Backing Into an Evidentiary Standard for ID
by BradfordIn a comment within the Misusing Science thread Keiths made the following brief remark:
If immaterial souls exist "” particularly souls of the kind that most people envisage "” then there are testable empirical consequences.
The logic of the statement indicates that if we could observe what are reasonably inferred as consequences of an immaterial soul then we would have cause to suspect a soul exists and that the lack of such expected consequences would be evidence against the existence of a soul. I'm not going to explore what those consequences might be or whether the linkage is appropriate but instead want to focus on another implication inherent in the statement.
The belief, shared by ID critics other than Keiths, is an acknowledgement that observable physical consequences can be used as evidence to support a claim, in favor of or opposed to, an immaterial concept. That is noteworthy because intelligence is an immaterial concept about which physical evidence has been linked in such disciplines as forensic science and archeology. ID critics have been quick to point out that a known designer is identifiable in such disciplines and contrast this with ID's unidentified designer as a form of criticism.
Yet look closely at the soul claim again. The souls in question belong to designed organisms namely, humans. The designer is nowhere in evidence even assuming physical consequences consistent with the existence of an immaterial soul. So, in principle, a link between physical consequences and an immaterial entity is established even in the absence of an identified designer. Some neuro-science enthusiasts are inadvertently making claims relevant to ID and a designer centric approach.
July 7th, 2007 at 1:03 am
Hi Bradford,
Unless I am misunderstanding you here. I suspect there are a lot of "immaterial concepts." However, before we get too far into this. Where are you drawing the line?
Love
Fight or flight instinct
Information
Quantum Information
Gravity
Radio Waves
Light Waves/particles
Electron Waves/Particles
Atoms
Molecules
I am also interested in how you treat the issue that forensic science and archeology assumes "intelligence" includes the ability to learn and/or adapt.
Especially archeology.
Comment by Thought Provoker — July 7, 2007 @ 1:03 am
July 7th, 2007 at 3:51 am
This essay, Science, Religion, and the Human Future by Leon Kass in the April issue of Commentary, nicely addresses the question posed by keiths:
On a side note, Steven Pinker and Leon Kass exchanged words over this essay in Commentary's letters to the Editor. Kass knows how to sling the zing:
In fact, Kass address this question precisely in his rebuttal of Pinker:
Comment by todd — July 7, 2007 @ 3:51 am
July 7th, 2007 at 7:12 am
Hi TP,
The point of my post was to ascertain where ID critics draw the line; particularly with reference to the contention that identifying design (a soul in this case) requires identifying the designer too. Is it your view that the existence of a soul is a matter that can be resolved through experimentation?
As for intelligence, last week I posted a comment indicating that a working definition of the term was broader than you allow.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 7:12 am
July 7th, 2007 at 7:25 am
Hi Todd,
I read this at the link to your name:
The existence and non-existence of God is indeed a metaphysical matter. Ultimate questions are answered philosophically by IDists and ID critics alike. It appears that some are of the view though, that ultimate answers are fine as long as they fall within the purview of negating God.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 7:25 am
July 7th, 2007 at 8:05 am
John von Neumann:
His response to an anonymous claim that it is not possible for a machine to think (or have a soul if you like).
Comment by Raevmo — July 7, 2007 @ 8:05 am
July 7th, 2007 at 8:23 am
Raevmo quoting:
It looks like you, me and John are of like minds on this. Souls are intelligently designed (my metaphysical position).
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 8:23 am
July 7th, 2007 at 11:57 am
Bradford wrote:
Hi Bradford,
If I understand your point correctly, you're saying that if an ID critic believes that an immaterial soul has testable consequences, then that critic is implicitly acknowledging that physical evidence can point to design, even though the designer is not identified.
If that's what you are trying to say, then let me point out that there is an unstated assumption underlying your position: that immaterial souls, if they exist, must be designed entities.
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 11:57 am
July 7th, 2007 at 12:08 pm
Sorry, Bradford, even if the "soul" exists, it evolved. It was not designed. The "evidentiary" status of design is nil. Design is an illusion and even if it wasn't, in case you haven't noticed, all the "evidence of design" is actually evidence of evolution, only badly misunderstood or misinterpreted by the IDers.
When "inadvertently" supplied the slimmest thread by keiths, Bradford took it, fashioned into a noose around his own neck, and jumped!
Keith's gave you an opening and you immediately closed it by assuming a "metaphysical position."
"Souls are intelligently designed (my metaphysical position)." I suppose that by assuming such a metaphysic one can feel immune to "evidentirary standards" and all that sciency-soundin' sorta stuff.
Which is the usual bassackwards approach of the IDers to science. You're not going to back your sorry you-know-what into science! LOL
If you had any "evidence" you'd lay it on the table.
Btw, You won't find the "soul" on modern human anatomy charts because it doesn't exist. What neuroscience has done, in less than two decades is to subsume the "soul" under the functional anatomy of, the structures and processes occurring in, the CNS. Our behavior originates in this world and not some ghostly sphere. You don't have a soul. As empirically determinable a matter-of-fact as the fact that you don't have antlers.
If neuroscientists are just calling the same thing by a different name then we can make positive empirically testable statements about the "soul": It is material (conforms to prior knowledge of basic physico-chemical principles), localizable (to patterns of interactions of CNS with its environment), analyzable (is composed of identifiable parts, each subserving a particular function), predictable, and, of course, evolved over billions of yrs.
Comment by Rock — July 7, 2007 @ 12:08 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 12:11 pm
Bradford,
Thanks for reading my pitiful blog - I upgraded MoveableType and haven't fixed any of the styles or layout. I envy those of you with the time to compose - lately, I'm lucky to be able to read and follow these great threads, much less post on them.
As for the topic, I get the sense many anti-ID types have a poor understanding of rigorous epistemology - philosophy, in the hierarchy of knowledge and learning, is above observation - it frames it. There is no such thing as a 'blank-slate' observation - we all come with presuppositions which inform our observations. Theory comes before observation, always.
Comment by todd — July 7, 2007 @ 12:11 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 12:35 pm
Rock:
Actually Keiths and his sympathizers were given ample opportunity to demonstrate their claims with empirical proposals but to no avail. The existence of souls is presumed metaphysically.
The difference being that antlers have determinable physical properties by which their absence can be determined. How do you test an immaterial property?
The referenced neuroscientists are feeding their anti-religious biases at someone else's expense. Nothing more.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 12:35 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 12:47 pm
Keiths:
The assumption is that the process, by which it is determined whether or not they are designed entities, does not require a prior identification of the designer. Your confidence that an immaterial concept lends itself to empirical conclusions, without having to resolve a designer identity issue one way or the other, implies that empirical conclusions of intelligent design could proceed in a likewise manner.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 12:47 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 12:55 pm
Todd:
I think you are right about the poor understanding of rigorous epistemology but there is also a fundamentalist streak running through EAs that allows them to contend, on the one hand, that absence of evidence does not equate to support for an alternative paradigm when referencing OOL matters and at the same time maintain that the absence of physical evidence for an immaterial soul equates to its non-existence. They are blinded to inconsistencies in their positions and unable to distinguish science from scientism.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 12:55 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 1:05 pm
Hi Bradford,
You wrote…
Well, it looks like your thread is going to dissolve into the same old dualing metaphysics. This appears to be where you are most comfortable. You get to complain how the "other side" is being unreasonable. I call it "shield bashing".
However, I am patient. Meanwhile, since you have broaden your working definition, you might want to think about examples of what intelligence isn't by your definition. And, yes, you need to explain it in terms a pseudo-critic can understand and apply (i.e. you can't just arbitrarily declare that Darwinists don't exhibit intelligence because you want too).
P.S. My immaterial/material distinction is coming to the point that everything is immaterial. There is no such thing as solid matter.
Comment by Thought Provoker — July 7, 2007 @ 1:05 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 1:31 pm
TP:
It's too bad you see it that way because the other side, as you put it, is abusing science to further their own metaphysical agenda and I am noting it. I would think you would agree that alloting valued funding to projects like the existence of souls is unwise. I'm not willing to go along with the fiction that attempts to "empirically" assess souls is anything other than anti-science and anti-NOMA in nature.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 1:31 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 1:34 pm
Raevmo wrote:
Von Neumann was assuming that conscious thought can be precisely defined and explained in terms of something other than conscious thought. But of course, that's exactly what the anti-materialist denies. The anti-materialist position just is the position that conscious thought does not reduce to, nor is explicable by, nor admits of definition in non-conscious, non-thought terms, and in particular the terms of the mechanics of matter.
The materialist is the one saying conscious thought really is nothing more than material in nature. Fine, go ahead and prove it. The onus of proof lies with the camp affirming the positive case, not with the skeptic.
The aptly named Rock wrote:
One doesn't find 'rational mind' there either. So presumably 'you' are mindless and non-rational.
Does this come as a 'surprise', or were 'you', um, 'aware' of this already?
What is a material entity? Answers to this question tend to generate amusing paradoxes.
If a material entity is one that has empirically detectable consequences, and if God created the universe, and if the universe is empirically detectable, then God is a material entity.
And consider this. Zachriel wrote:
This would include all completely mind-independent material entities. For it is plausible to think that there are many portions of the material cosmos that will never be observed by any physical being, and certainly by no human being; for instance, the deep interiors of many planets, stars, black holes, comets, etc. These interiors are, essentially, theoretical entities posited to explain empirical data. But so are minds other than our own. So, for that matter, is God.
Already, concepts of 'dark' matter and 'dark' energy are having to be postulated in order to reconcile observation with what is predicted by the current theory of gravity, while seriously proposed models have theorized that gravitational energy may 'leak' from our universe. And that's before we even get on to various versions of a multiverse hypothesis, most of whose member universes are decidedly unobservable.
So let me reiterate the question: What does it mean to say material entities exist which will never have any observational consequences? As Michael Dummett puts it:
[Emphasis in original]
What if, as theists believe, conscious rational thought is ontologically basic and not reducible to, or explainable in terms of, anything else, in just same way that materialists have held that matter is ontologically basic and not reducible to, or explainable in terms of anything else? Then, of course, it would be quite silly to demand of the theist a further explanation of conscious rational thought, just as it would be silly to demand of a materialist a further explanation of material things in terms of non-material ones.
In other words, conscious rational thought and matter are proposed as two competing candidates for ontological and explanatory ultimacy.
Comment by stunney — July 7, 2007 @ 1:34 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 2:23 pm
stunney:
Perhaps we should ask a medium to interrogate the ghost of Neumann about his assumptions. That might clear things up a bit.
The slightly annoying thing about the anti-materialists is not that they are wrong (hell, they might even be right), but that they are so unhelpful. They are just sitting at the sidelines criticizing the materialists, while they could be more productive and propose models in terms of the mechanics of non-matter (whatever it is).
Well, one could turn your argument upside down and say that anti-materialists make the positive claim that materialism doesn't suffice, and then the onus would be upon them. It seems more economical from where I am sitting to try and explain consciousness in terms of strictly material mechanics (if necessary even invoking quantum weirdness). If one day this approach succeeds in producing a model that can perfectly mimic the behavior of a conscious being, will you be gracious enough to admit that materialism is probably right after all?
Comment by Raevmo — July 7, 2007 @ 2:23 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 2:38 pm
Hi, Raevmo,
Let's assume that Neumann creates (or builds if you will) a machine that has a mind. I'll give him the benefit of the doubt, and allow that any device he comes up with really has a mind. The questioning process now proceeds:
me: Neumann, speak up now, does any part of this device have a part that is identified as mind?
Neumann: points to a a section of the machine. The mind is here he says.
me: Pointing to the parts, I say, Balls, Neumann. Since when is a resistor considered a mind? Since when is a capacitor a mind? Since when is this ic chip considered a mind. Since when are these wires considered a mind?
Neumann: The combination of it all produces the mind.
me: When you built this device, did you build it to produce a mind?
Neumann: yes.
me: To build this device to have a mind, did you have a concept of what a mind is?
Neumann: yes.
me: Where is the concept, Neumann? Come now, point to it.
Neumann: points to the entire device. The mind emerges from it, he says.
me: Well, then where is it? Show it to me. No, don't point to panels and wires and resistors and such. Show me the mind, show me the concept you used when you first started to build the device. For surely the concept must be inside the device somewhere.
Neumann: You're crazy, concepts don't exist like material things.
me: that's correct.
Neumann: then why are you arguing with me?
me: Because you think you know what a mind is, for how else could you determine that this device has one? I was hoping you could show me exactly what a mind looks like. But you can't. All you can do is build a device and point to the parts, and then assert it has a mind because of what the device can do. In all your brilliance, you may be right, but you still cannot produce the mind for me to see. I ask you to show me the mind, and instead you show me parts that could also be used inside of a toaster. You have shown only that you cannot grasp the reality of an idea, and in that we agree.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — July 7, 2007 @ 2:38 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 2:41 pm
Rock:
Sort of makes me wonder why they bother. I suppose there are lots of people out there who are so insecure in their metaphysical beliefs that the physical act of typing them (over and over and over again, paying no attention to classifications) must make them feel better.
As might be topical in a thread about the mis-use of metaphysics to argue about mis-placed metaphysics. keiths insists that 'souls' are evidential, thus he asserts he's proved a negative by then saying they're NOT evidential! That he's just made a complete mockery of rational thought is not a concern, to him or to any of his responders. Who obviously know more about the difference between physics and metaphysics than keiths, neuroscientists, and your (admittedly cute) Leprechaun character.
Comment by Joy — July 7, 2007 @ 2:41 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 2:54 pm
Anax talking to the ghost of Von Neumann:
Thanks for producing that amusing dialog, but somehow I don't think Neumann would be very amused.
How do you imagine that you might "see" a mind? How do you know that the people you talk to have a mind?
Comment by Raevmo — July 7, 2007 @ 2:54 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 3:20 pm
Von Neumann isn't nearly as smart now as he was before he died. Do we all lose 50 IQ points in the afterlife?
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 3:20 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 3:47 pm
Hi, keiths,
So you believe in an afterlife? I was simply referring to Neumann in the historical present tense, a convention frequently used for famous people no longer living.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — July 7, 2007 @ 3:47 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 3:53 pm
stunney quotes Dummett (again):
Stunney,
This must be the 7th or 8th time I've seen you quote Dummett on this point. I keep hoping you'll go off and think critically about what Dummett is saying, but instead you just turn around and quote him again.
There is a simple and obvious answer to Dummett's question:
1. Let A be a created material universe containing no conscious observers.
2. Let B be God's conception of such a universe.
3. Let C be a created material universe containing a conscious observer.
4. According to Dummett, there is no difference between A and B.
5. What would it take to get from A to C? God would have to create a conscious observer and place him in A.
6. What would it take to get from B to C? God would have to create a universe, and also create and insert a conscious observer into it.
7. Conclusion: If getting from A to C requires different steps than getting from B to C, then A and B are not equivalent.
Note that this argument does not depend on God actually creating such an observer. The fact that it is possible is enough to demonstrate the difference between A and B.
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 3:53 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 4:26 pm
Hi, Raevmo,
The problem right off the bat is that I wouldn't use "see" in the same way I think you mean it (via sensible perceptions like sight, hearing, touch, etc). I think of the mind as an immaterial concept. If I wanted to have a discussion about mind, in an attempt to learn more about what it is, I would seek out someone who had the same assumption that immaterial things can be real. Without that shared belief, there would only be the endless back and forth that you see going on here on a regular basis. Even among people who believe in immaterial concepts like mind, there would be much disagreement over the cause of the concepts. There is a huge ocean of concepts that can't be seen sensibly, even ones that are thought to be purely material, like color, length, mass, etc. Many material things can demonstate the concepts, and this observation can help to put some meat on the discussion, but there first must be agreement that the objects are not the concepts. If someone is disposed to thinking that matter causes the causes, or that matter is the cause of its own existence, then a fruitful discussion can't even get off the ground, in my opinion.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — July 7, 2007 @ 4:26 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 4:29 pm
Raevmo wrote:
This is a very good question, because it impales the materialist on the horns of a dilemma.
Either the materialist must say that the presence and activity of mind can be scientifically inferred from some set of observed physical+behavioral+functional properties, in which case ID is capable of being scientific. Or, the materialist must concede that no inference to the existence and activity of a mind is rationally warranted simply on the basis of some set of physical+behavioral+functional properties, in which case materialist accounts of mind must be false.
Take your pick, Raevmo.:smile:
The phrase, 'mechanics of non-matter' is a contradiction in terms.
How is saying that X does not suffice for Y a positive claim? The positive claim is: "X suffices for Y". The denial is the negative, and notoriously one cannot prove a universal negative.
Yes, provided it can also come up with a true statement that is not one of, nor provable in a finite number of steps from, the axioms with which it was originally programmed. The Godelian challenge is that there are such statements which a rational mind can generate.
By 'rigorous justification' von Neumann here means provability by a finite machine.
Comment by stunney — July 7, 2007 @ 4:29 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 4:37 pm
Joy wrote:
Joy,
Where did you get that bizarre idea? That's not a rhetorical question — I'm genuinely curious to understand how the machinery of misapprehension operates in your head. How do you manage to pervert the position of almost everyone you argue against? Is it intentional dishonesty? Bad reading comprehension?
My actual position: The existence of the immaterial soul, as most people conceive of it, has empirical consequences. The non-existence of the soul also has empirical consequences. The accumulated evidence best matches the latter hypothesis. The issue remains evidential throughout.
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 4:37 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 4:38 pm
Anax:
I think you should cut the materialists some slack (I'm starting to like these US expressions). They are doing the hard work. Why not give them some time to see if they can come up with a working model of the mind? If the project fails, you can claim victory. But until then, let's just see where it goes. Unless of course you have some immaterial experiments to propose right now.
Comment by Raevmo — July 7, 2007 @ 4:38 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 5:01 pm
Let me point out an obvious error that mad errorists sometimes make when they don't pay attention to what Dummett actually says, even after one repeats for their consumption what Dummett says seven or eight times.
The mad errorist might reason as follows:
1. Let A be a created material universe containing no conscious observers.
2. Let B be God's conception of such a universe.
3. Let C be a created material universe containing a conscious observer.
4. According to Dummett, there is no difference between A and B.
Then the mad errorist says:
5. What would it take to get from A to C? God would have to create a conscious observer and place him in A.
Why is 5 an exegetical error? Because placing a conscious observer in A so as to get to C would make that universe not be a case of a universe that never contains a conscious observer. Here's Dummett again, with added emphasis:
In other words, premise 1 above needs to be re-written to read like this:
1* Let A be a created material universe that never contains conscious observers
if it is to represent what Dummett actually stated.
Comment by stunney — July 7, 2007 @ 5:01 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 5:01 pm
stuntissimo:
This would be my pick, except that I don't see how this implies that ID is capable of being scientific. How does that compute? Don't forget we haven't really agreed upon a definition of mind. What is yours?
Why is that? Even the non-material must "do" something. How else are you going to discriminate between different non-material entities? What non-material properties are the basis of differences between minds?
What I meant is that you make the positive claim that an additional "thing" is needed, namely something immaterial. You know very well what I mean, but for some reason you feel the need to quibble about irrelevant details. I can play that game too. Did you ever get that PhD in philosophy?
A provisional yes. More than I hoped for. A computer can generate Goedel sentences too, so what's the point?
Comment by Raevmo — July 7, 2007 @ 5:01 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 5:50 pm
Keiths:
As most people conceive of it? How do build a scientifically useful hypothesis from this starting point? Keiths you can assert whatever you wish and I'm grateful we live in a country that allows for the free expression of opinions. But why do you bother? This smacks of an obsession, not sound science.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 5:50 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 6:21 pm
Der Ravemeister wrote:
It implies that ID is capable of being scientific because it implies that one can detect a mind on the basis of some set of physical+behavioral+functional properties which, once such a set is specified, may be found to apply to the existing or discoverable data concerning pre-human biology.
Well, I'm willing that my fingers type this post, and they're actually doing so.
I've answered this before. In a nutshell (no, I'm not referring to Zachriel's body), persons are individuated on the basis of their intentional acts.
I'm saying there are irreducibly mental states and properties. I don't view that as saying there are 'additional things'. Mental properties are just there, and the question before us is, are they reducible to physical states. You say they are. I'm skeptical of your claim. You have to persuade the skeptic. The skeptic doesn't have to posit additional things. We already know there are mental states and properties. The skeptic doesn't have to prove their existence.
The computer has to do more than just generate a Godel sentence. Here's the relevant exchange:
In other words, it's not just a case of generating a Godel sentence. It has to do that and 'perfectly mimic' human behavior to the point where it passes the Turing test both in general and specifically with regard to mimicking the understanding that a skilful human mathematician or logician typically displays. I suggest that it will not pass the Turing test, because there will always be a Godel sentence that a human can generate which the model will not mimic without being re-programmed.
Comment by stunney — July 7, 2007 @ 6:21 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 6:43 pm
"Actually Keiths and his sympathizers were given ample opportunity"¦""”Bradford
Tu quoque!
Does ID have any "evidentiary standards"? No, because "How do you test an immaterial property?"
I haven't a clue! How "˜bout yourself?
And neuroscientists are doing "nothing more" than feeding anti-religious bigotry?! C'mon, Bradford, thou dost protest too much, methinks? Maybe just a wee bit, huh? (And in your book does it make me a bigot because i have neuroscientists as friends, because I follow neuroscience (and beleive at least some of it), or because I just don't share your religious beliefs? Or all of the above?
That "bigotry card" just got played too often. You lost sympathy pts there.
"Does this come as a 'surprise', or were 'you', um, 'aware' of this already?"
LOL stunney, surprisingly I didn't even feel the insult of your question to my intelligence, so you may be correct, there's just nothing there there. I can accept that as a hypothesis.
[And pardon me, God, I know you're busy, but in your infinite grace could you spare me questions such as stunney asks? I thank you in advance and thank you again for all the wonderful things you've done. Bless your soul, Big Guy. Keep up the good work!]
(And there is no leprechaun amongst all my known multiple personalities, Joy.)
Comment by Rock — July 7, 2007 @ 6:43 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 7:00 pm
Rock:
Aw, that's a shame. Could'a sworn I detected a faraway Asimov echo in there… he had a leprechaun I rather liked - usually kept in in his vest pocket, since he didn't believe in time enough to have a watch. Guess I'll have to tell Banshee-Joy (a cousin of Poof-Joy) that she's SOL. She won't be happy, will probably keep everybody in the neighborhood up all night screaming inanities at the moon!
I do see this thread has degenerated in to an ad hominem fest of usual proportions. Have fun, y'all.
Comment by Joy — July 7, 2007 @ 7:00 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 7:01 pm
Rocks:
We do distinguish intelligently caused events. Symbolic sequencing is a common example. But I know the rules. A functional genome arose through an unidentified process that just had to be devoid of an intelligent causal component. Do you have a clue as to how an initial genome came about?
Referenced modified neuroscientists. The subclass of neuroscientists concerned with empirical testing of souls are feeding their prized, unscientific notions. BTW, if you have doubts about a capacity to test immaterial properties you too should think such neuroscientists are wasting our time and theirs.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 7:01 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 7:13 pm
Bradford:
Um… don't look now, Bradford. Parapsychology has been a division of AAAS for three decades.
Comment by Joy — July 7, 2007 @ 7:13 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 7:16 pm
stunney wrote:
Stunney,
I see you carefully avoided quoting the one paragraph from my comment where I anticipate and directly address your objection:
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 7:16 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 7:28 pm
Bradford wrote:
Joy commented:
Not to mention that psychology and neuroscience routinely study cognition, emotion, personality, decision-making, memory, pleasure, pain — all of which have been considered functions of the soul.
Are you telling us that these are not sciences, Bradford?
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 7:28 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 7:34 pm
A question for Raevmo or one of his co-religionists:
What, in your opinion, is the proper materialist definition or, if there is no definition, the proper materialist characterization of a computer program, a rule, or an algorithm, and is that definition/characterization sufficient, in your opinion, for defining or characterizing all logically possible minds? If it isn't, please specify what more is needed.
Let me provide an example of disagreement about this question in order to stimulate your thoughts:
PS: Raevmo, were you at least able to understand my explanation (with minor correction) of Kripke's modal argument against mind-brain identity?
Comment by stunney — July 7, 2007 @ 7:34 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 7:52 pm
I wrote:
Bradford responded:
But we're not trying to determine whether the soul was designed. We're trying to determine if it exists at all.
No. Determining whether something exists is not the same as determining whether it was designed. Establishing sufficient conditions for the former is not the same as doing so for the latter.
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 7:52 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 8:23 pm
keiths:
Sort of depends on one's conception of soul, seems to me. Conceptions vary widely, even in single religions. I think the closest approximation is probably consciousness, though certain aspects of consciousness are also considered by some to be part of the animal retinue of nature. The Septuagint translates the Hebrew nephesh as "life, vital breath." The animating spirit, so to speak, a version of vitalism.
Plato's version of soul contained three parts. The logos (mind), thymos (emotion, ego) and pathos (animist appetites). Christian conception is predominantly (Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy) immaterial and independent (Aquinas), Bahai' considers soul the 'higher essence,' as do Mahayana Buddhism with the 'Buddha-nature' and Hinduism's concept of Atman ('higher man'). In Tibet's form of Mahayana, there are 3 minds - an immortal 'very subtle' mind, a 'subtle' or 'unconscious' mind, and 'gross mind' that doesn't even have enough power to dream. Both the lower minds disintegrate at death.
Catholics consider soul to be the inmost aspect of humans, signifying the "spiritual principle in man." Some Christians don't believe in souls at all, some think it dies with the body (to be recreated in resurrection), some consider it to be the "likeness of God" instilled in the original creation. SDAs consider soul to be of one substance with body, denying that it has consciousness or sentient existence or immortality.
A Jain text says of soul: "The soul is without taste, colour and cannot be perceived by the five senses. Consciousness is its chief attribute. Know the soul to be free of any gender and not bound by any dimensions of shape and size."
Judaic mysticism (Kabbalah) postulates three souls. The nephesh, which is the part that is alive and can die, feels hate, hunger, love, pain, etc. Then there's the ruach or 'middle soul' identified as spirit. It contains the moral virtues and distinguishes between good and evil. Equating to psyche or ego, personality. Finally there's the Neshamah or higher soul (Higher Self or super-self). It is identified with the intellect, and enjoys an afterlife.
Sikhs believe soul (atma) to be part of the Universal Soul, identical with God. Many religious traditions consider the immortal soul (or part of the soul) to return to the godhead at death, because it is one substance with the godhead.
Scientists generally consider the soul to be identical to the brain, or to the conscious processes enabled by the brain. Agnostics reserve judgment, Atheists don't believe in souls (or, in some cases, consciousness).
So… who's conception of soul are you refuting here, and how do YOU define it for your refutational purposes?
Comment by Joy — July 7, 2007 @ 8:23 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 8:29 pm
Joy asked:
I'm glad you asked, because I'm in the middle of writing up a comment that addresses that very question.
Stay tuned.
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 8:29 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 8:35 pm
Keiths:
Only that determinations about souls are not science.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 8:35 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 8:45 pm
Keiths:
So you believe you can determine whether an immaterial soul exists and therefore should have no objections with determinations as to whether or not x resulted from immaterial intelligence.
You are playing with words. What would exist is an intelligent cause of a designed outcome. We are still testing for existence.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 8:45 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 9:03 pm
I asked:
Bradford responded:
Psychology studies cognition, emotion, personality, decision-making, memory, pleasure, pain, and will. If "determinations about souls is not science", as you say, then one of the following statements must be true:
By your logic, either
1) psychology is not a science, or
2) cognition, emotion, personality, decision-making, memory, pleasure, pain, and will are not functions of the soul.
Which is it, Bradford?
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 9:03 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 9:10 pm
Neither. The problem is you are not equiped with a means of detecting souls. You are limited to evaluating entities associated with them but an intolerable level of vagueness hinders a capacity to state anything definitive.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 9:10 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 9:14 pm
Bradford:
I guess I'll ask you the same thing I asked keiths (in a different way), because I'm not understanding your assertions. While I suspect that the concept of soul can't be scientifically falsified, I have to wonder what YOUR conception of soul is that it's a designed artifact. Which COULD be falsified, I think.
If souls are specially designed artifacts, doesn't that sort of negate notions of soul as 'immaterial'? Or that which is morally cognizant and discerns good and evil (morally responsible)? Are you into predestination?
An overview of your concept of soul would help. If you and keiths are talking about completely different things, this discussion has no meaning. Thanks.
Comment by Joy — July 7, 2007 @ 9:14 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 9:21 pm
Bradford,
I'm glad to hear that you don't deny psychology's scientific status.
Psychology is equipped to study cognition, emotion, will, etc. Either those are functions of the soul, in which case you admit that science is capable of making "determinations about souls", or they are not, in which case the soul doesn't do much of anything.
Which is it?
If you disagree with the dichotomy, show us where the logic fails.
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 9:21 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 9:28 pm
Joy, to Bradford:
I made the same request of Bradford before, but he refused to answer, preferring to hide behind the "it's not science" excuse.
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 9:28 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 9:40 pm
keiths:
Well, I asked you the same thing, but I haven't seen an answer. Pot, meet kettle.
It would appear from reading your posts that you consider soul to be the physical correlates of consciousness. IOW, physical processes in the brain that produce consciousness. Is that a correct impression?
If so, will you answer whether or not you consider the products of those processes to be physical constructs? …oops. Never mind. You already made that clear with the whole Poof-Joy thing.
Comment by Joy — July 7, 2007 @ 9:40 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 9:44 pm
Joy:
Hi Joy. The very necessity of having to ask what is my personal, subjective view of what a soul is illustrates the empirical difficulties. I noticed your comment detailing the differing views of souls. I was prepared to post something similar if needed. Within each main group lie individual perceptual differences and there is no objective model by which we can determine which view is correct as we are able to do with physical models of conceptual theories related to physics or biology. Earlier today I read of research into a protein known as ATM. The researchers were attempting to understand the protein's interreactions with other proteins. I've been reading differing views that scientists have as to exactly how ATM is functionally involved with proteins which repair double strand breaks. Since the whole process is not completely understood there are some educated guesses. But there are real mechanisms that exert constraints on concepts. There are no real physical constraints on a soul other than the one which lies beyond the bounds of science- death and what if anything follow it. I could explain my personal view of what a soul is, but in Keith's case, his view is that they do not exist. Where are the objective checks on soul concepts, corresponding to the genomic repair mechanisms, that can be used to eventually confirm or negate differing theories related to ATM function?
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 9:44 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 9:48 pm
My personal view has no more bearing on a scientific determination than my view on what preceeded the existence of the universe has on cosmology. The fact that you feel the need to ask this is telling.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 9:48 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 10:18 pm
Sometimes mad errorists think that there is, contrary to Dummett's thesis, a difference between God's creating a material universe, in the whole of which there never was any creature able to experience it, and His creating nothing at all; that is, between His creating such a universe and His merely conceiving of it, on the grounds that God could insert an observer into an observerless universe.
True, God could insert an observer into an observerless universe. But even God couldn't insert an observer into a permanently observerless universe. Nor could God conceive of Himself inserting an observer into a permanently observerless universe, since doing such a thing is literally inconceivable.
According to Dummett, there is no difference between God creating, and God merely conceiving of a permanently observerless universe existing, call it rU. What would it take to get from rU to a universe containing an observer, call it oU? Allegedly, God would have to create a conscious observer and place her in rU. And what would it take to get from some observerless universe God merely conceives of, call it cU, to oU? God would have to instantiate the concept of cU, and also create and insert a conscious observer into it. Allegedly the fact that this is 'possible' is enough to demonstrate a 'difference' between rU and cU, with nothing depending on oU ever being instantiated.
But is it possible? No, it's not. Does it demonstrate a difference between rU and cU? No, it doesn't.
What is the difference between a) it being the case that God would have to place an observer in rU to make oU obtain, and b) it being the case that God would have to instantiate cU and also insert a conscious observer into it to make oU? There is none, because the notion of placing an observer in rU is either logically impossible, or else is just a confused misnomer for the notion of a possible transition, not from rU to oU, but from cU to oU where the concept of cU is not identical with the concept of rU.
Contrary to the assumption of the mad errorist, there simply isn't any logically possible transition from rU to oU, because there is no possible world in which a member of the set of all forever observerless universes is identical with a member of the set of all universes containing observers. Those sets are, in the Kripkean jargon, 'rigidly designated'—they have their members essentially. Hence such a scenario is no more logically possible than is the scenario of the singletons {the man George Bush who was the US president on 07/07/2007} and {the man Abraham Lincoln who was US president in 1863}
actually being the same set, or the scenario of the referent of "water" actually being identical with the referent of "the smallest prime number between 4 and 12".
God's conceiving of the referent of "rU" and God conceiving of the referent of "oU" is for God to conceive of two distinct and logically incompatible states of affairs. Hence, conceiving of creating and inserting a conscious observer into any possible universe cannot be a thought of—–cannot be a thought that refers to—-the insertion of an observer into rU at all.
Kripke's Naming and Necessity is the essential guide in these matters.
Comment by stunney — July 7, 2007 @ 10:18 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 10:23 pm
The reason why our sentient, percipient, and thinking ego is met nowhere within our scientific world picture, can easily be indicated in seven words: because it is itself that world picture. It is identical with the whole and therefore cannot be contained in it as part of it.
~ Physicist Erwin Schrodinger
Comment by todd — July 7, 2007 @ 10:23 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 10:24 pm
Bradford,
Every scientist knows that you have to specify a hypothesis in order to test it. The word 'soul' means different things to different people. If we don't specify which concepts of soul we are talking about, we can't test them. For example, as Joy pointed out, there are scientists and philosophers (Owen Flanagan, for one) who believe that the soul exists, but also believe that it is purely physical and does not survive death. This is obviously very different from your personal view of the soul. It's logically possible for you to be right and Flanagan to be wrong, or vice-versa. If we don't specify whose definition we are using, we can't answer the existence question.
On the other hand, once we specify the kind of soul we are talking about, and provided that the soul has empirical consequences, then we can make some headway in determining whether or not it exists.
If you don't want to commit to a view of the soul, that's fine. Stay tuned as we evaluate different soul-concepts in light of the evidence. I'm sure we'll cover something much like yours.
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 10:24 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 10:43 pm
todd, quoting Schrödinger:
Todd,
Schrödinger was a smart man, but he bungled that one.
While it's true that a brain can never know itself in the sense of understanding the position and velocity of every particle within itself, or even in the sense of understanding the state of every neuron it contains, that hardly means that we can't come to understand ourselves in a meaningful way at higher levels of abstraction.
No human being can ever know a computer in the sense of being able to hold in mind the state of every transistor at a given moment, but who would argue that humans don't understand computers?
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 10:43 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 11:23 pm
Stunney,
Dummett asks
… and states that
Neither of those concepts requires the universe to never harbor conscious observers; if there is any time when it does not harbor them, that means, according to Dummett, that the matter and energy within it do not exist at that time, and that it is therefore indistinguishable from a non-existent universe. By Dummett's own logic, the universe does not begin to exist until conscious observers arise or are created within it.
This means that Dummett's "never" qualifier is unnecessary, and thus your objection to my argument breaks down.
My argument stands, and it shows that Dummett is wrong to claim that material existence requires a conscious observer.
Comment by keiths — July 7, 2007 @ 11:23 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 11:38 pm
Keiths:
Ah, cherry picking to support a metaphysical agenda. We can all do that. Observe this research result supporting biblical wisdom:
Virtue is supposed to be its own reward, but accumulating evidence suggests that by helping others, people help themselves, improving their mental health, their physical well-being, even their longevity.
One large study published this fall even seems to bear out the biblical wisdom that it is more blessed to give than to receive — a message relevant to many as the holiday donation season begins.
"It might be too early to know whether increasing what we give will make us happier and healthier — however, this is certainly the implication of the recent work in this area," said Stephanie L. Brown, a researcher at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.
She and colleagues recently reported that, among a group of 423 elderly couples followed for five years, the people who reported helping others — even if it was just giving emotional support to a spouse — were only about half as likely to die as those who did not.
Comment by Bradford — July 7, 2007 @ 11:38 pm
July 8th, 2007 at 12:06 am
It's not cherry-picking. I'm willing to take any soul-concept you throw at me and evaluate it against the evidence.
To get you started, here are a couple of soul-types that might actually exist:
1. Flanagan's physical soul, which I mentioned earlier in the thread, is compatible with the evidence and likely does exist.
2. A Chalmers-like immaterial soul that has no causal influence on the body might exist. The evidence doesn't rule it out, but so far only the "hard problem" motivates its existence.
Comment by keiths — July 8, 2007 @ 12:06 am
July 8th, 2007 at 12:21 am
Bradford wrote:
There's not merely a lack of evidence for the existence of an immaterial soul; there's a surfeit of evidence against its existence.
The evidence actually rules out a broad variety of soul concepts. Let's start by looking at a typical "folk-dualist" concept of the soul, modifying it as necessary to avoid conflicts with the evidence. By the end of the exercise, you'll see that only an extremely restricted version of the soul remains. This truncated concept of the soul is unlikely to be satisfying to those who currently believe in the soul, especially if they believe for religious reasons.
I realize that many readers of this thread will have concepts of the soul that differ from, and are hopefully more sophisticated than, the folk-dualist soul I am about to present. As I said, we will modify this concept as we go in order to make it compatible with the evidence. At some point I suspect we will be addressing a version of the soul very much like yours. If not, please don't be shy, like Bradford; jump into the discussion and present your soul concept.
Characteristics of the "folk-dualist" soul:
1. It's the "real me". My body is a vehicle for my soul during life.
2. It is the seat of my identity. I continue to exist beyond bodily death because my soul continues to exist (whether or not it is eventually reunited with the body).
3. It is the seat of my mental life. My thoughts, emotions, personality, memory, etc., are functions of the soul. My soul continues to carry out these functions after death, when separated from the body.
4. It makes decisions and possesses a will. This makes it morally responsible for my actions.
5. Each person has one soul. The mapping from souls to bodies is one-to-one. My soul controls my body, but nobody else's. Conversely, my body responds to "commands" from my soul, but nobody else's.
Some ancillary notions about the soul which aren't necessarily part of the folk-dualist view, but are still worth discussing:
6. Humans have souls, but animals don't.
7. The soul is capable of perceiving the world directly, as in near-death or out-of-body experiences.
8. The soul is created by God.
In future comments I'll look at how the evidence impinges on each of these proposed soul properties. If there are others you want to suggest, please do.
Comment by keiths — July 8, 2007 @ 12:21 am
July 8th, 2007 at 2:44 am
keiths:
I think you almost completely miss what he's saying. It is along the same reasoning over the implications of a required observer. Sentient perception and thought is the source of the rules of Science®. A scientific world picture is framed and given meaning by an ego (soul - whether material or not). All observation is theory-laden. We all reason from a given set of premises science cannot confirm or deny but can lend credence or raise doubts about those premises.
Science cannot provide meaning because meaning is individually unique to sentient beings.
You said
and I agree with you. But look at the terms your perceiving thinking being used - they seem to deny the very thing you wish to assert!
On your material terms - a brain, which I presume you mean the central hub of being and ego, "can never know itself in the sense of understanding the … [position, velocity, state] … of every [particle/neuron]…it contains". First, I wonder what use would you (your brain) get out of knowing all those states? Is that knowledge in any meaningful way? Moreover, if you did know all the material details of your brain, which we both agree you cannot, would you be able to show me where meaning originates? Would you be able to give meaning to any observation on those terms alone?
You go on to say "it hardly means that we can't … understand ourselves in a meaningful way at higher levels of abstraction". But isn't abstraction by definition immaterial? Aren't you saying exactly what the anti-materialists have been saying ad infinitum on this blog? Is knowing the mechanics of your body and brain alone sufficient to know yourself? You say no, apparently, because you seem to recognize you can understand yourself - meaningfully - with higher levels of abstraction. Indeed, inner thoughts - reflections, plans, feelings cannot yield meaning in terms of the mechanics of cranial matter.
Whether a soul is material, immaterial or some combination of both does not negate the fact of you or me or us. I am conscious of myself and aware of you and others. I exist. The you that perceives the world and interprets (gives meaning to) external stimuli is the soul as I picture it. The question is whether you or me are the sum total of every particle in our physical container or if we are something more than that.
You are claiming the ability to use evidence to "impinge on soul properties", which requires you give meaning to material facts. You cannot provide that meaning in terms of your atomic/synaptic mental states. Should the mechanical details of your mind have any bearing on the meaning you lend to facts and present as evidence? If not, why not?
The question is not whether the soul exists - for it does when defined as the perceiving you behind your eyes and other senses - but whether it transcends physical form or not. Because the question is on physical transcendence, empirical science cannot even address it, much less answer it. However, this does not mean it cannot be answered to individual satisfaction - it just cannot be confirmed nor denied by Science®. The answer then must be sought by a chain of reasoning from a given axiom.
And that is what Schroedinger's quote drives at - at every step of the way, your thinking ego frames your perception and perhaps influences that of others, creating group frameworks. You can only fully understand yourself inwardly, reflecting on past experience to give meaning to your present. This cannot be bottled and sampled in a lab. It is real (enough, to you or me), but cannot be known empirically.
Consider the difference between knowing about pain and knowing pain. You can know that nerve cells send signals to the brain which are then interpreted as pain or pleasure or whatnot. But until you experience pain, your knowledge of pain is incomplete. Once you experience it, then you know what it is and this is not reducible in any meaningful way to your physical reaction to painful stimuli. You cannot fully convey the knowledge of your pain experience to someone else who hasn't shared a similar experience.
Comment by todd — July 8, 2007 @ 2:44 am
July 8th, 2007 at 3:34 am
[I'm back, against my better judgment -- but it's cheaper picking fights here than in bars, and I'm only endangering my mental health]
stunney asks:
The formal definition of an algorithm or computer program is well-defined by the concept of Turing machines or (equivalently) computable functions. However, this is a purely mathematical concept so it has little directly to do with materialism one way or the other. (also note that there are some kinds of algorithms that go beyond the Turing definition, such as probabilistic algorithms, but that's not important for this discussion).
As I've said before, real computers are only approximations of formal programs. Formal programs don't, for instance, require electricity to run or generate heat, whereas any physical embodiment of a program does. Turing machines have an infinite memory, real computers have a finite memory. Turing machines cannot make errors, real computers are subject to physical noise and can as a result diverge from their formal definition (although they are engineered to make that happen infrequently).
Brains diverge even further from the mathematical ideal of computation. They are noisy, they have analog aspects, and they are tightly coupled to the body and the surrounding environment. This last is the most profound difference, IMO, from the standard mathematical model of computation, and it's a difference that has been increasingly under consideration by AI since the late-80s or so, when there started to be more emphasis on robotics and situated cognition.
So — real human minds are not well understood as programs in the Turing sense, but they are fully material, and they do implement approximations of a variety of computational algorithms. The thing is, while minds are not exactly computer programs they are closer to computers than they are to anything else, so computational models of thinking are the best we have.
It gets more complicated, though, when you consider that an appropriately programmed computer can simulate basically anything, and in fact there is no guarantee that the universe we inhabit is not a gigantic computer simulation, with computation determining the behavior of every jot, tittle, and quark. On a less cosmic scale, a digital computer can simulate a noisy analog computer like the brain, so in that sense, the brain is an instantiation of a computer program.
It's very easy to be confused about this stuff if you want to be. Searle has built an entire career on confusing himself and others. But it's really quite simple — brains are manifestly complex material devices that can be at least partially understood in computational terms. The brain also manifestly implements the mind, as keiths is in the process of demonstrating. The AI position is that you can make a machine out of something other than neurons and still have it be a mind. There is no in-principle reason to believe this is wrong, although achieving it in fact has been much harder than anticipated, because it turns out we need much better understandings of what the mind and brain actually do than we have in order to do it.
Comment by mtraven — July 8, 2007 @ 3:34 am