A long, boring post on everybody's favorite topic
by machtI tend to think that when scientists find an idea useful they … well, they will use it. I also think that after the idea has been around for long enough to be well-tested, make predictions, etc. that scientists start treating the idea not just as something useful, but also as something true or real. And if some philosopher of science tells these scientists that this useful idea is against the "rules" of science, scientists tend to ignore them. See this paper by 2004 Nobel Prize winner Frank Wilczek, for example. Wilczek basically says "I'm working on a theory that is already falsified and there's really nothing you can do about it, Popper."
Methodological naturalism is a recent term for the rule that science must be restricted to natural processes or the rule that science cannot refer to the supernatural or the rule that scientists, while doing science, must act as if the supernatural does not exist. Keep in mind that this is very often claimed to be part of the very definition of science. It is a rule that has to be followed in order for something to be science.
Now, based on what I said in the first paragraph of this blog post, I tend to think that if some modern scientist happened to introduce something supernatural into science and it was testable and it made useful predictions, then I think most scientists would would say to hell with the methodological naturalism "rule." They would just ignore what the philosophers say (not that many philosophers at all have suggested that MN should be a "rule" for science).
Recently, some ID critics have been re-defining methodological naturalism as a "preference" – rather than a rule – for natural causes or, more recently as "pragmatic rejection." Now, this isn't so strange since it is a move towards a more historically and philosophically accurate stance. Rosenhouse is quite right that not looking towards supernatural causes is a "convention for doing science" and a useful one at that – especially in modern science. I think most IDists would fully agree that modern science has been incredibly successful in looking for natural causes. But Rosenhouse goes on to say that IDists think "MN is nothing but an arbitrary rule used to exclude ID from its place at the table." But I think he misunderstands those who are against MN. They aren't arguing against the "preference for natural causes" nor are they arguing against the "pragmatic rejection" of supernatural causes. What they are arguing against is when people take this preference, this convention, this pragmatic rejection and make it into a "rule" or make it part of the very definition of science. They are saying that if a well-tested, prediction-making theory came along that was useful to scientists, then despite any rules you put forth, scientists are probably going to go with what works. That's all (most) MN critics are saying.
Also, despite what Rosenhouse implies, very few (if any) philosophers "imply that "science" and "non-science" are simply arbitrary labels that reflect cultural biases." Even the much misunderstood Feyerabend didn't think that. I really can't think of any philosophers who have said that "science" and "non-science" are "arbitrary labels." He then goes on to say that it is better to think that "science and non-science are opposite ends of a continuum, as opposed to rigidly defined categories." I tend to agree but this way of viewing science and non-science is devestating to those who think there are strict rules that one must follow in order for their theories to be called "scientific." It also puts him at odds with the many people who say that MN is part of the very definition of science.
Rosenhouse next quotes Alvin Plantinga and then summarizes Plantinga's argument as:
(1) Science encompasses all that is true. (2) God is true. Therefore, (3) God is part of science.
Unfortunately, Plantinga doesn't come close to saying anything like this. I'm having trouble even imagining where he pulled this syllogism from (it is quite ridiculous to think that Plantinga would accept premise 1, for example). The quoted text comes from a section titled "Science Stoppers?" and Plantinga is discussing a common reason people say that MN is a necessary part of science – namely, that "[a]scribing something to the direct action of God tends to cut off further inquiry." Plantinga's argument is essentially that if supernatural causation is a "science stopper," then "it doesn't follow that God didn't directly create life." That's his argument. He is essentially arguing that "being a science stopper" is not a strict rule that disqualifies something from being science.
Anyway, there it is. My long, boring post on a topic that people really shouldn't be taking seriously anymore.
May 20th, 2006 at 3:39 am
Well, you're right about the long and boring bit anyway. I seem to have missed whatever point it was you were trying to make.
I did notice this bit:
If something 'supernatural' is testable in the natural world then it becomes… natural.
Comment by Odd Digit — May 20, 2006 @ 3:39 am
May 20th, 2006 at 9:09 am
Hi, Macht!
This is an off-topic post, but your "preference"-link doesn't work.
Comment by Analyysi — May 20, 2006 @ 9:09 am
May 20th, 2006 at 11:55 am
[...] Macht has a long post up at Telic Thoughts complaining about "rules" in science. He writes: Methodological naturalism is a recent term for the rule that science must be restricted to natural processes or the rule that science cannot refer to the supernatural or the rule that scientists, while doing science, must act as if the supernatural does not exist. Keep in mind that this is very often claimed to be part of the very definition of science. It is a rule that has to be followed in order for something to be science. [...]
Pingback by Heaven is not the sky » Blog Archive » The “rules” of science — May 20, 2006 @ 11:55 am
May 20th, 2006 at 12:03 pm
If "being a science stopper" is a struct rule that disqualifies something from being science, then the big bang is not science!
Cosmology has become exteremely telic. The MN argument is an arguement held to tanaciously by biologists, not by physiscist.
Comment by bFast — May 20, 2006 @ 12:03 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 12:39 pm
Is intelligent causation natural or extra-natural? If it is natural then it doesn't violate MN.
Dembski says:
The nature of a designer [whether, for instance, the designer is a conscious personal agent or an impersonal telic process] lie outside the scope of intelligent design. As a scientific research program, intelligent design investigates the effects of intelligence and not intelligence as such."
http://tinyurl.com/4at5r
And Dembski again:
"ID is not an interventionist theory. It's only commitment is that the design in the world be empirically detectable. All the design could therefore have emerged through a cosmic evolutionary process that started with the Big Bang. What's more, the designer need not be a deity. It could be an extraterrestrial or a telic process inherent in the universe. ID has no doctrine of creation."
Micah Sparacio says:
"The naturalism that ID proponents probably see as limiting in nature, is the naturalism that eliminates intelligent causation from the natural order. It is a naturalism that seeks to reduce our ontology and in doing so, eliminates certain explanatory devices from our scientific toolkit.
When one is talking about extra-natural causes, I have no idea what one is talking about. My mind hasn't come across such a thing. All causation that I know of takes place in the natural world. This notion of the natural world stands in sharp contrast to the limited notion of "nature" which eliminates or reduces teleology and intelligent causation from its ontology.
ID is interested in what I've called an expanded natural ontology which makes room for teleology and takes intelligent causation as a first-class citizen of that ontology.
Still, I'm unclear as to what an "extra-natural thing" is. Almost by definition, it is "that which does not exist." Certainly, the ID theorists are not interested in investigating "that which does not exist."
So there is a distinction to be made:
1. Nature: the ontology available to modern science
2. Nature: that which exists and takes place in the universe
If one includes intelligent causation as a part of one's ontology, then there is no reason to suppose that an intelligent cause is extra-natural. Rather, it is perfectly natural.
I think that differences in ontology, methodology and/or axiology cause a great deal of confusion in these discussions. When the differences are acknowledged and made clear, then the conversation will probably be able to proceed more productively. Until then, we'll continue to see participants in various paradigms demanding that other participants work from within the same ontology, methodology and/or axiology.
The important question, then, is this: "Is intelligent causation natural or extra-natural?" The answer will certainly depend on the ontology from within which you operate.
Comment by Jack — May 20, 2006 @ 12:39 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 1:43 pm
I'm not sure what's wrong. I went back to edit it and put in the correct link but when I re-published it, it didn't make the change. Here is the correct link.
Comment by macht — May 20, 2006 @ 1:43 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 1:56 pm
Hi Macht,
You only included the anchor ("#comment-12787"), which made the link refer to our own post. Anyway, it's been fixed now.
Comment by Krauze — May 20, 2006 @ 1:56 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 2:00 pm
Actually I used the entire link but when I saved it, it "stripped" everything else off. I tried it several times. But anyway…
Comment by macht — May 20, 2006 @ 2:00 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 2:02 pm
Hi Macht,
Hmm… maybe you accidentally cut out the start of the link, like "ttp://telicthoughts.com".
Comment by Krauze — May 20, 2006 @ 2:02 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 2:09 pm
Jack,
This post has more to do with my on-going disbelief that many ID critics still think this is an issue and the bad arguments they make, rather than an attempt to associate ID with supernatural causation. I happen to think there are good reasons to not involve "supernatual causes" in scientific theories, but I don't think there should be a rule against doing so. Why? Because I could be wrong. If some theory that involves supernatural causes, for example, made testable predictions, was elegent, was consistent with other theories, and unified previously un-unified theories, why wouldn't it count as science?
Comment by macht — May 20, 2006 @ 2:09 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 2:23 pm
Mark Nutter, are you hard of reading? I nowhere described MN as "arbitrary." I, in fact, quite explictly stated that most demarcation attempts weren't arbitrary.
And stop trying to reword the definition of MN. MN is not "simply a rule that says you can't claim to have verified the unverifiable."
Now, you are quite right that many things that have been considered "supernatural" have become considered "natural" after they've been considered scientific long enough (e.g., action at a distance seems pretty spooky and mystical if you are a mechanist). But this is all the more reason to get rid of a rule against including the supernatural in science.
We already have important criteria for scientific theories – testability, the ability to make predictions, etc. Once we accept these, MN becomes useless. It's as simple as that.
Comment by macht — May 20, 2006 @ 2:23 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 3:46 pm
"if some modern scientist happened to introduce something supernatural into science and it was testable"
See, I don't get this – ID keeps missing the point, that it's impossible to simultaneously use supernatural explanations and have those explanations be testable. How can you test miracles and magic??
Comment by Daniel — May 20, 2006 @ 3:46 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 4:00 pm
For those of you who have been following my posts lately, this is an excellent example of an argument from ignorance.
There are plenty of organizations (Randi, CSICOP, etc.) that claim they can make scientific claims about the supernatural, paranormal, etc.
Comment by macht — May 20, 2006 @ 4:00 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 5:00 pm
Um, not quite there macht. There's a big difference between ID and the organizations you mention. They're trying to naturally explain the to-date supernatural; ID isn't trying to decipher the "Designer's" purposes, plans or means at all.
You might as well perpetrate already debunked claims like "ID is just like SETI or forensics or archaeology" while you're at it too.
Comment by Daniel — May 20, 2006 @ 5:00 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 5:08 pm
A question for you – if ID really was interested in science and producing natural explanations of to-date supernatural phenomena, who is doing that research?
Put another way – why isn't the Discovery Institute giving out research grants to test ID?
No – explaining supernatural phenomena can be done scientifically, but ID isn't doing that – oh, yeah, there's Behe's one attempt, which didn't work out.
I know, I know, this has been brought up time and time again – but IDers keep dodging the question (or maybe "dodging the experimental research" would be more appropriate a thing to say).
But, hey, prove me wrong – do the research and publish it. Don't whine about supernaturalism or naturalism.
Comment by Daniel — May 20, 2006 @ 5:08 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 5:34 pm
Daniel,
Can you give me a scientific definition of "supernatural" Thanks.
Comment by Douglas — May 20, 2006 @ 5:34 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 5:57 pm
Just thought I would pass this along because it seems to fit here from an interview in the August 2004 issue of Touchstone Magazine:
Comment by samohth — May 20, 2006 @ 5:57 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 6:15 pm
Macht vs. Naturalism…
God is not outlawed. One only has to provide evidence. A Designer is an acceptable agent, provided their is evidence for the Designer. It seems to me that the only ones with cause to assault methodological naturalism are those who know they've no…
Trackback by hell's handmaiden — May 20, 2006 @ 6:15 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 6:19 pm
Douglas,
Simply put, supernatural is that which is not natural or of nature, where natural is defined as:
- existing in or in conformity with nature or the observable world
- obeying the forces and processes that produce and control all the phenomena of the material world: the laws of nature
And containing elements of being observable, empirical, measurable, testable, confirmable, falsifiable, and reproducable, among others.
Comment by Daniel — May 20, 2006 @ 6:19 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 6:22 pm
samohth,
Nice quote – that's rather honest of Nelson, saying that all ID has are intuitions and notions. ID, and Creation Science before it, has been saying "just give us 5 (or 10) years" for decades now, however, so I'm not going to hold my breath on that.
Comment by Daniel — May 20, 2006 @ 6:22 pm
May 20th, 2006 at 6:29 pm
Does anybody not agree with Nelson's quote?
Comment by macht — May 20, 2006 @ 6:29 pm
May 21st, 2006 at 12:03 am
I think it all depends on how you define natural and supernatural. If nature is natural- then can we not define ALL of the contents of the universe as natural? Would not God be natural, as he would surely be part of nature, but also partly outside of it?
Wouldn't the big bang be supernatural, in a sense, in that the laws of nature weren't around (so we assume) BEFORE that point? If what we see as nature (ie the universe) is "natural", then from the big bang came nature…which means it's supernatural if we decide to use this definition.
I think someone earlier made a good point when they said once we figure something out (to whatever extent), it's natural at that point. I'd say the terms natural and supernatural are somewhat useless most of the time. They're very foggy at best, in my book, and if you ask me- all that is in the universe is natural. The things we usually deem supernatural (miracles, God himself, etc) could easily be seen as part of the universe somewhere, thus- natural. The terms almost never have any real power ultimately. To me at least.
Comment by HaroldJenkins — May 21, 2006 @ 12:03 am
May 21st, 2006 at 9:28 am
Thought I might as well post this link here, as it relates to "scientific" presumptions, and the confluence of astounding scientific insight, and otherwise obvious-to-a-child common-sense (the link deals with the "direction" of Evolution):
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12853798/?GT1=8199 .
Comment by Douglas — May 21, 2006 @ 9:28 am
May 21st, 2006 at 9:35 am
Hi Douglas,
That story is already being discussed here.
Comment by Krauze — May 21, 2006 @ 9:35 am
May 21st, 2006 at 9:38 am
Krauze,
Okay, thanks. Sorry for interrupting with a redundant post.
Comment by Douglas — May 21, 2006 @ 9:38 am
May 21st, 2006 at 11:01 am
The Hell's Handmaiden person said,
Ummm, yes he is. Here is the relevant quote from his article (my emphasis):
In other words, Wilczek took a theory that was "not wrong" but it was complicated and not very elegant and he put it aside. He then started working on a theory that was wrong and he knew it was wrong. That, my friends, is the definition of being falsified.
Second, my point in the first paragraph of this blog post has nothing to do with whether Popper is right or wrong. The point was that scientists – like Johnny Cash to the Nashville music establishment after winning a Grammy – often have no problem giving philosophers of science the middle finger. This is especially so if the result is "straightforward and successful." Whether Popper is right or wrong is beside the point. Whether Wilczek's understanding of Popper is right or wrong is besides the point. What matters – for the purposes of this post – is that Wilczek didn't agree with what he believes Popper had said and had no problem ignoring the falsification rule.
Third, the problem isn't that Wilczek's theory wasn't falsifiable – it was that it was already falsified when he started working on it!
Fourth, I'm quite aware of the reasons people put forth for making falsifiability a necessary part of science. I'm also aware of the many problems with that position. I suggest the Hell's Handmaiden person read some Lakatos.
Comment by macht — May 21, 2006 @ 11:01 am
May 21st, 2006 at 11:07 am
I should also say something about my understanding of MN. Del Ratzsch has documented the many uses of MN here. Contrary to the Hell's Handmaiden person, MN really is "about restricting science to the natural." That's how people on both sides of the debate use the term and how they understand the term.
Comment by macht — May 21, 2006 @ 11:07 am
May 22nd, 2006 at 6:22 pm
Third, the problem isn't that Wilczek's theory wasn't falsifiable – it was that it was already falsified when he started working on it!
There is a big difference between working on an idea that is not falsifiable, and one that is already falsified. However much Wilczek may have enjoyed tweaking Popper, there is nothing wrong with this, even from a Popperian standpoint. There is no scientific "rule" against continuing to explore the properties of a theory that is already known to be incorrect, and scientists do this rather frequently. A particular theory may be known to be incorrect, but it may have nevertheless have aspects that could illuminate the development of a testable theory that does have a chance of being correct. The problem with a nonfalsifiable idea is that there is no way to ever determine whether it is right or wrong. Obviously, this doesn't apply to a theory that has already been falsified.
Comment by trrll — May 22, 2006 @ 6:22 pm
May 23rd, 2006 at 4:52 pm
Hey macht,
Have you come up with a way to experimentally control, observe, measure, or otherwise study the Designer yet?
No? You mean you don't know how to test ID's invokation of the Designer?
Let me get this straight – ID is testable, but you don't have an explanation for how one might test it – is that about right?
Comment by Daniel — May 23, 2006 @ 4:52 pm
May 23rd, 2006 at 5:23 pm
I've never heard a good argument for why ID couldn't be testable. Do you have one?
Comment by macht — May 23, 2006 @ 5:23 pm
May 23rd, 2006 at 5:32 pm
macht,
are you even reading my posts?
The argument goes "You can't test God (the Designer)."
Comment by Daniel — May 23, 2006 @ 5:32 pm
May 23rd, 2006 at 5:35 pm
Not really.
That's not an argument, that's just a contradiction.
Comment by macht — May 23, 2006 @ 5:35 pm
May 23rd, 2006 at 5:58 pm
That explains a lot.
Um, no, it's an assertion of fact. The rest of what I've said is the argument – but seeing as how you're not bothering to read what I'm saying, I guess you're rather clueless about what I've been saying…
Comment by Daniel — May 23, 2006 @ 5:58 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 6:04 pm
I think that an ID-based theory could be testable in principle. The problem is that most reasonable ID-type theories can be rejected out of hand based upon existing evidence. There is just too much about biology that looks, well, rather poorly designed. That's not entirely inconsistent with design, but it's more Microsoft than DaVinci. So a plausible ID theory would probably involve design by multiple generations of research teams who didn't keep very good records or communicate very well with one another. The problem is that the people who are interested in ID aren't really interested in coming up with the most reasonable Design theory, because they are doing Christian apologetics rather than biology. So to explain all the stuff that looks poorly designed, they have to presume that the Designer is working at such a deep level that his work is incomprehensible to us mere mortals (it only looks jerry-rigged, but it's actually brilliant in some way that we are too stupid to comprehend). But incomprehensible means unpredictable, and unpredictable means untestable.
Besides, real biologists generally don't really see the need for a Design theory when evolutionary theory has been so extraordinarily successful in its predictions. And in any case, it is perceived as just pushing the real problem up to another level, because then they would have to explain where the Designer came from–which would probably end up involving some version of evolutionary theory, just somewhere else. This obviously doesn't trouble the religiously motivated ID types, because they have no problem with posting a "Science stops here" sign. But scientists have grown suspicious about such notices, because every time somebody has posted one, some other guy has looked on the other side of the sign and found more science.
Comment by trrll — May 24, 2006 @ 6:04 pm