his workshop, so too is natural selection limited to the variability that exists in nature. Furthermore, just as a tinkerer’s creations seem jury-rigged, so too do the products of natural selection. This is because certain pieces that the tinkerer might like to use may only be available to him at certain times, and the same holds true for the process of natural selection. The tinkerer and natural selection alike produce a product that is well designed, but not necessarily aesthetically pleasing.

This is why Jacob accurately noted that natural selection works like a bricoleur rather than a cunning engineer and Massimo Pigliucci endorsed this view. This is why Ken Miller sees the blind watchmaker at work when he sees “ nothing so much as a hodgepodge of borrowed, copied, mutated, and discarded sequences and commands that has been cobbled together by millions of years of trial and error against the relentless test of survival."”

We don’t expect rational, elegant, aesthetically pleasing results from a non-rational process that behaves like a tinkering, jury-rigging, bricoleur.

I would say the blind watchmaker mimics a designer because the adaptations it crafts are often very rational solutions.

Unless you can demonstrate that these rational solutions were indeed generated by non-telic forces, you are begging the question. But I say that the blind watchmaker mimics a designer simply because it produces adaptations and a rational solution would simply be a subset of all possible adaptations. Kludges satisfy the needs of the blind watchmaker and because evolution is under historical constraint, cannot be erased simply because they are kludges.

This is a common theme among ID supporters though, they apply metaphysical limits on what they think the capabilities of the blind watcher might be and then they claim design because life exceeds their arbitrarily imagined limits. Although evolution is certainly constrained in ways a designer is not there is no arbitrary limit to the complexity or rationality of its final products.

You are over-reacting, as there are no proposed limits. This is not about finding something that the blind watchmaker cannot do (recall, that would be an expression of the traditional template discussed in chapter 2). This is about scoring and using criteria to determine what counts for and against design based upon what we would expect. I score kludges against design and rational solutions for design. You score kludges against design and rational solutions for non-telic processes. My approach is open-ended, your approach has only one output.

What leads us to call one thing more rational than another? We use various factors like how many steps are required, how directly it carries out its function, how many parts must interact, and how successfully the function is carried out. These are all related and could be generalized as 'efficiency'.

Yes, as I explain in the book, efficiency is one facet of rational design. But rationality is far more multi-dimensional that any single metric. For example, it was not efficiency which led me to propose the rational relationship between proteins and DNA.

Wouldn't you expect the most efficient adaptation to have the survival advantage?

If so, we should expect the planet to be covered only with bacteria, as this is the most efficient cell design for replication.

It seems intuitive that the most rational solution according to our perceptions would also be the most efficient solution and thus have a selective advantage. To be honest I can't fathom why anyone would expect 'rationality' and 'survival advantage' not to highly correlated.

And I can’t fathom why you think they are so closely linked. Rationality is a subjective quality and is something that is recognized by beings who possess the attribute. Why would you think such a subjective reality is seen by the blind watchmaker? Why do you think natural selection is called the blind watchmaker?

No, YOU don't expect a rational solution, I obviously do ;).

Sure, and you also expect kludges – you have all the bases covered.

I might expect to find mostly kludges, which seems to be confirmed by my casual observations, but I would also expect to find some absolutely brilliant solutions too.

Hold on here. If you expect to find mostly kludges, why would you expect a rational solution from a process that produces mostly kludges?

I would also predict that the "older" a system is the more likely it would be to contain highly rational solutions. This follows from my belief that 'rational' solutions do, in fact, have a survival advantage so the more deep time a system has endured the more rational I would expect the result to be from a statistical standpoint (in other words I would expect individual cases to violate this but to form a general pattern).

But you have yet to show that rational solutions have a survival advantage over kludges. Do you have evidence that rational solutions come with a higher reproductive success when competing against kludges?

Also note that these people you are quoting are claiming that life as we know it meets their definition of “complex, redundant, suboptimal, and not too pretty.” He says, "Exactly like living organisms, and precisely what you would expect from a natural phenomenon." Those quotes seem to completely agree with what I'm saying.

No they don’t – they are pointing out that the blind watchmaker works like a bricoleur rather than a cunning engineer. You are trying to argue the opposite.

I use the blind watchmaker as a metaphor for evolution, so they really are the same in my mind.

But they are not. The blind watchmaker is a metaphor for a mechanism of evolution. And as I have pointed out, there is no reason to treat evolution and design as mutually exclusive topics.

But the very essence of my claim is precisely that a non-telic process can exhibit certain behaviors identical to a telic process.

Yes, but have you not demonstrated this claim.

The element that I see as superfluous is purpose or intent. I've seen nothing to justify the claim of purpose or intent so my bias towards minimalism compels me to challenge the telic perspective.

What data would justify the claim of purpose or intent?

It's your scale so you are free to define it however you like, it just seems to me that the possibility space goes from "extremely bad" through "neutral" to "extremely good."

Yes, that’s -5 to 0 to +5.

An extremely bad design would be one that, say, ensured the eventual extinction of the species and that would be highly irrational (-5 score).

You can only score that which exists. If something is so irrational that it fails to work, selection removes it. But we clearly can have working, irrational solutions. In The Design Matrix, I give the PCP degradation pathway a Rationality Score of -4. It works, yes, but it has all sorts of kludging features.

Then again this points out another weakness of your scale. In nature if you found a -5 rationality design it would almost certainly be an indication of telic interference since, as you point out, nothing in nature would survive to be scored with such a bad design. Yet you add a telic agent and they can, for example, breed dogs with faces so flat they would die of sinus infections if left to survive on their own. Or breed fruit trees with fruit that is completely sterile such that it cannot reproduce in the absence of the telic agent. In these cases only though knowledge of the intelligent agent can any sort of rationality be inferred in the result (for example, the agent likes furry human-proportioned faces for aesthetic reasons and likes to eat bananas but only if they do not contain large hard seeds). So it seems both extremes of the Rationality scale might imply telic agency.

No one said the Matrix was perfect. So sure, if we found evidence of something that should not exist according to natural causes, yet exists and persists for millions of years, you might very well have evidence of a telic agent. Although, I would not score an irrational system as indicative of design unless we found the thing your analogies presume –independent evidence of the telic agent sustaining the irrational system. Yet the Matrix is about assessing design inferences without the luxury of such independent evidence.

Nevertheless, after all this, I’m struck by the fact that you don’t seem to realize the Matrix already does a good job controlling for your basic complaint. Let’s say that we score a system with a Rationality Score of +5, but we don’t score the other three criteria. That would give as a DM score of 0, 0. 5, 0, thus 1.25. This is hardly a score that would reflect a deep conviction. You might see it as a false positive, but then again, you are a non-teleologist who assigns all features to the blind watchmaker. But let’s say the system was generated by evolution and there is good evidence for this. Then you have a score of 0, -5, 5, and 0 for a final DM score of 0 – completely ambiguous. Now while a score of complete ambiguity may be troubling for those who think they see clearly, I’m not too concerned about such complaints. So y’see, your concern has already been addressed by the logic of the scoring system when I wrote the book.

This topic gets even more interesting once we begin to couple IC with rationality. As I explain in the book, the non-telic explanations for IC ultimately reach for exaptation at the base of it all. How do we define that? According to one site, “The utilization of a structure or feature for a function other than that for which it was developed through natural selection.” You’ve lost whatever slim thread there was for explaining rationality. Unless foresight is involved, there is no reason to think a fortuitous process such as exaptation is going spawn rational solutions (of course, this was all addressed in the book).

Zachriel: The discovery of a griffin or centaur would represent a substantial violation of Common Descent. There is no plausible ancestor.

kornbelt888: So isn't what you're really saying is that if something were found that didn't fit into the current phylogenic tree, the phylogenic tree would have to be modified?

A centaur would simply not fit the phylogenetic tree. It is a cross of two separate lineages, a human and a horse. But let's assume it is not an exact cross, but something somewhat like a horse and a human. We still have a mammal with six limbs, and still no plausible ancestor.

kornbelt888: Haven't things been found that have caused that to occur to a lesser degree?

Of course. When dealing with historical reconstruction, especially of a history that stretches over millions of years and left little evidence, there are going to be gaps and missteps.

kornbelt888: If so, then aren't we talking about a matter of degree?

Scientists often use words like "plausible" and "reasonable". But ultimately it comes back to be able to make valid empirical predictions. Stories of centaurs have all the characteristics of human imagination (design). But you are welcome to propose an alternative hypothesis.

kornbelt888: How much of a "non fit" would have to occur before common descent was abandoned?

Consider Mercury's anomalous precession. One could have bombastically declared that the anomaly falsified Newton's Theory of Universal Gravitation. But Newton's Theory remained successful at predicting a vast number of other phenomena, from moons to apples. So, Mercury's errant orbit remained shelved as an anomaly. Call it Newton's Theory of Almost Universal (except Mercury's anomalous precession) Gravitation.

Again, it comes back to being able to propose and test valid hypotheses.

Zachriel: The discovery of a griffin or centaur would represent a substantial violation of Common Descent. There is no plausible ancestor.

So isn't what you're really saying is that if something were found that didn't fit into the current phylogenic tree, the phylogenic tree would have to be modified? Haven't things been found that have caused that to occur to a lesser degree? If so, then aren't we talking about a matter of degree? How much of a "non fit" would have to occur before common descent was abandoned?

kornbelt888: As for Cambrian rabbits (did you mean pre-cambrian?), that would cause some reconsideration of some lineages and understanding about the emergence of mammals, but would it necessitate a radical new theory to accommodate it?

Zachriel: A Precambrian rabbit would precede its posited ancestor. It's extremely doubtful Common Descent could survive such a challenge.

Why? It would only necessarily indicate the current phylogenic tree does not exhaustively map to all the real world life-forms on earth. Why should anyone be surprised by that? If the rocks started to show that mammals emerge prior to the cambrian, and then apparently re-emerged during the cambrian, by some unknown mechanism, how would Common Descent necessarily be violated? Would that appease the doubters? I'm not sure I buy the griffin or rabbit argument that it would necessarily blast Common Descent of the map, esp in the eyes of hardened anti-telics. But I think it would sure add fire to those already skeptical of Common Descent.

kornbelt888: So mythological chimeras … are irrelevant.

The discovery of a griffin or centaur would represent a substantial violation of Common Descent. There is no plausible ancestor.

kornbelt888: As for Cambrian rabbits (did you mean pre-cambrian?), that would cause some reconsideration of some lineages and understanding about the emergence of mammals, but would it necessitate a radical new theory to accommodate it?

A Precambrian rabbit would precede its posited ancestor. It's extremely doubtful Common Descent could survive such a challenge. A single example would probably be considered anomalous, though.

kornbelt888: Although, I think the term "explain" is more appropriate than "justify." At any rate, MET and ID can both "explain anything", so both are equal as far as that goes.

Todd B: Actually, I'd say "rationalize" is the more correct term; "god did it" certainly explains nothing. And no, MET cannot "explain anything" because its not a magical supernatural force.

I neither mentioned "god" or any "magical supernatural force."

Common examples of things MET cannot explain: mythological chimeras, Cambrian rabbits, the origin of life, the laws of physics (which Ben Stein seems dumb enough to expect it to explain), etc etc etc.

By "everything", I meant everything with regards to biological evolution. Apologies for not making that clear. So mythological chimeras, the origin of life, and the laws of physics, are irrelevant.

As for Cambrian rabbits (did you mean pre-cambrian?), that would cause some reconsideration of some lineages and understanding about the emergence of mammals, but would it necessitate a radical new theory to accommodate it?

kornbelt888: Although, I think the term "explain" is more appropriate than "justify." At any rate, MET and ID can both "explain anything", so both are equal as far as that goes.

Actually, I'd say "rationalize" is the more correct term; "god did it" certainly explains nothing. And no, MET cannot "explain anything" because its not a magical supernatural force. Common examples of things MET cannot explain: mythological chimeras, Cambrian rabbits, the origin of life, the laws of physics (which Ben Stein seems dumb enough to expect it to explain), etc etc etc.