Against Darwinism
by nullasalusI only just found out that Jerry Fodor recently debated Philip Kitcher on the merits of Darwinism, specifically the value of natural selection in an explanatory capacity. While Fodor is an avowed atheist and metaphysical naturalist, he nevertheless takes a very dim view of Darwinism (though not evolution or common descent), and I tend to find his views interesting for one reason only: His ability to really, really irritate a diverse array of people.
In the interest of helping him out with that, I now provide a link to Jerry Fodor's paper Against Darwinism. Here's one interesting footnote.
As usual, not attending to the intensionality of one’s explanatory constructs eventuates in all sorts of silliness. Thus Jarrel Diamond (in his Introduction to Ernst Mayr’s What Evolution Is Basic Books, 2001) wonders (rhetorically) ‘How can one explain the remarkable adaptation of every species to its chosen niche? ‘ (p. x). Likewise Sober (1993) p.186: “The exquisite fit of organisms to their environments … is one of the central phenomena that the theory of evolution by natural selection attempts to explain.” (See also passages from Dobzhansky quoted on p 49 of Sterelny and Griffiths.) But, so long as `degree of fitness’ and `the organism’s environment’ are specified post-hoc, there’s nothing here to wonder at except a tautology. If a certain creature fails to occupy a certain niche exactly, then it just follows that that isn’t exactly the niche that the creature occupies. Imagine a research program directed to explaining why each creature fits so precisely into the corresponding hole in space. Would the NSF be well-advised to fund it? Or imagine Scrooge before his tragic capitulation: `The chap who is living in the gutter on scraps from the tables of the rich has nothing to complain of , for he is perfectly adapted to living in exactly the way that he does; viz in the gutter on scraps from the tables of the rich.’ This would be a joke if it were funny.
Fodor also has a book due out this or next year entitled "What Darwin Got Wrong", with co-author Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini. As it sounds like it will really irritate many people, I look forward to reading it. Until then, here's a thread for talking about Fodor's paper.
April 4th, 2009 at 6:46 am
From Fodor's paper:
I guess this is par for the course for a philosophy paper. Not much counting of horses teeth. Is there anything in the paper that you think biologists should find useful, Nul?
Comment by Alan Fox — April 4, 2009 @ 6:46 am
April 4th, 2009 at 11:33 am
In the following section I think Fodor is raising some issues with which a lot of ID’ist would agree:
In other words, naturalist’s have a hard time stripping away the explanations of design and intention. Somehow the ideas and language of design and intention have a way of sneaking back in. Sometimes they are even used as metaphors (ie. "Nature designs", "natural selection somehow knows" etc.)
Yet, the strict naturalist argues, with almost absolute confidence, that it is an unguided and undirected natural process that leaves behind only the appearance of intention and design. But how do we know that assumption is true? Has anyone ever proven the naturalists’ major premise? Is it something that is provable or is it something that we need to accept by faith?
Fodor continues: “Only agents have minds, and only agents act out of their intentions, and natural selection isn’t an agent.”
That is something to keep in mind.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — April 4, 2009 @ 11:33 am
April 4th, 2009 at 12:30 pm
You'd have to ask a biologist, Alan. I thought the paper was interesting, and that Fodor seems to enjoy taking positions that promise to annoy a diversity of people. Admittedly, I have a weakness for rascals of any stripe.
As for the utility or validity of his observations, I'll leave that to others to decide for now.
Comment by nullasalus — April 4, 2009 @ 12:30 pm
April 4th, 2009 at 3:16 pm
Hi Nullasalus,
In the opening post, you wrote…
I take it that it is ok for Fodor to be irritating, but when I quote him doing it, my comment gets holed?!?
Actually, it wasn't my intent to be irritating. I took the time to read the paper you so kindly linked to and found it rather entertaining and I actually laughed out loud when I read the line I posted. I thought others would find it funny too, but I take it you did not.
My comment was a temporary placeholder until I had time to formulate a more detailed response. I found Fodor's paper interesting because he hints at a familiar theme, what if both sides of the ID/Darwin debate are wrong? Here is a telling excerpt…
I was planning on commented further on this, but now I am unsure whether or not I have irritated you to the point of becoming a persona non gratis. So I will wait and see.
Comment by Thought Provoker — April 4, 2009 @ 3:16 pm
April 4th, 2009 at 3:36 pm
TP,
If you wrote a very long, interesting paper that managed to be irritating primarily because you were approaching a popularly divisive question from a fresh angle, I'd probably post it. Snarky one-liners meant to tweak people, I have zero tolerance for – and I will tolerate no petty bullshit in any thread I administer. Also, I'm biased and unfair about this.
That said, if you have comments about Fodor's paper, go for it. Criticize it. Praise it. Expand on it. But Fodor's paper is the topic, not side-issue culture war nonsense, not theism versus atheism, not the imagined or real political proclivities of the Discovery Institute. And if you somehow manage to turn this into a discussion about Orch-OR, I won't hole you, but I will certainly make use of the eye-roll smiley.
Comment by nullasalus — April 4, 2009 @ 3:36 pm
April 4th, 2009 at 7:04 pm
I asked one and they said "no". I think they were probably right.
Do you disagree. Have you any supporting arguments
Comment by Alan Fox — April 4, 2009 @ 7:04 pm
April 4th, 2009 at 7:30 pm
If you're interested in hearing arguments about the supposed vacuity of natural selection in an explanatory capacity, I would recommend Jerry Fodor's "Against Darwinism". He seems to be well aware of standard biologist objections.
As for me, I'll reserve judgment for now. I'm just doing a little bit of that thar "thought provokin" I've heard so much about.
Comment by nullasalus — April 4, 2009 @ 7:30 pm
April 4th, 2009 at 7:33 pm
Fodor states the following proposition:
I don't think Darwinism (or indeed anyone) claims that NS explains phenotypic distributions. At best, natural selection is a partial explanation for the observed phenotypic distributions, and there is plenty of evidence for that. Yet there are also plenty of other well-established mechanisms that affect phenotypic distributions in biological populations, such as genetic drift. Thus, it seems to me that Fodor is attacking a strawman here.
Fodor provides the following "proof" of the proposition:
I find this very hard to understand. Can someone more versed in philosophy explain the "proof"?
Comment by Raevmo — April 4, 2009 @ 7:33 pm
April 4th, 2009 at 7:52 pm
Hi Nullasalus,
Thank you for the reassurance concerning your use of moderation powers.
You wrote…
I am curious how many people managed to work their way through Fodor's rambling style. While he was entertaining, he used a lot of words to get his points across.
I hesitate to be the first to give a summary of what was said because it is likely to result in me being attacked instead people making the effort to present a counter interpretation.
Therefore, I am giving fair warning. I am not going to answer any questions from people who do not present their understanding of what Fodor said prior to challenging me.
Fodor makes a reasonable case that "Darwinists", especially Evolutionary Psychologists, are overreaching in their theories to the point that the whole concept "… is very likely ill-conceived."
While this initially sounds like a standard negative attack based on incredibility, Fodor’s approach is quite different. Fodor isn’t arguing about what natural processes can’t do. In fact, he clearly presumes natural processes can do everything that has happened simply based on the prima facie that it did happened.
Fodor argues against sweeping claims of generalized laws. He explains there is a big difference between providing a historical narrative of an event/trait that happened verses claiming a predictive law suggesting an event/trait was destined to occur as it did.
Fodor uses the Battle of Waterloo as an example. While historians can offer explanations for Napoleon’s loss, it wasn’t something that could have been predicted. The results weren’t due to some definable law.
Fodor closes with…
I hope no one is going to try to argue that Fodor was forced to provide this disclaimer against his true beliefs.
The irony is that while ID proponents may like the title Against Darwinism, Fodor's main message is that life's diversity is just as much a “Just So” story as all other historical events and that is ok.
Comment by Thought Provoker — April 4, 2009 @ 7:52 pm
April 4th, 2009 at 8:02 pm
That was quick, nullasalus. You obviously weren't kidding about zero-tolerance. But perhaps you could try to answer the question I posed at the end of my non-holed comment. That would be great, seeing as you are probably the most well-versed person in philosophy around here. Thanks in advance.
Comment by Raevmo — April 4, 2009 @ 8:02 pm
April 4th, 2009 at 8:12 pm
Actually, Raevmo, I really have no opinion on what Fodor's offering up here. I've presented his paper with no endorsement other than mentioning I find him amusingly irritating, and since he's an ardent atheist his criticisms come from a different direction than normal. As I've said before, I have no real problems with fairly orthodox evolutionary theory, so long as it's stripped of excess metaphysical baggage.
I hoped people would read and interact with Fodor's paper and the views therein on their own. I'm very tired of TT posts that turn into personal dust-ups or political posturing in the comments section straightaway. If I wanted that kind of bull I'd hang out at Youtube.
Comment by nullasalus — April 4, 2009 @ 8:12 pm
April 4th, 2009 at 8:37 pm
Nullasalus, it's too bad you have no opinion about the paper you made the topic of this thread. If your sole motive was to present a paper that might irritate some people, then I wonder why you chose this particular paper. To me, it's not irritating at all, and I presume you would prefer to irritate people that do not share your world view.
Comment by Raevmo — April 4, 2009 @ 8:37 pm
April 4th, 2009 at 8:49 pm
Why is it that you and Alan both want to argue with me specifically? It's flattering, really, but silly.
You'll notice in the OP I didn't say that Fodor irritates only people I disagree with, but a diverse array. Considering I made it clear that he accepts evolution and common descent, I thought it was obvious that his position would put him in stark disagreement with (some) ID proponents and (some/most) ID opponents. His full views would pit him dead against all ID proponents (and even myself) since he explicitly rejects ID, but his paper discusses NS in Darwinism specifically.
What's more, even Fodor knows that what he's doing is irritating. His final footnote:
You're taking my joking about 'irritating' a bit too far. If I only wanted to get on people's nerves, there are other subjects that would work better, lame as they are.
Comment by nullasalus — April 4, 2009 @ 8:49 pm
April 4th, 2009 at 9:35 pm
Thought Provoker wrote:
I think you misunderstand Fodor's main point. He's not arguing that the evolutionary explanation for diversity is a "just so story", as the evolutionary explanation for diversity isn't natural selection. On the contrary, the evolutionary explanation for biological diversification is genetic divergence following allopatry in divergent ecosystems.
Fodor's main point is that the evolutionary explanation for adaptation is a "just so story", because natural selection isn't (indeed, can't be) an "agent". To which my response is (as many of you already know), "so what else is new?" I've been making the point for years that natural selection isn't a "mechanism", it's an outcome of three interacting mechanisms (variation, heredity, and fecundity). Furthermore, Fodor's assertion that some evolutionary biologists make too much of natural selection and adaptation is very old news. Gould and Lewontin made a forceful argument for this very same point 30 years ago (see http://ethomas.web.wesleyan.ed... ), and the development of Kimura's theory of neutral molecular evolution has integrated this same point into the mainstream of current evolutionary theory.
Indeed, if I were in a less charitable mood, I would paraphrase Adam Sedgwick's review of Darwin's Origin and say of Fodor's critique that what is new in it is incorrect, and what is correct in it isn't new.
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 4, 2009 @ 9:35 pm
April 4th, 2009 at 10:46 pm
I find a bit of irony in Fodor's criticism of "selected for" language. He criticizes the use of intentional language in biology but as an atheist, an intentionality specialist, and presumably not a panpsychist, he still seems perfectly happy utilizing intentionality language in reference to human beings. The irony I see in this is that if Mother Nature is not intentional then why ascribe it to human beings either? If it's chance and necessity through and through then why use terms like intentionality at all. After all under this world view human actions are fundamentally no more intentional than a rock falling off a cliff. They both just do what they do. They could both be said to be "about" something (i.e. the rock falling could be said to be about hitting the ground). One thing we could reasonably require from philosophers is that they be consistent.
Comment by Steve Petermann — April 4, 2009 @ 10:46 pm
April 5th, 2009 at 12:30 am
I disagree. As I have pointed out in previous comments, humans (and indeed, virtually all living organisms) are intentional entities. No less an evolutionary biologist than Ernst Mayr said so over three decades ago. The question is not "Do living organisms have intentions/purposes?", but rather "Do the processes by which living organisms have come to exist have intentions/purposes?" That's the question that animates both sides of the debate over "design in nature", and it's the one over which EBers and IDers most vehemently disagree. So far, anyway…
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 5, 2009 @ 12:30 am
April 5th, 2009 at 12:52 am
Besides, a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds…
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 5, 2009 @ 12:52 am
April 5th, 2009 at 5:33 am
Can't speak for Raevmo. I just asked if there was anything of interest for a biologist in the paper (as I couldn't see any). Apparently, you either don't think so, or have no opinion. Not much to have an argument about.
Comment by Alan Fox — April 5, 2009 @ 5:33 am
April 5th, 2009 at 9:26 am
Allen_MacNeill,
Ok, but what about rocks and rivers? Are they intentional as well? If not, why not?
I agree that the argument is about whether the processes of evolution are intentional or not. My issue is one of consistency. If those processes are not intentional then why talk about intentionality in anything? Let me expand on my example. How is the rock compacting the ground after falling any different from a human hammering a nail? If causes are chance and necessity through and through, then both the human and the rock act because of a long series of precursor chance and necessity events leading up to the present act. The only difference is in the complexity and number of those precursor events.
Ok, in the words of the famous philosopher, Rosanna Anna Danna, "Never Mind".
Comment by Steve Petermann — April 5, 2009 @ 9:26 am
April 5th, 2009 at 2:27 pm
Steve Petermann asks:
According to Mayr (and to virtually all philosophers who have addressed this subject), intentional entities (what are generally referred to as "agents") must have an "onboard semantic program" that actively alters their structure and function in such a way as to attempt to reach a goal that is encoded in the program.
The qualifier "semantic" is important: semantic programs are composed of encoded information in which symbols stand for and are translated into physical, chemical, and biological objects and processes.
The qualifier "attempt" is also important: just because an agent does not reach a goal does not mean that it was not attempting to do so. Hence, even a simple bacterium is an "intentional agent", albeit one with a very low level of complexity and flexibility of intentionality.
By contrast, rocks and rivers are not intentional agents because they do not have "onboard semantic programs" which can alter their structure and function to attempt to reach a goal that is encoded in their program. They are what Ernst Mayr referred to as teleomatic entities. That is, whatever "ends" they come to (flowing or rolling downhill, for example, or emptying into a lake or forming a pile of scree) are the result of the operation of physical and chemical laws which do not depend on the operation of onboard semantic programs.
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 5, 2009 @ 2:27 pm
April 5th, 2009 at 2:58 pm
There is another kind of "intentionality" (i.e. teleology) besides the two I outlined above. This is instrumental (sometimes called "derived", "indirect", or "secondary" teleology) in which an object or process that is itself teleomatic is co-opted by an intentional agent in the process of that agent's attempts to reach its internally programmed goal(s).
For example, if I block my driveway with a large boulder, the boulder has "instrumental intentionality", provided by me.
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 5, 2009 @ 2:58 pm
April 5th, 2009 at 4:10 pm
Allen wrote:
How does one answer such a question empirically?
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — April 5, 2009 @ 4:10 pm
April 5th, 2009 at 7:27 pm
Allen_MacNeill,
But what is a "semantic onboard program"? From a change and necessity standpoint, it is just a states of affairs in the brain produced by precursor chance and necessity events. Even the use of a term like "semantics" to characterize neural structures is itself a product of those causes. Perhaps chance and necessity developed terms like "intentional", "meaning" and "symbol" to promoted fitness. A clever but fallacious trick.
Understood this way there is no "goal" they strive for. They don't strive for anything. They just do what they do based on their current state of affairs. A rock is only different in the level of complexity. One could just as easily say a rock has a "semantic onboard program" because it has internal crystalline elements, chemical and organic elements that are able to change over time and respond to outside stimuli. This in turn produces different structures and dynamic properties (i.e. mass, density, stressor matrices, chemical compositions, etc.) or to put it your way a new "semantic onboard program".
Comment by Steve Petermann — April 5, 2009 @ 7:27 pm
April 5th, 2009 at 7:41 pm
Steve Petermann wrote:
That's a very good question; indeed, it may be the question. How would one go about showing that anything has a purpose? We have an extraordinarily well-developed ability to do this, but like many innate abilities (such as the ability to recognize faces or learn to speak and understand spoken language), it operates "in the background" and is almost completely inaccessible to us.
One approach would be to determine what empirical characteristics a widely accepted goal-seeking process has, and then to see if the the processes by which living organisms have come to exist exhibit those same characteristics.
For example:
• All goal-seeking agents have a semantically encoded program which is encoded, stored, activated, and replayed in a physical medium. That is, it is "embodied" in the form of something empirically detectable (such as DNA sequences in a genome or action potentials and altered synapses in a nervous system or magnetic domains in a hard disk or binary code deposited by laser on optial media, etc.) rather than being purely "disembodied".
• The processes by which such programs are encoded, stored, activated, and replayed in physical media can be empirically observed and, with sufficient analysis, replicated and/or recreated.
• The semantically encoded information which is encoded, stored, activated, and replayed in a physical medium can be copied, modified, and/or transformed using the same (or similar) physical mechanisms (e.g.recombinant DNA technology, learning in nervous systems, reprogramming in electronic digital media, etc.).
• Virtually all goal-seeking agents exhibit goal homeotaxis: that is, if perturbed away from an intended goal, a teleological entity will actively correct for the perturbation and reorient toward the goal.
That's a first attempt at a short list; I'm sure others can think of more (and hopefully so will I, with time).
I seems clear to me that the genomes of living organisms, the sensory/nervous/motor systems of animals, and the electronic control systems of some technological devices (such as heat-seeking missiles) all qualify as genuine telelogical agents vis-a-vis the four criteria listed above. However, it is not at all clear to me that the same is true for the processes by which the genomes of living organisms and the sensory/nervous/motor systems of animals can to be fulfill any of the criteria listed. Indeed, I'm not sure how anyone would go about testing whether this would be the case for "intelligently designed" systems that were not intentionally designed by humans.
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 5, 2009 @ 7:41 pm
April 5th, 2009 at 7:51 pm
The information in a "semantically encoded program" (SEP) is not equivalent in any way to, for example, the force of gravity or the chemistry of crystalline rocks. What distinguishes the operation of a SEP from purely teleomatic objects and processes (such as gravity and inorganic chemistry) is that the meaning of information in the SEP is not a purely "natural" property of the material medium in which the program is encoded. Rather, the meaning of the information in a SEP is the result of an analogical transformation, in which one form of material object(s) or process(es) (e.g. the sequence of amino acids in a protein or the sounds of spoken words) is represented in some other form of material object(s) or process(es) (e.g. the sequence of nucleotide bases in DNA or the written form of the spoken words).
Again, I cannot see any way to determine if there is any kind of SEP existing in purely non-material/disembodied form somewhere "outside" of nature, and so cannot even imagine a way in which the existence of such a SEP (or its non-existence) could be either verified or falsified.
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 5, 2009 @ 7:51 pm
April 5th, 2009 at 10:40 pm
Allen,
But what you ascribe to as meaning is, in effect, just a set of states of affairs in the brain created by a series of precursor reactive processes driven by chance and necessity. Light hits the eye; then through a long series of reactions neural synapses, dendrites, etc are set such that if a similar light pattern hits the eye, a set of reactions ensue that eventually react with the prior neural set, perhaps causing another series of reactions such as moving out of the way of a baseball flying at one's head.
You say that meaning is encoded but that is circular. It "means" something to you because that is just another set of states of affairs in your brain setup by prior reactive processes. Those states of affairs will fire when some new appropriate reactive process is initiated. The rock is no different, albeit, less complex. It also has "encoding" from prior reactive processes. That "encoding" is such that it will react to subsequent reactions either internal or external. The rock "encodes" the "meaning" of being pushed off a cliff such that it will fall to the ground. It encodes the fact that it is heavier than air and will fall, just as a synapse encodes the fact that if "pushed" it will fire. In the chance and necessity model "meaning" is just a set of reactive processes initiate by some other reaction. So if a rock isn't intentional why should we say a human is? They both are just reactive systems "encoded" to respond to subsequent reactions.
Comment by Steve Petermann — April 5, 2009 @ 10:40 pm
April 5th, 2009 at 11:43 pm
Hi, Steve,
If I understand you correctly, are you implying that if there is intentionality in anything, then there must be intentionality in everything?
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 5, 2009 @ 11:43 pm
April 6th, 2009 at 12:41 am
Hi AnaxagorasRules,
Close but with some nuance. As an objective idealist, it is my view that reality is constituted by Mind, the mind of God. As such there is intentionality inherent in everything. Other minds are aspects of the One Mind. In the West, Plato was an early proponent of something like this and as you well must know so was Anaxagoras. In the East a similar position can be found in Vishishtadvaitism.
Comment by Steve Petermann — April 6, 2009 @ 12:41 am
April 6th, 2009 at 12:59 am
Hi, Steve,
I'm not sure if Mind should have ever been thought of as anything other than a distinct entity seprate from matter, as it originally was. Definitionally, the mind has turned into a gobblygook of connotations.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 6, 2009 @ 12:59 am
April 6th, 2009 at 11:17 am
Steve Petermann:
Your description of the encoding of "meaning" (above) is actually quite close to my view of reality, especially your description of how material/physical events become encoded in genomes, nervous systems, etc. However, I don't think that this means that there is a merely quantitative continuum of "encoding" from teleomatic to teleonomic to teleological processes. Rather, I think that there is a discontinuity between teleomatic encoding processes in which material/physical processes are encoded "by necessity" (i.e. as the result of some physical/chemical relationship between the code and the information being encoded) and encoding processes in which material/physical processes are encoded "by chance" (i.e. as the result of an arbitrary relationship between the code and the information being encoded).
An example of the former would be analogous to having an impression of your teeth made in order to have a plastic mouth protector fashioned. Once the impression is made, multiple copies of the mouth protector can be made from it. An example of the latter would be associating the sound of the letter "A" with the written letter "A". Most people recognize that this association is probably almost completely arbitrary. However, in the evolution of written language there is often a stage in which the script version of the letter evolves from a pictographic version of the letter, and is therefore not quite so arbitrary. Also, think of the shape of the letter "O" and the shape of your mouth when you say it; is this relationship completely arbitrary?
And so, contra your assertion that there is intentionality inherent in everything, according to my view of reality intentionality is an emergent property of a universe in which (to quote Democritus of Abdera once again) "all things are the fruit of chance and necessity" and there is no empirically detectable intentionality in anything, except for those active entities which have encoded programs that guide their behavior.
Two mutually incommensurate world views, and IMHO the decision as to which you will accept is itself purely arbitrary (i.e. it is not the result of "necessity"). For more on how I view this "split", see:
http://evolutionlist.blogspot....
especially the section on "Platonic versus Darwinian World Views". I have written more on this specific subject here:
http://evolutionlist.blogspot....
And yes, I have read Alvin Plantinga's soi dissant "refutation" of Darwinian naturalism and found it both incoherent and utterly unconvincing. Indeed, I am preparing a detailed refutation of his position for inclusion in my own book on this subject, On Purpose: The Evolution of Design by Means of Natural Selection, or the Proliferation of Intentional Agents in the Struggle for Existence (coming soon to a dusty university library near you).
Personally, I find my world view to be much more compatible with both modern science and the Quaker/Taoist/Zen Buddhist tradition which I have "practiced" for most of my life (we keep practicing, hoping we will eventually get it right). But perhaps that's just me…
So, are there "real world" consequences that flow from the acceptance of these two world views, and if so what are they?
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 6, 2009 @ 11:17 am
April 6th, 2009 at 11:24 am
There is (as usual) a semantic way to weasel out of the split between world views outline above. That is, to define the totality of relationships between all material/physical objects and processes in the universe as "Mind" (with a capital M). Then it is an easy step to equating this "Mind" with the concept of "God", but to me this adds nothing at all to one's ability to make sense out of what we observe in nature. As my sophomore roommate in college once said during an all-night bull session on this topic, "What's the difference between calling it "God" and calling it "potato chips"? Exactly; it all seems to come down to semantics to me, which isn't a compelling argument for existence or non-existence, and therefore epistemologically interesting, but useless in practice.
This kind of "semantic weasel" is essentially the approach taken by Gregory Bateson in his next-to-last book, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. Bateson defines "relationship" as essentially equivalent to "mind", and therefore all things are the fruit of Mind (given these definitions, of course). There was a time when I was deeply enamored of Bateson's approach, but I have come to view it as somewhat puerile (but maybe that's just the onrush of mortality, or early Alzheimer's, or both).
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 6, 2009 @ 11:24 am
April 6th, 2009 at 11:30 am
BTW, this has been an immensely useful exercise for me thus far. My sincere gratitude to TT for hosting this discussion, and to Steve and Anaxagorous to once again helping us all come to clarity on where we stand on these issues.
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 6, 2009 @ 11:30 am
April 6th, 2009 at 12:12 pm
Hi, Allen,
Because Anaxagoras did not call his idea potato chips. He called it Mind. It was a stipulative definition. Anaxagoras was the originator of the idea of an Entity distinct from matter, which determined what matter does, so he got to define it. The definition is neither true nor false. It is what it is. I've enjoyed this dialogue between you and Steve, and based on your last post, I think that you and he are not really talking about the same thing. Your classifications of intentionality are derived from observing the behaviors of different clumps of matter. The intentionality that Steve is referring to is closer to the original concept (but which is still a little different, due to the original was a pre-Christian, even athiestic viewpoint). A close synonym to Anaxagoras's Mind, I think, would be Order.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 6, 2009 @ 12:12 pm
April 6th, 2009 at 12:38 pm
AnaxagorasRules wrote:
I've enjoyed it as well, and agree that we aren't talking about the same thing; indeed, that was my point in my comment at 11:17. My point was that it doesn't matter what you call it, "Mind" or "potato chips". What matters is what you're talking about when you use those words. Indeed, I doubt whether Anaxagoras or Plato used the word "Mind"; didn't they speak Attic, or (more likely) Ionic?
And I think the disagreement between Steve (and you) and me is perhaps more than just semantic. You write:
Exactly; that's precisely what an empirical scientist does. In my case, the particular "clumps of matter" that I study are people (I'm an evolutionary psychologist by avocation and training). However, it would be right on target to say that's how an evolutionary biologist studies people. We study what they do, and generally discount what they say they are doing (unless, like David Livingston Smith, we are interested in the all-to-human talent for self-deception).
Perhaps I should post under the moniker of "DemocritusRules"? But that would violate my personal rule of posting non-anonymously. So it goes…
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 6, 2009 @ 12:38 pm
April 6th, 2009 at 1:49 pm
Hi, Allen,
I had a good source on Anaxagoras once (nearly 300 pages devoted to him alone) by the greek scholar W. K. C. Guthrie, but stupidly sold the book to make room for more books. I'll probably end up buying it again, if I can find it. If memory serves, Anaxagoras was of the sixth century, and from the coast of Asia Minor, which would put him there after the Ionian invasion, so I'd guess he spoke an Ionian dialect.
Actually, I think I agree with both of you. I can agree that the many different types of matter show different kinds of intention, and I can also agree with Steve that no one type of matter is any more or less intentional than any other. To make that point, I'd strip away all of the emergent properties, and get to a level playing field – the periodic table of elements. At that level the higher order structures do not exist, and while there are differences in the elements, it's easier to make the case that the differences derive from an intentionality that is distinct from the elements themselves. In other words, one could not really argue that helium is more intentional than hydrogen or sulphur. One could not really argue that an oxygen molecule was more intentional than a nigrogen molecule.
I like Democritus too. I gave Anaxagoras the nod because of one of his teachings, that went (paraphrasing): "Everything is made out of everything, for how else could bread and water turn into flesh and bones and hair?"
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 6, 2009 @ 1:49 pm
April 6th, 2009 at 4:59 pm
Allen it was me, not Steve Peterman, who asked the question above in response to your question.
You asked: "Do the processes by which living organisms have come to exist have intentions/purposes?"
In response, I (JAD) asked: "How does one answer such a question empirically?"
You then went on to make the following four points:
The information encoded in a DNA may not be disembodied but it is transcendent and transferable. By transcendent I mean that the information does not emerge from matter itself. For example, the four DNA nucleotides: A, T, C, G don’t naturally, by some unguided process arrange themselves into a coded sequence. The sequence, in other words, is imposed by something else upon the medium. That explains why coded sequences or information is also transferable. Just like the words and letters that I am writing and you (hopefully) are reading do not depend upon paper and ink for their origin or their existence. I guess that I am arguing, contra Marshall McLuhan, “the medium is not the message.”
Agreed. But, that doesn’t explain how an unguided and mindless process, evolution, could be the cause of such encoded programs.
You are not really answering your own question which is, once again:
"Do the processes by which living organisms have come to exist have intentions/purposes?"
In other words, as I wrote above it is transferable.
Agreed.
But they are analogous, aren’t they? It would seem to me, then, that naturalistic explanations are presently in the same boat as ID. Can you presently explain how the genomic information, that is responsible for example for the sensory/nervous/motor systems of animals, came to be by a completely mindless and unguided process? In other words, how can you explain teleology by dysteleology?
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — April 6, 2009 @ 4:59 pm
April 6th, 2009 at 8:31 pm
Anaxagoras,
I was of like mind for a time, but found that a monistic view much more elegant and aesthetically appealing, at least for me. It totally avoids the problem of a causal link between mind and matter that Descartes ran into with his dualism.
Also as I began studying the problem of consciousness, I found that an objective idealism provided a ready solution to the "hard problem". If mind constitutes reality then consciousness is fundamental in all things, albeit manifesting itself in different ways up the hierarchy of things. David Chalmer's seminal paper "Consciousness and its place in reality" had a powerful effect on me. In that paper he sees three potential solutions to the hard problem:
He likes Type-F best, but also acknowledges that similar to Type-F, a Type-I monist (i.e. idealism), is also viable solution. He doesn't like it because it seems unnatural. Since I am a proponent of teleology, I find an objective idealism the most complete solution.
Comment by Steve Petermann — April 6, 2009 @ 8:31 pm
April 6th, 2009 at 11:33 pm
Allen,
Yes I think there are. If we and other creatures are merely chance and necessity engines, then our sense of self and meaning changes dramatically. Can we truly believe we have any kind of freedom or agency if the only causes at work are chance and necessity? Now I've heard all kinds of semantic gymnastics attempted to try to salvage "freedom" (compatibilism for instance), but as far as I've seen they all amount to re-defining freedom through obscure language and argument that in the end are totally hollow.
Comment by Steve Petermann — April 6, 2009 @ 11:33 pm
April 7th, 2009 at 12:14 am
Interesting twist the conversation has taken.
For what it's worth, I was checking over David Chalmers' blog recently, including a link to some papers from a recent online conference on consciousness. One of the contributors there mentioned that, thanks to the surge of pressure from Chalmers and other philosophers, there's been a noticeable move in the (broad) direction of both dualism and monism of a Russelian/dual-aspect stripe. It's just one guy, so take it with a grain of salt, but I recall that even John Searle noticed similar a couple years ago. Of course, Searle routinely gets accused of (property) dualism himself, so…
Either way, my own amateur suspicion is that something closer to a Russelian monistic view of nature and mind is going to become more popular, while the mechanist/materialist view is going to be quietly brushed aside. I also suspect that if that happens, many will just refer to it as physicalism anyway. In fact, here's Edward Feser on the subject:
The joys of philosophy, eh?
Comment by nullasalus — April 7, 2009 @ 12:14 am
April 7th, 2009 at 3:09 pm
Hi, Steve,
That might solve the duality issue, in that a material consciousness puts reality and consciousness in one single package, but it doesn't help in understanding what consciousness is, and can create many problems through a misunderstanding of definitions. I can think that a rock is conscious, very easily in fact, but then my hierarcy of terms and definitions gets muddled to the point where I lose an ability to differentiate between different types of matter, where, not only can I not explain what I mean to others, I can't even explain what I mean to myself. The dualist model, Mind as a separate entity, controlling matter, is a simplification that makes it easier (I think) to build up a consistent hierarcy of reality, where matter almost necessarily must play a dominant role. (In other words, Mind does not have to be considered at all in many discussions about nature.)
The consciousness that I think of as Consciousness, is the will (or order…like attracts) that makes protons stick together inside of a nucleus, and that completely reverses itself outside the nucleous (unlike attracts). That Consciousness is acting on all matter, all the way up through the emergent structures, but that is not the consciousness that I think of when I say a person or a dog is conscious, but a rock isn't. That consiousness is specifically an emergent property consciousness that I distinguish from Consciousness. It means that I have to figure out which hat to wear, or which consciousness to talk about, depending on the context of the discussion.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 7, 2009 @ 3:09 pm
April 7th, 2009 at 3:22 pm
Actually, I shouldn't use the term Consciousness when I mean Mind, so substitute Mind for Consciousness. It is the Mind that Anaxagoras postulated, distinct from and controlling matter.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 7, 2009 @ 3:22 pm
April 7th, 2009 at 3:24 pm
Steve Petermann wrote:
Yes, and here is a link to an article on precisely this subject by Brian Boyd, a professor of English at the University of Auckland, and the author of On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction:
http://www.theamericanscholar....
Here's Boyd's conclusion:
Exactly. To me, it is absolutely marvelous (and surprising) that a process that is itself not teleological (i.e. evolution by natural selection) can produce not just teleological entities (i.e. "agents"), but the capacity for the most complex and aesthetically satisfying forms of teleology imaginable. And, to me, it is a testimony to the extraordinary comprehensiveness of the natural laws by which evolution by natural selection operates, that they should be able to bring about all this without "tinkering" by some hypothetical supernatural proofreader. There is, indeed,
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 7, 2009 @ 3:24 pm
April 7th, 2009 at 3:43 pm
Hi, Steve,
Regarding my comment two comments back, a better way to explain what I do is: I factor out the commonality of Mind (or Order), which is inherent in all things, and put it in its own conceptual box. In any classfication system, where some concepts subsume other concepts, one must abstract out commonalities when building a hierarchy. In my hierarchy, Mind (or Order) stands as a set of commands, which nature, in the form of the elements, must obey. In obeying the commands, nature can build many different structures.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 7, 2009 @ 3:43 pm
April 7th, 2009 at 4:14 pm
The entire bit about 'design – without a designer!' is so much fluff, at least as far as science is concerned. Science can get you as far as the mechanisms, observed and hypothetical, involved in evolution. The moment teleology is discussed, out goes the science – or at least, in comes the contamination with philosophy. And that includes regarding nature or evolution as lacking teleology, or lacking ground-level teleology.
Particularly because the strict Paleyan sense of teleology – and I'll take that as the extreme of 'If it's complex, then it was likely created in its entirety de novo at some point in the past' – isn't the only way to regard teleology, and was sharply disconnected from the primary way of understanding teleology as acting in nature in the western view. My own perspective has been to regard life and evolution as akin to a program that began and carried on with certain objectives (Front loading? Maybe.), complete with predictable developments, and possibly even some certainties. Broadly Aristotilean / Aquinian, complete with predictability and intelligibility that would be the hallmark of a mind. Which means nature is absolutely rife with teleology, and an evolutionary perspective confirms this rather than challenges it. Creators are not limited to 'tinkering' when it comes to creation.
That's philosophy too, but hey – driving home that distinction between philosophy and actual science is most of the reason I found ID so interesting to begin with.
Comment by nullasalus — April 7, 2009 @ 4:14 pm
April 7th, 2009 at 5:21 pm
nullasalus:
I can’t agree more. It seems Allen might be engaged here in a little bait and switch. He hasn’t really explained how one knows or one can prove empirically that the process that is the cause of mind and intelligence, or teleological agency, can be produced by a mindless process that is itself non-teleological. The question is not whether that is logically possible; I would have to concede that it is logically possible because I cannot give any argument of why it would be logically impossible. But it does not follow then that it is necessarily true, or that non-teleological explanations are the only explanations compatible with science. In general I think that once one starts making “global” claims about the universe as a whole or natural history as a whole, one is no longer in the realm of what empirical science alone can adequately explain. Instead you have stepped across the line and are practicing what might be called, depending on ones interest or preference, natural philosophy or natural theology.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — April 7, 2009 @ 5:21 pm
April 7th, 2009 at 10:21 pm
Allen,
Well gee, I don't see how you answered my question. Your reference and statement say nothing about freedom. All they do is repeat the tired old awe and wonder response to what nature can do, but say nothing about how we can consider ourselves as free agents when it is assumed that the fundamental causes are chance and necessity. Heck, even your sense of appreciation for what nature can do, is itself programmed into your brain by chance and necessity, not by any free choice. Maybe that doesn't bother you but it would a lot of people.
Comment by Steve Petermann — April 7, 2009 @ 10:21 pm
April 7th, 2009 at 11:04 pm
For my part, I'm not sure whether I'd be worried as much about the free will question. I'm more interested in what it does to the question of reason and rationality. If someone's theory of reality, taken seriously and worked out to its obvious conclusion, results in there being absolutely no room for either of those things (say, because everything ultimately reduces to blind mechanism / materialism completely) – something's up, to put it very lightly. I can understand a response of 'Well, now that is a mystery' – it may not be satisfying, but at least it's honest. If the response is to ignore the problem, or worse, to try and justify it all by poetic descriptions of the universe, then I know I'm dealing with a sophist.
Comment by nullasalus — April 7, 2009 @ 11:04 pm
April 8th, 2009 at 12:23 am
Hi, nullasulaus,
There is no reason why reason and free will can't be looked at as being emergent properties in their own right. Even one takes the purely material view, his science permits him to say that, because if thoughts are emergent properties of the brain (as he/she would say), then so is free will (and reason and a lot of other types of thoughts) an emergent property of the brain. I can just as well say that free will is as much of a necessity as is having thoughts. In fact I could probably make an argument that free will is more in keeping with chance and necessity than strict material determinism is! Though I wouldn't, because I don't think that matter is behind the necessity aspect.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 8, 2009 @ 12:23 am
April 8th, 2009 at 12:47 am
AnaxagorusRules,
Maybe, but at that point it seems to do a tremendous violation of what used to be meant by 'material'. Before QM kicked over the cart, the great glory of the materialist position (and the reason why the mind was placed well outside of it) was because it allowed for a perspective that was reducible and predictable in a Laplace perspective. 'Matter bumps into other matter, we can measure these intersections without any recourse to things like 'guidance' or 'reason' or 'purpose', and that's why things happen.' Basic. Deterministic. Simple. Straightforward. And coincidentally leaving absolutely no room for either reason or free will, because once you're reducing things to matter, and matter behaves the way it does because it utterly lacks connection to reason and will, you can't really 'reduce' those things without destroying them or regarding them as illusory. And if you regard them as illusory, you're closing the door on any possibility of your conclusion having 'intellectual force'.
Now, I don't deny that you can take a monist view that accounts or allows for these things, and slap the label 'materialist' or 'physicalist' on there. That was the point of my post with regards to Galen Strawson (who denies free will in any meaningful sense, but at the same time also upends the cart that is materialism in the Dennett/Churchland/etc sense) and the rest, who all come close to each other one what the universe is 'really' made of, while at the same time they call it materialist, not-materialist but monist, or out and out dualist. And then there's William Hasker, who is an emergent-dualist, guys like Edward Feser or Odenberg who are hylomorphists, etc.
I suppose what I'm saying is, there are a variety of views that can mesh with the science – dualist, monist, and otherwise. But I think it's important to have a look at just what is really being proposed, and whether the important things (for me, rationality first and foremost, and will second but still important) are accounted for. To paraphrase Victor Reppert, at times what you're getting with an explanation isn't a real explanation at all, but burying the bodies of those 'important things' under a convoluted enough scheme that the hope is you just don't ask about them. And I think if one is falling to strong emergence to 'explain' rationality or free will, the game is over for the naturalist.
Comment by nullasalus — April 8, 2009 @ 12:47 am
April 8th, 2009 at 1:31 am
Hi, nullasalus,
Biology has shifted to a heavy focus on emergent properties. Here's a quote straight from the latest edition of Campbell's Biology book (8th edition, page 3). I'm including a lot of surrounding material for contextual completeness. Check out the bolded tid bit:
The next section actually discusses the limitation of reductionism! Once the science explicity states that thoughts are an emergent property of the brain (since the brain is a complex network of nerve cells, that quoted passage could not have been referring to anything else), then the door is open to call free will (and any other mental phenomenom) an emergent property.
Maybe it was a slip up…we'll see, if they revise it out in the next edition.
I don't think of my belief system as monist or dualist… it only so happens to appear dualist, in that I factor out Mind and think of it as distinct from matter. It's just that I can't factor anything out of Mind or subdivide it in any way, and so I treat it as its own indivisible concept. So I have Mind and matter, with matter being subdivided like crazy. I'm not familiar with the teachings of any of those people listed.
I was actually astounded by that quote in the biology book (and it's one of the most highly regarded biology books in the country) about thoughts being an emergent property of the brain (and the context…that the emergent properties cannot be understood in terms of the preceding level!). By extension, free will as an emergent property of the brain automatically becomes a viable concept, and it has the stamp of science on it.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 8, 2009 @ 1:31 am
April 8th, 2009 at 1:52 am
AnaxogorasRules,
You may (or may not be) be interested in the hylomorphist school of thought, which goes back to Aquinas and Aristotle. Where matter is taken seriously – very seriously – and the world is examined through the lens of four causes. Material (the underlying 'stuff'), Formal (What arrangement said 'stuff' is in), Efficient (How said 'Stuff' came to be organized) and final (Purpose or end-goal for said stuff considered with form, material, and efficient cause). Then again, your name is AnaxogorasRules, you probably are familiar with all of this.
Forgive me when I talk about views 'you' can take – dualist or monist. I don't mean you personally, but I'm speaking in a very sloppy way where 'you' usually means a more idealized concept of 'anyone'. One of my biggest problems with philosophical arguments is how very malleable terms tend to be. The skeptic in me says that when 'will' and 'thought' and 'reason' are called 'emergent properties', what's really being said is, 'Hell, we have no idea, so let's kick them under the heading of strong emergence – which is like hocus-pocus for the physicalist'. But again, Hasker is a dualist and relies on emergence, so it's not like only one side plays the game.
I suppose I can best put things this way: I'd be very tempted to agree that free will is real. Moreso, I'd agree that rationality is real (otherwise, what are we talking about?) At the same time, I find the idea of accounting for either thing in a purely and truly materialist scheme as unlikely to impossible. What I expect is for what constitutes 'materialist' to change a la Strawson, with the hope that no one notices that a redefinition is underway.
Comment by nullasalus — April 8, 2009 @ 1:52 am
April 8th, 2009 at 2:59 am
Hi, nullasalus,
If you think about it, you might agree that a materialist is a lot less materialistic than he thinks he is. For example, a cell is considered to be a materialistic thing, a membrane-enclosed compartment containing organelles and a nucleus [for eukaryotic cells]. But does that structure exist as a separate entity apart from the atoms that make it up? No. There is a valid question as to just how material a cell structure is. As an analogy, take a block of computer memory. It is made up of many similar transistors. We say that a word is 32 bits long, that a byte is 8 bits, that a char is a byte in length, a bool is a true or false, but all of this is a structure imposed on memory units. Does this structure exist as a separate entity apart from the memory units? Again, I would say no. The memory units themselves are structures imposed on silicon and other atoms. I think that it is only when we are discussing the atoms themselves are we actually talking about primary, existant stuff. Even the structure of a diatomic molecule like O2 is not an existant thing…in other words, the structure (shape) of it does not exist in addition to the two oxygen atoms. At a very basic level, when I discuss anything at all related to matter, I understand it as discussing patterns made by atoms. And these patterns do not exist separately and in additon to the atoms that constitute them. The materialist who doesn't understand this confusedly thinks of patterns made by atoms as being matter itself.
Paraprasing this last paragraph, what I'm saying is that free will is no less real than a cell.
I broke out my Plato today, deciding it was time to reapportion my reading material (lately it's been heavily weighted toward biology and chemistry). I always have a hard time with Aristotle, and never really know if I understand what he's talking about.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 8, 2009 @ 2:59 am
April 8th, 2009 at 3:11 am
AnaxagorasRules,
Possibly. But we're getting into foggy territory here, and half the time I wonder if the 'less materialism' is due to passive ignorance or active deception. What can I say, I'm a skeptical person.
What you're talking about with regards to cells and codes, though, is translating to me as aristo-thomism, so I'm hesitant to say much there. Let me read up on some Anaxagoras and get back to you – I get the feeling we're on the same page, but we're using different language to communicate similar ideas.
Comment by nullasalus — April 8, 2009 @ 3:11 am
April 8th, 2009 at 3:24 am
Hi, nullasalus,
You won't find too much on Anaxagoras. Not much of his writing is extant. I had a good source (W.K.C. Guthrie) but sold the book like an idiot. He was the presocratic philospher who originated the concept of Nous, which roughly translates to Mind. This was the entity he postulated as existing distinct from matter, which controls matter. He got into hot water for this, because his Nous even controlled the gods (Zeus, Hera, etc.).
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 8, 2009 @ 3:24 am
April 8th, 2009 at 3:26 am
Anaxagoras,
Sounds like the precursor to logos, then. Interesting! The idea of mind permeating all matter (assuming it's permeating, rather than standing about and organizing) sounds close to those ideas I've been talking about. I tend to focus more on a panenthiest slant, but nevertheless… interesting stuff.
Comment by nullasalus — April 8, 2009 @ 3:26 am
April 8th, 2009 at 3:07 pm
Hi, nullasalus,
Yes, definitely. The terms have to be very precise. Last night, do you recall that comment I made about the structures made by atoms as not existing separately apart from and in addition to the atoms that make the structure? I didn't explain that as well as I could have, and there are gaps in that explanation that don't make sense. Here's a better explanation.
For example, take a circle. One that we can observe objectively…be it drawn on a piece of paper or modeled by something in nature, a stick circle drawn in sand or dirt, etc. It's pretty obvious that that circle does not have its own existance separate from and in addition to the atoms that make it. To show this all we have to do is disturb the circle, and poof, it's gone. The atoms are still there, in a different arrangement, but that particular circle that the atoms had made is gone.
However, we can discuss circles all day long without having to actually look at one. We can discuss their circumference, their areas, their radius, in an abstract, general way. But where does this circle exist? One way of dealing with this conundrum is to stipulate that this general circle exists in an immaterial realm, immutable and permanent, and it is from this idea that all atom-made circles get their temporary structure. This concept is very close to the concept of Platonic Forms.
Now one could say, well, if the things in this realm are immaterial and exist separately from atoms, how do you know that they really exist? I could say that they exist as emergent properties of the brain. But I won't because every mental concept could be called an emergent property of the brain (this is the sloppy and hand-waving lazy answer), and that is not going to help me understand the nature of reality. So my real answer is that it is the best understanding that I can come up with, that seems to model both the atoms that I observe objectively and the mental phenomena that I can think about subjectively and talk about obectively. This concept – immutable patterns existing in an immaterial realm, that can be modeled temporarily by atoms – seems to best explain (for me) what I objectively and subjectively observe.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 8, 2009 @ 3:07 pm
April 8th, 2009 at 7:42 pm
Anaxagorous Rules wrote:
In my opinion thoughts are better understood as transcendent properties rather than emergent properties. Let me try to explain.
First, what do mean by an emergent property? One of the simplest examples of an emergent properties is that of common table salt (NaCl) which has properties that do not exist for either sodium (Na) or chlorine (Cl) in isolation. The properties of salt are therefore said to be emergent.
On the other hand, coded or sequenced information such as we find in DNA or RNA I would argue is not an emergent property but a transcendent property. By analogy consider a code that we know is created by an intelligent agent. For example, consider the following coded sequence: “IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE CODE” which of course anyone who can read the English language can immediately understand. As Allen MacNeill pointed out earlier, coded messages, as far as we know, require some kind of “physical” medium: ink and paper, scrabble pieces, morse code communicated over electrically conductive lines, electronically digitized information communicated over fiber optic lines etc. The point that I am trying to make is that there is nothing in any of the media that necessarily gives rise to coded sequence that I have given above. In other words, the sequence does not emerge from the medium in which it is created. Ink or paper doesn’t create coded sequences. Scrabble pieces don't create coded sequences. The coded sequence is created by something else (in this case intelligent agency.)
The same argument holds for the coded sequences that we find in, DNA and RNA. The four nucleotides A, T, C, G for DNA and A, U, C, G for RNA have no intrinsic chemical properties that would cause them to arrange themselves into meaningful coded sequences. The code come from something else. It is, therefore, not an emergent property; it is a transcendent property.
I think that a similar argument can be made for what goes on inside the brain. I don’t think consciousness and thought emerges from neurons and axons of the brain any more than information emerges from the chemical nucleotides of DNA or RNA. In other words, thought is something that is caused by my mind not my brain. Thought , therefore, in that sense it can be said to transcend the physical organ and processes of the brain.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — April 8, 2009 @ 7:42 pm
April 8th, 2009 at 8:32 pm
Hi, JOHN_A_DESIGNER,
I can agree with this, and I also don't have a problem with using the word transcendant, with the connotation being "higher level". My model is just tweaked a little differently, using terms closer to the Platonic concept of Forms. What is also interesting about that quote from the textbook is that that quote also states that:
And there was a following section that I had not included (as it didn't have to do with my main point, but which coincides with your main point:
Look at the two big admissions here, from the previous quote and this last one:
a. Novel properties emerge at each higher level, ones that did not exist at the previous level.
b. A higher level order cannot be fully explained by breaking it down into its parts.
Much deeper in the book, page 1078, there is one (1) short section devoted to consciousness:
That last statement is a tremendous understatement. A thing can't fully be expained in terms of its parts, and all science can do is study the lower level parts. At least with a cell they can poke and probe at the structure of the cell, and visually see the structure. A thought can't be seen…the firing neruons are lower level emergent properties that don't give a clue to the higher level structures of an infinitude of subjective thoughts. Knowing that this or that part of the brain undergoes neural activity if someone is, say, nervous, doesn't tell anything about the structure of the nervous thought. And there are limitless thoughts.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 8, 2009 @ 8:32 pm
April 8th, 2009 at 10:42 pm
AnaxagorasRules:
My own view on Forms, at least as far as it exists, takes more the side of Plato’s student Aristotle, who disagreed with his master, not only on particular points, but sometimes fundamentally. Plato, for example, pioneered a philosophical view that developed into idealism; Aristotle, on the other hand is credited for pioneering the philosophical view known as realism.
Plato taught that the Form were metaphysically transcendent. That is, there is an Ideal Universal Form that that exists in a transcendent realm of which particulars are shadowy imperfect copies. Aristotle, on the other hand, thought that form (or essence) was actually identified with the particular. In my opinion, Aristotle’s view of forms is very close to the modern thinking surrounding the concept of information. Aristotle, for example was concerned with what makes a thing the kind of thing that it is, and unlike Plato he thought you could determine this by studying individual things empirically. I think that he would have no problem with genetics as a way to define and categorize different species of plants and animals. Aristotle also made important contributions as one of the worlds first, if not the first, biologists.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — April 8, 2009 @ 10:42 pm
April 8th, 2009 at 11:00 pm
Hi, JOHN_A_DESIGNER,
I take a little of Plato and a little of Aristotle. Plato had a better handle on the transcendant aspect of reality, Aristotle a better sense of the physical aspect, especially in terms of classification. But each had their faults. Aristotle was too dependent on physical reality, and Plato was not concerned enough about it. Taking a little bit of both, I think once can build a pretty decent metaphysical system. I can say very little about modern philosophy, as I've never studied it.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 8, 2009 @ 11:00 pm
April 8th, 2009 at 11:12 pm
John A. Designer wrote:
I agree; you have expressed my own position on this matter quite well. The only thing I might add is that I think that Aristotle's four causes still apply quite well, including "final cause" (i.e. teleology), in the sense defined by Mayr in his 1974 paper on teleology and teleonomy.
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 8, 2009 @ 11:12 pm
April 8th, 2009 at 11:29 pm
Anaxagoras and JAD,
You two have a view of metaphysics that comes close to my own. I'd suggest that if you want to read up on some interesting contemporary accounts, you have a look at David Oderberg's papers, along with Edward Feser's. There's others of course, but those two I've been following as of late while trying to get a better grasp on updated perspectives regarding forms and final causes, etc. I'm seeing more discussion along Platonic/Aristotilean lines as of late too, in these circles.
Comment by nullasalus — April 8, 2009 @ 11:29 pm
April 9th, 2009 at 12:00 am
Hi, nullasalus,
Thanks for the sources you've left sprinkled in this thread. I've pdf'd the thread for future reference…at points in this thread I've stated things in a way that seem very clear to me, and fear that I may never regain the thinking pathways that led to them. So I'll have this hard copy for reference. I just want to add that Plato and Aristotle become particularly relevant for me when I conceptualize abstract ideas. For example, take the related concepts of Justice, Law, Legal System, Injustice, Criminology, etc. One can use Plato's concept of Forms to think of these concepts as idealized seperate entities, and use Aristotle's classification motif to determine which derives from which (which is the genera and which is the species), which are related but seperate, and so on. The target would be a conceptual hierarchy that is logical, with definitions that are precise and that explain succintly each concept (and that concept only). Some abstract systems have dozens of concepts, and both Plato and Aristotle can help. Also, Forms is really not the best word to use to refer to Plato's immaterial realm. Idea is actually a better term.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 9, 2009 @ 12:00 am
April 9th, 2009 at 9:05 am
I've saved this thread as well. May I congratulate one and all for a truly enlightening discussion!
Comment by Allen_MacNeill — April 9, 2009 @ 9:05 am
April 9th, 2009 at 8:11 pm
Allen wrote:
Since we are talking Aristotle, and Allen agreed with what I said about Aristotle, and then went on to mention some of Mayr’s work on teleology, I became curious and wanted to see if there was anything written by Mayr discussing teleology and Aristotle available (for free) on line.
Guess what? There is. I found the following 3 quotes in an essay entitled, “THE MULTIPLE MEANINGS OF TELEOLOGICAL”
Quote 1:
I want to focus on the first sentence: “This confusion is nothing new and goes back at least as far as Aristotle, who invoked final causes not only for individual life processes (such as development from the egg to the adult) but also for the universe as a whole.”
This is exactly the way that I have long interpreted Aristotle’s POV. In other words, his teleology was a ultimately a cosmological teleology. Indeed, this interpretation seems to be reinforced in Mayr’s next Aristotle quote:
Sure enough Mayr continues to interpret Aristotle as favoring some kind of cosmological teleology. I also found it interesting that he alludes to the two basic versions of ID: the version of ID where the designer or creator occasionally intervenes to guide evolution and the second version where the guidance is built-in, or as we like to say around here, front loaded.
Okay, so far so good. Mayr and I are apparently in agreement on Aristotles views concerning teleology. But then Mayr throws us a curve. He writes:
So did I miss something reading Mayr’s paper? He begins by apparently agreeing that Aristotle saw the universe as a whole being teleological, but then concludes that well… maybe not. It appears to be a contradiction to me.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — April 9, 2009 @ 8:11 pm