An Argument from Realism Against Naturalism about Human Beings
by MikeGeneThe following essay was written by Jim Madden and the views/arguments contained within do not necessarily reflect the views of Mike Gene. Mike Gene hosts such essays simply to provoke thought and promote discussion and communication.
Here's how I define "nominalism" and "realism":
The Realism Thesis (RT): There are some predications, say Px, such that 'P' refers to a property of x which is identical to all other instances of P.
The Nominalist Thesis (NT): For any predication, Px, 'P' means only that x is a member of a set of contingently associated individuals (or sense images of individuals) with nothing intrinsically in common.
[Of course NT could (should) be worked with more. It basically assumes a sort of crude set nominalism, as opposed to an exemplar or similarity view (Berkeley) or somebody who analyzes away similarity in terms of something more fundamental (Hume in the Treatise). I do, however, believe the argument can be adjusted for more sophisticated versions of nominalism.]
To get a sense of my way of thinking of RT vs. NT consider the following proposition:
(1) Pa and Pm.
One who subscribes to RT analyzes (1) as saying something (being P) is identical between a and m. The proponent of NT would analyze (1) as saying that a and m (taken either as material individuals or sense images of such) are contingently associated as members of a set, 'P'. Membership in P is accounted for not in terms of intrinsic properties of a and m, but in terms of social convention, pragmatic conditioning, prior neurological wiring, etc.
For the sake of argument let's suppose that my version of RT and NT are workable. In what follows I will further suppose that RT is true and NT is false. Of course that is a controversial claim, and one I can't really hope to defend exhaustively here. So I'm just going to move ahead with the assumption of RT.
What does this have to do with the ontology of thinking? Well, I think this shows that naturalism about human beings is false. By naturalism about human beings I mean the view that all facts about human beings can be fully explained in terms of facts about human bodies (ultimately particles and laws of nature). More specifically, and relevant to our case, naturalism tells us that all facts about human cognition or thinking are explained by facts in the human brain. My thesis is that if RT is true (which I think it is), then thinking is not explained by any brain state.
Why think that I'm right? Socrates is a rational animal, capable of thoughts, i.e., acts of predication that carry deductively valid consequences. Suppose that Socrates, while in the presence of his student, Socrates thinks that
(2) Wm,
where 'W' means '. . . is wise' and 'm' refers to Plato. The proponent of NT would claim that (2) means that
(2-NT) Socrates contingently associates Plato with a set of other individuals called 'wise'.
Whereas the proponent of RT would claim that (2) means
(2-RT) Socrates recognizes the universal property of wisdom in Plato.
It is important to note that (2-NT) and (2-RT) are not equivalent propositions.
Suppose we have two rational beings, Socrates and Nocrates. The former exists in a possible world in which RT is true (for my money, the actual world) and the latter in a world in which NT is true. What is happening in Nocrates' brain when he thinks (2), here analyzed as (2-NT)? Presumably one region of his brain (associated with the sense image of Plato) is activated simultaneously (or nearly so) with the activation of another region (that associated with the memories or prior sense images of individuals called "˜wise'). Let's call this total brain state type BT1.
Consider what happens in Socrates brain when he thinks (2), here analyzed as (2-RT). Socrates and Nocrates might be functionally indistinguishable, e.g., they might pass the same Turning tests "“ they would answer affirmatively when posed the same set of propositions regarding Plato and his being wise under the same conditions. Moreover, we find the exact same brain states associated with Socrates affirming (2-RT) as we as we described in Nocrates' case; when Socrates affirms (2-NT) he tokens BT1.
Since I'm assuming that NT is true in the actual world, the point then is that Socrates' associated brain state for (2-NT) is BT1, which is the same associated brain state that Nocrates would token under the assumption of (2-NT). That is to say, in the actual world (in which I assume RT is true and NT is false) Socrates' total brain state is the same as it would be if NT were the case. Thus, the fact that NT is the better explanation of Socrates' thought of (2) is not accounted for by his total brain state "“ what determines the truth of (2-RT) as opposed to (2-NT), i.e. what counts for thinking, is not BT1. To account for (2-RT) we need something in addition to the token of BT1, because that's the same brain state type we would expect if (2-NT) were true. For this reason, I conclude that thinking is not physical, i.e., no total brain state is sufficient to account for it. In other words, given that Nocrates and Socrates would token the same brain state type under the same conditions, we know that Socrates' thinking is not explained fully by any brain state. It would seem that there is some agency intrinsic to Socrates that explains his thinking in addition to his brain states. The fact that human beings can think with universal content shows that no neurological process can be used to explain our cognition fully.
June 12th, 2008 at 8:35 am
Jim
I found this Wiki page helpful understanding this issue.
If I understand this right, you are saying that the greenness of grass is actually the same thing as the greenness of my car. Actually, grass is a somewhat yellow green, and my car is a silver green; I wonder how much alike the properties need to be to be considered the same thing. Both greens are made up of light at a variety of frequencies; perhaps it is each frequency that is a property?
Okay, so the RT proponent says the greenness of my car is the same thing as the greenness of grass, the NT proponent that the car and the grass are both members of the set of green things because of the way we perceive colours.
What? You are going to assume your contentious claim is correct, and refuse to properly defend it? An interesting strategy, but at least you are open about it.
This is okay if all S/Nocrates is doing is saying Plato is wise, without philosphising about that statement.
I am confused here. Socrates is in the RT world, so why does he have an associated brain state for (2-NT)? Have you made a typo here, or is Socrates in the RT world pondering about the statement from an NT perspective? If the later, then his brain is in a different state compared to him pondering about the statement from an RT perspective, so would not be in BT1.
I feel myself getting confused between the objective world and our perception of it. I thought NT and RT were about the former.
I do not see why that is a problem. Indeed, you seem to have done a good job explaining exactly why we should expect that.
Let us suppose the soul exists, and that Socrates' soul-brain system has a state BT1, and run that throgh your argument. Can we they determine that there must be some agency intrinsic to Socrates that explains his thinking in addition to his brain-soul system states? If so, … [ad infinitum]
Comment by The Pixie — June 12, 2008 @ 8:35 am
June 12th, 2008 at 9:02 am
Hi Jim,
Regarding the use of the word 'token'; are you using that in the sense of a distinction between 'type' and 'token'. As in 'type' = general/not in particular and 'token' = a particular/concrete occurrence?
Thanks.
Comment by Doug — June 12, 2008 @ 9:02 am
June 12th, 2008 at 10:13 am
Doug — That's exactly how I'm using the type/token distinction.
Comment by Jim Madden — June 12, 2008 @ 10:13 am
June 12th, 2008 at 10:34 am
Pixi — First thanks for you great and thorough feedback. I appreciate that.
Here are a few replies to you concerns:
(1) "I wonder how much alike the properties need to be to be considered the same thing. Both greens are made up of light at a variety of frequencies; perhaps it is each frequency that is a property?" You raise a classic worry about RT here. The point, however, is that there is no principle way to say how similar two instances (your car, grass) have to be in order to take the same predicate (green). Which particulars are green is not a philosophical issue, but something we discover empirically. However, the proponent of RT will say that if indeed we can say truly that both the care and grass are green, then there must be something identical between them, otherwise we constantly equivocate on the word "green" and we lose meaning. There is a confusion between cause and essence in your remarks about colors being frequencies light. Certainly colors are caused by such frequencies, but they aren't identical to them.
(2) "What? You are going to assume your contentious claim is correct, and refuse to properly defend it? An interesting strategy, but at least you are open about it." Well this is just how philosophy gets done sometimes. My worry is whether RT implies that naturalism is false. I'm happy to defend RT, if you like (as I bgan to do in (1) above). Enquiry begins somewhere, and we can't solve all problems as once.
(3) "Socrates is in the RT world, so why does he have an associated brain state for (2-NT)?" Good question, this is really the rub of my argument. My point is that whether NT or RT is true is nuetral to Socrates' total brain state. Thus, Socrates' brain state does not explain why it is the case that RT is true. (Once again under my assumption of realism.) If you don't like my assumption of realism (and you're not alone there), Socrates' brain state still doesn't explain NT either, since it is consistent with RT too! So why do I believe that Socrates' brain state is nuetral to NT and RT? Well because I believe that RT is true in the actual world, but Socrates' brain state in this world doesn't do anything to explain that fact. There's no way to read RT off of the brain. I hope this helps.
(4) I like your infinite regress argument, but I don't think it works. My piont is that awareness of universals is not something explained by the brain. Human awareness (that which can understand deductive consequences) requires universals, and universals can't be accounted for in brain states alone. So I posit a non-physical agency on the part of Socrates. I would take that it that that very same agency would be the source of understanding of the process of understanding (self-reflection), which (If I understand your objection properly) would nip your regress in the bud. Let me know whether I'm missing your point.
Thanks!
Comment by Jim Madden — June 12, 2008 @ 10:34 am
June 12th, 2008 at 11:06 am
Jim
I get the impression you are not advocating classical realism then, which would say that there is some quintessential green, and both the car and the grass shared in that universal. That both are green is ultimately an artefact of our eyes, but I will agree that they do share the same property. I am not sure I fully understand the implications of that under RT as opposed to NT.
Apparently not that good a question, as you did not see what I was really asking about! Are you saying that Socrates (in the RT world) might approach the issue of Plato's wisdom from an RT approach or from an NT approach? Thus we have Socrates-RT and Socrates-NT in the RT world, and Nocrates-RT and Nocrates-NT in the NT world (and where two of them have got it wrong, and two right). Socrates-RT and Nocrates-RT have the same brain states BT1-RT (though Nocrates-RT happens to be wrong). Socrates-NT and Nocrates-NT have the same brain states BT1-NT (though Socrates-NT happens to be wrong).
So far so good. But I do not see why BT1-RT should be identical to BT1-NT, giving that these are for different philosophocal approaches to the issue. Conversely, if they are equal, then that would seem to destroy your argument.
Can we forget Socrates for a moment, and consider Sid (and his counterpart Nid, of course(). Sid is not a philosopher, and knows even less about RT and NT than me. Sid thinks Plato was wise, however. For Sid, yes, I agree that whether NT or RT is true is nuetral to his total brain state.
Back to Socrates. Socrates is a philosopher who (we might suppose) understands NT and RT; does this mean that Socrates thought processes are different to Sid's? What I am not clear about is whether Socrates is thinking Plato is wise in the same way as Sid, or whether Socrates is looking at the issue philosophically and RT and NT become an issue.
So why not say:
The brain cannot explain awareness of universals. If we assume universals exist (i.e., assume realism) then there must be more to human thinking.
I will agree that human awareness needs universals (abstractions I would cal them). I do not think it follows that reality needs them, though that is not a problem for you, I think.
The purpose of my infinite regress was to lead us to these two questions: Why do you suppose the brain cannot handle universals? Why do you suppose this non-physical agency can?
Comment by The Pixie — June 12, 2008 @ 11:06 am
June 12th, 2008 at 11:18 am
Hi Pixie
From reading the posts it seems quite clear that the reference is indeed towards a universal.
It can't be that, because then that would lead to realism and nominalism making the exact same claim.
Comment by Doug — June 12, 2008 @ 11:18 am
June 12th, 2008 at 11:26 am
Hi Jim,
Is this supposed to read, "when Nocrates affirms (2-NT) he tokes BT1."
Comment by Doug — June 12, 2008 @ 11:26 am
June 12th, 2008 at 1:28 pm
Jim,
Your essay echoes the problem of Godel for number theory.
It is impossible to axiomatize what "natural" means in any consistent way. This is oddly related to the topic of algorithmic compression and irreducible complexity in mathematics.
An aniti-IDist physicist named Mark Perakh made somewhat the same observation informally here:
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova — June 12, 2008 @ 1:28 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 1:57 pm
Doug,
Yep, that's a typo. It should read "When Socrates afferms (2-RT). . . " Thanks.
Comment by Jim Madden — June 12, 2008 @ 1:57 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 2:09 pm
Pixi,
The argument is supposed to be amenable to any sort of realism, whether it be in a Platonic (universals exist as substances independently) or Aristotelian variant (my view, wherein universals exist only in intellects), just like I think its amendable to any form of nominalism.
Please note that whether Socrates or Nocrates (Sid or Nid) believe realism/nominalism is true is beside the point. The piont is whether realism or nominalism is true in the possible world in which they exist. If Socrates/Sid exists in a possible world where realism is true and he thinks Wm, but his brain state is the same as it would have been were he to exist in a possible world in which nominalism is true, then we know that the truth of realism is not explained by his brain.
When you say "I will agree that human awareness needs universals (abstractions I would cal them). I do not think it follows that reality needs them, though that is not a problem for you, I think" all I can do is agree!
Now, you ask what can the non-physical agency explain that Socrates brain can't? Well, first let me note that the argument doesn't show that thinking can't be physical, but just that as a matter of fact it isn't, as I've argued above. Moreover, why think a non-physical agency does if Socrates' brain doesn't? The non-physical agency is simply an explanatory hypothesis. Our best physical explanation of thought is BT-1, but that doesn't work here. Thus, assuming there isn't a better physical explanation, we're in our rights to accept a non-physical agency as our best bet, at least provisionally.
Comment by Jim Madden — June 12, 2008 @ 2:09 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 2:17 pm
Salvador,
I agree that that naturalism/supernaturalism debate is plagued with an inability to get clear on the terms. I generally follow C.S. Lewis and simply take supernaturalism to be the view that naturalism is false. I'll follow Lewis and take naturalism to be that every event in the universe can be explained by the "total system" of physical entities and physical laws. Of course this won't pass as formal definition of "anturalism" since I don't think ou can't define "physical" but in terms of "natural."
For these reasons I try to limit the scope of the debate, i.e., I worry about naturalism about human beings, which I take (more or less following John Searle) that psychological (including cognitive) phenomena can be explained by states of the human central nervous system. Given that as my target, it would seem that my argument (if it works) does defeat naturalism about human persons — there is something about us (thinking) that's not explain by the central nervous system.
Comment by Jim Madden — June 12, 2008 @ 2:17 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 3:40 pm
Jim,
My view is that the word "natural" has consistent meaning when one is willing to admit "supernatural" or "artificial" entities.
If one insists that every real thing must be "natural", then the word "natural" becomes absolutely meaningless and leads to logical contradictions such as those you describe.
The only out is to suppose we have unreal entities (like false statements). We can then say everything natural is what is real, but in such case that is a superfluous statement — that is a tautologus as saying "what is real is what is real".
Salvador
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova — June 12, 2008 @ 3:40 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 4:02 pm
Salvador,
Good show! I think I get what you are driving at. Taking "natural" as a description of all that is tantamont to taking "being" as a predicate, which famously leads to absurdities. To say we know what natural means requires that we would have to know what it would be like for something to fail to be natural. I get you point right?
If so, do you think this makes hay in worries over philosophical naturalism? Do you think such a position is null, or empty? I'm intrigued.
Jim
Comment by Jim Madden — June 12, 2008 @ 4:02 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 4:17 pm
Jim
I think that makes it clearer what you mean (to me anyway).
Now I better understand you, that makes sense. I am still wondering where you stand on universals. You definition of RT does not invoke them (and wisely so, as this is easily the weakest part of classical RT).
So BT1-NT is the same as BT1-RT. I agree with you here. However, I agree because I can imagine no reason why they should be different. Brain states do not necessarily reflect the natural world, so Socrates can happily have an abstract concept of green or wise, in either the RT world or the NT world. From the OP:
What is the "truth of (2-RT)" This is a two-leveled claim. On the first level, it is true, Plato was wise. No problem there. On the second level, we wonder if Socrates abstract concept of wise accurately maps to the universal propery that is wise (i.e., in the RT world), or whether it poorly maps to property of Plato of being wise (i.e., the NT world) (if that makes sense). In either case: (1) Plato is wise; (2) Socrates knows that Plato is wise; and (3) Socrates brain state is the same.
As we flip Socrates between the RT world and the NT world, he changes such that his second level claim is alternately an accurate mapping and a poor mapping. And yet his mental state is constant. As you say, this is not accounted for by his total brain state, as this is constant. Rather, it is accounted for by the world state. If you like, you could say that the RT universe has the accurate mapping to Socrates mental state, while the NT has the poor mapping. We do not need to invoke any new aspect of the mind to explain the difference, they can be explained by the differences in the way the worlds operate.
Comment by The Pixie — June 12, 2008 @ 4:17 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 4:23 pm
Thank you for your interest. By the way, thank you for your nice work on the topic…..
Even if philosohical naturalism is inconsistent, and thus wrong on some points, it does not necessarily mean it is wrong on every point. So, unfortunately, even if we can show it is an inconsistent system of philosophy, the question of God's existence won't be settled by discrediting philosophical naturalism…..
Somewhat along those line, bear in mind, if you are a theist, you are something of an atheist with respect to other deities, so we don't necessarily throw out all of philosophical naturalism, especially with respect to deities we personally reject.
What I mean is, let be generous and assume for the sake of argument, some sort of deity exists….would most theists be satisfied with an impersonal pantheistic God like that of Spinoza and Einstein?
In anycase, the value I see in your essay is that it discredits the use of philosophical and possibly methodological naturalism in scientific affairs.
The Big Bang basically broke the case for naturalism — we have a universe whose origin can't be reducible soley to observations we make within the universe [this is akin to Godel's incompleteness], thus in that sense, a supernatural entity was the cause of the universe….whether that entity is personal, loving, whatever….can only be known, I suppose, if that entity is willing to communicate with us and if we are willing to accept the message on faith.
Upon pondering Godel, Mathematician Hofstadter stated, "truth is greater than provability". If so, the greatest truths can only be known through two conditions:
1. the truth is revealed in a persuasive way to us
2. the truth is accepted on faith, since ultimate truth is unprovable
It is impossible to know the truth without some degree of faith. When my math professor said that in class, I just about dropped out my chair!
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova — June 12, 2008 @ 4:23 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 6:17 pm
Gosh, I hate to admit that I'm not following Jim Madden's argument. Especially since I was a philosophy major. It seems to me that in believing that Plato is wise, Socrates believes that Plato partakes of a universal property labeled "wisdom," and Nocrates believes that Plato is a member of a set of people who share similar characteristics he would label as "being wise." How does it follow that Socrates and Nocrates would have identical brain states?
Comment by Bilbo — June 12, 2008 @ 6:17 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 6:44 pm
Bilbo, if I understand Jim (big if, I admit), then Socrates and Nocrates both have the same belief, the difference is in the worlds they live in. Socrates lives in a world where Plato partakes of a universal property labeled "wisdom," while Nocrates lives in a world where Plato is a member of a set of people who share similar characteristics he would label as "being wise."
Comment by The Pixie — June 12, 2008 @ 6:44 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 6:49 pm
It's not clear to me that we could legitimately say that they have the "same belief." Socrates believes in universals. Nocrates doesn't. That seems to imply that the content of their beliefs would be somewhat different.
If the content of their beliefs is the same, in spite of their different philosophical viewpoints, then I think Jim would need to provide some sort of argument as to why we should think this so. Yes?
Comment by Bilbo — June 12, 2008 @ 6:49 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 7:46 pm
I could be wrong, but isn't that why Jim specifically spelled it out for us? The belief in question is that Plato is wise; issues concerning universals or social convention/prior neurological wiring are consequences of the worlds they live in, I don't see how that (for this simple belief of Plato) has to be reflected in the content of that particular belief. So I don't see why it would imply the content of that belief about Plato would need to be somewhat different.
Comment by Doug — June 12, 2008 @ 7:46 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 8:02 pm
I just re-read Jim's OP. I'm no longer sure what his argument is. I probably never was.
Comment by Bilbo — June 12, 2008 @ 8:02 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 8:09 pm
Jim seems to be saying that the content of Socrates and Nocrates beliefs are different, yes?
Comment by Bilbo — June 12, 2008 @ 8:09 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 8:20 pm
So Jim gives us two possible worlds, one where RT is true, and one where NT is true. Socrates exists in world-RT. Nocrates exists in world-NT. Somehow from this Jim assumes that Socrates would have belief (2-RT), or the belief that Plato is wise, in the sense that Plato participates in the universal property of wisdom. And Jim assumes that Nocrates would have belief (2-NT), or the belief that Plato is wise, in the sense that he is a member of a group of people who are called wise.
This need not follow. Socrates could be a Nominalist in RT, and Nocrates could be a Realist in NT.
But let's grant his assumptions. He then further assumes that they could have the same brain state, BT1. And then he concludes that this proves that beliefs are more than brain states. Well of course they are more than brain states, given his assumptions! Their beliefs have different contents, but the same brain state. It follows that beliefs must be more than just brain states.
But why grant that Socrates and Nocrates, even though they have different belief contents, could have the same brain state?
Comment by Bilbo — June 12, 2008 @ 8:20 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 8:31 pm
By the way, I should add that I believe that there are universals, and I think this is a problem for materialism or physicalism, both in how to account for their existence, and in how to account for our ability to perceive them. It just doesn't appear to me that Jim has provided a very good argument here.
Comment by Bilbo — June 12, 2008 @ 8:31 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 8:32 pm
Here's a condensed version of Jim's argument, as I understand it from the opening post:
Jim,
Here are a few criticisms, some of which overlap with The Pixie's:
A. Beyond the realistic/nominalistic distinction, you don't specify whether the worlds are otherwise identical.
B. If the worlds are not otherwise identical, then the situations giving rise to the thought "Plato is wise" might be different in each world. To Socrates, "Plato is wise" might mean "Plato is always thinking three steps ahead when he makes an argument, as many wise men do," while to Nocrates it might mean "Plato has a deep and wise insight into human psychology." There is no reason to suppose that their brain states will be identical in this case, which defeats your argument.
C. If the worlds are not otherwise identical, then the question becomes: do the differences between the worlds impinge in any way on the experiences that Socrates and Nocrates have? If they do, then objection (B) comes into play again.
D. As an example, If the worlds are not otherwise identical, and if Socrates and Nocrates differ in their beliefs about whether nominalism or idealism is true, then there is no reason to assume their brain states are identical when they have the thought "Plato is wise."
E. On the other hand, if you maintain that the worlds are otherwise identical, then it raises this question: Is this even possible? Can two worlds differ only in whether nominalism or realism is true?
F. If the worlds are otherwise identical, then Socrates and Nocrates have identical experiences and thoughts. In that case, each of them means exactly the same thing when he says "Plato is wise." They share the same brain state, and they share the same thought. No evidence of thought transcending brain.
G. Assuming again that the worlds are otherwise identical, let's ask Socrates and Nocrates whether they are nominalists or realists. They will answer identically, but the answer could be "Yes", "No", "I don't know", "There's not enough evidence to decide," etc. If Socrates says he is a nominalist, then he is wrong (since his world is realistic). If Nocrates says he is a realist, then he is wrong (since his world is nominalistic). All this tells us is that if Socrates and Nocrates have a definite opinion on the nominalist/realist question, then one of them is wrong. But the fact that a human can be wrong tells us nothing about whether human thought transcends the brain.
In short, no matter how I look at it, I can't see how your argument supports the thesis that brain states are insufficient to account for thought.
Comment by robin — June 12, 2008 @ 8:32 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 8:37 pm
Bilbo,
gotta give a man a chance to reply.
Comment by Doug — June 12, 2008 @ 8:37 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 8:39 pm
Certainly. And since I have philosophical problems with materialism, I hope my critique is incorrect, and Jim shows me the errors of my ways.
Comment by Bilbo — June 12, 2008 @ 8:39 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 8:41 pm
Does Robin's summary clear up any of the problems?
BTW, thank you Robin for condensing it!!
Comment by Doug — June 12, 2008 @ 8:41 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 8:45 pm
I think Robin's critique, though more lengthy than it needs to be, says essentially the same thing I did. Why grant that Socrates and Nocrates could have different contents to the belief that "Plato is wise," while having the same brain state?
Comment by Bilbo — June 12, 2008 @ 8:45 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 8:45 pm
My pleasure, Doug. I hope it's a fair summary of Jim's argument.
Comment by robin — June 12, 2008 @ 8:45 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 8:50 pm
It's what I was thinking…. Just more clear, concise and intelligible
that, and I really like your critiques too. I'm not too inclined philosophically, but what you're saying makes sense. I'm looking forward to Jim's response.
Comment by Doug — June 12, 2008 @ 8:50 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 9:22 pm
Robin:
There is conceptual ambiguity. What if though the thinking were focused on something more precise- a mathematical equation. Would the same solution given by both men indicate anything at all about their respective brain states? Given that there can be separate routes to the same answer, even if brain states were identical, could separate analytical thinking, yielding the same solutions in identical brain states, be evidence for duality?
Comment by Bradford — June 12, 2008 @ 9:22 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 10:30 pm
Salvador wrote:
However, intellectual honesty requires that any arguments you make against other deities be applied unflinchingly and objectively to your own deity, with appropriate modifications, to see if they stick.
If you define 'natural' as meaning 'within the universe', and if you define the universe as excluding anything causally preceding the Big Bang, then by definition anything causally preceding the Big Bang must be supernatural. That tells you nothing about the nature of the predecessor, and it hardly 'breaks the case for naturalism.'
The problem is that not only do you have to accept the message on faith, but you also must have faith that the message comes from God, and further that God is a benevolent deity whose messages should be heeded. The consequences of these leaps of faith can be tragic. How many people have been stoned to death, maimed, banished, or otherwise persecuted because somebody else was certain that it was God's will?
A couple of years ago, Barack Obama commented on the story of Abraham and Isaac:
Salvador again:
This assumes that the greatest truths are unprovable. In fact, the truths that Gödel showed to be unprovable are isomorphic to statements of the form, "This statement cannot be proven within this system." If such a statement is true, then it obviously cannot be proven. If such a statement is false, then it shows that the system is inconsistent.
The fact that there are truths that are unprovable within any arithmetically complete and consistent system is of great theoretical importance, and Gödel's fame is well-deserved. The content of those unprovable truths, however, is rather more mundane.
Of course some faith is necessary. For example, almost all of us believe that a correspondence between thought and reality is possible, though we can't prove it.
However, skeptics see faith as a necessary evil and seek to minimize the number of things they take on faith. When faith contradicts with reason and evidence, faith is jettisoned.
Many believers, on the other hand, celebrate faith as a virtue. Consider this appalling statement from Martin Luther:
Speaking of conflicts between faith and reason, I notice that you haven't been able to point out any flaws in my refutation of Trevors and Abel (on the Aiguy's Computer thread).
Do you now concede that their paper does not support your claim (below)?
Comment by robin — June 12, 2008 @ 10:30 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 10:38 pm
Furthermore, if you use philosophical naturalism to argue against the existence of deities other than your own, then you're assuming your conclusion by defining reality to exclude the supernatural. Note that this precludes the existence of your own deity, as well.
Far better to reach a tentative position of philosophical naturalism based on evidence and reason, rather than assuming it, on faith, as a starting point.
Comment by robin — June 12, 2008 @ 10:38 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 10:55 pm
Bradford asked:
Bradford,
Consider what it really means to speak of two brains having identical states. It means they possess the same number and type of neurons, arranged precisely the same way, with the same DNA, with each synapse having precisely the same strength of connection, and so on. This certainly cannot be achieved now, and may never be achievable.
And even if two brains started from an identical state, if they were instructed to solve a problem by two different routes, they would undoubtedly end up in different states, even if they reached the same answer.
To demonstrate duality in this context, you would have to somehow prove that two brains were in exactly the same state (or equivalently, you'd have to be able to return a single brain to an exact previous state), and yet show that the thoughts were different.
A pretty tall order.
Comment by robin — June 12, 2008 @ 10:55 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 11:00 pm
Hi Robin,
Where should one start then, in your opinion? Doesn't or couldn't, evidence and reason also lead to a tentative conclusion of a First Mover/God (sans any of the religious stuff)? Sorry if this is (unintentionally) off topic.
Regards.
Comment by Rob R. — June 12, 2008 @ 11:00 pm
June 12th, 2008 at 11:11 pm
Identical states exist only as thought experiments. Even identical twins have epigenetic differences. Brain complexity is imposing as well; making broad conclusions linking thought to specific physical causes problematic.
Robin:
The faith based criticism needs perspective. This is a refreshing look at this from an atheist, albeit a fair one.
What does this have to do with Alan's post? Obviously men such as Richard Dawkins are opposed to the evils of religion, but they are often accused of not paying proper attention to atheistic Communism and Nazism. Let's sidestep the fact that Nazism had at least a Deistic core, Communism was avowedly an atheist ideology. The New Atheists might claim that the evil of Communism was not committed in the name of, or because of, atheism, but rather due to collectivist and totalitarian political ideology. But, I would hold that these are exactly the aspects of religion which the New Atheists use as a cudgel against religion! If you read Dawkins' The God Delusion he obviously has contempt for the hypothesis of God itself as infantile, but his most trenchant critiques hinge upon the material consequences of religion, the irrationality of behavior and policy (from his perspective) which are rooted in religious ideology. But the homophobia, patriarchy and Puritanism which were extant in the former Communist countries strongly suggests that social characteristics which secular liberal elites decry because of their associations with religion will not be mysteriously banished with the death of the gods. It is to me somewhat ironic that the New Atheists often invert the concepts of religionists, whereas the latter might posit a utopia under the aegis of their god the former seem to project a godless future where the dark hand of the divine has been removed and so the lion may now lay with the lamb! It seems they forgot to remember that His Dark Materials was fiction.
2) The previous point attempted to emphasize that because religion is so broad, and so interconnected with various other aspects of human sociality, it is very difficult to adduce that religion as such is the causal factor underlying a particular dynamic. I think that the missteps by scholars such as Max Weber in overemphasizing the importance of religious ideas in driving the nature of a society or culture illustrate this. Weber famously suggested that a Calvinist ethic drive the rise of modern capitalism, using Germany as an example. Though there are debates as to the validity of Weber's assertions (the majority seem to believe the idea falsified, though there is a revisionist minority), his assumption that East Asian societies would never modernize economically because of their Confucian/Buddhist religious sensibilities shows the weakness of this sort of black-box approach to religion.
Comment by Bradford — June 12, 2008 @ 11:11 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 12:28 am
Rob R. asked:
Hi Rob,
I think the right place to start is on the fence, letting reason and evidence guide you from there.
As we follow the causal chain, there seem to be several possibilities:
1. We eventually uncover a cause that must exist, by sheer logical necessity. This is what Anselm and others tried (but failed, in my opinion) to do with their ontological proofs of God's existence.
Keep in mind that an ultimate cause need not be godlike. For example, imagine that the Steady State theory had triumphed over the Big Bang, and that someone had managed to show that the universe's own existence was logically necessary. If all of this had happened, we would have identified a first cause — but most of us would be reluctant to label it 'God'.
2. The causal chain is infinite, and we never reach the end.
3. We reach a point in the chain where we are unable to proceed, due to our intrinsic human limitations, and so we must leave the question unanswered.
4. The causal chain loops back on itself in some spooky way. This idea is appealing to some of the more wooful interpreters of quantum mechanics, who like to say that we bring the whole universe, including ourselves, into existence simply by observing it.
Whatever the ultimate outcome, I would say the evidence to date makes the kind of interventionist God envisioned by most theists seem very unlikely.
Comment by robin — June 13, 2008 @ 12:28 am
June 13th, 2008 at 12:33 am
Bradford,
The lengthy quote you provided seems to have nothing to do with my point, which is that it is a mistake to elevate faith over evidence and reason.
Comment by robin — June 13, 2008 @ 12:33 am
June 13th, 2008 at 12:53 am
On the subject of the violent histories of theism and atheism, I strongly recommend - as a counterpoint to Dawkins, Hitchens, and Harris - Vox Day's book, "The Irrational Atheist". Available free in PDF form, and very much worth the read. Just found this recently, and while his tone can get snarky, he does quite a job.
As for the 'evidence to date' according to robin, I'd disagree. And I think one important point is that people are able to disagree on the subject and have good reasons for doing so. I don't think all, or even most religion is an elevation of faith over evidence and reason. If anything it's usually a mix of all three. For me, reason and evidence brings me to deism over the alternatives (In fact, I'd argue that deism trumps atheism and even agnosticism as the reasonable position - but, that's me.) And, accepting deism as such, investigating claims to an experience of deity gains ground. That in turn leads me to Christianity in general, Catholicism in particular.
And, I'm curious to see where Madden's argument goes. I have a feeling I know what he's getting at, but I'll let him clarify as he sees fit before commenting.
Comment by nullasalus — June 13, 2008 @ 12:53 am
June 13th, 2008 at 2:31 am
nullasalus wrote:
Faith need not be pervasive to be baleful. A single belief, taken on faith — like the belief that the Bible is the inerrant word of God — can do great harm, as anybody who was ever stoned to death by the Hebrews would tell you, if they could.
I think he was pretty clear about what he was trying to accomplish:
Comment by robin — June 13, 2008 @ 2:31 am
June 13th, 2008 at 3:25 am
robin,
Or the belief that Marx had the best idea ever, and anyone standing in the way was holding back justice. Or the belief that money and power means everything, and if you can get away with a whole lot of viciousness to increase yours, that's just the way it is. Or the belief that religion is way too dangerous to tolerate, and if utopia demands stamping it out with violence, it's a small price to pay.
As I said, I highly recommend Vox Day's book. Just one more that drives the point home, though he does it in a very aggressive way.
Not what I referred to. Rather how he meant his examples to be taken. As I said, I'll sit back and wait to see what he has to say.
Comment by nullasalus — June 13, 2008 @ 3:25 am
June 13th, 2008 at 4:23 am
nullasalus wrote:
Pernicious beliefs all, which is precisely why it is so important that we examine them critically rather than holding them as articles of faith.
P.S. I, too, recommend Vox Day's book — to readers who like their snark unleavened by reason. And the price is right.
Comment by robin — June 13, 2008 @ 4:23 am
June 13th, 2008 at 4:35 am
robin,
You can examine critically, you can reason, but in the end we all have to make judgments about what to believe knowing that possibilities remain open, many times in big ways. Faith never goes away. It barely gets minimized.
There we go, folks - even Robin endorses it. Give it a good read, and tell your friends.
Comment by nullasalus — June 13, 2008 @ 4:35 am
June 13th, 2008 at 5:25 am
How about someone starting a new thread about this book? It seems to be slagging of Dawkins, so seems right on target for TT.
Comment by The Pixie — June 13, 2008 @ 5:25 am
June 13th, 2008 at 5:27 am
nullasalus wrote:
Null,
You keep making my case for me. Thanks!
It's true that the information on which we base our decisions is often incomplete. Despite our best efforts, we sometimes reason incorrectly. Even if we're diligent about applying logic to the evidence at hand, we'll sometimes get the wrong answer.
But these are reasons not for resorting to faith, but rather for redoubling our efforts to apply logic and reason wherever we can. We're far more likely to discover errors if we subject all of our beliefs — including the oldest, seemingly best-established ones — to critical scrutiny.
The day we stop questioning a belief is the day we commit ourselves to its infallibility. For a species as prone to error as ours, this is foolhardy behavior.
On the other hand, the payoff for maintaining a questioning attitude can be enormous. To see this, you need only to consider a certain patent clerk who near the turn of the century decided to question the commonsense belief, held for millennia, that space and time are disjoint.
Comment by robin — June 13, 2008 @ 5:27 am
June 13th, 2008 at 7:36 am
I hear that refrain often and wonder if those using it have thought it through. Faith, in the biblical sense of the word, is action stemming, not from irrational belief, but rather a reasonable expectation that what is unseen is a true basis for proceeding. The best examples are not cherry picked stories of those claiming to hear voices but of biblical personalities who had a reasonable expectation that their actions were right. Since you used Obama's comments about Abraham, that example will suffice to illustrate the point. Prior to receiving the message to sacrifice his son Abraham had extensive prior experiences with God resulting in tangible benefits that came with following God's lead. The most significant probably being the birth of Isaac himself as it occurred when his parents were advanced in age. Both God's power and trustworthiness were repeatedly shown to Abraham. Abraham had a personal history with the one who asked him to sacrifice his son and he knew of God's good intentions and ability to change bad circumstances into good ones. That's the backdrop to the sacrifice story. Without it you get a skewed analysis of Abraham's actions. It doesn't even matter if you believe the account. What matters is the logical consistency to it and other biblical accounts illustrating the real meaning of faith and the fact that faith and reason were not set as opposite concepts by those who coined both the word and its initial meaning.
The second point is the prevalence of the belief that faith is elevated over reason and that this is somehow peculiar to people of faith. Faith is something exercised by all of us continually. We all act on reasonable expectations and on what cannot be verified by sensory experiences. Again lets use Obama and other politicians to illustrate the point in this election year. Both Obama and McCain will set out policy positions and make promises their respective supporters will endorse based on what- sensory confirmations confirming the plausibility of the proposed policies? Hardly. If that were the case those of us who act on reason and have the same information would vote for the same candidate. Instead despite having virtually the same data available many of us are at loggerheads. Our actions are motivated by our subjective experiences and our expectations as to outcomes influenced by subjective hopes and fears. Common problems faced by the people of a nation yet inspiring reactions that are based more on emotion and preconception than objective reason. That incidentally is closer to how New Atheists view the meaning of faith.
I could delve into many aspects of life and point out just how often members of my own species forsake reason for ill-founded faith when acting on a non-religious idea or their hopes and fears. The reason I linked to the science blog was to emphasize the writer's point that actions, attributed to religious people by New Atheists, to further well known talking points, are ambiguous with respect to true motives. In nations like the USSR failings attributed to religion were found practiced by people brought up within an anti-religious system and not themselves religious. People, not of faith, doing what is unreasonable. No doubt you can cite examples of religious people who claim faith as a basis for rejecting reason and evidence. I can do the same for people who are not of faith. It is also an opportune time to remember that even within the small community of people who debate about such topics as intelligent design we are in agreement as to about 99.99% of issues pertaining to science. The small areas of disagreement come with faith and reason found on both sides. The positioning of true, well founded faith over reason is a dubious juxtaposition but if it is a mistake to elevate faith (well or ill founded) over evidence and reason then it is a common one and I have to marvel at the unreason of those believing the argument has significance.
Comment by Bradford — June 13, 2008 @ 7:36 am
June 13th, 2008 at 7:39 am
A case in point. Let me know when your faith in the origin of life explanation gives way to confirming evidence.
Comment by Bradford — June 13, 2008 @ 7:39 am
June 13th, 2008 at 8:12 am
nullasalus wrote:
You made my day, nullasalus.
Will you also recommend Dr. Dr.'s new treatise?
Comment by olegt — June 13, 2008 @ 8:12 am
June 13th, 2008 at 10:32 am
Pixie:
How bout that someone being you Pixie. The guest post option is open to you too.
Comment by Bradford — June 13, 2008 @ 10:32 am
June 13th, 2008 at 1:27 pm
Bradford wrote:
Bradford,
Read Martin Luther again:
To Luther, faith is required only to convince himself of something his reason rejects out of hand. He says it would not be needed otherwise. It's hard to imagine a better example of irrationality.
Are you trying to tell us that Luther, Mr. Sola Scriptura, did not possess a "biblical faith" Don't the millions of Lutherans who accept his teachings on faith qualify as Bible-believing Christians, in your view?
And far from stating that faith must be based on a "reasonable expectation", as you claim, the Bible teaches the opposite:
What is reasonable about being sure of what you hope for? What is rational about being certain of something for which you don't have evidence?
Don't use your reason; just believe.
Don't ask for evidence; just believe.
Do you really think it was unreasonable for Thomas to ask for evidence of such an extraordinary event?
You're assuming that 1) everyone who "acts on reason" reasons perfectly, 2) that everyone shares the same moral code, and 3) that everyone possesses the same hierarchy of desires. These are all false assumptions.
Not only religious people, but the Bible itself.
Agreed. Religion doesn't have a monopoly on faith. If you believe something simply because Mao Zedong or Kim Jong-il said it, then you're exhibiting an irrational faith, much like someone who believes whatever the Pope says ex cathedra.
If you believe that spinal "subluxations" can cause deafness or cancer, as many chiropractors do, then you have elevated faith above reason, because the evidence says otherwise.
I've never confined my argument to religious faith. That is why I wrote earlier that:
Comment by robin — June 13, 2008 @ 1:27 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 1:44 pm
Let me address Robin's great critique of my argument. I'll try to address Pixie later, though I think some of what I have to say below will speak to his worries. Althought I will say this about the worry of whether the content of Nocrates' and Socrates' beliefs is indentical: I think they are the same, though I make that claim somewhat tentatively; I've not thought much about that point until now. (That's the benefit of this kind of discussion!) They are both disposed to affirm "Wm" read as "Plato is wise." Assuming NT can make sense of logical consequences, etc., "Wm" has the same logical and behavioral consequences in both worlds — as I said originally, they would both pass the same Turing Tests. The difference is the truth maker, i.e., the state of affairs that makes "Wm" true in either world. In the NT world, the truth maker is just Plato's contingent membership in a semantic class called 'wise'. (For a an NTer all predicates are really just proper names of classes.) In the RT world the truth maker is Plato's being an instantiation of a universal held by Socrates. [Notice that part of the story about the truth makers in both worlds carries with it a story about Socrates and Nocrates, that will be important for what follows below.] So the beliefs are the same in their content, though their truth makers are different.
Robin reconstruct's my argument well, but I watn to make some changes to his version that better reflect my original intent:
1. Consider two worlds. In one world is the actual world where realism is true. In the other is a possible world in which nominalism is true.
2. Socrates lives in the realistic world (the actual world). Nocrates lives in the nominalistic world.
3. Both Socrates and Nocrates believe that "Plato is wise."
4. The brain state that Socrates token for "Plato is wise" is the exact same brain state we would expect Nocrates to token for "Plato is wise."
5. The Socrates and Nocrates token the same brain states under the same empirical conditions, but the truth makers of their beliefs are different.
6. Therefore, Socrates' belief is not explained by the tokening of a brain state.
I think that adjusts the argument for the terminology I just introduced.
Now, Robin generously offers several very penetrating criticisms. They all, however, amount to forcing me into a dilemma: Either (a) the NT world and the RT world are identical save only whether or not NT or RT are the case, or (b) the NT and RT world are different in additional ways. It would seem that if I go with (a), then:
"If the worlds are otherwise identical, then Socrates and Nocrates have identical experiences and thoughts. In that case, each of them means exactly the same thing when he says "Plato is wise." They share the same brain state, and they share the same thought. No evidence of thought transcending brain."
On the other hand, if I go with (b), then I take it Robin's worry is that there can be other factors independent of the phenomena being discussed that account for the difference between Socrates and Nocrates, which would seem to undermine my argument.
Robin, am I reading your criticism properly? Brilliant! Let me try to respond. I'm in fact happy to affirm (a). However, I don't think whether NT or RT is true is a small difference between possible worlds! Those differences are empirically or scientifically detectable. Nevertheless, philosophers arguing over NT vs. RT don't dispute the empirical or experimental facts. Indeed, what would such evidence for or against NT or RT even be like? But we can still coherently debate the issue, and neither of us doubt that we both understand "Grass is green" in the same way. Where we differ is over what makes it true. Thus, similitude of experience or even propositional content doesn't mean the truth maker is the same. So I agree that Socrates and Nocrates have the same experience and even they mean the same thing, just like I claim that they would token the same brain state. However, the truth maker of Socrates' belief is different form the truth maker of Nocrates' belief, and this is nothing that can be accounted for in naturalistic terms.
Robin's criticism stems from what I now see as an ambiguity in my original post. I think Socrates and Nocrates both have the same thought in terms of content, but what consitutes thought (the logical structure of thinking) differs between their two worlds. This logical structure of thought, I think my argument shows, isn't accounted for biological naturalism.
One think I haven't thought about yet, and I don't have time for now, is whether a realist like me can admit that an NT-world is logically possible. (It would seem odd to me to say that RT is only contingently true.) I'll have to leave a promissary note on that for now.
I have to run along for the moment. I'm sorry if I have slighted anybody who has take the time to consider my argument.
Comment by Jim Madden — June 13, 2008 @ 1:44 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 2:43 pm
He may have had biblical faith for the best evidence of it is how one lives his life. The quote supplied does not accurately reflect the character of God. The real issue though is whether Luther's belief, as indicated by that quote, impacted his life in any significant way that could be defined as irrational. Truthfully I have never met anyone who did not have some irrational aspect to his or her personality. We are all flawed and none of us rational in all respects.
But who is the object of our faith? Not some feckless human but God whose character and capabilities ensure his promises. If the promises of God are true, the most rational thing a human being could do would be to step out in faith and follow the path set out by the creator.
Comment by Bradford — June 13, 2008 @ 2:43 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 3:07 pm
robin,
Believe me, I am well aware that for all the talk of open-mindedness and free inquiry, plenty of scientists and self-declared 'rational people' never question their beliefs. Einstein taught a valuable lesson - and learned it again from LeMaitre, among others.
Besides, your argument is already lost: You admit faith is necessary for everyone, and that claims of 'reason and rationality' often result in highly flawed conclusions, even (particularly, given the track record) among atheists. Your response is to say 'alright, but we see faith as a necessary evil - that makes us better'. It gets you nowhere. Not even your biblical quotes help, because they rely on twisting quotes about faith in things unseen into 'faith with zero evidence' - but that's not the case. Thomas HAD evidence (his knowledge of Jesus and miracles, others' claims, his knowledge of the missing body, his recognition of the idea of God) - it was not sufficient for him. I think we can all agree that in many cases, being able to believe something reasonably without needing utterly over the top demonstration is a virtue. 'Being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see' does not become faith without evidence either; it's not being sure BECAUSE we hope or BECAUSE we do not see. Reason, evidence, and rationality still enter into the picture.
As for Luther, cite him all you like - I think he's utterly wrong, on a number of points, not the least of which is his take on faith.
Anyway, good ol' Vox's book is written for one express purpose: Getting people with tremendous faith to question their views. And that's the last I'll say about it, as I don't want to distract further from Jim Madden's thread.
olegt,
You thought that post was new to me? My reply is comment #2, where I mention that I identify (yet again) as a TE, and point out that I don't think Ken Miller is a good representative of TE viewpoints. Hell, most of my posts on UD are pointing out what I think ID's (considerable) limitations are, defending TE, and even defending people I think are being attacked unfairly. I'll probably do it again here.
Anyway, once again I don't want to distract from Jim's thread. I'll just mention "The Irrational Atheist" is can be downloaded free from this link, and is a fantastic response to Harris, Hitchens, Dawkins and (to a lesser degree) some other NA claims. I've never endorsed a book like this on forums before, but I make an exception here. It's that good. I'll hop back in if someone decides to make a thread about faith; it's a losing argument for atheists.
Comment by nullasalus — June 13, 2008 @ 3:07 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 3:24 pm
The Koine Greek word pistis doesn't mean blind faith in the modern Hollywood sense of "faith", it means trust, the kind of trust Abraham had with Yahweh, because Yahweh earned his trust.
Comment by kornbelt888 — June 13, 2008 @ 3:24 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 4:27 pm
Bradford, nullasalus, kornbelt888 –
Mike Gene has generously supplied a new open thread, so let's take our discussion of faith over there.
Comment by robin — June 13, 2008 @ 4:27 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 4:33 pm
Jim,
You still haven't explained why in an NT-world Nocrates must be a Nominalist, instead of a Realist. Since you believe that we are presently living in an RT-world, and there are people who call themselves Nominalists in this world, their believe that Plato is wise, would have different content from a Realist belief that Plato is wise.
You need an argument that shows that in an NT-world, only Nominalists exist. And that in an RT-world, only Realists exist. Then you need an argument that shows the content of their beliefs would be the same, anyway.
And no, they wouldn't pass the Turing test. "Socrates, do you believe that wisdom is a universal quality that exists independently of any its instantiations?" "Yes." Same question to Nocrates: "No." Turing test failed.
Comment by Bilbo — June 13, 2008 @ 4:33 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 4:34 pm
On the subject of Faith: Let's take it to another thread, and reserve this one for Jim's argument. I'll start one now. Better yet, Mike has started an open thread for us to speak our mind. Let's use that one for "Faith."
Comment by Bilbo — June 13, 2008 @ 4:34 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 4:43 pm
Nocrates lives in the possible world where nominalism is true. Hasn't this been stated numerous times in this thread? If Nocrates lives in a possible world where nominalism is true what more needs to be explained?
Socrates lives in the realist world (the one Jim said he believes is the actual world), Nocrates lives in one possible world where nominalism is true. To my understanding it's not comparing Socrates and Nocrates who both live in the realist world while Nocrates just happens to be a nominalist… Nocrates is living in a possible world where nominalism is true.
That wasn't the question they would be asked. The question wasn't regarding their beliefs about realism v nominalism it was about the belief of Plato being wise.
Comment by Doug — June 13, 2008 @ 4:43 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 4:49 pm
Yes Doug, I understand that Nocrates lives in a possible world where Nominalism is true. Why would that mean that Nocrates must be a Nominalist?
OK, further question: "Socrates, when you say that Plato is wise, do you mean that he is wise because he partakes of a universal quality called wisdom?" "Yes." "Nocrates, same question." "No." Turing test failed.
Comment by Bilbo — June 13, 2008 @ 4:49 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 4:58 pm
It's just an example where we believe that, regardless of how Nocrates personally feels on the matter, the reality of that world is that P for any subject is not identical to every/any other instance of P, but instead is a product of social convention, pragmatic conditioning, prior neurological wiring, etc.
He's a nominalist because the reality of that world is that nominalism is true - independent of Nocrates feelings (whether or not he feels nominalism is true or false).
Comment by Doug — June 13, 2008 @ 4:58 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 5:00 pm
By the way, I think there are cogent arguments along the lines that Jim is exploring. I recommend a book by the philosopher Victor Reppert, C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea. He analyses Lewis's "Argument from Reason," and presents several strong versions of the argument. And it's quite readable, for the non-philosopher.
Comment by Bilbo — June 13, 2008 @ 5:00 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 5:03 pm
Bilbo,
I could be wrong here, but it seems JM isn't really concerned with whether Socrates and Nocrates themselves subscribe to realism or nominalism. In fact, he's pointed out that between the two worlds, he's willing to accept that Socrates and Nocrates are identical in every material way. It's that Socrates and Nocrates can be identical despite inhabiting a realist and nominalist world respectively. There is a very real difference, yet naturalism apparently can't suffice to discern between them.
Doug seems to have a better handle on this than I, so I ask him: Does this sound accurate?
Comment by nullasalus — June 13, 2008 @ 5:03 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 5:03 pm
It would be nice if Reppert were to come over here and discuss this as well.
He posts in the comment on his blog "Dangerous Idea". I'd be really interested to hear his input.
Comment by Doug — June 13, 2008 @ 5:03 pm
June 13th, 2008 at 5:03 pm
OK, Doug, it's still not clear to me why Nocrates must be a Nominalist. But I was willing to grant that assumption to Jim. But we still have the question of the content of Socrates' belief about Plato, and Nocrates' belief. And the contents seem to be decidedly different. Which raises the further question, why grant that they could have the same brain states?
Comment by