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A Useless Critic

by MikeGene

Astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson is the director of the Hayden Planetarium at the American Museum of Natural History. He has criticized Intelligent Design as follows:

Another practice that isn't science is embracing ignorance. Yet it's fundamental to the philosophy of intelligent design: I don't know what this is. I don't know how it works. It's too complicated for me to figure out. It's too complicated for any human being to figure out. So it must be the product of a higher intelligence.

As someone who has been seriously thinking about intelligent design for many years, I can report that Tyson's characterization is NOT "fundamental to the philosophy of intelligent design." On the contrary, Tyson is simply repeating a superficial perception of ID that is common among its critics. Thus, this is one reason why I simply do not assign much weight to the criticism of many ID critics. They may be very intelligent and very good at what they normally do, but their basic grasp of ID is not very impressive. For example, when it comes to the type of questions that interest me, someone like Neil deGrasse Tyson doesn't seem to offer me anything useful or interesting.

This entry was posted on Tuesday, May 29th, 2007 at 11:49 pm and is filed under Intelligent Design, The Critics. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site. The trackback link is: http://telicthoughts.com/a-useless-critic/trackback/

86 Responses to “A Useless Critic”

  1. Mung Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 12:00 am

    Another practice that isn't science is embracing ignorance. Yet it's fundamental to the philosophy of intelligent design: I don't know what this is. I don't know how it works. It's too complicated for me to figure out. It's too complicated for any human being to figure out. So it must be the product of a higher intelligence.

    Seriously, is this even worth wasting the time and bandwidth to respond to? What an utter moron. Its like some fundy preacher "preaching to the choir" when it doesn't really need to make sense and certainly dosn't have to be true.

    What if you were to apply each of his statements to the flagellum?

    I don't know what this is.

    False.

    I don't know how it works.

    False.

    It's too complicated for me to figure out.

    False.

    It's too complicated for any human being to figure out.

    False.

    So it must be the product of a higher intelligence.

    Um, no. That's not how the argument proceeds you dimwit.

    Useless critic is right.

  2. Comment by Mung — May 30, 2007 @ 12:00 am

  3. MikeGene Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 12:16 am

    Hi Mung,

    Tyson is obviously not a moron. But it is also clear that he thinks he knows what ID is all about when he doesn't. If you are going to publicly argue that something is fundamental to the philosophy of X, then it's a good idea to have some grasp on what X is all about.

  4. Comment by MikeGene — May 30, 2007 @ 12:16 am

  5. Thought Provoker Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 12:17 am

    Hi Mike,

    I will try to be a "Useful critic". Although I probably won't be very critical.

    1. How does one reasonably infer the existence of intelligent design without having independent information about the designer?

    First of all, you don't try to eliminate ALL the chance hypotheses, leaving only a perfect design as an alternative. Mike, you are unique in that you are practically the only ID proponent that doesn't try to do that.

    However, that makes it harder to distinguish "designed" from "lucky".

    About your only chance is to build a database of retrocausal examples. Examples where the solution to an evolutionary need was put in place before the need manifested itself. (Front-loading).

    2. If one can reasonably infer design, just what was designed? It's not that interesting (to me) to point to this or that and declare design simply in order to be able to declare design. What intrigues me is whether some form of systematic approach to infer design uncovers any larger pattern.

    Realistically, it will be the "larger pattern" that will make the case. Unless we are talking about an imperfect God who slipped in a Babel Fish, the answer will come from the forest, not an individual tree.

    3. Since I am an evolutionist, the design inference then leads to a deeper and more fascinating question "“ how does design relate to evolution? Just what aspects of evolutionary history have been shaped and influenced by design?

    Again, it will be the forest, not a few trees. Chances are practically ALL life will "…have been shaped and influenced by design" if any of it has.

    My Thoughts,
    TP

  6. Comment by Thought Provoker — May 30, 2007 @ 12:17 am

  7. Bradford Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 12:28 am

    Yet it's fundamental to the philosophy of intelligent design: I don't know what this is. I don't know how it works. It's too complicated for me to figure out. It's too complicated for any human being to figure out.

    The above is inaccurate in almost all respects. The way it very often goes is:

    I know what this is. I know how it works. I can figure out causes and effects. Human beings can comprehend this biological system. The nature of the system itself is evidence for intelligent design.

  8. Comment by Bradford — May 30, 2007 @ 12:28 am

  9. MikeGene Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 12:28 am

    Okay TP, so now you are really starting to worry me. :wink: You might just go down as the first critic how actually seems to be hearing me. :shock:

    PS: Glad y'liked the cadherins.

  10. Comment by MikeGene — May 30, 2007 @ 12:28 am

  11. stunney Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 8:44 am

    Tyson wrote:

    I don't know what this is. I don't know how it works. It's too complicated for me to figure out. It's too complicated for any human being to figure out. So it must be the product of a higher intelligence.

    There are a couple of possible flip-sides to this remark.

    A

    I don't know what this is.

    I don't know how it works.

    It's too complicated for me to figure out.

    It's too complicated for any human being to figure out.

    So it doesn't exist.

    This is essentially the tack taken by eliminative materialists with respect to consciousness. But it's also the basic reasoning used by many, such as Dawkins, to arrive at atheism.

    B

    I know what this is.

    I know how it works.

    It's not too complicated for me to figure out.

    It's not too complicated for any human being to figure out.

    So the Empire State building must not have been intelligently designed.

    Oh, wait, um.

    Hold on.

    Let me think about this…

    Yeah, and while you're at it, you might want to ask yourself this: if intentional rational thought itself is to be understood, must it be understood only in terms of non-intentional non-rational non-thought?

    I don't see why that need be the case at all. I don't think intentional rational thought is a 'problem'. It's only a problem if you try to give a materialist reduction of it. But I wouldn't try such a reduction.

    Why think that rational and moral mindhood needs to be or can be explained, if by 'explained' you mean 'explained in terms of something else which doesn't possess mindhood'? It's the materialist who thinks mind, consciousness, reason, normativity, moral and aesthetic and emotional value, needs to be explained in terms of non-mind, non-reason, non-consciousness, non-normativity, non-value. The anti-materialist ist is saying that doesn't need to be done, nor can it be done; and that it's wrongheaded to think otherwise. Theists hold that it's ultimately mind that explains why matter exists and has the properties it has"“–it was intelligently designed—-not the other way round.

    The mind of the creator is THE basic truth about reality, because it is itself the basic reality. All other realities reflect this basic truth by being themselves rationally ordered in their design. And some of these created realities are endowed with reason and value, and with the capacity for moral agency.

    The explanation for that just is that a transcendent creative mind pre-eminently endowed with reason and value, is the fundamental ontological and explanatory fact about reality.

    It is senseless to say that this 'doesn't explain anything' in precisely the same way that it would be senseless to say that if materialism is true, positing impersonal material forces as the fundamental fact about reality, 'wouldn't explain anything'.

    Mind works this way"¦..consciousness, reason, intention, purpose, knowledge, etc. Matter works this way"¦occupying space, rest mass, inertial motion, etc etc. Why hold that mindstuff is more 'mysterious' than matterstuff?

    It strikes me that our conscious mental lives are the most obvious, matter-of-fact, taken-for-granted, intuitively indubitably self-evident realities there are, and that it's things like curved spacetime, energy fields, quarks, and suchlike that are the 'mysterious' things.

    The central fact which grounds and mediates anyone's access to any facts about curved spacetime, energy fields, etc, whatsoever is the fact of rational consciousness. And the central observation we can make about the fact of rational consciousness is that it's unlike any physical fact we know. Indeed, consciousness, through which we encounter whole realms of the nonphysical such as rationality, morality, aesthetics, and meaning, is intrinsically unlike anything else in the physical universe, a fact reflected in physics textbooks which purport to explain everything about the universe but say nothing, far less explain anything, about rational consciousness.

    Meantime, it's only fair to point out that materialists have a hard time accounting in their own terms for the central presuppositions of science"“—namely, rational observership, rational inference, and rational agency—"”without appearing to endow matter with magical properties.

    Another major difficulty for materialists is to account for why matter appears to obey 'laws' or behave with regularity—-laws and regularities of remarkable mathematical (and hence rationally intelligible) elegance and beauty. How can the matter now present in the universe control its own future, so to speak"”—especially if we conceive of it as being devoid of teleology? If 'laws' are posited to explain regularities, must not they themselves be immaterial entities that transcend and govern the universe's material entities? And is it not the case that the only plausible candidates for being immaterial entities are only ever encountered as the contents of minds?

    Perhaps Tyson knows how to figure all that out without positing an intelligent designing mind as the universe's and life's creator. If so, I'm all ears.

    But perhaps instead he will, er, embrace ignorance with all the passion of a promissory materialist:

    "We don't know how this occurred. But we, er, know it occurred without an intelligent designer being involved at any stage."

  12. Comment by stunney — May 30, 2007 @ 8:44 am

  13. Deuce Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 11:17 am

    I don't know what this is. I don't know how it works. It's too complicated for me to figure out. It's too complicated for any human being to figure out. So it must be the product of a higher intelligence.

    translated:

    I don't know what ID is. I don't know how it works. I just know that it's beneath me and so I can't be bothered to figure it out. None of the enlightened human beings in my circle can be bothered to figure it out. So I'll just assume that it's the least intelligent thing I can imagine it being and criticize that.

  14. Comment by Deuce — May 30, 2007 @ 11:17 am

  15. Farshad Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 5:12 pm

    I don't know what this is. I don't know how it works. It's too complicated for me to figure out. It's too complicated for any human being to figure out. So it must be the product of a higher intelligence.

    :arrow:

    I know that a higher intelligence does not exist. It may seem too complicated but I'm sure that it is a product of nature regardless of our current understanding of its mechanism. I don't know how it works but I'm sure that science will explain it somewhere in the near future without violating the laws of nature. Even if the scientific results turn out to be in favor of the existence of a higher intelligence, either we will ignore the results or we will keep on working and producing bizarre alternative theories.

    Eventually, if somehow we fail, we can still summon multiverse demons or parallel dimension genies to help us. You know that in a multiverse everything is possible . The only thing that is not allowed to exist in a multiverse, is a higher intelligence of any kind.

  16. Comment by Farshad — May 30, 2007 @ 5:12 pm

  17. Mark Frank Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 5:27 pm

    As someone who has been seriously thinking about intelligent design for many years, I can report that Tyson's characterization is NOT "fundamental to the philosophy of intelligent design."

    This assumes that there is a clearly identifiable philosophy which is intelligent design. My experience is that some of IDs strongest proponents have contradictory ideas. e.g. Dave Scott recently wrote "I think the problem with specification is it's a subjective measure but it shouldn't be hard to understand". However, Dembski clearly believes specification is not subjective but can be deduced from his version of complexity theory. You might ask how many ID supporters understand ID.

  18. Comment by Mark Frank — May 30, 2007 @ 5:27 pm

  19. David Heddle Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 5:48 pm

    Mike Gene,

    Spot on. Neil deGrasse Tyson's critique is old hat. He could have just said "I agree, ID is God of the gaps" and be done with it, without wasting so many pixels. Nothing original in his post. Nothing clever. Nothing amusing. Five minutes I wish I could reclaim.

  20. Comment by David Heddle — May 30, 2007 @ 5:48 pm

  21. MikeGene Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 5:57 pm

    Hi Mark,

    This assumes that there is a clearly identifiable philosophy which is intelligent design. My experience is that some of IDs strongest proponents have contradictory ideas. e.g. Dave Scott recently wrote "I think the problem with specification is it's a subjective measure but it shouldn't be hard to understand". However, Dembski clearly believes specification is not subjective but can be deduced from his version of complexity theory. You might ask how many ID supporters understand ID.

    Then one should criticize along those lines. Tyson didn't. He is the one claiming a fundamental aspect to the philosophy of ID.

    It would seem to me that this should be an easy place where critics could say, "MikeGene is right on this one."

  22. Comment by MikeGene — May 30, 2007 @ 5:57 pm

  23. thesciphishow Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 9:25 pm

    Come on Mike. You don't really expect an ID critic to actually understand the arguments and engage them ? That is totally unreasonable Mike.

  24. Comment by thesciphishow — May 30, 2007 @ 9:25 pm

  25. Bradford Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 9:33 pm

    Mark Frank: This assumes that there is a clearly identifiable philosophy which is intelligent design. My experience is that some of IDs strongest proponents have contradictory ideas. e.g. Dave Scott recently wrote "I think the problem with specification is it's a subjective measure but it shouldn't be hard to understand". However, Dembski clearly believes specification is not subjective but can be deduced from his version of complexity theory. You might ask how many ID supporters understand ID.

    Anti-IDists have differing and sometimes contradictory ideas as to how life originated. All differing versions share something in common. ID interpretations are excluded. IDists do differ among themselves but all share the view that ID is a plausible idea worthy of rational discussion free of the ad homs and cliche thinking that accompanies critiques of ID.

    Why is the lack of uniformity among ID critics not a problem and a lack of uniformity among IDists seen as a problem? Why don't you reveal the hidden objection?

  26. Comment by Bradford — May 30, 2007 @ 9:33 pm

  27. Thought Provoker Says:
    May 30th, 2007 at 9:53 pm

    Hi Mike,

    You wrote…

    It would seem to me that this should be an easy place where critics could say, "MikeGene is right on this one."

    Did you notice that I commented on this purely political topic and didn't say anything in defense of "the other side" I didn't even offer counter-spin. Wasn't that good enough? Do I have to actually say it? :roll:

    I even said something supportive. Can you cut me a break? :???:

    Do I have to?:cry:

    Ok, Here goes…

    Well, upon due consideration that Tyson made no attempt to separate ID movement from ID science and further exacerbated this situation by using words like "fundamental". A comparison of chance hypotheses would tend to support the tentative presumption that MikeGene is right on this one. :evil:

    Can we talk science now? :mrgreen:

    Regards,
    TP

  28. Comment by Thought Provoker — May 30, 2007 @ 9:53 pm

  29. Mark Frank Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 1:56 am

    Mike, Bradford

    For what it is worth I agree that Tyson has added nothing original to the argument against ID (although I did find the bit of science history at the beginning rather interesting). My point was simply that many ID proponents seem to be just as confused about ID is as the critics.

    While the ID community cannot give a coherent account of what ID is, then I think you can continue to expect broad brush criticism aimed at the underlying motivation of most ID proponents rather than the details which differ among proponents.

  30. Comment by Mark Frank — May 31, 2007 @ 1:56 am

  31. Bradford Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 4:39 am

    Mark Frank: While the ID community cannot give a coherent account of what ID is, then I think you can continue to expect broad brush criticism aimed at the underlying motivation of most ID proponents rather than the details which differ among proponents.

    The reason for the personal attacks, that come in the form of an obsession with motivation, is an inability to put out reasoned refutations of arguments advanced by IDists. Personal attacks are the first option of the intellectually ineffectual.

  32. Comment by Bradford — May 31, 2007 @ 4:39 am

  33. MikeGene Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 7:03 am

    Hi Mark,

    While the ID community cannot give a coherent account of what ID is, then I think you can continue to expect broad brush criticism aimed at the underlying motivation of most ID proponents rather than the details which differ among proponents.

    In other words, we can't hold Tyson accountable for his own intellectual sloppiness.

    You are merely projecting your own experience into Tyson's head, as I doubt he has followed the writings of Dave Scot. And rather than expect him to be familiar with all the details about the "ID community," I think we can expect him to have read Behe and Dembski. But it doesn't look like he has. Instead, it looks like he is effectively relying on hearsay. Why would I say that? Many times, I have heard ID critics characterize Dembski or Behe's position along these lines: "Something is so incredibly complex that it must have been designed." Tyson has heard and trusted this characterization and has thus embellished on the "incredibly complex" angle in front of a friendly audience.

    Oddly enough, this gets to the trust issue that psychologist Paul Bloom is writing about:

    Given the role of trust in social learning, it is particularly worrying that national surveys reflect a general decline in the extent to which people trust scientists. To end on a practical note, then, one way to combat resistance to science is to persuade children and adults that the institute of science is, for the most part, worthy of trust.

    So let us just say that anyone out there (apart from the community of critics) only has to read Dembski or Behe to find themselves in a position where they don't trust Tyson.

  34. Comment by MikeGene — May 31, 2007 @ 7:03 am

  35. Mark Frank Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 7:07 am

    The reason for the personal attacks, that come in the form of an obsession with motivation, is an inability to put out reasoned refutations of arguments advanced by IDists. Personal attacks are the first option of the intellectually ineffectual

    Bradford

    Actually there are plenty of reasoned refutations of different arguments advanced by IDists. Look at:

    http://www.talkreason.org/inde...

    (there is even a contribution I wrote last year)

    But my point is that ID supporters themselves often appear not to understand the arguments, much less the refutations. For example, how many could

    1) define "specified" in any more detail than "conforming to a pattern"
    2) explain how ID differs from a Bayesian explanation of how we detect design and their reasons for preferring ID to the Bayesian explanation

    (I would agree, however, that they are much more in evidence on UD than here.)

  36. Comment by Mark Frank — May 31, 2007 @ 7:07 am

  37. Bradford Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 7:23 am

    Mark Frank: explain how ID differs from a Bayesian explanation of how we detect design and their reasons for preferring ID to the Bayesian explanation

    As one who imputes ID at point of origin, explain to me first how a Bayesian explanation is used to detect the origin of design generated in accordance with conventional theories about life's origin.

  38. Comment by Bradford — May 31, 2007 @ 7:23 am

  39. Mark Frank Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 7:47 am

    As one who imputes ID at point of origin, explain to me first how a Bayesian explanation is used to detect the origin of design generated in accordance with conventional theories about life's origin.

    Bradford

    I have tried parsing this sentence n different ways and give up. Who imputes ID – you or me? Does "origin of design" mean the thing that originated it? I thought ID stayed clear of that? Dembski and Behe certainly do. Are you talking about design as applied to living objects or design in general?

    Are you saying you don't understand the Bayesian or likelihood approaches to detecting design? If so that rather proves my point. Dembski has written about both (fallaciously – but that's another story), they are two leading alternatives to detecting design that were established long before ID ever came along – yet how many IDists are even aware of them?

    I won't repeat my description of likelihood versus specification here. You can read it on talk.reason. It is rather poorly written – but I still believe in it.

    Cheers

  40. Comment by Mark Frank — May 31, 2007 @ 7:47 am

  41. Bradford Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 7:57 am

    Does "origin of design" mean the thing that originated it? I thought ID stayed clear of that? Dembski and Behe certainly do. Are you talking about design as applied to living objects or design in general?

    Explain the cause of the design evident in DNA. Is that too difficult to understand?

  42. Comment by Bradford — May 31, 2007 @ 7:57 am

  43. Mark Frank Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 8:34 am

    Explain the cause of the design evident in DNA. Is that too difficult to understand?

    My explanation for the appearance of design in DNA is the classic evolutionary one.

    Now answer my question. Do you understand either the likelihood or full Bayesian approaches to detecting (real) design?

  44. Comment by Mark Frank — May 31, 2007 @ 8:34 am

  45. Bradford Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 9:00 am

    Explain the cause of the design evident in DNA. Is that too difficult to understand?

    My explanation for the appearance of design in DNA is the classic evolutionary one.

    Baloney. There is no classic evolutionary explanation of the cause of the design evident in DNA. There is only an explanation for its diversification once existing within a replicating cellular environment. Try again.

  46. Comment by Bradford — May 31, 2007 @ 9:00 am

  47. Mark Frank Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 9:10 am

    You are merely projecting your own experience into Tyson's head, as I doubt he has followed the writings of Dave Scot. And rather than expect him to be familiar with all the details about the "ID community," I think we can expect him to have read Behe and Dembski. But it doesn't look like he has. Instead, it looks like he is effectively relying on hearsay.

    Mike

    You may well be right. I have not explained myself clearly. I simply have a minor irritation with ID proponents who respond to criticism by X with "X doesn't understand ID" and then I find they don't understand it any better. They may have passed Dembski's or Behe's words in front of their eyes and learned to recite some of the mantras, but they have not assessed it critically or considered alternatives.

  48. Comment by Mark Frank — May 31, 2007 @ 9:10 am

  49. Mark Frank Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 9:12 am

    Bradford

    I will attempt further explanation when you answer my question. I think it is your turn.

  50. Comment by Mark Frank — May 31, 2007 @ 9:12 am

  51. Bradford Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 9:38 am

    Bradford

    I will attempt further explanation when you answer my question. I think it is your turn.

    I've been through this game before. Your Bayesian approach is sterile at discerning the cause that generated an initial genome on this planet. Your classic "evolutionary explanation response" betrays that. You are not in a position to distinguish between an intelligently directed chain of events and one that is not when you are clueless about the process.

  52. Comment by Bradford — May 31, 2007 @ 9:38 am

  53. salimfadhley Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 9:56 am

    Tyson is obviously not a moron. But it is also clear that he thinks he knows what ID is all about when he doesn't. If you are going to publicly argue that something is fundamental to the philosophy of X, then it's a good idea to have some grasp on what X is all about.

    The problem is, it's VERY difficult for people who operate outside the networks of church-funded organisations that promote ID to really know what ID is about; The best we ID critics can be reasonably expected to do is offer a critique of the public statements made by ID proponents.

    ID is a very "broad church", which includes hard-liners such as Sal Cordova and (forgive me), moderates like Mike Gene. Strictly speaking every YEC is also an ID proponent since ID makes no claims at all that conflict with YECism. YEC proponents often cite the work of prominent ID proponents such as Behe & Dembski as a justification for their own positions.

    Since there is very little common ground (apart from the obvious rejection of the standard evolution theory of the origin of species), there is little that we can say that applies to the whole of the movement.

  54. Comment by salimfadhley — May 31, 2007 @ 9:56 am

  55. Mark Frank Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 10:20 am

    I've been through this game before. Your Bayesian approach is sterile at discerning the cause that generated an initial genome on this planet. Your classic "evolutionary explanation response" betrays that. You are not in a position to distinguish between an intelligently directed chain of events and one that is not when you are clueless about the process.

    Bradford – you seem determined not to answer the question.

    Do you understand either the likelihood or full Bayesian approaches to detecting (real) design?

    I am however amused that you believe the Bayesian approach is sterile because you claim I am clueless about the process. What does ID have to say about the process?

  56. Comment by Mark Frank — May 31, 2007 @ 10:20 am

  57. Rock Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 12:25 pm

    Mark Frank Says: Actually there are plenty of reasoned refutations of different arguments advanced by IDists. Look at:
    http://www.talkreason.org/inde…
    (there is even a contribution I wrote last year)

    An account of how we detect design
    By Mark Frank
    http://www.talkreason.org/arti...
    "So it appears we can account for the way we detect design in just the same way we detect any other cause. We assess the probability of the outcome given the proposed cause and we assess the likelihood of the cause existing in the first place. Finally we compare these assessments to alternative explanations."

    Ironically, Mark Frank's oblique criticism of so many of Dembski's critics actually turns into a criticism of Dembski. Even when he's right he's still wrong! (You've heard that "criticism" before, haven't ya, IDers?)

    "[ID] explicitly forbids any exploration of design as a cause because it refuses to be drawn into who or what the designer is or how they implement their design.""”Mark Frank

    It took me less than three minutes of searching Dembski's pubs page to determine otherwise: "Once it is settled that certain biological systems are designed, the door is open to a new set of research problems. Here are some of the key problems:"¦

    What is the causal history of a designed object?…"

    (Actually I collected a buncha quotes to the same effect, but I won't bother with anymore than that.)

    Informing myself in this way I see that Dembski repeatedly returns to the same question: "But suppose a detailed causal history is lacking and we are not able to trace the design process. Suppose instead that all we have is an object, and we must decide whether it emerged from such a design process. In that case, how do we decide whether the object is in fact designed?" http://www.designinference.com...

    Not that I'm inclined to be fair to anyone (LOL), but to be fair to Dembski he "forbids" nothing, but does make it quite plain that he has bounded his own pursuit of such matters. Seems to me that its actually many critics who implicitly forbid the pursuit of such matters. Of course, they are in more position to forbid anything, anymore than Dembski or any other IDer is, but certainly no encouragement in the pursuit can be taken from such statements along the lines of Design is an illusion, there is not way to detect design, design is anti-science, no rational and knowledgeable scientist accepts design, etc.

    (I even found an essay on Dembski's basic philosophical differences with Bayes and a really interesting paper on the pragmatism of mathematical inquiry.)

  58. Comment by Rock — May 31, 2007 @ 12:25 pm

  59. Bradford Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 12:52 pm

    MF: I am however amused that you believe the Bayesian approach is sterile because you claim I am clueless about the process. What does ID have to say about the process?

    I'm amused by this:

    "So it appears we can account for the way we detect design in just the same way we detect any other cause. We assess the probability of the outcome given the proposed cause and we assess the likelihood of the cause existing in the first place. Finally we compare these assessments to alternative explanations."

    The probability of an initial genome (the outcome) is assessed based on the likelihood of what cause which you identify as existing in the first place? What alternative "explanations" are there for comparative purposes? It is little wonder you did not want to get into details and instead attempted the "standard evolutionary" handwave. Before you assess probabilities get an idea as to what it is you are comparing.

    Those DNA symbolic encoding patterns we see and the genetic code which assigns meaning to amino acid encoding and command codons is evidence of an intelligent cause.

  60. Comment by Bradford — May 31, 2007 @ 12:52 pm

  61. Mark Frank Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 12:54 pm

    Rock

    Ironically, Mark Frank's oblique criticism of so many of Dembski's critics actually turns into a criticism of Dembski.

    No idea what you mean by this. The paper you were reading (there are two) was no never meant to be a criticism of Dembski's critics.

    "[ID] explicitly forbids any exploration of design as a cause because it refuses to be drawn into who or what the designer is or how they implement their design."

    Point taken – I would have been better to phrase that as "ID avoids any exploration of design as a cause because it refuses to be drawn into who or what the designer is or how they implement their design." It is hardly central to the paper.

    Cheers

  62. Comment by Mark Frank — May 31, 2007 @ 12:54 pm

  63. mtraven Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 2:52 pm

    their basic grasp of ID is not very impressive.

    Could it be because there isn't much there to grasp? Tyson's language may have been slightly sloppy but he seems to capture the essence of the ID mindset pretty well. Real science attempts to explain complex phenonemenon in terms of simpler ones. ID is about giving up explanation in favor of mystifications. All of ID founders on the problem of how you explain the workings of the designer, which nobody here really seems interested in, for some reason.

  64. Comment by mtraven — May 31, 2007 @ 2:52 pm

  65. Mark Frank Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 2:54 pm

    Bradford

    The probability of an initial genome (the outcome) is assessed based on the likelihood of what cause which you identify as existing in the first place? What alternative "explanations" are there for comparative purposes? It is little wonder you did not want to get into details and instead attempted the "standard evolutionary" handwave. Before you assess probabilities get an idea as to what it is you are comparing.

    Still not answering the question I see.

    Looks like you want to develop an argument based on our lack of knowledge of how DNA first appeared. Sounds a bit like:

    I don't know how it works. It's too complicated for me to figure out. It's too complicated for any human being to figure out. So it must be the product of a higher intelligence.

    Maybe Dyson wasn't so off beam after all.

  66. Comment by Mark Frank — May 31, 2007 @ 2:54 pm

  67. Jehu Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 3:55 pm

    Mark Frank,

    Looks like you want to develop an argument based on our lack of knowledge of how DNA first appeared. Sounds a bit like:

    I don't know how it works. It's too complicated for me to figure out. It's too complicated for any human being to figure out. So it must be the product of a higher intelligence.

    Maybe Dyson wasn't so off beam after all.

    It is not our lack of knowledge that makes the occurance of DNA by a non-intelligent means so improbable – it is our abundance of knowledge. Since Louis Pasteur, scientific discovery and research has continued to make the chance occurance of life more and more improbable. The notion that some day the tide will suddenly change and research will begin to show how it is possible is purely a faith based speculation and one that is contrary to the evidence.

  68. Comment by Jehu — May 31, 2007 @ 3:55 pm

  69. Bradford Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 4:02 pm

    Still not answering the question I see.

    What question is that MF? An answer to a question that has eluded scientists since Darwin? If you have the answer give it up. Or do you assess probabiity based on whatever parameters suit your views?

    Looks like you want to develop an argument based on our lack of knowledge of how DNA first appeared. Sounds a bit like:

    I don't know how it works. It's too complicated for me to figure out. It's too complicated for any human being to figure out. So it must be the product of a higher intelligence.

    Sounds like you are in auto-cliche mode. Do you think for yourself?

  70. Comment by Bradford — May 31, 2007 @ 4:02 pm

  71. Jehu Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 4:04 pm

    mtraven

    All of ID founders on the problem of how you explain the workings of the designer, which nobody here really seems interested in, for some reason.

    That is complete nonsense of course. All you need to detect a force is to be able to measure and observed its effect, you do not need to know what a force is or what caused the force. For example, science does not need to know what force caused the big bang to show the effect of the big bang and establish its historical reality. Science does not need to know what dark matter is in order to detect it. Likewise, ID does not need to know what the designer is in order to show the effect caused by the designer – namely the highly specified complex designs that exist in nature.

  72. Comment by Jehu — May 31, 2007 @ 4:04 pm

  73. Mark Frank Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 4:23 pm

    Bradford

    What question is that MF?

    The one that I asked (and repeated) in previous posts

    "Do you understand either the likelihood or full Bayesian approaches to detecting design?"

    Mike – I do hope you are still reading this. Bradford has rather neatly illustrated that IDists in practice do use exactly the type of argument Dyson is talking about.

    Cheers

  74. Comment by Mark Frank — May 31, 2007 @ 4:23 pm

  75. Bradford Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 4:32 pm

    "Do you understand either the likelihood or full Bayesian approaches to detecting design?"

    Mike – I do hope you are still reading this. Bradford has rather neatly illustrated that IDists in practice do use exactly the type of argument Dyson is talking about.

    MF, if you had a Bayesian approach that would be helpful in providing answers to life's origin you would spell it out. As I said before you serve as an example of what is wrong with ID critics.

  76. Comment by Bradford — May 31, 2007 @ 4:32 pm

  77. Mark Frank Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 5:03 pm

    Bradford

    I have to point out that for the fifth time of asking you have not answered the question. :twisted:

  78. Comment by Mark Frank — May 31, 2007 @ 5:03 pm

  79. mtraven Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 5:11 pm

    ID does not need to know what the designer is in order to show the effect caused by the designer – namely the highly specified complex designs that exist in nature.

    But — we already have a perfectly fine theory of how seemingly-designed artifacts can emerge without a designer (natural selection). If ID wants to toss this away without providing an alternative explanation, what good is it? It's saying, "look, there's design here, but I won't accept the theory with known explanatory power, instead I'll point to some mysterious force that I won't specify." And of course, the only reason not to specify it is to try to sneak religion into science without being explicit about it.

  80. Comment by mtraven — May 31, 2007 @ 5:11 pm

  81. Jehu Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 5:29 pm

    mtraven

    But "” we already have a perfectly fine theory of how seemingly-designed artifacts can emerge without a designer (natural selection). If ID wants to toss this away without providing an alternative explanation, what good is it? It's saying, "look, there's design here, but I won't accept the theory with known explanatory power, instead I'll point to some mysterious force that I won't specify." And of course, the only reason not to specify it is to try to sneak religion into science without being explicit about it.

    Because natural selection simply does not have the explanatory power you claim it has. And as I have already pointed out, we do not have to know what a force is or what causes a force in order to determine its existence.

  82. Comment by Jehu — May 31, 2007 @ 5:29 pm

  83. Doug Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 5:37 pm

    But "” we already have a perfectly fine theory of how seemingly-designed artifacts can emerge without a designer (natural selection).

    That's the point of friction. There exists the theory that states how it should be, but the evidential support for those claims are not forthcoming. And bits of evidence surface that run contrary to what would be expected if the theory provided an accurate account.

    It's saying, "look, there's design here, but I won't accept the theory with known explanatory power, instead I'll point to some mysterious force that I won't specify." And of course, the only reason not to specify it is to try to sneak religion into science without being explicit about it.

    What is the explanatory power of the theory? If the theory is unable to to envelop new findings as well as enveloping our increasing understanding in related fields (organic chemistry, biochemistry, etc) when does the value of the explanatory power become questioned?

    And of course, the only reason not to specify it is to try to sneak religion into science without being explicit about it.

    I don't know if you are being serious with this comment. You've been very reasonable and considerate up until this comment…. so I don't know if you said it in jest.

  84. Comment by Doug — May 31, 2007 @ 5:37 pm

  85. Bradford Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 5:55 pm

    Bradford

    I have to point out that for the fifth time of asking you have not answered the question.

    I'm not going to answer your question. Get on with your point if you have one. You never answered mine. You wrote:

    So it appears we can account for the way we detect design in just the same way we detect any other cause. We assess the probability of the outcome given the proposed cause and we assess the likelihood of the cause existing in the first place.

    The outcome in question is life arising on a lifeless planet. What preexisting cause are you citing? If you are unwilling to identify causal options any methodology you apply is suspect.

  86. Comment by Bradford — May 31, 2007 @ 5:55 pm

  87. Bradford Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 5:57 pm

    mtraven: But "” we already have a perfectly fine theory of how seemingly-designed artifacts can emerge without a designer (natural selection).

    But that is exactly what is undemonstrable in a prebiotic environment.

  88. Comment by Bradford — May 31, 2007 @ 5:57 pm

  89. Bradford Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 6:06 pm

    Anti-IDism is built on smoke and mirrors. Try to distract by focusing on the evolution of existing organisms while ignoring or evading questions as to how organisms came about in the first place. If pressed invoke natural selection as an explanation but refuse to specify what chemical outcomes are selected and why.

  90. Comment by Bradford — May 31, 2007 @ 6:06 pm

  91. stunney Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 7:48 pm

    mtraven wrote:

    Real science attempts to explain complex phenonemenon in terms of simpler ones.

    Who gets to decide what qualifies as 'simpler'?

    If intentional rational thought itself is to be understood, must it be understood only in terms of non-intentional non-rational non-thought?

    I don't see why that need be the case at all. I don't think intentional rational thought is a 'problem'. It's only a problem if you try to give a materialist reduction of it. But I wouldn't try such a reduction.

    Why think that rational and moral mindhood needs to be or can be explained, if by 'explained' you mean 'explained in terms of something else which doesn't possess mindhood'? Why think that mind, consciousness, reason, normativity, moral and aesthetic and emotional value, need to be explained in terms of non-mind, non-reason, non-consciousness, non-normativity, non-value?

    The explanation for rational, conscious mentality given by theists is that a transcendent creative mind pre-eminently endowed with reason and value, is the fundamental ontological and explanatory fact about reality. It is senseless to say that this 'doesn't explain anything' in precisely the same way that it would be senseless to say that, if materialism is true, positing impersonal material forces as the fundamental fact about reality, 'wouldn't explain anything'.

    Mind works this way"¦..consciousness, reason, intention, purpose, knowledge, etc. Matter works this way"¦occupying space, rest mass, inertial motion, etc etc. But why hold that mindstuff is more mysterious than matterstuff?

    It strikes me that our conscious mental lives are the most obvious, matter-of-fact, taken-for-granted, intuitively indubitably self-evident realities there are; and that it's things like curved spacetime, energy fields, quarks, and suchlike that are the really 'mysterious' things.

    The central fact which grounds and mediates anyone's access to any facts about curved spacetime, energy fields, etc, whatsoever is, of course the fact of rational consciousness. And the central observation we can make about the fact of rational consciousness is that it's unlike any other physical fact we know. Indeed, consciousness, through which we encounter whole realms of the nonphysical such as rationality, morality, aesthetics, and meaning, is intrinsically unlike anything else in the physical universe, a fact reflected in physics textbooks which purport to explain everything about the universe but say nothing, far less explain anything, about rational consciousness.

    Meantime, it's only fair to point out that materialists have a hard time accounting in their own terms for the central presuppositions of science"“"”namely, rational observership, rational inference, and rational agency"”"”without appearing to endow matter with magical properties.

    Another major difficulty for materialists is to account for why matter appears to obey 'laws' or behave with regularity"”-laws and regularities of remarkable mathematical (and hence rationally intelligible) elegance and beauty.

    How can the matter now present in the universe control its own future, so to speak"”"”especially if we conceive of it as being devoid of teleology? If 'laws' are posited to explain regularities, must not they themselves be immaterial entities that transcend and govern the behavior of the universe's material entities? And is it not the case that the only plausible candidates for being immaterial entities are only ever encountered as the contents of minds?

    A single, unitary divine mind is intuitively a simpler hypothesis than the brute fact of there being (for no reason or purpose) a set of different impersonal Laws of Nature, just as positing a unitary rational will to explain the various voluntary, intentional actions human beings perform is intuitively a simpler hypothesis than the brute fact of there being (for no reason or purpose) an enormously complicated system of bodily biomechanics that arose merely by an evolutionary history strewn with accidents. Which, indeed, is why most people throughout human history have preferred the unitary rational human will hypothesis over the complex biomechanical hypothesis; it's simpler. As is the unitary rational divine will hypothesis for explaining the highly ordered physical universe. They're both simpler hypotheses in most people's opinion.

    Consider a couple of hypotheses:

    1. Some Laws of Nature exist, and exist independently of human beings; and no divine will exists

    and

    2 A divine will exists, and exists independently of human beings; and no Law of Nature exists

    These are empirically equivalent hypotheses and are both consistent with all observational data. But notice that a divine mind is intuitively a simpler notion to grasp (by analogy with our own minds) than are a set of immaterial, impersonal, causally inert Laws, which very few people have ever really known anything about in terms of thorough scientific knowledge. But communicating with other minds? Yes, everyone does that as easily as falling off a log.

    See also the material on Penrose and Dummett I comment on here.

  92. Comment by stunney — May 31, 2007 @ 7:48 pm

  93. mtraven Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 8:19 pm

    Who gets to decide what qualifies as 'simpler'?

    If intentional rational thought itself is to be understood, must it be understood only in terms of non-intentional non-rational non-thought?
    ..
    Why think that rational and moral mindhood needs to be or can be explained, if by 'explained' you mean 'explained in terms of something else which doesn't possess mindhood'? Why think that mind, consciousness, reason, normativity, moral and aesthetic and emotional value, need to be explained in terms of non-mind, non-reason, non-consciousness, non-normativity, non-value?

    We've been over this ground before. You can, I suppose, consider mind as foundational and not in need of explanation. But the facts of the natural world seem to argue against that, both on the physiological level, in that it appears that minds are produced by the workings of brains, which are composed of complex neural circuts, and on the evolutionary historical level — it appears that minds did not exist at the beginning of the universe, but gradually appeared over time (we're talking ordinary human minds here). This sort of thing suggests that minds are grounded in mechanistic biology, rather than the other way around.

    Meantime, it's only fair to point out that materialists have a hard time accounting in their own terms for the central presuppositions of science"“"”namely, rational observership, rational inference, and rational agency"”"”without appearing to endow matter with magical properties.

    Another major difficulty for materialists is to account for why matter appears to obey 'laws' or behave with regularity"”-laws and regularities of remarkable mathematical (and hence rationally intelligible) elegance and beauty.

    Not really, there is nothing magical about rational agency or inference, there are perfectly fine mechanistic theories for all of the things you list.. But the larger point is that even if you believe these things difficult to explain, a "transcendent divine mind" doesn't explain them either. It doesn't explain anything, it is a surrender to ignorance — which was the original point of this thread.

    Perhaps it's just a matter of taste, whether you prefer mechanistic explantions or the kind you like. But the point is, if you have a mechanistic view of mind then you will actually be able to learn something about how minds work — you can do PET scan experiments that see which areas light up for certain tasks, for instance, or you can explore the systematic failures of rationality that humans are prone to. But if you merely say that our minds are offshoots of some transcendent mind, what have you learned about how your mind works? Pretty much nada, which is why the former kind of explanation is science and the other is something else.

  94. Comment by mtraven — May 31, 2007 @ 8:19 pm

  95. CJYman Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 9:16 pm

    You can, I suppose, consider mind as foundational and not in need of explanation.

    Or, you can see mind as foundational AND in need of explanation, just as natural laws and information processors and natural laws ARE foundational AND in need of explanation. Consider that the appearance of information processors (ie: living cells, then the brain, and then computers) and the natural laws that arise from them within the universe in no way means that natural laws and information processing is not a part of the foundation of the universe or NOT in need of explanation. Our universe is indeed the result of (founded on) the processing of quantum information which causes our natural laws. Likewise, just because mind arises within this universe, does not mean that it can not be a part of the foundation of the universe. In fact, it would take more knoweldge of consciousness in order to discover if this is indeed true. This is one IDea (consistent with ID theory) which can not proceed on ignorance.

    As it stands, since our universe results from the processing of information and if it can increase information within it (it has in the form of life) then it is intelligent (not necessarily conscious). This is another IDea which proceeds upon MORE, not less, knowledge.

    But the facts of the natural world seem to argue against that, both on the physiological level, in that it appears that minds are produced by the workings of brains, which are composed of complex neural circuts,

    "The facts of the natural world" ?? Which facts? The facts that we aren't quite sure what the mind even is? Or the appearance that quantum (sub-natural law) occurences may actually be necessary to create consciousness?

    and on the evolutionary historical level "” it appears that minds did not exist at the beginning of the universe,

    Within or without the universe?

    Since the universe (as a program) creates further information processors (in the form of life), it appears that mind did exist before the universe. I'm sure we can now create computer simulations to see if any random set of laws within a program will produce further information processors, or if mentally fine tuned programs are necessary to create further information processors.

    but gradually appeared over time (we're talking ordinary human minds here). This sort of thing suggests that minds are grounded in mechanistic biology, rather than the other way around.

    Like I've already pointed out … just because the mind appeared within the universe, it does not follow that it can not be foundational to or foundational with natural laws.

    And there is no suggestion within evolution that minds are grounded in mechanistic biology. IMO, the ideas that require quantum occurences between sufficiently sized and sufficiently organized biological structures are more plausible. In this case, the structures arise from mechanistic and intelligent (on the part of the living cell) processes — evolution — but then operate on quantum (sub-natural law) occurences between these structures.

    To sum up, there may be an explanation as to how to build a mind within our universe (as there is to build information processors and laws) and also a reason why a mind is needed as foundational to our universe (as are information processing and laws).

  96. Comment by CJYman — May 31, 2007 @ 9:16 pm

  97. MikeGene Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 9:22 pm

    Hi Sal,

    The problem is, it's VERY difficult for people who operate outside the networks of church-funded organisations that promote ID to really know what ID is about;

    Hmmm. I don't operate inside the networks of church-funded organisations that promote ID, yet I would not make the mistake Tyson made. Why? I simply read Behe's book. Is Behe's book VERY difficult to understand?

    According to Tyson, here is Behe's argument:

    Look at the cilium. What the heck is it? No one knows. How does it work? No one has a clue. It's too complicated for me to figure out. It's too complicated for anyone to figure out. Therefore, it MUST be the product of a higher intelligence.

    Tyson either did not read the book or suffers from reading comprehension problems. Actually, the more charitable interpretation is that he effectively relies on hearsay. Why would I say that? Many times, I have heard ID critics characterize Dembski or Behe's position along these lines: "Something is so incredibly complex that it must have been designed." Tyson has heard and trusted this characterization and has thus embellished on the "incredibly complex" angle in front of a friendly audience.

    The best we ID critics can be reasonably expected to do is offer a critique of the public statements made by ID proponents.

    So who was Tyson quoting?

  98. Comment by MikeGene — May 31, 2007 @ 9:22 pm

  99. MikeGene Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 9:24 pm

    Hi mraven,

    Could it be because there isn't much there to grasp? Tyson's language may have been slightly sloppy but he seems to capture the essence of the ID mindset pretty well.

    Slightly sloppy?? Okey dokey. But those are your perceptions.

    Real science attempts to explain complex phenonemenon in terms of simpler ones.

    I agree that ID is not science. But your principle intrigues me. Okay, I'm reading those words on the computer screen. They read "“ "Real science attempts to explain complex phenonemenon in terms of simpler ones." This sequence apparently came into existence because of the entity "mraven." Is mraven simpler than the sequence of letters?

    ID is about giving up explanation in favor of mystifications.

    So I hear.

    All of ID founders on the problem of how you explain the workings of the designer, which nobody here really seems interested in, for some reason.

    Some reason? I have explained my problems with the designer-centric approach many times over.

  100. Comment by MikeGene — May 31, 2007 @ 9:24 pm

  101. mtraven Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 10:17 pm

    Some reason? I have explained my problems with the designer-centric approach many times over

    Well, I read some of that and I just don't get it. Natural selection gives you design without a designer, so if ID is something different that difference has to be the fact of a designer. A non-designer-centric ID is even more content-free than the standard variety. Unless I.m missing something.

  102. Comment by mtraven — May 31, 2007 @ 10:17 pm

  103. Bradford Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 10:21 pm

    Well, I read some of that and I just don't get it. Natural selection gives you design without a designer, so if ID is something different that difference has to be the fact of a designer. A non-designer-centric ID is even more content-free than the standard variety. Unless I.m missing something.

    You are missing something that has been pointed out to you. You are abusing the concept of natural selection. Natural selection enables variation in design once the designed genome exists. It does not account for a genomic origin.

  104. Comment by Bradford — May 31, 2007 @ 10:21 pm

  105. stunney Says:
    May 31st, 2007 at 11:34 pm

    mtraven wrote:

    You can, I suppose, consider mind as foundational and not in need of explanation.

    I don't understand your use of the word 'suppose', as if considering mind as foundational, ontologically and explanatorily, weren't the default position throughout recorded history.

    But the facts of the natural world seem to argue against that, both on the physiological level, in that it appears that minds are produced by the workings of brains, which are composed of complex neural circuts, and on the evolutionary historical level "” it appears that minds did not exist at the beginning of the universe, but gradually appeared over time (we're talking ordinary human minds here).

    Er, I think most theists agree that human brain states and human mental states are systematically correlated, and that human minds have a past of lesser duration than the physical universe's.

    I completely fail to see why that constitutes even an iota of evidence in favor of the view that mind is not foundational. Human mind is not foundational, to be sure. But no theist to my knowledge has ever claimed that human mind is foundational. Theists just aren't that anthropocentric.

    This sort of thing suggests that minds are grounded in mechanistic biology, rather than the other way around.

    This sort of thing suggests that human minds and human bodies are causally interrelated. But there's no evidence that mental states are mere effects of bodily motions, and a ton of evidence that such mental states cause bodily motions (such as the mental decision to type this reply); and a colossal amount of evidence that human bodies, including their brain states, disintegrate when all of a person's mental states are permanently removed.

    Meantime, it's only fair to point out that materialists have a hard time accounting in their own terms for the central presuppositions of science"“"”namely, rational observership, rational inference, and rational agency"”"”without appearing to endow matter with magical properties.

    Another major difficulty for materialists is to account for why matter appears to obey 'laws' or behave with regularity"”-laws and regularities of remarkable mathematical (and hence rationally intelligible) elegance and beauty.

    mtraven:
    Not really, there is nothing magical about rational agency or inference, there are perfectly fine mechanistic theories for all of the things you list..

    Oh, so if something's not mechanical, it's magical, is it?

    What a crock of risible irrational shit.:roll:

    But the larger point is that even if you believe these things difficult to explain, a "transcendent divine mind" doesn't explain them either.

    Why do you have this insane, irrational habit of thinking that if something mental is to be explained, it can only be explained by something of an utterly different ontological character? Do you take this attitude when it comes to explaining non-living material things—that if they're to be explained, they can only be explained by living immaterial things?

    And if not, why such blatant inconsistency on your part?

    It doesn't explain anything, it is a surrender to ignorance "” which was the original point of this thread.

    Nonsense. Utter batshit crazy, unadulterated, irrational, illogical bullcrap. :grin:

    Conscious, rational understanding and knowledge are the opposite of ignorance. Making understanding and knowledge foundational isn't to embrace ignorance. It's to embrace understanding and knowledge.

    You and your fellow loonies, by contrast and quite pitifully, are determined to embrace ignorance with all the passion of a promissory materialist:

    "We don't know how this occurred. But we, er, know it occurred without any conscious, rational, understanding, knowledge or intelligent designer being involved at any stage."

    Perhaps it's just a matter of taste, whether you prefer mechanistic explantions or the kind you like. But the point is, if you have a mechanistic view of mind then you will actually be able to learn something about how minds work "” you can do PET scan experiments that see which areas light up for certain tasks, for instance, or you can explore the systematic failures of rationality that humans are prone to.

    I'm sorry to have to break this to ya—-but it's actually impossible to find out anything by doing PET scan experiments unless you have a mind capable of rational conscious understanding of PET scan experiments.

    But if you merely say that our minds are offshoots of some transcendent mind, what have you learned about how your mind works? Pretty much nada, which is why the former kind of explanation is science and the other is something else.

    In other words, any rational inquiry into the nature of mind which is mired in the quicksands of mechanistic materialism is doomed to abysmal, ignoble failure.:smile:

  106. Comment by stunney — May 31, 2007 @ 11:34 pm

  107. Foxfier Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 12:07 am

    But "” we already have a perfectly fine theory of how seemingly-designed artifacts can emerge without a designer (natural selection).

    Actually, natural selection would only explain changes in stuff that was there, as "selection" implies that there is stuff to select amongst.

    As I understand it, the current non-ID theory is that "somehow, life got started, possibly with lightning and a bunch of rock tea, then it started improving."

  108. Comment by Foxfier — June 1, 2007 @ 12:07 am

  109. mtraven Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 2:06 am

    stunney, as usual, resorts to invective and smileys when he doesn't have any good arguments.

    I don't understand your use of the word 'suppose', as if considering mind as foundational, ontologically and explanatorily, weren't the default position throughout recorded history.

    So what? People have believed all sorts of stupid things throughout human history, that does not oblige me to believe it too.

    I completely fail to see why that constitutes even an iota of evidence in favor of the view that mind is not foundational. Human mind is not foundational, to be sure. But no theist to my knowledge has ever claimed that human mind is foundational. Theists just aren't that anthropocentric.

    Unfortunately human minds are the only ones we actually know about. Theists are completely anthropocentric, since their main trick is to project themselves onto the cosmos, an insistence that something like a human self is at the core of the universe, no matter that observation tells us quite a different story.

    I'm sorry to have to break this to ya"”-but it's actually impossible to find out anything by doing PET scan experiments unless you have a mind capable of rational conscious understanding of PET scan experiments.

    Is that supposed to be some kind of an argument? Just because you can't imagine rational minds arising from material causes doesn't mean the rest of us are subject to your limitiations.

    Why do you have this insane, irrational habit of thinking that if something mental is to be explained, it can only be explained by something of an utterly different ontological character?

    I don't think mental things can only be explained by non-mental things. You can explain mental things in terms of other mental things (ie, through logical inference) or through material causes, The latter is just more interesting, because it reveals more of the interconnected nature of mind and matter.

  110. Comment by mtraven — June 1, 2007 @ 2:06 am

  111. Farshad Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 2:07 am

    Natural selection gives you design without a designer.

    You need to have a blind faith in Natural Selection to believe that it is capable of creating human from bacteria.

  112. Comment by Farshad — June 1, 2007 @ 2:07 am

  113. Mark Frank Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 2:10 am

    Bradford

    You wrote:

    I'm not going to answer your question. Get on with your point if you have one. You never answered mine. You wrote:

    So it appears we can account for the way we detect design in just the same way we detect any other cause. We assess the probability of the outcome given the proposed cause and we assess the likelihood of the cause existing in the first place.

    The outcome in question is life arising on a lifeless planet. What preexisting cause are you citing? If you are unwilling to identify causal options any methodology you apply is suspect.

    As you refuse to answer the question, it looks like I will have to assume that you don't understand either the likelihood or full Bayesian approaches to detecting design. Which is my main point – there are many ID proponents that don't understand the issues in any depth.

    To address your point about the origin of life. Bayesian logic is (among other things) a method for deciding among different hypotheses given the evidence. It is not a magic solution for unsolved problems. If we discover more evidence about the origin of life then Bayes will give us a way of evaluating that evidence. But it doesn't provide the evidence. That would be daft. At the moment we simply don't know how life originated. Maybe we never will.

    IDists believe something on the lines of "life demonstrates CSI, CSI entails design, therefore life was designed" (the details vary according to the IDist). Comparing this logic with a Bayesian (or even comparative likelihood) approach demonstrates that it is an unjustified inference. I try to explain this in my paper "Specification versus likelihood" – I have no doubt others explain it better elsewhere. It is far too long to put in a post.

    You appear to be arguing that we should dismiss the Bayesian logic of statistical inference because we happen not to know the answer to a specific question!

  114. Comment by Mark Frank — June 1, 2007 @ 2:10 am

  115. stunney Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 3:33 am

    mtraven wrote:

    stunney, as usual, resorts to invective and smileys when he doesn't have any good arguments.

    LOL. Every one of your statements was left in tatters, and rather easily too.

    By the way, what bit of matter is a good argument?

    People have believed all sorts of stupid things throughout human history, that does not oblige me to believe it too.

    A brave lunatic could say the same.

    He'd still be a lunatic, however.

    Unfortunately human minds are the only ones we actually know about. Theists are completely anthropocentric, since their main trick is to project themselves onto the cosmos, an insistence that something like a human self is at the core of the universe, no matter that observation tells us quite a different story.

    You mean observation carried out by conscious rational minds?

    You mean the observation that reveals every day and in every way that the physical universe is fine-tuned for life and for rational intelligibility?

    Yeah, that anthropic cosmological principle.

    I'm sorry to have to break this to ya"”-but it's actually impossible to find out anything by doing PET scan experiments unless you have a mind capable of rational conscious understanding of PET scan experiments.

    mtraven:
    Is that supposed to be some kind of an argument?

    No, just a statement of plain fact.

    Why do you find it so discomfiting?

    Just because you can't imagine rational minds arising from material causes doesn't mean the rest of us are subject to your limitiations.

    Well, at least you admit it's just your imagination at work, not your reason.

    Why do you have this insane, irrational habit of thinking that if something mental is to be explained, it can only be explained by something of an utterly different ontological character?

    mtraven:
    I don't think mental things can only be explained by non-mental things. You can explain mental things in terms of other mental things (ie, through logical inference) or through material causes, The latter is just more interesting, because it reveals more of the interconnected nature of mind and matter.

    Why are material causes of mental states more interesting than mental causes of material states? Why would material causes reveal more of the interconnectedness of mind and matter than mental causes would reveal?

    And if you simply can't fathom mental causes of material motions, don't presume that the rest of us are subject to your silly limitations.

  116. Comment by stunney — June 1, 2007 @ 3:33 am

  117. salimfadhley Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 5:41 am

    As I understand it, the current non-ID theory is that "somehow, life got started, possibly with lightning and a bunch of rock tea, then it started improving."

    This is a classic confusion of abiogenesis (how life got started) and evolution (how the different species formed from already existing life). I think you need to be clear on just what standard theory you are criticizing here; it seems that you are objecting to abiogenesis – am I right here?

    Just how many different variants of ID theory are there? As I see it, there are so many flavours of ID, it's hard to work out which is the "official" one.

    Lets consider the various ID proponents attitudes to evolution; Something which pretty much all of us here agree DOES happen. At one end of the ID spectrum you have folks like Mike Gene and Mike Behe who believe that "Macro Evolution" does exist (however I am not sure if he believes that human beings share common ancestry with other forms of life). Mike certainly believes in a concept called "front loading" which strongly implies that the "designer" made this original life with a specific intent to prosper and possible foreknowledge of what this life would become.

    There are others who deny Macro Evolution but are quite comfortable with the idea of adaptive "Micro Evolution", but further assert that "Macro Evolution" is impossible because there is some kind of (unspecified) species barrier that limits how much genetic change can occur through normal evolutionary processes. These people go on to claim that no species has evolved into any other species.

    Yet another ID variant is the Guillermo Gonzalez "Privaliged Planet" theory; a minor refinement of the cosmological fine-tuning argument; He strongly implies that the Earth's position in space-time, and the fundamental constants of the universe are so precisely optimized for life that that this is the strongest evidence for the "designer" – indeed if the earth really is so optimized then we should certainly not rule out natural abiogenesis theories – unless of course our planet is not that optimal after-all.

    We also should not rule out YEC as a variant of ID. It's perhaps the most popular segment of the Intelligent Design movement; Many here will quickly point out that YEC does not equal ID, however the claims made by both parties are quite compatible. The only point of difference is that YEC proponents do not hesitate to identify the "designer", and also claim to have read his book.

    So here are four slightly different variants of ID – just about the only thing they have in common is a rejection of some part of mainstream cosmology, biology and a wholesale objection to "materialism" (which I define as a rejection of the supernatural).

    So Out of Mike Behe, Mike Gene, Guillermo Gonzalez and Ken Ham, which of these outspoken individuals TRULY understands ID?

  118. Comment by salimfadhley — June 1, 2007 @ 5:41 am

  119. Bradford Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 7:50 am

    MF: You appear to be arguing that we should dismiss the Bayesian logic of statistical inference because we happen not to know the answer to a specific question!

    A question? It is the main one. You cannot make accurate statistical inferences about events of which little is known. Your complaints about ID, as represented by a paper referenced yesterday, are erroneous. I explained that here.

  120. Comment by Bradford — June 1, 2007 @ 7:50 am

  121. Mark Frank Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 8:44 am

    Bradford

    I am sorry – I think this dialogue has run its course. Our minds work in such different ways that I am finding this too frustrating to continue.

    Maybe on some other subject….

  122. Comment by Mark Frank — June 1, 2007 @ 8:44 am

  123. Foxfier Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 10:26 am

    salimfadhley- actually, that isn't a different FORM of ID, it's simply a different PART of the same ID theory. Sorry to cut into the rant. Not believing in life just somehow starting does not rule out not believing that this life, once started, somehow managed to turn into everything that's here, just as believing that someone started life on this planet doesn't rule out believing that it then carried on its own merry way.

    Digressing, I am not aware of *any* ID folks who disbelieve in microevolution, such as that which produced dogs.

    None the less, "natural selection" does make one wonder, selection among what? Please don't change the subject again, seeing as there are just as many flavors of evolutionary theory; they all, however, have to get life from somewhere.

  124. Comment by Foxfier — June 1, 2007 @ 10:26 am

  125. salimfadhley Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 12:02 pm

    Foxfier, as I mentioned before "the theory of evolution" is the standard explaination for the origin of the myriad of species we see on earth today.

    The theory of evolution does not offer an explanation for abiogeneis (the origin of the very first life), in the same way that thermodynamics does not explain nuclear fusion (but you might need to understand both in order to fully appreciate the workings of an atomic power-station).

    It's a silly, worn out argument to merely state that evolution does not explain how species formed because evolution does not explain the origins of the first life. As I have previously stated there are a number of competing abiogenesis theories – none of these are the theory of evolution.

    Digressing, I am not aware of *any* ID folks who disbelieve in microevolution, such as that which produced dogs.

    Well the domestic dog is an example of a creature that has been domesticated very recently; It's more an example of artificial selection than natural selection. I agree, it would be truly bizarre to argue that dogs are not the descendants of wolves, however claims as similarly ludicrous have been made in ID books. I might direct you to the controversy surrounding "Of Pandas and People" as an example.

    Despite what you say, there ARE variants of ID. An obvious degree of variation exists in the amount of evolution that the various flavours of ID permit. For example, Mike Gene's view appears to be that almost any structure might have evolved, however with the designer's foreknowledge and direction by front-loading.

    There are other ID advocates who insist that evolution can never cross a "species barrier" and that "macro evolution" does not exist.

    Like I said, there is a wide spectrum of ID belief and very little consensus over all but a few core issues (e.g. rejection of materialism), so while you may think you have an understanding of ID, the overwhelming majority of life-science researchers sees a hodge-podge of views and nothing that is testable, verifiable or stands up to any non partisan scrutiny.

    By the way, the reviews of Behe's latest ID work are starting to appear; May I suggest that Mike posts up a list of reviews from both side of the ID debate of this controvercial tome?

  126. Comment by salimfadhley — June 1, 2007 @ 12:02 pm

  127. Foxfier Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 2:58 pm

    salimfadhley – So which theory built on clouds are you using, given the wide range of evolutionary theories? It is a silly, worn out argument to claim that natural selection causes seemingly designed things without a designer. It's kind of like saying that a building isn't evidence of creative intent, because it's built by following a diagram exactly. Where did the diagram come from? Where did the things being selected amongst come from?

    If one believes that dogs came from a single ancestor, then one believes in microevolution. No matter how silly you think other claims are, do you have an example of what you claimed?

    The rest of your post seems to be responding to someone else's post, not something I wrote.

  128. Comment by Foxfier — June 1, 2007 @ 2:58 pm

  129. stunney Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 6:23 pm

    salimfahdley wrote:

    For example, Mike Gene's view appears to be that almost any structure might have evolved, however with the designer's foreknowledge and direction by front-loading.

    That is also my view as regards physical structures and organisms; but with these additions:

    1) Evolutionary naturalism cannot, even in principle, adequately account for rational and quasi-rational languages. (Examples include: DNA, non-human animal quasi-languages, mathematical and logical languages, computer programming languages, codes in general, and ordinary human languages).

    2) Evolutionary naturalism cannot, even in principle, adequately account for objective value (Examples include: moral, sensual, emotional, and aesthetic value).

    3) Evolutionary naturalism cannot, even in principle, adequately account for the data of cosmological fine tuning for both life and for the enduring rational intelligibility of the physical order.

    I would like to draw your attention also to the fact that quantum mechanics, just like ID, comes with a variety of versions and interpretations, even though observational data remain as they are. For example, Bohm's hidden variables theory, Everett's many worlds theory, objective reduction theories, etc:

    Objective collapse theories regard the present formalism of quantum mechanics as incomplete, in some sense. (For that reason it is more correct to call them theories than interpretations.) They divide into two subtypes, depending on how the hypothesised mechanism of collapse stands in relation to the unitary evolution of the wavefunction.

    1. Collapse is found "within" the evolution of the wavefunction, often by modifying the equations to introduce small amount s of non-linearity. A well-known example is the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory[1].
    2. The evolution of the wavefunction remains unchanged, and an additional collapse process ("Objective reduction") is added, or at least hypothesised. A well-known example is the Penrose interpretation, which links collapse to gravitational stress in general relativistic spacetime, with the threshold value being one graviton.[2]

    Objections

    The fact that these theories seek to extend the formalism is considered as violation of the principle of parsimony by some.

    The fact that the collapse process, treated realistically is apparently superluminal and non-local is also considered a problem.

    You seem to be criticizing ID for comprising variant hypotheses. Er, so does quantum mechanics. In both cases the observational data do not vary.

  130. Comment by stunney — June 1, 2007 @ 6:23 pm

  131. Raevmo Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 8:10 pm

    stunney:

    1) Evolutionary naturalism cannot, even in principle, adequately account for rational and quasi-rational languages. (Examples include: DNA, non-human animal quasi-languages, mathematical and logical languages, computer programming languages, codes in general, and ordinary human languages).

    I take an interest in non-human animal quasi-languages such as bird song. Why is that *in principle* unaccountable by evolutionary naturalism? You must have some powerful arguments to be confident enough to dismiss the work of so many scientists that believe the opposite of your claim. Please share those arguments.

  132. Comment by Raevmo — June 1, 2007 @ 8:10 pm

  133. Joy Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 8:15 pm

    I noticed that no one has dealt the death-blow to salimfadhley's tripe here:

    The problem is, it's VERY difficult for people who operate outside the networks of church-funded organisations that promote ID to really know what ID is about; The best we ID critics can be reasonably expected to do is offer a critique of the public statements made by ID proponents.

    So let me do the honors. Salim, I don't operate in any network of church-funded organizations. So while critiquing what any individual ID supporter offers as evidence of ID is a valid exercise in scientific criticism (supposing the criticism is scientific), it simply cannot be considered an effective critique of ID itself.

    IOW, ignorance is an entirely inadequate refutation of ID.

    Strictly speaking every YEC is also an ID proponent since ID makes no claims at all that conflict with YECism. YEC proponents often cite the work of prominent ID proponents such as Behe & Dembski as a justification for their own positions.

    How strange, considering how long you've been participating here at TT. The ID supported on this site is evolutionarily-favorable, accepts the notion of common ancestry, and has no problem with the evidence that the universe began whenever cosmologists claim it began (it changes regularly, but currently measured in teen-billions).

    Since YECs believe the earth, its solar system and even all the visible stars were created sometime around 6-10 thousand years ago, this is a rather glaring conflict for you to have missed entirely. Again, very strange.

  134. Comment by Joy — June 1, 2007 @ 8:15 pm

  135. mtraven Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 9:24 pm

    Ravemo asks stunney:

    I take an interest in non-human animal quasi-languages such as bird song. Why is that *in principle* unaccountable by evolutionary naturalism? You must have some powerful arguments to be confident enough to dismiss the work of so many scientists that believe the opposite of your claim. Please share those arguments.

    I can now with some confidence channel stunney's worldview. He starts with the premise that mind and matter are radically separate sorts of stuff, and any attempt to unify them is doomed to failure. Since the natural world is material, only the supernatural can explain mental phenomena, or even sub-mental information carrying phenomena like DNA. Because matter is so incapable, so inert, we something else to account for informational phenomena, so there's got to be a big Transcendent Mind in the Sky to account for all the things that I (stunney) believe the natural world can't do by itself.

  136. Comment by mtraven — June 1, 2007 @ 9:24 pm

  137. stunney Says:
    June 1st, 2007 at 10:04 pm

    Raevmo wrote:

    Why is that *in principle* unaccountable by evolutionary naturalism?

    DNA, chump boy.

    Got a verified evolutionary naturalist explanation of it, chump boy?

    That's right. You've got no such thing.

    mtraven wrote:

    I can now with some confidence channel stunney's worldview. He starts with the premise that mind and matter are radically separate sorts of stuff, and any attempt to unify them is doomed to failure. Since the natural world is material, only the supernatural can explain mental phenomena, or even sub-mental information carrying phenomena like DNA. Because matter is so incapable, so inert, we something else to account for informational phenomena, so there's got to be a big Transcendent Mind in the Sky to account for all the things that I (stunney) believe the natural world can't do by itself.

    Explain life. Explain rationality. Explain consciousness. Explain codes. Explain laws of nature. Explain moral value.

    Using only your 'magicmatter' ridiculous bullcrap, whydoncha?

    By the way…

    What bit of matter is a good argument?

  138. Comment by stunney — June 1, 2007 @ 10:04 pm

  139. Vladimir Krondan Says:
    June 2nd, 2007 at 6:18 am

    I take an interest in non-human animal quasi-languages such as bird song. Why is that *in principle* unaccountable by evolutionary naturalism?

    Bird songs, like anything else claimed to be evolutionary adaptations, can only arise by natural selection if they are germinal. Where are they in the genetic material? Saying that "they are there somewhere in the chromosomes" won't do. Unless, of course, you happen to be using DGP Darwinian Germplasm!

  140. Comment by Vladimir Krondan — June 2, 2007 @ 6:18 am

  141. Raevmo Says:
    June 2nd, 2007 at 6:36 am

    Teramitsu, I., Kudo, L.C., London, S.E., Geschwind, D.H., and White, S.A.. 2004. Parallel FoxP1 and FoxP2 expression in human and songbird brain predicts functional interaction Journal of Neuroscience 24: 3152-3163 .

  142. Comment by Raevmo — June 2, 2007 @ 6:36 am

  143. Vladimir Krondan Says:
    June 2nd, 2007 at 7:12 am

    Teramitsu, I., Kudo, L.C., London, S.E., Geschwind, D.H., and White, S.A.. 2004. Parallel FoxP1 and FoxP2 expression in human and songbird brain predicts functional interaction Journal of Neuroscience 24: 3152-3163 .

    These genes are thought to play a role in vocal learning and vocal articulation. So where are the genes for bird songs?

  144. Comment by Vladimir Krondan — June 2, 2007 @ 7:12 am

  145. RogerRabbitt Says:
    June 2nd, 2007 at 7:25 am

    Mark Frank Says:

    This assumes that there is a clearly identifiable philosophy which is intelligent design. My experience is that some of IDs strongest proponents have contradictory ideas. e.g. Dave Scott recently wrote "I think the problem with specification is it's a subjective measure but it shouldn't be hard to understand". However, Dembski clearly believes specification is not subjective but can be deduced from his version of complexity theory. You might ask how many ID supporters understand ID.

    What is Dembski's position?

    Specification depends on the knowledge of subjects. Is specification therefore subjective? Yes, but not in a way that limits specification's usefulness for science. – William Dembski, No Free Lunch, page 66.

    One might as well ask how well ID critics have researched what IDers are actually saying. And if I can't trust the "institution of science" to accurately reflect simple facts that I can easily check out, what would motivate me to trust them on issues that I suspect neither they nor their ID opponents have really a firm knowledge of?

  146. Comment by RogerRabbitt — June 2, 2007 @ 7:25 am

  147. Raevmo Says:
    June 2nd, 2007 at 8:50 am

    So where are the genes for bird songs?

    About 2 centi-Morgans from the genes for English.

  148. Comment by Raevmo — June 2, 2007 @ 8:50 am

  149. Mark Frank Says:
    June 2nd, 2007 at 10:29 am

    What is Dembski's position?

    Specification depends on the knowledge of subjects. Is specification therefore subjective? Yes, but not in a way that limits specification's usefulness for science. – William Dembski, No Free Lunch, page 66.

    One might as well ask how well ID critics have researched what IDers are actually saying. And if I can't trust the "institution of science" to accurately reflect simple facts that I can easily check out, what would motivate me to trust them on issues that I suspect neither they nor their ID opponents have really a firm knowledge of?

    Dembski is a bit confusing sometimes. But if you read this paper which explicitly supersedes NFL (page 32) you will find he defines specification in terms of simplicity, which is turn defined in terms of the shortest algorithm that can define a pattern. I can't usefully give page numbers as you have to follow the whole chain of reasoning.

    Actually the NFL definition is not saying the concept of specificity is subjective – only that it is relative to a particular person's knowledge. You might as well say the decision about what someone owns is subjective.

  150. Comment by Mark Frank — June 2, 2007 @ 10:29 am

  151. Brian Killian Says:
    June 2nd, 2007 at 12:38 pm

    Mtraven wrote:

    I can now with some confidence channel stunney's worldview. He starts with the premise that mind and matter are radically separate sorts of stuff, and any attempt to unify them is doomed to failure. Since the natural world is material, only the supernatural can explain mental phenomena, or even sub-mental information carrying phenomena like DNA. Because matter is so incapable, so inert, we something else to account for informational phenomena, so there's got to be a big Transcendent Mind in the Sky to account for all the things that I (stunney) believe the natural world can't do by itself.

    Materialists: The real Cartesian dualists.

  152. Comment by Brian Killian — June 2, 2007 @ 12:38 pm

  153. RogerRabbitt Says:
    June 2nd, 2007 at 2:59 pm

    Mark Frank says:

    But if you read this paper which explicitly supersedes NFL (page 32)

    Let's see:

    The changes in my account of these concepts here should be viewed as a simplification, clarification, extension, and refinement of my previous work, not as a radical departure from it. To see this, it will help to understand what prompted this new treatment of specification and specified complexity as well as why it remains in harmony with my past treatment.

    MF says:

    you will find he defines specification in terms of simplicity, which is turn defined in terms of the shortest algorithm that can define a pattern.

    I'm not sure that is completely accurate. From your link:

    Note also that simplicity here is with respect to S's background knowledge and is therefore denoted by a complexity measure Ï•"²S, thereby making the dependence of this measure on S explicit.25

    MF says:

    Actually the NFL definition is not saying the concept of specificity is subjective – only that it is relative to a particular person's knowledge.

    You started out by saying "Dembski clearly believes specification is not subjective", despite the fact that he specifically says quite the opposite. It may be that he uses the word in a way you do not, but then Dave Scot may also, which would still undercut your initial point. But beyond that, let's compare your characterization of what he said in NFL, to what he says in the document you linked to:

    Even though χ depends on S's background knowledge through ϕ S(T), and therefore appears still to retain a subjective element, the elimination of chance only requires a single semiotic agent who has discovered the pattern in an event that unmasks its non-chance nature.

    It sounds like those two are still consistent in their essence. Subjectivity hasn't been eliminated from specification by Dembski, but he still thinks the concept is useful for scientific investigation.

    I'm not familiar enough with Dave Scot's writings to comment on his take on specification and subjectivity.

  154. Comment by RogerRabbitt — June 2, 2007 @ 2:59 pm

  155. mcromer Says:
    June 2nd, 2007 at 3:51 pm

    Well, I read some of that and I just don't get it. Natural selection gives you design without a designer

    That is certainly the belief of atheistic scientists, but it is an assertion woefully lacking in any specific substance.

    Certainly natural selection can explain why antibiotic resistance genes spread through a population, and many other gene population questions. However there is an almost insurmountable distance between determining which enzymes are created in a bacteria to protect against an antibiotic, and the real creative leaps we see in evolution.

  156. Comment by mcromer — June 2, 2007 @ 3:51 pm

  157. Mark Frank Says:
    June 2nd, 2007 at 5:11 pm

    Rogerrabbitt

    I am afraid I don't get your point in your 2:59 post above. However, here is the passage that Dave Scott wrote that makes it pretty clear he either hasn't understood or disagrees with Dembski's paper:

    The problem with this is that specification is subjective. It is not a product of nature but rather a product of mind. We can't, or at least I believe we can't, come up with an objective formula that distinguishes specification from non-specification.

    It is probably unfair to use Dave Scott as an exemplar of the ID movement. I am just not convinced that most ID proponents understand ID much better than most ID critics. It is late – but if challenged I will try to justify that statement tomorrow.:wink:

  158. Comment by Mark Frank — June 2, 2007 @ 5:11 pm

  159. stunney Says:
    June 2nd, 2007 at 5:54 pm

    Brian Killian wrote:

    Mtraven wrote:

    I can now with some confidence channel stunney's worldview. He starts with the premise that mind and matter are radically separate sorts of stuff, and any attempt to unify them is doomed to failure. Since the natural world is material, only the supernatural can explain mental phenomena, or even sub-mental information carrying phenomena like DNA. Because matter is so incapable, so inert, we something else to account for informational phenomena, so there's got to be a big Transcendent Mind in the Sky to account for all the things that I (stunney) believe the natural world can't do by itself.

    Materialists: The real Cartesian dualists.

    No, really, mtraven can channel thoughts!

    In other words, the bit of matter that = mtraven can get arranged in a particular way that = another bit of matter, in some sense of '=' that is equivalent to what we mean by 'represent'.

    How could you possibly fail to see that this way of putting it is the opposite of 'embracing ignorance', Brian?

    Oh, because you're just not that irrational and/or dumb?

    Ah, I see. Well, that explains your attitude very nicely.

  160. Comment by stunney — June 2, 2007 @ 5:54 pm

  161. Mung Says:
    June 3rd, 2007 at 3:47 pm

    Mark Frank:

    Do you understand either the likelihood or full Bayesian approaches to detecting (real) design?

    I think Bradford is inviting you to show that you do, in order to establish whether you are competent to judge others on the matter, and giving you the scenario in which he expects you to establish your case.

    You either fail to see this or are intentionally ignoring it. So now you don't have the "oh, i failed to see your point" objection anymore.

    Apply the Bayesian approach. Let's see you do it, and let's see how well it works.

    I simply have a minor irritation with ID proponents who respond to criticism by X with "X doesn't understand ID" and then I find they don't understand it any better.

    Missing the point entirely. They don't need to understand the entirety of ID in order to understand that some statement about ID is false. And to reject an argument that some statement about ID is false on the basis that the person making the evaluation doesn't know everything there is to know about ID is irrational.

    It is probably unfair to use Dave Scott as an exemplar of the ID movement. I am just not convinced that most ID proponents understand ID much better than most ID critics.

    Knock yourself out. It's mostly an exercise in irrelevance though. If a suppoerter of ID says an ID critic is wrong on some point concerning ID and explain why, and the response of the critic is yes, but you don't understand this other completely unrelated aspect about ID, so I am free to disregard your argument, that says much more about the ID critic that it does about the ID suppoerter, woudn't you say?

  162. Comment by Mung — June 3, 2007 @ 3:47 pm

  163. Mung Says:
    June 3rd, 2007 at 4:15 pm

    No, really, mtraven can channel thoughts!

    No doubt there exists a fully material explanation, which explanation is itself fully material.

  164. Comment by Mung — June 3, 2007 @ 4:15 pm

  165. mtraven Says:
    June 3rd, 2007 at 6:48 pm

    stunney:

    A single, unitary divine mind is intuitively a simpler hypothesis than the brute fact of there being (for no reason or purpose) a set of different impersonal Laws of Nature, just as positing a unitary rational will to explain the various voluntary, intentional actions human beings perform is intuitively a simpler hypothesis than the brute fact of there being (for no reason or purpose) an enormously complicated system of bodily biomechanics that arose merely by an evolutionary history strewn with accidents.

    I don't know of any humans who have a "unitary rational will". All the ones of my acquaintance are fallible creatures, with multiple conflicting goals and heaping gobs of irrationality, much of which can be traced back without difficulty to the observable fact of the "enormously complicated system of bodily biomechanics" that underlies their functioning.

    Now, in Cartoon World, people have unitary characters and goals (Wiley Coyote wants to eat the Road Runner, Yogi Bear wants the Pikanick Basket), so things are much simpler. If the inhabitants of such worlds want to believe in the Great Cartoonist, it's understandable (and even correct). However, the real world seems considerably more complicated, and it does not appear that anybody's in charge. Good thing too, or he'd have a hell of a lot of explaining to do.

  166. Comment by mtraven — June 3, 2007 @ 6:48 pm

  167. Axeman Says:
    June 5th, 2007 at 12:03 am

    My Lord! This talk about how "simple" matter is as an explanation to thought flies smack in the face of Turing theory. Machines are the most understandable processing devices we can experience. Their processing is the most explicit an understanding of thought can be.

    Thus an understandable (where it's understandable how we would understand it–not just some far-flung in the future TO-BE-UNDERSTANDABLE when we have bubblecars and helical roads spiraling up buildings) model of thought is a TURING one. Yes, not all machines need to be TMs, but we do not as such understand them either.

    Thus we understand no non-Turing model of computers as understandable. Now the matter of our understanding the method of our understanding is problematic, because we not only have to be a machine that computes what we understand, but must be encodable as a machine that understands how it understands that. Now there are all sorts of implications with the halting problem, but especially with a TM taking its own encoding as input.

    There is nothing simple about information processing, or, should it differ, thought. Reducing it to matter is a pointless academic exercise that really seems to appeal to reductionists for some reason.

    In fact, TM-related theory should deflate anyone who thinks that we can come up with a non-brain, totally-symbolic representation of an algorithm which encodes the brain so as to prove that the brain processes the algorithm by which it processes.

  168. Comment by Axeman — June 5, 2007 @ 12:03 am

  169. stunney Says:
    June 5th, 2007 at 12:19 am

    mtraven wrote:

    I don't know of any humans who have a "unitary rational will". All the ones of my acquaintance are fallible creatures, with multiple conflicting goals and heaping gobs of irrationality, much of which can be traced back without difficulty to the observable fact of the "enormously complicated system of bodily biomechanics" that underlies their functioning.

    If there is no such thing as a rational will, then there is no such thing as irrational action. All behavior would be, in that case, not irrational, but non-rational. (A similar distinction exists between immoral and non-moral behavior. All animals exhibit the latter but only humans are capable of the former, which is one reason we don't charge rabbits with crimes.) Attributions of irrationality presuppose the possibility of valid attributions of rationality.

  170. Comment by stunney — June 5, 2007 @ 12:19 am

  171. mtraven Says:
    June 5th, 2007 at 1:06 am

    If there is no such thing as a rational will, then there is no such thing as irrational action.
    I didn't say "there is no such thing as a rational will", I said humans don't have a "unitary rational will". Obviously humans occasionally exhibit rationality, or we wouldn't have a word for it…but it's hardly unitary, and hardly constitutes a complete or even a very good incomplete theory of human behavior.

    You said:

    just as positing a unitary rational will to explain the various voluntary, intentional actions human beings perform is intuitively a simpler hypothesis than the brute fact of there being (for no reason or purpose) an enormously complicated system of bodily biomechanics that arose merely by an evolutionary history strewn with accidents.

    Rationality may be simpler but it does not match the observable facts very well.

  172. Comment by mtraven — June 5, 2007 @ 1:06 am

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    The Privileged Planet by Guillermo Gonzalez and Jay Richards

    The Way of the Cell by Franklin Harold

    The Volitional Brain by Benjamin Libet

    Evolution in Four Dimensions by Eva Jablonka & Marion Lamb

    The Evolution-Creation Struggle by Michael Ruse




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