Dense Bradford, poor RLC and silly Leibniz argument. At least I'm in good company. Leibniz:
Suppose that there be a machine, the structure of which produces thinking, feeling, and perceiving; imagine this machine enlarged but preserving the same proportions, so that you could enter it as if it were a mill. This being supposed you might visit its inside; but what would you observe there? Nothing but parts which push and move each other, and never anything which could explain perception.
Jeffrey Shallit reacts with this lightweight argument:
But Leibniz's argument is not much of an argument. He seems to take it for granted that understanding how the parts of a machine work can't give us understanding of how the machine functions as a whole. Even in Leibniz's day this must have seemed silly.
If Shallit cannot beat up anything more than straw men he needs to retire. Leibniz is not arguing that we cannot understand how a machine or brain works. His remarks (parts moving and pushing each other) indicate the opposite. Leibniz is pointing out that even when the mechanics are understood the results fall short of explaining perception, feelings and thinking. Although not explicitly stated by Leibniz, a reason for that could be the interactive nature of mind and matter. Of course only tards are not materialists so if you are a materialist you need not trouble yourself with challenges to your dogma.