Why Telic Language in non-ID Biology?
by Steve PetermannIn response to g arago's comment here at Telic Thoughts, Allen MacNeill blogs on The Resurrection of Formal and Final Causes. He also talks about this here where he presents (and agrees with) Ernst Mayr's arguments for the legitimacy of teleological language in biology. Of course I would also argue that telic language in biology is legitimate but for different reasons. Let's take a look at the arguments and perhaps a strange implication will come to light.
Here's the way Mayr described the teleological language used in biology:
Ernst Mayr [1] distinguished between two different kinds of natural processes that appear to be "goal directed":
Teleomatic processes: Processes that simply follow natural laws, i.e. lead to a result consequential to concomitant physical forces, and the reaching of their end state is not controlled by a built-in program. The law of gravity and the second law of thermodynamics are among the natural laws which most frequently govern teleomatic processes. Examples include the cooling to ambient temperature of a red hot bar of iron and the falling of a rock to the ground.
Teleonomic processes: Processes that owe their goal-directedness to the operation of a program. The term teleonomic implies goal-direction. This, in turn, implies a dynamic process rather than a static condition, as represented by a system. Examples include the development of an adult organism from a fertilized zygote and the building of a dam by beavers.
and
Mayr argues very strongly that the common use of teleological language by biologists is legitimate because it recognizes the goal-directedness of biological processes. He also stresses that, although many biological processes (such as ontogeny) are clearly goal-directed, they owe their goal-directedness to the operation of programs, such as the genetic program encoded in the DNA. He concludes that although such programs themselves are goal-directed (i.e. purposeful), the process by which such programs have come into being "“ evolution by natural selection "“ is NOT itself goal directed..
It's interesting that Mayr uses the "program" rubric to distinguish between teleomatic and teleonomic processes. This distinction puzzles me. Take a hurricane, for instance. Mayr would describe this as teleomatic, in other words "no program". Whereas he claims that biotic systems have a program and are therefore teleonomic. This seems a weird distinction for a naturalist. After all a hurricane has a program as well. It's called the meteorological state of affairs. How is the meteorological state of affairs any different from the genetic/biotic state of affairs? According to materialists they would both mechanistically create the next state of affairs.
But where does Mayr get his idea that programs are goal directed? From analogical thinking of course. He knows that humans create programs that are goal directed. What creates those programs? Intelligence of course. Apparently Mayr wants to use teleological thinking (for some reason) but instead of following the analogy where it leads, he wants to truncate it for some reason.
So if there is really no distinction between the "goal directedness" of a hurricane and a biotic system, does using teleological language in biology really make any sense? Why can't biologists who are critical of ID teleology just eliminate all telic language (purpose, function, design, plan, goal, etc) from their speech. Wouldn't that be interesting? Anyone care to try it for just one week?
May 16th, 2006 at 11:46 pm
[...] I've found myself in an unusual position tonight. I agree with most of what an ID supporter writes. He, Steve Petermann, is writing about a distinction made by Ernst Mayr between teleomatic and teleonomic processes, and argues in essense that the distinction makes no sense. I rather agree. Consequently… So if there is really no distinction between the "goal directedness" of a hurricane and a biotic system, does using teleological language in biology really make any sense? Why can't biologists who are critical of ID teleology just eliminate all telic language (purpose, function, design, plan, goal, etc) from their speech. Wouldn't that be interesting? Anyone care to try it for just one week? Telic Thoughts » Why Telic Language in non-ID Biology? [...]
Pingback by hell’s handmaiden » Blog Archive » Telic Language in Biology? — May 16, 2006 @ 11:46 pm
May 17th, 2006 at 11:18 am
I think the following comment from hell's handmaiden exposes why biologists *need* teleological language.
Quite simply, what is there in biology that cannot be explained by this simple little phrase, or it's obvious counterpart?
Hookworms don't climb upwards through the soil to get to the top. They climb upwards because in past generations those with this inclination reproduced better.
We can combine these two statements into:
Hookworms don't climb upwards through the soil to get to the top. They climb upwards because in past generations those with this inclination reproduced better than those without this inclination.
Replace "hookworm" and "climb unpwards through the soild" as needed for differing organisms and differing structures or behaviours.
Can anyone else now see why the need for teleogical language?
Comment by Mung — May 17, 2006 @ 11:18 am
May 17th, 2006 at 11:43 am
I remember having the same reservations when I first read Mayr's paper back in 1974. The reason for my reticence was this: clearly, if the overall theory of macroevolution is valid, then there must have been a transition from teleomatic causation to teleonomic causation in biological organisms. Furthermore, this transition cannot have been "sudden" (i.e. the result of some kind of "miracle"), if we are limited to strictly naturalistic causation. It follows, then, that there must have been some intermediate level of teleological causation that would qualify as "more than simply teleomatic" but "not quite fully teleonomic."
The obvious candidate for such a transition is the evolution of the genetic code and its translation apparatus (i.e. DNA "”> RNA "”> ribosome "”> polypeptide. If the code is truly arbitrary (i.e. there is no "necessary" correspondence between particular tRNAs, amino acids, and codon/anticodon sequences), then the origin of the code (which is the most obvious transition from teleomatic to teleonomic causation) is highly problematic. This was the reason for Francis Crick's proposal that the code was "seeded," rather than having evolved. His proposal, however, immediately fell prey to the "it's turtles all the way down" objection; it simply displaced the transition to an invisible (and therefore untestable) location. Comforting to Deists, but very unsatisfying to those steeped in the empiricist tradition.
To date, there is not enough empirical evidence either for the "sudden/miraculous invention" or the "naturalistic transition" model, despite many years of looking. As a scientist, therefore, I remain "agnostic" on the subject, and eagerly await further research (which, I might point out, is only being done by folks in the "naturalistic" tradition - ID people like Dembski (by his own pround admission) are above getting their hands dirty doing the requisite research).
Ever since the origin of the genetic code, however, there is ample (indeed, overwhelming) evidence that all that is necessary to get to where we are now (i.e. a diverse, inter-related, functional biosphere) is biological evolution as first proposed by Darwin. that was part of Darwin's genius (and his immense good luck) - by "starting in the middle" he avoided the really difficult problem of ultimate origins (the last paragraph of the Origin notwithstanding).
The real "gap" that ID could potentially fill is therefore the origin of the genetic code and translation apparatus. Everything that has happened since then is pure naturalism. To me, founding one's metaphysics and theology on an "Intelligent Designer" whose entire field of action focuses on the interactions between small nitro-carbons seems pretty small beer (hence my essay, "Natural Selection, Sparrows, and a Stochastic God" http://evolutionlist.blogspot.... ).
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — May 17, 2006 @ 11:43 am
May 17th, 2006 at 12:16 pm
Hi Allen,
These sorts of categorical distinctions like that Mayr is offering have always been problematic. Where and how does one draw the line. This is also a difficult problem for other distinctions like consciousness and the soul. I believe these problems are the reason for "it's turtles all the way down" positions like panpsychism, Chalmer's protophenomenon, and monistic theist and absolute idealist positions like my own. If teleology is not "all the way down" where does one draw the line? To me the weak teleology of deism or the combined weak and strong (primary and secondary causes) of classic theism do not offer elegant solutions.
What forms of ID offer are, however, at least an openness to expore these metaphysical speculations. Can there be empirical support for the "turtles" approach beyond analogy and logic? I think there can, but it probably won't convince materialists or even many traditional religious adherents. The support I think it can offer, at least, is that strong teleological positions are perfectly reasonable and consonant with empirical observations. I don't believe answers to these deep questions will ever be resolved beyond a doubt. The rabbit hole goes too deep for that.
Comment by Steve Petermann — May 17, 2006 @ 12:16 pm
May 17th, 2006 at 12:27 pm
Steve Petermann wrote:
"Where and how does one draw the line?"
An excellent question. I finally decided that you draw the line at the symbolic nature of the genetic code. That is, the nucleotides in DNA are "necessarily" complementary to the nucleotides in RNA, but the codons in mRNA don't appear to be "necessarily" correlated with the amino acids bound to the complementary tRNAs. Therefore, the code is "arbitrary" and "symbolic" in the same way that human languages are; there appears to be no "necessary" relationship between the code and the products of translation of the code.
If there were, evolution would be teleomatic all the way up, and therefore no different than gravity. However, the apparently arbitrary relationship between the code and its translated products is the source of the difference between Mayr's teleomatic and teleonomic processes; the results of gravity are teleomatic, but the results of gene translation are teleonomic.
Given the immense length of time that has transpired since the origin of the genetic code and translation apparatus, and the problems involved with modeling the spontaneous evolution of these processes in the laboratory, I am not sanguine about the resolution of this dilemma. That's why I'm an evolutionary psychologist "“ I, like Darwin, "start in the middle" after all the heavy lifting from teleomatic to teleonomic causation is done.
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — May 17, 2006 @ 12:27 pm
May 17th, 2006 at 2:32 pm
What evidence?
The fact that natural selection exists and is important to evolution, and the fact that evolution occurs, does not in the least indicate that natural selection of random mutations can generate all of the complexity and diversity we see.
This is something that is hotly debated within the anti-teleological evolutionary community, not just pointed out by ID-sympathisizers.
Comment by MatthewCromer — May 17, 2006 @ 2:32 pm
May 17th, 2006 at 2:34 pm
Hi, Steve, I think that Mayr's Teleomatic/Teleonomic distinction is extremely dubious, given what possibilities he brings to the table. His definition of a teleonomic process is one that follows a "program". But this is terribly confused. The word "program" is tied up in the concept of intentionality ("programmed" is more or less synonymous with "designed"). To say that something follows a program means that it is behaving in the way that it is intended to. The same goes for the word "function". It implies an agent with intrinsic intentionality that intended it to behave the way it does. But, Mayr goes on to explicitly say that these programs were generated by a process that does *not* have intentions. Literally, he is saying something like "Living things are teleonomic because they behave as they were intended by a process that has no intentions". He's presupposing the very intentionality he wants to deny. What he *ought* to say is that teleonomic processes are an illusion - that there are really only teleomatic processes, and that "program" does not describe anything objectively real, but perhaps that it is convenient for us to describe things this way.
Comment by Deuce — May 17, 2006 @ 2:34 pm
May 17th, 2006 at 2:50 pm
I find it interesting where Allen chooses to draw the line. Do we draw yet another line with the appearance of human language? Is that where Darwinism ceases and something else takes over?
If Darwinism cannot explain the code, it also cannot explain human languages. Why not? Are their origins also too distant in time?
Comment by Mung — May 17, 2006 @ 2:50 pm
May 17th, 2006 at 3:12 pm
It's almost a year old, but Mike's post, "Send Us Your Trash!", is so relevant to this thread.
Comment by Krauze — May 17, 2006 @ 3:12 pm
May 17th, 2006 at 3:22 pm
Allen,
But I can easily find a similar way of looking at "teleomatic" processes. Atoms could also be considered "symbolic". There would also be no necessary (as you define it) relationship between those symbols and the molecules that utilize them.
Comment by Steve Petermann — May 17, 2006 @ 3:22 pm
May 17th, 2006 at 8:48 pm
Steve Petermann wrote:
"Atoms could also be considered "symbolic". There would also be no necessary (as you define it) relationship between those symbols and the molecules that utilize them."
On the contrary, atoms are entirely "concrete," in that they do not "represent" anything else. Rather, they react with each other in precise and predictable ways when forming molecules, in ways that are entirely determined by a combination of the electronegativity of their nuclei and the distribution of electrons in their outer orbitals. There is absolutely nothing "arbitrary" or "symbolic" about this at all.
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — May 17, 2006 @ 8:48 pm
May 17th, 2006 at 8:52 pm
Steve Petermann wrote:
"…if telic thinking and language are helpful for Mayr, why would he then, out of the other side of his mouth claim that there is really nothing telic going on at fundamental levels. Seems arbitrary or ideological to me."
Quite the opposite: Mayr was very careful to point out that there is no empirical evidence to support the assertion that teleology is necessary for natural selection. True, one can include teleology in such explanations, but doing so does not add anything to them, and there is no limit to how many levels of teleological explanation one can add in this process.
In other words, the reason that evolutionary biologists (and scientists in general) do not include teleology in explanations of natural processes is that it isn't logically necessary to do so. That's all.
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — May 17, 2006 @ 8:52 pm
May 17th, 2006 at 9:37 pm
Can I get just a little love?
Over at his own blog Allen has as yet to address anything I've written. The trend continues here at TT. Is Steve's appeal to atoms (which has nothing to do with Allen's choice of where to draw the line) somehow more important than my question concerning human languages (which Allen admits is directly relevant to where he chooses to draw the line)?
Why does Allen choose the genetic code as the place where he will draw his line? What is it about evolutionary theory that is incapable of dealing with this arbitrary line?
What about the origins of human language, which Allen considers directly analogous to the origin of the genetic code? Does Allen draw a smilar line at the origin of human language? If so, why? If not, why not?
I reiterate, if Darwinism cannot explain the code, it also cannot explain human languages.
Comment by Mung — May 17, 2006 @ 9:37 pm
May 17th, 2006 at 9:41 pm
That is a common assumption of reductionist faith but not, as far as I know, demonstrated or even demonstratable.
The Schrodinger equation can be solved for a hydrogen atom, but for larger atoms and molecules the equation is so complex that it cannot be calculated exactly.
So in fact the electrical and chemical properties of atoms and molecules are discovered through a process of observation, not calculated from first principles. It is true that many of their properties fit the predictions of basic QM models, but others are not reduceable in detail at all.
Comment by MatthewCromer — May 17, 2006 @ 9:41 pm
May 17th, 2006 at 9:59 pm
Let's get back to the original topic. Why teleological language in biology?
I propose that it is due to the inadequacy of the alternative Darwinian explanation.
X is as it is because Y, which possessed X, out-reproduced Z, which lacked X, and, as a result of lacking X, Z produced fewer offspring tnan Y. It should be obvious that this does not explain the origin of X, and therefore all which follows is vacuous.
Comment by Mung — May 17, 2006 @ 9:59 pm
May 18th, 2006 at 2:45 am
Mung wrote:
What gives you the idea that 'Darwinism' should be used to explain human languages? Was Darwin a linguistic, or a botanist, biologist, i.e. naturalist?
Neo-Darwinism should not explain languages. Unfortunately, the 'theory of evolution' (or theories) have been stretched to linguistics as well. I've been working on a paper about this for some time, but it is not ready yet. If the words I am writing here, now, this moment, can be said to have 'evolved' onto the page, screen, etc. then my human agency is lost into some kind of environmentalist explanation. It is quite depersonalizing and has some connection with 'death of the author' ideology.
It is probably wrong to ask a natural scientist to explain where the line can or should be drawn about this. It would be asking someone to speak outside of their field fo expertise or specialization. I find some of the most balanced and reasonable persons in this 'debate' are those who know what they know and what they don't know. It seems to me that Mung, along with many, many, many others on the sidelines of this ID parade, have yet to confront the different between human-made and non-human made things. This is a great paradox that the IDM, to say nothing about TT's, seems ill-prepared to solve.
Arago
Comment by g arago — May 18, 2006 @ 2:45 am
May 18th, 2006 at 7:55 am
Allen,
Sure they do. Many physcists like Schrodinger and Davies have stated that what we call "atoms" are actually abstractions created by physcists to represent the data they discover by observations. They also question reifying those abstractions. (I can provide some quotes if you'd like) What they represent is the underlying structure of reality, whether it is further abstracted as zero sized particles, Planck sized superstrings or quantum loops.
They also represent the building blocks where many different molecules can be built. Maybe I misunderstood your reference to language. What I though you were saying is that a single word can be used in many ways with other words to create unique meanings. How is the use of "atoms" to create many different molecules any different from the building blocks of DNA which can be expressed many different ways to produce proteins?
Are you saying that there is something especially different in the physics of going from DNA transcription to final product? I don't follow?
Comment by Steve Petermann — May 18, 2006 @ 7:55 am
May 18th, 2006 at 11:26 am
"In other words, the reason that evolutionary biologists (and scientists in general) do not include teleology in explanations of natural processes is that it isn't logically necessary to do so. That's all.""”Allen_MacNeill
Except that they do include teleology in explanations of natural (biological) processes and it certainly isn't a question of "necessity" at all. They do so because it accurately describes what they observe and demonstrate. What explains the felt necessity to eliminate such language in biological explanations?
James G. Lennox, "Darwin was a teleologist," Biology and Philosophy Volume 8, Number 4 October 1993, pp. 409 "“ 421.
Abstract It is often claimed that one of Darwin''s chief accomplishments was to provide biology with a non-teleological explanation of adaptation. A number of Darwin''s closest associates, however, and Darwin himself, did not see it that way. In order to assess whether Darwin''s version of evolutionary theory does or does not employ teleological explanation, two of his botanical studies are examined. The result of this examination is that Darwin sees selection explanations of adaptations as teleological explanations. The confusion in the nineteenth century about Darwin''s attitude to teleology is argued to be a result of Darwin''s teleological explanations not conforming to either of the dominant philosophical justifications of teleology at that time. Darwin''s explanatory practices conform well, however, to recent defenses of the teleological character of selection explanations.
(Thanks to Fran O'Rourke ["Aristotle and the Metaphysics of Evolution," Rev. of Metaphysics 58: 1 (Sep. 2004), p. 20.] for the reference to Lennox.)
Also a non-niggling niggle (and one of my favorite non-niggling niggles) here: This schema, that we've all seen a thousand times, I'm sure, "DNA "”> RNA "”> ribosome "”> polypeptide" is incorrect. Biologists know its incorrect and if they don't they are in the wrong business. I suspect that they feel this truncated simplification somehow illustrates an important biological principle. But it doesn't. It's misleading about the true principle. DNA maps into fitness, adaptation. And like human language, it is a decidedly non-arbitrary mapping. It is an adaptation for adaptation. (Maybe there is some controversy about that idea"”that human language is an adaptation and an adaptation facilitating further adaptation?)
Is "adaptation" an intrinsically teleological notion? (And an adaptation for adapting doubly so!) Now maybe the IDers really have little if anything to offer, like Dr. MacNeill says, in advancing science. But I am reminded that Ronald Fisher criticized biologists for having abandoned the subject of adaptation (!) because adaptation had "teleological" connotations for them (?!). If Fisher's criticism was true it is an obvious case where a non-teleological bias was is a science-stopper.
Now, I think its probably nearly-impossible for a biologists to investigate biology and not be investiging adaptation in some way, shape, or form. (Like how I slipped that Aristotilean "form" in there?) What I think he was criticizing was the abandonment of a systematic, theoretically-driven investigation into adaptation. Which I think was part-and-parcel with his general criticism that the biologists of his day just weren't very good "Darwinists."
Dr. MacNeill can explain, but what must be meant by "arbitrary"? Does it imply arbitrary wrt fitness? Which ("fitness") was what was dropped from the schema. Is the commonly represented truncated version really disguising a fundamental (and decidedly anti-teleological) hypothesis? Genetic variation is random (arbitrary) wrt fitness?
Comment by Rock — May 18, 2006 @ 11:26 am
May 19th, 2006 at 11:04 am
I use the term "arbitrary" in the sense that there seems to be no "necessary" connection between the codons, anticodons, tRNAs, and the proteins that are produced by their interactions. For example, the mRNA codon AUG codes for the amino acid methionine via compementary binding with a tRNA that has the anticodon UAC. While it is true that this complementary binding is absolutely "faithful" (that is, only this codon-antidocon pair specifies the amino acid methionine), there is no evidence that I'm aware of that "requires" that this codon-anticodon pair correspond to methionine. During the origin of the code, in other words, the amino acid methionine and the codon-anticodon pair AUG/UAC became associated for purely arbitrary reasons, but once they were associated, that association became fixed and has remained so ever since. There seems to be no physical/chemical reason why that codon-anticodon pair became associated with methionine and not arginine, for example.
Bottom line: the association of particular amino acids with particular codon-anticodon pairs appears to have been arbitrary, but once fixed it became absolutely necessary.
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — May 19, 2006 @ 11:04 am
May 19th, 2006 at 5:22 pm
Hi, Mung, you made an excellent point in your first comment on this topic, and I wanted to expand on it.
Note that Hell's Handmaiden has taken the position that I said Mayr should've taken in my previous post: Living things don't really have functions after all. Some reproduced, and some didn't, and that's all there is to explain.
But here's the rub. If living things don't have functions, then their (nonexistent) functions don't need to be explained. But nearly the whole reason why biological entities need to be explained in the first place is that they appear to have functions. Remove teleological language from scientists' descriptions of living things, and there isn't much left to talk about. As Rock says directly above, biologists "do include teleology in explanations of natural (biological) processes and it certainly isn't a question of "necessity" at all. They do so because it accurately describes what they observe and demonstrate."
Hence, Handmaiden's explanation is actually an attempt to explain away, by denying the very rationale for why biological features need an explanation in the first place. The "explanation" given is indeed the opposite of teleological, but luckily for teleologists, it's also the opposite of an explanation. It's eliminativism applied to biology, analogous to eliminativism in philosophy of mind.
So here we have a problem. In order to describe and model living things effectively, without the entire description being a description of a subjective illusion imposed by the observer - the imagining of faces in clouds, "teleonomic" processes need to be an objective reality. Mayr saw this, which is why he said it. However, for the reductive account given by Handmaiden to work, teleonomic processes must be a convenient illusion, just as surely as must be intentionality, because there aren't literally any programs, and there aren't literally any goals. Hookworms, after all, don't climb upwards through the soil to get to the top. It's just that ones that didn't climb didn't end up being reproduced.
The two views contradict each other, but what else is an ateleologist, who nevertheless doesn't want to stick their head in the sand when doing biology, to do?
Comment by Deuce — May 19, 2006 @ 5:22 pm
May 19th, 2006 at 9:45 pm
Hi Deuce,
It seems to me that biologists are impaled on the horns of a dilemma. They use teleological language because reality is teleological , or they use it because the alternative is vacuous. Either way, they cannot escape teleological language.
Also, we are finding out that there are literal programs encoded in DNA.
As for Allen's comments:
The origins of human languages must be equally problematic. If that is so, then what reason do we have to accept that:
This is a serious flaw in Allen's position. Perhaps one of these days he will apply himself to addressing it.
Comment by Mung — May 19, 2006 @ 9:45 pm
May 19th, 2006 at 11:04 pm
Deuce and Mung,
I think you and Mung are right that the use of teleological language in biology for folks like Allen presents a dilemma. After all where does this type of language come from? It comes from the human experience of teleology, the experience of purpose, planning and goal. If so then there are only two options. Either teleology is real or it is an illusion perpetrated on us by nature. If it is just a perpetration by nature then it is self-defeating from a scientific perspective because nature could have hoaxed us all around. The obvious entailment is also that humans are not really intentional but this perception is merely a tragic farce that nature has played on us to increase fitness.
Comment by Steve Petermann — May 19, 2006 @ 11:04 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 10:12 am
To the degree that human beings are (mere) biological entities, you are right, Steve. Human's 'experience teleology,' if it can be put so simply.
Human beings are also 'natural' to a degree. However, if they are not 'entirely natural' (or, to the degree that they are not natural) then any theory about human beings that restricts itself to naturalistic terminology is incomplete. Biology is tied up in a dilemma of its own making; partly due to the limitations of the discpline or field of knowledge/investigation/research/etc. and partly because some biologists (wish to) elevate their subject into objective reality which all other fields of study ought to embrace as transferable gospel truth (i.e. the hierarchy of knowledge discussion). Not all biologists are universalists or scientistic in the Enlightment mold.
Steve displays language that gravitates around evolutionary and i+d concepts, which may constrain his potential to embrace an alternative to either theoretical paradigm, should an alternative emerge. Mung, I assume, accepts that human-made language is an example of some 'thing that does not evolve' (into being or having become). Language was invented/discovered 'for a purpose.'
G.A.
Comment by g arago — May 20, 2006 @ 10:12 am
May 20th, 2006 at 10:27 am
Instead of coming up with weird new words and convoluted rationalizations, why don't biologists just follow the lead of physicists, chemists, and geologists "“ abandon the teleological concepts and terminology? For example, when biologists continually speak of protein complexes as molecular machines, or developmental events as a program, or chemical reactions as networks and circuits, this does more to fuel ID than the works of Dembski and Behe combined.
Comment by MikeGene — May 20, 2006 @ 10:27 am
May 20th, 2006 at 11:09 am
LOL - why stop at terminology. After all, the reasoning being used by ID advocates here lends itself to assertions such as "golly gee, it's so easy to describe living things using English, the designer must be an Englishman", "wowie zowie, ying-yang is a much better way to described life than nuts'n'bolts, Eastern philosophies must be the one "true path", etc., etc. Why haven't biologists invented a whole new language, completely free of ties to extant languages and cultural nuances, to describe life?
ID proponents think that the fact that scientists use the language and cultural connections they are born into to describe life has some deep metaphysical connotation. I find the idea weak, at times incomprehensible. And, as with most of ID thought, quite misleading with it comes to insight into living things.
Comment by Art — May 20, 2006 @ 11:09 am
May 20th, 2006 at 2:10 pm
Well, to be honest, I'm not taking one view or another. I am simply attempting to point out the inconsistency inherent in Allen's position.
If the origin of the genetic code is "problematic" for "pure naturalism," and human languages are analogous to the genetic code, then the origin of human language is also "problematic" for "pure naturalism," and therefore it is irrational to claim that "everything that has happened since then [the origin of the genetic code] is pure naturalism."
Comment by Mung — May 20, 2006 @ 2:10 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 2:17 pm
Art brings up an interesting question.
How was it that "physicists, chemists, and geologists" were able to "abandon the teleological concepts and terminology?" Were constructs already available to them within their languages, or did they invent new concepts and terms?
Mike questions why biologists didn't go down the same path as the physicists, chemists, and geologists. Art argues that they would have been forced to come up with a new language. I think Mike's point is still valid and unanswered. If "physicists, chemists, and geologists" why not biologists?
Comment by Mung — May 20, 2006 @ 2:17 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 3:59 pm
I recommend taking careful notes in pchem (the interface between chemistry and physics) and counting the references to engines, cycles, work, and the like.
Does this mean the rules of chemistry and physics were drafted by an Englishman?
Comment by Art — May 20, 2006 @ 3:59 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 4:19 pm
Hi Art,
You write:
I don't. I consider it more of an intriguing curiosity than a "deep metaphysical connotation." After all, geologists, meteorologists, physicists, chemists, astronomers, etc. likewise share in these "language and cultural connections," yet they are not nearly as indebted to teleological concepts and terminology.
Yes, but the key here is not your opinion, but that you have helped define an important pivot point in this debate. It is not about anti-evolutionism or metaphysics, but about whether "ID thought" is or is not truly misleading when it comes to insight into living things. Such questions can only be answered from an open-ended, investigative manner. So like I said, non-teleologists should stop using teleological bank accounts to cash their checks because such borrowing and dependency is confusing the issue. As long as non-teleologists continue to depend on teleological concepts and terminology, and use such things to shed light on biotic reality, the opinions of any given non-teleologist will be drowned out by all this activity. It's not what you say that matters "“ it's what you do.
Comment by MikeGene — May 20, 2006 @ 4:19 pm
May 22nd, 2006 at 9:11 am
I find this whole notion bizarre. The use of descriptive terminology 'proves', somehow, that even ateleologists accept teleology (or some such notion). I understand that a bulk og the "evidence" for ID is the use of metaphor and descriptive language, but this is just getting pretty sad.
Comment by derwood — May 22, 2006 @ 9:11 am
May 22nd, 2006 at 9:16 am
Using the Find function for this page, a search with 'prove' retrieves on derwood's comment.
Comment by MikeGene — May 22, 2006 @ 9:16 am