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Bradford has kindly directed me to this thread to continue our interesting discussion regarding what the word "intelligence" might mean in the context of "Intelligent Design Theory" (I was not allowed to continue posting on the previous thread, called "So Then How Did It Happen").
Before I answer the previous posts directly, I think it would be of great benefit to try and agree on some fundamental concepts.
I'll start with a few working definitions that I believe will help us to tease apart our actual positions. These are just definitions, not statements of fact. We can all decide if these definitions are clear enough and otherwise acceptable:
design(noun)
A complex, functional mechanism, like a watch or an eyeball or a flagellum
design(verb)
To cause a design (noun) to exist. The term does not imply anything else about the cause – only that it resulted in the existence of a design (noun)
intelligence(noun)
The ability to design (verb)
(Note this is a very unusual definition, but there are many different definitions of intelligence used in different disciplines. I think this definition is good for ID, but perhaps you'd like to add other attributes commonly associated with intelligence, such as the ability to learn from experience, or solve novel problems).
intelligent(adj)
Exhibiting intelligence
consciousness(noun)
The private, first-person experience of being aware of our thoughts and our environment.
conscious intelligence
The quality of being both conscious and intelligent
OK. Now, here are some propositions that use this terminology, and hopefully we can begin to discuss which of these statements are true or false with better clarity:
1) Both living things (like humans and spiders) and non-living things (like computers) can design things. In other words, humans, spiders, and computers are intelligent.
2) As far as we know, only human beings (and perhaps some other "higher" animals?) are conscious.
3) So, something does not have to be conscious in order to be intelligent (this follows from 1&2).
4) We can tell if something is intelligent or not. We don't need to know the origin of the thing, or how it works, in order to decide if it is intelligent or not. (Note: If you accept my definition of "intelligence" above, then we can tell if something is intelligent or not simply by observing the products of its behavior. Otherwise, if you want to say that intelligence entails learning or novel problem-solving abilities, then you would need to actually observe behaviors in order to see if something was intelligent).
I'll leave it there for the time being, just to see if we can agree on a few terms and these propositions before trying to see what it all means for ID.
Let me add another definition here for a term that has come up:
foresight(noun)
The ability to make a plan – a representation of conditions that do not exist in the world – that can be used to find a solution to a problem without actually implementing trial-and-error in the world.
Why not just use the common definitions from the dictionary? If you can choose to define something in an ad hock manner you can win any argument. Didn't we learn anything from George Orwell?
Design (Noun)
1: a particular purpose held in view by an individual or group b: deliberate purposive planning 2: a mental project or scheme in which means to an end are laid down
Note artifacts are not designs but the result of designs
Design (verb)
1: to create, fashion, execute, or construct according to plan : DEVISE, CONTRIVE2 a: to conceive and plan out in the mind
Note: the dictionary definition is all about the cause (a plan) intelligence (noun)1 a (1): the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations Note: I believe you will find there are not different definitions but only different wordings of the one standard definition
Intelligent (ADj)
having or indicating a high or satisfactory degree of intelligence and mental capacity
Note this has to do with what one is not what one does
consciousness (noun) the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself
Note This is pretty much what you said except it does not needlessly emphasize the subjective nature of consciousness. I have no problem with your definition but it seems to be a way of sneaking in something that you have no right to do.
conscious intelligence
The quality of being both conscious and intelligent
Note this is your definition I have no problem with it as long as we define both consciousness and intelligence correctly
foresight (noun)
an act of looking forward; also : a view forward
note this is much simpler than yours
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 20, 2008 @ 6:12 pm
1) Agree but in the case of all nonliving intelligent things we know of there are livings things at the begining of the causal chain doing the programming
2) I have no way of knowing for sure anything is conscious except me. I can and do assume other entities are conscious based on a lot of factors.
3) Agree but this flows from the dictionary definitions not from your propositions.
4) Agree but we do need to know the characteristics of a thing to know if it is intelligent.
We might need to know if it has the ability to learn or design using foresight for example
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 20, 2008 @ 6:31 pm
if you want to say that intelligence entails learning or novel problem-solving abilities, then you would need to actually observe behaviors in order to see if something was intelligent).
That is simply incorrect If you know an artifact required foresight to produce you know it's creator is intelligent per the dictionary definitions .
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 20, 2008 @ 6:53 pm
Why not just use the common definitions from the dictionary? If you can choose to define something in an ad hock manner you can win any argument. Didn't we learn anything from George Orwell?
Words have meanings !!!!!!
Yes, words have meanings, and they have different meanings in different contexts. For example, I might say someone used "force" to make me give them money, but the word "force" in that context doesn't mean exactly the same thing it means in physics!.
So dictionary definitions are quite often unsuitable for scientific or philosophical discussions. In science and philosophy, then, the first order of business is always to clarify a technical vocabulary, so that we can say exactly what we mean when we describe our theories.
Now, let's look at the changes you've proposed…
Design (noun)
I defined this word to mean a complex functional mechanism, like an watch or a flagellum. Using my definition, we can then begin to ask how such a thing comes to exist – in particular, whether or not some conscious mind was involved.
Using your (dictionary) defintion, the answer to those questions is already assumed in the definition. So if we are to use your definition, we need another word for a complex functional machine that does not already carry the connotation of mental cause. So I believe my definition is simpler to work with in this context, but if you'd like we can use a definition more like yours.
Now, the dictionary definition you propose doesn't really work for ID in general – if you want to call a flagellum a "design", you don't really mean a "purpose" or a "mental project" – you really mean the physical, integrated, functional, physical components working together in the cell. So how about this instead:
Design (noun): "Something that was created by a conscious mind".
OK?
Design (verb)
Likewise, you are suggesting that we incorporate reference to a conscious minds whenever we talk about the creation of complex functional objects. Again, I would like to be able to ask the question of how a complex functional mechanism comes to exist without already assuming that conscious minds are involved. So, again, I think my definitions are more clear and simple, since they do not presuppose the answers to these questions. But I'm willing to use a meaning like the one you propose:
Design (verb): "To create something by means of conscious thought".
OK?
intelligence (noun)1 a (1): the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations
Note: I believe you will find there are not different definitions but only different wordings of the one standard definition
I am quite sure you are mistaken on this point, and that I can find a large number of very different definitions (not just rewordings, but very different meanings) provided on this board, on other ID resources, in academic references from psychology, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and so on.
But I'll accept your definition for now, if you are sure you want to use this particular definition. (I will bet that other ID-friendly folks with want to change it though!).
intelligence (noun): "The ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations"
Intelligent (ADj) having or indicating a high or satisfactory degree of intelligence and mental capacity
Note this has to do with what one is not what one does
This differs from most ID usage in that in ID, "intelligent" usually refers to a property that something either has or doesn't – a binary property. You would like to say that the adjective only applies if something has a certain level of "mental capacity", right? Ok, let's go with that then. If something has the ability to learn or understand and deal with new situations, but not to a high or satisfactory degree, then by your definition it is not intelligent, right?
consciousness (noun) the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself
Note This is pretty much what you said except it does not needlessly emphasize the subjective nature of consciousness. I have no problem with your definition but it seems to be a way of sneaking in something that you have no need to do.
I wasn't "sneaking" anything in, no. Your definition is just fine, though, as long as you realize that we have no way of objectively observing consciousness. I hope we agree that humans are capable of consciousness (when they are not unconscious of course), but that deciding when things other than waking human beings are conscious or not presents a scientific challenge.
foresight (noun)an act of looking forward; also : a view forward
note this is much simpler than yours
I think that the metaphorical "looking" presents a problem here; we really aren't talking about eyesight of course. But if you'd like, we can separate these two concepts:
1) plan (verb) to create a representation of conditions that do not exist in the world that can be used to find a solution to a problem without actually implementing trial-and-error in the world.
2) foresight (noun) the ability to consciously create plans
Can we agree on these changes?
And now the propositions:
1) Both living things (like humans and spiders) and non-living things (like computers) can design things. In other words, humans, spiders, and computers are intelligent.
FMM: Agree but in the case of all nonliving intelligent things we know of there are livings things at the begining of the causal chain doing the programming
You agree that both living and non-living things (like computers) can be intelligent – good. (And yes, all nonliving intelligent things we know of are created by living things).
2) As far as we know, only human beings (and perhaps some other "higher" animals?) are conscious.
FMM: I have no way of knowing for sure anything is conscious except me. I can and do assume other entities are conscious based on a lot of factors.
OK, but what else in our experience do you assume is conscious besides some subset of animals?
3) So, something does not have to be conscious in order to be intelligent (this follows from 1&2).
FMM: Agree but this flows from the dictionary definitions not from your propositions.
Ok. Consciousness and intelligence are distinct, and there is no empirical basis for claiming that anything which is intelligent must be conscious or vice-versa, right?
4) We can tell if something is intelligent or not. We don't need to know the origin of the thing, or how it works, in order to decide if it is intelligent or not.
FMM: Agree but we do need to know the characteristics of a thing to know if it is intelligent.
We might need to know if it has the ability to learn or design using foresight for example
Agreed. My point was we do not need to know how it came to exist, for example, or if it is physically deterministic.
This means, for example, that if you conclude that the cause of flagella was intelligent, you needn't necessarily be able to answer the question of "who designed the designer?" or "how did the designer design it?". Right?
AIGUY: if you want to say that intelligence entails learning or novel problem-solving abilities, then you would need to actually observe behaviors in order to see if something was intelligent).
FMM: That is simply incorrect If you know an artifact required foresight to produce you know it's creator is intelligent per the dictionary definitions .
I think there is some confusion here.
Yes, of course if we use your definitions, once you say an artifact required "foresight" then you have already assumed conscious intelligence was involved. So then the question simply becomes, how do we know when something required "foresight" instead of "planning"
We've already agreed that a computer can be intelligent, and that it can plan, but it has no foresight. And we agree that this remains true whether or not we consider the way the computer works, or the origin of the computer.
So even if we agreed that evolutionary processes would not result in a flagellum, and that planning was required, we would need additional evidence that foresight was required.
Also, since your definition of "intelligence" entails learning and dealing with novel situations, you'll need to explain how ID might be able to support the claim that the cause of complex biological structures was intelligent. If, for example, the only thing that this cause is capable of is creating these life forms, then it would neither have to learn nor deal with novel situations, right?
Yes, of course if we use your definitions, once you say an artifact required "foresight" then you have already assumed conscious intelligence was involved
the question of knowing something is a question of consciousness not intelligence does a computer know anything when it predicts a chess move I will make based on my past history? Probably not. Does it show foresight? yep
I don't in any way assume consciousness
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 20, 2008 @ 9:42 pm
I might say someone used "force" to make me give them money, but the word "force" in that context doesn't mean exactly the same thing it means in physics!.
Actually all that's required is to specify which dictionary definition you are using in this case the 1st vs the 3rd
In science and philosophy, then, the first order of business is always to clarify a technical vocabulary, so that we can say exactly what we mean when we describe our theories.
I have no problem with clarifying. what I object to is changing meaning ad hock with no specific agreed upon reason
For example look at your changes to my common dictionary definitions
Design (noun): "Something that was created by a conscious mind".
No, A computer or a wasp can create a design and I don't believe that computers are conscious it's best to stick with the dictionary here.
Design (verb): "To create something by means of conscious thought".
No, A beaver designs it's dam and I don't believe beavers are conscious it's best to stick with the dictionary here.
If something has the ability to learn or understand and deal with new situations, but not to a high or satisfactory degree, then by your definition it is not intelligent, right?
That is almost correct. We are dealing with degrees when we are speaking of intelligent the ants from the other thread are intelligent but not to the same degree as the musical genius Sting
plan (verb) to create a representation of conditions that do not exist in the world that can be used to find a solution to a problem without actually implementing trial-and-error in the world.
Once again why not go with the dictionary?
Plan: to arrange the parts of : DESIGN
2 : to devise or project the realization or achievement of
3 : to have in mind : INTEND
This seems adequate to me
foresight (noun) the ability to consciously create plans
Foresight has nothing to do with consciousness again best to stick with the dictionary here
Can we agree on these changes?
No you need to give compelling reasons before you change common language I've yet to see any.
OK, but what else in our experience do you assume is conscious besides some subset of animals?
God ,Angels, Demons. The jury is still out on my old pickup
there is no empirical basis for claiming that anything which is intelligent must be conscious or vice-versa, right?
There is no empirical basis for claiming you are conscious. That does not mean I don't assume you are and for good reason.
you needn't necessarily be able to answer the question of "who designed the designer?" or "how did the designer design it?". Right?
According to the dictionary definition, if it was designed it was designed using foresight so we already know how it was designed by definition. Now do you see why it is important to stick with common definitions when possible?
So even if we agreed that evolutionary processes would not result in a flagellum, and that planning was required, we would need additional evidence that foresight was required.
Not if we concluded it was designed and stuck to the common English definitions of words.
Also, since your definition of "intelligence" entails learning and dealing with novel situations, you'll need to explain how ID might be able to support the claim that the cause of complex biological structures was intelligent. If, for example, the only thing that this cause is capable of is creating these life forms, then it would neither have to learn nor deal with novel situations, right?
I could define "learn" and "deal with novel situations" for you but I trust you know by now where I'd get that information.
In order for your stament to make sense you would have to explain to me why you would not consider the creating of the bacterial flagellum at a specific point in time using multiple interconnecting pieces a novel situation?
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 20, 2008 @ 11:00 pm
the question of knowing something is a question of consciousness not intelligence does a computer know anything when it predicts a chess move I will make based on my past history? Probably not. Does it show foresight? yep
From this I gather you believe that "knowing" entails consciousness, and so a computer probably doesn't "know" anything. However, you seem to be saying that "foresight" does not entail consciousness, since you say a computer can show foresight. Do I have that right?
I don't in any way assume consciousness
So when ID suggests the cause of life was "intelligent", this does not necessarily mean "conscious", right? It might be an unconscious intelligent process?
No a computer or a wasp can create a design and I don't believe that computers are conscious it's best to stick with the dictionary here.
Again, your dictionary definition for design (n) was "a particular purpose held in view by an individual or group b: deliberate purposive planning 2: a mental project or scheme in which means to an end are laid down". But since you say you do not assume consciousness, then you must be saying that none of these words entail consciousness, right? In other words, you think something can be deliberately purposive, but have no conscious awareness of the fact that they are deliberately purposive, right?
No a beaver designs it's dam and I don't believe beavers are conscious it's best to stick with the dictionary here.
So "knowing" entails consciousness.
"Design" does not entail consciousness.
"Conceiving" and "planning out in the mind" do not entail consciousness either.
"Foresight" entails "looking forward", but it does not entail consciousness.
Do I have that straight? Is there somewhere all of this is written down, or do ID folks just make this up as they go along?
It's important, because "intelligence" is the sole explanatory concept offerred by ID, and so we ought to be able to say generally what "intelligence" is, and to be clear about it. If we mean something that knows what it is doing, consciously reflects on its goals and desires, the way people do, then that is one sort of claim (and something the evidence can't possibly support). And if we don't necessarily mean any of those things, then we need to say what we do mean.
Once again why not go with the dictionary?
Plan: to arrange the parts of : DESIGN
2 : to devise or project the realization or achievement of
3 : to have in mind : INTEND
This seems adequate to me
Again, if you are not assuming consciousness, then you need to make clear that concepts like "to have in mind" and "intend" have no connotation of consciousness (which is not, I think, what most people would say).
According to the dictionary definition, if it was designed it was designed using foresight so we already know how it was designed by definition. Now do you see why it is important to stick with common definitions when possible?
I think we're seeing exactly the opposite here: While you might believe that words like "intent" and "foresight" and "deliberate planning" do not imply consciousness, others (including others here at TT) would disagree with you. And for some odd reason you've taken the word "know" to imply consciousness! (I would say my word processor knows how to compute line spacing without consciousness). So you see, without a precise technical lexicon, people constantly talk past each other about these issues.
I could define "learn" and "deal with novel situations" for you but I trust you know by now where I'd get that information.
I don't think we need technical definitions for these, unless we find we mean different things.
In order for your stament to make sense you would have to explain to me why you would not consider the creating of the bacterial flagellum at a specific point in time a novel situation?
The cause of the flagellum might be completely physically determined – hard wired – to create the flagellum, without ever having "figured it out" for itself. Thus, it would not be "dealing with" – generating an intelligent response to – this "situation", but rather producing this particular solution "by instinct", the way a spider makes a web. The only way we could tell if the cause was actually intelligent would be by presenting it with other situations that it had not yet encountered to see if it could generate novel responses. This is exactly what ethologists do when studying animal intelligence (or lack of same).
Do I have that straight? Is there somewhere all of this is written down, or do ID folks just make this up as they go along?
It's not like there's a single ID proposal out there – everyone from Dembski to Behe to even MikeGene, I believe, have pointed out how ID is at this point a collection of points of view, sometimes with proposals, other times with differing definitions.
You often point out that intelligence, consciousness, mind, etc are hard things to pin down – and you seem to agree that it's possible some aspects of them may well defy the physicalist paradigm, or at least require a new understanding of physics.
But even if you accept all that – are you saying they shouldn't bother trying, or even holding an opinion based on the data?
The only way we could tell if the cause was actually intelligent would be by presenting it with other situations that it had not yet encountered to see if it could generate novel responses. This is exactly what ethologists do when studying animal intelligence (or lack of same).
But even those results are debatable. We can say which animals performed similar on a given test, but justifying the interpretation is a whole other ballgame. Should they not even bother trying to determine if there's 'actual intelligence' present? Is the guy who says 'Fish can't feel pain, they don't have a neocortex' justified? What about the guy saying 'Fish can feel pain, look how they react to an irritant'? Are we outside the scientific realm at that point?
All this before mentioning that something can be both 'hardwired / physically predetermined' yet still intelligent. If nothing else, I'm glad ID proponents are calling attention to these questions, difficult and thought-provoking as they are.
It's not like there's a single ID proposal out there – everyone from Dembski to Behe to even MikeGene, I believe, have pointed out how ID is at this point a collection of points of view, sometimes with proposals, other times with differing definitions.
I understand. What I fault these authors for is not having different opinions on critical aspects of what might collectively be called ID Theory, but rather for failing to make each of their assumptions and commitments explicit. On the contrary, I think Dembski and Behe go to great lengths to disguise the fact that they are making any sorts of commitments about mind at all.
You often point out that intelligence, consciousness, mind, etc are hard things to pin down – and you seem to agree that it's possible some aspects of them may well defy the physicalist paradigm, or at least require a new understanding of physics.
But even if you accept all that – are you saying they shouldn't bother trying, or even holding an opinion based on the data?
No, I'm saying that people need to say what they mean. ID generally equivocates on the meaning of this explanatory concept ("intelligence" or "intelligent cause" or "teleology"), and so it isn't possible to evaluate the strength of the evidence for its claims. If ID posits an eternal and immaterial personal being who consciously reflects on His goals and desires as the creator of the universe, then I would say the empirical evidence is pretty weak for that. However, if ID suggests that some process uses memory and learning to devise new complex forms, I'd say the evidence is overwhelmingly strong. (Of course evolution uses memory and learning!)
But even those results are debatable. We can say which animals performed similar on a given test, but justifying the interpretation is a whole other ballgame. Should they not even bother trying to determine if there's 'actual intelligence' present?
Well, scientists do not look for actual intelligence in animals, because that would be to reify an instrumental concept. But they do carefully operationalize their definitions, so they can identify any common components of inter-species mental abilities.
Is the guy who says 'Fish can't feel pain, they don't have a neocortex' justified? What about the guy saying 'Fish can feel pain, look how they react to an irritant'? Are we outside the scientific realm at that point?
Yes.
All this before mentioning that something can be both 'hardwired / physically predetermined' yet still intelligent.
Actually these are the definitions of Fifth Monarchy Man – not me. In contrast to your views, he makes no assumption of consciousness.
If nothing else, I'm glad ID proponents are calling attention to these questions, difficult and thought-provoking as they are.
I can't tell if you're joking here. It feels to me that I have for the most part dragged people kicking and screaming into the discussion. Again, it is nice to encounter some understanding and interest in these central issues here at TT, even if a couple of other folks here apparently think the matter is completely irrelevant.
On the contrary, I think Dembski and Behe go to great lengths to disguise the fact that they are making any sorts of commitments about mind at all.
I understand how you can say that on one level, but on another – intelligent design immediately suggests we have to tackle minds and mental. I don't know about Dembski, but Behe's focused on some mechanistic limitations of evolution – I don't think he'd necessarily get into issues of mind over 'the edge of evolution' anymore than, say, Fodor would have to when he makes his criticisms.
ID generally equivocates on the meaning of this explanatory concept ("intelligence" or "intelligent cause" or "teleology"), and so it isn't possible to evaluate the strength of the evidence for its claims. If ID posits an eternal and immaterial personal being who consciously reflects on His goals and desires as the creator of the universe, then I would say the empirical evidence is pretty weak for that. However, if ID suggests that some process uses memory and learning to devise new complex forms, I'd say the evidence is overwhelmingly strong. (Of course evolution uses memory and learning!)
I don't think 'ID' does – it's a loose association, ranging from Behe and Dembski to (I suppose) MikeGene and John Davison, among others.
As for eternal and immaterial beings – whole other subject, and one even ID proponents seem not to want to bother getting into. Their focus is typically whether design, full stop, can be detected – and if so, how. They do take it as fundamental that something distinct called 'design' does exist.
I also don't think ID proponents wholesale reject evolution. I'm positive some do – others do not, still others I think do so in name, but accept all the mechanisms. The word has been abused too much, to the point where some people will fight the name alone.
Well, scientists do not look for actual intelligence in animals, because that would be to reify an instrumental concept. But they do carefully operationalize their definitions, so they can identify any common components of inter-species mental abilities.
Yes.
Then we have a problem, and it's not ID. Because there's quite an army of people on both sides of that particular debate who do think it's a scientific issue. Among many others related specifically to design, mind, consciousness, and otherwise.
Actually these are the definitions of Fifth Monarchy Man – not me. In contrast to your views, he makes no assumption of consciousness.
I'm just pointing out the obvious here. Rehashing.
I can't tell if you're joking here. It feels to me that I have for the most part dragged people kicking and screaming into the discussion. Again, it is nice to encounter some understanding and interest in these central issues here at TT, even if a couple of other folks here apparently think the matter is completely irrelevant.
I'm dead serious. ID, as a school of thought, is promoting a lot of inquiry and discussion about contentious issues – and most importantly, helping to show how contentious said issues truly are, and showing a variety of ways to look at and consider them. I liken it to the internet explosion versus standard journalism; yes, there may be aspects of it I dislike, but I'll take the mess over what preceded it.
My two cents, given FMM's definitions it seems like the resulting intelligent designer could very easily be something I would call a natural law. I suspect most people assume a conscious being when they think intelligent design, but we can't even prove other humans are conscious when we have 6 billion of them to study so it seems truly impossible to prove some proposed being we cannot observe is conscious. But removing the attribute of conscious from your definition of intelligent opens up all sorts of possibilities. This seems to include the possibility that evolution, as we understand it today from a purely materialist perspective, might itself qualify as intelligent.
I don't know about Dembski, but Behe's focused on some mechanistic limitations of evolution – I don't think he'd necessarily get into issues of mind over 'the edge of evolution' anymore than, say, Fodor would have to when he makes his criticisms.
Dembski equates intelligent cause with libertarian will, but only when pressed; otherwise, he pretends that "you know, intelligence" is a satisfactory definition. If Behe stopped after pointing out mechanistic limitations, I wouldn't have a beef with him; instead, he invokes "intelligent cause" without qualification, leaving us to wonder exactly what mental attributes does he believe are in evidence.
As for eternal and immaterial beings…I also don't think ID proponents wholesale reject evolution…
My point here was the range of possible interpretations of "intelligence" in this context is so vast that it could describe an evolutionary processes – or a god.
NULLASALUS: Is the guy who says 'Fish can't feel pain, they don't have a neocortex' justified? What about the guy saying 'Fish can feel pain, look how they react to an irritant'? Are we outside the scientific realm at that point?
AIGUY: Yes.
NULLASALUS: Then we have a problem, and it's not ID. Because there's quite an army of people on both sides of that particular debate who do think it's a scientific issue. Among many others related specifically to design, mind, consciousness, and otherwise.
Sorry, I lost you here. I said yes, we are outside of science when we take a stand on whether or not fish consciously suffer pain. I don't rule out future discoveries that might enable us to support some answer, but I don't think we have evidence now one way or the other.
ID, as a school of thought, is promoting a lot of inquiry and discussion about contentious issues – and most importantly, helping to show how contentious said issues truly are, and showing a variety of ways to look at and consider them. I liken it to the internet explosion versus standard journalism; yes, there may be aspects of it I dislike, but I'll take the mess over what preceded it.
Well, yes. I suppose that would be easier to see if the people going to see Expelled came out discussing dualist metaphysics and the Chinese Room instead of how Darwinism causes moral decay.
If Behe stopped after pointing out mechanistic limitations, I wouldn't have a beef with him; instead, he invokes "intelligent cause" without qualification, leaving us to wonder exactly what mental attributes does he believe are in evidence.
I'm not familiar enough with Dembski re: libertarian will, and I don't think it's necessary for ID as a whole, so I'll pass on that. But if Behe's not being specific about the mental attributes, it may well be because he considers that an avenue to explore rather than a question to pass judgment on. Considering where that question is right now, I don't think there's a qualification out there that would help much – see the fish/pain response.
My point here was the range of possible interpretations of "intelligence" in this context is so vast that it could describe an evolutionary processes – or a god.
Or it could describe a god that employs evolutionary processes. And 'God' can be further explored in a number of different directions, under the 'Christian' heading alone. Or it could mean just an intelligent force of undetermined origin; maybe there's a way to identify a pattern without needing a body, however faintly. (And if there's no way? That, too, is just as important to make clear – because frankly, 'design detection' was around before ID. It was just erroneously billed as 'negative', and some people wish for those good ol' days.)
Maybe a lot of things. I don't see much harm in people considering this question for themselves (much less being made aware that there's a question to address), or at least no more harm than is already standard in the discussion.
Sorry, I lost you here. I said yes, we are outside of science when we take a stand on whether or not fish consciously suffer pain. I don't rule out future discoveries that might enable us to support some answer, but I don't think we have evidence now one way or the other.
I know what you yourself say. But honestly, that doesn't seem to be the view most people involved in the argument take. Some groups (Including politically charged ones like the PETA) field scientists talking about how, yes, fish certainly do feel pain, and we must take action. Other groups (Including fly fishing organizations) cite scientists and argue no, they absolutely don't feel pain, and no action is needed. The scientists involved on either side don't seem to think it's outside their field, and they cite what they consider and bill as strong evidence.
I guess where I'm going with this is, one common complaint about ID is that the view and its proponents are somehow damaging science. I've stated how limited I think the case is in either direction – but I don't buy the 'threat to science' line, as if ID (or anti-ID) brings a new twist to the table. Research is abused left and right to prop up everything from grant requests to social/political causes to otherwise, and usually no one cares unless they have an opposing view to what's being said. Nothing new is up with the ID debate – it just has more people involved than flyfishers and vegans.
Well, yes. I suppose that would be easier to see if the people going to see Expelled came out discussing dualist metaphysics and the Chinese Room instead of how Darwinism causes moral decay.
I haven't seen the film, but my understanding is that link was only one part of the presentation. I think that topic is worth attention, but with greater precision than is typically offered in either direction.
I'm hesitant to comment on Expelled before watching it myself, but I will admit outright my opinion of universities as bastions of open discussion and free thinking is low to say the least. I'd say I hope the effect is a more open (sans repercussion) conversation about these subjects at universities is in the cards, but in my heart I'd rather most of them were choked by an autodidact culture.
Do I have that straight? Is there somewhere all of this is written down, or do ID folks just make this up as they go along?
It is written down in the dictionary
Again, if you are not assuming consciousness, then you need to make clear that concepts like "to have in mind" and "intend" have no connotation of consciousness (which is not, I think, what most people would say).
I will grant that most folks think that way. It's because folks haven't thought about it deeply enough.
That is the reason that we give our pets names and pay good money to bury them. My hound dog "intends " to tree a coon when he is on it's trail and he has in mind a treat when he begs at my feet but I don't think he is conscious .
Just because we are often loose with our attributing of consciousness in some situations does not mean we should be.
While you might believe that words like "intent" and "foresight" and "deliberate planning" do not imply consciousness, others (including others here at TT) would disagree with you.
Since the attributing of consciousness is a subjective philosophical thing that is to be expected is it not.
(I would say my word processor knows how to compute line spacing without consciousness).
The term know was in response to the comment from hrun
I believed he was using it in the sense of (being aware) of what would happen in the future to know in this sense implies consciousness IMHO. But you are using it in a different sense (know how) this is equivocation and can be addressed by going to the dictionary and pointing out which definition you are using
The cause of the flagellum might be completely physically determined – hard wired – to create the flagellum, without ever having "figured it out" for itself.
If that is the case it's the cause of the cause that's intelligent. The thing that did the hard wiring
The only way we could tell if the cause was actually intelligent would be by presenting it with other situations that it had not yet encountered to see if it could generate novel responses.
That is exactly what we have done. Remember secondary causes must have causes. If we found say a bacterial flagellum natural law we would have to ask ourselves is its cause intelligent and based on the fact that it caused a bacterial flagellum natural law for this particular novel situation and other laws in others we would have to say yes.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 8:45 am
Aiguy: While you might believe that words like "intent" and "foresight" and "deliberate planning" do not imply consciousness, others (including others here at TT) would disagree with you.
fifth monarchy man: Since the attributing of consciousness is a subjective philosophical thing that is to be expected is it not.
CJYman *defines* "intelligence in terms of foresight and foresight in terms of awareness (or consciousness) of future targets that do not yet exist."
intelligence (noun): The ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations.
Then intelligence does not require foresight. Induction is a type of learning. It uses incremental memory, not foresight.
forefight: an act of looking forward.
Then foresight does not require consciousness. Computers can use foresight, manipulating models and making decisions.
aiguy: As far as we know, only human beings (and perhaps some other "higher" animals?) are conscious.
Most mammals are considered conscious, however, only primates, cetaceans and pachyderms have been shown to be self-conscious.
Cjyman *defines* "intelligence in terms of foresight and foresight in terms of awareness (or consciousness) of future targets that do not yet exist."
I would disagree but this only emphasizes the subjective philosophical nature of consciousness. We would agree on the definition of intelligence and that's what is important for the subject of ID is it not?
Then intelligence does not require foresight. Induction is a type of learning. It uses incremental memory, not foresight.
Inductive reasoning requires us to assume that nature will continue to be uniform (foresight)
Then foresight does not require consciousness. Computers can use foresight, manipulating models and making decisions.
We agree here
Most mammals are considered conscious, however, only primates, cetaceans and pachyderms have been shown to be self-conscious.
Your argument is with Aguy not me he said only humans are considered conscious I assumed he was talking about something like self-consciousness but since determining consciousness is a subjective philosophical thing I ran with it
I only know for sure that I'm conscious.
We can all be right because like Aguy says there is no way to know empirically.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 10:26 am
But if Behe's not being specific about the mental attributes, it may well be because he considers that an avenue to explore rather than a question to pass judgment on.
And again: Rather than saying "I've shown it's not evolution, and I don't know what might be responsible – let's explore", he instead says "I think intelligent agency is the answer". He, like Dembski (and FMM here and 99% of ID folks I've talked to), assumes that "intelligent agency" is a perfectly meaningful term that we all understand because, well, we are intelligent agents for example. But of course a sample of one does not define a class, and offering "intelligent agency" as a hypothesis is really a Rorshach Inkblot of an answer, where each ID enthusiast gets to imagine whatever they'd like to believe about it and pretend that that is what the evidence supports.
Or it could describe a god that employs evolutionary processes. And 'God' can be further explored in a number of different directions, under the 'Christian' heading alone. Or it could mean just an intelligent force of undetermined origin; maybe there's a way to identify a pattern without needing a body, however faintly. (And if there's no way? That, too, is just as important to make clear – because frankly, 'design detection' was around before ID. It was just erroneously billed as 'negative', and some people wish for those good ol' days.)
Or it could describe evolution alone, which learns and remembers and so is "intelligent" too (even though it is nothing but a blind natural process).
So, again, this "mysterious answer" strategy supports everything from an evolutionary algorithms to God Almighty – which is another way of saying it supports no concrete answer at all.
Maybe a lot of things. I don't see much harm in people considering this question for themselves (much less being made aware that there's a question to address), or at least no more harm than is already standard in the discussion.
We've been here: My problem is with folks like Ben Stein, and with everyone at the DI who tries to claim scientific support for just one of these answers in order to make science consonant with Christian Theology.
The scientists involved on either side don't seem to think it's outside their field, and they cite what they consider and bill as strong evidence.
I think they're wrong. A human being with frontal lobe damage can experience pain without emotional affect… and we think we can scientifically describe what a fish on a hook feels?
I guess where I'm going with this is, one common complaint about ID is that the view and its proponents are somehow damaging science.
Not yet they're not, but they're trying pretty hard to mess up high school classes by "protecting the right" of science teachers to start teaching all sorts of nonsense.
I've stated how limited I think the case is in either direction – but I don't buy the 'threat to science' line, as if ID (or anti-ID) brings a new twist to the table. Research is abused left and right to prop up everything from grant requests to social/political causes to otherwise, and usually no one cares unless they have an opposing view to what's being said. Nothing new is up with the ID debate – it just has more people involved than flyfishers and vegans.
To this and comments re: Expelled: Multiple wrongs do not make a right.
No, I'm afraid it isn't, because as I've shown dictionaries do not say which of these words are actually supposed to imply human-like conscious awareness and which do not, nor do dictionaries spell out the empirically accessible properties that these definitions are based on. Just because the dictionary defines "soul" or "God" or "magic" does not mean these concepts are suitable as scientific explanations.
I will grant that most folks think that way. It's because folks haven't thought about it deeply enough.
Yes, you're right: people do not think about these issues very carefully. That is the reason ID "theorists" need to spell out exactly what they believe the evidence supports, instead of using ambiguous terms and letting everybody read into the "theory" whatever they'd like to believe. That is the problem.
That is the reason that we give our pets names and pay good money to bury them. My hound dog "intends " to tree a coon when he is on it's trail and he has in mind a treat when he begs at my feet but I don't think he is conscious
We strongly disagree: I absolutely believe my dogs are conscious. I have absolutely no idea how we might ever settle our disagreement scientifically, however. And so again, how can anyone argue that "ID Theory" might be able to decide the matter for "The Cause of Life" when we can't even settle the matter for our dogs?
Just because we are often loose with our attributing of consciousness in some situations does not mean we should be.
Correct: To the extent that "ID Theory" is supposed to be serious science, it should NOT be loose with this attribution, and let its proponents interpret it however they'd like to.
Since the attributing of consciousness is a subjective philosophical thing that is to be expected is it not.
And since ID leaves the meaning of it's central explanatory concept ambiguous in this regard, I say ID is nothing but a "subjective philosophical thing".
The term know was in response to the comment from hrun
I believed he was using it in the sense of (being aware) of what would happen in the future to know in this sense implies consciousness IMHO. But you are using it in a different sense (know how) this is equivocation and can be addressed by going to the dictionary and pointing out which definition you are using
Nope, sorry – dictionaries don't say if knowing implies consciousness. Scientists actually do have to pin down single, operationalized definitions for their terms (if they want to get published, anyway).
If that is the case it's the cause of the cause that's intelligent. The thing that did the hard wiring
Unless that cause is hard wired too, of course. And what about that cause? What caused that one?
We can play this game as long as you'd care to. You can posit a conscious final cause, and I can posit an unconscious final cause, or we can posit no final cause at all, and we'll just be running through the same old philosophical arguments that people have used for millenia. ID brings nothing new to this.
That is exactly what we have done.
No, nobody can subject the Intelligent Designer to experiments to see what He would do in novel circumstances.
Only if a natural law has the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations. laws can't be intellegent by definition
Processes operating strictly in accordance with "natural law" can be intelligent. Evolutionary processes are an example.
aiguy: Deep Blue beats human chess champions because it is really good at thinking about chess.
Right. While there are conscious agents in the causal chain, Deep Blue itself is (presumedly) unconscious, and yet has "goals", "plans", "foresight", and "experience" that leads to a "designed" outcome in the face of an uncertain "environment." All without consciousness.
I think the hangup about consciousness with regards to any proximate designer of earth life is a needless diversion and should be jettisoned.
Kornbelt,
I think the hangup about consciousness with regards to any proximate designer of earth life is a needless diversion and should be jettisoned.
Aguy:
We agree. We are making progress!
It's not we who is making progress it's you. We IDers (as far as I can tell) were here from the get go.
Now, what does it mean to have a "deliberate intent" if this intent is not conscious?
Who cares? Deliberate intent has not been brought up in this discussion and was not defined at the outset. Does deep blue have deliberate intent? Does it matter? Does a beaver have deliberate intent? does it matter? how would you know?
Why do you insist here on deveining into things that we can't know empirically? We can know if something is intelligent empirically. Most folks believe we can know if something designed empirically. Why is that not enough for you?
We can talk about conciousness all day but it's not nessary for ID. Get over it
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 12:19 pm
It's not we who is making progress it's you. We IDers (as far as I can tell) were here from the get go.
Now, what does it mean to have a "deliberate intent" if this intent is not conscious?
Who cares? Deliberate intent has not been brought up in this discussion and was not defined at the outset. Does deep blue have deliberate intent? Does it matter? Does a beaver have deliberate intent? does it matter? how would you know?
Why do you insist here on deveining into things that we can't know empirically? We can know if something is intelligent empirically. Most folks believe we can know if something designed empirically. Why is that not enough for you?
We can talk about conciousness all day but it's not nessary for ID. Get over
it
First of all, as nullasalus points out often, "IDers" as a group do not agree on very much, so even if you happen to think consciousness is not an important part of "ID Theory", others (like nullasalus) disagree with you. If you happen to agree with me that these sort of mental attributes can't be inferred from the evidence, then that is great – we agree. But there are plenty of "IDers" (including the leading ID authors, like Dembski) who argue that a human-like mind is exactly the conclusion that ID supports.
(Added in edit:) And secondly, once one removes the intuitive notions of folk psychology from the "intelligent cause" of ID, it is not clear to most people what remains. So now that we know we agree that consciousness and free will have nothing to do with it, we need to be precise about what does have to do with it.
you operate strictly in accordance with "natural law" and you are intellegent so this is a given
Again, many IDers would strongly disagree with this statement (they even define intelligence as "not by law or chance" or even as "counterflow: that which nature would not otherwise do"). It really is difficult for me to argue about ID when every IDers thinks such radically different things. If you happen to agree with me on certain points, just realize that in that case I am arguing against others who disagree with both of us.
please explain how RM/NS can learn or show foresight.
RM&NS is a learning process, because adaptations that increase reproductive success are preserved in the gene pool. RM&NS does not exhibit "foresight" if we look at its inner workings (which is what we do). However, it may be that all foresight is achieved by some generate-and-test process. Deep Blue's foresight is achieved this way, and maybe human brains do something similar. In other words, maybe all foresight is accomplished by random variation and selection. In that case, one could view the entire evolutionary process as implementing "foresight" (but we get to see the intermediate tests rather than just the products of the search).
there are plenty of "IDers" (including the leading ID authors, like Dembski) who argue that a human-like mind is exactly the conclusion that ID supports.
Please provide documentation that Dembski believes that a designer must be conscious I goggled around but found no such thing.
It might also be helpful to provide a link where nullasalus says that consciousness is required for intelligent design.
Again, many IDers would strongly disagree with this statement (they even define intelligence as "not by law or chance"
Just because something is in accordance with natural law does not mean it is reducible to natural law this is what we IDers are getting at with comments like that.
It really is difficult for me to argue about ID when every IDers thinks such radically different things
Why do you feel the need to argue at all? Can't we all just get along?
All IDers agree that the question of whether we can infer design empirically is interesting. Most of us think that there are aspects in nature that are best explained as being the result of design. That's about the extent of our agreement.
If you want to argue about something else feel free but realize you are not arguing with ID when you do so.
RM&NS is a learning process, because adaptations that increase reproductive success are preserved in the gene pool.
How does this prove intelegence? All it says is that each generation will be more fit than the last. RM/NS does not learn anything it is the same coming out as it was going in
In that case, one could view the entire evolutionary process as implementing "foresight" (but we get to see the intermediate tests rather than just the products of the search).
It might be that the evolutionary process is "implementing" foresight for another entity (maybe the universe) but it does not exhibit foresight and therefore is not intelligent.
I gotta get back to work
peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 1:46 pm
Please provide documentation that Dembski believes that a designer must be conscious I goggled around but found no such thing.
It might also be helpful to provide a link where nullasalus says that consciousness is required for intelligent design.
From this very thread:
nullasalus: It's not like there's a single ID proposal out there – everyone from Dembski to Behe to even MikeGene, I believe, have pointed out how ID is at this point a collection of points of view, sometimes with proposals, other times with differing definitions.
Again, if you think IDers do not believe the evidence supports a conscious designer with free will, then that's great – we are all in agreement. I'm not going to look up references for you to find quotes to the contrary.
Again, many IDers would strongly disagree with this statement (they even define intelligence as "not by law or chance"
Just because something is in accordance with natural law does not mean it is reducible to natural law the is what we IDers are getting at with comments like that.
Well no. Just look at Dembski's "Explanatory Filter" to see why you're mistaken here.
All IDers agree that the question of whether we can infer design empirically is interesting.
Which is completely ambiguous, since many (I think most) IDers believe that to "infer design" means to "infer a conscious being was responsible for some artifact".
Most of us think that there are aspects in nature that are best explained as being the result of design. That's about the extent of our agreement.
And you agree on nothing because you disagree about what "the result of design" means.
If you want to argue about something else feel free but realize you are not arguing with ID when you do so.
What I argue is that unless you make explicit what these terms like "result of design" is supposed to mean, then there is no "ID Theory" at all.
How does this prove intelegence?
You asked me to explain why RM&NS was capable of learning. Learning is what it does.
All it says is that each generation will be more fit than the last. RM/NS does not learn anything it is the same coming out as it was going in
Huh? Each generation is different, incorporating the lessons learned in the last generation. Evolution learns from the environment which traits are most fit. Its goal is to produce more fit organisms.
It might be that the evolutionary process is "implementing" foresight for another entity (maybe the universe) but it does not exhibit foresight and therefore is not intelligent.
And I think it is exhibiting foresight, just like Deep Blue does.
aiguy: Deep Blue's foresight is achieved this way [generate-and-test], and maybe human brains do something similar.
Humans seem to exhibit creativity, which is beyond generate and test. Or is it? Did Deep Blue have creativity? (Kasparov claimed to have detected it, which made him accuse IBM of human intervention during the game.) What is creativity? That might be the most difficult word to define. When I write music, my goal is something pleasing to my "aesthetics" while also being "unique" in "certain respects."
At any rate, in the case of the origin of earth life, I think the issue of creativity can be sidelined. The proximate issue isn't how the designer and its goals and abilities came to be, but what minimum requirements the designer must have. The proximate designer need not be creative at all. It need only have a goal (created by itself, or assigned to it by another agent), algorithms and data sufficient to find solutions to achieve it goal given the environment.
In other words, maybe all foresight is accomplished by random variation and selection. In that case, one could view the entire evolutionary process as implementing "foresight" (but we get to see the intermediate tests rather than just the products of the search).
One difference is, Deep Blue came to the game with a vast arsenal of "front loading." What did the "agent" of evolution, whether that be the laws of nature or something more complex, come to the "game" with? This is the question, isn't it.
Humans seem to exhibit creativity, which is beyond generate and test. Or is it? Did Deep Blue have creativity? (Kasparov claimed to have detected it, which made him accuse IBM of human intervention during the game.) What is creativity? That might be the most difficult word to define. When I write music, my goal is something pleasing to my "aesthetics" while also being "unique" in "certain respects."
We do know that generate-and-test can result in creativity, because we build systems using generate-and-test algorithms that produce novel solutions to problems. Deep Blue is an example of this. (Kasparov claimed to have detected "intelligence", but as we've seen these dictionary-defined mentalistic terms are all too vague for discussions like these). Some people (like Penrose) think human cognition has other methods besides gen-and-test to come up with novel solutions, but none of these ideas are very well developed yet.
One difference is, Deep Blue came to the game with a vast arsenal of "front loading."
Everything is always "front-loaded" by the nature of whatever exists. What you really mean by front-loading, I think, is that the generator is somehow constrained, so the tester has fewer candidates to test. But natural law constrains everything that happens, in evolutionary processes and everything else. There may be other constraints that we don't understand (this is what people like Stuart Kauffman think, and I think he's right).
What did the "agent" of evolution, whether that be the laws of nature or something more complex, come to the "game" with? This is the question, isn't it.
Yes indeed – I think you and I are pretty much on the same page here. But we need to either drop these connotation-laden words like "agent" from the discussion or give them precise definitions!
And again: Rather than saying "I've shown it's not evolution, and I don't know what might be responsible – let's explore", he instead says "I think intelligent agency is the answer". He, like Dembski (and FMM here and 99% of ID folks I've talked to), assumes that "intelligent agency" is a perfectly meaningful term that we all understand because, well, we are intelligent agents for example. But of course a sample of one does not define a class, and offering "intelligent agency" as a hypothesis is really a Rorshach Inkblot of an answer, where each ID enthusiast gets to imagine whatever they'd like to believe about it and pretend that that is what the evidence supports.
Behe has said it may well be natural mechanisms that were front-loaded – he believes in common descent, certainly evolution (though he also seems to question certain explanations for generating useful mutations.) You say '99% of the ID folks you talk to' butcher agency – my response is that 99% of the ID critics I talk to butcher agency and evolution. They know 'mutation + stuff dies or reproduces' and that's it. They don't know neutral drift, epigenetics, some think the very thought of punctuated equilibrium is a creationist conspiracy, and so on – and few critics seem to care about that. And, in the exact mirror, many believe that 'evolution shows there is no intelligence and that's what the evidence supports'.
I think the only assumption is that 'intelligent agency' is meaningful enough to be a point at which people start exploring. Just as it was meaningful enough to completely discard before they started taking the angle they did.
Or it could describe evolution alone, which learns and remembers and so is "intelligent" too (even though it is nothing but a blind natural process).
So, again, this "mysterious answer" strategy supports everything from an evolutionary algorithms to God Almighty – which is another way of saying it supports no concrete answer at all.
I don't think, especially if it is 'God Almighty', that a concrete answer can be given besides on the scale of evolution or cosmology. Interestingly enough, neither do ID proponents in the mainstream; most of the time I see them insisting that the designer can't be identified nor does it need to be, so what's lacking here is a concrete answer to a question they're not engaging directly anyway.
Again, I have no problem with that question not providing a definite answer. I think the recognition of the question's difficulty and nature would be a drastic improvement over the recent past.
We've been here: My problem is with folks like Ben Stein, and with everyone at the DI who tries to claim scientific support for just one of these answers in order to make science consonant with Christian Theology.
First, there are plenty of people who try to claim scientific support for just one answer in order to make science consonant not with agnosticism, but atheism.
Second, I wouldn't deny that a whole lot of the motivation behind ID was in response to that sort of game (Though frankly, I think there are jews, buddhists, muslims, even deists and others who are attracted to ID at this point, at least in the broad range.) But if critics are motivated against ID first and foremost because they don't like the attempts to make or view science compatible with faith – then this isn't really about science anyway. I'm not going to swallow a line of 'well, they just think science should remain pure of political influences and not be used to back up metaphysics'.
Third – ID does have the advantage of approaching a less aggressive question, and investigating ways to identify artifacts made by beings even vaguely analogous to humans. Sure, it's less of a focus due to the political and theological fights, but that doesn't bother me – the potential there is intriguing, to me at least.
I think they're wrong. A human being with frontal lobe damage can experience pain without emotional affect"¦ and we think we can scientifically describe what a fish on a hook feels?
You think they're wrong, sure. I think they're wrong. It's possible that many scientists, if pressed, would say they're getting outside of science. Yet it happens – and the excess is nothing new, nor is it limited in scope. Asking why this happens is a question that could lead to some interesting revelations.
To this and comments re: Expelled: Multiple wrongs do not make a right.
And I agree. The problem is, what's the absolute 'right' way to handle ID? Pretend science was completely objective, lacking distortion and politicizing and misunderstanding, until ID came along? That can't be it, because that's nonsense. We can argue that ID is different because many of the proponents are motivated by metaphysics, perhaps? But so are many of ID's critics. Should we highlight the problems of defining and discovering agency/intelligence? Alright, but that leaves us with gaping questions and a natural urge to at least square inclinations with the data anyway.
I've offered up one of my own ways out – recognize the complexities (and validity) of the issue being raised, yet also the limitations of science to definitely rule on the answer. And I think this path has been examined, and rejected, because it's believed that there's vastly more to gain socially/politically by pretending otherwise.
And, just saw this.
But we need to either drop these connotation-laden words like "agent" from the discussion or give them precise definitions!
Or we need to explore what the varieties of 'agent' may well cover, and recognize the variety involved. 'Evolution' is connotation-laden and lacking a precise definition, but there's no reason to drop that word.
I think the only assumption is that 'intelligent agency' is meaningful enough to be a point at which people start exploring. Just as it was meaningful enough to completely discard before they started taking the angle they did.
I think there are significant differences between the butchering of evolutionary ideas and the offering of "agency" as a scientific explanation. There certainly are well defined scientific evolutionary hypotheses, and those hypotheses are well-understood, and are declared to be false (or inadequate) by IDers and others (like me). In contrast, there is no well-defined scientific hypothesis of "agency" that can even be evaluated against the evidence; we don't know what the evidence is supposed to show.
I think the recognition of the question's difficulty and nature would be a drastic improvement over the recent past.
I'm always in favor of people realizing that clarity and certainty are rarely understated.
First, there are plenty of people who try to claim scientific support for just one answer in order to make science consonant not with agnosticism, but atheism.
All of science is always consonant with both theism and atheism.
But if critics are motivated against ID first and foremost because they don't like the attempts to make or view science compatible with faith – then this isn't really about science anyway. I'm not going to swallow a line of 'well, they just think science should remain pure of political influences and not be used to back up metaphysics'.
Sorry but that really is my line. It's about not co-opting science to support things that science can't support, no matter what it is. Dawkins co-opts science to hawk atheism; I complain. Dembski does it for theism; I complain about that too.
Third – ID does have the advantage of approaching a less aggressive question, and investigating ways to identify artifacts made by beings even vaguely analogous to humans. Sure, it's less of a focus due to the political and theological fights, but that doesn't bother me – the potential there is intriguing, to me at least.
If you subtract the anthropomorphic intuitions, there is nothing remaining of this analogy. That is what I think this thread will show. In contrast to your views, FMM here denies that IDers even try to demonstrate conscious intent, and believes this "vague analogy" has nothing to do with consciousness or volition. Once those are taken out of the discussion, it becomes difficult to imagine any meaningful criteria to distinguish intelligent from unintelligent processes.
The problem is, what's the absolute 'right' way to handle ID? Pretend science was completely objective, lacking distortion and politicizing and misunderstanding, until ID came along? That can't be it, because that's nonsense.
Correct. ID is just made it a lot worse.
Should we highlight the problems of defining and discovering agency/intelligence? Alright, but that leaves us with gaping questions and a natural urge to at least square inclinations with the data anyway.
Yes, this is exactly what we must do. Our "natural urges" are sated by philosophy, religion, and our every day musings, just like always.
I've offered up one of my own ways out – recognize the complexities (and validity) of the issue being raised, yet also the limitations of science to definitely rule on the answer. And I think this path has been examined, and rejected, because it's believed that there's vastly more to gain socially/politically by pretending otherwise.
It has not been rejected by me – I am 100% in favor of your method. Recognize the complexities of the questions, and recognize the limitations of science, and respect those limitations!
'Evolution' is connotation-laden and lacking a precise definition, but there's no reason to drop that word.
Sorry, I disagree: No theoretical constructs that are advanced as explanations in evolutionary theory are difficult to relate to our shared empirical experience. Mutations and differential reproduction and drift and epigenetic information… all of these have unproblematic, concrete meaning. We just don't happen to think these things fully account for life, but that is a different problem.
I think there are significant differences between the butchering of evolutionary ideas and the offering of "agency" as a scientific explanation. There certainly are well defined scientific evolutionary hypotheses, and those hypotheses are well-understood, and are declared to be false (or inadequate) by IDers and others (like me). In contrast, there is no well-defined scientific hypothesis of "agency" that can even be evaluated against the evidence; we don't know what the evidence is supposed to show.
But we can explore it. We can take certain things to be express assumptions, and then have a look at the data, and see where we go – even while admitting that we're running with assumptions. Is it scientific? Personally, I don't think so. Yet it's still valid and worth the ink. And it was happening (crudely, flippantly) before ID arrived on the scene; they just added more voices.
Sorry but that really is my line. It's about not co-opting science to support things that science can't support, no matter what it is. Dawkins co-opts science to hawk atheism; I complain. Dembski does it for theism; I complain about that too.
I don't want to get into questions of motives. I'll just say again that this abuse was rife in 'science' well in advance of ID, even without YEC being involved. I'm willing to bet that there's a PETA member out there who thinks all this ID talk is nonsense, and the real abuse of science is from guys like James D Rose.
If you subtract the anthropomorphic intuitions, there is nothing remaining of this analogy. That is what I think this thread will show. In contrast to your views, FMM here denies that IDers even try to demonstrate conscious intent, and believes this "vague analogy" has nothing to do with consciousness or volition. Once those are taken out of the discussion, it becomes difficult to imagine any meaningful criteria to distinguish intelligent from unintelligent processes.
My third point was related to questions of smaller design, like literally finding an artifact on (say) another planet, or exploring ways to more positively identify specifically human-like intention.
More than that, I don't think anything is necessarily wrong with 'anthropomorphic intuitions' so long as they're qualified. I've read FMM's comments in other threads, and think they're interesting – if he's saying an agent can truly be an agent, but doesn't necessarily have to be conscious as humans know it, that's just one more avenue to explore.
Correct. ID is just made it a lot worse.
I disagree. I think ID's just the yin that's finally balancing out a whole lot of yang. So to speak.
Yes, this is exactly what we must do. Our "natural urges" are sated by philosophy, religion, and our every day musings, just like always.
That's fine, it's a great ideal. I'd love for it to happen. But can you really name any time when science wasn't filled with all kinds of fights and controversies like this, and it wasn't because the topic was so conventionally dull and low-stakes anyway?
That's not to say it shouldn't be pursued.
It has not been rejected by me – I am 100% in favor of your method. Recognize the complexities of the questions, and recognize the limitations of science, and respect those limitations!
And if you were representative of the majority of people interested in this fight, there'd be no fight for me. Unfortunately, it's not the case, and the result means a convoluted discussion. I'd be interested in seeing a scientific heavyweight waltz out and denounce all sides, ID proponent and no-ID proponent. I think Ken Miller was moving in that direction, but apparently Myers spooked him out of it.
Sorry, I disagree: No theoretical constructs that are advanced as explanations in evolutionary theory are difficult to relate to our shared empirical experience. Mutations and differential reproduction and drift and epigenetic information"¦ all of these have unproblematic, concrete meaning. We just don't happen to think these things fully account for life, but that is a different problem.
But I'm not talking about the constructs within the theory, but the word itself. If it were just 'change over time' that would be one thing, but it means a lot of different things to a lot of different people, not all of them necessarily ignorant.
aiguy: We do know that generate-and-test can result in creativity, because we build systems using generate-and-test algorithms that produce novel solutions to problems.
OK, I'll tentatively buy that definition of creativity: novel solutions to a goal.
KB: One difference is, Deep Blue came to the game with a vast arsenal of "front loading."
aiguy: Everything is always "front-loaded" by the nature of whatever exists.
Assuming a mechanistic sort of reality at the bottom of the ontological pond, I would agree that there is always an implicit order at any state of the system that entirely predicts any future state. But is it safe to assume that? Is this something that can be sidelined?
aiguy: what you really mean by front-loading, I think, is that the generator is somehow constrained, so the tester has fewer candidates to test.
I would say that things that add to the Front Loading Factor (FLF) would be specificity of the goal, more and faster algorithms to generate and test for a solution, information about previous attempts at the goal. More of these things in a given closed system means more front loading, by my definition.
KB: What did the "agent" of evolution, whether that be the laws of nature or something more complex, come to the "game" with? This is the question, isn't it.
aiguy: Yes indeed – I think you and I are pretty much on the same page here. But we need to either drop these connotation-laden words like "agent" from the discussion or give them precise definitions!
By "agent" I meant simply "goal seeker" or "problem solver." I have no problem dropping that word from the thread.
And I think it {evolution} is exhibiting foresight, just like Deep Blue does
.
Quote:
All appearances to the contrary, the only watchmaker in nature is the blind forces of physics, albeit deployed in a very special way. A true watchmaker has foresight: he designs his cogs and springs, and plans their interconnections, with a future purpose in his mind's eye. Natural selection, the blind, unconscious automatic process which Darwin discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the existence and apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It has no mind and no mind's eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind watchmaker.
End quote Dawkins The Blind Watchmaker (1996) p.5
It's impossible to argue with you Darwinists you believe such radically different things
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 5:40 pm
RM&NS is a learning process, because adaptations that increase reproductive success are preserved in the gene pool. RM&NS does not exhibit "foresight" if we look at its inner workings (which is what we do). [...] In other words, maybe all foresight is accomplished by random variation and selection. In that case, one could view the entire evolutionary process as implementing "foresight" (but we get to see the intermediate tests rather than just the products of the search).
Um, did you skip the discussion on the Limiting the Designer thread, where Allen MacNeill said:
So, the "random" part of RM & NS isn't random. // So, the "mutation" part of RM & NS isn't the most important source of variation.
and…
So the "natural selection" part of RM & NS isn't the only significant cause of preservation and proliferation of phenotypes and genotypes in populations.
I realize you were asked by fmm specifically about "RM/NS," but since mutation isn't random nor the most important source of variation, and selection isn't the only important factor in preservation and proliferation of geno/phenotypes, I don't see how you can dismiss things like foresight with an appeal to RM/NS.
It really doesn't matter except for my little joke
What matters is that in order for anyone to take his opinion seriously he needs to
1) show that Dawkins (and the vast majority of scientists) are mistaken scientifically
or
2) Show that Dawkins' (and the vast majority of scientists) opinions here are not scientific
Either way he will need to be making the same kinds of arguments that ID does and facing the same kind of opposition. From now on when ever he presents arguments for his opinion I will ask what sort of papers he has published and point out that he has yet to present a distinguishing testable prediction.
Once he has done all that we can finally get down to our disagreements about the nature of intelegence.
Welcome to our side Aguy. Good luck
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 8:50 pm
Joy (quoting): So, the "random" part of RM & NS isn't random.
Random refers to random with respect to fitness, which is generally well-supported.
fifth monarchy man: It's impossible to argue with you Darwinists you believe such radically different things
Evolutionary processes are a type of learning, certainly by induction. That genomes can store information for later use can be considered a type of "foresight". Aiguy repeatedly used scare quotes and included an explanation of what he meant, as in this statement.
aiguy: In other words, maybe all foresight is accomplished by random variation and selection. In that case, one could view the entire evolutionary process as implementing "foresight" (but we get to see the intermediate tests rather than just the products of the search).
The usual concept of foresight is that we in some way model the future. We then make changes to the model *before* we implement our solution. Evolution implements and tests at every step. Evolution rewards the prepared, so we can imagine a type of "foresight", for instance, genomes that keep spare parts around that have been useful in the past, or developmental patterns that allow for rapid adaptation. But this is stretching the definition somewhat.
In any case, evolution does learn by induction, and that makes it intelligent. Intelligent Design equivocates on the term "intelligent".
intelligence: the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations.
Keep in mind that CJYman is using different defintions.
CJYman: I have defined intelligence in terms of foresight and foresight in terms of awareness (or consciousness) of future targets that do not yet exist …
Awareness of future targets does exist. I will now provide evidence for that. I have designed a couple of mechanical logic gates in my spare time while thinking of a future target that did not yet exist (the mechanical logic gate itself) …
I have not "insisted" that "true" intelligence requires conscious awareness of future targets. I have defined it as such.
By target, you seem to mean an unrealized goal. Computers can find paths to unrealized goals. Indeed, they are quite adept at designing novel logic circuits. Your example doesn't seem to distinguish between ordinary intelligence and "true intelligence".
if he's saying an agent can truly be an agent, but doesn't necessarily have to be conscious as humans know it, that's just one more avenue to explore.
In order to explore these questions we must at least separate the clearly analytic from the synthetic propositions. To say "an agent can truly be an agent" is to be making some specific assumptions about what a "true agent" is supposed to be. If noone has said just what "true agency" means, we can hardly go looking for it.
I disagree. I think ID's just the yin that's finally balancing out a whole lot of yang. So to speak.
And to me that's another way of saying "two wrongs make a right."
But I'm not talking about the constructs within the theory, but the word itself. If it were just 'change over time' that would be one thing, but it means a lot of different things to a lot of different people, not all of them necessarily ignorant.
If you ask most biologists to explain what it means to say speciation was caused by evolution, they will tell you what that means – they disagree about the details, but agree on the basics. In contrast, if you ask IDers what it means to say speciation was caused by intelligence, you will get radically different answers (not physically determined, caused by conscious deliberation, caused by an unconscious physical process that is "intelligent" because it… something or other…).
As for anything I didn't respond to: I agree with you.
kornbelt,
I'm not assuming a "mechanistic sort of reality" (whatever that is, given QM and all) at bottom. But biological complexity isn't evidence of any "non-mechanistic sort of reality". Otherwise we agree.
Alan,
As it happens, I suppose I'm really not a Darwinist (I have a hunch biology is built into physics in a way we don't understand).
Joy,
I realize you were asked by fmm specifically about "RM/NS," but since mutation isn't random nor the most important source of variation, and selection isn't the only important factor in preservation and proliferation of geno/phenotypes, I don't see how you can dismiss things like foresight with an appeal to RM/NS.
I did not dismiss things like foresight with an appeal to RM&NS. Let me try to explain this point again.
At a high level of abstraction we can think of every problem solver (i.e. every intelligent agent) as working by generate and test. In one extreme version of this method, the generator is random (with regard to the solution space), and so all of the work in finding a solution is done by the tester. At the other extreme, the generator is constrained to produce only valid solutions, and so the tester does nothing. In between these extremes, the generator produces some set of candidate solutions and the tester filters them.
It could be the case that the generator in human problem solvers does all of the heavy lifting, so our minds can somehow "see right through the problem" to the solution. Penrose has ideas about how this might work; Cartesian dualists might say that this is part of the job description for res cogitans and leave it at that. Others think that our mental generators are more like those in evolutionary processes, cranking out all sorts of wild candidates, while our tester watches and waits for something that will work.
But no matter how our minds manage to get the job done, we consider ourselves to have foresight, yes? Even if we someday find out that our brains really are like neural Darwin machines – massively parallel algorithm processors that sift through astronomical numbers of wild guesses, analogously to RM&NS – we would still consider ourselves to be intelligent creatures with foresight. And by the same token, we could consider RM&NS itself to be an intelligent process. The reason it doesn't appear to exhibit "foresight" is because we observe the intermediate candidates from the generator, before they are filtered. But when we look at the end result (complex biological forms), we can see it really is an intelligent process after all.
So, that was my point: The hypothesis that "intelligence" and "foresight" are responsible for life forms is so vague that it doesn't even eliminate evolution as a candidate. ID always needs to say something more specific about what it is proposing in order to be meaningful.
Now, you've shown where MacNeill points out that the generator for biological evolution isn't random (or even random with regard to fitness), and the tester is not limited to natural selection. I don't see how that goes against anything I've said.
FMM,
I didn't say it was impossible to argue with IDers, of course. I just don't want to be accused of battling strawmen because you happen to have a different take on ID.
What matters is that in order for anyone to take his opinion seriously he needs to
1) show that Dawkins (and the vast majority of scientists) are mistaken scientifically
or
2) Show that Dawkins' (and the vast majority of scientists) opinions here are not scientific
Neither Dawkins nor anybody else has ever published a paper concluding anything about the "intelligence" or "lack of intelligence" of Darwinian evolution. Yes, Dawkins' expositions of the theory to the lay public, as well as introductory textbooks, will speak of "lack of purpose, lack of a mind's eye, lack of foresight" and so on. But these are not scientific conclusions, and they are obviously using the same vague, ambiguous senses of these mentalistic terms that we find in the dictionary. As I've said many times, these defintions are not sufficiently precise to allow for debate on these matters.
So, the differences arise because we are using these mentalistic words differently, and not from differences in what we believe about evolutionary mechanisms. Mentalistic concepts have nothing to do with evolutionary theory! I have other differences with Dawkins, but we both mean the same thing when we talk about evolutionary processes like RM&NS.
From now on when ever he presents arguments for his opinion I will ask what sort of papers he has published and point out that he has yet to present a distinguishing testable prediction.
Alan,
As it happens, I suppose I'm really not a Darwinist (I have a hunch biology is built into physics in a way we don't understand).
Well, certain words have become popularly pejorative: Darwinist, atheist, evilutionist, idiot, creationist etc. It becomes increasingly difficult to avoid the charge of name-calling.
As a lapsed biochemist, I don't disagree with what I understand of what you have posted, and I commend your effort in proposing an agreement "on terminology. I am also immediately suspicious of anyone who claims certainty so saying "…we don't understand" is persuasive:smile:
Intelligence; there's a hard one. "Ability to design" makes "intelligent design" somewhat circular, but perhaps that's your point. "Foresight" needs work; you and Dawkins do not appear to be using the same definition. (good catch, fifth monarchy man) and that leaves "random" to tackle, at least.
I suggest, if you can get agreement on terms your argument is virtually won.
On the other hand, this discussion is philosophical. This is admirable and my only issue with those who promote Intelligent Design is whether there can be a scientific (i. e. testable) hypothesis of Intelligent Design (note caps; there ought to be a clear distinction between intelligent, in its everyday use, and "Intelligent" as used by Bill Dembski, for example).
So, all can be resolved with the careful application of semantics: discuss.:wink:
ETA: I wonder whether I should add "genuinely, for its own sake" after "those who promote Intelligent Design", but perhaps that would be a little pejorative.
In any case, evolution does learn by induction, and that makes it intelligent.
I'm glad to see you are not going down the same road as Aguy with foresight. As I've shown that road is fraught with all kinds of problems
I do find it very interesting that you would also choose to say that evolution is intelligent. I've often marveled at the way that some folks see all kinds of humanlike attributes in evolution It's been said to do all kinds of things that we would normally expect in agents. It sounds like Animism and if you are serious it would be an ID view IMHO.
Welcome to our side.
Before we discuss whether what RM/NS does can be called induction lets do some preliminaries.
Please explain how an abstract and intangible concept like evolution can be said to learn. Can gravity learn or justice or thermodynamics. It seems that you are making a category error here. In fact can you name a single abstract entity besides evolution that can be said to learn or plan or sleep for that matter?
Is evolution today more intelligent than evolution a million years ago?
What sorts of things does evolution know? Does it know math for instance?
Is evolution universally connected so that evolution on different planets profits from the learning that evolution does on earth?
I realize this is Philosophical but most folks think that if a computer becomes intelligent enough it will be conscious do you expect evolution to do this?
has it already?
Does evolution disserve our admiration for all it has accomplished? Worship?
Like I said very interesting
Aguy
Huh?
Ask Zach
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 9:46 am
fifth monarchy man: I'm glad to see you are not going down the same road as Aguy with foresight. As I've shown that road is fraught with all kinds of problems
Yes, I agree. An argument can be made, but I think that the tangent is a bit too subtle for this discussion. There are more fundamental issues (as we can see following).
fifth monarchy man: I do find it very interesting that you would also choose to say that evolution is intelligent.
We have defined intelligence as "the ability to learn … or to deal with new or trying situations."
fifth monarchy man: It seems that you are making a category error here.
Evolutionary *processes* are learning processes that are capable of dealing with new situations. Evolutionary *processes* subsumes several mechanisms, including reasonable fidelity of transmission across generations (memory).
fifth monarchy man: Please explain how an abstract and intangible concept like evolution can be said to learn.
Evolutionary algorithms accumulate adaptive information in a library we call genomes.
fifth monarchy man: Is evolution today more intelligent than evolution a million years ago?
The content of the library is somewhat different.
fifth monarchy man: What sorts of things does evolution know? Does it know math for instance?
The library includes the knowledge of how to make pandas and people.
fifth monarchy man: Is evolution universally connected so that evolution on different planets profits from the learning that evolution does on earth?
No. Evolution is adaptive to local conditions.
fifth monarchy man: I realize this is Philosophical …
It's not merely philosophical. Learning and the ability to adapt is an empirically demonstrable property. That's why the definition is important.
Evolutionary algorithms accumulate adaptive information in a library we call genomes.
So in a sense we are all part of evolution. First Animism and now Pantheism I had no idea you were so spiritual.
It's not merely philosophical. Learning and the ability to adapt is an empirically demonstrable property. That's why the definition is important.
I agree but I was talking about intelligences' connection to consciousness. Consciousness is not an empirically demonstrable property. I know you ascribe consciousness to most mammals is degree of intelligence the determining factor? If so can we expect evolution to become conscious? Is it already?
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 10:47 am
At a high level of abstraction we can think of every problem solver (i.e. every intelligent agent) as working by generate and test. In one extreme version of this method, the generator is random (with regard to the solution space), and so all of the work in finding a solution is done by the tester. At the other extreme, the generator is constrained to produce only valid solutions, and so the tester does nothing. In between these extremes, the generator produces some set of candidate solutions and the tester filters them.
And this is no doubt what makes the "RM/NS" shorthand so popular among both IDers and DDs. The DDs like it (and teach it to everybody's children as the most instruction in biological evolution a huge majority of them ever receive) because it's catchy like a propaganda slogan, it's easy to impart, and it artificially supports their preference for selection as life's designer. IDers like it because it's so easily revealed to BE simplistic, dumbed-down pablum that looks a lot like ideological sloganeering, which leaves wide open the actual source and nature of biological evolution.
The deal is, it is known that biological evolution doesn't work exclusively or even primarily by RM/NS. It's not a good – or even adequate – description of what's going on. Obviously the pablum doesn't sell well to the public (or their children), since upwards of 60% don't believe it even after taking the requisite indoctrination and passing the test. The DD answer to that situation?
"Waaaaaa! You don't know enough to make that judgment!"
Which is darned lame. Of course they know enough to judge RM/NS insufficient for explanation – they were taught it on purpose, supposedly so they'd have enough knowledge to judge. When they DO judge, the truth comes out clearly – they were taught simplistic pablum that science knows very well to be insufficient! Tell me, aiguy… whose fault is that?
I'm just reading, don't care to enter into the arguments here. I simply note that you're pushing the pablum as if we're all 15-year old hormone-addled school children, when reality is that we are well beyond the RM/NS scam and have been for a long time. It's just a little bit insulting when you resort to this smokescreen when objects to your definitional distractions, that's all.
fifth monarchy man: So in a sense we are all part of evolution.
That's been known since Darwin.
fifth monarchy man: First Animism and now Pantheism I had no idea you were so spiritual.
As my statements were empirical, the attribution of spirit indicates that you have misunderstood the points raised.
fifth monarchy man: I agree but I was talking about intelligences' connection to consciousness.
I used *your* definition of intelligence, the ability to learn … or to deal with new or trying situations.
fifth monarchy man: Consciousness is not an empirically demonstrable property.
consciousness, the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself.
It depends on the precise usage. We can often infer from behavior when organisms are aware of things, including when they are aware of themselves. But people also use these words to refer to the actual subjective experience"”something outside of the purview of science.
Joy: The deal is, it is known that biological evolution doesn't work exclusively or even primarily by RM/NS. It's not a good – or even adequate – description of what's going on.
J: The deal is, it is known that planets don't orbit exclusively or even primarily by tracing ellipses. It's not a good – or even adequate – description of what's going on.
Turns out that elliptical orbits are a oversimplification of chaotic planetary dynamics. Why do they lie to children!?
And this is no doubt what makes the "RM/NS" shorthand so popular among both IDers and DDs. The DDs like it (and teach it to everybody's children as the most instruction in biological evolution a huge majority of them ever receive) because it's catchy like a propaganda slogan, it's easy to impart, and it artificially supports their preference for selection as life's designer. IDers like it because it's so easily revealed to BE simplistic, dumbed-down pablum that looks a lot like ideological sloganeering, which leaves wide open the actual source and nature of biological evolution.
You've completely misunderstood the point, even though I think I made it quite clearly: I was not describing biological evolution, but the general way cognitive scientists think about problem solving. And I was not saying that biological evolution or all problem solving is random variation and selection. So you got everything wrong.
Again, at a high level of abstraction, all problems can be viewed as search problems, and all search problems can be viewed as some variation of generate-and-test. All search algorithms (constraint search, means-ends, best-first, etc) and all other problem solving strategies (even a "pure insight" into a solution!) can be conceptually subsumed under an abstract view of G&T.
As I explained:
AIGUY: It could be the case that the generator in human problem solvers does all of the heavy lifting, so our minds can somehow "see right through the problem" to the solution. Penrose has ideas about how this might work; Cartesian dualists might say that this is part of the job description for res cogitans and leave it at that."
How you interpreted this as me saying that either human thought OR biological evolution used random generation of variants is difficult to imagine – unless of course you didn't actually read what I wrote and went off half-cocked.
The deal is, it is known that biological evolution doesn't work exclusively or even primarily by RM/NS.
I think everybody here knows this; I certainly did.
Which is darned lame. Of course they know enough to judge RM/NS insufficient for explanation – they were taught it on purpose, supposedly so they'd have enough knowledge to judge. When they DO judge, the truth comes out clearly – they were taught simplistic pablum that science knows very well to be insufficient! Tell me, aiguy"¦ whose fault is that?
I actually think it's your fault for failing to read my posts carefully. I don't think anybody here is suggesting that RM&NS is adequate to explain biological forms; I'm certainly not, and I've said so.
I'm just reading, don't care to enter into the arguments here. I simply note that you're pushing the pablum as if we're all 15-year old hormone-addled school children, when reality is that we are well beyond the RM/NS scam and have been for a long time. It's just a little bit insulting when you resort to this smokescreen when objects to your definitional distractions, that's all.
I think you are not only demonstrably confused about what I've said here, but it would appear that you are so predisposed in your views with such hair-trigger responses that you really don't care.
FMM,
You've failed to engage my argument. I'll just pick up one thing you said to Zach as an illustration of lingering confusion:
Is evolution today more intelligent than evolution a million years ago?
As any psychologist will explain, learning does not entail becoming more intelligent; rather, intelligence stays relatively constant throughout one's life, and as we learn we gain knowledge.
Again the problem is playing fast and loose with mentalistic concepts just keeps the confusion going. If instead you actually tried to define your terms precisely, and then stuck to those definitions, you'd find a whole new world of clarity (and a world where "ID Theory" really didn't mean what you intuitively believe it to mean).
Before any one will take your arguments seriously you must convince the vast majority of scientists that what is taught in science class is not science. Good luck
You are free to believe anything you want (some folks believe trees have souls) but don't expect me to care. That is until you come up with a distinguishing testable prediction.:wink:
If instead you actually tried to define your terms precisely, and then stuck to those definitions,
That is exactly what Ive done hence my disscusion with Zach
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 12:49 pm
before any one will take your arguments seriously…
Too late – a lot of people take these arguments very seriously. Even on this board, ID-friendly folks like nullasalus have taken these arguments seriously and engaged them with serious responses. So I guess it's just you.
you must convince the vast majority of scientists that what is taught in science class is not science. Good luck
That is nonsense. Nobody here is arguing that biological science is not science.
You are free to believe anything you want (some folks believe trees have souls) but don't expect me to care. That is until you come up with a distinguishing testable prediction.
A prediction for what theory? I have proposed no theory, nor any hypothesis. The question of whether or not evolutionary processes are to be called "intelligent" is not a question of fact, but of definition. It is a semantic issue, and not an issue of science. It is a matter of clarifying our terms.
Once again: Because evolution learns, and is goal-oriented, and employs a problem-solving strategy similar to what other "intelligent agents" do, I argue that the term "intelligent" (once we divorce it from consciousness and will) fairly applies to evolutionary processes.
Before any one will take your arguments seriously you must convince the vast majority of scientists that what is taught in science class is not science.
You've completely misunderstood the point, even though I think I made it quite clearly: I was not describing biological evolution, but the general way cognitive scientists think about problem solving. And I was not saying that biological evolution or all problem solving is random variation and selection. So you got everything wrong.
Ah, so. So when you say "every problem solver" – as every "intelligent agent" – operates via "generate and test" and liken it specifically to RM/NS as a "learning process" [all quotes your words], you didn't really mean that RM/NS might equate to "foresight" so as to postulate that intelligent design can simply be good old RM/NS.
You know, if you weren't so stuck on confusing every issue with twisted logic and distractive sleight-of-mind, you just might make some sense.
I think you are not only demonstrably confused about what I've said here, but it would appear that you are so predisposed in your views with such hair-trigger responses that you really don't care.
I don't really care. I was just calling you on this ridiculous contortionist act. But since that's your entire schtick, carry on. FMM obviously doesn't mind playing your game.
Because evolution learns, and is goal-oriented, and employs a problem-solving strategy similar to what other "intelligent agents" do, I argue that the term "intelligent"
I thought you were arguing for foresight. Are you abandoning that argument?
The question of whether or not evolutionary processes are to be called "intelligent" is not a question of fact, but of definition
If you are abandoning the foresight argument I agree.
Since we have a good standard definition of intelligent all we need to define evolution.
I suggest using the dictionary
quote:
: one of a set of prescribed movements
2 a: a process of change in a certain direction : UNFOLDING b: the action or an instance of forming and giving something off : EMISSION c (
1): a process of continuous change from a lower, simpler, or worse to a higher, more complex, or better state : GROWTH (
2): a process of gradual and relatively peaceful social, political, and economic advance d: something evolved
3: the process of working out or developing
4 a: the historical development of a biological group (as a race or species) : PHYLOGENY b: a theory that the various types of animals and plants have their origin in other preexisting types and that the distinguishable differences are due to modifications in successive generations; also : the process described by this theory
5: the extraction of a mathematical root
6: a process in which the whole universe is a progression of interrelated phenomena
hows that?
Quick questions
Does it include us?
Does it include the environment? or is it limited to an abstract concept like justice or thermodynamics
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 1:13 pm
Ah, so. So when you say "every problem solver" – as every "intelligent agent" – operates via "generate and test" and liken it specifically to RM/NS as a "learning process" [all quotes your words], you didn't really mean that RM/NS might equate to "foresight" so as to postulate that intelligent design can simply be good old RM/NS.
As you yourself acknowledged, I was specifically asked about RM&NS! Did you forget this point already? Need I say once again I am not arguing for RM&NS as an explanation for anything? Did I not explicitly refer to possibilities for how human thought might not use randomly generated candidate solutions (e.g. dualism, or Orch-OR?)
Are you denying that evolutionary processes (RM&NS or otherwise) can reasonably be said to learn? Are you denying that even a problem solver which did employ a random generator could still be seen as intelligent if only the successful solutions were accessible?
You know, if you weren't so stuck on confusing every issue with twisted logic and distractive sleight-of-mind, you just might make some sense.
If you weren't so closed-minded and every-ready with the angry rhetoric, you might just understand what I'm trying to say here and have your perspective broadened. As it is, you just wish I'd stop challenging the way you think about minds, and so you brand me (of all things) a Darwin Defender, pretend that I'm arguing for RM&NS, and otherwise hurl all of your vitriol… at straw men. And then you say you "don't care"
Joy: Ah, so. So when you say "every problem solver" – as every "intelligent agent" – operates via "generate and test" and liken it specifically to RM/NS as a "learning process" [all quotes your words], you didn't really mean that RM/NS might equate to "foresight" so as to postulate that intelligent design can simply be good old RM/NS.
Even if bias is clearly evidenced through a selection process anti-teleologists will claim the bias is a manifestation of underlying physical forces which are themselves blind, brute forces of Nature. It is the teleological goal of anti-teleologists to exclude conscious design. That will induce them to make philosophical pronouncements about Nature which are truthfully open questions both from philosophical and empirical perspectives. Since anti-teleologists cannot even specify what the selection criteria was which caused a functional genome in the first place and which led from that to a replicating cell, they are in no position to assert that issues centered around conscious intelligence are in any way empirically settled. That won't keep them from trying though.
I thought you were arguing for foresight. Are you abandoning that argument?
No, I'm not. Are you?
Again, I argue that saying "intelligence" is the cause of biological forms is meaningless. First, different IDers mean very different things by this word; second, IDers generally fail to make their own particular meaning explicit; third, once consciousness and will are subtracted from the concept, the concept is so vague that it can fairly be applied even to evolutionary processes.
If you are abandoning the foresight argument I agree.
Are you trying to say that something can be intelligent without foresight? Or have foresight without intelligence? Or that "Intelligent Design Theory" should be called "Foresight Design Theory"
Since we have a good standard definition of intelligent all we need to define evolution.
Your definition of intelligence is this: "the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations". It doesn't say anything about "foresight". And your defintion of foresight doesn't mention intelligence: "an act of looking forward; also : a view forward". Please tell us how do you determine when something is "looking forward"
So, since we've established that evolution has the ability to learn (remember, that doesn't mean "increase one's intelligence"!), it appears that evolutionary processes ought to be called intelligent by your own definition. And I'll wait until you provide a way to tell when intelligent things use foresight or not.
I suggest using the dictionary… hows that?
Useless, as always. Dictionaries are not scientific textbooks… did you somehow learn they were?
Quick questions
Does it include us?
Does it include the environment? or is it limited to an abstract concept like justice or thermodynamics
Does what include us? What is the referrent for "it" here?
Even if bias is clearly evidenced through a selection process anti-teleologists will claim the bias is a manifestation of underlying physical forces which are themselves blind, brute forces of Nature. It is the teleological goal of anti-teleologists to exclude conscious design.
Great! Here FMM is arguing that IDers do not assume consciousness, nor do they deny that physical forces may underlie intelligent phenomena… and you say these positions are "anti-teleological".
Wouldn't you agree there is quite a bit of confusion on these issues here?
So, since we've established that evolution has the ability to learn (remember, that doesn't mean "increase one's intelligence"!), it appears that evolutionary processes ought to be called intelligent by your own definition.
I need to know what you mean by evolution before we can establish anything Zach believes it includes us do you agree? Does it include anything concrete or is it just an abstract process per the dictionary definition
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 1:44 pm
Since anti-teleologists cannot even specify what the selection criteria was which caused a functional genome in the first place and which led from that to a replicating cell, they are in no position to assert that issues centered around conscious intelligence are in any way empirically settled. That won't keep them from trying though.
What is with you and Joy and these strawman arguments? Can you show where anyone here has said issues around conscious intelligence are in any way "empirically settled" Can you show me how any of my arguments depend on specifying the selection criteria for a functional genome?
What is with you and Joy and these strawman arguments? Can you show where anyone here has said issues around conscious intelligence are in any way "empirically settled" Can you show me how any of my arguments depend on specifying the selection criteria for a functional genome?
In that case we'll have to await further data before assessing the plausibility of intelligent design.
Are you trying to say that something can be intelligent without foresight?
I don't think it can that's why Dawkins' view is important to this conversation but he (or anyone else I know) does not mention evolution learning so if you want to limit your arguments to this you would not be in conflict with him.
Later on you will have to convince me how something can learn and not have foresight but we should take this one step at a time
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 1:52 pm
In that case we'll have to await further data before assessing the plausibility of intelligent design.
My point is that you can't assess the plausibility of "intelligent design" until you say precisely what "intelligent design" is. If you say it entails consciousness (and apparently you do, as does nullasalus, but not FMM), that's one thing. If you say it is not the result of physical necessity (and you do, but not FMM) that's another thing. If you define it simply in terms of what it can do – create complex form and function – that's another thing. If you define it to mean anything that can learn and remember, that's something else again.
So no, we can't assess the plausibility of ID without specific statements about exactly what ID is supposed to entail. It is obvious from this thread (and everywhere else) that different IDers have very different ideas about what they are talking about, even when they don't realize it.
I don't think it can that's why Dawkins' view is important to this conversation but he (or anyone else I know) does not mention evolution learning so if you want to limit your arguments to this you would not be in conflict with him.
I have already explained that I do not disagree with Dawkins on matters of fact, but only on the way we are using the words "foresight" or "mind's eye" or "intelligence". He is using these words in colloquial ways to make his point; I am attempting to have us all pin down specific technical meanings so we can actually discuss what the evidence supports.
My point is that you can't assess the plausibility of "intelligent design" until you say precisely what "intelligent design" is.
It is unnecessary to have to exclude different "interpretations" of intelligence at this point. Once a case has been made for any particular form the philosophers from the competing camps can take their knives out and carve out arguments aimed at excluding undesireable metaphysical implications.
In order to explore these questions we must at least separate the clearly analytic from the synthetic propositions. To say "an agent can truly be an agent" is to be making some specific assumptions about what a "true agent" is supposed to be. If noone has said just what "true agency" means, we can hardly go looking for it.
I'm not sure what you refer to here. I think there are plenty of concepts of 'true agent' floating around. Few if any aren't controversial, but there's still a starting point available here.
And to me that's another way of saying "two wrongs make a right."
I think ID's opposite continuing to exist without challenge would have been vastly more wrong. But, yes, you want clarity in the debate, and take the position that anything that detracts from clarity is negative. Fair enough.
If you ask most biologists to explain what it means to say speciation was caused by evolution, they will tell you what that means – they disagree about the details, but agree on the basics. In contrast, if you ask IDers what it means to say speciation was caused by intelligence, you will get radically different answers (not physically determined, caused by conscious deliberation, caused by an unconscious physical process that is "intelligent" because it"¦ something or other"¦).
Well, hold on now. Biologists versus 'anyone who supports ID'? Ask most people who oppose ID what it means to say speciation was caused by evolution. The basics they agree upon will be 'random mutations and natural selection'. I actually haven't seen much 'big name' ID treatment of speciation, other than MikeGene touching on it with front-loaded genes.
'Evolution' as a word is employed far and wide. Cultures evolve, animals evolve, public transit systems evolve – hell, sometimes even universes evolve. Does evolution automatically mean 'darwinian'? Answers on both sides range from 'yes' to 'no' to 'depends on what you mean by darwinian'.
It is unnecessary to have to exclude different "interpretations" of intelligence at this point. Once a case has been made for any particular form the philosophers from the competing camps can take their knives out and carve out arguments aimed at excluding undesireable metaphysical implications.
Well, fine then – ID theorists will actually need to say what particular thing they are attempting to make a case for and then go about trying to make the case. As it is, they do not do this at all. Instead, they leave it ambiguous (and typically resist all efforts to actually be specific) and still they claim various data as evidence for "intelligence" or "teleology" without saying just what it is they mean.
And that is my whole beef with ID. I'm not against the ideas in general, nor am I a Darwin Defender at all. If IDers would simply make their assumptions explicit, instead of collectively lumping everything from a mechanical search to an omnipotent God all together under the label of "intelligent cause", then I would wish you all well and look for any interesting developments.
I'm not sure what you refer to here. I think there are plenty of concepts of 'true agent' floating around. Few if any aren't controversial, but there's still a starting point available here.
Sure, always the same issue: If you pick one particular concept of what a "true agent" (as opposed to a false agent? a fake agent?) that can be characterized with reasonable clarity, then by all means proceed. Just don't trade on ambiguity!
Well, hold on now. Biologists versus 'anyone who supports ID'?
No – you could just say "leading ID authors" instead, and the point still holds. Who else should I refer to?
Ask most people who oppose ID what it means to say speciation was caused by evolution. The basics they agree upon will be 'random mutations and natural selection'. I actually haven't seen much 'big name' ID treatment of speciation, other than MikeGene touching on it with front-loaded genes.
Dembski and Behe explain speciation, of course. The explanation is "intelligent cause".
'Evolution' as a word is employed far and wide. Cultures evolve, animals evolve, public transit systems evolve – hell, sometimes even universes evolve. Does evolution automatically mean 'darwinian'? Answers on both sides range from 'yes' to 'no' to 'depends on what you mean by darwinian'.
Of course! That is why we do not use dictionary definitions in science! (Are you listening, FMM?)
But when evolutionary biologists write papers, there is no confusion over what sense of the word they are using. There are of course strong disagreements among evolutionary biologists, but they simply do not equivocate on the meaning of the word "evolution", because nobody offers that single word as an irreducible (or unknown) mechanism.
Dembski and Behe explain speciation, of course. The explanation is "intelligent cause".
Actually, they don't.
Behe, for instance, finds intelligence is evidenced to the level of classes, with a tentative case from orders to genera. Speciation, he sees, as accessible to blind, unintelligent, evolution.
Explicit design appears to reach into biology to a certain level, to the level of the vertebrate class, but not necessarily further. Randomness accounts perfectly well for many aspects of life. Contingency is real.
Pez,
Thanks, I stand corrected, although the point isn't relevant to the present discussion. The salient point is simply that Dembski and Behe and other DI folks explain "certain features of biology and the universe" by "intelligent cause".
In the case of Dembski, it's clear he describes a conscious, deliberate agent with libertarian free will (or "directed contingency" as he prefers to call it). Clearly, there is no scientific evidence that whatever caused these biological features actually had conscious awareness or could transcend physical causality the way Dembski describes.
For other ID "theorists", we don't know whether "intelligence" is supposed to mean some unspecified, unconscious, physical process, or some unspecific, ominscient God, or something else entirely (but still unspecified!). This characterization is simply too vague to begin to evaluate against the evidence.
Behe, for instance, finds intelligence is evidenced to the level of classes, with a tentative case from orders to genera. Speciation, he sees, as accessible to blind, unintelligent, evolution.
Behe is a clever fellow. He knows that speciation has been observed without any evidence of a designer, so he can't make the case that speciation requires a designer. He also knows that history has wiped out pretty much all evidence of the initial speciation events that eventually gave rise to what we now call separate classes, so he can safely declare design without having to worry too much his claim can be refuted with direct evidence. Very convenient.
No – you could just say "leading ID authors" instead, and the point still holds. Who else should I refer to?
Dembski and Behe explain speciation, of course. The explanation is "intelligent cause".
Pez gives a good reference, though I'd go one further – I don't think 'intelligent cause' is offered as a mechanism necessarily. Ken Miller, if he really wanted to, could cite 'intelligent cause' to explain speciation – and then cite any and all of the mainstream proposals as mechanism. 'Intelligent cause' can't explain Houdini's tricks on its own, but it could (to me, certainly is) well be a property of the explanation.
But when evolutionary biologists write papers, there is no confusion over what sense of the word they are using. There are of course strong disagreements among evolutionary biologists, but they simply do not equivocate on the meaning of the word "evolution", because nobody offers that single word as an irreducible (or unknown) mechanism.
I don't see 'agent' as being equivocated on, if only because the ID question tends to be whether there is a way to discern between resulting acts of intelligence, or of chance. I'll say again I think the question is ultimately damn complex, but I'm glad enough there are now two sides to the argument popularly given rather than one. I know that you disagree and wish there were proper limits in place, but we've covered that.
Pez gives a good reference, though I'd go one further – I don't think 'intelligent cause' is offered as a mechanism necessarily. Ken Miller, if he really wanted to, could cite 'intelligent cause' to explain speciation – and then cite any and all of the mainstream proposals as mechanism. 'Intelligent cause' can't explain Houdini's tricks on its own, but it could (to me, certainly is) well be a property of the explanation.
First, let's get away from the specific case of "speciation" – I should not have focussed on that rather than "biological features" in general. Our discussion here is about what it means to explain anything by appeal to "intelligent cause" (or "intelligence" or "intelligent agency" etc), not just speciation.
As for explaining Houdini's tricks, I would say adding "intelligent cause" to any sort of explanation would convey zero information. Once you knew that Houdini did something, and you knew what it was he did, what could you possibly learn from being told "and it was intelligent, too!"
I don't see 'agent' as being equivocated on, if only because the ID question tends to be whether there is a way to discern between resulting acts of intelligence, or of chance.
I don't think "chance" explains anything either, but let's not get sidetracked on that. But yes of course "agent" is equivocated on; just from this thread we see it could mean anything from a physically determined search routine to an omnipotent immaterial godhead… and that I think is a bit too much leeway.
I'll say again I think the question is ultimately damn complex, but I'm glad enough there are now two sides to the argument popularly given rather than one. I know that you disagree and wish there were proper limits in place, but we've covered that.
I'd be happy if IDers said
"I think these features of biology and the universe were caused by…
… an immaterial being with a conscious mind or
… an extra-terrestrial life form or
… a physical process that retains information (learns) over time
or something equally specific, and then proceeded to list the evidence which was supposed to support their assertion.
Instead, IDers in general insist on lumping all of these things together, so if there is any reason to believe any one of these (or any number of other possible interpretations of "agent"), they can claim support for all of them – a fallacy of over-generalization. This is not intellectually honest.
Well, fine then – ID theorists will actually need to say what particular thing they are attempting to make a case for and then go about trying to make the case.
The relevant point, from an empirical perspective, is a clear hypothesis and resulting supporting data. If, for example, researchers were to find that an evolutionary process shows bias rather than randomness with respect to fitness and consequent predictable outcomes based on this, then they can leave the inevitable critiques to theists and atheists who will argue about the implications of the finds.
The relevant point, from an empirical perspective, is a clear hypothesis and resulting supporting data. If, for example, researchers were to find that an evolutionary process shows bias rather than randomness with respect to fitness and consequent predictable outcomes based on this, then they can leave the inevitable critiques to theists and atheists who will argue about the implications of the finds.
Bias with respect to fitness would of course be fascinating. At that point, we would want to begin to advance hypotheses to try to account for this observation.
The point I am making in this thread is that it is mistaken to believe that the hypothesis of "intelligence", if found to be true, serves to explain this observation. As we've seen, this term simply could refer to anything that results in such a bias, from unknown physical laws, to unknown processes that act according to physics as we currently understand it, to a conscious god… Without further specification, "intelligence" just doesn't rule anything out – as long as it results in the bias, it could be called "intelligent" according to some definition of that term.
So, while researchers should most definitely look for interesting things like mutation bias, their project should not be called "Intelligent Design Research"… unless, of course, they really do make clear what they mean by "Intelligent Design" so we can all see if their conclusions are truly warranted.
As for explaining Houdini's tricks, I would say adding "intelligent cause" to any sort of explanation would convey zero information. Once you knew that Houdini did something, and you knew what it was he did, what could you possibly learn from being told "and it was intelligent, too!"
'Houdini did something' implies intelligence and agency straightaway in that case. The intelligence adds explanation to the 'what it was he did' – there were more than physical actions going on, there were mental ones as well. Or so we'd assume.
just from this thread we see it could mean anything from a physically determined search routine to an omnipotent immaterial godhead"¦ and that I think is a bit too much leeway.
I don't see why it would be 'too much leeway', especially since the former can be employed by the latter for all we know. I think questions of agency are inherently confusing and foggy, so it's not 'intentionally being vague and misleading' so much as 'focus on a topic which is itself vague and difficult to grasp'.
Instead, IDers in general insist on lumping all of these things together, so if there is any reason to believe any one of these (or any number of other possible interpretations of "agent"), they can claim support for all of them – a fallacy of over-generalization. This is not intellectually honest.
In this same thread we have Raevmo talking about how speciation occurred 'without any evidence of a designer' and how therefore designers aren't necessary to the process. Is that an intellectually honest conclusion? Hell, is it an intellectually honest way of framing the topic?
IDers routinely say they don't need to get into the question of a designer's identity, and that they're concerned with design itself. I'm sure many would be and are willing to engage the topic of designer possibilities as a distinct question. Maybe an immaterial being with a conscious mind could employ a physical process that retains information towards an end. Maybe an ET could. Maybe processes have consciousness or something close to it, in part and in totality. Maybe those processes and their consciousness are part of an even greater 'intelligence' that is conscious. But it's worth asking if there is something about 'intelligence' that could be shared between all these things regardless of what is specifically asserted, and if such a thing can be identified in the universe apart from other things.
Again, at the end of the day, I'm just glad enough that the debate is on – and if what are confusing topics have their inherent confusion highlighted, wonderful. Someone should write a book called 'Intelligent Design, Chance and Science: Why Absolutely Everyone is Wrong'.
The point I am making in this thread is that it is mistaken to believe that the hypothesis of "intelligence", if found to be true, serves to explain this observation.
It could. It would depend on the constraints identified and alignment with theory. The main point I am making in this thread is that theists and atheists will never agree about the "ultimate reality" connected with physical processes because of bones of contention irrelevant to science itself.
'Houdini did something' implies intelligence and agency straightaway in that case. The intelligence adds explanation to the 'what it was he did' – there were more than physical actions going on, there were mental ones as well. Or so we'd assume.
Since you cannot tell me how to distinguish physical actions without mental actions from physical actions with mental actions, this appears to be moot. Saying "intelligence" was involved in what he did adds nothing at all to our understanding. Let's try it:
Q: How did Houdini escape from the cage?
A: He used a hairpin to pick the lock.
Q: Aha! I have one more question: Was intelligence involved?
Now, what difference could it possibly make how we answer this?
I don't see why it would be 'too much leeway', especially since the former can be employed by the latter for all we know. I think questions of agency are inherently confusing and foggy, so it's not 'intentionally being vague and misleading' so much as 'focus on a topic which is itself vague and difficult to grasp'.
That's just fine, as long as the researchers say "We don't really know what this means". But this is hardly the case. Instead, they insist on saying "We know from experience that intelligent agents do such-and-such", which implies that there is some well-understood class of things called "intelligent agents" and this class shares certain well-defined properties and so on. This is all completely BS.
In this same thread we have Raevmo talking about how speciation occurred 'without any evidence of a designer' and how therefore designers aren't necessary to the process. Is that an intellectually honest conclusion? Hell, is it an intellectually honest way of framing the topic?
Obviously these statements (like Dawkins') are to counter what is being perceived as the arguments from ID folks. This simply supports my point: The debates go round-and-round talking past each other because nobody bothers to define terms, period. So by all means, let us leave all talk of "designers" and "intelligence" out of biological science unless they are given precisely operationalized definitions!!!
IDers routinely say they don't need to get into the question of a designer's identity, and that they're concerned with design itself.
That is a completely confused statement. Who says a "designer" must have an "identity" Evolution doesn't have an "identity", so saying that there is something with an "identity" already plays on our intuitions about what sorts of things have identities (people and anthropomorphic projections have identities). And they need to say if "design itself" means "something created by a conscious mind" as some ID proponents would say…
I'm sure many would be and are willing to engage the topic of designer possibilities as a distinct question. Maybe an immaterial being with a conscious mind could employ a physical process that retains information towards an end. Maybe an ET could. Maybe processes have consciousness or something close to it, in part and in totality. Maybe those processes and their consciousness are part of an even greater 'intelligence' that is conscious.
Right. And maybe it has nothing to do with consciousness at all – like FMM thinks.
But it's worth asking if there is something about 'intelligence' that could be shared between all these things regardless of what is specifically asserted, and if such a thing can be identified in the universe apart from other things.
I think what you are saying is that it is worth trying to come up with a specific definition of "intelligence" that could be used in this research context. If that is what you are saying, we again are in full agreement
Again, at the end of the day, I'm just glad enough that the debate is on – and if what are confusing topics have their inherent confusion highlighted, wonderful. Someone should write a book called 'Intelligent Design, Chance and Science: Why Absolutely Everyone is Wrong'.
Or "Intelligent Design – How to Leverage Ambiguity and Equivocation for Specious Argumentation".
In this same thread we have Raevmo talking about how speciation occurred 'without any evidence of a designer' and how therefore designers aren't necessary to the process. Is that an intellectually honest conclusion? Hell, is it an intellectually honest way of framing the topic?
Isn't it? Speciation is not terribly difficult to understand from a purely mechanistic point of view. The observed instances conform to this view. Nobody ever noticed any designer playing a role.
Ok. Here is an interesting thought experiment. It often is quite useful to determine if a project that is being pursued might actually have the desired 'payout'.
Let's look at the best case scenario for intelligent design as it stands right now. Let's just assume that ID research managed to convince all biologists, every single one of them, including all granting agencies, that their design detection works and that, without a doubt, life on earth is the product of the design of an intelligent agent.
What do you think would happen now at this junction? How much knowledge would we have gained? How would biological research be altered? Please, be as specific as you can possibly be.
AIGUY: The point I am making in this thread is that it is mistaken to believe that the hypothesis of "intelligence", if found to be true, serves to explain this observation.
BRADFORD: It could. It would depend on the constraints identified and alignment with theory.
Let's stick with your example here. Say we find evidence that mutations are biased, which means something fundamental is wrong with current evolutionary theory. That's great. Now, you want to call this finding evidence of "intelligence" Or you want to say that this bias actually is an instance of intelligence? What?
I think that the only reason you want to bring the concept of "intelligence" into it is to allude to some beliefs that you have which are not warranted by this type of finding of bias in mutations.
The main point I am making in this thread is that theists and atheists will never agree about the "ultimate reality" connected with physical processes because of bones of contention irrelevant to science itself.
We completely agree about this. I'm adding that if the overly vague and connotation-laden label of "intelligence" was left out of the discussion, and people stopped trying to equivocate on its meaning, then scientists could research problems with our current theories, look for things like mutation bias, and whatever else they wanted to do, and nobody would ever accuse them of bringing religion into the lab or science classroom.
Let's stick with your example here. Say we find evidence that mutations are biased, which means something fundamental is wrong with current evolutionary theory.
Not to distract you from your excellent quest for operational definitions of intelligence, but what does it mean to say that mutations are biased? Most mutations are bad for fitness. In that sense they are biased. How could they not be biased? Indeed, some influential models of sexual selection rely on biased mutation in the sense that extreme male traits (such as the peacock's tail) are more likely to deteriorate than to become even more extreme under the influence of mutation.
Not to distract you from your excellent quest for operational definitions of intelligence, but what does it mean to say that mutations are biased? Most mutations are bad for fitness. In that sense they are biased. How could they not be biased? Indeed, some influential models of sexual selection rely on biased mutation in the sense that extreme male traits (such as the peacock's tail) are more likely to deteriorate than to become even more extreme under the influence of mutation.
This "bias" was Bradford's example. The specifics weren't important to my argument, so I didn't dwell on them. I took it to mean something like finding an increased frequency of mutations for some specific phenotypic change that is beneficial in some particular environment.
Since you cannot tell me how to distinguish physical actions without mental actions from physical actions with mental actions, this appears to be moot. Saying "intelligence" was involved in what he did adds nothing at all to our understanding. Let's try it:
Q: How did Houdini escape from the cage?
A: He used a hairpin to pick the lock.
Q: Aha! I have one more question: Was intelligence involved?
Now, what difference could it possibly make how we answer this?
For most people, the question was already answered before 'How did Houdini escape from the cage'.
Yes, I know about the problem of distinguishing the mental from the physical. My response is that it, at least, is a topic to be explored. If there's no way to truly distinguish between 'that which is caused by an agent' and 'that which is not caused by an agent' – and I'm willing to accept that – then THAT must be recognized too.
Instead, they insist on saying "We know from experience that intelligent agents do such-and-such", which implies that there is some well-understood class of things called "intelligent agents" and this class shares certain well-defined properties and so on. This is all completely BS.
Obviously these statements (like Dawkins') are to counter what is being perceived as the arguments from ID folks. This simply supports my point: The debates go round-and-round talking past each other because nobody bothers to define terms, period. So by all means, let us leave all talk of "designers" and "intelligence" out of biological science unless they are given precisely operationalized definitions!!!
I'm willing to accept there's a certain amount of BS being flung around – but I think it's being flung on all sides. You've already said 'two wrongs don't make a right', but I still stick with 'what are the realistic options?' Or further, how much blame can be placed on ID proponents for playing the science game by what amount to established rules?
I also don't think Dawkins' statements are only there 'to counter ID' – they're there to promote a certain point of view, and to promote it as the stuff of scientific discovery. The Blind Watchmaker was being touted well in advance of the Discovery Institute – the whole line of thought was present in advance of that as well. Even Darwin himself attacked certain ideas of agency through examples that relied on an interpretation of the mental.
That is a completely confused statement. Who says a "designer" must have an "identity" Evolution doesn't have an "identity", so saying that there is something with an "identity" already plays on our intuitions about what sorts of things have identities (people and anthropomorphic projections have identities). And they need to say if "design itself" means "something created by a conscious mind" as some ID proponents would say"¦
I think whether evolution has an effective 'identity' is an interesting topic, but not one I want to get into right now. Even defining 'conscious mind' is a trick.
Or "Intelligent Design – How to Leverage Ambiguity and Equivocation for Specious Argumentation".
Again, at least ID has called attention to a whole lot of worthwhile questions and distinctions on the subject. I'd rather have multi-party BS fights than a lack of controversy and only one side's BS is offered, and therefore taken as correct. I don't think ID is as vilified as it is because of a real belief that it's 'harming science'. I think it's largely a political fight, and what was supposed to only be evidence to support one viewpoint (Dawkins', etc) is now being rallied as evidence to support a swarm of opposing viewpoints (Dembski's, Behe's, even Miller's and Heller's, etc). And if the argument-ender is dropped and it's recognized that questions of design and designers can't be ruled on in either direction by science, it's a step backwards for a side that used to enjoy relatively unfettered BS rights.
Raevmo,
Isn't it? Speciation is not terribly difficult to understand from a purely mechanistic point of view. The observed instances conform to this view. Nobody ever noticed any designer playing a role.
As has been said, it's a BS counter. No one needs to notice a physical designer nearby, shooing portions of the population to another area, for design or a designer to be in play. 'I didn't notice one kind of designer, therefore all kinds of designers are ruled out'.
What do you think would happen now at this junction? How much knowledge would we have gained? How would biological research be altered? Please, be as specific as you can possibly be.
My own view is that setting ID on a sound empircal footing awaits a theory of information that would extend understanding initially advanced by Shannon. A theoretical Shannon Part II which would focus on transmission, storage and error correction of information within systems governed by chemical constraints. Beyond this I share Mike's view that ID is a concept that does not have to be scientifically supported and I do not mean by that physical systems cannot be cited in favor of ID. There are causal scenarios not best described by reductionist approaches but that is the topic of a likely future blog entry.
As far as what would happen at this junction, knowledge and research would be impacted by whatever it was that brought empirical credibility to an ID theory. So if, for example, an information theory made distinguishing predictions about information arising with as opposed to without the input of intelligence or provided a useful information entropy concept then biological systems so affected would incorporate such thinking as hueristic guides.
My response is that it, at least, is a topic to be explored.
Philosophers and cognitive scientists keep exploring! No problem!
If there's no way to truly distinguish between 'that which is caused by an agent' and 'that which is not caused by an agent' – and I'm willing to accept that – then THAT must be recognized too.
Agreed.
I'm willing to accept there's a certain amount of BS being flung around – but I think it's being flung on all sides. You've already said 'two wrongs don't make a right', but I still stick with 'what are the realistic options?' Or further, how much blame can be placed on ID proponents for playing the science game by what amount to established rules?
Yes, BS on all sides. Dawkins' ultra-Darwinism and insistence that we know nothing else is at work is BS. We need to keep this stuff out of the classroom (it is already kept out of the journals, however).
I also don't think Dawkins' statements are only there 'to counter ID' – they're there to promote a certain point of view, and to promote it as the stuff of scientific discovery. The Blind Watchmaker was being touted well in advance of the Discovery Institute – the whole line of thought was present in advance of that as well. Even Darwin himself attacked certain ideas of agency through examples that relied on an interpretation of the mental.
You're right.
Again, at least ID has called attention to a whole lot of worthwhile questions and distinctions on the subject.
I have noticed that people are more interested in AI since this whole thing started, which can't be a bad thing
I'd rather have multi-party BS fights than a lack of controversy and only one side's BS is offered, and therefore taken as correct.
Hold on, though. I agree we need to rip out talk of "mindless" evolution and "purposeless" and "blind" and "no mind's eye" and so on. This stuff has no place in biological science. That doesn't mean there is a controversy about the rest of it, or that it would somehow help to pretend ID has scientific merit.
And if the argument-ender is dropped and it's recognized that questions of design and designers can't be ruled on in either direction by science, it's a step backwards for a side that used to enjoy relatively unfettered BS rights.
Everybody is going to keep writing outrageous BS in their popular books, and we can't even try to change that. The heart of the matter is what is sanctioned by scientific institutions. Talk of minds and purpose are not published in biology journals (I suppose somebody will prove me wrong here, but I'm right for the vast majority of papers). So we need to make sure it's out of biology textbooks, and we're done.
As has been said, it's a BS counter. No one needs to notice a physical designer nearby, shooing portions of the population to another area, for design or a designer to be in play. 'I didn't notice one kind of designer, therefore all kinds of designers are ruled out'.
Of course it's not a BS counter. If there is no evidence of a designer and the observed process conforms to a mechanistic theory, then the designer hypothesis is totally superfluous. Occam's razor.
My own view is that setting ID on a sound empircal footing awaits a theory of information that would extend understanding initially advanced by Shannon. A theoretical Shannon Part II which would focus on transmission, storage and error correction of information within systems governed by chemical constraints. Beyond this I share Mike's view that ID is a concept that does not have to be scientifically supported and I do not mean by that physical systems cannot be cited in favor of ID. There are causal scenarios not best described by reductionist approaches but that is the topic of a likely future blog entry.
As far as what would happen at this junction, knowledge and research would be impacted by whatever it was that brought empirical credibility to an ID theory. So if, for example, an information theory made distinguishing predictions about information arising with as opposed to without the input of intelligence or provided a useful information entropy concept then biological systems so affected would incorporate such thinking as hueristic guides.
So, as far as I can tell from your answer: Biological research would be completely unchanged?
My own view is that setting ID on a sound empircal footing awaits a theory of information that would extend understanding initially advanced by Shannon. A theoretical Shannon Part II which would focus on transmission, storage and error correction of information within systems governed by chemical constraints.
Maybe so. (I think the tie between information and meaning (the problem of intentionality), much less conscious understanding, can't actually be approached from this direction, but that's another discussion).
Beyond this I share Mike's view that ID is a concept that does not have to be scientifically supported…
And I always need to emphasize that it is specifically the claim to scientific support that I object to. Anyone can speculate about the nature of mind and its causal role in the universe; just don't pretend that there is some concrete hypothesis there that has evidential support. (I think the ambiguity in the way many IDers speak about these issues would be rejected by philosophers too, though).
As far as what would happen at this junction, knowledge and research would be impacted by whatever it was that brought empirical credibility to an ID theory. So if, for example, an information theory made distinguishing predictions about information arising with as opposed to without the input of intelligence or provided a useful information entropy concept then biological systems so affected would incorporate such thinking as hueristic guides.
When you say "as opposed to without the input of intelligence" it means absolutely nothing to me. I have no way of telling what you could possibly be talking about. As far as I can tell, maybe you mean "living things" (life as we know it from Earth) or something. Or maybe you mean "not the result of physical necessity", which is something very different. Or maybe you mean…
I know I'm repeating myself, but I'm not sure why you don't take this point. Without saying which of these definitions/characterizations you mean, it means absolutely nothing to say things like "without the input of intelligence"!
So, as far as I can tell from your answer: Biological research would be completely unchanged?
Completely is too strong a word. I'm of the view that if an evolutionary theory never existed we would stilll use conserved concepts but would reference homology to some other paradigm making genetic similarities intelligible. So I'm not of the view that current research is driven by our understanding of geologic events.
I'm of the view that if an evolutionary theory never existed we would stilll use conserved concepts but would reference homology to some other paradigm making genetic similarities intelligible. So I'm not of the view that current research is driven by our understanding of geologic events.
So in the absolute best-case-scenario for ID, explanatory filter, CSI, IC all accepted by all biologists around the world, biological research would remain virtually unchanged. Hmm. That seems so odd to me, I don't even know what to say.
Does anybody else have any ideas how biology would change in this aforementioned best-case-scenario?
When you say "as opposed to without the input of intelligence" it means absolutely nothing to me. I have no way of telling what you could possibly be talking about.
This is not a problem for me. I start with obvious polar opposites and worry about boundaries later. If you wish to view quintessential examples of intelligence consider the works of Newton or Einstein. Intelligence can be bluntly obvious. Mike uses the example of a subcode in a genome detailing biblical events.
If you wish to view quintessential examples of intelligence consider the works of Newton or Einstein. Intelligence can be bluntly obvious.
I see – you must mean "without the input of white, male human beings". Is that right?
Mike uses the example of a subcode in a genome detailing biblical events.
No, I think that is an example of something that an "intelligent agent" might create, rather than an example of an intelligent agent per se, right?
"Without the input of intelligence". What does this mean? I have studied intelligent systems for thirty years, and I honestly, truly cannot say what you mean by this phrase.
(And please don't ask for a canonical definition of the "intelligent systems" I study, because as everyone in the discipline knows, there is none. We just study systems that people generally like to call "intelligent", and that's all there is to it. Nobody argues if any particular system is intelligent or not, because we all know it is meaningless).
Of course it's not a BS counter. If there is no evidence of a designer and the observed process conforms to a mechanistic theory, then the designer hypothesis is totally superfluous. Occam's razor.
There's plenty of evidence for a designer – it's simply not conclusive. Want to play with Occam's razor? Let's go.
1. There are two proposed kinds of speciation – 'natural' and artificial.
2. Artificial speciation has a designer – this is a certainty.
3. Whether natural speciation has a designer is an open question.
4. No designer needs to be physically present to have artificially arranged speciation. They can rely entirely on foresight (Front loading, etc).
5. Artificial speciation can explain all speciation.
Add Occam's razor, and a designer becomes the only reasonable explanation. Now we know why he was a monk. Maybe nowadays he'd be into Nick Bostrom's simulation theory. Hell, maybe he'd be both.
aiguy,
Hold on, though. I agree we need to rip out talk of "mindless" evolution and "purposeless" and "blind" and "no mind's eye" and so on. This stuff has no place in biological science. That doesn't mean there is a controversy about the rest of it, or that it would somehow help to pretend ID has scientific merit.
I'd be fine with ID being recognized as 'not science', if no-ID is also recognized as 'not science'. If Dawkins' and Stenger's nonsense were attacked with half of the gusto ID is attacked with (by the people who 'want to defend science'), I'd be satisfied. It's not happening. I don't think it will happen. Hell, outfits like Templeton are attacked with more hostility, and they at least effectively oppose ID.
Everybody is going to keep writing outrageous BS in their popular books, and we can't even try to change that. The heart of the matter is what is sanctioned by scientific institutions. Talk of minds and purpose are not published in biology journals (I suppose somebody will prove me wrong here, but I'm right for the vast majority of papers). So we need to make sure it's out of biology textbooks, and we're done.
That work still lies ahead of us. And even with that aside, there are other aspects to it – Behe's "Edge of Evolution" was just a book. Even if it's flawed, the treatment it got – the amount of anger present in reviews alone – indicates a problem. Especially compared to the sympathy the no-ID counters are received with. Because if you assert there's evidence of design in nature, you're a threat to science – but if you assert there's evidence of no-design in nature, you're either defending rational thought or 'just expressing your view, and that's okay'.
Because if you assert there's evidence of design in nature, you're a threat to science – but if you assert there's evidence of no-design in nature, you're either defending rational thought or 'just expressing your view, and that's okay'.
If you assert there is evidence of "design" in biology, then you have said nothing until you say what "design" means without equivocation.
If you assert that "design" implies conscious mind, then you really do not have evidence of this, and so this appears to be nothing but an animistic explanation that was purged from science for very good reason long ago.
If you assert "no design", then you've said nothing for the same reason. If you assert "no conscious mind" directing biology etc, then you too have made a statement that can't be evaluated by scientific means.
Science can say, however, that we have no empirical evidence for a conscious mind that started or directed the creation of biological structures.
Science can say, however, that we have no empirical evidence for a conscious mind that started or directed the creation of biological structures.
And no empirical evidence against – this before getting into 'conscious', 'mind', and 'conscious mind' all being topics we have serious trouble figuring out even with humans, where we supposedly know (yet have no real empirical evidence of) consciousness and minds are certainly in play.
Trying to pass off 'no evidence of design' as 'evidence of no design' is BS writ large, a subtle switch with big ramifications – and one which intentionally ignores the ocean of issues and limitations present in talking about such things.
There's plenty of evidence for a designer – it's simply not conclusive.
Yeah, sure. Like what?
1. There are two proposed kinds of speciation – 'natural' and artificial.
Give me an example of artificial speciation.
4. No designer needs to be physically present to have artificially arranged speciation. They can rely entirely on foresight (Front loading, etc).
Fantasy. Where's the evidence?
Add Occam's razor, and a designer becomes the only reasonable explanation.
You can't be serious. You're saying it looks just like a process without a designer, but in fact a designer set it all in motion a long time ago. You're *adding* a designer to the explanation. You're violating Occam's razor.
And no empirical evidence against – this before getting into 'conscious', 'mind', and 'conscious mind' all being topics we have serious trouble figuring out even with humans, where we supposedly know (yet have no real empirical evidence of) consciousness and minds are certainly in play.
Right.
Trying to pass off 'no evidence of design' as 'evidence of no design' is BS writ large, a subtle switch with big ramifications – and one which intentionally ignores the ocean of issues and limitations present in talking about such things.
Right. But I didn't try to pass it off – I didn't say the latter, only the former. Still, I understand your point.
If you and I can't reach common ground on this, I don't think any two people with differing beliefs about all this can. Here's my revised proposal for what is the right thing to do: We actually teach our budding scientists about how scientists study mind, introducing the difficulties in studying consciousness, the difficulties in measuring intelligence, how we try to model behaviors in AI, what neuroscience shows, and so on.
The measure of our success in this will be the following: When somebody says "Do you think intelligence was involved in the creation of life?" our students will correctly reply "What is that supposed to mean?"
Plenty. Do you deny any designers exist at all? Do you think there are aspects of nature which are in principle beyond the understanding of any designer? Can evolutionary principles be used by designers in the here and now?
Better yet – why don't you tell me what you're advocating as opposed to a designer? Primal chaos that just happens to be rational and understandable?
Give me an example of artificial speciation.
Let's go with the wikipedia example – look up speciation, head down to artificial speciation. That'll do for my purposes.
Fantasy. Where's the evidence?
Depending on the degree, where isn't it? In a weak sense, all I'd have to do is isolate populations in different environmental niches and wait. Maybe I'd have to wait a long time, but down the road it would happen. If I had more foresight, maybe I could tell what kind of changes would happen in a given environment over time. Maybe I could even tell when there would be another separation of population.
Do I have knock-down evidence that this is what happened? Nope – but I said there was no conclusive evidence in either direction.
You can't be serious. You're saying it looks just like a process without a designer, but in fact a designer set it all in motion a long time ago. You're *adding* a designer to the explanation. You're violating Occam's razor.
When did I say that? I'm saying that someone is asserting this 'natural speciation' as opposed to 'artificial'. The only difference between the two is that in artificial speciation, we have foresight and arrangement. But artificial speciation can explain all we see, including the natural speciation. So I'm chopping away the distinction – artificial's all we have.
You're the one adding something to the explanation; it's why you have to discern between two types of speciation to begin with. But what exactly are you adding? Again: Primal chaos?
You killed JFK. There's no evidence that you killed JFK, but hey trying to pass that off as evidence that you didn't kill JFK is BS.
Yeah, right.
Oh, calm down Raevmo. I don't honestly think my example is going to convince you – I'm pointing out that I can play the Occam's Razor game as well as anyone else. There's a reason a lot of people nowadays roll their eyes when it's brought up, you know. Namely, it doesn't really do the work everyone would like to think it does. No better way to illustrate that than cutting something people favor with it.
aiguy,
Right. But I didn't try to pass it off – I didn't say the latter, only the former. Still, I understand your point.
My apologies – I didn't mean to say you were trying to pass it off. I sometimes throw in 'you' to mean 'anyone'. Bad habit.
As for your example, it sounds reasonable enough. I'd probably add in some education about philosophy in general. But as an ideal, maybe it's close enough.
I see – you must mean "without the input of white, male human beings". Is that right?
No more so than I mean the particular hydrogen and oxygen molecules that bonded to form a molecule of water as a description of chemical reactions involving the combustion of hydrogen and oxygen. Assuming intelligence is a parochial quality limited to white males is stupidity.
"Deep Blue … has "goals", "plans", "foresight", and "experience" that leads to a "designed" outcome in the face of an uncertain "environment."
So then, to get back to the original dialog where you objected to "an intelligence designed life" as being meaningless, if we define the term "intelligence" using Deep Blue as an example of intelligence, with it's goal orientation, database of information, and generate-and-test abilities, will that suffice to make the statement "an intelligence may have designed the first earth life" meaningful to you?
AIGUY: I see – you must mean "without the input of white, male human beings". Is that right?
BRADFORD: No more so than I mean the particular hydrogen and oxygen molecules that bonded to form a molecule of water as a description of chemical reactions involving the combustion of hydrogen and oxygen.
And here is the difference: We can characterize quite precisely what we mean by "water molecules". You cannot, however, provide any useful characterization of what you mean by "intelligent agent". You can only give examples, and you cannot tell us how to generalize from those examples. I gave you a (ridiculous) guess at what might be the common attributes you were trying to illustrate in hopes that you would see what you were missing here.
So I still don't know what you mean when you say "without the input of intelligence".
So then, to get back to the original dialog where you objected to "an intelligence designed life" as being meaningless, if we define the term "intelligence" using Deep Blue as an example of intelligence, with it's goal orientation, database of information, and generate-and-test abilities, will that suffice to make the statement "an intelligence may have designed the first earth life" meaningful to you?
We need a definition rather than an example. Would you like to offer "goal oriented, with a database of information, and generate-and-test abilities" as your definition of "intelligent"
aiguy: Would you like to offer "goal oriented, with a database of information, and generate-and-test abilities" as your definition of "intelligent"
I haven't decided. I'm just testing your waters. Is "goal oriented, with a database of information, and generate-and-test abilities" meaningful enough for you? Or how about "goal-seeking algorithmic process?"
Hey all
I go away for a little while to see the new Indiana Jones flick and the whole nature of the conversation changes.
I don't remember if there are any loose ends that I need to clean up so if I have not answered anyone's questions let me know. I willing to let my outstanding questions go unanswered so don't worry about them
In the case of Dembski, it's clear he describes a conscious, deliberate agent with libertarian free will (or "directed contingency" as he prefers to call it).
The fact that you get "conscious, deliberate agent with libertarian free will" from "directed contingency" is evidence only of your bias I don't get any such thing I can see a computer coming up with the answer to a math problem as "directed contingency"
Instead, IDers in general insist on lumping all of these things together, so if there is any reason to believe any one of these (or any number of other possible interpretations of "agent"), they can claim support for all of them – a fallacy of over-generalization. This is not intellectually honest.
Actually it's just a sign of the early stage of this discussion. We have a hunch it's only a hunch and would like to explore it that's all.
And that is my whole beef with ID. I'm not against the ideas in general, nor am I a Darwin Defender at all. If IDers would simply make their assumptions explicit, instead of collectively lumping everything from a mechanical search to an omnipotent God all together under the label of "intelligent cause", then I would wish you all well and look for any interesting developments.
At some point the assumptions (and definitions) will get more explicit but it won't happen as the result of a discussion on the internet. It will happen as folks try to turn their hunches into hypotheses and their hypotheses into theories. If you don't have the patience to wait feel free to ignore the discussion I'm sure it will get along just fine with out you.
relax man
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 10:26 pm
I haven't decided. I'm just testing your waters. Is "goal oriented, with a database of information, and generate-and-test abilities" meaningful enough for you? Or how about "goal-seeking algorithmic process?"
I do think these are meaningful, yes. I also think this particular definition encompasses evolutionary processes, which I do not believe is the intent of most ID proponents.
aiguy: ID theorists will actually need to say what particular thing they are attempting to make a case for
When I suggested a "human-like intelligence" you rebuffed me for being too vague. A human mind is a "particular thing." We may not completely understand how it works, but we know the kinds of things it can do. To say a "human-like intelligence made the first life form" may contain many unknowns, but so does "a human-like intelligence designed the Empire State building." The point is, whether or not it is true, it is not a meaningless statement.
BTW, I'm not an ID "theorist". If anything, I'm an ID conjecturist.
aiguy, the term intelligence surfaces in research studies. Presumably the intelligent scientists using the term have some sense of the word. But it does serve as a wedge for atheistic motivated arguments.
The fact that you get "conscious, deliberate agent with libertarian free will" from "directed contingency" is evidence only of your bias I don't get any such thing I can see a computer coming up with the answer to a math problem as "directed contingency"
I'm not talking about you – I am taking about Bill Dembski. He describes intelligence as transcending physical causation, and he has written extensively expressing his opinion that algorithmic machines cannot be intelligent, meaning they cannot generate CSI. So your charge of "bias" is misplaced.
Actually it's just a sign of the early stage of this discussion. We have a hunch it's only a hunch and would like to explore it that's all.
Cool – I like hunches and exploration. I also like science, but that's a whole different matter.
At some point the assumptions (and definitions) will get more explicit but it won't happen as the result of a discussion on the internet. It will happen as folks try to turn their hunches into hypotheses and their hypotheses into theories. If you don't have the patience to wait feel free to ignore the discussion I'm sure it will get along just fine with out you.
People have been attempting to make more explicit assumptions, definitions, and hypotheses about mind for thousands of years. Philosophy of mind is ancient, and relatively little has changed over the millenia. The entire "ID Movement" has brought nothing new to any of these issues, but I'm sure philosophers and theologians thinking about these issues (as well as the actual scientists who explore mind in the cognitive sciences) will get along just fine without you.
aiguy, the term intelligence surfaces in research studies. Presumably the intelligent scientists using the term have some sense of the word. But it does serve as a wedge for atheistic motivated arguments.
"Intelligence" is never offered as an explanation of anything in any scientific discipline. Moreover, whenever the term is used (in psychology or other cognitive science) it is given an operational definition (such as "as indicated by the Stanford-Binet IQ tests"). Only ID attempts to pass off "unspecified intelligent cause" as an explanation.
So nice try, but my insistence on a meaningful definition of this term is not driven by any "atheistic motivated arguments". It is simply a requirement for having a technical discussion in science or philosophy.
KB: Is "goal oriented, with a database of information, and generate-and-test abilities" meaningful enough for you? Or how about "goal-seeking algorithmic process?"
aiguy: I also think this particular definition encompasses evolutionary processes…
Which is the same thing as saying that nature itself is a front-loaded process.
Edit: i.e, nature is a "goal-seeking algorithmic process".
Wrong. It has been correlated to behavior and even used to explain fitness metrics involved in evolutionary developments.
I believe in each case (of published science of course) you'll find an operational definition specified. If there is no definition offered, what definition are they using?
Edit: Really – an unspecified intelligent cause? I really find that hard to believe. Could you suggest a reference?
People have been attempting to make more explicit assumptions, definitions, and hypotheses about mind for thousands of years.
Yet your "whole beef "with ID is that it hasn't come up with any in less than 20 years. I'd say we are doing pretty good
Cool – I like hunches and exploration. I also like science, but that's a whole different matter.
Did you know you were on a blog whose owner says explicitly that ID is not science?
The entire "ID Movement" has brought nothing new to any of these issues, {explicit assumptions, definitions, and hypotheses about mind}
Who said we were trying to bring anything new to these issues? I for one could care less about these issues. I'm interested in if design can be detected empirically that's all. I leave you to worry about mind
but I'm sure philosophers and theologians thinking about these issues (as well as the actual scientists who explore mind in the cognitive sciences) will get along just fine without you.
They have so far and I have no intention of horning in now
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 11:05 pm
KB: Which is the same thing as saying that nature itself is a front-loaded process. i.e, nature is a "goal-seeking algorithmic process".
aiguy: Front-loaded by what?
Foul. That's outside the scope of the topic of our dialog, which is the nature of the proximate designer of the first earth life.
Or are you implying that we need to determine what caused the proximate cause no matter what the nature of the proximate cause is before we can progress?
I believe in each case (of published science of course) you'll find an operational definition specified. If there is no definition offered, what definition are they using?
That's no problem aiguy because an operational definition is context dependent. That's what is lacking with your complaints. You are creating sweeping negatives without consideration of context.
Yet your "whole beef "with ID is that it hasn't come up with any in less than 20 years. I'd say we are doing pretty good
No, my beef about ID is that it equivocates on the meaning of "intelligence".
Did you know you were on a blog whose owner says explicitly that ID is not science?
That's good.
I'm interested in if design can be detected empirically that's all. I leave you to worry about mind
Hmm, let's see. Your chosen definition for design includes "to conceive and plan out in the mind". But you aren't "worried about" mind? Seems odd.
kornbelt,
Foul. That's outside the scope of the topic of our dialog, which is the nature of the proximate designer of the first earth life.
Fair enough. (Again it's a terminology issue, this time regarding "front-loaded". I now conclude that in your usage, the term "front-loaded" does not imply that something intelligent was responsible).
Bradford,
That's no problem aiguy because an operational definition is context dependent. That's what is lacking with your complaints. You are creating sweeping negatives without consideration of context.
First, if you have references for these scientific papers that explain something by reference to an unspecified intelligence, I'd like to see them. I really think you'll find that in each case, the paper is talking about some specific animal, and not "intelligence" in the abstract. Moreover, if "intelligence" is offered as an explanation, a specific operationalized definition for "intelligence" in that context will be given.
Second, if it's no problem to provide an operational definition for "intelligence" in the context of ID Theory, please tell us what that might be.
Third, I don't know what you mean when you say I create "sweeping negatives without consideration of context". Can you explain this?
That's no problem aiguy because an operational definition is context dependent. That's what is lacking with your complaints. You are creating sweeping negatives without consideration of context.
Reading through, aiguy seems to be making some effort to get agreed definitions to avoid misunderstandings. Why not try working with "intelligence, intelligent" for the general use and "Intelligence, Intelligent" when referring to the specific use, as, I presume it has, among ID theorists. The same could easily apply to "designer" and, I suppose, "evolution".
1. There are two proposed kinds of speciation – 'natural' and artificial.
2. Artificial speciation has a designer – this is a certainty.
3. Whether natural speciation has a designer is an open question.
4. No designer needs to be physically present to have artificially arranged speciation. They can rely entirely on foresight (Front loading, etc).
5. Artificial speciation can explain all speciation.
From the point of view of the gene pool of the organism undergoing selection, there is absolutely no distinction between artificial and natural selection. A dog breeder is effectively the environment. The selection process involves differential success in producing progeny. The breeder has no method of evaluating outcomes of breeding experiments other than by viewing the results. It is the same process.
ETA:
A breeder cannot add to or alter the genome*, but can only select animals with the desired traits in the hope those traits will be heritable. Variations in genomes arising from mutations are the source of variation. The breeder is only exploiting the natural process. There is no substantive difference between artificial and natural selection.
*Of course genetic engineering suggests the future possibility of "designer genes", but the day a DNA sequence can be written from scratch by a human designer which, when introduced into an embryo, produces a predicted result, is a very long way off. Until that day it's "generate-and-test".
4. No designer needs to be physically present to have artificially arranged speciation. They can rely entirely on foresight (Front loading, etc).
John Davison (front loading advocate par excellence) states "The environment had nothing to do with [evolution]". Yet we always find species adapted to their niche, move an organism to a hostile environment and the population adapts or becomes extinct. How does "front-loading" account for that observation. Presumably the genetic information is present already, but what mechanism is there that unpacks the information in the right time and place?
By Occam's razor, differential survivability and reproductive success is the more powerful and simpler explanation, no?
Reading through, aiguy seems to be making some effort to get agreed definitions to avoid misunderstandings.
I disagree Alan. He's using definitions in an attempt to avoid the (for him) unpleasant reality that intelligence can be detected through physical evidence even if the source is unidentified. There are clear theological motives for doing this. For many years mainstreamers have asserted that biological processes and their origin have been devoid of telic features and some have even adopted imagary to stress the point; hence the blind watchmaker. But if physical processes are cited to support an argument favoring a particular theoretical lense then those same processes must be open to falsification or modification due to new data. This in turn can lead to new or revised theories. If this is not to be then we have a religious story about origins and not an empirical theory.
aiguy: First, if you have references for these scientific papers that explain something by reference to an unspecified intelligence, I'd like to see them.
I recall with much intereest the work of Jane Goodall who established through direct observation that animals other than humans were able to use tools. In that case the animals were chimps and the tools used to secure insectal meals. The point was made that the use of tools was evidence for a high level of intelligence. Since then other primates have been found to use tools. What is indicative of the flexibility of evidence is the capacity to detect first evidence of primate tool utilization prior to actually observing primate useage of branches, twigs, stones etc. Evidence at a scene can indicate tool useage where observation of primates using them has not taken place.
There is a parallel previously pointed out at TT where space exploration offers future possibilities of identifying evidence of intelligent design even when no intelligent organisms can be found. That would occur if the ruins of an advanced civilization were found on an uninhabitable planet once occupied by intelligent non-human organisms.
SETI currently searches for non-human intelligence based on bandwidth but there are rumblings among SETI enthusiasts of a need to diversity the search and look for other fingerprints in electromagnetic waves detectable on earth. The emphasis is on an identifiable physical entity (electromagnetic radiation) even as a source remains unknown or even perhaps non-existent.
A signal or a physical object, through its physical nature, can reveal an intelligent cause. To argue otherwise is to hide reality in a fog of obfuscating fears.
I disagree Alan. He's using definitions in an attempt to avoid the (for him) unpleasant reality that intelligence can be detected through physical evidence even if the source is unidentified.
Well, there's the problem in a nutshell. You use the word "intelligence" in that sentence, and I am wondering what you mean by it. By my convention, intelligence may be detectable, as you later talk about intelligence in bonobos, as they are observed to design and manufacture tools, (this tallies with aiguy's suggested definition) but are you not talking about "Intelligence" here, which means something different? This is what I am hoping to see a definition of. You used intelligent/intelligence eight times in your post.
There are clear theological motives for doing this. For many years mainstreamers have asserted that biological processes and their origin have been devoid of telic features and some have even adopted imagary to stress the point; hence the blind watchmaker.
Telic. I guess I was educated in the mainstream of the day, and I never came across its use in my classes, so I have only seen this word in the last three years after becoming interested in the ID phenomenon. It would help if there could be a consensus definition of teleology (and teleonomy) too.
1 a: the study of evidences of design in nature b: a doctrine (as in vitalism) that ends are immanent in nature c: a doctrine explaining phenomena by final causes
2: the fact or character attributed to nature or natural processes of being directed toward an end or shaped by a purpose
3: the use of design or purpose as an explanation of natural phenomena.
Teleonomy,
: the quality of apparent purposefulness of structure or function in living organisms due to evolutionary adaptation.
Presumably telic derives from teleology and not teleonomy;)
BTW looking at Barry A's thread at UD as an example of "was it designed". The tree grew by cell division into the shape constrained by its environment including the actions of the gardener. So is the shape of the tree a product of design or of its environment? And does that get us anywhere?
Hi Alan,
Your false dichotomy makes a Dembskian point quite nicely. Design can be detected without knowing how or where it was implemented. Design can inhere in the environment and constraining conditions. The point of his project is that it be evidenced in the artifact in question. It is not a mechanistic claim and that secondary question can be explored separately.
In the case of the tree, the design was implemented through the environment and likely some direct implementation. That there was a plan/conception and a purpose takes us to the fact that said environment was designed by the intelligence.
Whether the trophic characteristics of the tree, necessary for the implementation of this design, also reflect design is yet another question – perhaps out of reach. If an investigator is comfortable chalking them up to natural law then the design is seen to be realized through environment and natural law, ie. constraint and necessity. And yet the design is detectable.
But perhaps this is a question to be discussed more fully at UD?
He's using definitions in an attempt to avoid the (for him) unpleasant reality that intelligence can be detected through physical evidence even if the source is unidentified.
aiguy is doing no such thing. IF you were to define what you mean by intelligence, then we could actually look if said intelligence could be detected through physical evidence evenif the source is unidentified.
For example, if your definition of intelligence is "capable of using tools to shape artifacts" then we can and do detect the activity of intelligent beings all the time, without (or prior to) identifying a source. But since you can't or won't say what you mean by intelligence, we have no way to evaluate your claim that in general "intelligence can be detected".
It's just absolutely laughable that you can claim to be able to detect something, but you are unable to tell us exactly what it is you are detecting and how you are detecting it.
I recall with much intereest the work of Jane Goodall who established through direct observation that animals other than humans were able to use tools.
Oh. So Jane Goodall established an operational definition of intelligence during her research and then showed that chimps are intelligent, just like some other creatures who use tools.
How surprising. She actually does exactly what aiguy said any scientific paper would do– which is exactly the opposite of what you like to do.
Alan Fox: BTW looking at Barry A's thread at UD as an example of "was it designed". The tree grew by cell division into the shape constrained by its environment including the actions of the gardener. So is the shape of the tree a product of design or of its environment? And does that get us anywhere?
I think it's pretty clear the shape was designed by a particular, rather lazy species of ape known for such things.
False dichotomy? Please elaborate? If a false dichotomy is "typically used in an argument to force your opponent into an extreme position — by making the assumption that there are only two positions", then are you saying there is designed, not designed and another explanation? Is something not always either designed or not designed?
I am just asking what is meant by "design" and intelligence. Combining aiguy's definitions, how do you feel about intelligence being "the ability to cause a complex, functional mechanism to exist"
The point of his project is that it be evidenced in the artifact in question. It is not a mechanistic claim and that secondary question can be explored separately.
Not much change since Dembski said:
As for your example, I'm not going to take the bait. You're asking me to play a game: "Provide as much detail in terms of possible causal mechanisms for your ID position as I do for my Darwinian position." ID is not a mechanistic theory, and it's not ID's task to match your pathetic level of detail in telling mechanistic stories. If ID is correct and an intelligence is responsible and indispensable for certain structures, then it makes no sense to try to ape your method of connecting the dots. True, there may be dots to be connected. But there may also be fundamental discontinuities, and with IC systems that is what ID is discovering.
In the case of the tree, the design was implemented through the environment and likely some direct implementation. That there was a plan/conception and a purpose takes us to the fact that said environment was designed by the intelligence.
Whether the trophic characteristics of the tree, necessary for the implementation of this design, also reflect design is yet another question – perhaps out of reach. If an investigator is comfortable chalking them up to natural law then the design is seen to be realized through environment and natural law, ie. constraint and necessity.
So, as I said, does that get us anywhere?
And yet the design is detectable.
Yes via a 5 minute internet search using the watermark and finding pooktre's website. Would the explanatory filter have produced a similar result?
But perhaps this is a question to be discussed more fully at UD?
Perhaps not for those of us who have difficulty with the registration procedure;)
Hi Alan,
There was no substance to your comment which was not answered the first time. Was it a product of design or its environment? Why, yes. Both. No dichotomy.
As for AI guy's definitions, I'd have responded to them without your prompting if I thought that discussion needed me. Nonetheless, your question is answered and the definitions are not germane to your objections.
Your trotting out of Dembski's accurate statement is wiki-rhetoric and painfully predictable. Identifying the design of the the tree-chair didn't require an internet search nor does it require a mechanistic explanation of the designer's procedure.
Zach can see that the design is pretty clearly.
Identifying the design of the the tree-chair didn't require an internet search nor does it require a mechanistic explanation of the designer's procedure.
Well, until I checked, I couldn't eliminate photoshop trickery or that the structure was an artificial construct and, as you say:
You're not a simpleton.
Thanks for the compliment:P
Now, my question still stands, does looking at a picture of an espaliered tree get us anywhere? I understand, I think, what design is in a general sense, but what progress can be made if you are coy about defining "Design" and "Intelligence"
AIGUY: "Intelligence" is never offered as an explanation of anything in any scientific discipline.
BRADFORD: Wrong. It has been correlated to behavior and even used to explain fitness metrics involved in evolutionary developments.
I've asked you twice now to tell us what you might be referring to, but you haven't responded. I must assume now you've found that I'm right: No scientific discipline ever offers the concept of "intelligence" in the abstract as an explanation for anything. Only ID tries to do this.
That's no problem aiguy because an operational definition is context dependent. That's what is lacking with your complaints. You are creating sweeping negatives without consideration of context.
I have also pressed you several times to provide the operational definition for "intelligence" that you believe suits the purposes of ID research, and again you have not responded. I must assume you realize there is no definition of "intelligence" that will support the goals IDers. Either your definition will invoke metaphysical suppositions that you can never evidence (like causes that "do not result from physical necessity") or your definition will be so broad that it encompasses all sorts of processes, such as a process of Darwinian evolution.
He's using definitions in an attempt to avoid the (for him) unpleasant reality that intelligence can be detected through physical evidence even if the source is unidentified. There are clear theological motives for doing this.
Here you have abandoned any attempt to address my points, and instead begin to focus on my emotional motivations. These do not constitute arguments against my position (and in addition they are false).
The point was made that the use of tools was evidence for a high level of intelligence. Since then other primates have been found to use tools.
If you read Goodall, or any ethologist studying animal intelligence, you'll see just what I've explained to you: Intelligence is not an explanation of anything.
SETI currently searches for non-human intelligence…
I never understand why ID folks look to SETI for support (the compliment is certainly not returned). SETI researchers use evolutionary biology to guage the probability that biological life form exist on other planets, and then they go looking for them by looking for signals that are not otherwise found in nature. In stark contrast, ID observes things that are found in nature (biological life forms) and goes looking for something completely undefined – except for its purported ability to create living things.
If ID wants to suggest that extra-terrestrial life as SETI hypothesizes it is the cause of life on Earth, then they can join Crick and the others who have toyed with this idea. That at least is a theory with some content, since at least we do have knowledge of biological life forms from our experience of life on Earth. Unfortunately, that theory has languished for lack of evidence, and also for lack of interest (since it fails to answer the question of biological life came to exist).
A signal or a physical object, through its physical nature, can reveal an intelligent cause. To argue otherwise is to hide reality in a fog of obfuscating fears.
The more you cast aspersions on my motives, the more it appears you are projecting. In any event, let's see if we can stick to the issues, yes?
I will ask one more time: What is the operational defintion of intelligent cause that you would like to use in this context?
Well, until I checked, I couldn't eliminate photoshop trickery or that the structure was an artificial construct and, as you say:
Photoshop trickery produced by the environment? Nope. By intelligent design. You saw the design regardless of its source and regardless of the degree of environmental influence.
Who's being coy about definitions? The beginning of this thread seems plastered with definitions.
Behe told us what he meant by design at his first at bat:"Purposeful arrangement of parts".
The word intelligent is not added as an additional, to-be-defined-descriptor, but as clarification of what is being said when we say "design". This is in reaction to coy definition mongering by those who recognize the design and call it "apparent" or say that it is created by chance.
Behe further tells us that the design entails planning, foresight and knowledge.
His use is in keeping with commonly held positions, the dictionary and that of fifth monarchy man at the beginning of this thread.
I haven't followed it throughout so I don't know if this steps on the toes of others who have different definitions, but I see no coyness here.
aiguy: SETI researchers use evolutionary biology to guage the probability that biological life form exist on other planets, and then they go looking for them by looking for signals that are not otherwise found in nature. In stark contrast, ID observes things that are found in nature (biological life forms) and goes looking for something completely undefined – except for its purported ability to create living things.
All of these things are "found in nature." What do you mean by "otherwise?" and how do you know the first life form on earth shouldn't be in that catergory?
Hi hrun,
Yes to the first.
I'm not sure about the second.
If this is a complaint about the wet-bench experimental work or lack of same by ID proponents it's a separate complaint altogether from what I am discussing with Alan.
===
Alan,
Neither do you have to re-ask whether inferring ID is of any use to us. Increasing our true knowledge of the world is of use to some and pointless to others. for any utilitarian benefits you can search or talk to someone else.
All of these things are "found in nature." What do you mean by "otherwise?"
This is what SETI researchers describe. They look for narrow-band transmissions because no other known astrophysical process generates them.
and how do you know the first life form on earth shouldn't be in that catergory?
We know is that life on Earth exists; we don't know why.
Pez
Who's being coy about definitions? The beginning of this thread seems plastered with definitions.
You'll see no agreement on these defintions! The fact that ID is supposed to be a "theory" that offers "intelligence" as its sole explanatory construct, yet fails to provide a technical definition for this term, is truly hard to fathom.
Behe told us what he meant by design at his first at bat:"Purposeful arrangement of parts".
Here you have a definition of the word "design" as a noun. This is a completely different definition than the one ID-friendly FMM here suggested above in this thread! Unfortunately it says nothing about what sorts of causes might result in "designs". To say some artifact is "purposeful" does not mean that the cause of that thing had a conscious or deliberate purpose in mind… or does it?
The word intelligent is not added as an additional, to-be-defined-descriptor, but as clarification of what is being said when we say "design".
If the term "intelligent" is supposed to clarify something, then please write down one single clear definition of this term in the context of ID!
I haven't followed it throughout so I don't know if this steps on the toes of others who have different definitions, but I see no coyness here.
aiguy: This is what SETI researchers describe. They look for narrow-band transmissions because no other known astrophysical process generates them.
Cells and their internal mechanisms are are not caused by any known physical processes either, except from previous cells that know how to make them.
Of what use could any narrow-band signal not known to be generated by astrophysical processes be in determining whether "intelligent life" (whatever that means) generated it? What could we ever conclude from it?
aiguy: If the term "intelligent" is supposed to clarify something, then please write down one single clear definition of this term in the context of ID!
What does "intelligent" mean in "SETI" If it merely means something "other than astrophysical processes", how does that clarify anything?
It would seem to me that SETI is no more scientific than looking for a designer's signatures in genomes.
Is looking for "Yahweh did it" in the genome science?
Hi AI Guy,
I didn't say there was agreement. I suggested there might not be. But since Behe's name has come up, and since he is so closely associated with the concept, I think his lack of coyness in defining design answers Alan Fox's question quite well.
Here you have a definition of the word "design" as a noun. This is a completely different definition than the one ID-friendly FMM here suggested above in this thread! Unfortunately it says nothing about what sorts of causes might result in "designs".
It looks equally like a verb to me. Is that relevant? The cause is purposefulness; that is, intent, will, foresight, desire, etc.
To say some artifact is "purposeful" does not mean that the cause of that thing had a conscious or deliberate purpose in mind"¦ or does it?
I believe it does. Bradford and nulasallus may not agree, but I am certain that is what Behe et al are claiming.
If the term "intelligent" is supposed to clarify something, then please write down one single clear definition of this term in the context of ID!
I already did. !
Design is the purposeful arrangement of parts.
With clarification:
Design is the purposeful arrangement of parts by an intelligent agent in contradistinction to purposeless forces.
Cells and their internal mechanisms are are not caused by any known physical processes either, except from previous cells that know how to make them.
Yup, except for that!
Of what use could any narrow-band signal not known to be generated by astrophysical processes be in determining whether "intelligent life" (whatever that means) generated it? What could we ever conclude from it?
SETI folks argue that evolutionary theory points to the possibility of biological life as we know it might evolve on other suitable planets. To see if this is true, they try to think of what life as we know it might do to make their presence known, and they've decided that we would send signals out into space that were different from all of the other signals out there (narrow-band EM transmissions).
What does "intelligent" mean in "SETI"
Unlike ID, SETI doesn't try to explain anything by using that word. They aren't positing some unspecified abstract "intelligence" or anything. They are talking explicitly about biological life forms as we know them. The descriptive term "intelligent" applied to the life forms SETI looks for means nothing but "able to send signals into space" in the context of SETI.
It would seem to me that SETI is no more scientific than looking for a designer's signatures in genomes.
SETI is looking for extra-terrestrial life forms. ID can't say what it is looking for. (And by the way, SETI is not a theory).
Pez
I didn't say there was agreement. I suggested there might not be. But since Behe's name has come up, and since he is so closely associated with the concept, I think his lack of coyness in defining design answers Alan Fox's question quite well.
I see. Yes, I appreciate anyone who actually attempts to provide technical definitions rather than, say, arguing that they are not important
It looks equally like a verb to me. Is that relevant?
Yes: Much of the confusion surrounding what ID posits results from conflating the noun and verb forms of the word "design". Just look at what FMM says above vs. what Behe says to see how IDers use these words in completely different ways from each other.
The cause is purpose
I do not believe that "purpose" is characterized as a cause in a way that we can detect when it is or is not operating. If you disagree, please tell me what the method is for detecting "purpose".
that is, intent, will foresight, desire, etc.
More of the same. What is the test for "will", Pez?
I believe it does. Bradford and nulasallus may not agree, but I am certain that is what Behe et al are claiming.
IDers disagree about the fundamental tenets of ID theory – the very meaning of the sole explanatory concept offered by ID. I'm trying to see if there is any common ground at all. In any event, nullasalus thinks consciousness is a critical component of ID, but admits there are no empirical tests that could be applied in the context of ID.
hrun: For example, if your definition of intelligence is "capable of using tools to shape artifacts" then we can and do detect the activity of intelligent beings all the time, without (or prior to) identifying a source. But since you can't or won't say what you mean by intelligence, we have no way to evaluate your claim that in general "intelligence can be detected".
I pointed out that evidence for intelligence is context dependent. The use of tools can be one context. Patterns in electromagnetic radiation another context. The ability to solve a test problem requiring spatial aptitudes another context. The ability to compose music another context. The ability to construct high technology (by 21st century human standards) anywhere in the universe by any type of being is another context. The ability to construct encoded systems utilizing symbols is another context. The list is, for practical purposes, endless. There is a common denominator to all. The traversing of a causal pathway to whatever the outcome involving intelligent input is marked by the capabilities of a mind(s) overcoming critical obstacles along the way. That morsal of food would not have been obtained without the use of a tool. Symbolism within a code was assigned to effect communication within a system etc. Of course I'm not explaining anything you have not been exposed to so the question is why do you pretend definitions are an insuperable obstacle to intelligent design? If they are not then why the effort on your part?
aiguy: Unlike ID, SETI doesn't try to explain anything by using that word. They aren't positing some unspecified abstract "intelligence" or anything.
They must be implicitly "explaining" something. At bare minimum, the sender must have an "intelligence at least as powerful as ours" since "it can send out signals like we can." Like it or not, that says something meaningful about the senders beyond the bald fact that they send signals out.
They are talking explicitly about biological life forms as we know them. The descriptive term "intelligent" applied to the life forms SETI looks for means nothing but "able to send signals into space" in the context of SETI.
OK, perhaps they should call it, "Search for Extra-terrestrial Critters Who Would Send Out a Signal Like We Can." Or SETCWWSOSLWC for short.
No reason to conclude they are "intelligent" since we don't have a definition for that.
Several people in this thread have tried: purpose, foresight, knowledge. In order to send out a signal, they would need those at least in the same abundance as humans, do you agree?
KB: It would seem to me that SETI is no more scientific than looking for a designer's signatures in genomes.
aiguy: SETI is looking for extra-terrestrial life forms… (And by the way, SETI is not a theory).
You didn't address what I said. SETI looks for signals. How is that different than looks for "signals" or signatures in a genome? Anyway, I agree, SETI is not a theory. It's merely a research program.
aiguy: ID can't say what it is looking for
What ID is looking for is signs of intelligence (purpose, foresight, knowledge), as a prerequisite for earth life, particularly the first life form, as my interest goes.
aiguy: I've asked you twice now to tell us what you might be referring to, but you haven't responded. I must assume now you've found that I'm right: No scientific discipline ever offers the concept of "intelligence" in the abstract as an explanation for anything. Only ID tries to do this.
Why use the term abstract when every time I use an example I refer to concrete circumstances? We don't use the word evolve in the abstract either do we even though the word is fraught with multiple meanings and ambiguity. Like the term evolve the term intelligence is context dependent. By ignoring specifics and pretending that useage is an abstraction you are confirming that the definition charade is a poor attempt at debunking ID.
Of course I'm not explaining anything you have not been exposed to so the question is why do you pretend definitions are an insuperable obstacle to intelligent design? If they are not then why the effort on your part?
So which one of those many "definitions" you cited is the operational one for ID?
Unlike ID, SETI doesn't try to explain anything by using that word. They aren't positing some unspecified abstract "intelligence" or anything. They are talking explicitly about biological life forms as we know them. The descriptive term "intelligent" applied to the life forms SETI looks for means nothing but "able to send signals into space" in the context of SETI.
What is not said is revealing. The ability to send signals into space presumes a level of highly developed technology. The signals are evidence of a secondary implication requiring a mind to effect. And we cannot tell anything about the source other than that it is intelligent; presumptions about biological make-up notwithstanding.
So which one of those many "definitions" you cited is the operational one for ID?
All can be operational within their respective contexts. What is your definition of evolve and how is it operational for all contexts and at the same time non-trivial?
My explanatory filter tells me that Bradford must be losing the argument. He is resorting to insults again.
An insult is personal Raevmo. Pointing out an ineffective line of reasoning is not except perhaps to sensitive types who feel threatened by disagreement. Is that an insult? If the shoe fits…
All can be operational within their respective contexts. What is your definition of evolve and how is it operational for all contexts and at the same time non-trivial?
Bradford, we are not looking for a definition of intelligence that is operational for all contexts. We just want a definition of intelligence that is operational in the context of ID, where it somehow can be detected.
Is this really such a difficult notion?
There is the claim that the action of an intelligent agent can be detected in the design of certain features in biology. THIS is the context we are talking about here. Can you tell us the operational definition of intelligence in THIS context?
An insult is personal Raevmo. Pointing out an ineffective line of reasoning is not except perhaps to sensitive types who feel threatened by disagreement. Is that an insult? If the shoe fits"¦
There is the claim that the action of an intelligent agent can be detected in the design of certain features in biology. THIS is the context we are talking about here. Can you tell us the operational definition of intelligence in THIS context?
That necessary to replicate and evolve. Have you figured out how an initial genome would be formed?
That is your operational definition of intelligence? So a bacterium has intelligence? So a bacterium could have been the intelligent designer which might be responsible for all those features in biology? That surely doesn't make any sense.
Why use the term abstract when every time I use an example I refer to concrete circumstances?
Your examples are concrete, but the cause that ID hypothesizes is utterly abstract, to the point where ID can't even say if this abstract, unspecified "intelligent agent" is even a physical thing. It doesn't get more abstract than that.
We don't use the word evolve in the abstract either do we even though the word is fraught with multiple meanings and ambiguity.
The single word "evolve" is never meant as an explanation obviously; there is a huge literature describing all of the mechanisms of evolution. Yet when I ask IDers to expand on the single word "intelligent", we get either a description of metaphysical assumptions (such as free will) or we get something that describes all sorts of things that IDers don't really want to include in their theory (like evolutionary processes).
Like the term evolve the term intelligence is context dependent.
The explanatory concepts in evolutionary theory are all defined quite specifically, and there is no ambiguity about what "mutations" or "differential reproduction" or "heritability" and these other concepts mean, and everyone agrees on what they mean. In contrast, there is great disagreement (even among IDers on this very board!) on what this single explanatory concept ("inteligence") is supposed to mean in the context of ID.
What is not said is revealing. The ability to send signals into space presumes a level of highly developed technology. The signals are evidence of a secondary implication requiring a mind to effect.
No, in SETI minds aren't implied by signals; minds are implied by brains, which are implied by the encephalization quotients predicted by SETI researchers using evolutionary theory. See here for example: http://www.space.com/searchfor...
Bradford,
There are now 180 messages on this thread, and we still do not have an empirically accessible definition for the "intelligent cause" that ID offers as its sole explanatory concept. Even the IDers disagree fundamentally about what it is supposed to mean.
Won't you admit that this means we can't yet being to evaluate the plausibility of "ID" against the evidence, since nobody can say what is being suggested?
Me:It looks equally like a verb to me. Is that relevant?
Yes: Much of the confusion surrounding what ID posits results from conflating the noun and verb forms of the word "design". Just look at what FMM says above vs. what Behe says to see how IDers use these words in completely different ways from each other.
I don't see a problem with any conflation. Behe's definition is equally applicable to design as a verb or a noun.
noun: Parts purposefully arranged.
verb: To purposefully arrange parts.
I do not believe that "purpose" is characterized as a cause in a way that we can detect when it is or is not operating.
That's the entire point of ID; can we detect purpose? The proponents say yes. Interestingly, so do their critical counterparts who say we've tested for it and found it absent.
. If you disagree, please tell me what the method is for detecting "purpose".
…
More of the same. What is the test for "will", Pez?
It's the same test as that for not-purpose and not-will.
AI Guy,
On "mutations" there is great ambiguity. Just try arguing that there is more to variation than mutations to find out how much. And then try throwing in the equally ambiguous descriptor "random".
There is also much ambiguity in the definitions for life, species, gene, etc. And yet we have a whole science devoted to studying these.
Odd. I always thought that mutation was quite well defined as changes in the genome sequence. What's the ambiguity? It's well defined. We can use this definition to see if something is a mutation. We can use this definition to test what causes mutations. And so forth.
Now. Can you give a similar definition for intelligence in the context of ID?
And note that we can go ahead and also give you workable definitions of the terms used here, like genome and sequence. So, if you give a definition of intelligence that includes terms like 'purpose' or 'foresight' can you also tell us how we can detect those things?
Nope – they are hypothesizing that life exists elsewhere (based on evolutionary theory) and they're looking for it.
At bare minimum, the sender must have an "intelligence at least as powerful as ours" since "it can send out signals like we can." Like it or not, that says something meaningful about the senders beyond the bald fact that they send signals out.
What does it mean – that if they took our human IQ tests, their scores would be higher than ours? That's ridiculous. We would know nothing except that they could send these signals. SETI folks would say their hypothesis that life exists elsewhere has evidence.
Several people in this thread have tried: purpose, foresight, knowledge. In order to send out a signal, they would need those at least in the same abundance as humans, do you agree?
The only reason we would suspect that they had human-like minds is because based on evolutionary theory SETI hypothesized that life forms similar to us may have evolved elsewhere. This doesn't come from some theory of intelligence, it comes from our knowledge of life on Earth and the SETI assumptions based on evolutionary theory.
What ID is looking for is signs of intelligence (purpose, foresight, knowledge), as a prerequisite for earth life, particularly the first life form, as my interest goes.
There is no such thing as a "sign of intelligence" in the abstract. There are only signs of actual living things who we may wish to call intelligent.
That's the entire point of ID; can we detect purpose? The proponents say yes. Interestingly, so do their critical counterparts who say we've tested for it and found it absent.
Before you even ask the question, you must say what "purpose" is supposed to mean. In cybernetics, a purposeful system is defined as one that uses negative feedback to navigate toward a goal. Is this what you mean?
There is also much ambiguity in the definitions for life, species, gene, etc. And yet we have a whole science devoted to studying these.
What you are missing is that none of these concepts are ever offered as an explanation of anything! Whenever something is hypothesized to explain some phenomena, scientists must characterize the explanatory concepts with sufficient clarity so we can see if that is actually what is responsible or not. For example, consider:
Q: Why do worms reproduce?
A: Because they are alive
This is NOT a helpful explanation because life is (loosely) defined as things that reproduce and have metabolisms and… whatever. Likewise:
Q: How can squirrels find acorns?
A: Because they are intelligent
This is NOT a helpful explanation either, for the same reason. In contrast:
Q: Why do giraffes have long necks?
A: Because ancestor giraffes were born with genetic mutations that cause longer necks, and the offspring of these had disproportionate numbers of offspring….
Whether you think this explanation is true or not, it does not suffer from ambiguity of terms. We all agree on what these concepts mean.
====
AIguy,
As for a definition of purpose, back to normal use and dictionaries for me.
Purpose is the intended goal, the effect or result of a desire, the reason that something is done, .
As a verb, to intend or determine an outcome.
What you are missing is that none of these concepts are ever offered as an explanation of anything!
As I said, neither is "intelligence".
Intelligence is the clarifier for those who were ambiguous with the term "design".
What is being inferred in ID is design, ie. the exercise of purpose.
This implies intelligence. But some claim design and purpose do not require intelligence (by definition then, they deny the design and purpose they are seeking to describe), so, as a popular term, intelligence is added to the name.
Is it not? I think it is a pretty clear definition and I don't think many scientists would argue about it.
Is the ambiguity in the word "random" then?
Of course that is where ambiguity is. Mutations are not random in the sense that they are not evenly distributed across the genome. Mutations are not random in the sense that not every base is affected equally by every mutagenic agent. And so forth
So, if somebody claims that mutations are random, then I would suggest to ask what they mean by random, no?
aiguy: There are now 180 messages on this thread, and we still do not have an empirically accessible definition for the "intelligent cause" that ID offers as its sole explanatory concept.
I identified the common denominator to design examples and explained that distinguishing empirical evidence is context dependent. I've also been asking for "a non-trivial, empirically accessible definition for "evolve." The answer is the same. It is either context dependent or a trivial change over time bit of nonsense.
hrun: The explanatory concepts in evolutionary theory are all defined quite specifically, and there is no ambiguity about what "mutations" or "differential reproduction" or "heritability" and these other concepts mean, and everyone agrees on what they mean. In contrast, there is great disagreement (even among IDers on this very board!) on what this single explanatory concept ("inteligence") is supposed to mean in the context of ID.
There is no ambiguity about mutations and there is also no ambiguity about the theoretical framework and imagary attached to mutations. Their non-telic presumption is based on other concepts like randomness and the lack of a rudder to an evolutionary process. But these concepts also suggest what could constitute evidence of bias and direction to a mutation process.
hrun: So a bacterium has intelligence? So a bacterium could have been the intelligent designer which might be responsible for all those features in biology? That surely doesn't make any sense.
Of course you left out the reference to an initial genome which explains the replication capacity of bacterium. You assume the cause aligns with your perception of reality even though you are unable to cite the cause.
As for a definition of purpose, back to normal use and dictionaries for me.
Purpose is the intended goal, the effect or result of a desire, the reason that something is done, .
As a verb, to intend or determine an outcome.
Not so good, I'm afraid. You now say that purpose is "the reason that something is done". Therefore, the purpose of rainclouds is to rain, and the act of raining is purposeful, thus intelligent.
AIGUY: If you disagree, please tell me what the method is for detecting "purpose". "¦ More of the same. What is the test for "will", Pez?
PEZ: It's the same test as that for not-purpose and not-will.
This makes no sense. You are offering "purpose" or "will" as a cause of certain phenomena. I ask how can we tell that it really is "purpose" or "will" and not something else that is involved. If you can't come up with a way, then we can't tell if ID is true or not.
aiguy: What does it mean – that if they took our human IQ tests, their scores would be higher than ours? That's ridiculous. We would know nothing except that they could send these signals.
No. We would know they were at least as intelligent as we are when it comes to making radios that can send signals. That says something meaningful about them beyond the mere fact of the signal itself.
aiguy: SETI folks would say their hypothesis that life exists elsewhere has evidence.
What would the signal require as a minimum to indicate intelligence over "known astrophysical processes?"
I identified the common denominator to design examples and explained that distinguishing empirical evidence is context dependent.
No, you have identified no common denominator, and no, you have not given any method to distinguish intelligence in the context of ID (where the supposed "intelligence" is a completely abstract reference).
I've also been asking for "a non-trivial, empirically accessible definition for "evolve." The answer is the same. It is either context dependent or a trivial change over time bit of nonsense.
No – I'm no biologist, but even I know this: Darwinian evolution explains biological forms like this: Organisms vary in ways that affect their ability to reproduce, and these variable traits are at least partially heritable. In situations where the organisms compete for resources, traits that serve to enhance reproduction will spread throughout a population…. and so on.
Why use the term abstract when every time I use an example I refer to concrete circumstances?
Your examples are concrete, but the cause that ID hypothesizes is utterly abstract, to the point where ID can't even say if this abstract, unspecified "intelligent agent" is even a physical thing. It doesn't get more abstract than that.
What is not said is revealing. The ability to send signals into space presumes a level of highly developed technology. The signals are evidence of a secondary implication requiring a mind to effect.
No, in SETI minds aren't implied by signals; minds are implied by brains, which are implied by the encephalization quotients predicted by SETI researchers using evolutionary theory. See here for example: http://www.space.com/searchfor...
No. We would know they were at least as intelligent as we are when it comes to making radios that can send signals. That says something meaningful about them.
Think about what you are saying! Here, try this:
I'm thinking of something. Can you tell me anything about what I'm thinking about? No, not yet… I haven't told you anything about it yet.
What if I tell you it can emit narrow-band EM signals? What do you know about it now? You know that it can emit narrow-band EM signals, and that is all you know.
What if I tell you it is intelligent? What do you know about it now?
You know not a single thing more than you did before I said this, because "intelligence" doesn't have any meaning when applied in the abstract like this (or like it is in ID).
What would the signal require as a minimum to indicate intelligence over "known astrophysical processes?"
aiguy: The only reason we would suspect that they had human-like minds is because based on evolutionary theory SETI hypothesized that life forms similar to us may have evolved elsewhere. This doesn't come from some theory of intelligence, it comes from our knowledge of life on Earth and the SETI assumptions based on evolutionary theory.
Evolutionary theory adds precisely nothing to the basic intuitive notion that "life may exist that can send signals from elsewhere because we know we exist and we can send signals."
KB: What ID is looking for is signs of intelligence (purpose, foresight, knowledge), as a prerequisite for earth life, particularly the first life form, as my interest goes.
aiguy: There is no such thing as a "sign of intelligence" in the abstract. There are only signs of actual living things who we may wish to call intelligent.
Who's being abstract? A signature in the genome that clearly indicates a message to us wouldn't be abstract at all. Neither would finding a radio signal full of images of aliens jumping in a swimming pool. Both testify of a goal, foresight, and knowledge, the hallmarks of intelligence, in my opinion. So far, I have no reason to think otherwise.
Evolutionary theory adds precisely nothing to the basic intuitive notion that "life may exist that can send signals from elsewhere because we know we exist and we can send signals."
Yes, SETI relies heavily on evolutionary theory, for example to estimate how long it might take for organisms with sufficiently large and complex brains to evolve on a suitable planet.
Who's being abstract?
ID refers to "intelligence" in the abstract, rather than a specific thing (like a biological life form, say).
A signature in the genome that clearly indicates a message to us wouldn't be abstract at all. Neither would finding a radio signal full of images of aliens jumping in a swimming pool. Both testify of a goal, foresight, and knowledge, the hallmarks of intelligence, in my opinion. So far, I have no reason to think otherwise.
You have not yet told us what that means yet – in the abstract.
aiguy: What if I tell you it can emit narrow-band EM signals? What do you know about it now? You know that it can emit narrow-band EM signals, and that is all you know.
From that alone I would not conclude it was from an intelligent source. Some things that intelligent beings do are indistinguishable from non intelligent processes. I'd have to wait for something that was indistinguishable. Primes up to 3001 would be pretty convincing to me, and I would guess most people. If a genome contained a series of primes up to 3001, I would probably conclude the same thing: I was designed from a source with goals, foresight and knowledge, the hallmarks of intelligence.
aiguy: What if I tell you it is intelligent?
I would think you were full of new wine.
What do you know about it now?
Nothing. And I would not assume it was from an intelligent source.
What if the signal contained all primes up to 3001? That would tell me a hell of a lot about the source.
KB: What would the signal require as a minimum to indicate intelligence over "known astrophysical processes?"
aiguy: What do you mean by "intelligence"
Something that exhibits a goal, foresight, and knowledge. See above and past posts. How many times do I need to say it?
KB: Evolutionary theory adds precisely nothing to the basic intuitive notion that "life may exist that can send signals from elsewhere because we know we exist and we can send signals."
aiguy: Yes, SETI relies heavily on evolutionary theory, for example to estimate how long it might take for organisms with sufficiently large and complex brains to evolve on a suitable planet.
They're welcome to do that. But it's unnecessary. We already know this galaxy has intelligent life capable of sending complex radio signals. Evolutionary theory adds nothing to that empirical knowledge.
ID refers to "intelligence" in the abstract, rather than a specific thing (like a biological life form, say).
ID who? Not ID me. You're talking to me here, not "ID", nor the DI, and not Bill Dembski. I couldn't give a damn what they say.
KB: A signature in the genome that clearly indicates a message to us wouldn't be abstract at all. Neither would finding a radio signal full of images of aliens jumping in a swimming pool. Both testify of a goal, foresight, and knowledge, the hallmarks of intelligence, in my opinion. So far, I have no reason to think otherwise.
aiguy: You have not yet told us what that means yet – in the abstract.
I don't know. You're the one with ideas of "abstract intelligence." I've already defined intelligence: goals, foresight and knowledge.
From that alone I would not conclude it was from an intelligent source. Some things that intelligent beings do are indistinguishable from non intelligent processes. I'd have to wait for something that was indistinguishable. Primes up to 3001 would be pretty convincing to me, and I would guess most people.
Not to SETI researchers looking for life forms. For them, where the signal comes from is a critical indicator. If a signal of primes emanated from a planet suitable for life, that would be good evidence that living things sent it. If it came from, say, inside a neutron star, then they would likely hypothesize some non-biological source instead.
Something that exhibits a goal, foresight, and knowledge. See above and past posts. How many times do I need to say it?
Ok, fine. A goal, foresight, and knowledge. First of all, since we know machines which operate strictly in accordance with physical necessity meet these criteria, we know that intelligence is not something that transcends physical necessity (and so you are saying Bradford is wrong about this). You are saying that an unconscious, deterministic, process that blindly follows natural law can be called intelligent, as long as it exhibits a "goal, foresight, and knowledge". Do you agree so far?
edit:
You're the one with ideas of "abstract intelligence."
Again, the point here is that ID confuses pointing to an actual thing which we might call "intelligent" with simply referring to "intelligence" without any reference to any kind of thing in particular. This latter usage is what I call an "abstract" reference to "intelligence", and what I claim has no meaning at all.
Not to SETI researchers looking for life forms. For them, where the signal comes from is a critical indicator. If a signal of primes emanated from a planet suitable for life, that would be good evidence that living things sent it. If it came from, say, inside a neutron star, then they would likely hypothesize some non-biological source instead.
Good for them. If they conjectured a non-biological source for a signal with primes up to 3001, I would count them as insane, eat a cookie, drink a Guinness Draft, and go to bed.
Ok, fine. A goal, foresight, and knowledge. First of all, since we know machines which operate strictly in accordance with physical necessity meet these criteria, we know that intelligence is not something that transcends physical necessity (and so you are saying Bradford is wrong about this).
You are saying that an unconscious, deterministic, process that blindly follows natural law can be called intelligent, as long as it exhibits a "goal, foresight, and knowledge". Do you agree so far?
Yes. Deep Blue was an instance of it.
As previously stated, the proximate cause of the first earth life is all I'm concerned about here.
Good for them. If they conjectured a non-biological source for a signal with primes up to 3001, I would count them as insane, eat a cookie, drink a Guinness Draft, and go to bed.
Well, we disagree. Sequences of prime numbers can quite plausibly arise from non-biological sources, I'd say, and it's hard to imagine biological life inside a neutron star (since there aren't even atoms in there!) But I think we're a bit off track here.
And sorry – I lost track that you'd already said that intelligence can be mechanical/non-conscious. (We should have different names for these different versions of ID).
I don't think you responded to my point about how we are supposed to detect "goals". Is the "goal" of a river to put water into the sea?
So too with knowledge. If an electrical engineer produces a high-voltage arc, does the engineer "know" about arcs? If a thundercloud produces a high-voltage arc, does the thundercloud "know" about arcs?
And that leaves foresight. You believe there is a class of things that exhibits foresight, and these are known as "intelligent agents". Just to make sure I understand, I'll describe something with foresight, and you tell me if you'd call it intelligent:
"A blind, undirected, natural process that cannot learn nor adapt to novel circumstance, and whose behavior is completely determined and predictable by physical law, and cannot do anything at all except one class of behaviors which is "producing complex life forms", which it does by utilizing foresight".
KB: You're the one with ideas of "abstract intelligence."
aiguy: Again, the point here is that ID confuses pointing to an actual thing which we might call "intelligent" with simply referring to "intelligence" without any reference to any kind of thing in particular. This latter usage is what I call an "abstract" reference to "intelligence", and what I claim has no meaning at all.
I haven't been using "intelligence" in an abstract way or meaningless way. But just to clarify:
Goal: an intention or motive to obtain something, abstract or concrete, whether an object or a status change, that you don't possess presently.
Knowledge: what has come to you via your five (or six) senses, and information communicated from others. Not always reliable.
Foresight: the ability to use knowledge to predict a series of events, as causes lead to effects, which in turn become causes to other effects. Not always accurate, but with a goal, forms the basis of action.
Humans have these properties. Computers can be programmed to have them.
The way I see it, no consciousness or transcendence is required by the proximate designer of the first biological life on earth. A cell (for example) has a finite amount number of molecules that can have a particular arrangement. It is conceivable to me that a computer and certain kinds of hardware could be programmed with a goal to achieve such a construction. Transcendence or consciousness or something else might be required up the causal line (who knows? we don't know enough about Reality to know what is necessary for anything, ultimately), but not at the proximate design point to earth life as we know so far.
Goal: an intention or motive to obtain something, abstract or concrete, whether an object or a status change, that you don't possess presently.
We know when people have goals, because we can talk about them (and we are subjectively aware of our own goals). But how do we tell when other things have goals? Does a river have a goal of getting water to the sea? How can you tell?
Knowledge: what has come to you via your five (or six) senses, and information communicated from others. Not always reliable.
So now you're saying that nothing has knowledge without the same sort of physical senses we have? No, you don't really mean that, right? But… what about the thundercloud?
It is conceivable to me that a computer and certain kinds of hardware could be programmed with a goal to achieve such a construction.
It is conceivable to me that natural processes that we do not understand could achieve such a construction. How? I don't know – we don't understand it. But I know that tagging on the label of "intelligence" certainly doesn't help, because it doesn't tell us anything we didn't already know.
aiguy: And sorry – I lost track that you'd already said that intelligence can be mechanical/non-conscious. (We should have different names for these different versions of ID).
No problem. But it just goes to show, "ID" is not a monolithic cult ruled by DI on high.
I don't think you responded to my point about how we are supposed to detect "goals". Is the "goal" of a river to put water into the sea?
Perhaps. A goal is a motive or impulse to change from one state to another. A personal goal of mine is to feel more pleasure than pain. Same deal. It's all about motive toward certain state changes.
aiguy: So too with knowledge. If an electrical engineer produces a high-voltage arc, does the engineer "know" about arcs? If a thundercloud produces a high-voltage arc, does the thundercloud "know" about arcs?
Knowledge is relative. Someone who does scientific experiments with electricity (or studies those who have) will certainly "know" different things about arcs than one who merely experiences an occurrence of one.
As for thunderclouds knowing about arcs, I would say a storm system may "know" about an instance of a bolt if by that we mean that it alters the state the system. This does violence to the common usage of the term, but if we're speaking on strict epistemological terms, then I'd say yes, in a sense the "system knows" a lightning bolt has occurred. Knowledge is relative, and this would be quite low on the scale.
aiguy: And that leaves foresight…A blind, undirected, natural process that cannot learn nor adapt to novel circumstance, and whose behavior is completely determined and predictable by physical law, and cannot do anything at all except one class of behaviors which is "producing complex life forms", which it does by utilizing foresight".
Here's what I said:
Foresight: the ability to use knowledge to predict a series of events, as causes lead to effects, which in turn become causes to other effects. Not always accurate, but with a goal, forms the basis of action.
A computer chess game knows the rules of the game, has knowledge of past games and knowledge of the current game, and has a goal of capturing the opponent's king. Its foresight consists of running through various scenarios using the aforementioned facilities, down to many levels of cause and effect, and finding the best next move in light of the goal and the current state of the board.
I've been thinking about you charge that ID equivocates the term intelligence and I think that if there is equivocation it's not intentional.
ID is like AI in that there are strong and weak varieties.
Weak AI and strong AI have are not separate disciplines Strong AI is just the extreme edge of Weak AI. Many but not all AI researchers believe strong AI is possible yet their attention is focused on the weak kind.
The same is true for ID all the action is in the weak kind at least right now it's what Kornbelt and I are interested in It also seems to be what Behe and Denton have in mind.
Bradford seems to be looking more for the strong variety but it is mostly philosophical IMHO like strong AI.
Suppose we all inferred that the flagellum was designed would that prove the designer was a conscious agent with free will? I don't think so. Folks like Penrose and our own thought provoker would continue to assume the universe was the designer. No ones faith would be challenged we would only have some more information about the world.
Folks like Bradford would then have to get busy looking for an additional test like the Turing test but for artifacts that will convince folks that the designer was consciousness. It would have to be better than Turing to convince me however!!!!
Do I think that a conscious designer exists of course I do but I don't think there is a way to know that empirically the same way I don't think there is a way to know if a computer is conscious empirically.
Many folks prehaps most would be convinced by a computer that passed the Turing test but this is just a way to draw an arbitrary line in the sand it does not prove consciousness.
I would be excited if some empirical proof for the conscious intelligence that Bradford is talking about and I would be even more excited if we found specific empirical proof beyond the shadow of a doubt for the God of the Bible but I just don't expect to see this.
Does that mean that ID is not interesting, far from it. If fact it's my conviction that Strong ID is improvable that makes weak ID potentially scientific IMHO and it's what allows people of good will to come to this subject with an open mind.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 23, 2008 @ 7:44 pm
No problem. But it just goes to show, "ID" is not a monolithic cult ruled by DI on high.
Got it.
AIGUY: I don't think you responded to my point about how we are supposed to detect "goals". Is the "goal" of a river to put water into the sea?
KB: Perhaps… A goal is a motive or impulse to change from one state to another…
We might as well say the goal of gravity is to try and pull objects together and so on. This just doesn't help at all. On one hand you disavow that you're talking about anything conscious, but it seems that words like "motive" and "impulse" are all about conscious awareness.
As for thunderclouds knowing about arcs, I would say a storm system may "know" about an instance of a bolt if by that we mean that it alters the state the system. This does violence to the common usage of the term, but if we're speaking on strict epistemological terms, then I'd say yes, in a sense the "system knows" a lightning bolt has occurred. Knowledge is relative, and this would be quite low on the scale.
As I've argued here consistently, common usage vocabulary will get us nowhere except in deep confusion when we speak of issues regarding minds. The whole point here is settle on a technical vocabulary that will make all of IDs assumptions explicit.
So for "know", like "goal", it appears that just about any dynamic system in nature qualifies as having a goal and knowledge, according to your definitions. EDIT: And why wouldn't the thundercloud "know" as much as the engineer knows about making arcs (e.g. about voltage, ionization, etc)?
aiguy: "¦A blind, undirected, natural process that cannot learn nor adapt to novel circumstance, and whose behavior is completely determined and predictable by physical law, and cannot do anything at all except one class of behaviors which is "producing complex life forms", which it does by utilizing foresight.
KB: Foresight: the ability to use knowledge to predict a series of events, as causes lead to effects, which in turn become causes to other effects. Not always accurate, but with a goal, forms the basis of action.
I don't spot any contradictions between what I said and what you said. Do you?
We know when people have goals, because we can talk about them (and we are subjectively aware of our own goals). But how do we tell when other things have goals? Does a river have a goal of getting water to the sea? How can you tell?
Rivers "tell" us their goals (motive to change state) by doing just that if we allow them. Motives and impulses seem like the least mysterious aspect of the entire question.
So now you're saying that nothing has knowledge without the same sort of physical senses we have? No, you don't really mean that, right? But"¦ what about the thundercloud?
Right. I lapsed anthropocentric there for a second. (I'm only human, after all .) "Knowledge" is defined as permanent or semi-permanent state change in a system. It can be caused externally or within the processes of the system itself. It is useless of itself, but is referenced by the mechanism that has foresight. (Induction capabilities should be added to the list of intelligent attributes. But I admit I need to think about this more, given it's an ad hoc by a tired and semi-intoxicated brain.)
The chess game is a good example. For example, there is knowledge preset by the programmer, knowledge gained by past games and the current game, and knowledge of past internal searches. The foresight "engine" (if you will) utilizes this in its determinations. Nothing you don't know, I sure, aiguy.
KB: It is conceivable to me that a computer and certain kinds of hardware could be programmed with a goal to achieve such a construction.
aiguy: It is conceivable to me that natural processes that we do not understand could achieve such a construction.
I agree. Whether it could and/or did is of great interest to me. (But not in this thread.)
But I know that tagging on the label of "intelligence" certainly doesn't help, because it doesn't tell us anything we didn't already know.
In other words you're still claiming that it is "meaningless" to say "an intelligence designed life" as oppose to "nature designed life." It could be a matter of scale between saying "nature designed this" and "a human design this" and "a sophisticated computer designed this." But there is a meaningful difference. Take the Deep Blue computer. One could make the claim "human intelligence didn't design that, only natural forces are needed." Regardless of whether the claim is true or not, the contrast between the goal/knowledge/foresight powers of nature and the goal/knowledge/foresight powers of humans are vast, that we know of. You could say that in a human mind, knowledge and foresight are concentrated with certain level of sophistication not found "otherwise in nature." I'm not sure how to quantify it, exactly, but it's a meaningful difference.
The bottom line with respect to my participation in this thread is, saying one thing is more intelligent than another, and that in particular, "a human-like intelligence may have been required to create the first earth life" is not meaningless.
aiguy: We might as well say the goal of gravity is to try and pull objects together and so on. This just doesn't help at all. On one hand you disavow that you're talking about anything conscious, but it seems that words like "motive" and "impulse" are all about conscious awareness.
No, I don't mean it as an attribute of consciousness. Just think computers and A.I. Deep Blue had a "motive" or "impulse" to take the opponent's king. Back when I was a kid my electric train power supply had "impulse", and when it was on, it oscillated the voltage levels to the tracks. If that term throws you, just toss it out. "Motive" is sufficient. "Goal" is sufficient. Doesn't matter. It does no violence to the language to say that computers are programmed with goals and motives.
aiguy: So for "know", like "goal", it appears that just about any dynamic system in nature qualifies as having a goal and knowledge, according to your definitions. EDIT: And why wouldn't the thundercloud "know" as much as the engineer knows about making arcs (e.g. about voltage, ionization, etc)?
Think A.I. and Deep Blue. There is no "goal" in a lightning storm other than the next proximate effect. Unlike the next proximate effect in nature, Deep Blue's "knowledge" concerns a different level of matter arrangement, and it's "goal" and "foresight" engine looks into the future far beyond the next proximate molecular or electrical effect, and it uses non-proximately derived information in an attempt to get to that goal.
aiguy: "¦A blind, undirected, natural process that cannot learn nor adapt to novel circumstance, and whose behavior is completely determined and predictable by physical law, and cannot do anything at all except one class of behaviors which is "producing complex life forms", which it does by utilizing foresight.
KB: Foresight: the ability to use knowledge to predict a series of events, as causes lead to effects, which in turn become causes to other effects. Not always accurate, but with a goal, forms the basis of action.
aiguy: I don't spot any contradictions between what I said and what you said. Do you?
I don't admit that the OOL mechanism on earth could not learn. If anything, only the goal, and perhaps the foresight algorithms would be fixed. The knowledge base would certainly be expected to expand.
aiguy: Sequences of prime numbers can quite plausibly arise from non-biological sources
KB: I'd be interested in hearing how that might be done.
Please don't forsake this one. I'm all ears.
EDIT: Of course, computers are non-biological sources, and they can generate prime numbers, so I guess you got me there. But did you have something else in mind?
As for a definition of purpose, back to normal use and dictionaries for me.
Purpose is the intended goal, the effect or result of a desire, the reason that something is done, .
As a verb, to intend or determine an outcome.
Not so good, I'm afraid. You now say that purpose is "the reason that something is done". Therefore, the purpose of rainclouds is to rain, and the act of raining is purposeful, thus intelligent.
Have no fear, you've merely equivocated on the word reason; that's why you've drawn a faulty conclusion.
As you can see from the beginning of the sentence, we are working from cause to effect. If the intention of the effect is the reason for the cause then we have purpose. The goal is reached because it is the reason for the action, the effect is reached because it is intended or desired.
In the case of the rain cloud you are going backward. The rain cloud is the reason for the rain. It is not, as you say, that the rain is the reason for the rain cloud. Since there are perfectly good purposeless (as far as we can tell without dipping into philosophy and metaphysics) proximate reasons for the rain cloud there is no reason to think it exists in order to cause rain.
This makes no sense. You are offering "purpose" or "will" as a cause of certain phenomena. I ask how can we tell that it really is "purpose" or "will" and not something else that is involved. If you can't come up with a way, then we can't tell if ID is true or not.
It just may be that will not be able to tell if ID is true or not.
But let us backtrack. You weren't asking if ID was true, but whether it was damned by its use of the word "intelligent".
We see that it is not. As I've pointed out, and you even admitted by defining intelligence as that which designs, the word is quite superfluous to the ID project. As I said, it is merely offered to reinforce and clarify what design actually means. And 'design' does not suffer any vagueness of definition – purposeful arrangement of parts.
We know that there is the appearance of this design in biology and of the apparent purpose in nature; even such diehards as Dawkins will tell you so. Nature looks like it has a purpose, the universe looks like it knew we were coming, we must remind ourselves that the features we are looking at are evolved and not designed…
So how can he be intellectually fulfilled while denying the reality of this design and purpose? Because he has a test for purpose/will/design/intent, etc. His test entails the demonstration to his satisfaction that RM/NS (metaphysics, but what the heck) can create the appearance of design – as well as a healthy dose of Darwinian "that's not what a designer would do (more metaphysics).
So far so good. But along comes ID and argues that RM/NS (oops, strawman) cannot account for the appearance of design and purpose. Therefore, it is perfectly valid to infer that the appearance is real, in the absence of a purposeless, random, chance, unguided, etc. cause of said design.
It's not true, you say?
Fine by me. But we aren't discussing the validity of the inference, but the logic of drawing it based upon the definitions. There is nothing untoward in doing so.
Unlike with the rain cloud, we have the appearance of design and purpose without (to the IDer) a way to explain it away in terms of purposeless, non-design. Can anything but purposeful design account for such appearances? they ask. No, they answer.
aiguy: No, in SETI minds aren't implied by signals; minds are implied by brains, which are implied by the encephalization quotients predicted by SETI researchers using evolutionary theory.
You're insisting on your personal philosophical preferences. You would have no idea of what physical entity lies at the other end of a signal based on the signal itself. Your only reference point is based on your knowldge of life on earth- a tiny speck in the universe. To insist that the mind sending the signal is constrained by your limited understanding of mind/brain connections (based in turn on your limited earthly experiences) tells us nothing more than that your analysis is limited by your imagination.
aiguy:
No, you have identified no common denominator
Since the examples included primates using tools to secure food, humans solving analytical spatial puzzles and an advanced technological device found elsewhere in the universe explain to us how the food was secured, the puzzle solved or the device constructed without cognitive input enabling outcomes that would not have come about otherwise. The input is the common denominator.
"Knowledge" is defined as permanent or semi-permanent state change in a system….But I admit I need to think about this more, given it's an ad hoc by a tired and semi-intoxicated brain.
I'll wait for a new, improved version then. This definition of knowledge includes just about everything… including, say, the erosion of a hillside.
In other words you're still claiming that it is "meaningless" to say "an intelligence designed life" as oppose to "nature designed life."
That's right – the difference is undefined.
Take the Deep Blue computer. One could make the claim "human intelligence didn't design that, only natural forces are needed."
This claim would assume that human intelligence somehow transcends natural forces, which is a metaphysical assumption that can't be supported empirically.
The bottom line with respect to my participation in this thread is, saying one thing is more intelligent than another, and that in particular, "a human-like intelligence may have been required to create the first earth life" is not meaningless.
I agree completely: A human-like intelligence is a perfectly meaningful concept. But that would mean would could expect this human-like intelligence to be able to take a standardized IQ test, like a Stanford-Binet test, and score at least somewhere around 100 or so. That is a meaningful hypothesis: There exists some being that created life and could score at least 100 on a Standford-Binet IQ test. Now, please tell us how you might go about testing your hypothesis, and I'll admit there is something to this ID thing after all.
There is no "goal" in a lightning storm other than the next proximate effect.
I disagree. The overall goal of a lightning storm appears to be to equalize built-up electric charges between the clouds and the Earth. If you disagree, could you tell me the method you use to discern these "goals"
I don't admit that the OOL mechanism on earth could not learn.
It's not a matter of admitting that it can't learn. The question is can you think of any way to determine if it could or couldn't learn?
KB: I'd be interested in hearing how that might be done.
EDIT: Of course, computers are non-biological sources, and they can generate prime numbers, so I guess you got me there. But did you have something else in mind?
Not computers; what I had in mind was how prime number sequences can evolve in nature (as in Cicada cycles). So I find it plausible that non-biological systems could also be evolutionary.
The rain cloud is the reason for the rain. It is not, as you say, that the rain is the reason for the rain cloud.
So you say, but you don't say what method did you use to figure this out. I think everything exists for a reason, and the reason we have rain clouds is to make rain. So I think you need a new definition of "purposeful".
It just may be that will not be able to tell if ID is true or not.
As it is, you can't even try, because you haven't provided a testable definition of intelligence for anything, much less the Creator of Life.
But let us backtrack. You weren't asking if ID was true, but whether it was damned by its use of the word "intelligent". We see that it is not.
Yup, it really is. Half of you here think it has to do with consciousness, and half don't; this is a fundamental difference. None of you can characterize what "intelligence" is supposed to mean in a way that can be tested in the context of ID.
As I've pointed out, and you even admitted by defining intelligence as that which designs, the word is quite superfluous to the ID project. As I said, it is merely offered to reinforce and clarify what design actually means. And 'design' does not suffer any vagueness of definition – purposeful arrangement of parts.
The purposeful arrangements of parts we see in biology is caused by that which causes the purposeful arrangement of parts? Is that your final answer?
We know that there is the appearance of this design in biology and of the apparent purpose in nature; even such diehards as Dawkins will tell you so….
I disagree with Dawkins on a number of topics, and you I'm sure do too. I think he's confused about philosophy of mind in particular.
Therefore, it is perfectly valid to infer that the appearance is real, in the absence of a purposeless, random, chance, unguided, etc. cause of said design….Unlike with the rain cloud, we have the appearance of design and purpose without (to the IDer) a way to explain it away in terms of purposeless, non-design. Can anything but purposeful design account for such appearances? they ask. No, they answer.
Since there are perfectly good purposeless (as far as we can tell without dipping into philosophy and metaphysics) proximate reasons for the rain cloud there is no reason to think it exists in order to cause rain.
This argument is, in other words, if we don't know how something works, we can say "intelligence" was responsible. Otherwise, we can't say that.
That is not a good argument, and it certainly doesn't tell us what "intelligence" is supposed to mean in this context.
Everywhere you argue for "intelligence" as a cause, replace it with "magic" instead. You'll see that none of your arguments change at all.
Since the examples included primates using tools to secure food, humans solving analytical spatial puzzles and an advanced technological device found elsewhere in the universe explain to us how the food was secured, the puzzle solved or the device constructed without cognitive input enabling outcomes that would not have come about otherwise. The input is the common denominator.
You give a bunch of examples of things, and you claim they are all instances of the same thing in different contexts. I ask you what it is they are instances of, and you tell me "intelligence". Then I ask you how you characterize "intelligence" so I can see if your claim is true or not, but you can't. All you can do is give me examples. You can't tell me how to find my own examples. I have no idea if an example I come up with will meet your personal criteria for being intelligent or not.
Intelligence, alas, is like Edwin Meese's pornography: He couldn't define it, but he knew it when he saw it!
You're insisting on your personal philosophical preferences.
I find these sorts of statements aren't constructive.
You would have no idea of what physical entity lies at the other end of a signal based on the signal itself.
According to SETI researchers, they would assume a certain EQ (encephalization quotient – see the link I provided). I'm not an astrobiologist, so I can't really comment on that.
Your only reference point is based on your knowldge of life on earth- a tiny speck in the universe. To insist that the mind sending the signal is constrained by your limited understanding of mind/brain connections (based in turn on your limited earthly experiences) tells us nothing more than that your analysis is limited by your imagination.
I think you need to take this up with the SETI researchers, not me. I didn't bring SETI into this in the first place.
Bradford: You would have no idea of what physical entity lies at the other end of a signal based on the signal itself. Your only reference point is based on your knowldge of life on earth- a tiny speck in the universe. To insist that the mind sending the signal is constrained by your limited understanding of mind/brain connections (based in turn on your limited earthly experiences) tells us nothing more than that your analysis is limited by your imagination.
Extraterrestrial signals are hypothesized based on extrapolations of our knowledge of life on Earth. There is a possibility that such a discovery could be accidental and not entailed in the hypothesis, but presuming it was discovered with the tell-tale Doppler shift associated with a planet orbiting a suitable star for the evolution of carbon-based organisms, it would be considered a significant confirmation. Of course, then new hypotheses would be proposed to either undermine the initial determination or to guide future research into discovering characteristics of the purported source.
So far no one has discovered these signals, so one or another of the assumptions that make up the hypothesis are inaccurate or simply incorrect.
I think everything exists for a reason, and the reason we have rain clouds is to make rain. So I think you need a new definition of "purposeful".
You are welcome to that philosophical approach (and you'd probably be right, metaphysically) but since natural forces and physical laws can account for the cloud it's superfluous.
As it is, you can't even try, because you haven't provided a testable definition of intelligence for anything, much less the Creator of Life.
You already defined intelligence. Further than that it needs no definition.
None of you can characterize what "intelligence" is supposed to mean in a way that can be tested in the context of ID.
Nor does it need to be tested. The test is for design.
The purposeful arrangements of parts we see in biology is caused by that which causes the purposeful arrangement of parts? Is that your final answer?
That's right, if you want to take the name of the idea and make that its explanation then that's what you get. Like I said, the word "intelligent" in ID is merely clarifying what the word "design" already told us before it was highjacked.
I disagree with Dawkins on a number of topics, and you I'm sure do too. I think he's confused about philosophy of mind in particular.
His feet might smell, too, but that doesn't touch the fact that virtually anybody who thinks on the subject will admit that the watch looks designed and the universe appears to be a out-up job.
The question is, is that design real? Is it what it seems or is there another satisfactory explanation for it as there is for the raincloud? Some find RM/NS intellectually fulfills the world view that demands it and some find it comes up short.
This argument is, in other words, if we don't know how something works, we can say "intelligence" was responsible. Otherwise, we can't say that.
The argument is that in the absence of the argument forwarded to explain away the apparent design, and in the presence of arguments to the reality of the design, then design is the better explanation. Appearances are often misleading but we need good arguments and evidence to determine that.
That is not a good argument, and it certainly doesn't tell us what "intelligence" is supposed to mean in this context.
Everywhere you argue for "intelligence" as a cause, replace it with "magic" instead. You'll see that none of your arguments change at all.
Magic can substitute for a lot of explanations, like chance, and luck, and random, and multiverses, and brute facts … Even Dawkins, smelly feet and all, allows himself one big lucky break at the OOL to get things started – a lucky break his compatriots say might as well be a miracle.
On the other hand, the argument is not for intelligence but for design. Intelligence is part of the package, as per your own definition. Intelligence means that which can produce design (per you) and design is the purposeful arrangement of parts (per Behe) and purpose is the intended goal, the aim of the desire or will (per the dictionary … and Behe. Do certain features of life and the universe indicate intended goals or does chance and law account for everything?
That you don't find the argument for design compelling is hardly newsworthy, but that it can be dismissed on the basis of the name of the project is unsupportable.
As it is, you can't even try, because you haven't provided a testable definition of intelligence for anything, much less the Creator of Life.
What this really boils down to is the same basic idea that you need independent evidence of the designer before you can infer design. Your version is placed in the domain of a rigorous testable definition (which would provide independent evidence of the designer) but that knowledge is unnecessary. Even Allen MacNeill, whose feet my be just as smelly as Dawkins', has recently confirmed that such previous knowledge is unnecessary.
I agree completely: A human-like intelligence is a perfectly meaningful concept. But that would mean would could expect this human-like intelligence to be able to take a standardized IQ test, like a Stanford-Binet test, and score at least somewhere around 100 or so.
suppose I programed my computer with the answers to a standard IQ test after you adminstered the test would you conclude it had human like intelligence?
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 9:46 am
You give a bunch of examples of things, and you claim they are all instances of the same thing in different contexts. I ask you what it is they are instances of, and you tell me "intelligence". Then I ask you how you characterize "intelligence" so I can see if your claim is true or not, but you can't.
I have characterized intelligence- repeatedly. Again, it is the exercise of a cognitive function to surmount an obstacle that would not be surmounted in its absence. When a chimp uses tools to secure food, otherwise unobtainable without a tool, the chimp shows a level of intelligence that surpasses most other animals who don't possess this aptitude. I can't help the duh responses. The existence and applicability of intelligence is clear to those not having an ideological axe to grind.
Pez: Like I said, the word "intelligent" in ID is merely clarifying what the word "design" already told us before it was highjacked.
The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection. "” CFSC
Intelligent Design is the study of patterns in nature that are best explained as the result of intelligence. "” William Dembski
Intelligent Design is the study of patterns in nature that are best explained as the result of intelligence. "” ISCID
Perhaps you can see why people might be somewhat confused on this.
Hi Zach,
That's a good counter point, but like I said like I said, "intelligence" is merely clarifying what "design" already tells us.
Identify purpose and you identify design and you identify intelligence.
I assume we are working within the scientific paradigm. And leaving aside the straightforward statements of ID luminaries.
Pez: The test is for design.
If by design, you mean pattern, then nature is full of patterns, many with well-known causes. If by design, you mean a purposeful arrangement, that would seemingly require substantive investigation of the perpetrator's characteristics and modus operandi. Without this rigor, then we may as well say the purpose of the Monsoons is to pump water over Asia.
That is a meaningful hypothesis: There exists some being that created life and could score at least 100 on a Standford-Binet IQ test. Now, please tell us how you might go about testing your hypothesis, and I'll admit there is something to this ID thing after all.
Scientists attempt to determine the level of intelligence of Neanderthals by looking at the artifacts they left behind. Couldn't we test this hypothesis the same way? If not why not ?
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 10:15 am
Again, I'm assuming you are making statements meant to have scientific validity.
Bradford: it is the exercise of a cognitive function …
Calling intelligence "an exercise of a cognitive function" doesn't provide an operational definition required for empirical research.
Bradford: … to surmount an obstacle that would not be surmounted in its absence.
That seems to contrast intelligence to natural causes. This doesn't seem very useful, especially if we are not omniscient of all possible natural causes, or if intelligence itself is due to natural causes. A typical and empirically useful definition of intelligence might be based on the ability to learn or remember.
fifth monarchy man: Scientists attempt to determine the level of intelligence of Neanderthals by looking at the artifacts they left behind.
Neanderthal intelligence and technical achievement is compared to that of other organisms, including closely related hominids. The size and structure of the brain can be shown to closely correlate with intelligence (defined in terms of learning, memory, problem-solving, etc.). Sometimes, scientists even replicate the technologies to determine the difficulty of fashioning the artifacts. How did you think this was done?
Sometimes, scientists even replicate the technologies to determine the difficulty of fashioning the artifacts. How did you think this was done?
Scientists are even as we speak are attempting to replicate the technologies involved in creating life. Does the difficulty of this say anything about the intelligence of the designer?
The more I think about it the more I like this hypothesis
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 10:33 am
Bradford: it is the exercise of a cognitive function "¦
Calling intelligence "an exercise of a cognitive function" doesn't provide an operational definition required for empirical research.
"to surmount an obstacle that would not be surmounted in its absence"- the complete sentence lays out a general description that a context would furnish specifics of.
That seems to contrast intelligence to natural causes. This doesn't seem very useful, especially if we are not omniscient of all possible natural causes, or if intelligence itself is due to natural causes.
The exercise of intelligence does not have to contravene natural laws. I am not contravening natural laws by typing this. I'm manipulating physical effects to convey a message.
A typical and empirically useful definition of intelligence might be based on the ability to learn or remember.
That's part of it. There is also a capacity to reason which enables problem solving.
Zachriel: Neanderthal intelligence is compared to that of other organisms, including closely related hominids.
fifth monarchy man: That sort comparison is what is being proposed for the designer
You provided a definition of intelligence earlier, the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations. According to this definition, evolutionary processes are intelligent.
Zachriel: The size and structure of the brain can be shown to closely correlate with intelligence.
The Theory of Evolution has always included organisms and their environments. There's your Intelligent Design.
So when you say Evolution what you really mean is "the Universe" this is just pantheism and explains nothing.
To top it off it appears that the universe might be incapable of designing certain things we see around us because it is not intellegent enough. Hence the disscusion
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 11:02 am
fifth monarchy man: So when you say Evolution what you really mean is "the Universe" this is just pantheism and explains nothing
Not at all. Evolution is a carefully defined scientific theory. It is characterized by reproduction, fecundity, variation and selection. Each of these terms has a discrete empirical meaning, and the process can be directly observed, and its history inferred from a variety of evidences.
(By the way, "environment", an important aspect of selection, does not equate to "the Universe". Environment is local by definition, O.Fr. environ "compass, circuit".)
fifth monarchy man: To top it off it appears that the universe might be incapable of designing certain things we see around us because it is not intellegent enough. Hence the disscusion
This discussion concerned inconsistent usage of the word "intelligence". As to "intelligent enough", well biological evolution is a rather slow learner, on the order of millions of years, but its long-term memory can be excellent.
"Knowledge" is defined as permanent or semi-permanent state change in a system
I'll wait for a new, improved version then. This definition of knowledge includes just about everything"¦ including, say, the erosion of a hillside.
Knowledge is information that is available to a goal-seeking process. Think Deep Blue's database.
KB: Take the Deep Blue computer. One could make the claim "human intelligence didn't design that, only natural forces are needed."
aiguy: This claim would assume that human intelligence somehow transcends natural forces, which is a metaphysical assumption that can't be supported empirically.
One could make the claim "human intelligence didn't design that, only otherwise natural forces are needed." Is this a meaningless statement to you?
aiguy: I agree completely: A human-like intelligence is a perfectly meaningful concept.
Great. We're making progress. You didn't originally, on the other thread.
aiguy: But that would mean would could expect this human-like intelligence to be able to take a standardized IQ test, like a Stanford-Binet test, and score at least somewhere around 100 or so.
Yes, perhaps 150.
aiguy: That is a meaningful hypothesis: There exists some being that created life and could score at least 100 on a Standford-Binet IQ test. Now, please tell us how you might go about testing your hypothesis, and I'll admit there is something to this ID thing after all.
I don't know. That's a different topic. My interest in this thread was your statement about "human like intelligence" being a meaningless statement. I'm not interested in getting you to "admit there is something to this ID thing after all."
KB: There is no "goal" in a lightning storm other than the next proximate effect.
aiguy: I disagree. The overall goal of a lightning storm appears to be to equalize built-up electric charges between the clouds and the Earth.
If you disagree, could you tell me the method you use to discern these "goals"
By it's productions. The goal of Deep Blue is to beat a human or human-like chess player. Weather systems don't do things like that. They do not contain processes searching for solutions to problems where the goal is removed from the next proximate effect.
KB: I don't admit that the OOL mechanism on earth could not learn.
aiguy: It's not a matter of admitting that it can't learn. The question is can you think of any way to determine if it could or couldn't learn?
Humans learn, computers can learn. Deep Blue was programmed to learn facts about the game, the player, which it could use in it's goal seeking algorithms in future plays and future games towards the goal of taking the opponent's king.
KB: I'd be interested in hearing how that might be done. Of course, computers are non-biological sources, and they can generate prime numbers, so I guess you got me there. But did you have something else in mind?
aiguy: Not computers; what I had in mind was how prime number sequences can evolve in nature (as in Cicada cycles).
By evolve in nature, I assume you mean they were produced without intelligent intervention. Do you have evidence Cicada cycles were produced that way?
aiguy: So I find it plausible that non-biological systems could also be evolutionary.
Cicada's are non-biological? At any rate, I don't find it plausible at all that a non-biological system, other than a computing system designed by a human-like intelligence, could produce primes up to 3001. If you got any ideas about how it could be done, please elaborate.
It is characterized by reproduction, fecundity, variation and selection. Each of these terms has a discrete empirical meaning
Agreed but you are not saying reproduction, fecundity, variation and selection are intelligent. You are saying evolution is intelligent and by evolution you mean "the universe"
Environment is local by definition
Yes but when we are talking about "Evolution" (what you are calling intelligent) we are talking about a universal phenomena therefore it must include all environments so it is equivalent to the Universe.
This discussion concerned inconsistent usage of the word "intelligence".
Right and I'm using it consistently.
however now we are focused on human level intelligence and it is far from clear the universe has that level of intelligence
As to "intelligent enough", well biological evolution is a rather slow learner, on the order of millions of years, but its long-term memory can be excellent.
How excellent? Do you have a measurement? Does it meet the standard of human level intelligence? It appears that it can't pass the segregate IQ tests that Behe proposes in his latest book. At lest we have not seem any evidence that it can.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 1:06 pm
So, can we empirically measure the ability to learn, to remember, to solve problems? If so, do evolutionary processes do these things?
They might reflect the cognitive acts investing direction into such processes but that remains to be seen. I'm currently reading a book about an ongoing attempt to create life from scratch. Those involved in the endeavor are learned and very intelligent but the obstacles they face are imposing.
You are welcome to that philosophical approach (and you'd probably be right, metaphysically)
Yes, all attributions of purpose and reason (in the senses you are using) are non-empirical, you're right. That is why I am complaining about you claiming that such concepts can be used to define a cause (intelligent cause) for which you claim empirical evidence.
…but since natural forces and physical laws can account for the cloud it's superfluous.
Either "intelligence" is something that can be shown to cause things or not; you cannot evidence "intelligence" by finding gaps in our knowledge.
AIGUY: The purposeful arrangements of parts we see in biology is caused by that which causes the purposeful arrangement of parts? Is that your final answer?
PEZ: That's right, if you want to take the name of the idea and make that its explanation then that's what you get. Like I said, the word "intelligent" in ID is merely clarifying what the word "design" already told us before it was highjacked.
You are just digging deeper into these terminological dodges. Instead of arguing that "intelligence" has an operational defintion in ID (it does not) you say ID relies on the defintion of "design" instead. But of course you have no operational definition of that either, because as I've pointed out, there is no operational notion of purpose.
His feet might smell, too, but that doesn't touch the fact that virtually anybody who thinks on the subject will admit that the watch looks designed and the universe appears to be a out-up job.
I don't know what you mean by "designed", unless you mean "built by a human being". I don't think that's what you mean, and you really can't tell me. I think rainclouds look like they are their for the purpose of making rain, and you can't show my why I'm wrong, so this whole "detecting purposeful arrangements" thing is whistling in the wind.
The argument is that in the absence of the argument forwarded to explain away the apparent design, and in the presence of arguments to the reality of the design, then design is the better explanation. Appearances are often misleading but we need good arguments and evidence to determine that.
Two things wrong with this approach: First, it is an argument from ignorance, and second, you failed to characterize "design" (or "purpose") in a way we can test.
Magic can substitute for a lot of explanations, like chance, and luck, and random, and multiverses,
None of which count as scientific explanations of anything (which the exception of the speculations regarding multiverses which nobody claims is anything near settled science). Your conception of "intelligence" is indistinguishable from "magic" because it is a perfectly mysterious concept. In real theories, the explanatory concepts are less mysterious than phenomena being explained.
Intelligence is part of the package, as per your own definition. Intelligence means that which can produce design (per you) and design is the purposeful arrangement of parts (per Behe) and purpose is the intended goal, the aim of the desire or will (per the dictionary "¦ and Behe.
The detection of "the aim of the desire or will" is nothing but an excercise in subjective interpretation because it has no operational definition. We can never agree on what things have desires or "will" and what things don't when we know nothing about what sort of thing is responsible.
Do certain features of life and the universe indicate intended goals or does chance and law account for everything?
Why can't law account for intended goals?
What this really boils down to is the same basic idea that you need independent evidence of the designer before you can infer design.
No, you need an independent way of detecting "design"/"intelligence" before you can claim evidence for it. Your definition of "design" do not allow us to decide what things are purposefully arranged and what things are not.
suppose I programed my computer with the answers to a standard IQ test after you adminstered the test would you conclude it had human like intelligence?
Of course not! Human-like intelligence allows humans to solve novel problems, not just problems that they have already been taught. If I teach a computer to take IQ tests in general, and it can take any IQ test and score well on it, then yes, I would claim to have created a human-like intelligence.
You need to think a bit more about AI, FMM. You'll be surprised how much light it sheds on these issues, I think.
Yes, you have. You've said it is "not the result of physical necessity", for example. Do you still hold to this characterization, or have you changed your mind?
The challenge is to characterize intelligence in a way such that people can independently identify what things are intelligent and what things are not intelligent. That way, we can evaluate evidence of "intelligence" in the context of ID. Until you do that, we can't.
Again, it is the exercise of a cognitive function to surmount an obstacle that would not be surmounted in its absence. When a chimp uses tools to secure food, otherwise unobtainable without a tool, the chimp shows a level of intelligence that surpasses most other animals who don't possess this aptitude.
Chimps can't really design very much; at best they make a bed of leaves, or strip twigs off a branch for digging out termites. The termites, however, can build incredibly complex structures with heat-regulation and ventilation, specialized chambers for agriculture with irrigation, and so on. Does that mean termites are more intelligent than chimps?
I can't help the duh responses.
Exactly! You can't provide any characterization of this thing you are trying to use as a scientific explanation in a way that we can all agree when we see it and when we don't!
The existence and applicability of intelligence is clear to those not having an ideological axe to grind.
In order for an explanation to be empirically supported, it needs to be clear to everyone no matter what their ideology is. The fact that you can't come up with a clear characterization of this "thing" (intelligence) isn't my fault. The sort of subjective criteria you are pushing doesn't cut it, because of course people will continue to disagree when we can't appeal to empirically grounded characterizations to show who is right!
"to surmount an obstacle that would not be surmounted in its absence"- the complete sentence lays out a general description that a context would furnish specifics of.
Intelligence is "that which allows something to surmount an obstacle that would not be surmounted in its absence" Are you being serious? If so, this is perhaps the worst definition of any scientific explanation I've ever seen.
Knowledge is information that is available to a goal-seeking process. Think Deep Blue's database.
Ok, that's better. I suggest for "goal-seeking process" you try "process using negative feedback". This makes the whole thing operational – congratulations.
Unfortunately what you describe has very, very, very little resemblance to anything that people really mean when they talk about intelligent design. But at least what you are promoting might actually be investigated!
One could make the claim "human intelligence didn't design that, only otherwise natural forces are needed." Is this a meaningless statement to you?
Nope, that one's good.
Great. We're making progress. You didn't originally, on the other thread.
Really? I don't think so – of course I think "human-like intelligence" means something. Scientifically speaking, the meaning is operationalized via IQ tests, as I've mentioned.
Yes, perhaps 150.
Sure! If you find the Designer and Her score on Stanford-Binet is 150 I'll become a believer.
I don't know. That's a different topic. My interest in this thread was your statement about "human like intelligence" being a meaningless statement. I'm not interested in getting you to "admit there is something to this ID thing after all."
The meaning of "human-like intelligence" is either a subjective notion (meaningful to us, but not useful in science until it's operationalized, like the meaning of "beautiful sunset") or its meaning is made scientific by means of an operational definition (like the score on an IQ test).
By it's productions. The goal of Deep Blue is to beat a human or human-like chess player. Weather systems don't do things like that. They do not contain processes searching for solutions to problems where the goal is removed from the next proximate effect.
Sorry, but you're dropping into epicycles on your definitions here. Now you've brought something in about "searching for solutions". So intelligent things need to "search for solutions", and if they know the solution right away without searching, that means that they are not intelligent? (The storm achieves non-proximate effects – the long-term equalization of electrical potential).
Humans learn, computers can learn. Deep Blue was programmed to learn facts about the game, the player, which it could use in it's goal seeking algorithms in future plays and future games towards the goal of taking the opponent's king.
Yes, humans and computers (and the vast majority of living organisms) can learn. Learning is considered by most cognitive scientists to be a critical component of intelligence. My question was, how could you ever show that whatever created life was capable of learning?
By evolve in nature, I assume you mean they were produced without intelligent intervention. Do you have evidence Cicada cycles were produced that way?
I was talking about plausibility if you recall.
Cicada's are non-biological? At any rate, I don't find it plausible at all that a non-biological system, other than a computing system designed by a human-like intelligence, could produce primes up to 3001. If you got any ideas about how it could be done, please elaborate.
I don't know a lot of things. Just because we don't know how something works doesn't mean that "intelligence" constitutes a useful explanation. It didn't when people didn't know how tides worked (or seasons or lightning or planetary motion or… all of the other failed "applications of ID theory")
aiguy: Intelligence is "that which allows something to surmount an obstacle that would not be surmounted in its absence" Are you being serious?
You left out the part about cognitive function. Some obstacles cannot be surmounted by brute forces of nature. A guiding hand is required. Jane Goodall had no trouble with the word intelligent. She did not anticipate having to use it but was not hindered by needless parsing when she did.
It didn't when people didn't know how tides worked (or seasons or lightning or planetary motion or"¦ all of the other failed "applications of ID theory")
You're betraying your ignorance. Citing physical causation does not refute ID. From an origins perspective the issue remains unresolved.
Renaming is not explaining. You can call "intelligence" "cognitive function", but until you somehow tie these terms to things we can objectively observe we will never have a shared way of deciding what constitutes "cognitive function". I happen to consider evolutionary processes to constitute a type of "cognitive function", so to me your definition includes evolutionary processes.
Jane Goodall had no trouble with the word intelligent. She did not anticipate having to use it but was not hindered by needless parsing when she did.
Goodall described the chimps as being intelligent – she did not attempt to explain her chimps behavior by appeal to intelligence as a causal thing.
We've been over this – you claimed that scientists explained things by offering "intelligence" per se as a cause, but you couldn't support your claim (because it isn't true).
You seem to have trouble keeping these sorts of comments out of our discussion. Are you feeling angry?
I'm noting that when critics like you equate ID to fantasies about how tides work you are appealing to the swamp crowd that yuk yuks over these "witticisms."
Goodall described the chimps as being intelligent – she did not attempt to explain her chimps behavior by appeal to intelligence as a causal thing.
Of course she did. Her work was groundbreaking at the time because it was thought that only humans used tools. The linkage to intelligence was explicit. There is simply no other way to approach these discussions than to use terms you find objectionable. To claim that the chimp behavior was explainable without an appeal to their superior intelligence (by comparison to most other organisms) is a stuck on stupid strategy.
The termites, however, can build incredibly complex structures with heat-regulation and ventilation, specialized chambers for agriculture with irrigation, and so on. Does that mean termites are more intelligent than chimps?
Termites and other insects have some sophisticated adaptive mechanisms programmed into them. This illustrates a difference between insects, chimps and humans: Many insects lay down scented trails helping them find their way back to a hive, nest etc. It can be impressive watching them find their way back. If however a scented trail is disrupted they can wander endlessly even if within a short distance from their objective and even with a number of easy landmarks nearby. There is a lack of flexibility to their behavior contrasting with flexible cognitive responses found in higher forms of intelligence. Chimps and humans can recognize familiar landmarks and then reason from this that the destination must be near. They can readjust based on new information and an analysis of it.
Zachriel: It is characterized by reproduction, fecundity, variation and selection. Each of these terms has a discrete empirical meaning
fifth monarchy man: Agreed but you are not saying reproduction, fecundity, variation and selection are intelligent. You are saying evolution is intelligent and by evolution you mean "the universe"
Evolution is "the universe"! Are you really that confused over basic terminology, such as "evolution? Especially as I made direct reference to the Theory of Evolution.
fifth monarchy man: Yes but when we are talking about "Evolution" (what you are calling intelligent) we are talking about a universal phenomena therefore it must include all environments so it is equivalent to the Universe.
I have no idea what you are talking about. Evolution is a specific process that involves clearly defined mechanisms, including reproduction, fecundity, variation and selection.
Of course she did. Her work was groundbreaking at the time because it was thought that only humans used tools. The linkage to intelligence was explicit. There is simply no other way to approach these discussions than to use terms you find objectionable. To claim that the chimp behavior was explainable without an appeal to their superior intelligence (by comparison to most other organisms) is a stuck on stupid strategy.
No, your strategy is "stupid". So there.
Goodall discovered that chimps shape and use tools. That was her contribution – that was her discovery. Now, you can choose to call "tool use" a criterion for intelligence if you'd like to (which would leave out dolphins, unfortunately), and so if you'd like to, you can go ahead and call chimps "intelligent" on account of their tool use (Goodall did; I would too). But it makes not one bit of difference whether or not one calls them intelligent! The data here is tool use, not "intelligence".
Goodall could have reported all of her scientific results without ever referring to the concept of "intelligence": Headline: Chimps Found to be Tool-Users!. This would have conveyed 100% of the finding. In contrast, she could never have reported her findings by leaving out the concept of tool-use! If she had simply reported "Headline: Chimps found to be Intelligent!" then she would have had to immediately begun to explain what in the world she was talking about! (Did she discover they could build complex machinery? Prove math theorems? Compose symphonies? What?)
So in science, you begin with some particular organism, observe its abilities, and report on what it can and can't do. If its abilities include running fast and jumping high, you might choose to say the animal is "agile" or "athletic". If it can do things like remember locations or memorize mazes, you might choose to say the animal is "intelligent". But the fact is conveyed by the description of what the animal can do, and not on the post hoc label of "athletic" or "intelligent".
In contrast, ID begins with some observation (complex machinery in living things) and tries to explain it. Obviously the ability that anything (including evolution) would need in order to create complex biological machinery is… the ability to create complex machinery. And obviously if you'd like to say "creating complex machinery" is a criterion for intelligence (which unfortunately would leave chimps out) then you can call the cause of life "intelligent". But you have learned precisely nothing in this little naming excerise – all you've done is to say that whatever caused life, it was intelligent by definition. And if evolution turns out to really be the cause of complex biological machinery, then by your defintion, evolution is intelligent.
Termites and other insects have some sophisticated adaptive mechanisms programmed into them.
Humans have even more sophisticated adaptive mechanisms programmed into them.
If however a scented trail is disrupted they can wander endlessly even if within a short distance from their objective and even with a number of easy landmarks nearby. There is a lack of flexibility to their behavior contrasting with flexible cognitive responses found in higher forms of intelligence. Chimps and humans can recognize familiar landmarks and then reason from this that the destination must be near. They can readjust based on new information and an analysis of it.
The canonical example of this sort of inflexible intelligence is the sphex wasp, a favorite of philosophers of mind.
I agree – this is a different type of intelligence; one that lacks flexibility. (Experiments reveal that humans have areas in which they repeat the same mistakes endlessly too, so it seems we might be "sphexish" as well).
I think one way for you to think about what ID needs to do is to think of a way to decide if something has flexible (human-like) or non-flexible (sphex-wasp-like) intelligence. What you'll find is that the only way to tell the difference is to observe the behavior of the animal in question. Since this is not possible in the context of ID, ID can never say if the "intelligence" responsible was the kind a sphex wasp has, or the kind a human has. And then you need to decide if you are going to call something that might well be perfectly sphexish – without any ability to flexibly respond to novel circumstance – "intelligent" in the first place!
But it makes not one bit of difference whether or not one calls them intelligent! The data here is tool use, not "intelligence".
Right Einstein. Using a tool to attain a goal is not intelligence. Noone claimed it was. The claim is that intelligence enables humans and chimps to use tools and sometimes in highly innovative ways reflecting the intelligence of the organisms.
Using a tool to attain a goal is not intelligence. Noone claimed it was.
Obviously, because you are incapable of characterizing intelligence of arbitrary entities in any way that can be tested.
The claim is that intelligence enables humans and chimps to use tools and sometimes in highly innovative ways reflecting the intelligence of the organisms.
I just got through explaining this: It is not "intelligence" that enables humans and chimps to use tools any more than it is "athleticism" that enables cheetahs to run fast. Please read my last post.
I think one way for you to think about what ID needs to do is to think of a way to decide if something has flexible (human-like) or non-flexible (sphex-wasp-like) intelligence. What you'll find is that the only way to tell the difference is to observe the behavior of the animal in question.
So you are saying all those scientists who are trying to determine if Neanderthals were intelligent (human like) are wasting their time? Is the evidence for the great leap foward in human development 40000 years ago just idle speculation and will it forever remain as such?
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 7:08 pm
I just got through explaining this: It is not "intelligence" that enables humans and chimps to use tools any more than it is "athleticism" that enables cheetahs to run fast. Please read my last post.
You just got through explaining? As if you were an authority on the subject. I suppose it's the vast right wing conspiracy that leads people to think intelligence is linked to the capacity to use tools to construct rockets that take us to the moon. Can't be intelligence.
So you are saying all those scientists who are trying to determine if Neanderthals were intelligent (human like) are wasting their time? Is the evidence for the great leap foward in human development 40000 years ago just idle speculation and will it forever remain as such?
Physical anthropologists study all sorts of primate behaviors; they are trying to see where in the array of mental abilities studied for various primates the Neanderthals may come in. We can make educated assessments about the mental abilities of humans 10,000 years ago, or 2000 or 200 years ago too, since we believe humans then had similar mentality to humans now. This research depends heavily on our understanding of brain evolution and primate neurology too.
In contrast, we have absolutely no clue whatsoever about what type of mental abilities the Creator of Life might or might not have. All we know is whatever it was, it could somehow produce living things.
You just got through explaining? As if you were an authority on the subject. I suppose it's the vast right wing conspiracy that leads people to think intelligence is linked to the capacity to use tools to construct rockets that take us to the moon. Can't be intelligence.
Not only have you failed to respond to the arguments in my post, but your tone is increasingly hostile. I think everybody else is having a very nice, stimulating discussion on the topic here, though.
Here, just try responding to this: It is not "intelligence" that enables humans and chimps to use tools any more than it is "athleticism" that enables cheetahs to run fast.
Now, do you think "athleticism" is a useful explanation for our observation of fast running? Or, what do you think the difference is between these two types of labels, "athleticism" and "intelligence"
Physical anthropologists study all sorts of primate behaviors; they are trying to see where in the array of mental abilities studied for various primates the Neanderthals may come in. We can make educated assessments about the mental abilities of humans 10,000 years ago, or 2000 or 200 years ago too,
So you are saying your original stament is incorrect
you said:
What you'll find is that the only way to tell the difference is to observe the behavior of the animal in question.
What you meant is that there are all sorts of ways to tell the difference you just can't think of a way when we are talking about the Creator of life.
Quick question
Why should other people's investigations be limited by your lack of imagination?
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 8:07 pm
Goodall could have reported all of her scientific results without ever referring to the concept of "intelligence": Headline: Chimps Found to be Tool-Users!. This would have conveyed 100% of the finding.
Exactly. The linkage between intelligence and the capacity for using tools is so obvious readers would know a discovery was made which further documents the relatively advanced intelligence of chimps.
aiguy: Physical anthropologists study all sorts of primate behaviors; they are trying to see where in the array of mental abilities studied for various primates the Neanderthals may come in. We can make educated assessments about the mental abilities of humans 10,000 years ago, or 2000 or 200 years ago too,
fmm: So you are saying your original stament is incorrect
Or maybe he is saying that "mental abilities" has explanatory utility that "intelligence" lacks.:wink:
Either "intelligence" is something that can be shown to cause things or not; you cannot evidence "intelligence" by finding gaps in our knowledge.
It's not about finding gaps, it's about having explanations other than purpose. You call these 'gaps' in bias toward your own answers. It is not that the designed artifact appears not to be designed but since we have no other explanation we infer design. Rather, the designed artifact appears designed, and its parts have apparent purpose behind their arrangement … AND there is no good reason to suspect anything other than design. There is no empirical evidence of any explanation other than design.
Rain does not appear to be the reason for rain clouds and rain clouds do not appear to have been designed for the purpose of raining. The reason for rain clouds appears to be evaporation and condensation, the regular working of the meteorological phenomena.
You are just digging deeper into these terminological dodges.
I'm not dodging. Why do you challenge Bradford's negative characterizations of your argumetns and then do the same to mine?
Instead of arguing that "intelligence" has an operational defintion in ID (it does not) you say ID relies on the defintion of "design" instead.
I don't say this, you do. I showed that your definition of "intelligence" makes the question of its definition moot as you've already defined it as "that which designs" so whether in ID or in your propositions the situation relies not on the definition of intelligence. So be it. Now all we have to do is deal with is "design".
But of course you have no operational definition of that either, because as I've pointed out, there is no operational notion of purpose.
What do you mean "operational"
Purpose is that which is willed, intended, desired, and brought about by foresight. It is a goal or prescribed target or, alternatively, depending on how lax I've been, purpose is the will, intent, desire acting with foresight.
I don't know what you mean by "designed", unless you mean "built by a human being".
I mean that which exhibits parts purposefully arranged. Like a beaver's dam, or its lodge. Something for which natural laws and chance do not account. No, this is not an argument from ignorance unless you choose to appeal to our ignorance of unknown laws and hopeful chances.
I think rainclouds look like they are their for the purpose of making rain, and you can't show my why I'm wrong, so this whole "detecting purposeful arrangements" thing is whistling in the wind.
Sure I can. Things which happen by chance or lawful necessity don't appear to have been arranged purposefully – a design inference is superfluous, but not necessarily wrong. If a tree has fallen and it has rotted roots and lose dirt about its base and lies in the direction of last night's strong wind then there is no inference to purpose. If it's trunk has been struck through by repeated blows with a sharp instrument applied such that it lies between complex structures which it would likely have hit if falling by chance but didn't, then we can infer its purposeful felling.
The argument is that in the absence of the argument forwarded to explain away the apparent design, and in the presence of arguments to the reality of the design, then design is the better explanation. Appearances are often misleading but we need good arguments and evidence to determine that.Two things wrong with this approach: First, it is an argument from ignorance,
It is not an argument from ignorance. It is a decision not to appeal to unknown entities and an inference to the best explanation for the design and purpose apparent.
and second, you failed to characterize "design" (or "purpose") in a way we can test.
Your argument is reducing to the same old "ID is untestable". This debate has been ongoing in its current incarnation for over a dozen years and there's no need for us to rehearse it here. Your question, or so I thought, was about whether or not we needed a rigorous definition of "intelligence". Instead it is ending as nothing but the same old objections against design; it's untestable, argument from ignorance, it's not science, you need independent evidence of the designer, etc.
These all have defences and have been attacked on many threads here. I thought you were after something other than a defence of ID. I admit to being late to this party and I have no knowledge of the ideas you were arguing on the thread that preceded this one, so maybe I've misinterpreted your project.
None of which count as scientific explanations of anything (which the exception of the speculations regarding multiverses which nobody claims is anything near settled science).
"With the exception of"… so, at least one of these does count. As do "chance" and "luck". Magic is an adequate substitute for these explanations as it is in your characterization.
Your conception of "intelligence" is indistinguishable from "magic" because it is a perfectly mysterious concept. In real theories, the explanatory concepts are less mysterious than phenomena being explained.
I haven't offered a conception of intelligence. But you are incorrect about your assertion about explanations being less mysterious than the things they explain. The human mind and its will are very mysterious but explain very mundane things like thumbtacks quite well. An explanation is just as complex and just as mysterious as needs be.
The detection of "the aim of the desire or will" is nothing but an excercise in subjective interpretation because it has no operational definition. We can never agree on what things have desires or "will" and what things don't when we know nothing about what sort of thing is responsible.
This is an appeal to our ignorance and wishful thinking about potential future discoveries. We have a test. We have IC, CSI, and statistical arguments against the alternatives to design. You don't like these, I'm more than certain, but your displeasure is not the same as their nonexistence.
Do certain features of life and the universe indicate intended goals or does chance and law account for everything?
Why can't law account for intended goals?
One can draw the conclusion that if physical regularities account for an artifact then there is no obvious intent involved in the arrangement of the parts – "intent" is not evidenced and its inference would be superfluous. One can make an argument for the purposeful arrangement and action of matter which results in our inference of the law itself, but that is another story.
What this really boils down to is the same basic idea that you need independent evidence of the designer before you can infer design.
No, you need an independent way of detecting "design"/"intelligence" before you can claim evidence for it. Your definition of "design" do not allow us to decide what things are purposefully arranged and what things are not.
We have. We see if parts are arranged with respect to a final function or end goal. If that final arrangement evidences foresight by the fact that randomness, chance, unintentional repetitive movement of particles and luck do not account for it then that end arrangement demonstrates the existence of purpose, will, determination, desire, etc.. These are the kinds of causes which can choose from among infinite options and ensure a particular contingent outcome.
We can then infer the existence of the kind of thing that possesses will, desires, foresight, purposes and goals.
So you are saying your original stament is incorrect
No, my original statement is correct.
you said: What you'll find is that the only way to tell the difference is to observe the behavior of the animal in question.
That is correct. How can one possibly decide if some type of animal is capable of adaptive behaviors unless you actually observe the behaviors?
What you meant is that there are all sorts of ways to tell the difference you just can't think of a way when we are talking about the Creator of life.
I have no idea what you are talking about. We know a tremendous amount about the behaviors of animals… because we have observed their behaviors. We know what various primates can do in novel circumstances… because we have observed primates in novel circumstances. We know about how brain capacity correlates to abilties in vertebrates… because we have observed these correlations.
What do we know about "intelligent agents" in the abstract? Absolutely nothing. What can we observe that might illuminate the characteristics of the "Creator of Life" Not one, single, solitary thing.
Why should other people's investigations be limited by your lack of imagination?
AIGUY: Goodall could have reported all of her scientific results without ever referring to the concept of "intelligence": Headline: Chimps Found to be Tool-Users!. This would have conveyed 100% of the finding.
BRADFORD: Exactly. The linkage between intelligence and the capacity for using tools is so obvious readers would know a discovery was made which further documents the relatively advanced intelligence of chimps.
I have explained this several times now; the fact that you refuse to answer my point tells me you have no response. I will try again:
Here, just try responding to this: It is not "intelligence" that enables humans and chimps to use tools any more than it is "athleticism" that enables cheetahs to run fast.
Now, do you think "athleticism" is a useful explanation for our observation of fast running? Or, what do you think the difference is between these two types of labels, "athleticism" and "intelligence"
Or maybe he is saying that "mental abilities" has explanatory utility that "intelligence" lacks
Or maybe you should read what I write
The explanation for the existence of a stone axe from 30,000 years ago is not "intelligence". It is not agency. It is not something that does not result from physical necessity. The explanation is living things made it. More specifically, animals, primates, Homo Neanderthalis. You can call them intelligent or not, and it makes no difference to anyone; all we'd like to know is what they were and were not capable of doing.
It is not "intelligence" that enables humans and chimps to use tools any more than it is "athleticism" that enables cheetahs to run fast. Why can't you understand that?
It's not about finding gaps, it's about having explanations other than purpose.
You said "Unlike with the rain cloud, we have the appearance of design and purpose without (to the IDer) a way to explain it away in terms of purposeless, non-design."
In other words, if nobody can explain it otherwise, then the answer must be "purposeful design" (whatever that means). This really is a classic argument from ignorance, god-of-the-gaps approach.
You call these 'gaps' in bias toward your own answers. It is not that the designed artifact appears not to be designed but since we have no other explanation we infer design. Rather, the designed artifact appears designed, and its parts have apparent purpose behind their arrangement "¦ AND there is no good reason to suspect anything other than design. There is no empirical evidence of any explanation other than design.
First, it means nothing to say something was "designed" unless you actually say what sort of thing you are talking about. Now, you don't have to have all of the details of course. You don't have to say "Fred Smith designed it". You don't even have to say "A human being designed it". Maybe just "Some sort of animal designed it" or even "some unknown life form". At least these things have some meaning, so we learn something by these explanations. However, saying nothing at all about the cause tells us (guess what?) nothing at all. Saying nothing but "an unspecified thing" is completely vacuous of content. And adding "Oh, and this unspecified thing was intelligent" tells us not one thing more.
It means nothing, and nothing follows from that claim. You can't say one single thing more about this unspecified thing once you've been told it was "intelligent". You can't tell me if it can write a book, or write a symphony, or solve a crossword puzzle, or understand a joke. You can't tell me if it is aware of its actions, or if it can learn, or anything at all. This explanation is 100% empty of any informational content – it is a vacuous statement.
Rain does not appear to be the reason for rain clouds and rain clouds do not appear to have been designed for the purpose of raining. The reason for rain clouds appears to be evaporation and condensation, the regular working of the meteorological phenomena.
Motion does not appear to be the reason for flagella, and flagella do not appear to have been designed for the purpose of moving cells. The reason flagella appears to be whipping around in circles, the regular working of biological phenomena.
Give me a break here, Pez. We can keep this up as long as you'd like, but eventually you'll need to acknowledge that "purpose" is not something you can objectively detect if you have no way to observe whatever is that is supposedly acting with purpose!
I'm not dodging. Why do you challenge Bradford's negative characterizations of your argumetns and then do the same to mine
My apologies – I should not have said it was a dodge. It does appear that you are trying to redirect the confusion surrounding the concept of "intelligent cause" with confusion surrounding the concept of "purpose".
I don't say anything about ID and its definitions; I demonstrated that Behe has not been coy with his definitions. I also showed that your definition of "intelligence" makes the question of its definition moot as you've already defined it as "that which designs". So be it. Now all we have to do is deal with is "design".
OK, good enough. "Intelligence" is "that which designs".
I also see that page echoes my point (and is something freshman psychology students learn):
Operational definitions are at their most controversial in the field of psychology, where intuitive concepts, such as intelligence need to be operationally defined before they become amenable to scientific investigation, for example, through processes such as IQ tests.
Purpose is that which willed, intended, desired, and brought about by foresight.
Come on Pez, how am I supposed to know what is "willed, intended, and desired" and what isn't in the context of ID? I can't ask the designer of life if He meant to do it or not!
Something for which natural laws and chance do not account.
How do you know that natural laws and chance do not account for me designing a car, or writing these sentences? (Answer: You don't. That is a metaphysical speculation that you cannot support with evidence).
If it's trunk has been struck through by repeated blows with a sharp instrument applied such that it lies between complex structures which it would likely have hit if falling by chance but didn't, then we can infer its purposeful felling.
You can infer a human being felled it, and we already know what humans do "on purpose". We have no such knowledge about Designers of Life.
Your argument is reducing to the same old "ID is untestable". This debate has been ongoing in its current incarnation for over a dozen years and there's no need for us to rehearse it here. Your question, or so I thought, was about whether or not we needed a rigorous definition of "intelligence". Instead it is ending as nothing but the same old objections against design; it's untestable, argument from ignorance, it's not science, you need independent evidence of the designer, etc.
Yes of course ID is untestable, but my point is very much about the theoretical vacuity of ID, and how equivocation on the meaning of "intelligence" lays at the root of so much confusion here.
Nullasalus believes that intelligence entails consciousness, but agrees that ID cannot empirically support claims that the Designer was conscious. Kornbelt believes that intelligence does not entail consciousness, and in fact describes "intelligence" in a way that cannot be distinguished (at least by me) from other physical causes. You and Bradford say intelligence acts do not result from "natural law and chance"; others here disagree, and some agree that machines which are physically determined can be intelligent. If you ask ten IDers what they mean by "intelligent", you will get twenty very different contradictory answers.
I haven't offered a conception of intelligence.
Like I said, there are so many completely different explanations being offered it's hard to keep track.
But you are incorrect about your assertion about explanations being less mysterious than the things they explain. The human mind and its will are very mysterious but explain very mundane things like thumbtacks quite well. An explanation is just as complex and just as mysterious as needs be.
I do not agree that "will" explains thumbtacks. Can you show me how we can tell if will is involved or not? I believe that "human beings" explain thumbtacks, but not "will".
AIGUY: The detection of "the aim of the desire or will" is nothing but an excercise in subjective interpretation because it has no operational definition. We can never agree on what things have desires or "will" and what things don't when we know nothing about what sort of thing is responsible.
PEZ: This is an appeal to our ignorance and wishful thinking about potential future discoveries.
What??? What future discoveries? Ignorance and wishful thinking??? I am saying something that is not exactly controversial here: There are no empirical tests for will.
We have a test. We have IC, CSI, and statistical arguments against the alternatives to design. You don't like these, I'm more than certain, but your displeasure is not the same as their nonexistence.
You are saying that CSI is a test for "will" Seriously?
Pez: Rather, the designed artifact appears designed, and its parts have apparent purpose behind their arrangement "¦ AND there is no good reason to suspect anything other than design. There is no empirical evidence of any explanation other than design.
We have a robust Theory of Evolution, so according to your own reasoning, there is no reason to infer design.
Pez: Rain does not appear to be the reason for rain clouds and rain clouds do not appear to have been designed for the purpose of raining.
That clearly demonstrates your God-of-the-Gaps reasoning. Before people had reasonable scientific explanations, they did say that rain was caused by design. But this is not a scientific argument.
For an assertion to have scientific validity, you need to propose a hypothesis, and then test its entailed predictions. These predictions should be specific and distinguish between your hypothesis and other competing hypotheses.
Pez: Now all we have to do is deal with is "design".
Have you taken this up with the rest of the ID Community? They seem to think ID has something to do with Intelligence. In any case, your definition of design appears to include "purpose". You haven't solved the problem.
Pez: What do you mean "operational"
Simply, that which we can distinguish by an objective empirical test. How do we test for intelligencedesign purpose? Your previous argument was based on analogy and a gap; the intuitive recognition of design and a lack of a known explanation.
Pez: No, this is not an argument from ignorance unless you choose to appeal to our ignorance of unknown laws and hopeful chances.
Human ignorance is well-established. Gaps exist. Ignorance prevails.
Pez: It is not an argument from ignorance.
Sure it is. The scientific method is very basic, hypothetico deductive. We take your claim and tentatively accept it as true, the hypothesis. We derive from that hypothesis *entailed* empirical predictions. These predictions should be specific and distinguishing.
I have my magnifying glass and notepad at the ready.
That is correct. How can one possibly decide if some type of animal is capable of adaptive behaviors unless you actually observe the behaviors?
You were discussing how to tell whether a being had the human kind of intelligence and one way is by looking at the artifacts they leave behind. That's how we do it with extinct hominids. There are other ways as well we just have to be creative.
have no idea what you are talking about. We know a tremendous amount about the behaviors of animals"¦ because we have observed their behaviors. We know what various primates can do in novel circumstances"¦ because we have observed primates in novel circumstances
But we have not observed the behavior of extinct hominids at all yet scientists can and do attempt to determine whether they were intelligent (like us)
have no idea what you are talking about.
That's a common symptom of lack of imagination
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 25, 2008 @ 9:13 am
But we have not observed the behavior of extinct hominids at all yet scientists can and do attempt to determine whether they were intelligent (like us)
I haven't observed your behavior, or the behavior of countless other humans, but I can make all sorts of reasonable assumptions about something given only the information that it is human, because I know so many things about humans in general. Likewise, if you told an ethologist that you found a new species of primate that is closely related to chimps, she would instantly know a tremendous amount about this animal and what it might be able to do. Scientists know a tremendous amount about animals, and primates in particular, and that is how scientists can guess what sort of abilities Neanderthals had when they interpret the evidence of their activities.
In stark contrast, we know absolutely nothing about "intelligent agents" in the abstract. If you don't specify what sort of thing you are talking about (a life form? an animal? a primate? a non-physical spiritual being? a fifteen-dimensional vortex of dark energy plasma?) then we have nothing to go on. We can't say one single thing about the possible mental abilities of an unspecified "intelligent agent", whether or not we find artifacts from them.
Maybe the agent was consciously aware of producing the artifact, and maybe it wasn't. We can't use our knowledge of similar animals with similar brains to guess about this, because we have no idea whatsoever about anything having to do with an "intelligent agent" without knowing anything specific about the sort of thing it is.
That's a common symptom of lack of imagination
The funny thing is, I actually think it is the lack of imagination of ID folks that makes this hard to see. You think that all "intelligent agents" will somehow be similar, so that when you say an "intelligent agent" is responsible for something, that actually tells us something about it. If you use your imagination, however, you realize that any assumption you make about what an "intelligent agent" is is just a projection of human traits (or the traits of primates, or even animals or life forms). If you had a better imagination, you'd see that what is true of us animals might be completely different from other sorts of "intelligent agents"!
Maybe we have volition (a "will") and can choose to do what we want, but other intelligent agents don't, and are completely determined by their physical makeup. Maybe we have awareness of what we are doing, and we reflect on our beliefs and desires, but other intelligent agents don't. Maybe we have mental images that we use to think about the future, but other intelligent agents do not form images in their mind at all. Maybe we can appreciate music and poetry and literature, but other intelligent agents can't. And so on.
If you had a better imagination, you could see that we can't know anything about the abilities or characteristics of "intelligent agents" when we know nothing else about them. In constrast, we know a tremendous amount about Neanderthals, and that is the knowledge we use to guess about their mental abilities when we interpret evidence of their activities.
"¨Pez,"¨It's not about finding gaps, it's about having explanations other than purpose."¨
"¨You said "Unlike with the rain cloud, we have the appearance of design and purpose without (to the IDer) a way to explain it away in terms of purposeless, non-design.""¨In other words, if nobody can explain it otherwise, then the answer must be "purposeful design" (whatever that means). This really is a classic argument from ignorance, god-of-the-gaps approach.
No, it really isn't. It's not merely that there is no other explanation, but that, first and foremost, there is the explanation of design warranted by the observation. Then there is also the fact that any argument which is supposed to make this design argument superfluous, or that would argue for a mere appearance of design fails.
Now you've added 'god-of-the-gaps' to your argument along with, untestable, vacuous, independent knowledge of the designer, etc. This is looking more and more like a typical critique. If I thought we were just going to rehearse all the lines we'd heard a million times before I'd have saved myself the trouble of responding to your first queries.
You call these 'gaps' in bias toward your own answers. It is not that the designed artifact appears not to be designed but since we have no other explanation we infer design. Rather, the designed artifact appears designed, and its parts have apparent purpose behind their arrangement "¦ AND there is no good reason to suspect anything other than design. There is no empirical evidence of any explanation other than design."¨
"¨First, it means nothing to say something was "designed" unless you actually say what sort of thing you are talking about.
Been said – purposeful arrangement of parts.
Now, you don't have to have all of the details of course. You don't have to say "Fred Smith designed it". You don't even have to say "A human being designed it". Maybe just "Some sort of animal designed it" or even "some unknown life form". At least these things have some meaning, so we learn something by these explanations.
So saying some animal designed it is an explanation where saying something with will, foresight, imagination, a plan and desire isn't? Our opinions differ greatly. Appealing to some unknown life-form is more informative than appealing to something that designs with purpose? I fail to see how, given all you say to fmm about possible life-forms and our lack of knowledge about them.
However, saying nothing at all about the cause tells us (guess what?) nothing at all. Saying nothing but "an unspecified thing" is completely vacuous of content. And adding "Oh, and this unspecified thing was intelligent" tells us not one thing more.
I didn't say that it was intelligent and I've specified what can be specified by the evidence."¨
It means nothing, and nothing follows from that claim. You can't say one single thing more about this unspecified thing once you've been told it was "intelligent".
I didn't say it was "intelligent" but rather that it exhibits purpose. What more needs to be said?
You can't tell me if it can write a book, or write a symphony, or solve a crossword puzzle, or understand a joke. You can't tell me if it is aware of its actions, or if it can learn, or anything at all. This explanation is 100% empty of any informational content – it is a vacuous statement.
Who cares about its other talents? That's hardly necessary as part of the explanation.
"¨Rain does not appear to be the reason for rain clouds and rain clouds do not appear to have been designed for the purpose of raining. The reason for rain clouds appears to be evaporation and condensation, the regular working of the meteorological phenomena."¨"¨Motion does not appear to be the reason for flagella, and flagella do not appear to have been designed for the purpose of moving cells. The reason flagella appears to be whipping around in circles, the regular working of biological phenomena.
I think most observers will disagree with you here. Biology is fraught with anthropomorphic language for the very reason that these things do appear to be designed for the purposes they are accomplishing.
"¨Give me a break here, Pez. We can keep this up as long as you'd like,
Is that a dare?
but eventually you'll need to acknowledge that "purpose" is not something you can objectively detect if you have no way to observe whatever is that is supposedly acting with purpose!
Aha! Back to independent evidence for the designer. Same old objections. We don't need to observe that which is acting with purpose. That much is clear. "¨
I'm not dodging. Why do you challenge Bradford's negative characterizations of your argumetns and then do the same to mine"¨"¨My apologies – I should not have said it was a dodge.
Thanks.
It does appear that you are trying to redirect the confusion surrounding the concept of "intelligent cause" with confusion surrounding the concept of "purpose".
I don't see confusion in either.
"¨I don't say anything about ID and its definitions; I demonstrated that Behe has not been coy with his definitions. I also showed that your definition of "intelligence" makes the question of its definition moot as you've already defined it as "that which designs". So be it. Now all we have to do is deal with is "design".OK, good enough. "Intelligence" is "that which designs"."¨
Good enough."¨"¨
Purpose is that which willed, intended, desired, and brought about by foresight."¨"¨Come on Pez, how am I supposed to know what is "willed, intended, and desired" and what isn't in the context of ID? I can't ask the designer of life if He meant to do it or not!
Relax, Aiguy, we're suposed to be having a stimulating conversation, right?
You don't need to ask the designer anything and you don't need to observe the designer and you don't need independent evidence of the designer. You need to know if the artifacts you are studying are best explained by reference to design, if the purposeful arrangement of its parts are evidenced or if lack of purpose suffices as an explanation.
Your project is not at all what it appeared to me when you listed your propositions.
"¨"¨
How do you know that natural laws and chance do not account for me designing a car, or writing these sentences? (Answer: You don't. That is a metaphysical speculation that you cannot support with evidence).
Ah, very metaphysical indeed. I don't know that natural laws do not account for the designer just because I find evidence for design. But I can study the design and draw conclusion about whether or not atural laws themselves account for it.
"¨If it's trunk has been struck through by repeated blows with a sharp instrument applied such that it lies between complex structures which it would likely have hit if falling by chance but didn't, then we can infer its purposeful felling."¨"¨You can infer a human being felled it, and we already know what humans do "on purpose". We have no such knowledge about Designers of Life.
Back to your independent evidence thing. What if the felled tree were on a desert island with no humans but there was a chimp seen carrying an axe over his shoulder? Can we still conclude purpose in the felling of the tree?
"¨
Yes of course ID is untestable, but my point is very much about the theoretical vacuity of ID, and how equivocation on the meaning of "intelligence" lays at the root of so much confusion here.
I think we've seen that in theory it is not the least bit vacuous. "¨
Nullasalus believes that intelligence entails consciousness, but agrees that ID cannot empirically support claims that the Designer was conscious. Kornbelt believes that intelligence does not entail consciousness, and in fact describes "intelligence" in a way that cannot be distinguished (at least by me) from other physical causes. You and Bradford say intelligence acts do not result from "natural law and chance"; others here disagree, and some agree that machines which are physically determined can be intelligent. If you ask ten IDers what they mean by "intelligent", you will get twenty very different contradictory answers.
You get a similar plot when you ask about randomness and natural selection in evolution but that is not enough to invalidate a line of thought."¨"¨
Like I said, there are so many completely different explanations being offered it's hard to keep track.
If you read with more charity I think you would find the explanations don't differ a great deal. Mine differs mainly by focusing on the definitions that you wanted to deal with. I avoid explanations of the "intelligence" because your definitions don't require any discussion of it. Some others have generously acquiesced to discussing that issue with you nonetheless.
But you are incorrect about your assertion about explanations being less mysterious than the things they explain. The human mind and its will are very mysterious but explain very mundane things like thumbtacks quite well. An explanation is just as complex and just as mysterious as needs be."¨"¨I do not agree that "will" explains thumbtacks. Can you show me how we can tell if will is involved or not? I believe that "human beings" explain thumbtacks, but not "will".
See how mysterious the explanation for the mundane thumbtack is? You can't even tell if the explanation (human design) has or requires will. You've made my point; the explanan need not be less mysterious than the explandum."¨
"¨
What??? What future discoveries? Ignorance and wishful thinking??? I am saying something that is not exactly controversial here: There are no empirical tests for will.
I might have pasted my response on the wrong question. The appeals to ignorance are those which claim that, even in the absence of a natural law or empirical observation to the contrary, we ought to reject the better explanation because such future discoveries may lie on some imagined horizon.
You are saying that CSI is a test for "will" Seriously?
Yep. These are tests for design, and design is marked by purpose, will, intent, desire, foresight, etc. Yep. If the inference is sound then the test identifies will.
"¨
===
Zachriel,
"¨"¨
We have a robust Theory of Evolution, so according to your own reasoning, there is no reason to infer design.
Evolution! Why didn't somebody say so? If only we'd known that evolution explains the design it would have saved us all so much time! I wonder if Behe ever heard of evolution?"¨
But, as I said before:
"Some find RM/NS intellectually fulfills the world view that demands it and some find it comes up short."
Pez: Rain does not appear to be the reason for rain clouds and rain clouds do not appear to have been designed for the purpose of raining. "¨"¨
That clearly demonstrates your God-of-the-Gaps reasoning. Before people had reasonable scientific explanations, they did say that rain was caused by design. But this is not a scientific argument.
There's that post-enlightenment folk history again. The people I know of may have colloquially referred to the design behind rain and assumed the providential actions of God in specific instances of rain, but they also understood that there was a complex water cycle which accounted for the phenomenon in a regular and natural way."¨"¨ Pez: Now all we have to do is deal with is "design"."¨"¨
Have you taken this up with the rest of the ID Community? They seem to think ID has something to do with Intelligence.
Asked and answered.
In any case, your definition of design appears to include "purpose". You haven't solved the problem.
Yes, it "appears" to include purpose by the fact that I've written that half a dozen times. "¨Pez: What do you mean "operational""¨"¨
Simply, that which we can distinguish by an objective empirical test. How do we test for intelligence design purpose? Your previous argument was based on analogy and a gap; the intuitive recognition of design and a lack of a known explanation.
Question-begging. Who says that my explanation isn't the known explanation? What we lack is an explanation from those who deny mine. Pez: No, this is not an argument from ignorance unless you choose to appeal to our ignorance of unknown laws and hopeful chances."¨"¨
Human ignorance is well-established. Gaps exist. Ignorance prevails.
Sounds about right. And while it may we don't have to accept I.O.U.s as explanations when we have others. "¨Pez: It is not an argument from ignorance. "¨"¨
Sure it is. The scientific method is very basic, hypothetico deductive. We take your claim and tentatively accept it as true, the hypothesis. We derive from that hypothesis *entailed* empirical predictions. These predictions should be specific and distinguishing.
Thanks for the link. Is it really to a page explaining the scientific method? That is such a generous gesture.
So let's start with the first. Let's say you take the claim and tentatively accept it as true instead of resist it with every fibre of your being. Now, accepting as you do the possibility that life may indicate purposeful arrangement of parts, what would you propose as a test for this purpose? A sequence of steps that requires foresight and action toward an end-goal or plan? How would we test for that?
Or do we return only to that infamous requirement that we produce a video tape or the designer's signature?
"¨I have my magnifying glass and notepad at the ready.
Please keep your private affairs and development to yourself.
My apologies, but I can't find answers to my question that I posed on the other thread "So the how did it happen?"
I only have a bit of time right now, but I would love to continue on our discussion some time. I think that we are both asking the right fundamental questions and I'm positive that our discussion will be beneficial one way or the other.
One little thing, though. In your last comment here, you state that "we can't know anything about the abilities or characteristics of "intelligent agents" when we know nothing else about them." Are you merely being sarcastic?
How else can you know anything is intelligence apart from patterns that they leave, either in the form of actions, speech, writings, artifacts, etc?
I leave you with this quote from Reid: "No man ever saw wisdom [read "design" or "intelligence"], and if he does not [infer wisdom] from the marks of it, he can form no conclusions respecting anything of his fellow creature. How should I know that any of this audience have understanding? It is only by the effects of it on their conduct and behavior, and this leads me to suppose that such behavior proceeds only from understanding. But says Hume, unless you know it by experience, you know nothing of it. If this is the case, I never could know it at all. Hence it appears that whoever maintains that there is no force in the argument from final causes [design], denies the existence of any intelligent being but himself. He has the same
evidence for wisdom and intelligence in God as in a father or brother or a friend. He infers it in both from its effects and these effects he discovers in the one as well as the other…. From marks of wisdom and intelligence in effects, a wise and intelligent cause may be inferred. (Reprinted in Lectures on Natural Theology, University Press of America, 1981.)"
IOW, even when you have an experience with your fellow man, you can only determine his intelligence, or lack thereof, by the effects he leaves upon your senses. If everyone around was randomly bumping into walls and mumbling incoherently, there would be no effects for you to consider as signs of intelligence.
Remember that little question which begins ID research: "Can previous intelligence be detected from its effects, when nothing else is known about the intelligence?" But even then, that "anything else which is known about the intelligence" will itself only be stated in terms of the effects which that intelligence produces. Seems that so far, as long as intelligence can be defined (one aspect of which I believe I have done so already) the answer to that question is "yes."
Simply, that which we can distinguish by an objective empirical test. How do we test for intelligencedesign purpose? Can you provide an operational definition of purpose?
Pez: And while it may we don't have to accept I.O.U.s as explanations when we have others.
Now you have it. Ignorance is not evidence of design.
Pez: Now, accepting as you do the possibility that life may indicate purposeful arrangement of parts, what would you propose as a test for this purpose? A sequence of steps that requires foresight and action toward an end-goal or plan? How would we test for that?
Yes, I do believe you have it now! Those are exactly the sorts of questions ID Supporters need to answer.
Now you have it. Ignorance is not evidence of design.
Neither is it a rebuttal.
But we do have evidence of design, we have parts arranged in such a manner that they could not have been without purpose.
What is "purpose" Operationally we can test for purpose in a system by examining to see: if all of the parts of that system contribute to the whole and to its function; if each is necessary in order for that system to function; if removal of any of the parts causes the system to lose function; if there is a statistically-determined unlikelihood of the parts coming together by chance; if the arrangement of the parts is not demanded by any law describing the regularity of motion and interaction of matter.
Pez: Now, accepting as you do the possibility that life may indicate purposeful arrangement of parts, what would you propose as a test for this purpose? A sequence of steps that requires foresight and action toward an end-goal or plan? How would we test for that?
Zach: Yes, I do believe you have it now! Those are exactly the sorts of questions ID Supporters need to answer.
Done.
Denying these tests, and accepting the possible truth of the claim, how would you test for it?
Appealing to some unknown life-form is more informative than appealing to something that designs with purpose?
Yes. We have knowledge of life forms, so when you say some living thing was the cause of something, I have some idea what you are talking about. When you say something unspecified was the cause, I have no idea what you are talking about. And when you add "it designs with purpose" it tells me not one thing more, because we have no idea how one can tell when some unspecified thing has purpose.
I didn't say it was "intelligent" but rather that it exhibits purpose. What more needs to be said?
You have to say how I know when something is exhibiting purpose and when it isn't.
Who cares about its other talents? That's hardly necessary as part of the explanation.
Unless you can say something else about the cause of biological forms, then what you are saying is that whatever created life is something that could… create life. That is not a helpful explanation.
I think most observers will disagree with you here.[purpose of clouds]
How do you propose we decide who is right? (there is no way)
Biology is fraught with anthropomorphic language for the very reason that these things do appear to be designed for the purposes they are accomplishing.
People use anthropomorphic language for all sorts of things. My car didn't want to start this morning. My computer didn't know what day it was. The electron can see that both slits are open. Does this mean my computer or my car have knowledge and desires? Or that electrons can actually see? No, of course not.
Relax, Aiguy, we're suposed to be having a stimulating conversation, right?
Right. I think we're doing pretty well, really.
Back to your independent evidence thing.
No. The problem is not only independent evidence (although that would be nice if you want to get a paper published). The problem is that you commit the fallacy of over-generalization every time you call a human being an "intelligent agent". You can't give any example of an "intelligent agent" that isn't an animal. You can't specify what criteria determines membership in the class of "intelligent agents".
What if the felled tree were on a desert island with no humans but there was a chimp seen carrying an axe over his shoulder? Can we still conclude purpose in the felling of the tree?
Yes, a chimp is not some abstract, unspecified thing called an "intelligent agent". It is an animal, and we know a lot about chimps. Because we have this knowledge about chimps, we would assume the chimp did it.
But if there was a dolphin swimming nearby, we would not assume that the dolphin did it. Why not? Isn't a dolphin as intelligent as a chimp? (hint: there is no meaningful answer to that question). But why then, if a dolphin is an intelligent agent, would we not include the dolphin as a likely candidate? Because being an "intelligent agent" doesn't mean anything. The way we assess the likelihood of what chopped down the tree had nothing to do with "intelligent agency"! The only way we could figure it out is by using our knowledge of specific abilities of the various animals in question!
One little thing, though. In your last comment here, you state that "we can't know anything about the abilities or characteristics of "intelligent agents" when we know nothing else about them." Are you merely being sarcastic?
No, I'm completely serious.
How else can you know anything is intelligence apart from patterns that they leave, either in the form of actions, speech, writings, artifacts, etc?
The only way to discover if something is capable of learning is to interact with it. If you could not observe it in novel circumstances, you would never know if the thing is able to learn or solve novel problems. Now, you haven't said here what you mean by "intelligent", but many people consider that learning and solving novel problems are critical components of intelligence. So artifacts don't help – you need to be able to perform experiments.
Consider this: I find a trap-door fitted to cave with a lasso and a diving bell inside. I also find a pile of leaves and a twig with the branches missing. Which one of these sets of artifacts reveals a true flexible problem-solving intelligence? Answer: The pile of leaves is what a gorilla is capable of designing, while spiders design trap doors, lassos, and diving bells. However, spiders are capable of only the most rudimentary conditioning, and are incapable of devising solutions to novel problems. Gorillas, of course, are far more flexible in their responses and ability to learn.
Yes. We have knowledge of life forms, so when you say some living thing was the cause of something, I have some idea what you are talking about.
Oh, but I think not. "Life" is not an explanation for anything and its definition is too ambiguous.
Recall:
There is also much ambiguity in the definitions for life, species, gene, etc. And yet we have a whole science devoted to studying these.What you are missing is that none of these concepts are ever offered as an explanation of anything!
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You have to say how I know when something is exhibiting purpose and when it isn't.
That's the entire point of the ID project. It's not found in definitions nor in the name of the project but in argument and experiment.
Unless you can say something else about the cause of biological forms, then what you are saying is that whatever created life is something that could"¦ create life. That is not a helpful explanation.
No, it's saying that whatever created them created them intentionally. That may be nothing to you, but to others it is something. It says something about the nature of the universe we live in and about the planet we inhabit.
re: clouds and design:
How do you propose we decide who is right? (there is no way)
If you make a philosophical claim then you can argue philosophically. If you are making an empirical claim then we can test your claim against other factors and determine that your attribution of design is superfluous.
We can also decide who's right by discussing the matter and finding out one's true position. We will find yours at the end of this comment. Short answer:( there is a way.)
People use anthropomorphic language for all sorts of things. My car didn't want to start this morning. My computer didn't know what day it was. The electron can see that both slits are open. Does this mean my computer or my car have knowledge and desires? Or that electrons can actually see? No, of course not.
But if it actually appears that any of these uses is appropriate then one would have to provide an argument or evidence to show why it is not.
No. The problem is not only independent evidence (although that would be nice if you want to get a paper published).
I hope you aren't adding "peer-review" to the laundry list of cliche objections.
Yes, a chimp is not some abstract, unspecified thing called an "intelligent agent". It is an animal, and we know a lot about chimps. Because we have this knowledge about chimps, we would assume the chimp did it.
But one thing we know about chimps is that they don't fell trees with axes.
In fact, the evidence, the artifact in question, has given you information about the cause, not vice versa. You have now updated your knowledge of chimps not by observing them but by inference from examining a design. Knowledge can be obtained about the agent by looking at the design.
In fact, in the first case you said we could infer design because we presumed humans did it and we know humans can do it. Now you've inferred that a chimp could accomplish the design, even though you don't have previous knowledge of such activity, because you already inferred the design.
This is exactly what happened to you with regard the neandertal.
You claim to have in-principle objections but they are actually very specific only to the argument you have already rejected.
The only way we could figure it out is by using our knowledge of specific abilities of the various animals in question!
You have no knowledge about this specific ability. You infer it.
Recall that we were actually addressing this question:
Aiguy:I think rainclouds look like they are their for the purpose of making rain, and you can't show my why I'm wrong, so this whole "detecting purposeful arrangements" thing is whistling in the wind.
Pes sez: Sure I can. Things which happen by chance or lawful necessity don't appear to have been arranged purposefully – a design inference is superfluous, but not necessarily wrong. If a tree has fallen and it has rotted roots and loose dirt about its base and lies in the direction of last night's strong wind then there is no inference to purpose. If it's trunk has been struck through by repeated blows with a sharp instrument applied such that it lies between complex structures which it would likely have hit if falling by chance but didn't, then we can infer its purposeful felling.
In the first situation we had a tree felled with no indication of design and you inferred no design – even though a designing agent could have leveled it, there is no evidence that one did. We've now had an extended discussion on this and we see that you have no defence of inferring design in the first situation. My point is made.
So your claim that you think rain clouds appear designed to produce rain does not hold water in light of your treatment of the tree.
In repetition of the next point: In the second case you inferred design and said it was because we know what humans can do. You claim to be making this inference based upon what humans can do, but as above, humans could also have felled the tree in the situation where no design was inferred. So the examination itself was at least integral, if not the only justification, in your inference.
But when humans are removed and replaced with a chimp you still infer design. Now, of course, you are learning about the presumed agent and not about the inferred design. You don't infer design here because chimps are known to be capable of such a design, rather, you infer that a chimp could have created the design because you've already inferred the design.
Let us add to this experiment now.
We know that we can infer design even though we don't presume humans cut the tree down.
We know that we can infer design and then apply that information to our knowledge, or assumptions, about other agents.
Now let's look at the felled tree and observe that there are neither humans nor chimps about or evidenced within the presumed time frame of the tree's falling.
Do you chalk it up to chance, law and natural causes, or do you take note of the obvious design and wonder about the kind of agent who might have accomplished the task?
Have we not learned something about the agent, even if we don't know anything else about it? Wouldn't we at least have some knowledge about what to look for (ie. a human or chimp, or something with at least similar abilities in this regard, but definitely not a dolphin swimming nearby)?
Oh, but I think not. "Life" is not an explanation for anything and its definition is too ambiguous.
Touche, Pez – you're right. Let me speak more carefully about that issue:
I have granted here (in various posts in this thread and the Bunny thread) that the hypothesis of "human-like" intelligence (as opposed to "intelligence" unqualified) actually is meaningful in the context of ID. We know about human mental abilities, and to say that other mental abilities are similar certainly has some meaning. (The problem for ID is that there is no way of telling what particular mental abilities the Designer might have, so we can't know how "human-like" is its intelligence).
Likewise, saying that "life as we know it" from our experience of life on Earth would confer some information; it would not be entirely meaningless. Still, any reference to "intelligence" with no qualifiers at all is devoid of meaning in the context of ID.
That's the entire point of the ID project. It's not found in definitions nor in the name of the project but in argument and experiment.
When somebody has a way to perform an experiment to discern purpose in arbitrary systems, then you might have an argument.
No, it's saying that whatever created them created them intentionally. That may be nothing to you, but to others it is something. It says something about the nature of the universe we live in and about the planet we inhabit.
I think that would be something, but the way I understand intentions is necessarily connected to conscious intentions. And I can't think of any way to ever know if the Designer of Life was conscious. You can complain that I'm just flogging old horses regarding testability, but it goes deeper than that: There is simply no way to resolve the issue by any standard except pure personal preference.
[intentional language]: But if it actually appears that any of these uses is appropriate then one would have to provide an argument or evidence to show why it is not.
Unfortunately we have no theory to tell us when these uses are "appropriate" and when they are not. They seem appropriate to people whenever they talk about complex systems that are difficult to predict. But nobody thinks that cars really have desires.
But one thing we know about chimps is that they don't fell trees with axes.
LOL! I actually was thinking the chimp did it, because it was carrying the axe and I think a chimp could be trained to do it! Ok, there's some comic relief…
In fact, the evidence, the artifact in question, has given you information about the cause, not vice versa. You have now updated your knowledge of chimps not by observing them but by inference from examining a design. Knowledge can be obtained about the agent by looking at the design.
Oops, I lost you there. Ok, I'm back to what I originally thought: Given what I know about chimps, I would have guessed the chimp chopped the tree down. But if I saw the dolphin with the axe, I still wouldn't have guessed the dolphin did it.
In fact, in the first case you said we could infer design because we presumed humans did it and we know humans can do it. Now you've inferred that a chimp could accomplish the design, even though you don't have previous knowledge of such activity, because you already inferred the design.
Ok, I see. Well, you're wrong: It was all about what I already knew about chimps. For example, I know that chimps have hands that can hold things like axes (but dolphins don't). I know that chimps sometimes imitate people and can be trained to do things… and so on.
This is exactly what happened to you with regard the neandertal.
Right – it's all about our specific knowledge of humans and other animals, and has nothing to do with any general understanding of "intelligence".
In the first situation we had a tree felled with no indication of design and you inferred no design – even though a designing agent could have leveled it, there is no evidence that one did.
I don't know what a "designing agent" is, but I would not have guessed anything but the rotten roots were involved (no termites, beavers, lightning, or other possible causes).
We've now had an extended discussion on this and we see that you have no defence of inferring design in the first situation. My point is made.
Well, no. It's all about particular causes – termites, rotten roots, trained chimps, humans, lightning, whatever. We look for clues to see which of these causes could be involved. Intelligence and purpose have nothing to do with any of it.
So your claim that you think rain clouds appear designed to produce rain does not hold water in light of your treatment of the tree.
Yup, it does. My opinion about the "purpose" of rain clouds is just as credible, or fanciful, as yours or anyone else's. We have no way of discerning the "purpose" of things (unless we are talking about somebody who did it and who can communicate what they had in mind).
You don't infer design here because chimps are known to be capable of such a design, rather, you infer that a chimp could have created the design because you've already inferred the design.
Again: I see axe marks on the tree, so I figure something used an axe, rather than rotten roots or lightning or termites, etc. Now I want to know what swung the axe. I see a dolphin, but I know dolphins can't use axes. I see a chimp and know about what chimps can do so I figure the chimp did it. Intelligence and purpose had nothing to do with it.
Let us add to this experiment now.
I love experiments.
We know that we can infer design even though we don't presume humans cut the tree down.
I don't know what you mean by "design", so I can't say yes or no to this.
We know that we can infer design and then apply that information to our knowledge, or assumptions, about other agents.
Sorry I don't understand this either. I think you mean that everything with any mental abilities will have the same (or similar) mental abilities? If that's what you mean, then that is obviously false.
Now let's look at the felled tree and observe that there are neither humans nor chimps about or evidenced within the presumed time frame of the tree's falling.
Do you chalk it up to chance, law and natural causes, or do you take note of the obvious design and wonder about the kind of agent who might have accomplished the task?
Are there axe marks? Rotten roots? Electrical burns? Termite droppings? If none of these, then I would say "I don't know". If there were axe marks, I'd say "Something with an axe, but I don't know what".
Have we not learned something about the agent, even if we don't know anything else about it?
You mean that it cut down the tree? That's a bit circular, no?
Wouldn't we at least have some knowledge about what to look for (ie. a human or chimp, or something with at least similar abilities in this regard, but definitely not a dolphin swimming nearby)?
I wish I understood your argument, but I don't. Yes, we'd look for something that could swing an axe. It has nothing to do with purpose or intelligence.
I have granted here (in various posts in this thread and the Bunny thread) that the hypothesis of "human-like" intelligence (as opposed to "intelligence" unqualified) actually is meaningful in the context of ID.
You have? I thought you said the opposite to FMM. I'm glad to know you find this hypothesis meaningful.
(The problem for ID is that there is no way of telling what particular mental abilities the Designer might have, so we can't know how "human-like" is its intelligence).
If the inference is correct we certainly know something about its particular mental abilities. It has foresight. It can plan and act to realize that plan. It can create that which natural law and chance alone cannot. It can exercise intent.
Likewise, saying that "life as we know it" from our experience of life on Earth would confer some information; it would not be entirely meaningless. Still, any reference to "intelligence" with no qualifiers at all is devoid of meaning in the context of ID.
But saying "life-forms", which you would accept, says nothing, especially given the run-down you did previously. A life-form can be something completely beyond imagination to us – at least as much as "intelligence" can be. Saying 'life as we know it from our experience on Earth' (all of which, I presume, you are claiming was implied) is no different from saying "intelligence" and implying " as we know it from our experience on Earth". We have no more idea to what extent a "life-form" is like what we experience on Earth than we have about how human-like the intelligence in ID is. Yet you classify one as meaningful and one as vacuous.
When somebody has a way to perform an experiment to discern purpose in arbitrary systems, then you might have an argument.
What do you mean here by "arbitrary" How could one discern purpose where there is none and, therefore, no evidence?
I think that would be something, but the way I understand intentions is necessarily connected to conscious intentions. And I can't think of any way to ever know if the Designer of Life was conscious.
You are putting definitions and labels before evidence. If the evidence warrants the inference to design and that entails intention and intention entails consciousness then consciousness has been evidenced as well. You can't rule it out just because you don't like it. You can't claim there is no test for it if the test for design ultimately demands consciousness. You seem to want to say here that we can't test for consciousness, therefore we can't test for intent, therefore we can't test for intelligent design. That is coming off as backward to me.
Unfortunately we have no theory to tell us when these [anthropomorphic] uses are "appropriate" and when they are not. They seem appropriate to people whenever they talk about complex systems that are difficult to predict. But nobody thinks that cars really have desires.
Exactly. And they don't devise theories which would make them feel intellectually justified in denying the desires of a car. But they do when they try to deny the actuality of the design and purpose they see as apparent in biology and in the cosmos. They then write textbooks saying that they have refuted the actuality of said apparent design. I doubt you'll see that with regards to Ol' Betsy.
Given what I know about chimps, I would have guessed the chimp chopped the tree down. But if I saw the dolphin with the axe, I still wouldn't have guessed the dolphin did it.
Ah, but you know the tree was chopped down. You have inferred design, and now you are presuming the chimp could be the culprit. Pretty clever chimp to calculate the angle the tree would fall.
Ok, I see. Well, you're wrong: It was all about what I already knew about chimps. For example, I know that chimps have hands that can hold things like axes (but dolphins don't). I know that chimps sometimes imitate people and can be trained to do things"¦ and so on.
What you know about chimps does not account for the felled tree. You did't know that chimps can make such precision blows, or even create the appropriate swinging motion before you had made the design inference. But you knew the tree was chopped down anyway and in attributing it to the chimp you have learned about chimpanzee capabilities (hypothetically, of course).
Right – it's all about our specific knowledge of humans and other animals, and has nothing to do with any general understanding of "intelligence".
Even granting your desired point here, note the admission that you no longer have to observe the agent in question to gain the information about it; you are inferring from other agents (in this instance extrapolating to add to the human-like qualities of the chimp) and from the design apparent.
I don't know what a "designing agent" is, but I would not have guessed anything but the rotten roots were involved (no termites, beavers, lightning, or other possible causes).
As with the rain cloud and the implication about reasons. You didn't infer that the tree fell in order to expose its roots to the air.
Well, no. It's all about particular causes – termites, rotten roots, trained chimps, humans, lightning, whatever. We look for clues to see which of these causes could be involved. Intelligence and purpose have nothing to do with any of it.
They do indeed. With no evidence that intelligence and purpose were required you did not infer intelligence or purpose. With specific conditions met causes like termites, rotting roots, lightning and 'whatever' are insufficient to explain the event and intelligence and purpose are inferred.
Yup, it does. My opinion about the "purpose" of rain clouds is just as credible, or fanciful, as yours or anyone else's. We have no way of discerning the "purpose" of things (unless we are talking about somebody who did it and who can communicate what they had in mind).
Sure we do. With the tree we can infer that an intelligent agent wanted the tree chopped down. We can also infer that part of its purpose was to avoid the destruction of property. It had foresight and a plan and acted to fulfill these. We also refer to the conditions to determine if this action could have occurred without the intelligent agent and the answer is no.
Again: I see axe marks on the tree, so I figure something used an axe, rather than rotten roots or lightning or termites, etc. Now I want to know what swung the axe. I see a dolphin, but I know dolphins can't use axes. I see a chimp and know about what chimps can do so I figure the chimp did it. Intelligence and purpose had nothing to do with it.
The wind can swing an axe as well. Would you infer that the wind used the axe to cut down the tree?
I don't know what you mean by "design", so I can't say yes or no to this.
Oh. I wasn't clear. Purposeful arrangement of parts.
We know that we can infer design and then apply that information to our knowledge, or assumptions, about other agents.
Sorry I don't understand this either. I think you mean that everything with any mental abilities will have the same (or similar) mental abilities? If that's what you mean, then that is obviously false.
You think I mean that? Really?
Here's what I mean. You inferred design from the examination of the tree, its marks, and its position.
We can apply the information gained about an agent's attributes from this inference – that it desired the tree to fall, calculated the cuts and the direction of the fall, is capable of balanced swinging of an axe and can aim its blows – to any likely candidate regardless of our previous independent knowledge about that agent or our observations of it. In the case of the chimp you increased the pool of 'human-like' attributes it has to include such things as the ability to swing an axe efficiently and with the appropriate precision to cut down a tree and ensure the direction of its fall.
Are there axe marks? Rotten roots? Electrical burns? Termite droppings? If none of these, then I would say "I don't know". If there were axe marks, I'd say "Something with an axe, but I don't know what".
Yes, there are axe marks, the situation is as before. So we've learned two things here:
1) You don't really think that by my definitions you can justify attributing purpose to things and events that don't give any evidence of being designed for a purpose (neither rain clouds nor the uprooted tree). When you have limited knowledge of purposes you now say "I don't know".
2) On the other hand, your protestations notwithstanding, in the case where marks of agency are left you actually have gained some knowledge of the agent involved – it is something with an axe and it chopped the tree down.
Wouldn't we at least have some knowledge about what to look for (ie. a human or chimp, or something with at least similar abilities in this regard, but definitely not a dolphin swimming nearby)?
I wish I understood your argument, but I don't. Yes, we'd look for something that could swing an axe. It has nothing to do with purpose or intelligence.
Again, you've gained knowledge about the responsible agent even without independent prior knowledge – or even a candidate. It's a) not a dolphin and it b) can swing an axe. I doubt you'd accept as a candidate a rope with a knotted loop in the end hanging from a tree.
I agree completely: A human-like intelligence is a perfectly meaningful concept. But that would mean [we] could expect this human-like intelligence to be able to take a standardized IQ test, like a Stanford-Binet test, and score at least somewhere around 100 or so.
If the inference is correct we certainly know something about its particular mental abilities. It has foresight. It can plan and act to realize that plan. It can create that which natural law and chance alone cannot. It can exercise intent.
You can ascertain none of these things, no, because you have no way of interacting with the Designer to see what it can and can't do. Moreoever, it is not at all clear that human beings "excercise intent" (cf. the volition experiments), so how can you possibly say the Designer of Life excercises intent?
But saying "life-forms", which you would accept, says nothing, especially given the run-down you did previously. A life-form can be something completely beyond imagination to us – at least as much as "intelligence" can be.
No, not at all – as I said, astrobiologists refer to life as we know it from Earth.
Saying 'life as we know it from our experience on Earth' (all of which, I presume, you are claiming was implied) is no different from saying "intelligence" and implying " as we know it from our experience on Earth". We have no more idea to what extent a "life-form" is like what we experience on Earth than we have about how human-like the intelligence in ID is. Yet you classify one as meaningful and one as vacuous.
Again, I believe that both "life as we know it from Earth" and "intelligence as we know it from humans" are meaningful enough. However, neither "life" nor "intelligence" (nor lots of other descriptive categories, like "athleticism") are meaningful without such qualifiers, because what else these things might be is – as you say – potentially beyond our imagination.
AIGUY: When somebody has a way to perform an experiment to discern purpose in arbitrary systems, then you might have an argument.
PEZ: What do you mean here by "arbitrary"
I mean *any*. You could discern purpose in a human being by asking them what they intend to do, and then see if they end up doing it or not. But you could not, for example, ask a thundercloud if it intended to hit a church steeple with a lightning bolt.
How could one discern purpose where there is none and, therefore, no evidence?
I don't know how to discern purpose in arbitrary systems.
If the evidence warrants the inference to design…
I now think that by "design" you mean "something created by a human-like mind". Is that right? If so, I would think the evidence that a human-like mind was responsible for designing human-like brains would be quite weak (especially given the apparently necessity of human-like brains for human-like minds).
…and that entails intention and intention entails consciousness then consciousness has been evidenced as well. You can't rule it out just because you don't like it.
I like it just fine. I just don't see how you can think there could possibly be any evidence of "intention" that you could find in the context of ID. We can't even tell if a flea intends to jump on a dog, and we can watch them do it in high-def slow-motion.
You seem to want to say here that we can't test for consciousness, therefore we can't test for intent, therefore we can't test for intelligent design. That is coming off as backward to me.
We can't test for consciousness, AND we can't test for intent, AND we can't test for "intelligent design".
Exactly. And they don't devise theories which would make them feel intellectually justified in denying the desires of a car.
Right. People talk like cars have feelings. People inuit that cars don't have feelings. Some suggestive evidence for cars not having feelings comes from brain studies which show certain neurological structures are necessary for human-like thought and emotion, and these structures are not present in cars.
But they do when they try to deny the actuality of the design and purpose they see as apparent in biology and in the cosmos.
Huh? People talk like something with feelings created biology and the cosmos. Some people intuit that this is actually the case, and other people don't. I have no idea how we could ever find a way to determine if this was the case or not.
They then write textbooks saying that they have refuted the actuality of said apparent design. I doubt you'll see that with regards to Ol' Betsy.
If you are objecting to textbooks saying things to the effect of "Science has proven that mind and purpose was not involved in evolution", then I agree with you. That is not a statement that can be evaluated scientifically, and has no place in a science textbook.
Ah, but you know the tree was chopped down.
Um, right – wasn't there chopping marks on the tree stump, and a chimp carrying around an axe?
You have inferred design,
No, not at all. I simply figured out that it was probably the chimp with the axe that made the tree fall over.
…and now you are presuming the chimp could be the culprit. Pretty clever chimp to calculate the angle the tree would fall.
Uh oh, I seem to have missed something. Did you say something about the angle that the tree fell? Sorry if I missed it.
What you know about chimps does not account for the felled tree. You did't know that chimps can make such precision blows, or even create the appropriate swinging motion before you had made the design inference. But you knew the tree was chopped down anyway and in attributing it to the chimp you have learned about chimpanzee capabilities (hypothetically, of course).
No, I couldn't have guessed that the chimp did unless I knew about chimps specifically. I really do believe that a chimp can learn to chop a tree down with an axe – I would bet money on it. This has nothing at all to do with any design inference.
Even granting your desired point here, note the admission that you no longer have to observe the agent in question to gain the information about it; you are inferring from other agents (in this instance extrapolating to add to the human-like qualities of the chimp) and from the design apparent.
Huh? No, I know about chimps in particular. I've read books about them, seen 'em in zoos, on Discovery Channel…
You didn't infer that the tree fell in order to expose its roots to the air.
No, the tree fell to return its nutrients to the Earth.
They do indeed. With no evidence that intelligence and purpose were required you did not infer intelligence or purpose. With specific conditions met causes like termites, rotting roots, lightning and 'whatever' are insufficient to explain the event and intelligence and purpose are inferred.
Nope. There were possible causes, and clues that would indicate each of these causes. Intelligence and purpose had nothing to do with it.
AIGUY: We have no way of discerning the "purpose" of things (unless we are talking about somebody who did it and who can communicate what they had in mind).
PEZ: Sure we do. With the tree we can infer that an intelligent agent wanted the tree chopped down.
I don't know what an "intelligent agent" is. But if we figured out a human chopped down the tree from the clues, then we know that the human was conscious (because of what we know about humans).
The wind can swing an axe as well. Would you infer that the wind used the axe to cut down the tree?
Actually I don't think that "wind" can swing an axe, no. A strong wind could blow the axe over and make it slide across the ground, but it couldn't make it swing repeatedly into a tree. This is nothing to do with "intelligence" or "purpose" either.
Here's what I mean. You inferred design from the examination of the tree, its marks, and its position.
No, I did not infer design. I inferred that something chopped it down with an axe.
We can apply the information gained about an agent's attributes from this inference – that it desired the tree to fall, calculated the cuts and the direction of the fall, is capable of balanced swinging of an axe and can aim its blows – to any likely candidate regardless of our previous independent knowledge about that agent or our observations of it.
We can determine that whatever chopped down the tree was capable of chopping down the tree. If we have no other related knowledge about it – if it is a completely unspecified type of thing that cannot be observed – then that is absolutely all we know. We do not know that it desired anything. Or that it intended anything. We don't know if it learned to chop trees down, or was born with that hard-wired instinct, or… We don't know if it was compelled to chop the tree down by virtue of its physical structure, or if it had free will and could have done otherwise. We can know none of this unless we can interact with this thing. Which we can't.
Yes, there are axe marks, the situation is as before. So we've learned two things here:
1) You don't really think that by my definitions you can justify attributing purpose to things and events that don't give any evidence of being designed for a purpose (neither rain clouds nor the uprooted tree). When you have limited knowledge of purposes you now say "I don't know".
I can ascribe purpose and intent to anything I think might feel these things; you might disagree, but we have no way we can figure out who is right.
2) On the other hand, your protestations notwithstanding, in the case where marks of agency are left you actually have gained some knowledge of the agent involved – it is something with an axe and it chopped the tree down.
There were no "marks of agency". There were "marks of an axe". I don't know what an "agent" is, but I know what an "axe" is, and I also know what a "chimp" is. When I saw the chimp with the axe, I used all my chimp-knowledge and axe-knowledge and abduced how it must have gone down: The chimp did it with the axe in the forest.
This had nothing to do with purpose, agency, or intelligence.
In the case of the chimp you increased the pool of 'human-like' attributes it has to include such things as the ability to swing an axe efficiently and with the appropriate precision to cut down a tree and ensure the direction of its fall.
Figuring out if chimps can cut down trees with axes has not one single thing to do with the concepts of "purpose", and everything to do with things like "hand-eye coordination". Like I said, I bet a chimp can do it… but I might be wrong. In any case, purpose and agency have nothing to do with it.
Again, you've gained knowledge about the responsible agent even without independent prior knowledge – or even a candidate. It's a) not a dolphin and it b) can swing an axe.
What are you talking about? This is all about independent prior knowledge, and that is all that it is about! If the only thing I knew about a dolphin was that it was an "intelligent agent", then I would have absolutely no way of knowing if the dolphin was the culprit or not. But instead I used my independent prior knowledge about dolphins. I remembered that they have no arms, and figured this would make it difficult to use the axe.
I doubt you'd accept as a candidate a rope with a knotted loop in the end hanging from a tree.
Um, right. Ropes can't swing axes. Neither can dolphins. But I think chimps can, and maybe even a bear (they can ride bicycles). Termites can build fancy houses, and beavers build dams. Computers can play chess, but they can't write a screenplay. Dolphins do a lot of cool thing and everyone considers them really intelligent, but they can't design any artifacts except bubble rings. Thunderclouds can make high-voltage arcs; so can human electrical engineers.
Some of things we call "intelligent" and some things we don't, but it's not important. Things do what they can do.
Zachriel: Now you have it. Ignorance is not evidence of design.
Pez: Neither is it a rebuttal.
Right again! Ignorance is not evidence.
Pez: But we do have evidence of design, we have parts arranged in such a manner that they could not have been without purpose.
That's your claim.
Pez: What is "purpose" Operationally we can test for purpose in a system by examining to see: …
That's all I asked.
Pez: Operationally we can test for purpose in a system by examining to see: if all of the parts of that system contribute to the whole and to its function; if each is necessary in order for that system to function; if removal of any of the parts causes the system to lose function;
The word "function" seems to presuppose "purpose". We might say a heart has the purpose of pumping blood, or of sustaining life. We might say a Monsoon has the purpose of pumping water, or of sustaining life.
Pez: if there is a statistically-determined unlikelihood of the parts coming together by chance; if the arrangement of the parts is not demanded by any law describing the regularity of motion and interaction of matter.
Well, there's your argument from ignorance. If we don't know what causes a Monsoon, then by your reasoning, we would be warranted in concluding it is design.
Also, notice that your 'hypothesis' is sterile. It doesn't generate new hypotheses.
Pez: Denying these tests, and accepting the possible truth of the claim, how would you test for it?
In other fields of research that involve purpose, we look for evidence of the chain of causation between the artist, art and artifact. But there is no current scientific evidence of ID, so it's rather difficult to know where to begin.
Pez: No, it's saying that whatever created them created them intentionally. That may be nothing to you, but to others it is something. It says something about the nature of the universe we live in and about the planet we inhabit.
That's a perfectly acceptable religious or metaphysical doctrine. But there is no scientific evidence supporting design in biology.
Pez: You are putting definitions and labels before evidence.
A clearly stated hypothesis is an essential component of the scientific method. That's how we cut through the problem of naïve induction.
Pez: Ah, but you know the tree was chopped down. You have inferred design, and now you are presuming the chimp could be the culprit. Pretty clever chimp to calculate the angle the tree would fall.
Based on our knowledge of chimps, trees and axes, that might be a reasonable hypothesis"”which then has to be supported by additional observations. It might also just be a practical joke.
Pez: You did't know that chimps can make such precision blows, or even create the appropriate swinging motion before you had made the design inference.
That is incorrect. Aiguy already noted that it would not be a reasonable hypothesis if a dolphin was found with the ax. We know quite a bit about chimps, including that they have opposable thumbs. And again, we would then investigate the chain of causation more closely, making and testing hypotheses.
KB: Knowledge is information that is available to a goal-seeking process. Think Deep Blue's database.
aiguy: Ok, that's better. I suggest for "goal-seeking process" you try "process using negative feedback". This makes the whole thing operational – congratulations.
Obviously, your own goal-seeking process is looking for some minimum level of detail for the process itself. Why don't you specify it and save me the trouble of trying to read your mind. (One wife is enough.)
KB:I don't know. That's a different topic. My interest in this thread was your statement about "human like intelligence" being a meaningless statement. I'm not interested in getting you to "admit there is something to this ID thing after all."
aiguy:The meaning of "human-like intelligence" is either a subjective notion (meaningful to us, but not useful in science until it's operationalized, like the meaning of "beautiful sunset") or its meaning is made scientific by means of an operational definition (like the score on an IQ test).
That's fine, if you add to your "IQ test" the ability to design human-like machinery and processes. Intelligent is as intelligent does. "Human-like" encompasses the very best that humans can do.
KB: By it's productions. The goal of Deep Blue is to beat a human or human-like chess player. Weather systems don't do things like that. They do not contain processes searching for solutions to problems where the goal is removed from the next proximate effect.
aiguy: So intelligent things need to "search for solutions", and if they know the solution right away without searching, that means that they are not intelligent?
What does "right away" mean? If you mean by proximate, Deep Blue doesn't operate that way. The search algorithms (goal,foresight) had to search a minimal amount of data (knowledge) in order to make a decision about it's next move.
aiguy: (The storm achieves non-proximate effects – the long-term equalization of electrical potential).
A storm may "achieve" non-proximate effects, but the system has no goal and no foresight beyond the next proximate effect. There is no looking ahead to the future beyond the next proximate effect.
KB: Humans learn, computers can learn. Deep Blue was programmed to learn facts about the game, the player, which it could use in it's goal seeking algorithms in future plays and future games towards the goal of taking the opponent's king.
aiguy: Yes, humans and computers (and the vast majority of living organisms) can learn. Learning is considered by most cognitive scientists to be a critical component of intelligence. My question was, how could you ever show that whatever created life was capable of learning?
Showing that the designer was capable of learning is not my job presently. We're defining terms.
KB: By evolve in nature, I assume you mean they were produced without intelligent intervention. Do you have evidence Cicada cycles were produced that way?
aiguy: I was talking about plausibility if you recall.
"Plausibility" is a vacuous term without some idea of how possible it is. And its possibility is unknown. (Granted, that's off topic for this thread.)
KB: At any rate, I don't find it plausible at all that a non-biological system, other than a computing system designed by a human-like intelligence, could produce primes up to 3001. If you got any ideas about how it could be done, please elaborate.
aiguy: I don't know a lot of things. Just because we don't know how something works doesn't mean that "intelligence" constitutes a useful explanation. It didn't when people didn't know how tides worked (or seasons or lightning or planetary motion or"¦ all of the other failed "applications of ID theory")
I agree. I favor a demonstrable reductionist explanation if one is available.
I agree completely: A human-like intelligence is a perfectly meaningful concept. But that would mean [we] could expect this human-like intelligence to be able to take a standardized IQ test, like a Stanford-Binet test, and score at least somewhere around 100 or so.
Okay, if you think human-like intelligence is meaningful but then add a caveat as above I'm going to need a definition of this human-like intelligence. Does human-like intelligence mean it has to have hands with which to manipulate a pencil, or vocal chords with which to communicate to humans? Does it have to be able to take the test to qualify? Are you not merely saying that "human-0like intelligence" is an attribute of humans?
You can ascertain none of these things, no, because you have no way of interacting with the Designer to see what it can and can't do. Moreoever, it is not at all clear that human beings "excercise intent" (cf. the volition experiments), so how can you possibly say the Designer of Life excercises intent?
We don't need to interact with it to study its designs. If its designs demonstrate foresight then we infer the designer has foresight. We can ascertain human intent from the purposeful arrangement of parts in our artifacts and we can ascertain human-like intent in those of the designer.
No, not at all – as I said, astrobiologists refer to life as we know it from Earth.
When do they say this? Do the insist that all life-forms must be life as we know it from Earth? Do they say that any ETI must be from such a life form? When you said "life-form" do we take this as implicit? So saying a life-form unlike that found on Earth would not be meaningful then?
Again, I believe that both "life as we know it from Earth" and "intelligence as we know it from humans" are meaningful enough.
I have a feeling that you are conflating the two. Does your idea of a meaningful use of this phrase entail that said intelligence be attached to a human body?
I now think that by "design" you mean "something created by a human-like mind". Is that right? If so, I would think the evidence that a human-like mind was responsible for designing human-like brains would be quite weak (especially given the apparently necessity of human-like brains for human-like minds).
By design I mean that which plans and purposes with foresight. Our best example of that is the human mind, so it would be human-like in this regard.
I don't know why you've added the bit about it then designing human-like brains. Looks like you are trying to change the subject with a mind-reduces-to-brain argument. Is this a subtle way of doing what I said above, now constraining "human-like" intelligence to the human body? And "life-forms" to those found already on Earth (even though the term has no definition)?
Is your argument reducing now to an extreme empiricism where only what we've seen exists and only what we've seen occur can occur?
I just don't see how you can think there could possibly be any evidence of "intention" that you could find in the context of ID.
Then you reject their project. But you do not do so because it is incoherent or poorly defined, but because you just don't see it. The arguments and definitions are in place. The reason for the inference is in place. You just don't agree.
Um, right – wasn't there chopping marks on the tree stump, and a chimp carrying around an axe?
You have inferred design,
No, not at all. I simply figured out that it was probably the chimp with the axe that made the tree fall over.
Axe cuts are purposefully arranged parts. Or are they not? Could they have resulted from a force which had no purpose?
"¦and now you are presuming the chimp could be the culprit. Pretty clever chimp to calculate the angle the tree would fall.
Uh oh, I seem to have missed something. Did you say something about the angle that the tree fell? Sorry if I missed it.
You did miss it, I guess. Apology accepted.
Will you be changing your response now?
Huh? No, I know about chimps in particular. I've read books about them, seen 'em in zoos, on Discovery Channel"¦
You've never seen them cut down a tree with an axe.
Actually I don't think that "wind" can swing an axe, no. A strong wind could blow the axe over and make it slide across the ground, but it couldn't make it swing repeatedly into a tree. This is nothing to do with "intelligence" or "purpose" either.
Argument from ignorance. You aren't trying hard enough. A short, confined burst of wind could fling the axe through the air causing its blade to strike the tree. It could swirl and remove the axe from the tree and repeat the process. The axe may have been caught in a small but intense whirlwind where it was swung repeatedly striking glancing blows to the tree in just the right spot to chop it down and cause its apparently, but not actually, directed, felling.
Here's what I mean. You inferred design from the examination of the tree, its marks, and its position.
No, I did not infer design. I inferred that something chopped it down with an axe.
Which is design. The axe cuts are purposefully arranged.
We can determine that whatever chopped down the tree was capable of chopping down the tree. If we have no other related knowledge about it – if it is a completely unspecified type of thing that cannot be observed – then that is absolutely all we know. We do not know that it desired anything. Or that it intended anything. We don't know if it learned to chop trees down, or was born with that hard-wired instinct, or"¦ We don't know if it was compelled to chop the tree down by virtue of its physical structure, or if it had free will and could have done otherwise. We can know none of this unless we can interact with this thing. Which we can't.
We do know it intended to cut the tree down because the cut is designed. We don't need to know if it learned to cut the tree down, was programmed to cut the tree down or intuited how to cut it down to recognize that the blows and the felling were intended.
I can ascribe purpose and intent to anything I think might feel these things; you might disagree, but we have no way we can figure out who is right.
Yes we have. We have arguments, definitions and tests with which you can agree or not. If you are asking if we can ultimately know, for certain and for all time, proof beyond proof, then you are not talking about science and you are not subjecting this inquiry to normal levels of critique.
There were no "marks of agency". There were "marks of an axe".
Designed marks of an axe.
Again, you've gained knowledge about the responsible agent even without independent prior knowledge – or even a candidate. It's a) not a dolphin and it b) can swing an axe.
What are you talking about? This is all about independent prior knowledge, and that is all that it is about! If the only thing I knew about a dolphin was that it was an "intelligent agent", then I would have absolutely no way of knowing if the dolphin was the culprit or not. But instead I used my independent prior knowledge about dolphins. I remembered that they have no arms, and figured this would make it difficult to use the axe.
So without any independent knowledge of the culprit you know some things about it. For you, it has arms. For me, it has foresight and intent.
Um, right. Ropes can't swing axes.
Argument from ignorance. I have independent knowledge of ropes swinging tires, children, apes, stones, camping gear, etc. I'm quite sure a rope could swing an axe, even though I haven't seen one do it on Discovery.
Some of things we call "intelligent" and some things we don't, but it's not important. Things do what they can do.
That's right, and things with foresight and intent purposefully arrange parts.
Pez: But we do have evidence of design, we have parts arranged in such a manner that they could not have been without purpose.
That's your claim.
Exactly. That's the claim. It is supported by argument and evidence. we all know that you already reject ID but I'm not here to prove it right, merely argue that it is not proven wrong by mere reference to its definitions or it initials.
Pez: What is "purpose" Operationally we can test for purpose in a system by examining to see: "¦
That's all I asked.
You've been disputing this subject for years on all kinds of forums. You had no reason to ask. These have been laid-out from the beginning. By the way, we already know you disagree with ID.
The word "function" seems to presuppose "purpose". We might say a heart has the purpose of pumping blood, or of sustaining life. We might say a Monsoon has the purpose of pumping water, or of sustaining life.
Not really. Irreducibility and the apparent foresight required indicate purpose – it is not presupposed just because there is a physical result of some action.
In other fields of research that involve purpose, we look for evidence of the chain of causation between the artist, art and artifact. But there is no current scientific evidence of ID, so it's rather difficult to know where to begin.
We look for exactly the same in ID. We already know that you disagree that it is scientific.
Pez: if there is a statistically-determined unlikelihood of the parts coming together by chance; if the arrangement of the parts is not demanded by any law describing the regularity of motion and interaction of matter.Well, there's your argument from ignorance. If we don't know what causes a Monsoon, then by your reasoning, we would be warranted in concluding it is design.
If we have no reason to attribute the monsoon to design we do not do so – known cause or not.
By your reasoning all explanations are arguments from ignorance because all explanations rely upon the fact that they are the most probable among candidates. Nothing is 100% proven so every explanation accepted is accepted on the basis of ignorance of unknown factors and reliance upon likelihoods.
But there is no scientific evidence supporting design in biology.
Intriguing. Is this going to culminate in a few pages on nested hierarchies? If so, you could just direct me to talk.origins or something and leave this thread for what it was intended.
Based on our knowledge of chimps, trees and axes, that might be a reasonable hypothesis"”which then has to be supported by additional observations. It might also just be a practical joke.
The design inference was made prior to additional observations. Appeal to practical jokes reinforces the design inference.
That is incorrect. Aiguy already noted that it would not be a reasonable hypothesis if a dolphin was found with the ax. We know quite a bit about chimps, including that they have opposable thumbs. And again, we would then investigate the chain of causation more closely, making and testing hypotheses.
But we didn't investigate the chain of causation more closely. We saw the felled tree and inferred design. Aiguy claimed we inferred design only because we presumed a human did it. Then he inferred design because he presumed a chimp did it. But there is no independent knowledge that a chimp can do it. The design inference preceded the chimp inference.
That's fine, if you add to your "IQ test" the ability to design human-like machinery and processes. Intelligent is as intelligent does. "Human-like" encompasses the very best that humans can do.
Well, here's the rub: You want to explain how complex biological machinery comes to exist. You say that "intelligence" is the cause. I ask "What is 'intelligence'?" and you say "Intelligence is 'the ability to create complex machinery'". This is not a helpful theory. You need to have some meaning of intelligence that is independent of the phenomena you are trying to explain.
What does "right away" mean? If you mean by proximate, Deep Blue doesn't operate that way. The search algorithms (goal,foresight) had to search a minimal amount of data (knowledge) in order to make a decision about it's next move.
Right – Deep Blue searches (lots of data, zillions of possible moves/countermoves). Deep Blue is intelligent. Weather systems don't even have to search for the solution – they know what to do right away, without searching for it. Seems even smarter to me.
A storm may "achieve" non-proximate effects, but the system has no goal and no foresight beyond the next proximate effect. There is no looking ahead to the future beyond the next proximate effect.
I think you're right, but we have the advantage of being able to observe weather systems. If you could not observe weather systems, but could only know that over time, these clouds managed to equalize the electrical potential between them and the ground, you couldn't say of there was "looking ahead" involved or not. That is the situation in ID: We can't observe the creation of life, so we can't know if there was "looking ahead" or not.
Showing that the designer was capable of learning is not my job presently. We're defining terms.
Ok… so for you, learning is an essential component of "intelligence", yes?
Okay, if you think human-like intelligence is meaningful but then add a caveat as above I'm going to need a definition of this human-like intelligence. Does human-like intelligence mean it has to have hands with which to manipulate a pencil, or vocal chords with which to communicate to humans? Does it have to be able to take the test to qualify? Are you not merely saying that "human-0like intelligence" is an attribute of humans?
I am thinking of human-like intelligence the way scientists who study human intelligence think of it. We define it in terms of what humans can do that we can test. Human intelligence is tested with standard tests called IQ tests.
We don't need to interact with it to study its designs.
Obviously. Then you will know all about the designs and nothing about what caused them.
If its designs demonstrate foresight
You can't tell if something uses foresight just by looking at some artifact. When a person builds a car they use foresight. When robot builds a car it doesn't. You will here make the mistake of pointing out humans build robots. Who cares? You needn't consider the causal origin of something to determine if it has foresight or not. Robots have no foresight, and humans do, but both of them can build complex machines, and you can't tell which type of thing was responsible just by looking at the car. Maybe the first step in the causal chain had foresight, and maybe it didn't.
When do they say this? Do the insist that all life-forms must be life as we know it from Earth? Do they say that any ETI must be from such a life form? When you said "life-form" do we take this as implicit?
Yes, they say this. If I provide you a reference to SETI researchers saying this, will you concede the point?
I have a feeling that you are conflating the two. Does your idea of a meaningful use of this phrase entail that said intelligence be attached to a human body?
I do not understand the idea of "attaching intelligence" to a body. This is like "attaching athleticism" to a body. These are not things that can be "attached" to other things. They are descriptions of abilities.
By design I mean that which plans and purposes with foresight.
I thought "design" meant purposeful arrangement of parts. I guess that would be the noun. Now you say design is "that which plans and purposes with foresight". So this is also a definition of "design" as a noun? (Perhaps you meant "designer"). And I see you use "purposes" as a verb here… hmm. I think I'm confused now.
Our best example of that is the human mind, so it would be human-like in this regard. I don't know why you've added the bit about it then designing human-like brains. Looks like you are trying to change the subject with a mind-reduces-to-brain argument.
No, I've never said anything about that at all. I did mention that according to everything we've learned about minds and brains, it appears that human minds require human brains. If you want to follow the evidence where it leads, you'll certainly need to consider the evidence for that.
Is this a subtle way of doing what I said above, now constraining "human-like" intelligence to the human body? And "life-forms" to those found already on Earth (even though the term has no definition)? Is your argument reducing now to an extreme empiricism where only what we've seen exists and only what we've seen occur can occur?
The "design inference" is supposed to be empirically driven from our experience of "intelligence agents". Fine. I'm trying to figure out what "intelligent agents" are by reference to my experience. I see some intelligent agents are people, and some are other animals, and some are machines. If we focus on human-like intelligence, I see that human brains are necessary for human intelligence (I didn't say sufficient, I said necessary).
Then you reject their project. But you do not do so because it is incoherent or poorly defined, but because you just don't see it. The arguments and definitions are in place. The reason for the inference is in place. You just don't agree.
I said I didn't see evidence for "intention". I take this to mean the feeling of conscious intent that human beings experience and report. I say this is meaningful, but unsupportable in the context of ID. As for "intelligent cause" – I reject this because it is meaningless in the context of ID.
Axe cuts are purposefully arranged parts. Or are they not? Could they have resulted from a force which had no purpose?
If you provide a way to determine what things act with purpose and what things don't, then we could answer this question. But you can't, so we can't.
You've never seen them cut down a tree with an axe.
I've seen them drive a car though, and play trombone (they're not very good at either, but they manage).
Argument from ignorance. You aren't trying hard enough. A short, confined burst of wind could fling the axe through the air causing its blade to strike the tree. It could swirl and remove the axe from the tree and repeat the process. The axe may have been caught in a small but intense whirlwind where it was swung repeatedly striking glancing blows to the tree in just the right spot to chop it down and cause its apparently, but not actually, directed, felling.
If that is your best guess, then I would not want you to be my lab partner in science class. Still, you can advance that hypothesis if you wish. When you get around to testing your hypothesis you'll find you've misjudged the ability of wind to wield axes. My intuition was more along the lines of the chimp with the axe. I'd test my hypothesis by teaching a chimp to swing an axe. I bet you I could while you are still waiting for the wind to chop your tree down.
The axe cuts are purposefully arranged.
How can you tell?
We do know it intended to cut the tree down because the cut is designed.
I disagree. How can we tell who is right?
Yes we have. We have arguments, definitions and tests with which you can agree or not. If you are asking if we can ultimately know, for certain and for all time, proof beyond proof, then you are not talking about science and you are not subjecting this inquiry to normal levels of critique.
You have given me absolutely no test that can be performed to see if things are intended or not (unless you can ask the intender). The reason you haven't told me any test that can be applied is because there is no such test. You can argue and define all you'd like, but I disagree, and since we cannot appeal to our shared experience to resolve the matter, we will forever disagree. That's just fine, no problem. There are lots of issues like this. I happen to think the Moonlight Sonata is beautiful, but I can't demonstrate that as fact, and that's OK too.
So let's just agree to disagree, and agree that there is no possible recourse to our shared experience that can ever tell us if whatever caused life to exist intended to do so or not.
After all, you can't even tell me if my goldfish intends to swim or not.
aiguy: Well, here's the rub: You want to explain how complex biological machinery comes to exist. You say that "intelligence" is the cause. I ask "What is 'intelligence'?" and you say "Intelligence is 'the ability to create complex machinery'". This is not a helpful theory.
That's not all I've said. Do I need to repeat everything I've said in each post, or whenever I use the word "intelligent?" If you're having trouble with sub-thread continuity because of the different views and definitions of those with whom you converse, I can understand. Is that what's happening here?
You need to have some meaning of intelligence that is independent of the phenomena you are trying to explain.
I have provided.
KB: What does "right away" mean? If you mean by proximate, Deep Blue doesn't operate that way. The search algorithms (goal,foresight) had to search a minimal amount of data (knowledge) in order to make a decision about it's next move.
aiguy: Right – Deep Blue searches (lots of data, zillions of possible moves/countermoves). Deep Blue is strong>intelligent.
Weather systems don't even have to search for the solution – they know what to do right away, without searching for it. Seems even smarter to me.
Weather systems have no goal or foresight about anything other than the proximate effect so they don't need to search for a solution. Deep Blue has a next proximate effect and non-next proximate effects. That's a significant difference. Weather systems seems less smarter to me. Much less front loading (a hallmark of intelligent design.)
I've got a question for you: what is the difference between natural selection and artificial selection?
KB: A storm may "achieve" non-proximate effects, but the system has no goal and no foresight beyond the next proximate effect. There is no looking ahead to the future beyond the next proximate effect.
aiguy: I think you're right, but we have the advantage of being able to observe weather systems. If you could not observe weather systems, but could only know that over time, these clouds managed to equalize the electrical potential between them and the ground, you couldn't say of there was "looking ahead" involved or not.
Correct.
aiguy: That is the situation in ID: We can't observe the creation of life, so we can't know if there was "looking ahead" or not.
Also correct. Nobody scientifically or empirically knows how the first life form came to exist and what its nature was. It's those interesting machine-like features within in the cell coupled with the fact that no confirmed scientific theories exist for the origin of life, that makes some of us wonder greatly. And wonder often leads to understanding. But that's another topic.
KB: Showing that the designer was capable of learning is not my job presently. We're defining terms.
aiguy: Ok"¦ so for you, learning is an essential component of "intelligence", yes?
If depends on the goal. Some intelligently endowed tasks can be performed without learning anything external, like calculating primes. Some cannot, like vacuuming the house.
You can't tell if something uses foresight just by looking at some artifact. When a person builds a car they use foresight. When robot builds a car it doesn't.
A robot does not build a car. The human builds it using the robot as a tool. Rubber mallets, conveyor belst and rivet guns do not build a car either. And yes, the human has foresight and the building of the car demonstrates this foresight. And no, this is not a mistake.
The secondary or proximate cause may demonstrate no foresight or purpose but if design is indicated then that foresight had to have been an element of the system and indicates a designer. The robot is a great example.
You will here make the mistake of pointing out humans build robots. Who cares? You needn't consider the causal origin of something to determine if it has foresight or not. Robots have no foresight, and humans do, but both of them can build complex machines, and you can't tell which type of thing was responsible just by looking at the car. Maybe the first step in the causal chain had foresight, and maybe it didn't.
We can tell if it did by examining the artifact. If the robot has no foresight it is because the human did and built in the necessary contingencies based upon this foresight.
"¨
When do they say this? Do the insist that all life-forms must be life as we know it from Earth? Do they say that any ETI must be from such a life form? When you said "life-form" do we take this as implicit?"¨"¨Yes, they say this. If I provide you a reference to SETI researchers saying this, will you concede the point?
I was going to say that I don't really need a reference because we are now clear what it is that you are saying. But as I thought about I think I would like a reference. I would like to see if their meaningful search for intelligence and life-forms is as limited as yours. I doubt that they are looking for human brains and Earth's life-forms residing on other planets when they search for ETI.
From all of the above we can see that, as I suspected, you only accept "human-like intelligence" as meaningful insofar as it is just a fancy way of saying "human".:
If we focus on human-like intelligence, I see that human brains are necessary for human intelligence (I didn't say sufficient, I said necessary).
===
"¨
By design I mean that which plans and purposes with foresight."¨"¨I thought "design" meant purposeful arrangement of parts. I guess that would be the noun. Now you say design is "that which plans and purposes with foresight". So this is also a definition of "design" as a noun? (Perhaps you meant "designer"). And I see you use "purposes" as a verb here"¦ hmm. I think I'm confused now.
Yes, that was sloppy. I often word my answers in direct response to certain sentences in your comments and then when I look back they don't seem to quite fit. I thought looking back earlier that I had meant to say "designer" but, in retrospect, I think it was just bad syntax. But you ought not be confused; none of the concepts there is new or contradictory.
As I said before (although I'm not sure why I used design as a verb in this case…) :
I don't see a problem with any conflation. Behe's definition is equally applicable to design as a verb or a noun."¨noun: Parts purposefully arranged."¨verb: To purposefully arrange parts.
…
Behe further tells us that the design entails planning, foresight and knowledge.
Nothing new and nothing confusing – just a little grammatical awkwardness.
Axe cuts are purposefully arranged parts. Or are they not? Could they have resulted from a force which had no purpose?"¨"¨If you provide a way to determine what things act with purpose and what things don't, then we could answer this question. But you can't, so we can't.
We know their purposes by studying what they do."¨
"¨Argument from ignorance. You aren't trying hard enough. A short, confined burst of wind could fling the axe through the air causing its blade to strike the tree. It could swirl and remove the axe from the tree and repeat the process. The axe may have been caught in a small but intense whirlwind where it was swung repeatedly striking glancing blows to the tree in just the right spot to chop it down and cause its apparently, but not actually, directed, felling."¨"¨If that is your best guess, then I would not want you to be my lab partner in science class. Still, you can advance that hypothesis if you wish. When you get around to testing your hypothesis you'll find you've misjudged the ability of wind to wield axes. My intuition was more along the lines of the chimp with the axe. I'd test my hypothesis by teaching a chimp to swing an axe. I bet you I could while you are still waiting for the wind to chop your tree down.
And if I fail the test? Or rely upon deep time and unobservable and unobserved events? Then you are still just arguing from ignorance because you've not used enough imagination. Personal incredulity is not proof.
The axe cuts are purposefully arranged."¨"¨How can you tell?
Because of their specified complexity. They are at the appropriate angle for felling the tree and in the appropriate location for its directed fall. They are not randomly located or of arbitrary incidence and yet they are contingent and not dictated by law or preceding conditions.
We do know it intended to cut the tree down because the cut is designed."¨"¨I disagree. How can we tell who is right?
I've said before and you quote me below.
"¨Yes we have. We have arguments, definitions and tests with which you can agree or not. If you are asking if we can ultimately know, for certain and for all time, proof beyond proof, then you are not talking about science and you are not subjecting this inquiry to normal levels of critique."¨"¨You have given me absolutely no test that can be performed to see if things are intended or not (unless you can ask the intender). The reason you haven't told me any test that can be applied is because there is no such test.
I presumed you read my response to Zach. We have tests:
But we do have evidence of design, we have parts arranged in such a manner that they could not have been without purpose."¨What is "purpose" Operationally we can test for purpose in a system by examining to see: if all of the parts of that system contribute to the whole and to its function; if each is necessary in order for that system to function; if removal of any of the parts causes the system to lose function; if there is a statistically-determined unlikelihood of the parts coming together by chance; if the arrangement of the parts is not demanded by any law describing the regularity of motion and interaction of matter.
The wording will have to change a little in the case of the unknown lumberjack, but the principles and operation are the same.
So let's just agree to disagree, and agree that there is no possible recourse to our shared experience that can ever tell us if whatever caused life to exist intended to do so or not.
I agree that we disagree.
"¨After all, you can't even tell me if my goldfish intends to swim or not.
Pez: But we do have evidence of design, we have parts arranged in such a manner that they could not have been without purpose.
Zachriel: That's your claim.
Pez: Exactly. That's the claim. It is supported by argument and evidence. we all know that you already reject ID but I'm not here to prove it right, merely argue that it is not proven wrong by mere reference to its definitions or it initials.
Without a clear definition, there is no way to evaluate the validity of the claim. That you think this is unimportant is telling.
Pez: Not really. Irreducibility and the apparent foresight required indicate purpose – it is not presupposed just because there is a physical result of some action.
Irreducibility can evolve through various mechanisms.
You keep arguing in circles. Design conflated into purpose, then into function, now foresight, none of which provided with a useufl scientific definition. You just change the terminology and say you've provided the evidence.
Zachriel: In other fields of research that involve purpose, we look for evidence of the chain of causation between the artist, art and artifact.
Pez: We look for exactly the same in ID.
We? How many cites do you require?
Dembski: Identity Problem — Who is the designer? Note that the last four questions are not properly questions of science.
Intelligent Design and Evolution Awareness (IDEA) Center: Intelligent design theory makes no claim as to "how" the design occurred, whether it was by natural, or even supernatural causes.
Pez: If we have no reason to attribute the monsoon to design we do not do so – known cause or not.
We have very good reasons. The Monsoons are a purposeful mechanism whose purpose is to pump water in order to sustain life.
KB: That's fine, if you add to your "IQ test" the ability to design human-like machinery and processes. Intelligent is as intelligent does. "Human-like" encompasses the very best that humans can do.
AIGUY: I ask "What is 'intelligence'?" and you say "Intelligence is 'the ability to create complex machinery'". This is not a helpful theory.
KB: That's not all I've said. Do I need to repeat everything I've said in each post, or whenever I use the word "intelligent?" If you're having trouble with sub-thread continuity because of the different views and definitions of those with whom you converse, I can understand. Is that what's happening here?
No, I remembered what you had said KB: You wanted the "IQ Test" for the Designer to be "the ability to design human-like machinery and processes". Since you can't ask the Designer to design a new car, I assume the evidence for the Designer being able to pass this "IQ Test" is the evidence of biology itself. Thus, my charge of circular reasoning: The Designer of Life must be intelligent because intelligent is defined as being able to create machinery like we see in biology.
Weather systems seems less smarter to me.
Seem more smarter to me.
Much less front loading (a hallmark of intelligent design.)
I think front loading is not a hallmark of intelligent design.
I've got a question for you: what is the difference between natural selection and artificial selection?
I thought artificial selection was when human beings tried to control which animals mated with which other ones. Right?
Another question for you: in what sense, if any, was the existence of humans the goal of nature?
I don't know how to figure out goals in nature. Nobody does.
A robot does not build a car. The human builds it using the robot as a tool.
Nope, robots build cars. Humans don't even have to be there.
Rubber mallets, conveyor belst and rivet guns do not build a car either. And yes, the human has foresight and the building of the car demonstrates this foresight. And no, this is not a mistake.
No, you're mistaken. Robots build cars. You seem to think that just because humans designed robots, robots aren't responsible for building cars – but that can't be right. Didn't the Designer design human beings? Do you think that means that humans don't build cars, but the Designer does?
Just because humans are designed doesn't mean they aren't intelligent/purposeful, right? And just because a robot is designed doesn't mean it isn't intelligent/purposeful right?
We can tell if it did by examining the artifact. If the robot has no foresight it is because the human did and built in the necessary contingencies based upon this foresight.
How can you tell the human had foresight, rather than being built with the necessary contingencies based on the Designer's foresight?
I was going to say that I don't really need a reference because we are now clear what it is that you are saying. But as I thought about I think I would like a reference. I would like to see if their meaningful search for intelligence and life-forms is as limited as yours. I doubt that they are looking for human brains and Earth's life-forms residing on other planets when they search for ETI.
From all of the above we can see that, as I suspected, you only accept "human-like intelligence" as meaningful insofar as it is just a fancy way of saying "human".:
All scientists who seek signs of life in the universe are keenly aware that we have but one data point to guide us, Earth. So we look for evidence of life-as-we-know-it, a distinctive signature or biomarker that we learn to recognize from our ever-increasing understanding of life and biological processes on Earth.
After all, you can't even tell me if my goldfish intends to swim or not.
Perhaps that's only because nobody has tested goldfish "¦ the way they have, say, fruitflies.
First of all, you will notice you need to test the actual animal in order to see what sort of behavior it is capable of. These scientists were not testing the artifacts created by fruit flies to see if fruit flies have intent. Second:
Brembs emphasizes: "Regardless of our speculations on free will, the most important scientific aspect of our work is the evidence we found for a brain function which appears evolutionarily designed to always spontaneously vary ongoing behavior.
Like I said: Nobody can say if anything has free will, and nobody can say of anything intends to do anything.
Pez, I don't sense any forward motion here. You think scientists have methods to detect free will, intent, and purpose simply by looking at an artifact. I am quite sure scientists can do no such thing, and the scientists never claim to be able to any such thing. Perhaps you are thinking of psychics.
Thanks for the discussions. Bradford has locked me out of another thread (the "Intelligence: A Useful Concept" thread). Apparently my questions were too difficult for him to answer – he never did try to respond to my "athleticism" analogy. I'd like to see if somebody here has any response to that. But I think I'll curtail my participation here at this point, since I seem to be making the moderators too uncomfortable.
aiguy: Thus, my charge of circular reasoning: The Designer of Life must be intelligent because intelligent is defined as being able to create machinery like we see in biology.
This discussion (between you and me) is about definitions, prompted by your initial rejection of my specification that the designer would possess "at least human like intelligence", which you rejected as meaningless when I first issued it. Since then I've defined what I mean in a non-circular way. Saying the designer must at least possess human-like intelligence (as defined by me) is not equivalent to saying that the designer is intelligent because intelligence is defined as being able to create machinery like we see in biology.
The statement that the designer of the first life on earth must possess at least human like intelligence is not a meaningless statement. It may be false, and you may disagree with it, but it's not circular, and it's not meaningless.
KB,
It is not meaningless conceptually, but it is meaningless in terms of empirical science unless you specify what it means in terms of what sorts of things we could observe. We cannot give the Designer an IQ test, and so all we could possibly do is look at what we see in nature and then say that constitutes an IQ test. Again, thus my charge: Operationally at least, you are defining the intelligence of the Designer as that which could build biological forms.
Who's talking science here? I've been merely talking definitions.
I'm comfortable with engineering and philosophy. For now I'll leave any ideas about "ID science" to the big boys.
I don't think it has anything to do with engineering at all. All you are saying is that you would like to use whatever definitions of human intelligence there may be… and there are dozens of different ones of course, with nothing approaching a consensus on the matter, even among human psychologists.
Since you don't want to say how one might ever try to figure out if any of these definitions might actually apply in the context of ID, then I really don't think it has much to do with philosophy either.
But yes, you could meaningfully assert that you believe something with human-like intelligence (conscious, prone to certain optical illusions, musical, forgetful, etc) was responsible for life.
A robot does not build a car. The human builds it using the robot as a tool.
Nope, robots build cars. Humans don't even have to be there.
Their presence is not required for them to build the car. The determined the design, the parts necessary, the order of assembly, etc. The robot is merely doing the lifting. Hammers don't build houses and robots don't build cars.
No, you're mistaken. Robots build cars. You seem to think that just because humans designed robots, robots aren't responsible for building cars – but that can't be right. Didn't the Designer design human beings? Do you think that means that humans don't build cars, but the Designer does?
Responsible? Sure, like a car is responsible for an accident.
Humans have foresight and intention, unlike the robot, and are responsible for their creations.
How can you tell the human had foresight, rather than being built with the necessary contingencies based on the Designer's foresight?
First hand experience and introspection.
Just because humans are designed doesn't mean they aren't intelligent/purposeful, right?
Right.
And just because a robot is designed doesn't mean it isn't intelligent/purposeful right?
That's not why they aren't intelligent and purposeful. You already admitted they build without foresight.
First of all, you will notice you need to test the actual animal in order to see what sort of behavior it is capable of. These scientists were not testing the artifacts created by fruit flies to see if fruit flies have intent.
First of all, you can't test the actual animal. They tested the pathway of the animal, ie., the artifact.
You can only study intelligence, wisdom, will, etc. by its effects. The agent need not be there for that study.
Pez, I don't sense any forward motion here.
Neither do I. But thanks for the discussion.
You think scientists have methods to detect free will, intent, and purpose simply by looking at an artifact. I am quite sure scientists can do no such thing, and the scientists never claim to be able to any such thing. Perhaps you are thinking of psychics.
Psychics. No, I'm thinking of scientists. Many scientists study artifacts to determine intent and purpose.
I tell you that X has produced an artifact, and I give you the artifact to study. You conclude (somehow) that this artifact is a "design", by which you mean it displays "purpose". I ask you what you think caused this design, and you tell me it must have been something with intent, purpose, and intelligence.
Then I tell you what produced the artifact: It was a machine built out of metal and wires and electronic circuits. At that point, do you change your mind, and decide that it must not have been the machine that had intent, purpose, and intelligence, but rather something else with intelligence must have built this machine? Or do you accept that this machine actually was truly intelligent?
Consider the former choice: You first decided that the producer of this design was intelligent, but then you changed your mind when you found out it was a machine. This would mean you could not really detect intelligence just from looking at artifacts.
Consider the latter choice: You believe that deterministic physical processes (like machines, or like natural evolutionary processes) can be truly intelligent.
Either of these choices negates your position. You will probably respond by saying that what you could detect from the artifact was that true intelligence was involved at some unspecified position in the causal chain. Even if the proximal cause of the design was not intelligent, nor even if the cause of that cause wasn't, nor the cause of that cause, and so on back into the past… at some point there must have been a true intelligence with foresight.
Yes, well, this is an ancient argument – theologians have always argued from ultimate cause. You can believe it if you'd like, and I won't, and there really is not much else to say about it. But obviously this has nothing to do with science.
Many scientists study artifacts to determine intent and purpose.
It has never once happened, no. Scientists study artifacts to determine what sort of animal was responsible. Whatever they may know about (some operationalized notion of) intent and purpose of what created it they learn from interacting with similar animals. Whatever they can guess about how the animal used it also comes from our knowledge of animals and what they do. None of this has any relevance to figuring out the origin of life.
I like to define SETI as that branch of astrobiology that uses the deliberate actions of the inhabitants in order to detect habitable worlds.
…
Similarly, in SETI, we search for the signatures of technology-as-we-know-it, specifically, communication technology, as we assume that any signals we detect will be deliberate.
I see what you mean about the search for life like Earth life. But this is still far and away less restrictive than your "human-like intelligence is human".
Then again, apparently some astrobiologists think we can detect life even if it is unlike that on Earth. http://www.airspacemag.com/spa...
Then I tell you what produced the artifact: It was a machine built out of metal and wires and electronic circuits
This does not preclude intelligence. But car-building robots are not intelligent and you evidenced this yourself. They are not the designers.
Consider the former choice: You first decided that the producer of this design was intelligent, but then you changed your mind when you found out it was a machine. This would mean you could not really detect intelligence just from looking at artifacts.
Not so. If the machine has no intelligence, foresight, planning ability, etc., but the design is evidenced then the intelligence has to be elsewhere. Consider ID's project in which design can be inferred even if it was instantiated through secondary, unintelligent causes. Identifying design does not entail discovering the most recent, most proximate cause. As design theorists will tell you, ID is not an interventionist mechanistic project. Inferring instances of design does not locate the action temporally.
Consider the latter choice: You believe that deterministic physical processes (like machines, or like natural evolutionary processes) can be truly intelligent.
The machine is a deterministic physical process? Then it is not intelligent and is not the designer.
Either of these choices negates your position. You will probably respond by saying that what you could detect from the artifact was that true intelligence was involved at some unspecified position in the causal chain.
Indeed I will. As I already did in our investigation of the automated auto factory.
Even if the proximal cause of the design was not intelligent, nor even if the cause of that cause wasn't, nor the cause of that cause, and so on back into the past"¦ at some point there must have been a true intelligence with foresight.
You are a little loose with "cause" here. A facilitator is not the cause.
Yes, well, this is an ancient argument – theologians have always argued from ultimate cause. You can believe it if you'd like, and I won't, and there really is not much else to say about it. But obviously this has nothing to do with science.
Believe what you will. But whether or not it is science was not your question. It's based upon empirical study, its a valid inference derived logically from defined terms and observation, it is an attempt to explain nature, its ideas can be tested, etc. Call it what you will but it does not fail due to lack of or uncertain definitions.
It has never once happened, no.
Sure it has.
Scientists study artifacts to determine what sort of animal was responsible.
No, they often already know what sort of animal was responsible and then try to determine if that responsible animal actually was responsible. Real scientists with real degrees study artifacts and determine intent and design, differentiating it from chance and natural causes in cases of cases of death/homicide, abuse, criminal poisoning, arson, etc.
AIGUY: Then I tell you what produced the artifact: It was a machine built out of metal and wires and electronic circuits
PEZ: This does not preclude intelligence.
…The machine is a deterministic physical process? Then it is not intelligent and is not the designer.
I'm having a hard time figuring out what you mean here. You say a machine can be intelligent, but if it is a deterministic physical process then it cannot be intelligent. So, do you mean that only indeterministic machines can be intelligent?
To be more precise, are you defining "intelligent" to entail "not deterministic", or do you claim to somehow be able demonstrate that nothing "intelligent" is deterministic?
You are a little loose with "cause" here. A facilitator is not the cause.
What is the difference, and how can we test for which one something is?
It's based upon empirical study its a valid inference derived logically from defined terms and observation, it is an attempt to explain nature, its ideas can be tested, etc. Call it what you will but it does not fail due to lack of or uncertain definitions.
The only sense I can make out of your definitions is that you are talking about our conscious experience of intent. And if you think there is any way to empirically establish the existence of some unspecified thing (force, process, cause, animal, spirit, God, ghost, monster…) that created life and also experienced conscious intent, then I'm afraid there is little I could say to dissuade a faith as strong as that.
No, they often already know what sort of animal was responsible and then try to determine if that responsible animal actually was responsible.
I'm understanding less and less of what you're saying. Now you say that an animal can be responsible for creating an artifact, but not actually be responsible for creating the artifact. You've putting a bit too fine a point on it for me I'd say.
Real scientists with real degrees study artifacts and determine intent and design, differentiating it from chance and natural causes in cases of cases of death/homicide, abuse, criminal poisoning, arson, etc.
Sorry, we've miscommunicated again. Archeologists and police detectives know what sort of thing they are studying, because it is always the same: a human being. Forensics experts have no need for definitions of "agency" (most would think you were speaking of a police "agency"!) or "intelligence" (they would think "CIA"!). They have not studied the methods of "intelligent design". They do not need the concepts of CSI or IC. They do not read about complexity or and study the issues surrounding free will. Instead, they know about human beings and what human beings do.
AIGUY: How can you tell the human had foresight, rather than being built with the necessary contingencies based on the Designer's foresight?
PEZ: First hand experience and introspection.
So the machine isn't intelligent because a human built it, but the human is intelligent, even though the Designer built it… and you know this because you know that you are intelligent. Do I have this right? And you can use this same reasoning to assure us that the Designer is intelligent like you are, and not like a super-computer is?
That's not why they aren't intelligent and purposeful. You already admitted they build without foresight.
Plenty of deterministic robots have foresight, just not car assembly robots.
First of all, you can't test the actual animal. They tested the pathway of the animal, ie., the artifact.
What are you talking about? I'm talking about the link you gave me about the fruit fly. They had the little critter strapped down right in their lab! Really – it's on video!
You can only study intelligence, wisdom, will, etc. by its effects. The agent need not be there for that study.
Wisdom? You have an empirical test for wisdom? Wow, that's cool! Anyway, I can't see how you can seriously say these guys didn't need the agent (the animal) in order to study it. Please go to your own reference and read what they did to these little fruitflies, OK?
Just a quick one as I have no time.
The scientist's did not study the fruitfly. They studied the fruitfly's flight pattern. Their inference was drawn from that pattern, not from the fruitfly.
Ok, two more …
So the machine isn't intelligent because a human built it, but the human is intelligent, even though the Designer built it"¦ and you know this because you know that you are intelligent. Do I have this right?
No, you don't have this right. You know you don't because you asked it already and it was answered. The machine does not lack intelligence because it was built by a human.
You said:
Pez, I don't sense any forward motion here. You think scientists have methods to detect free will, intent, and purpose simply by looking at an artifact. I am quite sure scientists can do no such thing, and the scientists never claim to be able to any such thing. Perhaps you are thinking of psychics.
And tehy certainly do detect intent and purpose from an artifact.
Now you want to say "well, they didn't use IC or CSI". And to that I say (without defending that they probably did use at least an implied version of CSI and certainly the explanatory filter) so? Move goalposts much?
Archeologists and police detectives know what sort of thing they are studying, because it is always the same: a human being. …. Instead, they know about human beings and what human beings do.
Actually, they know what chemicals do, how fires behave, what nature can/cannot create, what marks ropes make, the natural levels of toxins, etc.
When events indicate "unnatural" (read, improbable) states involving these elements they infer agency, design, intent, purpose, etc.
Just like a fella looking at a readout of a fruitfly's flight path, for instance.
The scientist's did not study the fruitfly. They studied the fruitfly's flight pattern. Their inference was drawn from that pattern, not from the fruitfly.
Pez, these guys had a fly stuck to a pin in their laboratory, observing and photographing what the fly was doing. You are trying to tell me that they did not need to have the fly there? What were they doing with it then, since they weren't studying it? Playing with it?
I have this weird feeling that you are serious about this. Maybe you are making some metaphysical distinction between the thing-in-itself and how we perceive it? (I really hope not). In any event, I'm very comfortable with my assertion that in the experiment you cited, the scientists were studying a fruitfly, and they could not have done their experiment without having a fruitfly there.
And tehy certainly do detect intent and purpose from an artifact.
No, nobody has ever done this. Please read this carefully, because I know why we are miscommunicating. In your view:
1) Detective finds a shoe
2) Detective sees that the purpose of shoes is for walking
3) This indicates design
4) Therefore the shoe was made with conscious intent
5) Therefore the detective has inferred intent from an artifact
Right? Now, here is how I see it:
1) Detective finds a shoe
2) Detective knows that humans have feet, walk on them, need to protect their feet, (and he might even know that humans make shoes)
3) This indicates humans made the shoe
4) Humans have conscious intent
5) Therefore the shoe was made with conscious intent
6) Therefore the detective has inferred intent from an artifact
Do you see the difference?
Actually, they know what chemicals do, how fires behave, what nature can/cannot create, what marks ropes make, the natural levels of toxins, etc.
When events indicate "unnatural" (read, improbable) states involving these elements they infer agency, design, intent, purpose, etc.
You were right up until the end. They infer human causation, not "agency". They don't know what you mean by "agency".
Pez, these guys had a fly stuck to a pin in their laboratory, observing and photographing what the fly was doing. You are trying to tell me that they did not need to have the fly there? What were they doing with it then, since they weren't studying it? Playing with it?
They tracked it. If it were a deer they could have followed its trail through the woods. If they had a hound dog he could do it chemically. They didn't ask the fly questions. They didn't probe his feelings. He didn't tell them what he was thinking like you say we need to do with the designer. They studied what he had done.
Is that so weird a take?
Do you see the difference?
That's not what's done, the difference is irrelevant and the shoe does not trigger a design inference.
Detective finds a body dead in a garage.
Detective finds doors shut.
Detective finds a running car engine.
Detective determines cause of death to be carbon monoxide poisoning caused by a conscious human working on the engine.
Detective doesn't care about consciousness or free will arguments.
Detective determines accidental cause of death.
Detective finds same situation.
Finds garage doors are locked from the inside.
Finds cracks were sealed with towels.
Finds no evidence that the deceased had been doing repair work.
Detective determines the deceased deliberately killed himself.
Detective finds same situation.
Detective finds a suicide note.
There is an injury to the victim's head.
There is no carbon monoxide in his system.
Detective determine's the suicide is faked to cover an homicide.
A human actor is responsible in all three cases but this is not the reason the detective or the lab scientist infers intent. He does so on the basis of the artifacts left.
You were right up until the end. They infer human causation, not "agency". They don't know what you mean by "agency".
Even scientists know how to read dictionaries.
Anyway, thanks for admitting I am right, so let's eliminate the word "agency" and see just how right I am.
Notice that they compared the situation to what one could expect nature to create on its own, what chance and laws could account for. Notice this is a negative argument and one depending upon improbabilities and yet we did not claim it was an argument from ignorance. A nice step forward.
From the study of the situation, and not the direct observation of a human, they determined that natural causes cannot account for the situation and they rightly infer intentional interference.
They don't speculate on free will and human capabilities but examine ligature wounds to see if they are consistent with cause of death. If they match a specified pattern and can't be expected to have done so by chance then they determine (one each for you Alan) that non-chance (intent) was in play. They examine knife wounds and study their number, pattern, direction and depth to determine if they were accidentally caused by a careless slip of the blade or not.
Now, having determined the cause of death they rightly presume that, based upon their knowledge of people, a person instigated this cause. This assignment follows the design inference.
re: animals and responsibility, machines and determinism, designers and facilitators …
Jill walks into her house and lets her cat in ahead of her.
It jumps up on the counter where she feeds it and pulls at a treat bag as it does when it is hungry. The treat bag is attached to a string which sets off a remote-control car which drives across the floor and sets off a chain of dominoes. After many hundreds of them topple, having traversed inclines and even triggered a pendulum, a message is spelled out on the floor that says "Jill, will you marry me".
She can barely contain her excitement and cries "Yes! Yes! Of course!" as, in the piece de resistance the final domino pushes a cart carrying an engagement ring down a slope toward her.
But then she realizes that she can't decide between marrying her cat, the remote control car or the hundreds of dominoes.
And, unfortunately, polygamy is still illegal in her state.
The way a detective works is by collecting evidence and proposing theories of how a situation occurred. An important aspect of this process is comparing the situation to a library of similar situations either in personal experience, or in professional libraries.
The researchers tethered fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster) in completely uniform white surroundings and recorded their turning behavior…
They put the fly in a novel situation and watched to see what it would do. This is not something you can do in the context of ID.
They didn't ask the fly questions. They didn't probe his feelings. He didn't tell them what he was thinking like you say we need to do with the designer.
Nor (as they admit) did they demonstrate that the fly did anything with purpose, intent, or with free will! Here is what they found:
[T]he most important scientific aspect of our work is the evidence we found for a brain function which appears evolutionarily designed to always spontaneously vary ongoing behavior.
Now they could not have even shown this without interacting with a live fruitfly, and even though they had a fruitfly right there in their laboratory, they could not show that the fly had free will, intent, or purpose. So exactly how are you going to do this for some hypothetical intelligence that nobody can even see?
They studied what he had done. Is that so weird a take?
It was weird that you said they had not studied the fly. Putting the fly in a novel experimental circumstance and then observing what the fly would do is studying the fly by any reasonable use of language. I think my point has been made here – nobody can learn about the behavior of an unknown type of entity without actually observing the behavior of the entity.
That's not what's done, the difference is irrelevant and the shoe does not trigger a design inference.
Shoes aren't designed? Wow, this is harder than I thought.
A human actor is responsible in all three cases but this is not the reason the detective or the lab scientist infers intent. He does so on the basis of the artifacts left.
Sorry, I thought you were talking about identifying what sort of entity (intelligent or not) caused some phenomenon. Your detective wasn't trying to do anything of the sort. He just wanted to figure out if the human being did it, or some other human being did it, or if no human being at all did it.
Can you please show me how you think scientists detect intelligence when they have no idea what sort of entity was responsible for some phenomenon and cannot observe the entity in question? That is what ID is trying to do.
Even scientists know how to read dictionaries.
As we've seen, dictionaries don't define scientific theories.
I think my point has been made here – nobody can learn about the behavior of an unknown type of entity without actually observing the behavior of the entity.
Wrong still.
Only after the team analyzed the fly behavior with methods developed by co-authors George Sugihara and Chih-hao Hsieh from the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at UC San Diego did they realize the origin of the fly's peculiar spontaneity.
They did not derive their knowledge from observing his behaviour and they did not study him behaving. They observed the effects of his behaviour and they studied what he had done. They did not derive their findings from looking at the fly or asking him questions but by studying their record. They did not compare the artifacts (recordings of 'flight' patterns) to things they knew flies could do from their previous independent knowledge of flies. They didn't look at him trying to fly in the lab and compare this to their independent knowledge of how he flies in nature looking for food. Rather, they compared the record of his behaviour to what they considered to be the effects of randomness, and determination. And they concluded that he was not acting randomly or completely deterministically but, rather, exhibited a degree of spontaneity solely as a non-random effect from his mind. They made their inference as to his motivations (whether they existed at all and to what degree) based upon the artifact left behind from his acting. They studied a pattern in nature and analysed it mathematically – finding it to be very different from random noise. Anybody could study the data, the artifacts left behind, and the fly does not even have to be there – nor do they even have to know that it was a fly that generated the patterns to conclude that they were non-random.
I'll repeat that: Even if the did not know what produced the data, their analysis would have shown the same thing>. In fact, they still don't know the agent or cause of the spontaneity as their next planned step is to study the brain and see if they can find it there. They have inferred this lack of determination and chance without knowing its cause. As in other cases, they are now applying what they've inferred, non-random spontaneity, and considering it new knowledge about their candidate, the fly's brain. As you inferred design and then added axe-wielding to the repertoire of chimp behaviour, Bermes is adding spontaneity to the features of the fly's brain.
Now they could not have even shown this without interacting with a live fruitfly, and even though they had a fruitfly right there in their laboratory, they could not show that the fly had free will, intent, or purpose. So exactly how are you going to do this for some hypothetical intelligence that nobody can even see?
We study patterns in nature and determine whether they reflect randomness and determinism or not.
I think my point has been made here – nobody can learn about the behavior of an unknown type of entity without actually observing the behavior of the entity.
I think your point has been lost. Anybody can study the effects of a behaviour without independent knowledge of the agent.
Shoes aren't designed? Wow, this is harder than I thought.
Only if you're going to be silly about it. Detectives don't look at shoes and ponder their design.
Sorry, I thought you were talking about identifying what sort of entity (intelligent or not) caused some phenomenon. Your detective wasn't trying to do anything of the sort. He just wanted to figure out if the human being did it, or some other human being did it, or if no human being at all did it.
Nope. He was trying to figure out if it was done intentionally. I was talking about whether the patterns studied would indicate purposeful arrangement.
Can you please show me how you think scientists detect intelligence when they have no idea what sort of entity was responsible for some phenomenon and cannot observe the entity in question? That is what ID is trying to do.
That's all I've done for days. They look at patterns and use various methods to determine if these were the result of randomness, chance, luck, or physical necessity. When they are not the inference is to purposeful arrangement of parts. They may or may not have a candidate for having purposefully arranged this but they still have the inference. Then they apply that inference to potential candidates – human beings, chimps, neurological connections, ETI, panspermia directors, human-like minds, unembodied intelligent beings, etc.
They did not derive their knowledge from observing his behaviour and they did not study him behaving.
Well, I really can't say anything about this except what you say is patently false as can be seen by reading the page from the link you yourself provided.
Did they observe the fly's behavior?
From your page:
When scientists observe animals responding differently even to the same external stimuli, they attribute this variability to random errors in a complex brain." Using a combination of automated behavior recording…
I would say this indicates that scientists observed the animals behavior.
And also:
However, the analysis showed that the temporal structure of fly behavior is very different from random noise.
I would say this indicates that they observed the temporal structure of the fly behavior.
They observed the effects of his behaviour…
It is beyond reason for you to continue to pretend that these scientists did not observe and analyze the behavior of these animals, when it says exactly that explicitly on the page you cited.
They did not derive their findings from looking at the fly…
Yes, that is exactly what they did, and they say so. Not only did they look at the fly with their own eyes, they took videos of the fly, and they connected the fly with instruments. I have to ask again if you are being serious here.
…or asking him questions.
Flies can't talk, Pez. What in the world are you talking about? And because flies can't talk (and neither can the Intelligent Designer as far as we know) that is why the scientists can not figure out what the fly consciously intended to do, even when they were studying the fly directly (which they most emphatically were doing).
They didn't look at him trying to fly in the lab
This is precisely what they did. You may view a video of this very fly trying to fly in the lab:
and compare this to their independent knowledge of how he flies in nature looking for food.
This had nothing to do with their experiment. They were trying to see if flies exhibited unpredictable, spontaneous behavior when presented with constant stimuli. They could not determine this unless they put the fly in a novel situation – one where there were no external spatial cues available to the fly. So they put the fly in the lab and they studied the fly.
Honestly, Pez, this is all so plainly spelled out on your cited page that I find this conversation ridiculous.
I'll repeat that: Even if the did not know what produced the data, their analysis would have shown the same thing>.
This is nonsense. They could not possibly have collected data on the behavior of this animal in the controlled experimental setting that they had devised if they did not know what was producing the data.
In fact, they still don't know the agent
Uh, it was the fruit fly, Pez.
… or cause of the spontaneity as their next planned step is to study the brain and see if they can find it there.
"The biological implementation of this mechanism is currently unknown, but there is evidence from a previous study that a brain area called the ellipsoid body (sometimes called the "fly motor cortex") might be involved."
So yes, they assume there is a biological implementation (as opposed to say, a magical implementation or a spiritual implementation, which would not be amenable to scientific study at all).
I think your point has been lost. Anybody can study the effects of a behaviour without independent knowledge of the agent.
Unbelievable. The single study that you cite in order to make your point could not possibly be more clear that it is utterly essential to be able to study the organism directly in experimentally controlled situations. You have yourself provided the evidence that you are utterly confused about how scientists study animal intelligence.
AIGUY: Can you please show me how you think scientists detect intelligence when they have no idea what sort of entity was responsible for some phenomenon and cannot observe the entity in question? That is what ID is trying to do.
PEZ: That's all I've done for days.
There is not one single reference to any scientist who has ever "detected intelligence" of anything without knowing what sort of entity they were studying. The only reference you have provided was to a study where they were directly studying a fruit fly, watching it behave in a controlled experimental setting.
Hi Aiguy,
1) You keep saying "novel" environment. It is not that the environment is "novel" but that it specifically provides no cues and cannot be the cause the of the patterns.
2)
When scientists observe animals responding differently even to the same external stimuli, they attribute this variability to random errors in a complex brain." Using a combination of automated behavior recording"¦
This is about previous explanations about animals in general and has nothing to do with "knowing what fruit flies are capable of" and then comparing the new observations to that.
3) The very next sentence:
Using a combination of automated behavior recording and mathematical analyses, the international team of researchers showed for the first time that such variability cannot be due to simple random events but is generated spontaneously and non-randomly by the brain. "If even flies show the capacity for spontaneity, can we really assume it is missing in humans?" Brembs wonders.
…demonstrates that this is a new perspective gained from a new analysis and does not depend on independent prior knowledge.
4) Previous studies claimed that flies foraged due to environmental cues. The conclusions here do not rely upon this information and Brembs does not say "we can conclude this pattern indicates spontaneity because fruit flies are independently known to exhibit spontaneity". Instead, this study added knowledge not derived from prior investigations to the complex of what a fruit fly is capable of.
5) The conclusion of spontaneity is not drawn from looking at the video or eyeballing the fly but by analysing the graphed traces.
6) Anybody could analyse these and say that this pattern is not randomly generated. They don't have to know how they were generated.
I'll repeat that: Even if the did not know what produced the data, their analysis would have shown the same thing
This is nonsense. They could not possibly have collected data on the behavior of this animal in the controlled experimental setting that they had devised if they did not know what was producing the data.
Give the data to another analyst and ask "is this random noise?" and he will say "no".
7)
Flies can't talk, Pez. What in the world are you talking about? And because flies can't talk (and neither can the Intelligent Designer as far as we know) that is why the scientists can not figure out what the fly consciously intended to do, even when they were studying the fly directly (which they most emphatically were doing).
But they can gain information about the mental processes without independent prior knowledge and without asking the fly questions and by merely studying the artifact. Sounds like a lot of in-principle objections have bit the dust.
There is not one single reference to any scientist who has ever "detected intelligence" of anything without knowing what sort of entity they were studying. The only reference you have provided was to a study where they were directly studying a fruit fly, watching it behave in a controlled experimental setting.
There are plenty of references to studying a pattern but not an entity and concluding that the pattern was not generated randomly or lawfully and where the conclusion then is purpose. In the case of the fly the conclusion is "spontaneity" but it defeats the eliminative, argument-from-ignorance, can't-study-an-artifact objections.
Honestly, Pez, this is all so plainly spelled out on your cited page that I find this conversation ridiculous.
You keep saying "novel" environment. It is not that the environment is "novel" but that it specifically provides no cues and cannot be the cause the of the patterns.
The environment was novel in the sense that it is different from the environments in which flies exist. It was also novel in the sense that this particular fly had not encountered the environment previously. The salient point is that the experimenters devised the environment to test hypotheses about the fly's abilities and behaviors. That is the only possible way to learn about any entity's abilities and behaviors (without direct knowledge of similar animals of course).
PAPER: When scientists observe animals responding differently even to the same external stimuli, they attribute this variability to random errors in a complex brain." Using a combination of automated behavior recording"¦
PEZ: This is about previous explanations about animals in general and has nothing to do with "knowing what fruit flies are capable of" and then comparing the new observations to that.
No, this describes the present study, where scientists observed the animals responding differently in absence of external spatial cues. It is exactly what they did.
The very next sentence:
Using a combination of automated behavior recording
This shows that the scientists recorded the behavior of animal, rather than finding artifacts after the fact.
… and mathematical analyses, the international team of researchers showed for the first time that such variability cannot be due to simple random events but is generated spontaneously and non-randomly by the brain. "If even flies show the capacity for spontaneity, can we really assume it is missing in humans?" Brembs wonders.
"¦demonstrates that this is a new perspective gained from a new analysis and does not depend on independent prior knowledge.
The issue of "independent prior knowledge" is relevant when attempting to make inferences about behaviors of entities that are not being observed. That is how I knew that chimps could swing axes but dolphins could not, even though I did not observe either one in action.
This was not the situation in the experiment you cited, because the scientists were actually observing the behaviors in question. The scientists had captured the flies, and they actually observed them in their laboratory. Thus the issue with prior independent knowledge is irrelevant – they were not relying on prior knowledge because they were collecting knowledge directly by observing behaviors.
Previous studies claimed that flies foraged due to environmental cues. The conclusions here do not rely upon this information and Brembs does not say "we can conclude this pattern indicates spontaneity because fruit flies are independently known to exhibit spontaneity". Instead, this study added knowledge not derived from prior investigations to the complex of what a fruit fly is capable of.
Exactly. They collected new facts about fly behavior by observing flies behave.
The conclusion of spontaneity is not drawn from looking at the video or eyeballing the fly but by analysing the graphed traces.
What could your point possibly be here? What is the salient difference between recording video images, recording "graphed traces", or jotting down notes? All of these are records of behaviors, and constitute actual observations of actual behaviors of actual animals. This could not possibly be more clear! You can only study behaviors by studying behaviors, period!
Anybody could analyse these and say that this pattern is not randomly generated. They don't have to know how they were generated.
But there would be no pattern unless somebody had observed the flies under controlled conditions! They would have had no way of testing the hypothesis that flies exhibited spontaneous behavior unless they had performed the experiment on flies that they had captured and placed in the controlled setting of their laboratory where spatial cues had been removed! Why else do you think they went to all that trouble?
I'll repeat that: Even if the did not know what produced the data, their analysis would have shown the same thing
And if somebody gave us detailed records of observations of the Intelligent Designer in action – video tapes of Him operating by trial-and-error, say, or telling us in advance what sort of animals He planned to create – then you would have analogous data. But I hope you know that no such evidence exists. Maybe the Designer built flagella by trial and error with no pattern of his trials that indicated systematic thought. Maybe the designer exists outside of space and time (as some religions describe) and so this trial-and-error process went on forever before life appeared on Earth. Or maybe the Designer went about his work the way a human would, making blueprints and reflecting on His goals and methods before He started.
If we had some records of His behaviors, we would have something to go on when we tried to describe His mental abilities. But we have no observations of his behaviors, and no records of his behaviors, and no prospect of ever finding any. We have only our observations of things which we want to explain, but these things tell us precisely nothing about what mental abilities the cause may or may not have had.
But they can gain information about the mental processes without independent prior knowledge and without asking the fly questions and by merely studying the artifact. Sounds like a lot of in-principle objections have bit the dust.
They could have gained not one iota of information about mental processes without actually experimenting on an actual fly. My in-principle objections are perfectly intact, while your misunderstanding of how scientific research on animal behavior and mentality is performed has cost us quite a bit of confusion.
There are plenty of references to studying a pattern but not an entity and concluding that the pattern was not generated randomly or lawfully and where the conclusion then is purpose.
No, there is not a single such study. Just saying these studies exist do not make it so; you must actually reference one where "purpose" or "intelligence" of an unknown type of entity is evidenced.
In the case of the fly the conclusion is "spontaneity" but it defeats the eliminative, argument-from-ignorance, can't-study-an-artifact objections.
You can study artifacts all you'd like. If you don't study the actual entity, however, and also you have no prior independent knowledge of (even remotely) similar entities, then you can not possibly learn anything at all about its purpose or mental abilities. And such is the situation in ID, where "ID" attempts to explain the emergence of the original life forms (I'm not talking about Crick's panspermia, etc):
1) We have no prior independent knowledge of anything even remotely similar to anything that could be intelligent without being a life form.
2) We cannot observe the behaviors of the Designer in different situations
Therefore it is impossible to infer anything at all about the mental abilities or characteristics of the Designer.
No, this describes the present study, where scientists observed the animals responding differently in absence of external spatial cues. It is exactly what they did.
No, it is about the previous studies in which scientists attribute variability to random errors. They do not attribute the fly's behaviour here to these same causes and are not drawing their inference based upon this previous knowledge/observation of flies.
This shows that the scientists recorded the behavior of animal, rather than finding artifacts after the fact.
Right, they recorded the motions detailing the pattern which they then analysed. They did not draw their conclusions from watching the fly and they certainly didn't draw them by saying "here's what flies are capable of, so how do we interpret this data? They aren't spontaneous so the data does not show that they are…"
This was not the situation in the experiment you cited, because the scientists were actually observing the behaviors in question.
They were not observing spontaneity. They concluded spontaneity from analysing the data, not from watching the fly nor from reviewing their video. And when they analysed their data and drew their conclusions they did not confine them to prior knowledge of flies but in fact added to the knowledge.
Exactly. They collected new facts about fly behavior by observing flies behave.
They drew their conclusions not from observing flies behaving but by studying the record that behaviour created.
This could not possibly be more clear! You can only study behaviors by studying behaviors, period!
Studying the data generated by a behaviour is not the same as observing a behaviour. One can study the data and draw the conclusion without observing the fly. Oh wait, I forgot this … !
But there would be no pattern unless somebody had observed the flies under controlled conditions! They would have had no way of testing the hypothesis that flies exhibited spontaneous behavior unless they had performed the experiment on flies that they had captured and placed in the controlled setting of their laboratory where spatial cues had been removed! Why else do you think they went to all that trouble?
Of course the data had to be generated in some manner. If the fly marked his travels they could have observed those marks. If the fly was a polar bear they could put a collar on him and track him with GPS. They don't have to watch the animal and see it in action to draw the conclusion.
Here's another one … ! They look great.
If we had some records of His behaviors, we would have something to go on when we tried to describe His mental abilities. But we have no observations of his behaviors, and no records of his behaviors, and no prospect of ever finding any. We have only our observations of things which we want to explain, but these things tell us precisely nothing about what mental abilities the cause may or may not have had.
We have the record. We have the artifact.
They could have gained not one iota of information about mental processes without actually experimenting on an actual fly. My in-principle objections are perfectly intact, while your misunderstanding of how scientific research on animal behavior and mentality is performed has cost us quite a bit of confusion.
No, your reaction and protection of a failed point has.
You can study artifacts all you'd like. If you don't study the actual entity, however, and also you have no prior independent knowledge of (even remotely) similar entities, then you can not possibly learn anything at all about its purpose or mental abilities. And such is the situation in ID, where "ID" attempts to explain the emergence of the original life forms (I'm not talking about Crick's panspermia, etc):
1) We have no prior independent knowledge of anything even remotely similar to anything that could be intelligent without being a life form.
2) We cannot observe the behaviors of the Designer in different situations
Therefore it is impossible to infer anything at all about the mental abilities or characteristics of the Designer.
Assertion upon assertion.
re: assertion of second sentence: Yes you can.
re: 1) What about evolution and computers and robots? Given up your previous assertions already?
Oh yes, and we need no independent knowledge of such to draw our conclusions about the artifact. Oh yes, and this has nothing to do with ID failing by definition.
re: 2) We don't have to.
re: last quoted sentence: No it's not.
When you say "therefore" your conclusion should follow from your premises.
As for investigations that infer purpose without independent knowledge of possible designing agents, yes, there are plenty. The forensics situations above are perfect examples. Archaeology provides another great example. We don't even have to know the purpose of an artifact to know that its creation was intentional and that it had a purpose. Archaeologists can find artifacts and use these to add to the knowledge about the presumed designers rather than interpreting their data in light of independent prior knowledge of said agents – much the way Brembs did with the flies. Much the way archaeologists do with finds which force them to infer levels of intelligence by inferring behaviours (unobserved) by studying artifacts among human groups known through prior independent knowledge to lack these behaviours and the associated intelligence. They can infer from artifacts that these primates were capable of symbolic thought, foresight and planning at a time earlier than our independent prior knowledge would allow. This makes them a different kind of being with a different kind of intelligence than they were thought to be before the discovery of the artifacts.
No, there is not a single such study. Just saying these studies exist do not make it so; you must actually reference one where "purpose" or "intelligence" of an unknown type of entity is evidenced.
I didn't say anything about an unknown type of entity. I said that there are plenty of cases where purpose and intent are concluded by studying the patterns and not the entity. A forensic arsonist determines an intentionally set fire because he knows how fires spread naturally and has an opinion about how the fire in question spread. He doesn't need to know that "humans might set fires with multiple sources" to know that a fire originating from multiple sources is designed. You act like investigators once thought that accelerants spread themselves around a room and then a trail was spontaneously ignited by chance – until one day a study came in deomstrating "sometimes people set fires this way" and then the forensic arsonists said "oh wow, so it wasn't natural afterall. Too bad we didn't know that about arsonists before…".
On your next reminder that we presume people to be the perpetrators in these cases and that we have knowledge of people:
I have to admit that no investigators have been able to remove themselves to a time and place where humans were unknown before coming to their conclusions about intentional pattern-making. This doesn't affect the nature or object of their studies, however, nor the fact that they determine new things about specific agents and about people in general through their investigations of their designs and not solely the other way around.
And then again, don't forget the reason we are discussing fruitflies.
This study shows us that purpose/intent/will is amenable to scientific investigation and does not rely solely upon asking a designer what his intent was. Further, the experiment shows us that we can study the intentional aspect by studying the outputs and results of behaviour.
They were not observing spontaneity. They concluded spontaneity from analysing the data, not from watching the fly nor from reviewing their video.
The data was gathered by watching the fly.
And when they analysed their data and drew their conclusions they did not confine them to prior knowledge of flies but in fact added to the knowledge.
As I just explained, prior independent knowledge is not relevant when one is actually observing the subject itself, which was the case in this experiment.
They drew their conclusions not from observing flies behaving but by studying the record that behaviour created.
In science, the term "observation" very often does not refer to a direct perception with one of our senses. If I observe an acceleration of a mass, that doesn't mean I somehow directly can see the acceleration; it means I've instrumented the mass appropriately, and have computed the change in velocity, and deduced that acceleration was taking place. There is always some interpretation in every observation, but please let us not get bogged down in philosophy of science issues.
Studying the data generated by a behaviour is not the same as observing a behaviour. One can study the data and draw the conclusion without observing the fly. Oh wait, I forgot this "¦ !
Of course the data had to be generated in some manner. If the fly marked his travels they could have observed those marks. If the fly was a polar bear they could put a collar on him and track him with GPS. They don't have to watch the animal and see it in action to draw the conclusion.
Again, observing locations using a GPS is an observation nonetheless; we do not have to use our bare eyeballs to make a scientific observation.
We have the record. We have the artifact.
Aha – I see yet another source of our miscommunication. You are conflating a record of a behavior with the result of a behavior (the "artifact"). You are saying that our observations of the artifacts that the Designer makes (that is, biological forms) are analogous to the records of the observations of the behaviors of the fruitfly! Wow! Let's see if we can debug this.
According to ID, biological forms are the result of something that an Intelligent Designer did. The Designer – purposefully and with intent – thought up these complex forms and somehow brought them into existence. This designing and creating of forms is the behavior of the Designer, and these behaviors resulted in the physical artifacts of biology. This is analogous to a shoemaker who, through a set of behaviors, creates a physical artifact (a shoe).
So, in ID, we cannot observe the behaviors of the Designer, we can only view the results of the behaviors – the physical artifacts (the designs) that these behaviors caused.
Now consider the situation in the fruitfly experiment. There are no physical artifacts involved; the fruitfly does not design anything and bring it into existence. There are only behaviors. The scientists observe the behaviors of the fruitfly.
Now, you want to say that the records of the scientists' observations are somehow like the physical artifacts of ID, but that is very wrong: In the case of the fruitfly, it is the scientists who create these records, not the subject! The fruitfly does not write out the data, and the polar bear does not record his locations. The record is simply capturing what the scientists observe about the subject.
In contrast, in ID it is the subject (the Designer) who is ostensibly creating what we end up observing – the physical artifacts which the Designer designed.
In order to understand the mental capabilities of some unknown type of entity, it is not enough to simply see what it did (its artifacts). We would have to watch how it did it. That's how it always works; there's no other way. For example, for all we know, no matter how complex some design is, the cause of the design might be capable of only creating a design like that, and be unable to do anything else.
Hopefully we've cleared that up now. Whew.
As for investigations that infer purpose without independent knowledge of possible designing agents, yes, there are plenty. The forensics situations above are perfect examples. Archaeology provides another great example.
Obviously not – these disciplines have a huge amount of independent knowledge about what it means to be a human being. That is how they identify the activity of human beings. This doesn't work for "agents" in general, because they have no knowledge of "agents" in general.
I didn't say anything about an unknown type of entity.
I did! That is the case in ID, where all that is said about the Designer is that it is "intelligent".
And then again, don't forget the reason we are discussing fruitflies.
This study shows us that purpose/intent/will is amenable to scientific investigation and does not rely solely upon asking a designer what his intent was. Further, the experiment shows us that we can study the intentional aspect by studying the outputs and results of behaviour.
Read it again, this time taking the authors' caveats seriously. If you want to go this route, I can always claim that the experiments of Libet, Wegner, et al prove we have no free will. But let's both admit the issue lacks empirical resolution, shall we?
H Aiguy,
Nice to see we have some movement this morning. So we do not have to observe the designer, the fly or the polar bear with our bare eyeballs in order to understand what the agent is capable of or to make inferences about its mental capabilities. Check.
Now you admit that we can look at the tracks left by the fly or the bear as recorded and we can garner our conclusions from these. Check.
You've gotten stuck there, unfortunately, as you try to draw a distinction that will still leave the designer on one side of the line and the observer on the other. Your defence entails telling me I am very wrong, the use of a few more exclamation marks and the fact that the scientist created the record and the fly did not. To tell the truth, I can't tell which of these three is your strongest argument.
Let's go with the claim that it is the scientist creating the record and not the fly. As they say, this is a distinction without a difference. We have the record of the flight and this indicates spontaneity and tells us something about the mind of the fly.
With the polar bear we can record his actions in a similar way by tracking him. We do not have to be there, eyeball him, follow him in real time, or anything of the kind. We can sit down years later, without knowing it's a record of a polar bear even, and find the pattern made by the movement of the signal.
In snow we could do the same thing by following his footprints – a record
is left, created by his movement, without observation, without a camera, and without a scientist aiding in its making.
The pattern left by the animal can be millennia old if preserved in the proper medium and the scientist need not help create it but only needs to interpret it and find out something about the animal's mind he can make inferences about its habits and diet and even its intelligence.
So, in principle, we do not have to observe the animal to make a determination about its its mental abilities and we do not have to be involved in making the record of its behaviour – we only have to look at the results.
We have made such a determination in the case of the fly and your in-principle claims that we had to be there, had to watch it, had to take part in creating the record, are all null.
Now of course, you'll return to your 'independent prior knowledge' defence (one even Allen MacNeill has admitted is no defence).
Yes, we have to compare the record to something but that something doesn't have to be another of the same creature or entity. In the case of the fly we compared the record to that generated ostensibly at random by a computer and analysed it mathematically. This can be done whatever the source of the record and whether or not we have any involvement in its making.
So, in ID, we cannot observe the behaviors of the Designer, we can only view the results of the behaviors – the physical artifacts (the designs) that these behaviors caused.
…
And…
Now consider the situation in the fruitfly experiment. There are no physical artifacts involved; the fruitfly does not design anything and bring it into existence. There are only behaviors. The scientists observe the behaviors of the fruitfly.
Now shown to be irrelevant.
In order to understand the mental capabilities of some unknown type of entity, it is not enough to simply see what it did (its artifacts). We would have to watch how it did it. That's how it always works; there's no other way.
This assertion is refuted by the argument above. We do not need to learn everything about its mental capabilities, but we can learn something about them.
For example, for all we know, no matter how complex some design is, the cause of the design might be capable of only creating a design like that, and be unable to do anything else.
This new demarcation will not save your project, either. If it is only capable of creating that single purposeful arrangement of parts it is still capable creating that purposeful arrangement of parts. That is something we can learn about its mind.
Hopefully we've cleared that up now. Whew.
We just might have. Thanks for your effort. I hope you've seen the light.
Obviously not – these disciplines have a huge amount of independent knowledge about what it means to be a human being. That is how they identify the activity of human beings. This doesn't work for "agents" in general, because they have no knowledge of "agents" in general.
Same hole, same shovel. We don't infer the design of the Antikythera mechanism because we know humans can do such a thing but because of the thing itself. The knowledge of humans is incidental. Unfortunately, we will always have the background knowledge of what humans are and can do so you can wave this card all day. It's just not a very stimulating position and its not actually relevant.
I did! That is the case in ID, where all that is said about the Designer is that it is "intelligent".
What is said of the designer is also that it is capable of purposefully arranging parts using foresight and planning. ID doesn't say its an unknown type of entity at all; It is an entity capable of these types of things reflective of the action of a mind. It is unidentified in the case of ID, but not entirely unknown or unknowable. But you claim we'd be identifying the entity to the rigorous satisfaction of your project if we'd at least say "it is a life-form" or "it has human-like intelligence". I'd like to say it has "human-like intelligence" in that both we and the designer seem to share foresight, intent and the ability to arrange parts, but then it turns out that by "human-like intelligence" you've actually laid a trap and really mean "human … period". That kind of conclusion is unwarranted from the inference and our experience with humans.
Read it again, this time taking the authors' caveats seriously. If you want to go this route, I can always claim that the experiments of Libet, Wegner, et al prove we have no free will. But let's both admit the issue lacks empirical resolution, shall we?
I took his caveats seriously. Perhaps you should read it again and take his claims seriously. He says that his work has put us on the path to possibly investigating free will and he suggests that the question is not out of reach. He indicates that on the continuum which places his flies at "spontaneity" humans would far exceed this.
Also, what do you think he has tentatively shown here and which he calls "spontaneity" The fly's actions are neither wholly determined by the environment, are not generated by brain-processing errors and are not random. What does this mean?
Does this case show that we can empirically prove free will exists? No. But it doesn't mean that one is unjustified in making the inference based upon scientific rigour, either.
Libet, you say?
Libet thus produced the first experimental support for the version of free will that Richard Gregory famously called "free won't".
…
Yet Libet does not interpret his work as proving free will a convenient fiction.
…
Although his results have been widely and vigorously debated, one interpretation with significant experimental support is this: there exists conscious cerebral activity whose role may be " blocking or vetoing the volitional process so that no actual motor action occurs," as Libet wrote in 1998. "Veto of an urge to act is a common experience for individuals generally." It … reaffirms Sherrington's insight that "to refrain from an act is no less an act than to commit one": thus, "free won't".
Get your ad hominems ready for the citation…Jeffrey M. Schwartz, The Mind And The Brain, page 305.
But rather than trail so far away from your propositions and your claims about definitions let me just say that you are unjustified to clam that we cannot properly infer from scientific study whether something has or has not free will. That the matter is not settled to the consensus pleasure of the establishment does not make one position more correct or more scientific than the other.
And in addition, since you freely admit to the intelligence, foresight and designing capabilities of humans free will is just a red herring anyway.
Nice to see we have some movement this morning. So we do not have to observe the designer, the fly or the polar bear with our bare eyeballs in order to understand what the agent is capable of or to make inferences about its mental capabilities. Check.
Right! Not with our bare eyeballs. Video, GPS tracking, and other instrumentation are just fine when observing behaviors.
Now you admit that we can look at the tracks left by the fly or the bear as recorded and we can garner our conclusions from these. Check.
Well, as long as the instrumentation supports the conclusions, yes. Let's take an example so we're clear on this.
Let's say I have a hypothesis that a polar bear is athletic. In order to determine if I'm correct, I collect some GPS data, and see that at one point the bear is in location A, and then at some other time it is in location B. I see that location A is 100 miles from location B. These are my observational data – can I support my hypothesis?
Well, no. In order to test whether the bear is athletic, I need to make sure the bear can move quickly between point A and point B. It is not enough simply to know that it was in both locations. I need to observe how the bear moved between them (was the bear on a truck, or did it move itself by walking or running?) and I also need to observe how much time passed (if it took fifty years for the bear to traverse the distance, then it wouldn't have been an athletic bear).
With the polar bear we can record his actions…So, in principle, we do not have to observe the animal to make a determination about its its mental abilities and we do not have to be involved in making the record of its behaviour – we only have to look at the results.
First, you keep forgetting something: In each case, at some point in the process, somebody or some instrument has actually been in the presence of the bear, recording something about what the bear is doing. Without these observations of the bear per se, we would have no idea about a "bear" was!
Moreover, even though in this example somebody has actually made observations of an actual bear, you fail to see that one must make observations which support a particular hypothesis. Remember, my example showed that two GPS locations, without any information about time or method of transportation/motion, cannot be used to evaluate the proposition "bears are athletic". In exactly the same way, finding some complex biological machinery does not allow us to evaluate the proposition "the cause of biology is intelligent". In both cases, we must observe the behaviors involved. The only way to evaluate statements about behavioral capacity (e.g. athleticsm, intelligence) is to observe behaviors – there is no other way.
Now of course, you'll return to your 'independent prior knowledge' defence (one even Allen MacNeill has admitted is no defence).
I could summon my own authorities, but I'd rather actually argue the issues. But no, the issue here has nothing to do with "independent prior knowledge", as I have pointed out repeatedly, since in the case of the fruitfly and the bear there is no need for independent knowledge. Why? Because we can actually make observations of the animal's behavior.
Yes, we have to compare the record to something but that something doesn't have to be another of the same creature or entity. In the case of the fly we compared the record to that generated ostensibly at random by a computer and analysed it mathematically.
That is because the scientist carefully operationalized the definition of what they were looking for – spontaneity, defined as non-random changes in behavior that is not triggered by environmental cues. As they said,
"This signature indicates that there is a function in the fly brain which evolved to generate spontaneous variations in the behavior" Sugihara said.
(By the way, can you look at their data and answer the question "Is the fruitfly athletic" I would like to know the answer.)
AIGUY: So, in ID, we cannot observe the behaviors of the Designer, we can only view the results of the behaviors – the physical artifacts (the designs) that these behaviors caused.
"¦ And"¦
Now consider the situation in the fruitfly experiment. There are no physical artifacts involved; the fruitfly does not design anything and bring it into existence. There are only behaviors. The scientists observe the behaviors of the fruitfly.
PEZ: Now shown to be irrelevant.
On the contrary, hopefully you now see why it is essential.
AIGUY: In order to understand the mental capabilities of some unknown type of entity, it is not enough to simply see what it did (its artifacts). We would have to watch how it did it. That's how it always works; there's no other way.
PEZ: This assertion is refuted by the argument above. We do not need to learn everything about its mental capabilities, but we can learn something about them.
I agree that being able to learn something – even if it isn't everything – about the mental capabilities of an entirely unknown type of entity (one that is so different from anything in our experience that it may even exist outside of time and space!!!) would be a very good trick. Unfortunately, we can learn nothing at all about the behavioral capacity of something without being able to observe behaviors.
AIGUY: For example, for all we know, no matter how complex some design is, the cause of the design might be capable of only creating a design like that, and be unable to do anything else.
PEZ: This new demarcation will not save your project, either. If it is only capable of creating that single purposeful arrangement of parts it is still capable creating that purposeful arrangement of parts. That is something we can learn about its mind.
This is like saying even if the bear took 1,000 years to go from location A to location B, and the bear didn't even walk – it happened to be dead and its body was actually carried along by a glacier – we can still conclude the bear was athletic because point A was so far away from point B. Simply by seeing the end result (the ending location), it is impossible to judge anything about the behavioral capacity of the bear. In order to see if the bear was athletic, we would have to test the actual behaviors of the bear.
In just the same way, simply observing biological forms can tell us nothing at all about the intelligence of the cause of these forms. Perhaps the cause was unable to understand anything – it could not conceive of purpose, and had no foresight. Perhaps it was a blind, purposeless, unconscious, natural, physical process that is not intelligent at all.
We don't infer the design of the Antikythera mechanism because we know humans can do such a thing but because of the thing itself.
Nope, it is because humans build machines that look like that.
Unfortunately, we will always have the background knowledge of what humans are and can do so you can wave this card all day. It's just not a very stimulating position and its not actually relevant.
It is precisely the reason we can detect human activity, so it is perfectly relevant. And it's not just humans!
If I see a net crafted from rope and strung up to catch prey, I do not infer an "intelligent agent" in the abstract. Depending on what the net looks like, I would infer a human being trying to snare a lion or a spider trying to catch a fly. I can't tell you if a spider is intelligent or not (I would say not really, but perhaps you'd disagree). But because I know about what spiders do and what humans do, I can guess about which one is responsible.
What is said of the designer is also that it is capable of purposefully arranging parts using foresight and planning. ID doesn't say its an unknown type of entity at all; It is an entity capable of these types of things reflective of the action of a mind.
Of course it is a completely unknown form of entity! Is it an animal, vegetable, or mineral? Is it even a physical thing? Does it exist in space-time? ID specifies nothing about this entity at all, which is what I mean by "unspecified" and "unknown".
It is unidentified in the case of ID, but not entirely unknown or unknowable.
You won't tell me what you are talking about, or how to observe it, and you cannot characterize it in a way that allows me to empirically decide if it exists or not. Thus, it is to me unknown and unknowable (I'm talking about empirically-based knowledge of course).
But you claim we'd be identifying the entity to the rigorous satisfaction of your project if we'd at least say "it is a life-form" or "it has human-like intelligence". I'd like to say it has "human-like intelligence" in that both we and the designer seem to share foresight, intent and the ability to arrange parts, but then it turns out that by "human-like intelligence" you've actually laid a trap and really mean "human "¦ period". That kind of conclusion is unwarranted from the inference and our experience with humans.
We know what human intelligence is, so if you are talking about human intelligence that is a meaningful concept. It is very different from spider intelligence, or thermostat intelligence, or chess-playing computer intelligence. If you want to claim that the Designer has human-like intelligence, then I will take your claim seriously, and ask you to evidence your claim (showing, for example, that the Designer's mental processes are in fact similar to human beings).
Of course you have no way of supporting that claim, however, so instead you try to relax your claim and say it isn't really human-like intelligence, it's just, you know, intelligence in the abstract. Unfortunately, nobody in ID has any idea what it means to decide if something is intelligent in the abstract (except of course "having the ability to design living things!"), so this doesn't mean anything at all.
He says that his work has put us on the path to possibly investigating free will and he suggests that the question is not out of reach.
The authors are careful to distance their carefully operationalized definitions of spontaneity from the philosophical issue of free will. The reason they do this is because they are scientists. In contrast, ID proponents attempt to equivocate on all of these mentalistic words – intelligence, will, choice, purpose, intent, and so on – and deny that operationalized definitions are required for any of them in order to investigate them.
Also, what do you think he has tentatively shown here and which he calls "spontaneity" The fly's actions are neither wholly determined by the environment, are not generated by brain-processing errors and are not random. What does this mean?
I think the researchers are clearly on the right track:
"This signature indicates that there is a function in the fly brain which evolved to generate spontaneous variations in the behavior" Sugihara said.
Libet thus produced the first experimental support for the version of free will that Richard Gregory famously called "free won't".
I asked you not to go down this path. Libet wanted to support the notion of free will, but his experiments showed it did not exist as he had hoped to show. Many people interpreted his results to mean that free will was illusory (or, more properly, it is a perceptual inference rather than a causal force). Libet and others modified the notion of free will to try and make it compatible with the experimental results, including the idea that maybe we are still free to veto our actions. Further experiments (including a dramatic recent publication in Nature) have reinforced the idea of conscious will as non-causal, at least in many sorts of decision-making situations.
Now, either you want to argue that the matter has been empirically supported or you will take my advice and agree that there is no empirical resolution available to us (and no experiment that anyone has ever thought of that would resolve the issue once and for all).
Get your ad hominems ready for the citation"¦Jeffrey M. Schwartz, The Mind And The Brain, page 305.
Oh, goody! Here you go: Dr. Schwartz makes some of the most idiotic claims about the mind-body problem I've ever read. Here's my favorite: His highly effective treatments for OCD entail his verbal training of patients. He takes before-and-after brain scans, and shows that actual physical changes in the brain occur as a result of his verbal admonitions to patients about ignoring OCD urges. He points to these physical changes and claims they are evidence of "mind over matter", where an immaterial mind has been experimentally shown to change the physical brain.
When you stop laughing, you can mention to Dr. Schwartz that the physical change in the brain that occurs after the physical events of his treatments and accompanying the behavioral changes he observes is exactly what a materialist theory of mind would predict. If there were no physical changes accompanying the behavioral changes, he would have his evidence for dualism.
But rather than trail so far away from your propositions and your claims about definitions let me just say that you are unjustified to clam that we cannot properly infer from scientific study whether something has or has not free will. That the matter is not settled to the consensus pleasure of the establishment does not make one position more correct or more scientific than the other.
Not only can't anyone design any experiment that would resolve the issue, but the experiments that have been designed to be even suggestive about the issue have not been good news for libertarian free will proponents, who have had to introduce epicycles like "free won't" in order to salvage their ideas.
Moreover, all of these experiments are performed on subjects that are available for empirical study. Even if we could ever demonstrate "free will" in humans (and apparently we cannot) this would have no bearing the question of whether it was involved in the creation of life.
And in addition, since you freely admit to the intelligence, foresight and designing capabilities of humans free will is just a red herring anyway.
In general I'd say so, but you'll need to be more specific about those abilities for serious study. I'm not sure that humans are athletic either – i.e. if they have agility, dexterity, endurance, and acrobatic capabilities. Do you think so? Do you think the Designer of Life was athletic?
Pez –
I'd like to compliment you on your debating. I know we disagree very strongly about all sorts of things, but you are staying on the issues and making your arguments in good faith. Thanks.
-aiguy
Hi Aiguy,
Thanks for the compliment. It's rare that somebody will accuse another of arguing in good faith. I've enjoyed this discussion quite a bit. I'm not sure we're getting far enough to justify many more exchanges, but time will tell.
I return the compliment on your participation in this discussion … with the following exceptions.
1) The first half of of your comment is entirely built upon your assertions and ignoring the refutations I have already provided. (On a second read after starting this I have responded to some individual points again, but I don't think I'll include many here.)
You return to the claim that we don't need independent prior knowledge of the entity if and only if we have actually observed the entity's behaviour. Untrue. I already delivered you the case of the polar bear footprints as well as purportedly dinosaur footprints. We can examine these with no knowledge of the entity or any observation of its behaviour and make scientific conclusions about the behaviours. We could analyse the tracks in much the same way we did the fly's flight pattern and make determinations about it.
2) This failure to support your assertions follows over into the next portion of your comment where you assert we know nothing about the designer because we can't observe his behaviours. That position is unsupported by any compelling argument and defeated by the arguments about analysing tracks and patterns after-the-fact.
3) I'm sorry but your athleticism analogy doesn't interest me any more than it interested Bradford. This is not because we are afraid of its very severe implications but because it is not analogous the way you are using it and we are just fine discussing the actual topic at hand.
Nice to see we have some movement this morning. So we do not have to observe the designer, the fly or the polar bear with our bare eyeballs in order to understand what the agent is capable of or to make inferences about its mental capabilities. Check.
Right! Not with our bare eyeballs. Video, GPS tracking, and other instrumentation are just fine when observing behaviors.
And records are just fine in their absence. They are even preferable when it comes down to actual analysis. Now you admit that we can look at the tracks left by the fly or the bear as recorded and we can garner our conclusions from these. Check.
…Let's say I have a hypothesis that a polar bear is athletic. …
Well, no. In order to test whether the bear is athletic, I need to make sure the bear can move quickly between point A and point B.
On second thought, let's tackle this athleticism idea with which you are so enamoured and slay it forever so that it need not get you banned from any more threads. For its purported analogue, "intelligence", you've provided me the definition, "that which makes design possible, or that which designs, or the ability to design" etc.
So I don't actually have to (and have not in these discussions) refer to "intelligence". Instead I point out where design is inferred.
Please share the equivalent for "athleticism".
With the polar bear we can record his actions"¦So, in principle, we do not have to observe the animal to make a determination about its its mental abilities and we do not have to be involved in making the record of its behaviour – we only have to look at the results.
First, you keep forgetting something: In each case, at some point in the process, somebody or some instrument has actually been in the presence of the bear, recording something about what the bear is doing. Without these observations of the bear per se, we would have no idea about a "bear" was!
No, I don't forget this. What you've forgotten is I've already covered the fact that we don't need somebody or some instrument recording what the bear is doing. We can find out what he did by observing the records he makes himself. We don't even have to know what a bear is to look at the record and make our inferences.
In exactly the same way, finding some complex biological machinery does not allow us to evaluate the proposition "the cause of biology is intelligent".
This is not exactly the same way as you've established no correlation. And, again, I've not said "the cause is intelligent" I've said "this is designed".
In both cases, we must observe the behaviors involved. The only way to evaluate statements about behavioral capacity (e.g. athleticsm, intelligence) is to observe behaviors – there is no other way.
We are getting very near the end of this exchange as these assertions are not changing, are unsupported, and have no grounding in argument. It seems we will have to just disagree on some things.
Why? Because we can actually make observations of the animal's behavior.
That is not "why". The reason is that we can actually analyse the results of that behaviour whether it is observed or not. In the case of the fly the analysis shows that the prior knowledge was incomplete and that observing the behaviour was inadequate.
Yes, we have to compare the record to something but that something doesn't have to be another of the same creature or entity. In the case of the fly we compared the record to that generated ostensibly at random by a computer and analysed it mathematically.
That is because the scientist carefully operationalized the definition of what they were looking for – spontaneity, defined as non-random changes in behavior that is not triggered by environmental cues.
Good. No comparison to another similar creature or entity is needed. Therefore, this entity could be the only one of its kind. Therefore, analysing the data, with a well-defined target, is sufficient to draw conclusions about mental capabilities.
(By the way, can you look at their data and answer the question "Is the fruitfly athletic" I would like to know the answer.)
Define this subjective attribute, please, and together we will slay your dragon.
AIGUY: So, in ID, we cannot observe the behaviors of the Designer, we can only view the results of the behaviors – the physical artifacts (the designs) that these behaviors caused."¨"¦ And"¦"¨Now consider the situation in the fruitfly experiment. There are no physical artifacts involved; the fruitfly does not design anything and bring it into existence. There are only behaviors. The scientists observe the behaviors of the fruitfly."¨PEZ: Now shown to be irrelevant.
Aiguy:On the contrary, hopefully you now see why it is essential.
Nope. You've given me nothing by which to alter my opinion.
Unfortunately, we can learn nothing at all about the behavioral capacity of something without being able to observe behaviors.
Same assertion, still wrong.
AIGUY: For example, for all we know, no matter how complex some design is, the cause of the design might be capable of only creating a design like that, and be unable to do anything else."¨
PEZ: This new demarcation will not save your project, either. If it is only capable of creating that single purposeful arrangement of parts it is still capable creating that purposeful arrangement of parts. That is something we can learn about its mind.
Aiguy: This is like saying even if the bear took 1,000 years to go from location A to location B, and the bear didn't even walk – it happened to be dead and its body was actually carried along by a glacier – we can still conclude the bear was athletic because point A was so far away from point B.
It's nothing like saying that.
In just the same way,
You've demonstrated no analogy yet. The mere fact that the two words can be used as nouns describing an attribute does not make them analogous.
simply observing biological forms can tell us nothing at all about the intelligence of the cause of these forms.
Same assertion.
Perhaps the cause was unable to understand anything – it could not conceive of purpose, and had no foresight. Perhaps it was a blind, purposeless, unconscious, natural, physical process that is not intelligent at all.
Then it wasn't the cause of the design.
That's exactly what has been claimed in rebuttal to the design argument and that is exactly what the design argument shows is not the case. Blind, purposeless, unconscious, natural, physical processes not intelligent at all do not explain certain patterns in nature as well as design does.
We don't infer the design of the Antikythera mechanism because we know humans can do such a thing but because of the thing itself.
Nope, it is because humans build machines that look like that.
Nope. It's because a blind, purposeless, unconscious, natural, physical process that is not intelligent at all could not have and never has and has not been observed to have.
What is said of the designer is also that it is capable of purposefully arranging parts using foresight and planning. ID doesn't say its an unknown type of entity at all; It is an entity capable of these types of things reflective of the action of a mind.
Of course it is a completely unknown form of entity! Is it an animal, vegetable, or mineral? Is it even a physical thing? Does it exist in space-time? ID specifies nothing about this entity at all, which is what I mean by "unspecified" and "unknown".
That's because ID does not draw conclusions beyond the evidence. You do not learn everything there is to know about a thing by finding out if it is an animal or not, if it is physical or not, or where it is temporally located. You can't learn from those descriptors whether or not it is capable of planning and realizing a design utilizing foresight. You can draw such an inference by studying its artifacts, however.
It is unidentified in the case of ID, but not entirely unknown or unknowable.
You won't tell me what you are talking about, or how to observe it, and you cannot characterize it in a way that allows me to empirically decide if it exists or not.
You can have knowledge about it without observing it. You can have knowledge, for instance, about a serial killer without observing him. I know, we have experience with people ( "Who's on first.. I don't know's on third base!")…
But, again, that is not the deciding factor in our knowledge acquisition. It is not even necessary.
We know what human intelligence is, so if you are talking about human intelligence that is a meaningful concept.
By way of saying "it's human" Sorry, that's not in the cards. And it's not necessary.
If you want to claim that the Designer has human-like intelligence, then I will take your claim seriously, and ask you to evidence your claim (showing, for example, that the Designer's mental processes are in fact similar to human beings).
My evidence for the claim that the Designer was/is human? …there is none.
Of course you have no way of supporting that claim, however, so instead you try to relax your claim and say it isn't really human-like intelligence, it's just, you know, intelligence in the abstract.
No, it really is human-like in these aspects. You've just made up a definition whereby "human-like = human … period" and are now claiming this as a fact. This is not a fact.
Also, what do you think he has tentatively shown here and which he calls "spontaneity" The fly's actions are neither wholly determined by the environment, are not generated by brain-processing errors and are not random. What does this mean?
I think the researchers are clearly on the right track:
"This signature indicates that there is a function in the fly brain which evolved to generate spontaneous variations in the behavior" Sugihara said.
That doesn't answer the question. What do you think they've demonstrated?
"Libet thus produced the first experimental support for the version of free will that Richard Gregory famously called "free won't"."
I asked you not to go down this path.
And I failed to heed your warning.
Many people interpreted his results to mean that free will was illusory (or, more properly, it is a perceptual inference rather than a causal force).
Many people didn't. Libet didn't.
Libet and others modified the notion of free will to try and make it compatible with the experimental results, including the idea that maybe we are still free to veto our actions.
They didn't have to modify the notion. First and foremost, the idea barely touches free will and the demonstration is of a readiness potential, not a determinative activity. This is evidenced by studies which don't dramatically make the lunch-hour news shows or the New York Times.
Second, the idea that free will survives and has empirical experimental support was claimed by Libet in his veto-power idea. He didn't say "maybe".
And even if this were the only aspect to free will to survive (and it is not, even by Libet's standards) the notion of veto power is intrinsic to free will and goes back to Sherrington prior to Libet, and to William James over a hundred years ago ("consciousness…will, if endowed with causal efficacy, reinforce the favorable possibilities and repress the unfavorable or indifferent ones"). It is not a post hoc salve.
"At the end of the 19th century, William James recognized that the array of things we can attend to is determined passively by neural conditions but the amount of attention an aspect of consciousness receives after it has caught our mental eye is determined by active mental processes, by what he called 'spiritual force'." 369
And then there was that fellow Paul who said as much, sans the reference to neurology, over 1800 years earlier.
Further experiments (including a dramatic recent publication in Nature) have reinforced the idea of conscious will as non-causal, at least in many sorts of decision-making situations.
That interpretation is controversial and has added nothing new to the argument. I missed the drama in it, I'll admit.
Now, either you want to argue that the matter has been empirically supported or you will take my advice and agree that there is no empirical resolution available to us (and no experiment that anyone has ever thought of that would resolve the issue once and for all).
The matter is not resolved but free will has much empirical support. So the claim that one cannot state that this or that entity has free will is unwarranted. The claim that this can not be a part of a scientific conclusion is as well.
Get your ad hominems ready for the citation"¦Jeffrey M. Schwartz, The Mind And The Brain, page 305.
Oh, goody! Here you go:
Nice of you to oblige.
Dr. Schwartz makes some of the most idiotic claims about the mind-body problem I've ever read. Here's my favorite: His highly effective treatments for OCD entail his verbal training of patients. He takes before-and-after brain scans, and shows that actual physical changes in the brain occur as a result of his verbal admonitions to patients about ignoring OCD urges.
This might be idiotic if this is what he had done. But it's not. He didn't admonish people to ignore their urges and it wasn't the sound of his voice or the "physical treatment" that caused the mental changes or the actual physical changes to the brain.
He points to these physical changes and claims they are evidence of "mind over matter", where an immaterial mind has been experimentally shown to change the physical brain.
When you stop laughing, you can mention to Dr. Schwartz that the physical change in the brain that occurs after the physical events of his treatments and accompanying the behavioral changes he observes is exactly what a materialist theory of mind would predict.
Materialistic theory is always telling us what it would have predicted – except it didn't. Materialistic theorists told Schwartz that he could not cause the changes by introducing such concepts as volition and attention and materialist theory does not account well for them. On the other hand, Schwartz did predict his results and he was the first to experimentally verify them.
If there were no physical changes accompanying the behavioral changes, he would have his evidence for dualism.
He has plenty of evidence for his view that conscious intention and volition are responsible for the changes.
p.s.
None of your responses against Schwartz touches upon what he was reporting in the cite; the fact that Libet's own studies did not dissuade him of free will.
But rather than trail so far away from your propositions and your claims about definitions let me just say that you are unjustified to clam that we cannot properly infer from scientific study whether something has or has not free will. That the matter is not settled to the consensus pleasure of the establishment does not make one position more correct or more scientific than the other.
Not only can't anyone design any experiment that would resolve the issue, but the experiments that have been designed to be even suggestive about the issue have not been good news for libertarian free will proponents, who have had to introduce epicycles like "free won't" in order to salvage their ideas.
This is not an introduction nor an epicycle. This goes back as far as the idea. St. Paul told us that we had the choice between our good impulses and our bad ones and that the negative ones could be ignored and overridden.
I know the above has been needlessly off-topic, (and after your kind words, too) but I think clearing the air of these misconceptions justifies it.
And in addition, since you freely admit to the intelligence, foresight and designing capabilities of humans free will is just a red herring anyway.
In general I'd say so, but you'll need to be more specific about those abilities for serious study. I'm not sure that humans are athletic either – i.e. if they have agility, dexterity, endurance, and acrobatic capabilities. Do you think so? Do you think the Designer of Life was athletic?
We'll have to wait on your specifics about that ability.
Now you admit that we can look at the tracks left by the fly or the bear as recorded and we can garner our conclusions from these.
Again: You neglect the fact that the artifacts need to be relevant to the attribute you are investigating.
Footprints are records of where something with feet has been, and so if you were investigating where the subject walked, then you could evaluate your hypotheses against footprint data.
But if you were studying if the subject could do a crossword puzzle, the footprints wouldn't help you.
And if you were studying athleticism, you would need not only GPS readings, but also time information; else you couldn't determine if the subject was athletic.
And if you were studying foresight, you would need not only to see complex biological machinery. You would also need to see if the subject (the Designer) could solve novel problems – problems that it has not already encountered, or was born knowing. If the Designer could not learn, analyzing new problems and devising solutions, then It would not be intelligent. It would be a natural process that churned out life forms because that is what it does, just like gravity causes stars (presumably) without foresight.
And so, without being able to observe the Designer's behaviors, we can never know if It had foresight. We can't tell if an unspecified intelligent agent or an unspecified unintelligent process was responsible.
On second thought, let's tackle this athleticism idea with which you are so enamoured and slay it forever so that it need not get you banned from any more threads. For its purported analogue, "intelligence", you've provided me the definition, "that which makes design possible, or that which designs, or the ability to design" etc.
Yes, this definition renders ID a vacuous tautology (what causes the designs in nature? that which can).
So I don't actually have to (and have not in these discussions) refer to "intelligence". Instead I point out where design is inferred.
Please share the equivalent for "athleticism".
Athleticism is that which enables efficient locomotion. Of course it does other things as well, just as intelligence does other things besides just enabling design, right?
No, I don't forget this. What you've forgotten is I've already covered the fact that we don't need somebody or some instrument recording what the bear is doing. We can find out what he did by observing the records he makes himself. We don't even have to know what a bear is to look at the record and make our inferences.
One more time, then: Depending on the record you have, you can tell some things but not others.
If you are merely attempting to say that anything with behaviors that, in the end, result in complex biology machinery must be intelligent by definition, then again your theory is devoid of content.
So you are attempting to answer the question "Did the cause of living things exhibit intelligent behaviors?" and "Did It design living things intentionally, with a purpose in mind?" These sorts of questions are fraught with difficulty even for animals, where we have complete access to our subjects. But in the context of ID, where we cannot access the subject, there is no possible way to begin to answer them.
And, again, I've not said "the cause is intelligent" I've said "this is designed".
So the cause is not capable of foresight and purpose? Or foresight and purpose do not comprise intelligence? I'm trying to get this straight, really, but I've come across a lot of different takes on this.
AIGUY:That is because the scientist carefully operationalized the definition of what they were looking for – spontaneity, defined as non-random changes in behavior that is not triggered by environmental cues.
PEZ: Good. No comparison to another similar creature or entity is needed. Therefore, this entity could be the only one of its kind. Therefore, analysing the data, with a well-defined target, is sufficient to draw conclusions about mental capabilities.
And how do you see this applying in the context of ID? You can operationally define "intelligence" as "the ability to design living things", and you have a perfectly empty theory. And you have no other operational definitions that you could ever hope to confirm. Please, I would very much love to hear a truly operational definition of intelligence in the context of ID.
Define this subjective attribute, please, and together we will slay your dragon.
Athleticism is the ability to move with efficiency, agility, power, and speed. The exact operational definition will vary depending on the context. Just like "intelligence".
AIGUY: Perhaps the cause was unable to understand anything – it could not conceive of purpose, and had no foresight. Perhaps it was a blind, purposeless, unconscious, natural, physical process that is not intelligent at all.
PEZ: Then it wasn't the cause of the design.
You seem to have just assumed your conclusion. (I suspect it is yet again a confusion over analytic vs. synthetic propositions). I say that biological forms may be due to unspecified unintelligent causes rather than unspecified intelligent causes. You say if the cause was unintelligent, then the cause was… not the cause. Did you mean you don't believe that any physical process could result in biological forms? Or did you mean if it wasn't intelligent then by definition it didn't cause biological forms, because biological forms are "designs" (I think it might have been clearer if you defined away the word "design" rather than the word "intelligent"…)
That's because ID does not draw conclusions beyond the evidence.
Therefore ID does not draw any conclusions.
You do not learn everything there is to know about a thing by finding out if it is an animal or not, if it is physical or not, or where it is temporally located. You can't learn from those descriptors whether or not it is capable of planning and realizing a design utilizing foresight.
On the contrary: If I tell you that something is capable of planning and realizing a design using foresight, you will have learned not one single thing that can ever be observed about this subject. If you disagree, please tell me one concrete thing you could ever observe even in principle, or tell me one single thing that it would or would not do in any situation that you can imagine. Here:
1) I tell you only that entity "X" is intelligent, capable of planning and realizing a design using foresight.
2) You tell me one single thing about "X" in any context that could be observed, even in principle
You can draw such an inference by studying its artifacts, however.
No, you can't, because you don't know if it planned or foresaw anything. It may have been following its physical structure deterministically.
You can have knowledge about it without observing it. You can have knowledge, for instance, about a serial killer without observing him. I know, we have experience with people ( "Who's on first.. I don't know's on third base!")"¦ But, again, that is not the deciding factor in our knowledge acquisition. It is not even necessary.
It is absolutely necessary, and (to me) quite obviously so. The concept of "serial killer" does not even make sense in a world without humans/animals, so how can it not be important that we are talking about human beings?
AIGUY: If you want to claim that the Designer has human-like intelligence, then I will take your claim seriously, and ask you to evidence your claim (showing, for example, that the Designer's mental processes are in fact similar to human beings).
PEZ: My evidence for the claim that the Designer was/is human? "¦there is none.
(emphasis added in my quote) I said "human-like" and "similar to"; why do you change this to "is human" I understand you are not suggesting a human being was responsible. But you are suggesting that something with mentality somehow like a human being was involved. You are obliged to actually spell out operational definitions of the way(s) this thing's mentality was like ours, and then we can go about seeing if your claim is true.
That doesn't answer the question. What do you think they've demonstrated?
They've demonstrated that flies exhibit spontaneous changes in flight behavior without external cues.
They didn't have to modify the notion.
They? Libet did. He really did want the data the other way around.
First and foremost, the idea barely touches free will and the demonstration is of a readiness potential, not a determinative activity. This is evidenced by studies which don't dramatically make the lunch-hour news shows or the New York Times.
You may have missed Soon et al recently in Nature…. but it doesn't matter…
Second, the idea that free will survives and has empirical experimental support was claimed by Libet in his veto-power idea. He didn't say "maybe".
No, I think you're wrong, and even so other people disagreed with him… but it doesn't matter…
And even if this were the only aspect to free will to survive (and it is not, even by Libet's standards) the notion of veto power is intrinsic to free will and goes back to Sherrington prior to Libet, and to William James over a hundred years ago ("consciousness"¦will, if endowed with causal efficacy, reinforce the favorable possibilities and repress the unfavorable or indifferent ones"). It is not a post hoc salve.
Yes every possible idea about volition has been advanced over the past millenia. I'm not trying to claim empirical support against causal will, even though the majority of cognitive scientists interpret Libet, Wegner, Soon, etc this way. So I think we ought to agree that at this point the question is simply open.
The matter is not resolved but free will has much empirical support.
I agree with most neuroscientists who believe that it has none whatsoever, yet I am still willing to consider the matter open.
So the claim that one cannot state that this or that entity has free will is unwarranted. The claim that this can not be a part of a scientific conclusion is as well.
You are mistaken here, since there is no way to test if such a conclusion is true. Therefore, the conclusion cannot be considered scientific.
This might be idiotic if this is what he had done. But it's not. He didn't admonish people to ignore their urges and it wasn't the sound of his voice or the "physical treatment" that caused the mental changes or the actual physical changes to the brain.
I think you'll find the opposite is true: He did indeed speak to his patients, and instruct them in mindful awareness techniques to help them with their urges. Do you not believe these verbal instructions took place? Do you not believe these verbal instructions were encoded in a physical (acoustic) medium, rather than, say, telepathically transmitted? In that case, yes of course his speaking to his patients had these effects, in a manner perfectly consistent with physicalism:
Do you think that if I entered voice commands into my computer, the physical structure of the computer could not change as a result?
Do you think this means my computer has an immaterial mind?
Materialistic theory is always telling us what it would have predicted – except it didn't. Materialistic theorists told Schwartz that he could not cause the changes by introducing such concepts as volition and attention and materialist theory does not account well for them.
Sorry, I have no idea what you are talking about. A materialist is bound to believe that every mental change entails a physical change, and so obviously (and trivially) materialism predicts *some* change for every behavioral change. I am not offering his OCD treatments as some sort of evidence for materialism; my point was that it provides not one iota of support for dualism.
On the other hand, Schwartz did predict his results and he was the first to experimentally verify them.
His therapy and his predictions are 100% consistent with materialist theories of mind, notwithstanding the anonymous and confused materialists who expected brains could register information without physical change.
If the Designer could not learn, analyzing new problems and devising solutions, then It would not be intelligent. It would be a natural process that churned out life forms because that is what it does, just like gravity causes stars (presumably) without foresight.
1) You've introduced a new definition of intelligence.
2) The natural process churning out life forms is a lawful necessity in your scenario and this is what the investigation rules out.
And if you were studying foresight, you would need not only to see complex biological machinery.
Not if foresight is part of the hypothesis.
Yes, this definition renders ID a vacuous tautology (what causes the designs in nature? that which can).
If you thought it taulological you were dealing in bad faith by offering this as a definition. But, as I've said, the name, ID, does not define the project.
Athleticism is that which enables efficient locomotion. Of course it does other things as well, just as intelligence does other things besides just enabling design, right?
OK. How do you determine efficient locomotion?
Athleticism is the ability to move with efficiency, agility, power, and speed. The exact operational definition will vary depending on the context. Just like "intelligence".
You've added to the definition. Does agility, power and speed define "efficient" as it pertains to locomotion?
Depending on the record you have, you can tell some things but not others.
That is correct.
If you are merely attempting to say that anything with behaviors that, in the end, result in complex biology machinery must be intelligent by definition, then again your theory is devoid of content.
This is another ID strawman. The claim isn't "this is complex so it is designed". The claim is that we can measure the type of complexity and assess whether or not, being contingent, it was created by natural law, random chance, a combination of the two, or purposeful arrangement. Lots of complexity does not apparently require purpose.
These sorts of questions are fraught with difficulty even for animals, where we have complete access to our subjects. But in the context of ID, where we cannot access the subject, there is no possible way to begin to answer them.
Yes, there are difficulties. No, you can not rule on the possibility merely because you feel like it any more than you can on the basis of the definitions involved or the supposed tautology in the name.
So the cause is not capable of foresight and purpose? Or foresight and purpose do not comprise intelligence? I'm trying to get this straight, really, but I've come across a lot of different takes on this.
You made and admitted that the term "intelligence" is moot long ago.
And how do you see this applying in the context of ID? You can operationally define "intelligence" as "the ability to design living things", and you have a perfectly empty theory. And you have no other operational definitions that you could ever hope to confirm. Please, I would very much love to hear a truly operational definition of intelligence in the context of ID.
I showed Zach how purpose can be tested for operationally quite some time ago.
Did you not agree with it?
PEZ: Good. No comparison to another similar creature or entity is needed. Therefore, this entity could be the only one of its kind. Therefore, analysing the data, with a well-defined target, is sufficient to draw conclusions about mental capabilities.
And how do you see this applying in the context of ID?
I see it applying to ID in that it has eliminated another of your complaints. We now know we can infer design even if we have no candidate agent and no agent identical to it from which to draw prior independent knowledge.
Given a proper record, granted, and a sufficient methodology.
Did you mean you don't believe that any physical process could result in biological forms? Or did you mean if it wasn't intelligent then by definition it didn't cause biological forms, because biological forms are "designs" (I think it might have been clearer if you defined away the word "design" rather than the word "intelligent""¦)
1) You defined intelligent.
2) I mean that if the design is design then it demonstrates purposeful arrangement of parts and mindless, purposeless, natural, law-like, blind, random, physical, etc. causes don't do this.
Therefore ID does not draw any conclusions.
Ouch. A zinger.
So you don't believe there is any evidence for ID. That's the argument in a nutshell. You've used definitions, demarcations, claims of vacuity, claims of testability, prior independent knowledge, and now "no evidence". The playbook is almost complete.
1) I tell you only that entity "X" is intelligent, capable of planning and realizing a design using foresight.
2) You tell me one single thing about "X" in any context that could be observed, even in principle
X is not completely controlled by a combination of deterministic and random forces. If I measured outputs of the activities of X they would demonstrate this.
No, you can't, because you don't know if it planned or foresaw anything. It may have been following its physical structure deterministically.
If we can rule out chance and necessity this is not the case.
It is absolutely necessary, and (to me) quite obviously so. The concept of "serial killer" does not even make sense in a world without humans/animals, so how can it not be important that we are talking about human beings?
This seems odd coming from an AI guy. Does serial killer not make sense in a world of intelligent and responsible robots? Can you not tell if the activity required the actions of such a robot as opposed to that of a summer breeze? Can you not find something new about the robot by looking at what it has done … "it's killing them … on purpose!"
No, I have not slipped by referring the design back to robots, of whom we would have, in this scenario, prior knowledge. I am appealing to a particular case to defeat another of your claims – this one about serial killers and humans.
Your objections are becoming so fine-tuned that it is apparent that there is only one in-principle common denominator – "ID is wrong .. for some reason".
(emphasis added in my quote) I said "human-like" and "similar to"; why do you change this to "is human" I understand you are not suggesting a human being was responsib
Because you already defined "human-like" for me. You told me that it necessarily arises from a human brain. How can I say that about the cause of a design by merely looking at the design?
You are obliged to actually spell out operational definitions of the way(s) this thing's mentality was like ours, and then we can go about seeing if your claim is true.
It arranges parts purposefully.
They've demonstrated that flies exhibit spontaneous changes in flight behavior without external cues.
But define "spontaneous" please. How does "spontaneous" relate to free will and why is it so necessarily implicated that Brembs felt obliged to comment upon it and then, in your opinion, distance himself from the conclusion?
. So I think we ought to agree that at this point the question is simply open.
The question of empirically proving/disproving free will? Yes, I agree that is open.
You are mistaken here, since there is no way to test if such a conclusion is true. Therefore, the conclusion cannot be considered scientific.
Not so. If most neurologists, Nature, and New York Times can say that free will is scientifically disproven (even if you don't agree that it has … quite yet) then the assertion of free will is just as scientific. The tests they think weigh on the one side fail and others feel , in fact, weigh on the other. You can't tell me that it is unscientific to say X has free will if it is scientific to say X does not.
I think you'll find the opposite is true: He did indeed speak to his patients, and instruct them in mindful awareness techniques to help them with their urges. Do you not believe these verbal instructions took place?
Yes, the verbal instructions took place.
Do you not believe these verbal instructions were encoded in a physical (acoustic) medium, rather than, say, telepathically transmitted? In that case, yes of course his speaking to his patients had these effects, in a manner perfectly consistent with physicalism:
Your non sequitur has masked an enormous leap of logic. Yes, there is a physical imputation of soundwaves into the brain. These have a physical effect. 1) They receive countless soundwaves a day which have no such effect, so it is not the physicaity of the soundwaves that elicited an effect, but the information (non-material) content of those sound waves.
2) The physical effect caused by receiving those waves, nor the physical effect caused by the information received in those waves, caused the brain changes studied later. Those changes were the result of volitional focused attention.
3) The difference between receiving soundwaves and attention has been demonstrated experimentally.
Do you think that if I entered voice commands into my computer, the physical structure of the computer could not change as a result?
Do you think this means my computer has an immaterial mind?
That's not analogous to Schwartz' cases.
His therapy and his predictions are 100% consistent with materialist theories of mind, notwithstanding the anonymous and confused materialists who expected brains could register information without physical change.
No they are not. Materialist theories of the mind do not/did not allow (until shown otherwise) that intention of the mind can be the cause of physical changes of the brain. Materialist theories of the mind told Schwartz that the changes could not be initiated internally.
Pez: I showed Zach how purpose can be tested for operationally quite some time ago.
No, you didn't. You merely introduced other terms that require operational definitions of their own rounded by an argument from ignorance. Any time you have something 'complex' and no ready explanation, then your argument leads to a conclusion of "purpose".
Pez: Operationally we can test for purpose in a system by examining to see: if all of the parts of that system contribute to the whole and to its function; if each is necessary in order for that system to function; if removal of any of the parts causes the system to lose function; if there is a statistically-determined unlikelihood of the parts coming together by chance; if the arrangement of the parts is not demanded by any law describing the regularity of motion and interaction of matter.
More fundamentally, nothing in your operational test is entailed in the hypothesis. So even if you identify something that meets the requirements there is no logical necessity for it to be connected to the assumption.
AIGUY: If the Designer could not learn, analyzing new problems and devising solutions, then It would not be intelligent. It would be a natural process that churned out life forms because that is what it does, just like gravity causes stars (presumably) without foresight.
PEZ: 1) You've introduced a new definition of intelligence.
Charcterizing intelligence in terms of problem solving and learning is hardly new. If your technical definition of "intelligence" for ID ignores these critical features, you may want to adopt a new term for your conception in order to prevent any confusion people might have
In any event, aren't you using "capable of producing purposeful arrangements of parts using foresight" I'm saying that if something does one thing and one thing alone, no matter what the circumstance, by virtue of physical necessity, it does not use foresight. Do you disagree with this?
2) The natural process churning out life forms is a lawful necessity in your scenario and this is what the investigation rules out.
What investigation might you be referring to? How does any investigation rule out that the cause of life forms operates according to lawful necessity?
AIGUY: And if you were studying foresight, you would need not only to see complex biological machinery.
PEZ: Not if foresight is part of the hypothesis.
1) I see complex machinery and wish to know how it came to exist.
2) I have two hypotheses: an unspecified intelligent cause, and an unspecified unintelligent cause
3) In order to decide which hypothesis is true, I need to see if the cause exhibits any behaviors which illustrate foresight, i.e. certain types of problem-solving behaviors.
If you thought it tautological you were dealing in bad faith by offering this as a definition. But, as I've said, the name, ID, does not define the project.
Not bad faith at all – I have been clear from the very start that I believe ID is scientifically vacuous! My point is just that: If you define the "intelligence" of ID as "that which can create complex machinery like we find in biology", then obviously ID is completely vacuous. That is why we are arguing about how to gather evidence for foresight.
OK. How do you determine efficient locomotion?
Like I said, the operational definition is different for each context, just like intelligence. In human beings, one test for intelligence might be a score of 70 or more on a Standford-Binet IQ test. In human beings, one test for athleticism might be running a mile in under four minutes.
Athleticism is the ability to move with efficiency, agility, power, and speed. The exact operational definition will vary depending on the context. Just like "intelligence".
You've added to the definition.
Like I said, intelligence is more than the ability to design, and athleticism is more than the ability to move efficiently.
Does agility, power and speed define "efficient" as it pertains to locomotion?
Agility, power, and speed are requisite in order to enable something to move efficiently. Carl Lewis (olympic track star) was quite obviously athletic – do you disagree? His agility, power, and speed enabled him to move very efficiently. Albert Einstein was obviously intelligent, with the foresight and purpose to come up with brilliant theories.
(Perhaps this dragon of mine is a bit tougher to slay than you'd hoped. In fact, it is a reductio of your position that you will not be able to counter. Keep trying though – it's really fun.)
AIGUY: If you are merely attempting to say that anything with behaviors that, in the end, result in complex biology machinery must be intelligent by definition, then again your theory is devoid of content.
PEZ: This is another ID strawman. The claim isn't "this is complex so it is designed".
Yet again we miscommunicate by confusing analytic (definitional) and synthetic (factual) propositions! I was pointing out that ID must not simply define intelligent design as "that which can create complex designs", because in that case ID is clearly vacuous (it offers a "dormative principle" conceptualization of intelligence).
The claim is that we can measure the type of complexity and assess whether or not, being contingent, it was created by natural law, random chance, a combination of the two, or purposeful arrangement. Lots of complexity does not apparently require purpose.
Are you referring to the arguments promoted by Bill Dembski by any chance? That we can somehow all agree on what is "specified" and what is not? And that "specified complexity" has been proven to result only from "deliberate choosing" or directed contingency" or something? Is that what we're talking about now?
I think Bill Dembski's definitions of CSI are subjective, and his reasoning about "law plus chance" as opposed to "purposeful arrangement" (what Bill calls "intelligent cause") is utterly specious, since it simply assumes that intelligent cause is not itself the result of law plus chance, and fails to provide any independent characterization for how to identify intelligent cause.
So if this whole argument is going to reduce to an assessment of Dembski's notion of "specification" and CSI, that will be too bad indeed. Dembski never shows how we can ever empirically evaluate the proposition "only intelligent cause can generate CSI", because he never says how to determine if anything is intelligent except by seeing if it generates CSI!
AIGUY: These sorts of questions are fraught with difficulty even for animals, where we have complete access to our subjects. But in the context of ID, where we cannot access the subject, there is no possible way to begin to answer them.
PEZ: Yes, there are difficulties. NO, you can not rule on the possibility merely because you feel like it
This has nothing to do with how I feel. It is simply obvious that if we have no access to the data required to decide some question then we cannot answer the question. Even when we have access to a real, live organism in our lab, and we can gather all the data we can think of collecting, we still have can't agree on what things act with free will or conscious intent. It is therefore clear that when we can gather no data at all, we can't begin to answer these questions.
I showed Zach how purpose can be tested for operationally quite some time ago.
Did you not agree with it?
What you said to me was "It's the same test as that for not-purpose and not-will.", which is not helpful unless you say what the test for not-purpose is.
To test for gravity, we measure masses, distances and accelerations and compare them to the precise characterization of gravity provided by Newton's or Einstein's theories.
To test for purpose or will, we _______________________ (please fill in the blank).
I see it applying to ID in that it has eliminated another of your complaints.
That would require an operational definition of purpose which you are unable to provide. (Cybernetics provides an operational definition for purpose, but apparently ID folks don't like that one). So my complaint stands: While the fruitfly experiment provided a perfectly valid operational definition of "spontaneity", ID cannot (or will not) provide an operational definition of "intelligence" or "purpose" or "will" that can be applied in the context of ID.
1) You defined intelligent.
Again, if you accept my definition (that which creates complex form and function) then you and I have just agreed that ID is perfectly vacuous, because it attempts to explain the complex form and function in biology by that which can create complex form and function.
So, once and for all, please, I beseech you: Write down the definition that you believe ID Theory employs for the term "intelligent"! It is beyond reason that a definition which offers "intelligent cause" as its sole explanatory concept leaves the meaning of "intelligent" up to the reader to decide!
2) I mean that if the design is design then it demonstrates purposeful arrangement of parts
More confusion! You say things like "the cause is not the cause" and "if the design is design". When you say these things, you are obviously using these words in two different ways in the same sentence (because if you not, you are saying "If P and not-P…").
I cannot tell if your statement is supposed to be true by definition or if you think it is a true contingent fact about the world.
and mindless, purposeless, natural, law-like, blind, random, physical, etc. causes don't do this.
And is this supposed to be an empirical claim, or simply the definition of "design" If the former, you must say how to show the claim is true (you can't). If the latter, you are making tautological assertions.
So you don't believe there is any evidence for ID. That's the argument in a nutshell.
I still do not understand what ID is supposed to mean, because of all of this confusion regarding definitions. After all this time here in this thread, there is not one single post which summarizes the claims and definitions, and there is no single reference on the web that will do it either. Purpose, will, foresight, physical necessity, law plus chance, blind, natural… everybody has a different definition. ID hides behind a vast fortress of ambiguity and equivocation.
And you still haven't begun to tell me why offering "athleticism" is any more subjective or meaningless an explanation for some phenomenon than offering "intelligence".
You've used definitions, demarcations, claims of vacuity, claims of testability, prior independent knowledge, and now "no evidence". The playbook is almost complete.
This "playbook" is an enumeration of perfectly valid criticisms against ID, and you spin it like a liability for my position!
AIGUY:
1) I tell you only that entity "X" is intelligent, capable of planning and realizing a design using foresight.
2) You tell me one single thing about "X" in any context that could be observed, even in principle
X is not completely controlled by a combination of deterministic and random forces. If I measured outputs of the activities of X they would demonstrate this.
So you do indeed believe (as opposed to many others here on this forum) that in ID, intelligence must transcend physical cause. Fine, glad we got that clear.
Now, describe one single experiment that has ever been performed on anything that demonstrated any output was not the result of determinstic and random forces. Not even in the fruitfly experiment did anyone demonstrate that the behavior was not completely by deterministic and random forces! Of course there is no such experiment.
If we can rule out chance and necessity this is not the case.
You can't say how to rule out chance and necessity, so this is moot. Dembski tries to rule out chance and necessity in his "Explanatory Filter", but of course he doesn't – he simply rules out known explanations. So the result of his E-Filter is "we do not know" rather than "something intelligent did it".
AIGUY: It is absolutely necessary, and (to me) quite obviously so. The concept of "serial killer" does not even make sense in a world without humans/animals, so how can it not be important that we are talking about human beings?
PEZ: This seems odd coming from an AI guy. Does serial killer not make sense in a world of intelligent and responsible robots?
More terminological confusion: I don't consider robots "alive", so they can't be "killed".
Can you not tell if the activity required the actions of such a robot as opposed to that of a summer breeze?
You and other IDers keep saying things like "as opposed to a summer breeze" or "as opposed to the wind swining the axe" or "erosion and rain could not shape Mount Rushmore". This is the fallacy that I was just explaining: Just because you eliminate one paricular "unintelligent" theory (like a summer breeze) does not mean you have eliminated a whole class of explanations! Nobody thinks that rain carves statues or that wind swings axes or that "chance" creates life forms. These are all perfectly stupid theories.
Your objections are becoming so fine-tuned that it is apparent that there is only one in-principle common denominator – "ID is wrong .. for some reason".
Let me refresh your memory:
1) ID fails to provide a set of consistent interpretations for its theoretical concepts of "intelligence" and "design"
2) ID fails to provide operationalized definition of the terms it uses like "purpose", "will", "intent" and so on, and so ID's propositions can't be evaluated empirically.
3) ID asserts that intelligent behavior cannot be the result of law+chance without attempting to support this assertion
4) ID offers an unspecified "intelligent cause" as an explanation, but rejects "unspecified unintelligent cause" as an explanation.
These are just a few of the reasons. There are others.
Because you already defined "human-like" for me. You told me that it necessarily arises from a human brain. How can I say that about the cause of a design by merely looking at the design?
No, you are putting words in my mouth. I said there was reason to believe that human-like mentality would necessarily be associated with a human-like brain, but this is an empirical hypothesis and not a logical or definitional assertion. I would say human-like intelligence would entail conscious awareness, mental imagery, sensory processing, similar characteristics of remembering and forgetting, sensory illusions, and in particular it would need to have similar emotional components (as psychologists have found that our affective processing is inseperable from our rationcination).
AIGUY: You are obliged to actually spell out operational definitions of the way(s) this thing's mentality was like ours, and then we can go about seeing if your claim is true.
PEZ: It arranges parts purposefully.
The only operational definition I know of for "purposeful" is "utilizing negative feedback to approach a set point"; I can help you see how that definition is operational if you'd like.
But I do not see how your "arranging parts purposefully" can be emprically determined or not. Since I do not know how to empirically detect when something is purposeful or not, you need to tell me how to do it. Once and for all: Tell me how to look at some arranger which is arranging some parts, and decide if this arranger is purposeful or not.
AIGUY: They've demonstrated that flies exhibit spontaneous changes in flight behavior without external cues.
PEZ: But define "spontaneous" please.
They said it right in the page: "the international team of researchers showed for the first time that such variability cannot be due to simple random events but is generated spontaneously and non-randomly by the brain." Spontaneous here means "not in response to environmental cues". They defined this operationally, so they could test it, and they tested it by removing environmental cues to see if the behaviors persisted. See what I mean?
How does "spontaneous" relate to free will and why is it so necessarily implicated that Brembs felt obliged to comment upon it and then, in your opinion, distance himself from the conclusion?
As he said, these are philosophical issues. There is now way to resolve these issues by appeal to our shared experience.
(((edit out "” spontaneous=not random and not deterministic)))
Spontaneous in this paper does not mean "not random and not deterministic"!!! It means "not random and not in response to environmental cues"!
The question of empirically proving/disproving free will? Yes, I agree that is open.
Great! Agreement!
Not so. If most neurologists, Nature, and New York Times can say that free will is scientifically disproven (even if you don't agree that it has "¦ quite yet) then the assertion of free will is just as scientific.
First, I don't believe anyone says free will is "disproven" of course, because scientists and responsible journalists know that science does not "prove" things this way. (Can you provide some quotes here?) Second, obviously if some New York Times article said something like that, it doesn't mean it is science – it means the reporter misspoke.
The tests they think weigh on the one side fail and others feel , in fact, weigh on the other. You can't tell me that it is unscientific to say X has free will if it is scientific to say X does not.
You, I, and every cognitive scientist I have ever read agrees that neither of these statements represents a settled science, and that the question is indeed open.
AIGUY: Do you not believe these verbal instructions were encoded in a physical (acoustic) medium, rather than, say, telepathically transmitted? In that case, yes of course his speaking to his patients had these effects, in a manner perfectly consistent with physicalism:
PEZ: Your non sequitur has masked an enormous leap of logic. Yes, there is a physical imputation of soundwaves into the brain. These have a physical effect. 1) They receive countless soundwaves a day which have no such effect, so it is not the physicaity of the soundwaves that elicited an effect, but the information (non-material) content of those sound waves.
The non sequitur is yours I'm afraid: There is nothing about voice recognition that requires processing anything but the "physicality" of soundwaves. When I speak into my computer, it analyzes the soundwaves and reacts based on the information encoded in those waves. No immaterial mind is involved. Information is encoded in physical media which have physical effects on physical information processing devices.
(Please note again I am showing how Schwartz's data is consistent with physicalism; I am not arguing that physicalism is necessarily true).
2) The physical effect caused by receiving those waves, nor the physical effect caused by the information received in those waves, caused the brain changes studied later. Those changes were the result of volitional focused attention.
The changes were found later yes, after a long chain of neural events that were precipitated by the initial physical stimulus of the verbal instructions. As far as anyone can demonstrate, the brain changes were simply resultant from a causal chain of physical events.
3) The difference between receiving soundwaves and attention has been demonstrated experimentally.
"Receiving soundwaves" It matters what the "soundwaves" were! My computer does not respond to all soundwaves in the same way! It pays attention to my voice commands and ignores background noise. But I don't think it has an immaterial mind.
AIGUY: Do you think that if I entered voice commands into my computer, the physical structure of the computer could not change as a result? Do you think this means my computer has an immaterial mind?
PEZ: That's not analogous to Schwartz' cases.
Your terse and unsupported response tells me you can't think of a way it is not analogous. Of course it is – I have shown that a physical deterministic machine does exactly what Schwartz is talking about (changing in response to information in verbal commands) without (presumably) an immaterial mind. QED.
No they are not. Materialist theories of the mind do not/did not allow (until shown otherwise) that intention of the mind can be the cause of physical changes of the brain. Materialist theories of the mind told Schwartz that the changes could not be initiated internally.
This is utter fantasy. If you disagree, please identify this "materialist theory of mind" or its author. You won't be able to, because no materialist mind theorist would ever say such a stupid thing. My computer can spontaneously (not randomly, but not in response to environmental cues) cause physical changes inside itself. No free will. No immaterial mind. Just a machine.
Really? When I gave you the operational tests for purpose you said that was what you had been asking for.
You then wound up on another thread indicating that the test for irreducible complexity is, in fact, a potential test for foresight.
What Zach and I are trying to get you to see is this: What you call an operational test for "purpose" is instead an operational test for irreducible complexity. IC is (ostensibly) a property of the watch, not of the watchmaker.
We are interested in a way to demonstrate that the watchmaker acts with purpose, not in a way to demonstrate that the watch is complex, functional, or irreducibly complex. After all, "Intelligent Design" theory is supposed to say something about how to explain biological complexity, it isn't just supposed to talk about how complex and irreducible biology is… right?
Pez: When I gave you the operational tests for purpose you said that was what you had been asking for.
I reiterated that I was asking for an operational definition. I asked, but you still didn't answer. That's clear from the context.
Pez: What is "purpose" Operationally we can test for purpose in a system by examining to see: "¦
Zachriel: That's all I asked… The word "function" seems to presuppose "purpose". We might say a heart has the purpose of pumping blood, or of sustaining life. We might say a Monsoon has the purpose of pumping water, or of sustaining life.
In other words, I explained why you didn't provide the requested operational definition.
Pez: You then wound up on another thread indicating that the test for irreducible complexity is, in fact, a potential test for foresight.
I had attempted to operationally define foresight in such a way that would entail empirical implications that could distinguish it from orthodox evolutionary theory. And it wasn't based on irreducible complexity which can evolve through normal evolutionary mechanisms.
In any case, you should direct those comments there.
The changes were found later yes, after a long chain of neural events that were precipitated by the initial physical stimulus of the verbal instructions. As far as anyone can demonstrate, the brain changes were simply resultant from a causal chain of physical events.
"Receiving soundwaves" It matters what the "soundwaves" were! My computer does not respond to all soundwaves in the same way! It pays attention to my voice commands and ignores background noise. But I don't think it has an immaterial mind.
Your terse and unsupported response tells me you can't think of a way it is not analogous. Of course it is – I have shown that a physical deterministic machine does exactly what Schwartz is talking about (changing in response to information in verbal commands) without (presumably) an immaterial mind. QED.
1) Schwartz's assertion seems to rest primarily not on the doctor saying things to the subject, but the subject's internal reflection and thought. Pointing out that Schwartz spoke to the person, and soundwaves are physical, and there was a physical change in the brain, therefore the evidence is compatible with a 100% physical description… that's like saying that the patients followed signs to get to the testing lab, and sight is physical, therefore one would expect a physical change in the brain. Technically true, but too hamfisted.
2) At best, you're establishing that any normal person is going to be bombarded with sounds and sights and experiences that have what amounts to a physical experience, and thus any physical change in the brain cannot be utterly divorced from past physical events. That doesn't lead to 'physicalism is triumphant' but 'all bets are off'.
3) Given 1 and 2, it certainly doesn't seem that Schwartz is just some idiot who doesn't understand the complexities of what he's dealing with. If he thinks that physicalism re: the brain is utterly and obviously defeated, naturally that's going too far. If he thinks that his experiments and views call mainstream physicalism into question – the facts he's outlined grant him some justification. That someone's internal reflection and directed awareness can lead to the sort of brain changes he talks about is something to ponder, and informs dualist theories of mind as well as any other.
After all, "Intelligent Design" theory is supposed to say something about how to explain biological complexity, it isn't just supposed to talk about how complex and irreducible biology is"¦ right?
ID proponents approach questions like that in a variety of ways. For my money, there's a lot to be said in pointing out that everything we see in nature – whether complex and irreducible or not – can have an origin point in a purposeful agent. There are disputes about whether certain IC structures can occur through an unguided process – along with questions about what constitutes an unguided process to begin with.
Or, 'pointing out issues of complexity, irreducibility, and (through humans) known potential of intelligence and purposefulness is fair game with ID'.
1) Schwartz's assertion seems to rest primarily not on the doctor saying things to the subject, but the subject's internal reflection and thought.
Materialist theories of mind hold that everything we think and do is the result of physical causality. When the OCD patient resists the urge to wash his hands, materialists believe that this is the result of the totality of all physical interactions the person has experienced and the physical operation and structure of the person himself. Both Schwartz's therapeutic intervention (his talking to them) and the patient's own internal information processing (what his brain is doing) are – in the materialist view – all causal factors in the patient's behavioral and neurological changes. Dualists like Schwartz want to say that the "internal reflections and thought" involved something besides physical changes in the brain, but they have no way to demonstrate it.
The fact that changes do occur in the brain whenever external stimuli, internal thought, or behavioral changes occur is precisely what materialism requires. Thus Schwartz's evidence is 100% consistent with materialism's (trivial) predictions. What Schwartz needs for his evidence for dualism is exactly the opposite: He needs to show that some mental/behavioral event takes place without a change in the brain.
that's like saying that the patients followed signs to get to the testing lab, and sight is physical, therefore one would expect a physical change in the brain. Technically true, but too hamfisted.
Again – I say these are trivial predictions, because they do not allow us to claim evidence for materialism. They are consistent with materialism, but too "hamfisted", just as you say, to tell us if materialism is true.
2) At best, you're establishing that any normal person is going to be bombarded with sounds and sights and experiences that have what amounts to a physical experience, and thus any physical change in the brain cannot be utterly divorced from past physical events. That doesn't lead to 'physicalism is triumphant' but 'all bets are off'.
I agree 100%, and I've indicated as much quite consistently.
3) Given 1 and 2, it certainly doesn't seem that Schwartz is just some idiot who doesn't understand the complexities of what he's dealing with.
Yes, it really is the case I'm afraid. He really, really does say that this "mind over matter" stuff somehow amounts to empirical evidence for dualism! The same mistake is made by other ID-friendly neuroscientists like Mario Beauregard, who claim that every time we see a placebo effect, it is an empirical demonstration that an ontologically dualistic, immaterial mental cause is interacting with our physical bodies. These are sophomoric errors.
If he thinks that physicalism re: the brain is utterly and obviously defeated, naturally that's going too far. If he thinks that his experiments and views call mainstream physicalism into question – the facts he's outlined grant him some justification. That someone's internal reflection and directed awareness can lead to the sort of brain changes he talks about is something to ponder, and informs dualist theories of mind as well as any other.
You can ponder and question all you'd like. What these ID folks say, however, is that these data support dualism over physicalism, and that is simply false. Physicalists are perfectly aware that we humans reflect internally and are aware of things. And they would be the ones who would be surprised if these internal reflections did not always correspond with neural changes. Surprised… and completely defeated, because that would mean dualism is true. Honestly, I learned this stuff in Philosophy 101 (literally "Philosophy 101", I believe).
ID proponents approach questions like that in a variety of ways. For my money, there's a lot to be said in pointing out that everything we see in nature – whether complex and irreducible or not – can have an origin point in a purposeful agent.
Yes… or not. Now, I happen to know you mean "conscious" agent when you say this, so at least I know what you are talking about. As for Kornbelt, I know he does not mean conscious agent. Bradford means an agent that transcends physical necessity (but he really doesn't know what else he means, and is unable to articulate his ideas). I'm still not sure what Pez means.
There are disputes about whether certain IC structures can occur through an unguided process – along with questions about what constitutes an unguided process to begin with.
And here you are saying "guided" and "unguided" as though somebody has bothered to tell us guided by what? Guided by unconscious natural law? Guided by conscious mind? Who knows?
Dualists like Schwartz want to say that the "internal reflections and thought" involved something besides physical changes in the brain, but they have no way to demonstrate it.
What Schwartz needs for his evidence for dualism is exactly the opposite: He needs to show that some mental/behavioral event takes place without a change in the brain.
Absolutely not. Dualists are dualists – both mental and physical are involved by their view. There is no need for mental events that take place without physical changes – that view is closer to idealism than anything. Hell, Swinburne and Plantinga – not philosophy of mind specialists by a longshot – are both on record as saying they believe mental states will correlate with brain states.
Now, they have no way to demonstrate dualism beyond objection (and conversely, no one has a way to rule it out), but they can provide evidence and argue for what they feel is a judicious interpretation of the data re: their philosophical perspective.
I agree 100%, and I've indicated as much quite consistently.
Yes, it really is the case I'm afraid. He really, really does say that this "mind over matter" stuff somehow amounts to empirical evidence for dualism! The same mistake is made by other ID-friendly neuroscientists like Mario Beauregard, who claim that every time we see a placebo effect, it is an empirical demonstration that an ontologically dualistic, immaterial mental cause is interacting with our physical bodies. These are sophomoric errors.
No, they're not errors. They are empirical evidence that Schwartz and Beauregard are interpreting within their philosophies, and against other philosophies. Schwartz, Beauregard, and others provide empirical evidence that they argue is best understood within a dualistic framework. If doing this is an error on the grounds that materialists can argue in another direction, then the entire field is absolutely riddled with tremendous abuse of data – this, where formal dualists are currently the minority.
What these ID folks say, however, is that these data support dualism over physicalism, and that is simply false. Physicalists are perfectly aware that we humans reflect internally and are aware of things.
Again, they argue that the data is better understood within a dualist perspective compared to typical physicalist/materialist alternatives. That may come across as 'dualism is clearly right, and physicalism is false', but once more, if taking such a bold stance is indicative of idiocy, the field is full of idiots. Dennett is an idiot. Hofstadter is an idiot. Crick is an idiot.
And here you are saying "guided" and "unguided" as though somebody has bothered to tell us guided by what? Guided by unconscious natural law? Guided by conscious mind? Who knows?
As I always say, the mere fact that that argument exists, is important to highlight. I don't feel it WAS highlighted prior to ID.
AIGUY: What Schwartz needs for his evidence for dualism is exactly the opposite: He needs to show that some mental/behavioral event takes place without a change in the brain.
NULLASALUS: Absolutely not. Dualists are dualists – both mental and physical are involved by their view. There is no need for mental events that take place without physical changes – that view is closer to idealism than anything.
Whoa! Here is ID's own Dr. Egnor on the matter:
If dualism is true and the mind is partly the product of the material function of the brain and partly the product of something else, then:
1. There will be some mental phenomena without brain function
2. As brain function is altered, the mind will not necessarily be altered
3. If the brain is damaged, then mental function will not necessarily be damaged
4. Brain development will not necessarily correlate with mental development.
5. We will not always be able to correlate brain activity with mental activity "“ no matter how we choose to look at it
ETA: "Dualism predicts that mental function and brain function won't always correlate, because mental function isn't the same thing as brain function." – Egnor, same page
Yes, dualists believe in the reality of both material and mental stuff. But unless there are at least some mental phenomena that occur absent physical cause, then mind-stuff is obviously a superfluous hypothesis.
Hell, Swinburne and Plantinga – not philosophy of mind specialists by a longshot – are both on record as saying they believe mental states will correlate with brain states.
Really – they say mental states must always, without exception correlate with brain states? (reference for clarity please?) This is surprising, since it entails that without a brain there can be no mind, which is not something I think would sit well with either of these gentlemen.
Again: A dualist/interactionist believes that mental states are (at least sometimes) immaterial causes, so that we can have a change of mind without any associated change in our brain. Just like the brilliant neurosurgeon Michael Egnor tells us
No, they're not errors. They are empirical evidence that Schwartz and Beauregard are interpreting within their philosophies, and against other philosophies. Schwartz, Beauregard, and others provide empirical evidence that they argue is best understood within a dualistic framework. If doing this is an error on the grounds that materialists can argue in another direction, then the entire field is absolutely riddled with tremendous abuse of data – this, where formal dualists are currently the minority.
OK… but these subtle distinctions get lost, and what comes out is not that they are interpreting data from a philosophical perspective, but rather than scientific evidence supports their view.
Again, they argue that the data is better understood within a dualist perspective compared to typical physicalist/materialist alternatives. That may come across as 'dualism is clearly right, and physicalism is false', but once more, if taking such a bold stance is indicative of idiocy, the field is full of idiots. Dennett is an idiot. Hofstadter is an idiot. Crick is an idiot.
No, those guys are all pretty smart. Schwartz isn't really an idiot either, even though he has made some very bad arguments. Egnor and Beauregard are just idiots
More seriously, take a look at what was said: As Pez reports, Schwartz says that materialism predicted that no brain changes would occur when the patient thought about something:
PEZ: Materialist theories of the mind do not/did not allow (until shown otherwise) that intention of the mind can be the cause of physical changes of the brain. Materialist theories of the mind told Schwartz that the changes could not be initiated internally.
That is just an error, no matter how you spin it.
As I always say, the mere fact that that argument exists, is important to highlight. I don't feel it WAS highlighted prior to ID.
I agree, I suppose… but I think "ID" is at least 6,000 years old, and it has been highlighted ever since (under a different name).
I'm saying that if something does one thing and one thing alone, no matter what the circumstance, by virtue of physical necessity, it does not use foresight. Do you disagree with this?
By virtue of physical necessity? Right. That does not demonstrate foresight.
2) The natural process churning out life forms is a lawful necessity in your scenario and this is what the investigation rules out.
What investigation might you be referring to? How does any investigation rule out that the cause of life forms operates according to lawful necessity?
The test for irreducible complexity, complex specified information, information counter-flow … ID.
3) In order to decide which hypothesis is true, I need to see if the cause exhibits any behaviors which illustrate foresight, i.e. certain types of problem-solving behaviors.
The machinery is the indication.
Not bad faith at all – I have been clear from the very start that I believe ID is scientifically vacuous! My point is just that: If you define the "intelligence" of ID as "that which can create complex machinery like we find in biology", then obviously ID is completely vacuous. That is why we are arguing about how to gather evidence for foresight.
That's not the definition we've been using.
OK. How do you determine efficient locomotion?
Like I said, the operational definition is different for each context, just like intelligence. In human beings, one test for intelligence might be a score of 70 or more on a Standford-Binet IQ test. In human beings, one test for athleticism might be running a mile in under four minutes.
So you don't have a test for "athleticism" itself? Does a four-minute-mile test for athleticism in horses? Is your definition species-specific? Do you have tests that are not temporally defined?
Actually, as I reread this I am willing to work with the 4 minute mile as one sufficient test of athleticism, at least for human beings. See below…
Does agility, power and speed define "efficient" as it pertains to locomotion?
Agility, power, and speed are requisite in order to enable something to move efficiently. Carl Lewis (olympic track star) was quite obviously athletic – do you disagree? His agility, power, and speed enabled him to move very efficiently. Albert Einstein was obviously intelligent, with the foresight and purpose to come up with brilliant theories.
(Perhaps this dragon of mine is a bit tougher to slay than you'd hoped. In fact, it is a reductio of your position that you will not be able to counter. Keep trying though – it's really fun.)
Carl Lewis is/was athletic. Einstein was intelligent. How do you test for agility, power and speed?
In retrospect, I've returned to this comment and think I'll take it up a bit regardless of your forthcoming answers. In so doing I've decided to remove some of my other answers from above. I'll save them and reserve the right to refer you back at a future date.
Let's say an athletic-looking fellow around forty years old or so tells me he is Carl Lewis. I don't believe him and he shows me half a dozen olympic medals. he says he has more at home. This is pretty good evidence, I think, but not enough.
So I send him alone into a locked indoor arena and I man the only door.
I give him a couple of stop-watches and some instructions. When he comes out he shows me one watch stopped at just over 11 seconds. That's the time he ran the 100 in. Off Lewis' mark in his prime, but still pretty darn quick. He shows me the other and it's stopped at 3:58. No record, but I go it about 6 minutes.
Next I accompany him to the long-jump pit and he shows me his mark. An impressive 8 metres.
Okay, he might not be Carl Lewis, but these artifacts all evidence athleticism even though he was not observed making them, since he was alone in the arena. Right? Or do you contend that I am wrong?
AIGUY: If you are merely attempting to say that anything with behaviors that, in the end, result in complex biology machinery must be intelligent by definition, then again your theory is devoid of content."¨PEZ: This is another ID strawman. The claim isn't "this is complex so it is designed".
Yet again we miscommunicate by confusing analytic (definitional) and synthetic (factual) propositions! I was pointing out that ID must not simply define intelligent design as "that which can create complex designs", because in that case ID is clearly vacuous (it offers a "dormative principle" conceptualization of intelligence).
ID does not say this. ID specifies what kind of complexity indicates purposeful arrangement of parts. Allen's dormitive argument regarding the "Intelligent" in "Intelligent Design" was lame when he said it it's still a non-starter. We've already discussed what its purpose in the title of the project is. Redness causes redness is not the equivalent of "certain features of life are best explained with reference to the purposeful arrangement of parts."
The claim is that we can measure the type of complexity and assess whether or not, being contingent, it was created by natural law, random chance, a combination of the two, or purposeful arrangement. Lots of complexity does not apparently require purpose.
Are you referring to the arguments promoted by Bill Dembski by any chance?
Yep. I did reference CSI, right? There's also Irreducible Complexity.
That we can somehow all agree on what is "specified" and what is not?
We don't all have to agree. That is not a prerequisite in any scientific endeavour. In fact, disagreement is to be welcomed and expected.
And that "specified complexity" has been proven to result only from "deliberate choosing" or directed contingency" or something? Is that what we're talking about now?
Science is not about proof. But yes, CSI is the result of choosing between contingent possibilities.
I think Bill Dembski's definitions of CSI are subjective,
He admits so himself. As are most definitions and all observations.
and his reasoning about "law plus chance" as opposed to "purposeful arrangement" (what Bill calls "intelligent cause") is utterly specious, since it simply assumes that intelligent cause is not itself the result of law plus chance, and fails to provide any independent characterization for how to identify intelligent cause.
I'm not sure he says that an intelligent cause can't itself be the result of law + chance. That would be telling us something we can't know about the cause of the design. And again, it's irrelevant. who designed the designer is not an argument, nor is 'was the designer designed'?
So if this whole argument is going to reduce to an assessment of Dembski's notion of "specification" and CSI, that will be too bad indeed. Dembski never shows how we can ever empirically evaluate the proposition "only intelligent cause can generate CSI", because he never says how to determine if anything is intelligent except by seeing if it generates CSI!
That is one test.
AIGUY: These sorts of questions are fraught with difficulty even for animals, where we have complete access to our subjects. But in the context of ID, where we cannot access the subject, there is no possible way to begin to answer them."¨
PEZ: Yes, there are difficulties. No, you can not rule on the possibility merely because you feel like it
This has nothing to do with how I feel. It is simply obvious that if we have no access to the data required to decide some question then we cannot answer the question.
Right. And we have the data and don't need access to the subject.
Even when we have access to a real, live organism in our lab, and we can gather all the data we can think of collecting, we still have can't agree on what things act with free will or conscious intent. It is therefore clear that when we can gather no data at all, we can't begin to answer these questions.
We can agree when we agree on what free will and intent are. If we can't agree that the test demonstrates free will and intent we can still agree on what the data show. If "spontaneity", for instance, is not "free will" it is still spontaneity.
I showed Zach how purpose can be tested for operationally quite some time ago."¨Did you not agree with it?
What you said to me was "It's the same test as that for not-purpose and not-will.", which is not helpful unless you say what the test for not-purpose is.
I thought you might have seen my response to Zach. See Zach's comment above where he quotes it. Thanks, Zach.
To test for purpose or will, we _______________________ (please fill in the blank).
Eliminate necessity and random chance – the things offered as defeaters of the argument to purpose.
1) You defined intelligent.
Again, if you accept my definition (that which creates complex form and function) then you and I have just agreed that ID is perfectly vacuous, because it attempts to explain the complex form and function in biology by that which can create complex form and function.
Nope, "perfectly vacuous" was not part of the definition I accepted. When possible I try to avoid the royalties due PvM so I tend away from the word "vacuous" altogether.
So, once and for all, please, I beseech you: Write down the definition that you believe ID Theory employs for the term "intelligent"! It is beyond reason that a definition which offers "intelligent cause" as its sole explanatory concept leaves the meaning of "intelligent" up to the reader to decide!
That which acts with foresight and toward a purpose. Alternatively, that which chooses/selects with reference to a goal.
But, again (but of course not once and for all) the definition of intelligence is irrelevant because the inference is to design. What is meant is obvious in the terms design, purpose, foresight, etc.
2) I mean that if the design is design then it demonstrates purposeful arrangement of parts
More confusion! You say things like "the cause is not the cause" and "if the design is design". When you say these things, you are obviously using these words in two different ways in the same sentence (because if you not, you are saying "If P and not-P"¦").
I cannot tell if your statement is supposed to be true by definition or if you think it is a true contingent fact about the world.
If the pattern you've called "design" does not implicate purposeful arrangement of parts it is not design.
If the thing most proximately responsible is incapable of purposeful design then it is not the cause of the design and the actual cause is yet to be found. Refer here to my domino analogy. Neither the cat, the dominoes, nor the toy auto were responsible for the design, yet each has some role as an immediate, efficient or material cause.
and mindless, purposeless, natural, law-like, blind, random, physical, etc. causes don't do this.
And is this supposed to be an empirical claim, or simply the definition of "design" If the former, you must say how to show the claim is true (you can't).
Induction and inference to the best explanation.
I still do not understand what ID is supposed to mean, because of all of this confusion regarding definitions.
The confusion is of your own making.
And you still haven't begun to tell me why offering "athleticism" is any more subjective or meaningless an explanation for some phenomenon than offering "intelligence".
I didn't say it was subjective. I want to find out what you think athleticism is and then I will show you why your inability to identify it does not likewise damn the inference to design.
AIGUY:"¨1) I tell you only that entity "X" is intelligent, capable of planning and realizing a design using foresight."¨2) You tell me one single thing about "X" in any context that could be observed, even in principle
Pez: X is not completely controlled by a combination of deterministic and random forces. If I measured outputs of the activities of X they would demonstrate this.
AiGuy: So you do indeed believe (as opposed to many others here on this forum) that in ID, intelligence must transcend physical cause. Fine, glad we got that clear.
Is "completely controlled by deterministic and random forces" coterminous with "physical"
If we can rule out chance and necessity this is not the case.
You can't say how to rule out chance and necessity, so this is moot. Dembski tries to rule out chance and necessity in his "Explanatory Filter", but of course he doesn't – he simply rules out known explanations.
Promissory notes are not science and we are not forbidden from an inference in the hopes that some other explanation will pop its head up one day. We've covered this. The inference is assertible regardless of naturalism's blank cheques.
AIGUY: It is absolutely necessary, and (to me) quite obviously so. The concept of "serial killer" does not even make sense in a world without humans/animals, so how can it not be important that we are talking about human beings?"¨PEZ: This seems odd coming from an AI guy. Does serial killer not make sense in a world of intelligent and responsible robots?
More terminological confusion: I don't consider robots "alive", so they can't be "killed".
Did you do that on purpose? The robot is not the victim but the murderer. Oh…. are you going to pretend that because it takes the death of an animal to constitute a killing then we need reference to human animals to gain knowledge of the killer?
I must say that this is the smokiest of smoky.
Once again:
You can have knowledge about it without observing it. You can have knowledge, for instance, about a serial killer without observing him. I know, we have experience with people ( "Who's on first.. I don't know's on third base!")"¦"¨But, again, that is not the deciding factor in our knowledge acquisition. It is not even necessary.
…
Aiguy:It is absolutely necessary, and (to me) quite obviously so. The concept of "serial killer" does not even make sense in a world without humans/animals, so how can it not be important that we are talking about human beings?
[note that this doesn't address at all the question about whether or not knowledge is gained about the killer or whether or not one must refer to a person by comparison to the killer.] Does serial killer not make sense in a world of intelligent and responsible robots? Can you not tell if the activity required the actions of such a robot as opposed to that of a summer breeze? Can you not find something new about the robot by looking at what it has done "¦ "it's killing them "¦ on purpose!""¨No, I have not slipped by referring the design back to robots, of whom we would have, in this scenario, prior knowledge. I am appealing to a particular case to defeat another of your claims – this one about serial killers and humans."¨Your objections are becoming so fine-tuned that it is apparent that there is only one in-principle common denominator – "ID is wrong .. for some reason".
Aiguy's response … robots can't be killed.
Smoke.
Can you not tell if the activity required the actions of such a robot as opposed to that of a summer breeze?
You and other IDers keep saying things like "as opposed to a summer breeze" or "as opposed to the wind swining the axe" or "erosion and rain could not shape Mount Rushmore". This is the fallacy that I was just explaining: Just because you eliminate one paricular "unintelligent" theory (like a summer breeze) does not mean you have eliminated a whole class of explanations! Nobody thinks that rain carves statues or that wind swings axes or that "chance" creates life forms. These are all perfectly stupid theories.
What does carve statues and swing axes?
Why are you so unable to draw appropriate conclusions? If it's not wind and rain what unintelligent force is it? Gravity? EM?
Why can't we learn something about the robot by seeing how it killed a person, or by accounting for the number of people it has killed? If the event is compatible with natural laws and yet is contingent then we have a case against any yet-to-be discovered natural laws explaining it anyway because none will have the power to select from a myriad of more probable states.
Your objections are becoming so fine-tuned that it is apparent that there is only one in-principle common denominator – "ID is wrong .. for some reason".
Let me refresh your memory:
1) ID fails to provide a set of consistent interpretations for its theoretical concepts of "intelligence" and "design"
Disagree.
"¨2) ID fails to provide operationalized definition of the terms it uses like "purpose", "will", "intent" and so on, and so ID's propositions can't be evaluated empirically."¨3) ID asserts that intelligent behavior cannot be the result of law+chance without attempting to support this assertion
I'm still not convinced of this.
"¨4) ID offers an unspecified "intelligent cause" as an explanation, but rejects "unspecified unintelligent cause" as an explanation.
That which possesses the intelligence implied may be unspecified, but that is not the IDP's equivalent of saying "maybe there is something we don't know about or may one day discover that will explain this without recognizing its actual design".
Because you already defined "human-like" for me. You told me that it necessarily arises from a human brain. How can I say that about the cause of a design by merely looking at the design?
No, you are putting words in my mouth. I said there was reason to believe that human-like mentality would necessarily be associated with a human-like brain, but this is an empirical hypothesis and not a logical or definitional assertion.
So human-like intelligence is not necessarily associated with a human brain? Or it is?
I would say human-like intelligence would entail conscious awareness, mental imagery, sensory processing, similar characteristics of remembering and forgetting, sensory illusions, and in particular it would need to have similar emotional components (as psychologists have found that our affective processing is inseperable from our rationcination).
It need not be human-like in every and all aspects to be human-like. The ability to choose, deliberate, imagine and hold goals seems human-like enough to me.
Tell me how to look at some arranger which is arranging some parts, and decide if this arranger is purposeful or not.
It contingently arranges parts which are well-matched to perform a function in such an improbable manner that defies random chance.
PEZ: But define "spontaneous" please.
Aiguy: They said it right in the page: "the international team of researchers showed for the first time that such variability cannot be due to simple random events but is generated spontaneously and non-randomly by the brain." Spontaneous here means "not in response to environmental cues". They defined this operationally, so they could test it, and they tested it by removing environmental cues to see if the behaviors persisted. See what I mean?
So spontaneous is "not determined and not random". Sounds like something I've heard somewhere else. And yet, here you accept it.
(((edit out "” spontaneous=not random and not deterministic)))
Spontaneous in this paper does not mean "not random and not deterministic"!!! It means "not random and not in response to environmental cues"!
Really. And what would it be if it were in response to environmental cues? Since the behaviour is "indeterminate", "unpredictable", and "unlikely to be the by-product of the brain" in what way is it deterministic if it is generated by the brain not by accidental errors, not at random, and not in response to environmental cues? What determines it?
What did the co-author mean here, then:
"This nonlinear signature eliminates the two alternative explanations of spontaneous turning behavior in flies that would run counter to free will, namely complete randomness and pure determinism.
?
====
The question of empirically proving/disproving free will? Yes, I agree that is open.
Great! Agreement!
Great!
AIGUY: Do you not believe these verbal instructions were encoded in a physical (acoustic) medium, rather than, say, telepathically transmitted?
Information encoded in a physical medium is not physical.
In that case, yes of course his speaking to his patients had these effects, in a manner perfectly consistent with physicalism:"¨PEZ: Your non sequitur has masked an enormous leap of logic. Yes, there is a physical imputation of soundwaves into the brain. These have a physical effect. 1) They receive countless soundwaves a day which have no such effect, so it is not the physicaity of the soundwaves that elicited an effect, but the information (non-material) content of those sound waves.
Aiguy:The non sequitur is yours I'm afraid: There is nothing about voice recognition that requires processing anything but the "physicality" of soundwaves.
Who said anything about "voice recognition? You are changing the subject to justify yet another computer analogy. In fact, experimental evidence shows that a brain receiving an auditory signal is differently affected depending upon the focused attention given that signal. The signal can be identical each time and have different results.
When I speak into my computer, it analyzes the soundwaves and reacts based on the information encoded in those waves. No immaterial mind is involved. Information is encoded in physical media which have physical effects on physical information processing devices.
So? Appealing to a computer program that reacts to a soundwave without attending to it merely begs the question in the same way that your "athleticism" example does. You've presumed that because the sound wave is physical and the computer reacts to it that this is all that is involved in the studies referenced. This is false.
The information was carried on the physical wave but the wave was not the information. The information could have been conveyed in writing and then you'd say "see, it was encoded in photons". The key here is that it was encoded. We are looking not at physical carriers but the immaterial information carried. AND … it was not the reception of the information itself that had the effect on the brain's neurology.
Thanks to Nullasalus for saving me some typing on this subject. I appreciate the participation. And I hope it continues … hint.
2) The physical effect caused by receiving those waves, nor the physical effect caused by the information received in those waves, caused the brain changes studied later. Those changes were the result of volitional focused attention.
The changes were found later yes, after a long chain of neural events that were precipitated by the initial physical stimulus of the verbal instructions. As far as anyone can demonstrate, the brain changes were simply resultant from a causal chain of physical events.
Not so. They can test the effect of willful attention and show its effects. Also, not all the subjects can respond in the same way even though they received the same environmental stimuli.
3) The difference between receiving soundwaves and attention has been demonstrated experimentally.
"Receiving soundwaves" It matters what the "soundwaves" were! My computer does not respond to all soundwaves in the same way! It pays attention to my voice commands and ignores background noise. But I don't think it has an immaterial mind.
This is irrelevant. Monkeys respond differently to the same sound wave depending upon their attention and expectations. This difference in response is reflected in brain changes. Musicians respond differently to the same soundwaves when attending to them in different ways.
AIGUY: Do you think that if I entered voice commands into my computer, the physical structure of the computer could not change as a result? Do you think this means my computer has an immaterial mind?"¨PEZ: That's not analogous to Schwartz' cases.
Your terse and unsupported response tells me you can't think of a way it is not analogous. Of course it is – I have shown that a physical deterministic machine does exactly what Schwartz is talking about (changing in response to information in verbal commands) without (presumably) an immaterial mind. QED.
No you haven't. Not at all. Your inference from terseness is faulty.
No they are not. Materialist theories of the mind do not/did not allow (until shown otherwise) that intention of the mind can be the cause of physical changes of the brain. Materialist theories of the mind told Schwartz that the changes could not be initiated internally.
This is utter fantasy. If you disagree, please identify this "materialist theory of mind" or its author. You won't be able to, because no materialist mind theorist would ever say such a stupid thing.
You should watch your language. You're going to make yourself get upset and lose the opportunity to be stimulated by saying "stupid" so often. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E...
Eliminativism maintains that the common-sense understanding of the mind is mistaken, and that the neurosciences will one day reveal that the mental states that are talked about in every day discourse, using words such as intend, believe, desire, and love, do not refer to anything real.
Intent is the key thing Schwartz was working with, and the belief in that intent.
Modern eliminativists have much more clearly expressed the view that mental phenomena simply do not exist and will eventually be eliminated from our thinking about the brain in the same way that demons have been eliminated from our thinking about mental illness and psychopathology.[3]
While it was a minority view in the 1960s, eliminative materialism gained prominence and acceptance during the 1980s.[11] Proponents of this view, such as B.F. Skinner, often made parallels to previous pseudoscientific theories (such as that of the the four humours, the phlogiston theory of combustion, and the vital force theory of life) that have all been successfully eliminated in attempting to establish their thesis about the nature of the mental. In these cases, science has not produced more detailed versions or reductions of these theories, but rejected them altogether as obsolete. Behaviorists argued that folk psychology is already obsolete and should be replaced by descriptions of stimulus and response patterns.
Skinner, an eliminative materialist is one of the most prominent theorists discussed by Schwartz and his and other behaviourist's ideas were in direct opposition to Schwartz's method. Skinner argued that our subjective experience of mind as something special or different is just an illusion (a la Dan Dennett).
Below are some links to epiphenomalists. I know it's currently a trend to say they are not materialists, but:
Some eliminativists, such as the early Frank Jackson, claim that consciousness does not exist except as an epiphenomenon of brain function; others, such as Georges Rey, claim that the concept will eventually be eliminated as neuroscience progresses.
If it has no effects and makes no causal difference whatsoever, then it would seem unable to play any significant role in the systems or organisms in which it is present, thus undercutting at the outset most inquiries about its possible value. Nor can the threat of epiphenomenal irrelevance be simply dismissed as an obvious non-option, since at least some forms of consciousness have been seriously alleged in the recent literature to lack causal status. (See the entry on epiphenomenalism.) Such worries have been raised especially with regard to qualia and qualitative consciousness (Huxley 1874, Jackson 1982, Chalmers 1996), but challenges have also been leveled against the causal status of other sorts including meta-mental consciousness (Velmans 1991).
Both metaphysical and empirical arguments have been given in support of such claims.
But you're right, few would say it. But they have to fight hard to deny that it is true of their theories.
These are discussions and critiques of the implications of eliminative materialism and reductive physicalism. It's a bit of a literature dump and is unnecessary reading given that my point is made above.: http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/ph... http://www.phil.mq.edu.au/staf...
If a mental event is something other than a physical event, then for it to make any causal contribution of its own in the physical world would require a violation of physical law.
aiguy: To test for purpose or will, we _______________________ (please fill in the blank).
Pez: Eliminate necessity and random chance – the things offered as defeaters of the argument to purpose.
That's a serious category error. When we eliminate known sources of chance and necessity the remainder includes vast reaches of human ignorance. Indeed, any time you have something 'complex' and no ready explanation, then your argument leads to a conclusion of 'purpose'. We use hypothetico-deduction in order to break through this problem of naïve induction. Propose a valid hypothesis.
I'm sorry for sounding so pessimistic, but it seems that you do not wish to carry on a conversation with me. Is that the case? I'm only asking because again in your last comment to me here in this thread, you merely repeat my argument about how intelligence is detected by its effects as perceived by our senses.
I gave you a quote from Reid and a brief explanation. I posted:
"How else can you know anything is intelligence apart from patterns that they leave, either in the form of actions, speech, writings, artifacts, etc?
I leave you with this quote from Reid: "No man ever saw wisdom [read "design" or "intelligence"], and if he does not [infer wisdom] from the marks of it, he can form no conclusions respecting anything of his fellow creature. How should I know that any of this audience have understanding? It is only by the effects of it on their conduct and behavior, and this leads me to suppose that such behavior proceeds only from understanding. But says Hume, unless you know it by experience, you know nothing of it. If this is the case, I never could know it at all. Hence it appears that whoever maintains that there is no force in the argument from final causes [design], denies the existence of any intelligent being but himself. He has the same evidence for wisdom and intelligence in God as in a father or brother or a friend. He infers it in both from its effects and these effects he discovers in the one as well as the other"¦. From marks of wisdom and intelligence in effects, a wise and intelligent cause may be inferred. (Reprinted in Lectures on Natural Theology, University Press of America, 1981.)"
IOW, even when you have an experience with your fellow man, you can only determine his intelligence, or lack thereof, by the effects he leaves upon your senses. If everyone around was randomly bumping into walls and mumbling incoherently, there would be no effects for you to consider as signs of intelligence.
Remember that little question which begins ID research: "Can previous intelligence be detected from its effects, when nothing else is known about the intelligence?" But even then, that "anything else which is known about the intelligence" will itself only be stated in terms of the effects which that intelligence produces. Seems that so far, as long as intelligence can be defined (one aspect of which I believe I have done so already) the answer to that question is "yes."
To which you responded:
The only way to discover if something is capable of learning is to interact with it. If you could not observe it in novel circumstances, you would never know if the thing is able to learn or solve novel problems. Now, you haven't said here what you mean by "intelligent", but many people consider that learning and solving novel problems are critical components of intelligence. So artifacts don't help – you need to be able to perform experiments.
1. When did I ever say anything about learning?
2. I already defined intelligence for you in the thread "so then how did it happen" and you have not yet responded to my definition — which was all that you wanted in the first place.
3. If you actually read my comment before you responded, you would notice that I said that the only way to detect intelligence is through the effects that it leaves which we subsequently pick up through our senses. So, there is no difference between an "artifact" and an "experiment" since in running an experiment you will be picking up artifacts of intelligence through your senses in the form of visual, audible, and tactile clues.
I already stated, following IMO Reid's adequate rebuttal of Hume, that you can't know anything is intelligent except by the effects that it leaves upon your senses. The age of the effect, whether it is seconds, minutes, or centuries old makes no difference. An effect of intelligence is an effect of intelligence.
IOW, even when you have an [immediate] experience with your fellow man [or observe the actions of a gorilla or trapdoor spider], you can only determine his intelligence, or lack thereof, by the effects he leaves upon your senses. If everyone around was randomly bumping into walls and mumbling incoherently, there would be no effects for you to consider as signs of intelligence.
Likewise, you can determine that an ancient manuscript or a camera discovered on the other side of the universe originated in intelligence (as I have previously defined it).
aiguy, you also state:
"Consider this: I find a trap-door fitted to cave with a lasso and a diving bell inside. I also find a pile of leaves and a twig with the branches missing. Which one of these sets of artifacts reveals a true flexible problem-solving intelligence? Answer: The pile of leaves is what a gorilla is capable of designing, while spiders design trap doors, lassos, and diving bells. However, spiders are capable of only the most rudimentary conditioning, and are incapable of devising solutions to novel problems. Gorillas, of course, are far more flexible in their responses and ability to learn."
Yes, differing levels of intelligence do exist and can be researched. Again, the level of intelligence is decided by the effects that it produces.
Furthermore, you seem to have ignored how I've defined intelligence and how I've explained that it is not a vacuous notion and can be used as a partial explanation when dealing with conditions — potentially necessary conditions. Does this mean that you now understand how foresight (as I have defined one aspect of intelligence) is not a vacuous notion as was your original claim. I have explained this in the thread "so then how did it happen." Apparently you wanted a different thread to respond to me but as far as I can find, you have not yet done so. In fact, all that I can find is that you have "explicitly" ignored me (if such a thing is possible).
Also, you will notice that concepts such as purpose and will (as brought up by other commenters here as definitions of intelligence) are implications of a system which has foresight and the ability to apply that foresight. Again, I have previously explained this by referring to how one "wishes" to arrive at a specific destination and then plans their future route in advance. Therefore, if you agree with my understanding of intelligence and how it can be used as a condition (albeit not the whole story as I've already explained), then you may have to consider that these notions of purpose and will, since intricately linked with foresight as I've previously defined it, most probably do have an explanatory value (when seen as an implication derived from foresight).
Pez: 'Complexity' does not eliminate chance and complexity+ignorance does not=purpose.
I'm not quite sure how you are using your terms. I'll attempt to parse your statements.
Pez: Complexity does not eliminate chance…
Complexity implies organization, so in that aspect, it is not a random arrangement. However, complexity can arise from or be comprised of processes that include aspects of chance.
Pez: … complexity+ignorance does not=purpose
That's right, but your test for 'purpose' hinges on the equality. You observe something 'complex' and not having a ready explanation in necessity or chance, you conclude 'purpose'.
I'm sorry for sounding so pessimistic, but it seems that you do not wish to carry on a conversation with me. Is that the case?
No, I'm interested in talking to everyone here. The views among IDers here have been so varied I'll admit it's been hard to keep track of who thinks what. I'll try again with you here.
"How else can you know anything is intelligence apart from patterns that they leave, either in the form of actions, speech, writings, artifacts, etc?
I've tried to explain this to Pez; let me try again. If one is attempting to answer some question about a subject's capacity for a type of behavior, like intelligent behavior or athletic behavior, one needs to observe the relevant behaviors.
If I want to know if spider is intelligent, it is not enough for me to observe the artifact it leaves behind (the web that it builds). I need to observe the spider in novel situations to see if it can exhibit, say, problem solving skills. If the spider can't learn or use foresight to adapt to new circumstances, but instead just blindly follows hard-wired instinct to build these webs, then I would probably not consider the spider to be intelligent. However, if a human being built the very same artifact (a web made of silk), and we studied human beings to see if they used foresight to do this, we would come to a different conclusion: Humans would have to learn how to make a web, because they do not know this by instinct, so this would probably mean they are flexible and adaptive enough to be considered intelligent.
Again: Two entities make the very same artifact, but in one case we had a highly intelligent human being figuring out how to make a silk web, and in the other case a sterotyped instinctive animal who apparently lacks enough foresight to solve any novel problems.
Likewise if I want to know if bears are athletic, it is not enough for me to observe the "patterns that they leave". I might see footprints in the snow that go for many miles, but unless I can tell how long it took for the bear to traverse some distance, I can't know if the bear moved efficiently and with agility and speed, so I could not say if it should be considered athletic.
Hopefully you can see now why looking only at artifacts, without anyone ever being able to record the subject in situations where their actual behaviors can be observed, is not sufficient in order to answer questions about behaviors.
1. When did I ever say anything about learning?
If an animal is incapable of learning anything, then I have no idea why you would ever say it has foresight. Foresight (if I understand you) requires seeing the solution to a problem in advance of actually trying it. Another way of saying this is that the subject figures out or learns a solution that was previously unknown to the subject.
So, most scientists who study behavior including "learning" as a critical component for considering an animal intelligent. If an animal repeats the same behaviors no matter what circumstance it is in even when those behaviors result in the animal's death or failure to reproduce (like a spider), it's hard to see that animal as intelligent. Likewise, if an animal was incapable of moving quickly or efficiently, it would be confusing to call that animal athletic.
If you want to use this same word "intelligence" in a technical definition that is very different from the way we use the word in common usage, of course you can. I just wonder why you wouldn't pick another word, since most people do not think of things that can't learn to solve novel problems by using foresight as intelligent.
2. I already defined intelligence for you in the thread "so then how did it happen" and you have not yet responded to my definition "” which was all that you wanted in the first place.
Bradford locked me out of that thread, so our discussion was cut off. Can you refresh my memory? (Again, I've been given a large number of very different definitions here!)
3. If you actually read my comment before you responded, you would notice that I said that the only way to detect intelligence is through the effects that it leaves which we subsequently pick up through our senses. So, there is no difference between an "artifact" and an "experiment" since in running an experiment you will be picking up artifacts of intelligence through your senses in the form of visual, audible, and tactile clues.
Please read my response above once again to see that the issue is not whether we are observing behaviors in person or after the fact by means of records. Rather, the issue is that we must record data about the actual behaviors we are interested in. For athleticism, this would be data about how quickly the animal moved (evidence of athletic power). For intelligence, this would be data about how flexible and adaptive they are (evidence of foresight and reasoning).
Yes, differing levels of intelligence do exist and can be researched. Again, the level of intelligence is decided by the effects that it produces.
No, not at all. Rather, the level of intelligence is decided by the problems the subject can solve. An entity hard-wired to do one thing and one thing alone no matter what the circumstance does not evidence foresight, no matter what that one thing is.
Furthermore, you seem to have ignored how I've defined intelligence and how I've explained that it is not a vacuous notion and can be used as a partial explanation when dealing with conditions "” potentially necessary conditions. Does this mean that you now understand how foresight (as I have defined one aspect of intelligence) is not a vacuous notion as was your original claim.
Again, IDers are all over the map with what they mean by "intelligence", even on this one forum. My claim was that ID needs to qualify the term in order to have content. You've chosen "foresight"; others have chosen all sorts of other attributes.
I have explained this in the thread "so then how did it happen." Apparently you wanted a different thread to respond to me but as far as I can find, you have not yet done so. In fact, all that I can find is that you have "explicitly" ignored me (if such a thing is possible).
Again, for reasons known only to Bradford, he has blocked my access to two threads now, relegating me to this thread. He doesn't like my arguments, apparently.
CJYman: I already defined intelligence for you in the thread "so then how did it happen" and you have not yet responded to my definition "” which was all that you wanted in the first place.
I reread your comments, but can't find your definition. It's a rather long thread. Can you please provide your definition without elaboration? Thanks!
I've tried to explain this to Pez; let me try again. If one is attempting to answer some question about a subject's capacity for a type of behavior, like intelligent behavior or athletic behavior, one needs to observe the relevant behaviors.
This is not an explanation but an assertion.
And a refuted one at that.
AIGUY: I'm saying that if something does one thing and one thing alone, no matter what the circumstance, by virtue of physical necessity, it does not use foresight. Do you disagree with this?
PEZ: By virtue of physical necessity? Right. That does not demonstrate foresight.
I think until somebody actually writes a technical glossary for the terms you are using we will be talking past each other. Why do you say foresight cannot occur by virtue of physical necessity?
Furthermore, if something does one thing and one thing alone no matter what the circumstance, whether by physical necessity or not, would you say that demonstrates foresight? Of course not. So, since you can't tell if the Designer was capable of doing anything else in any other situation, you can't tell if the Designer had foresight.
The test for irreducible complexity, complex specified information, information counter-flow "¦ ID.
I've already said I believe these ideas (CSI, IC, and especially "counter-flow") to all be hopelessly confused. No scientists who study intelligence use any of these concepts. But I don't want the discussion derailed here, so let's just bracket this. I will only say that whatever these ideas are, they are characteristics of artifacts, and not characteristics of the cause of the artifacts.
AIGUY: 3) In order to decide which hypothesis is true, I need to see if the cause exhibits any behaviors which illustrate foresight, i.e. certain types of problem-solving behaviors.
PEZ: The machinery is the indication.
Imagine a spider and a human both making spider webs. Two entities make the very same artifact, but in one case we had a highly intelligent human being figuring out how to make a silk web, and in the other case a sterotyped instinctive animal who apparently lacks enough foresight to solve any novel problems, but making the very same artifact.
PEZ: OK. How do you determine efficient locomotion?
AIGUY: Like I said, the operational definition is different for each context, just like intelligence. In human beings, one test for intelligence might be a score of 70 or more on a Standford-Binet IQ test. In human beings, one test for athleticism might be running a mile in under four minutes.
PEZ: So you don't have a test for "athleticism" itself?
Sure, I have lots of tests for athleticism! Don't you have lots of tests for intelligence?
Does a four-minute-mile test for athleticism in horses?
No, the test for athleticism in horses is different. Likewise, you couldn't give a horse a Stanford-Binet IQ test, right?
Is your definition species-specific?
No, only the tests are species specific. How about for intelligence – is your definition species specific?
Do you have tests that are not temporally defined?
Yes.
Can't you see by now that I can keep this up as long as you'd like, and you will never be able show that "athleticism" is any more subjective or useless or vacuous in the context of ID than "athleticism" is? Both of these labels are simply loose, descriptive terms for various abilities that we informally lump together, but which can be given specific operational definitions only for particular entities.
Okay, he might not be Carl Lewis, but these artifacts all evidence athleticism even though he was not observed making them, since he was alone in the arena. Right? Or do you contend that I am wrong?
For about the fourth time: The issue is not if we are physically present with our bare eyeballs or if we see records of the relevant behaviors. The issue is that we observe data on the relevant behaviors. If we get a record of the distances and times from Carl's motions, we can judge his athleticism. If we only get a photograph of him crossing the finish line, however, we have no idea if he is athletic or not.
What would really be dumb would be to attempt to explain how Carl managed to run so fast by saying "It is because he is athletic". Hopefully you can see this tells us nothing we did not already know!
So you still haven't slain my dragon, Pez – he is still standing in front of you, and taunting you to reply: How is calling some "intelligent" any more informative than calling something "athletic" when you have no idea what sort of thing you are talking about? Is the moon athletic because it circles the Earth so quickly? Is a termite colony intelligent because it can build a complex functional structure? Can't you see these sorts of questions are matters of definition rather than discovery?
ID does not say this. ID specifies what kind of complexity indicates purposeful arrangement of parts.
I don't care how ID characterizes biological forms; I care about how ID attempts to characterize the cause of these forms. If ID restricts itself to talking about how complex and purposeful flagella are, then it has nothing to say about what caused the flagella.
But you are wrong, because ID does talk about what caused flagella. They say it was "intelligent cause". ("Certain features of biology and universe are best explained by intelligent cause" – does this ring a bell?)
"certain features of life are best explained with reference to the purposeful arrangement of parts."
The way I said it is the way all of the leading ID authors say it – why did you change it? Do you deny that "intelligence" is required to create a "purposeful arrangement of parts" This seems like nothing but obfuscatory wordplay to me.
I'm not sure he says that an intelligent cause can't itself be the result of law + chance. That would be telling us something we can't know about the cause of the design. And again, it's irrelevant. who designed the designer is not an argument, nor is 'was the designer designed'?
First, of course he is saying intelligent cause can't be the result of law plus chance – his explanatory filter asks us to distinguish the result of intelligent cause on one hand from the result of any combination of law+chance on the other hand. If intelligent cause is itself the result of law+chance, this makes no sense.
And besides, you have said this yourself, e.g. "By virtue of physical necessity? Right. That does not demonstrate foresight."
AIGUY: So if this whole argument is going to reduce to an assessment of Dembski's notion of "specification" and CSI, that will be too bad indeed. Dembski never shows how we can ever empirically evaluate the proposition "only intelligent cause can generate CSI", because he never says how to determine if anything is intelligent except by seeing if it generates CSI!
PEZ: That is one test.
But that is that only empirical test ID offers! In other words, that is the operational definition of intelligence in the context of ID. And that is exactly why I say "intelligence" in the context of ID is a dormitive principle:
Q: What caused the CSI in biology?
A: Intelligence.
Q: What is intelligence?
A: It is operationally defined in ID as "that which can cause CSI"
We can agree when we agree on what free will and intent are. If we can't agree that the test demonstrates free will and intent we can still agree on what the data show. If "spontaneity", for instance, is not "free will" it is still spontaneity.
Yes, we can show that the subject showed behavior that was not random and not triggered by environmental cues. This has nothing to do with ID. We can't show free will and intent, and that means these are not scientifically useful terms in the context of ID.
Eliminate necessity and random chance – the things offered as defeaters of the argument to purpose.
1) You cannot show that necessity+chance does not account for intelligence itself. You have admitted this yourself in your very last post.
2) You cannot eliminate all necessity and random chance, because you are not omniscient, and cannot say what other forms of necessity there may be
3) Even if you eliminate necessity and chance, there is nothing to tell us what might be remaining. It might be "mojo" or "magic" or "free will" or "the intrinsic geometry of hyperspace inversions" or…
But, again (but of course not once and for all) the definition of intelligence is irrelevant because the inference is to design. What is meant is obvious in the terms design, purpose, foresight, etc.
Again, if you are not saying that "intelligence" is "the best explanation for certain features of biology…" then you are not talking about what I'm interested in. If the definition of intelligence is irrelevant, then you are not talking about intelligent agents creating life, and I really don't know what you are talking about, but it is not what I think of as "intelligent design". Once again, from the DI website: The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause
…and we are not forbidden from an inference in the hopes that some other explanation will pop its head up one day. We've covered this. The inference is assertible regardless of naturalism's blank cheques.
These are two of ID's tricks that do not work:
1) Conflating "no known explanation" for "ruling out chance and necessity"
2) Casting "intent/purpose/intelligence" as the default conclusion once chance and necessity has been "ruled out".
Using ID's own tricks:
1) I rule out chance and necessity as explanations for protein folding, because nobody can explain how proteins fold by any combination of chance and necessity. That means nobody will ever find out how proteins fold inside of cells in terms of law+chance.
2) Since it's not chance and necessity, it must be "magic"
So I've demonstrated that proteins fold inside our cells by means of magic.
What does carve statues and swing axes?
Human beings.
Why are you so unable to draw appropriate conclusions?
Just stupid, I guess.
If it's not wind and rain what unintelligent force is it? Gravity? EM?
I have no idea what it might be, but I'm sure it's not wind and rain – so wind and rain have nothing to do with it.
1) We can't explain how proteins fold inside cells. Wind and rain can't explain it, so it must not be any unintelligent force.
2) Therefore a little intelligent demon must live inside each of our cells folding up our proteins, day in and day out…
So human-like intelligence is not necessarily associated with a human brain? Or it is?
Nobody knows for sure. It is not logically necessary. There is reason to believe that either the specific neurological structures in human brains, or a physical analogue of those structures, is required. If a physical analogue will work, nobody can say what particular physical features must be present (will transistors do? what about artificial microtubles?).
It need not be human-like in every and all aspects to be human-like. The ability to choose, deliberate, imagine and hold goals seems human-like enough to me.
Again, without operational definitions these are useless. A thermostat chooses and deliberates – prove me wrong empirically. How do you test for when something is "imagining" if it can't talk?
This sort of talk is like saying that the moon is athletic because it moves around the Earth so fast.
AIGUY: Tell me how to look at some arranger which is arranging some parts, and decide if this arranger is purposeful or not.
PEZ: It contingently arranges parts which are well-matched to perform a function in such an improbable manner that defies random chance.
I think this can be done by things that are not purposeful. How can we empirically decide who is right (since we can't just ask if somebody is doing it on purpose or not).
PEZ: But define "spontaneous" please.
AIGUY: They said it right in the page: "the international team of researchers showed for the first time that such variability cannot be due to simple random events but is generated spontaneously and non-randomly by the brain." Spontaneous here means "not in response to environmental cues". They defined this operationally, so they could test it, and they tested it by removing environmental cues to see if the behaviors persisted. See what I mean?
PEZ: So spontaneous is "not determined and not random". Sounds like something I've heard somewhere else. And yet, here you accept it.
Are you doing this on purpose? You keep changing "not in response to environment cues" into "not determined". Did you think we would not notice?
Really. And what would it be if it were in response to environmental cues? Since the behaviour is "indeterminate", "unpredictable", and "unlikely to be the by-product of the brain" in what way is it deterministic if it is generated by the brain not by accidental errors, not at random, and not in response to environmental cues?
Of course "determined" is different from "in response to environmental cues"!
I take "determined" to mean "necessitated by antecedent physical cause". The authors are not claiming that the fly's behavior is not caused by antecedent physical cause – only that it triggered by internal rather than external cause.
What determines it?
They've told you what they think. Once again:
Regardless of our speculations on free will, the most important scientific aspect of our work is the evidence we found for a brain function which appears evolutionarily designed to always spontaneously vary ongoing behavior.
They are talking about a physical brain which implements a physical function that generates physical signals to initiate physical behaviors, where the function does not use input from environmental cues.
What did the co-author mean here, then:
"This nonlinear signature eliminates the two alternative explanations of spontaneous turning behavior in flies that would run counter to free will, namely complete randomness and pure determinism.
He says what he means:
On the other hand, if our action was completely determined by external factors such that there was no alternative, again the person would not be held responsible
The fact that you confused the notion of "determined by external factors" with "determined by physical cause" illustrates once again the need for careful definitions. The behaviors in the fly's brain are determined (as far as we can tell!) in the philosophical sense of determinism, but the antecedent causes arise within the brain function they describe rather than being caused by external cues.
Who said anything about "voice recognition? You are changing the subject to justify yet another computer analogy.
Same subject: Both computer and OCD patient recognize the meaning of the information contained in the soundwaves.
In fact, experimental evidence shows that a brain receiving an auditory signal is differently affected depending upon the focused attention given that signal. The signal can be identical each time and have different results.
This is of course exactly the same for computers. Depending on the state of the computer, it may pay attention to commands, interpret them differently, or ignore them altogether.
So? Appealing to a computer program that reacts to a soundwave without attending to it merely begs the question in the same way that your "athleticism" example does.
Neither of these examples beg the question, and you have not said how you think they do. You just dismiss them by claiming they beg the question, but they don't.
You've presumed that because the sound wave is physical and the computer reacts to it that this is all that is involved in the studies referenced. This is false.
I have consistently pointed out that it is neither demonstrably false nor demonstrably true, but certainly nothing that Schwartz has shown is in any way inconsistent with or would not be (trivially) predicted by materialist theory.
We are looking not at physical carriers but the immaterial information carried.
Both the computer and the human interprets the immaterial information carried. I think we agree that the computer does not have an immaterial mind, however.
AND "¦ it was not the reception of the information itself that had the effect on the brain's neurology.
You and Schwartz believe this, others may not, and there is nothing you can do to decide the issue. That is why Schwartz was wrong to imagine he had evidence for dualism.
Thanks to Nullasalus for saving me some typing on this subject. I appreciate the participation. And I hope it continues "¦ hint.
I think you should take some points from nullasalus – he is quite a bit more clear about these issues I'd say, and I disagree with very little of what he says in general.
Not so. They can test the effect of willful attention and show its effects. Also, not all the subjects can respond in the same way even though they received the same environmental stimuli.
None of this is evidence for dualism.
Please answer this question: If dualism is false, does this mean your conception of ID is also false?
This is irrelevant. Monkeys respond differently to the same sound wave depending upon their attention and expectations. This difference in response is reflected in brain changes.
So you think this means monkeys have immaterial minds? (hint: computers respond differently to the same sound wave depending on their attention and expectations).
Musicians respond differently to the same soundwaves when attending to them in different ways.
As do computers.
No you haven't. Not at all. Your inference from terseness is faulty.
Either tell me why the computer analogy is faulty or withdraw your claim; your unsupported charge just doesn't cut it.
Eliminativism maintains that the common-sense understanding of the mind is mistaken, and that the neurosciences will one day reveal that the mental states that are talked about in every day discourse, using words such as intend, believe, desire, and love, do not refer to anything real.
Who said anything about "eliminativism" Stop it with these bait-and-switch bluffs, Pez – do you think we won't notice? If you continue reading your Wiki you will see that not all materialism is eliminativist materialism. I know many materialists but I've never actually met an eliminative materialist.
And even with that error that you've made, you've still confused the claims of even eliminative materialists! Just because they say "intent" does not exist does not mean they believe no brain changes could occur when someone is trained in Schwartz's technique! They of course would all believe that brain changes must occur!
[here you have some completely irrelevant historical information about behaviorists...]
Skinner, an eliminative materialist is one of the most prominent theorists discussed by Schwartz and his and other behaviourist's ideas were in direct opposition to Schwartz's method. Skinner argued that our subjective experience of mind as something special or different is just an illusion (a la Dan Dennett).
Neither you nor Schwartz understands these positions, apparently. First, can you name anyone who is a Skinnerian behaviorist? I didn't think so (shall I accuse "immaterialists" of thinking God hurls lightning bolts at Churches?). Really, this is a joke – Skinner's failed behaviorism is rejected by every materialist cognitive scientist I know. Moreover, even a Skinnerian behaviorist would never say that no brain changes would result either from external stimuli of training or further processing of information inside the brain.
But you're right, few would say it. But they have to fight hard to deny that it is true of their theories. These are discussions and critiques of the implications of eliminative materialism and reductive physicalism. It's a bit of a literature dump and is unnecessary reading given that my point is made above.
Pez, I'd like to clear up issues with you regarding how ID tries to infer mental attributes of the Designer by studying the evidence of biological forms. I do not want to argue philosophy of mind with you, however – sorry. I'm quite familiar with all of the arguments you've cited, but thanks for the references anyway.
I think these are the main points remaining:
1) Do you or do you not believe that ID Theory claims that "intelligent cause" constitutes a scientific explanation for the complex form and function we see in biology? If you do not think that ID attempts to do this, I think we needn't go any farther.
2) How can I decide if Carl Lewis is athletic if all I have is a picture of him at the finish line and I don't know how fast he's run? Maybe somebody carried him there, or it took a year to crawl the track.
Likewise, how can we decide if something uses foresight if all we have is the resulting artifact and we don't know if it can solve problems? Maybe the Designer has no foresight at all, and the one and only thing it does is output these life forms.
And finally, one more time:
AIGUY: I've tried to explain this to Pez; let me try again. If one is attempting to answer some question about a subject's capacity for a type of behavior, like intelligent behavior or athletic behavior, one needs to observe the relevant behaviors.
PEZ: This is not an explanation but an assertion. And a refuted one at that.
How can I decide if the bear is athletic from only GPS, if I don't know how long it takes him to traverse the snow, or even if he moved under his own power? I cannot.
How can I decide if the Designer used foresight to create a flagella if I don't know if the Designer is capable of solving novel problems? I cannot.
I'm looking for the best way to cut through all the confusion and the miscommunication that I see at the heart of these debates. People use all of these words differently, and we continually talk past each other.
I think that words "intelligence", "intelligent cause", "foresight", "will", "purpose", "intent", "mind" and others are constantly being used in ways that make no sense with respect to our experience in the context of ID. By this I mean either the words are used in ways that are too ambiguous to interpret in the context of ID, or they are used in meaningful ways that can't be evaluated against our shared experience by looking at the data.
So I'd like to focus on this analogy that I've come up with that I believe makes these issues much clearer.
"Athleticism" is the label we apply to various sorts of behaviors; the same is true of "intelligence". The tests for athleticism vary for each thing we test; we give a human a different test than a racehorse. Same with intelligence – we test the intelligence of an octopus one way, and a human being another way, and the Cause of Living Things yet another way.
Given that, I propose: "Athletic Cause Theory (ACT) says that certain features of biology and the universe are best explained by athletic cause".
Now, I believe that ACT is a perfectly ridiculous theory, because it really doesn't mean anything at all to apply the notion of "athleticism" to natural phenomena in general. I claim that it is meaningless to say, for example, that the speed of light is so fast because light is athletic.
However, I claim that this loose notion of athleticism is perfectly analogous to the loose notion of intelligence. Neither one of these ideas can serve as a useful explanation for anything. It is just as meaningless to say that "intelligence" explains the complex forms in biology as it is to say that "athleticism" explains how cheetahs can run so fast.
Can anyone refute this argument? To summarize my argument:
1) Explaining the speed of light or the running ability of a cheetah by appeal to "athleticism" is vacuous.
2) Explaining the existence of complex forms in biology by appeal to "intelligence" is vacuous in the same way, for the same reason.
To refute my argument, please tell me either
1) Why "athleticism" is actually an informative explanation for natural phenomena in general, such as how cheetahs run fast or how proteins fold up in cells so quickly
OR
2) Why "intelligence" is different from "athleticism" when both of them refer generally to the ability to do certain types of behaviors, and when neither of these concepts can be given a single, objective, uniform method to empirically decide what is athletic and what is not, or what is intelligent and what is not.
HI Aiguy,
I don't have time even to look over your comment right now but I do want to work on this dragon of yours.
For about the fourth time: The issue is not if we are physically present with our bare eyeballs or if we see records of the relevant behaviors. The issue is that we observe data on the relevant behaviors.
Do we have appropriate data here?
If we get a record of the distances and times from Carl's motions, we can judge his athleticism. If we only get a photograph of him crossing the finish line, however, we have no idea if he is athletic or not.
You aren't answering my question. Can I tell that this fellow, who shows me the stop watches and shows me marks in the sand is athletic?
What would really be dumb would be to attempt to explain how Carl managed to run so fast by saying "It is because he is athletic". Hopefully you can see this tells us nothing we did not already know!
That's a later question – and, as I said, it is not analagous. For now, we have a question about this would-be Carl Lewis.
So you still haven't slain my dragon, Pez – he is still standing in front of you, and taunting you
That's all he can do right now.
to reply: How is calling some "intelligent" any more informative than calling something "athletic" when you have no idea what sort of thing you are talking about? Is the moon athletic because it circles the Earth so quickly? Is a termite colony intelligent because it can build a complex functional structure? Can't you see these sorts of questions are matters of definition rather than discovery?
You've dashed off with a half-dozen questions, but I asked you only one on this subject.
This fellow I didn't observe running or jumping, is he athletic?
Using your terminology, is the fact that one stop-watch is stopped under four-minutes and the other at 11 seconds best explained by his athleticism? Is his athleticism indicated by the marks in the sand?
The fact that you confused the notion of "determined by external factors" with "determined by physical cause" illustrates once again the need for careful definitions. The behaviors in the fly's brain are determined (as far as we can tell!) in the philosophical sense of determinism, but the antecedent causes arise within the brain function they describe rather than being caused by external cues.
As far as we can tell, which is 'not very much at all'. Determinism, especially when related to brains, is an open question. The door has always been opened enough for determinists to think 'Well, if we had perfect information, it would be determinist' and their opponents to think 'Well, we can't have perfect information, because it's not determinist'.
You and Schwartz believe this, others may not, and there is nothing you can do to decide the issue. That is why Schwartz was wrong to imagine he had evidence for dualism.
I'm pounding on this point, but I think it's fair game: You're taking Schwartz to task for acting as if the evidence were consistent with a dualistic (and there are many specific dualist points of view) perspective, perhaps moreso than a physicalist one. Do I even need to quote Dennett's infamous treatment of dualists, ranging from Swinburne to Chalmers to otherwise? How about others' treatment? Why did Lycan feel it necessary to, even as a physicalist, write a paper admitting that the case for dualism is roughly as good as the case for physicalism with regards to the merits of reason?
Who said anything about "eliminativism" Stop it with these bait-and-switch bluffs, Pez – do you think we won't notice? If you continue reading your Wiki you will see that not all materialism is eliminativist materialism. I know many materialists but I've never actually met an eliminative materialist.
Maybe it's not a popular position nowadays, but they do exist. I think Pez is saying that Schwartz's discoveries were difficult to integrate with some physicalist schools of thought, and consistent with some dualist schools of thought. We all know that this field is wide open – you can believe in a soul by way of neutral monism, you can be a dualist and a materialist.
This really all seems to be coming down to 'Schwartz & Co. do what just about every other person in this field does, with as much justification.'
Really, this is a joke – Skinner's failed behaviorism is rejected by every materialist cognitive scientist I know.
You and I both know why Skinner's behaviorism is classified as 'failed' – because once upon a time (on the order of years, rather than many decades or centuries) it was popular. Deeper investigation into the mind combined with popular motion among philosophers and scientists led to its downfall – but it had an 'up' to fall down from.
2) Why "intelligence" is different from "athleticism" when both of them refer generally to the ability to do certain types of behaviors, and when neither of these concepts can be given a single, objective, uniform method to empirically decide what is athletic and what is not, or what is intelligent and what is not.
Not really my thing, but just for the hell of it: Because intelligence draws a circle that includes questions and possibilities of 'mind' (potentially defined in a broad number of ways) as the instigating event, while athleticism can only be drawn around a physical capacity to perform (unless, of course, it presupposes a mind or the mind-like).
I don't have time even to look over your comment right now but I do want to work on this dragon of yours.
He is ready to smite you.
Can I tell that this fellow, who shows me the stop watches and shows me marks in the sand is athletic?
I'm sorry, I don't understand – you are asking me if you can tell that some person who is showing you the times and marks is athletic or not? If so, then yes, if you give him tests to see if he is athletic, then you can answer that question.
Likewise, if you give me information regarding Lewis' running times and jumping distances in various standard events, I can tell you if he is athletic or not.
That's a later question – and, as I said, it is not analagous. For now, we have a question about this would-be Carl Lewis.
As I said, it is quite analogous, because both "intelligence" and "athleticism" are descriptive terms for various different types of behaviors, and neither have operational definitions that can be applied in arbitrary contexts. You have never yet said why you think the analogy is not valid.
You've dashed off with a half-dozen questions, but I asked you only one on this subject. This fellow I didn't observe running or jumping, is he athletic?
I can't say, since I don't know what he can do (except relay to you the results of Lewis' performance). You would need to have this fellow participate in some track events (or golf, or ping-pong, or whatever sport he might do) before we could say if he was athletic.
Using your terminology, is the fact that one stop-watch is stopped under four-minutes and the other at 11 seconds best explained by his athleticism?
Athletic Cause Theory explains Lewis' ability to run fast by appeal to the concept of "athleticsm". The stop watch is an instrument used to measure Lewis' running speed; other instruments could be used instead. Lewis' athleticsm does not explain the stop-watch readings, however, since the stop-watch might have been stopped by all sorts of things. We would need to ascertain that the watch reflected the time Lewis actually took to run under his own power the complete distance involved.
Is his athleticism indicated by the marks in the sand?
Not necessarily, no, since the marks in the sand might have been made by something that was not athletic at all. You need to observe that Lewis himself made those marks by jumping from a certain point, without intermediate touchdown, and without a jet-pack strapped to his back, and so on. Once you observe that Lewis actually accomplished an athletic feat, you can (according to ACTheory) explain the result on account of his athleticism.
As far as we can tell, which is 'not very much at all'.
Yes, for all we know, flies might have immaterial, contra-causal minds. (And so might rocks for that matter, but that's just getting ridiculous I suppose).
Determinism, especially when related to brains, is an open question. The door has always been opened enough for determinists to think 'Well, if we had perfect information, it would be determinist' and their opponents to think 'Well, we can't have perfect information, because it's not determinist'.
Yes, and QM makes all of this even more harder to sort out.
I'm pounding on this point, but I think it's fair game: You're taking Schwartz to task for acting as if the evidence were consistent with a dualistic (and there are many specific dualist points of view) perspective, perhaps moreso than a physicalist one.
No, I take him to task for saying things that are false: He claims that materialist theories predicted that no brain change could occur from people thinking about things like "mindful awareness". But not even the behaviorists would have made this claim, much less modern materialist theorists, so that is patently false.
Do I even need to quote Dennett's infamous treatment of dualists, ranging from Swinburne to Chalmers to otherwise? How about others' treatment?
What, his mysterian remarks? Sure, quote away – I'm really not a Dennett fan at all.
Why did Lycan feel it necessary to, even as a physicalist, write a paper admitting that the case for dualism is roughly as good as the case for physicalism with regards to the merits of reason?
And I agree with most of what he said too.
I've already told you I'm no materialist. I don't even think "materialism" makes sense, because it really alludes to a type of material – of physical cause – that nobody has believed in since the quantum revolution. Are quantum probability waves "material" or not? I can't say. Besides, I consider qualia a hard problem that can't begin to be couched in terms of any physics we can conceive of. So I call myself a neutral monist, but I don't pretend it means too much. Nothing explains our phenomenology, but it's not the sort of physical stuff we usually think of as "physical" so I'm not physicalist, and it doesn't help to call it irreducible res cogitans either so I'm not dualist. So neutral monism is the way I can say essentially nothing about what I think is going on, but at least not multiply my ignorant hypotheses
Maybe it's not a popular position nowadays, but they do exist. I think Pez is saying that Schwartz's discoveries were difficult to integrate with some physicalist schools of thought, and consistent with some dualist schools of thought. We all know that this field is wide open – you can believe in a soul by way of neutral monism, you can be a dualist and a materialist.
But he never even tries to show what makes it hard to integrate his results within materialism – he simply pretends that his results violate the predictions of materialism, which you and I know is not the case.
You and I both know why Skinner's behaviorism is classified as 'failed' – because once upon a time (on the order of years, rather than many decades or centuries) it was popular. Deeper investigation into the mind combined with popular motion among philosophers and scientists led to its downfall – but it had an 'up' to fall down from.
So you know I understand: I was an undergraduate at a major university in 1972-1976, more than a decade after Chomsky et al took radical behaviorism apart. Still and yet, that is exactly what I was taught – because that is what my professors knew. Imagine my disillusionment when I finally found out behaviorism was incapable of explaining behavior.
But now it is thirty years hence, and for Schwartz to position his findings against Skinnerian behaviorism at this point really is a strawman argument. And besides, once again, what he said about materialism wasn't true even if he takes Skinner to be the touchstone for current materialist thought. Even Skinner would not argue that the brain would not change when a behavior changed. (Skinner just wouldn't care about that particular issue, actually, because it was not the sort of "behavior" he was interested in.)
Not really my thing, but just for the hell of it: Because intelligence draws a circle that includes questions and possibilities of 'mind' (potentially defined in a broad number of ways) as the instigating event, while athleticism can only be drawn around a physical capacity to perform (unless, of course, it presupposes a mind or the mind-like).
As usual, nullasalus, you are spot-on. Yes, that is the salient difference… but it's a bit worse than you suggest.
"Intelligence" is a word that we use in informal and inconsistent ways to describe mental abilities of various sorts. "Athleticism" is a word that we use in informal and inconsistent ways to describe physical abilities of various sorts. Either of these words can be given precise operational definitions, but only for particular contexts – there are no meaningful empirically grounded definitions of either of these words that can apply universally to any sort of animal or entity.
Now, while it sounds reasonable to most people to explain how something like a flagellum comes to exist by appeal to "intelligence", it does not sound reasonable to explain how something like a flagella moves by appeal to "athleticism". Why should this be?
The reason is because most people reify the concept of intelligence, but not the concept of athleticism. The reasons most people offer for treating "intelligence" as a causal thing instead of a descriptive label are very confused, because they can't stop mixing up intelligence with our subjective experience of volition.
Most IDers deny that these issues are problematic for ID, but of course they are central to the very core tenets of any version of ID. In order for ID to even have meaning that we can evaluate the truth of, it must argue for some particular theory of mind that shows intelligence is a causal force rather than a description of our abilities. There are no books on ID per se that even attempt to do this! There is, however, a book listed on this forum's right margin – "Agents Under Fire" by Menuge – that does address these issues (poorly, in my opinion, but at least he's in the ballpark).
In order to have a meaningful ID theory, IDers need to drop the equivocations, the pretense that folk psychology is adequate to their needs, and put a stake in the ground for dualistic interactionism – or whatever they really are talking about when the use this damnably undefined term of theirs. They won't, however, because then they must drop their pretense that ID has somehow moved from philosophy/theology into the realm of science.
In the end, the athleticism analogy shows that it is perfectly absurd to attempt to explain anything by reference soley to "intelligence" without any other qualification, the way ID tries to do in it's canonical definition of "…features best explained by intelligence cause". It is exactly as absurd as explaining something by reference to athletic cause.
Yes, for all we know, flies might have immaterial, contra-causal minds. (And so might rocks for that matter, but that's just getting ridiculous I suppose).
Yes, and QM makes all of this even more harder to sort out.
No need to even move to 'immaterial and contra-causal' – our current knowledge of physics alone is a big question with regards to determinism in brains, even fruit-fly brains – and that's what I was mainly referring to here.
No, I take him to task for saying things that are false: He claims that materialist theories predicted that no brain change could occur from people thinking about things like "mindful awareness". But not even the behaviorists would have made this claim, much less modern materialist theorists, so that is patently false.
Dualists and materialists agree that a change in brain will correlate with a change in thought (they may disagree on which is prompting which, etc), and 'there will be a change in brain state from moment X to moment Y' is trivial when generalized that much. But the focus is on whether an internal mental dialogue and directed thought could lead to the sort of changes Schwartz records. Are you honestly telling me that every and all materialist theories about the brain presupposed that problems like OCD could be overcome by mental focus and dialogue? Or even the clear majority of them?
I'm not saying 'Can some materialist theory accept this with modification' or 'Is there a materialist theory that could accept this'.
What, his mysterian remarks? Sure, quote away – I'm really not a Dennett fan at all.
I know you're not. But just for the hell of it:
Dualism (the view that minds are composed of some nonphysical and utterly mysterious stuff) . . . [has]been relegated to the trash heap of history, along with alchemy and astrology. Unless you are also prepared to declare that the world is flat and the sun is a fiery chariot pulled by winged horses "” unless, in other words, your defiance of modern science is quite complete "” you won't find any place to stand and fight for these obsolete ideas.
I've already told you I'm no materialist. I don't even think "materialism" makes sense, because it really alludes to a type of material – of physical cause – that nobody has believed in since the quantum revolution. Are quantum probability waves "material" or not? I can't say.
I know you're not. And I agree with you entirely about materialism – I think the word (along with 'naturalism', for what it's worth) is comedy at this point.
But I'm pointing out that you're coming down on Schwartz, Beauregard, etc hard for asserting that developments in mind/brain studies and philosophy have bolstered dualism (on the grounds that there are physicalist or materialist theories that can accept them), when the fact is that these books are not just in the minority of writings, but frankly tend to take a defensive stance. Because the general attitude is (wrongly, as we both know) that dualism was put to the sword by neurology studies, as if it wasn't until Freud that people, dualists included, had a feeling this 'brain' thing was involved in thought.
Disagree with Schwartz, sure. Question his tone. But you're throwing out 'idiot' and, in essence, 'liar' for what amounts to a drumming up of support for a dualist friendly stance, in an arena where Dennett among others (And for as much as we both have a low view of some of his thoughts, we have to admit he's not exactly a small name in philosophy of mind) can.. well, hey, I did provide the quote. Again, I know you said you agree, but: Why did Lycan write what he did? Apparently, it was because he knew that the field was and is rife with an utter fabrication of the rational standing of dualism in philosophy of mind.
I think all I'm saying here is: Okay, I know you dislike ID, and you likely disagree with Schwartz's tone. But come on. Let's have some perspective here.
Even Skinner would not argue that the brain would not change when a behavior changed. (Skinner just wouldn't care about that particular issue, actually, because it was not the sort of "behavior" he was interested in.)
The issue is what changed the behavior, how it changed. Again, 'the brain will change between time X and Y' is trivial – almost everyone can get behind that. Once we get past that, the question is whether developments highlighted by Schwartz or the placebo effect, etc, are best described as 'physical acting on physical' or 'mental acting on physical'. Schwartz and others (of varying positions) think something closer to the latter is in play, rather than the former, and make their arguments accordingly. I'd criticize them (however limited, given the circumstances) if I saw them making ridiculous, over the top claims. I don't see it here. Instead it's the sort of fight you get in philosophy of mind debates that are reasonably cordial.
Now, while it sounds reasonable to most people to explain how something like a flagellum comes to exist by appeal to "intelligence", it does not sound reasonable to explain how something like a flagella moves by appeal to "athleticism". Why should this be?
Mostly because athleticism may or may not involve something mindlike, so while athleticism may potentially explain an aspect of the flagella, it's leaving other questions unanswered. For my money, you may as well replace 'athleticism' with 'physicalism' here, so this example isn't doing the work some would like it to.
They won't, however, because then they must drop their pretense that ID has somehow moved from philosophy/theology into the realm of science.
Honestly, in my following of ID and related news and views, the fight is largely about philosophy anyway, on all sides. But hey, I'm biased on that point.
In the end, the athleticism analogy shows that it is perfectly absurd to attempt to explain anything by reference soley to "intelligence" without any other qualification, the way ID tries to do in it's canonical definition of ""¦features best explained by intelligence cause". It is exactly as absurd as explaining something by reference to athletic cause.
Your complaint amounts to 'you need a firm definition of intelligence in order to test it or propose it in the scientific arena', which I agree with. I think there've been attempted moves towards this (Dembski apparently tries to establish something with math, Behe by appeals to limits of evolution), but I remain a skeptic of the ID end of science. On the other hand, I think questions of 'could intelligence have directed past causes' are wide open, even testable to a point – just hit the computer simulation. In fact, I think the mere existence of computer simulations has permanently exploded this debate, even if the ramifications haven't caught up with most of the philosophers yet.
Actually, that's an interesting question: Is 'an intelligent agent with the appropriate knowledge and ambulatory abilities could create life from non-life' a scientific statement? How about 'humans are able to front-load particular events in nature'? I mean, I always knew 'intelligence' of that type could be considered or offered up, but I'd like to know if those are scientific proposals.
Hi Aiguy,
I'm still short on time but I will respond to your gasping dragon again and see if you will let him out of his cage to fight me.
I'm sorry, I don't understand – you are asking me if you can tell that some person who is showing you the times and marks is athletic or not? If so, then yes, if you give him tests to see if he is athletic, then you can answer that question.
Likewise, if you give me information regarding Lewis' running times and jumping distances in various standard events, I can tell you if he is athletic or not.
Let him out. You understand perfectly well. You have the situation and the data. Can you tell if this fellow is athletic or not? You aren't giving him more tests or other tests. He has already been given the test. He has the stopwatches and the long jump marks as data. What say ye?
As I said, it is quite analogous, because both "intelligence" and "athleticism" are descriptive terms for various different types of behaviors, and neither have operational definitions that can be applied in arbitrary contexts. You have never yet said why you think the analogy is not valid.
You'll see if you quit wet-nursing this ferocious dragon that none will face.
I can't say, since I don't know what he can do (except relay to you the results of Lewis' performance). You would need to have this fellow participate in some track events (or golf, or ping-pong, or whatever sport he might do) before we could say if he was athletic.
Ah. I should have read the whole thing before baiting your fierce dragon. Here comes the poor thing, limping out to face me.
The stop watch is an instrument used to measure Lewis' running speed; other instruments could be used instead. Lewis' athleticsm does not explain the stop-watch readings, however, since the stop-watch might have been stopped by all sorts of things. We would need to ascertain that the watch reflected the time Lewis actually took to run under his own power the complete distance involved.
Poor dragon is a goner now. He got killed and doesn't even know it.
Is his athleticism indicated by the marks in the sand?
Not necessarily, no, since the marks in the sand might have been made by something that was not athletic at all. You need to observe that Lewis himself made those marks by jumping from a certain point, without intermediate touchdown, and without a jet-pack strapped to his back, and so on. Once you observe that Lewis actually accomplished an athletic feat, you can (according to ACTheory) explain the result on account of his athleticism.
There you go.
Not necessarily, no, since the marks in the sand might have been made by something that was not athletic at all.
Not necessarily? Try not at all.
You need to observe Lewis himself making the marks. You don't know if he walked out to the mark and rubbed out the other ones. You don't know that he didn't stop the watches while he sat on a chair having a smoke.
Now, consider the following:
Let's say an intelligent-looking fellow around years old or so tells me he is local wiz kid, Dexter Poindexter. I don't believe him and he shows me half a dozen academic awards, He says he has more at home. This is pretty good evidence, I think, but not enough.
So I send him alone into a locked examination room and I man the only door.
I give him a a few tests and some instructions. When he comes out he shows me one one previously well-scrambled Rubick's cube, now solved. He gives me his IQ-test answers and his score reveals an IQ of 157.
Next I accompany him into the room and he shows me a beautiful model of a three story loft he made with the lego blocks I gave him. He also gives me the proof of Pythagoras' theorem written out in the blank note-book I gave him as well as a poem he wrote.
Okay, he might not be Dexter Poindexter, but these artifacts all evidence intelligence even though he was not observed making them, since he was alone in the arena. Right? Or do you contend that I am wrong?
There's your dragon – analogy failed.
There are ways to have faked the tests given the ostensible Mr. Lewis which would in no way implicate athleticism as the cause. Yes indeed, you would have to observe him in order to conclude that athleticism was the cause of the artifacts. The artifacts can not evidence athleticism.
Contrast this to the Pindexter case and you see that intelligence is at play regardless of the ways you will now try to dismiss it. Did he cheat? Even if you excuse away every instance as someone else's work or some kind of cheat memory, learning, creativity and foresight are all indicated. The artifacts themselves demonstrate this. None of your reasons for demanding a different level of observation apply equally to the test for intelligence as they do for athleticism. The necessary qualifications for athleticism are just irrelevant in the case of intelligence.
You should be able to light your cigarette with your dragon's last breath.
Do give him a proper burial.
===
Oh, one more thing. I see Nullasalus (thanks, Null) has addressed a complaint you had about me referring to eliminitivism. You are calling it a bait-and-switch, as though it does not address your question.
But it does.
You said:
This is utter fantasy. If you disagree, please identify this "materialist theory of mind" or its author. You won't be able to, because no materialist mind theorist would ever say such a stupid thing.
Eliminitivism is a materialist theory and is applied. So is epiphenomalism a materialistic theory, although now primarily rejected and distanced from the materialists. As is Dennett's functionalism, which is a denial of mental states at all, including "intent", which is what Schwartz is relying upon.
None would ever say it? False.
Dualists and materialists agree that a change in brain will correlate with a change in thought (they may disagree on which is prompting which, etc), and 'there will be a change in brain state from moment X to moment Y' is trivial when generalized that much.
I must repeat that only dualists believe that thoughts/mental states can change without a corresponding change in brain states. Materialism would be refuted by such a finding.
If the OCD was relieved but scans found no evidence of brain change (of the sort Schwartz found), then Schwartz would surely have touted that as evidence of dualism, because immaterial mind must have been operating to change behavior without the involvement of the physical brain. Given the brain changes did occur, Schwartz touted that as evidence of dualism too, because… he believes in dualism.
But the focus is on whether an internal mental dialogue and directed thought could lead to the sort of changes Schwartz records. Are you honestly telling me that every and all materialist theories about the brain presupposed that problems like OCD could be overcome by mental focus and dialogue? Or even the clear majority of them?
There were no materialist theories of brains that either presupposed or predicted OCD could be overcome this way. Some materialists might have thought so, and others may not have, but neither of these opinions derived from either materialism in general or any particular materialist theory of mind. Likewise for dualism. It is neither more or less difficult to "integrate" Schwartz's findings into either metaphysics.
… the trash heap of history…that the world is flat…defiance of modern science…obsolete…
This shows that materialists are measured, smart, and correct, while you dualists shouldn't be allowed to drive. What's the problem?
But I'm pointing out that you're coming down on Schwartz, Beauregard, etc hard for asserting that developments in mind/brain studies and philosophy have bolstered dualism …Disagree with Schwartz, sure. Question his tone. But you're throwing out 'idiot' and, in essence, 'liar' for what amounts to a drumming up of support for a dualist friendly stance, in an arena where Dennett among others (And for as much as we both have a low view of some of his thoughts…Again, I know you said you agree, but: Why did Lycan write what he did? Apparently, it was because he knew that the field was and is rife with an utter fabrication of the rational standing of dualism in philosophy of mind.
Ok, you're right about this, I'm wrong. Thanks for pointing it out.
The issue is what changed the behavior, how it changed. Again, 'the brain will change between time X and Y' is trivial – almost everyone can get behind that. Once we get past that, the question is whether developments highlighted by Schwartz or the placebo effect, etc, are best described as 'physical acting on physical' or 'mental acting on physical'. Schwartz and others (of varying positions) think something closer to the latter is in play, rather than the former, and make their arguments accordingly. I'd criticize them (however limited, given the circumstances) if I saw them making ridiculous, over the top claims. I don't see it here. Instead it's the sort of fight you get in philosophy of mind debates that are reasonably cordial.
First a defense: I said his arguments were idiotic; and when I called the people idiots I indicated that was not (completely) serious. Now, my confession again: The tone of my rhetoric was out of line in any case, but especially so in light of your point regarding materialist polemics.
Now, that said: Schwartz is very good at treating OCD, and Michael Egnor is a successful surgeon. However, in my opinion, Schwartz is confused about what the predictions of materialism and dualism are, and Egnor is confused about virtually everything he writes on the topic. Can we leave it at that?
Mostly because athleticism may or may not involve something mindlike, so while athleticism may potentially explain an aspect of the flagella, it's leaving other questions unanswered. For my money, you may as well replace 'athleticism' with 'physicalism' here, so this example isn't doing the work some would like it to.
I hate it when somebody looks at a reductio ad absurdum and thinks it's not absurd. Can you tell me how "athleticism" might explain some aspect of flagella please?
Your complaint amounts to 'you need a firm definition of intelligence in order to test it or propose it in the scientific arena', which I agree with.
But it's worse than that – these very pages reveal constant and unrecognized equivocations between functional and behavioral definitions of "intelligence". It's not just that these definitions need a bit of tightening up – it is that IDers run blithely around in circles claiming that if they define "intelligence" as the ability to generate CSI then finding CSI in biology will be evidence of Intelligent Design.
I think there've been attempted moves towards this (Dembski apparently tries to establish something with math, Behe by appeals to limits of evolution), but I remain a skeptic of the ID end of science.
Dembski is the absolute master of equivocation on this point. I've seen quotes from him defining intelligence as "directed contingency" (something indistinguishable from libertarian free will) on one hand, then turn around and claim the definition is that which creates CSI, and finally complain bitterly when we press him to decide what meaning he'd like us to take. I won't use any bad ad hominem words here, but this guy… takes the cake.
On the other hand, I think questions of 'could intelligence have directed past causes' are wide open, even testable to a point – just hit the computer simulation. In fact, I think the mere existence of computer simulations has permanently exploded this debate, even if the ramifications haven't caught up with most of the philosophers yet.
I don't think I've caught up with it yet, actually. It's less about us living in a simulation for me, and more about why AI isn't an absolute defeater for Dembskian characterizations of intelligence (i.e. the "not by law or chance" definition).
Actually, that's an interesting question: Is 'an intelligent agent with the appropriate knowledge and ambulatory abilities could create life from non-life' a scientific statement?
My answer is no, it is not a scientific statement, for all the reasons we've been discussing: If you hypothesize the statement is true, then if some candidate agent failed to create life, it would mean only that it lacked either the requisite intelligence or the appropriate knowledge or ambulatory abilities. Without an independent method to measure intelligence and knowledge of arbitrary entities, your statement is scientifically undecidable.
AIGUY: I'm sorry, I don't understand – you are asking me if you can tell that some person who is showing you the times and marks is athletic or not? If so, then yes, if you give him tests to see if he is athletic, then you can answer that question.
PEZ: You understand perfectly well.
If I understood, I would have said "I understand". But you'll see I said "I don't understand", which means that I do not understand.
You have the situation and the data. Can you tell if this fellow is athletic or not? You aren't giving him more tests or other tests. He has already been given the test. He has the stopwatches and the long jump marks as data. What say ye?
I'm sorry but I'm confused (by which I do not mean that I am not confused). There is Carl Lewis, and there is another person, right? This other person – call him P – has a stopwatch showing some times and a record of the long jump marks, right? And you would like me to tell you if P is athletic? Or Lewis is athletic?
You need to observe Lewis himself making the marks. You don't know if he walked out to the mark and rubbed out the other ones. You don't know that he didn't stop the watches while he sat on a chair having a smoke.
Pretty much right, yes. We have to have reliable evidence that Lewis actually ran the distance in the requisite time, or actually jumped the distance. There could be other records besides a visual record, but we must have some record of all the relevant observational data.
…I send him alone into a locked examination room and I man the only door. I give him a a few tests and some instructions. When he comes out he shows me one one previously well-scrambled Rubick's cube, now solved. He gives me his IQ-test answers and his score reveals an IQ of 157. Next I accompany him into the room and he shows me a beautiful model of a three story loft he made with the lego blocks I gave him. He also gives me the proof of Pythagoras' theorem written out in the blank note-book I gave him as well as a poem he wrote. Okay, he might not be Dexter Poindexter, but these artifacts all evidence intelligence even though he was not observed making them, since he was alone in the arena. Right? Or do you contend that I am wrong?
There's your dragon – analogy failed.
Oh, Pez, I'm sorry, but I actually was hoping for a bit better than this.
You did not simply come across a bunch of artifacts that would be hard for you to design, with no idea about how they came to exist. This is the case in the context of ID, but not in this situation. In this case, you picked a bunch of tasks that would test this person's ability to solve problems using foresight and intent and creativity, and you gave this person these tests. That is precisely what I have been saying needed to be done all along: You must actually test the entity's abilities to solve problems!
You have focussed on completely irrelevant aspects, over and over again, even though I keep saying the same thing, over and over again. I shall put it in bold this time: The issue has nothing to do with observing the person with bare eyeballs. All we need is reliable data that tells us what we need to know. Whether I watch Dexter take the test with my own eyes, or he does it in a protected room, makes no difference. What matters is that I observe… perhaps the term "observe" is what is confusing the issue, so let's just say "find out". If I find out that Dexter is capable of passing tests for problem solving, then I have learned about Dexter's abilities. If all I see is some complex problems that would be hard for me to solve, then I have learned nothing about what solved them. Maybe it was something intelligent, or maybe it wasn't. (I beg you not to say "Well, if it wasn't intelligent, then it couldn't have solved the problems!")
There are ways to have faked the tests given the ostensible Mr. Lewis which would in no way implicate athleticism as the cause. Yes indeed, you would have to observe him in order to conclude that athleticism was the cause of the artifacts. The artifacts can not evidence athleticism.
Yes of course the records can evidence athleticism in precisely the same way that the records evidenced intelligence in Dexter. If the provenance of the evidence is not in question, then the only requirement is that the data is of the type we need in order to make our assessment. On the chance that you still do not understand, I shall spell it out for you:
Let's say an athletic-looking fellow tells me he is local sports hero, Jock McClock. I don't believe him and he shows me half a dozen sports awards, He says he has more at home. This is pretty good evidence, I think, but not enough.
So I send him alone into a locked examination room and I man the only door.
I give him a a few tests and some instructions. When he comes out he shows me he's managed to grab a marker off of a ten-foot-high shelf without anything that could be used as a ladder, and he's grabbed another marker from an elaborate obstacle course I've rigged to require great speed and agility to navigate in time before the marker is automatically locked away. Okay, he might not be Jock McClock, but these artifacts all evidence athleticism even though he was not observed making them, since he was alone in the arena. Right? Or do you contend that I am wrong?
You should be able to light your cigarette with your dragon's last breath.
Do give him a proper burial.
Please, I know you can do better than this, Pez. I just know it.
Oh, one more thing. I see Nullasalus (thanks, Null) has addressed a complaint you had about me referring to eliminitivism. You are calling it a bait-and-switch, as though it does not address your question. But it does. You said: This is utter fantasy. If you disagree, please identify this "materialist theory of mind" or its author. You won't be able to, because no materialist mind theorist would ever say such a stupid thing.
Eliminitivism is a materialist theory and is applied. So is epiphenomalism a materialistic theory, although now primarily rejected and distanced from the materialists. As is Dennett's functionalism, which is a denial of mental states at all, including "intent", which is what Schwartz is relying upon. None would ever say it? False.
I am technically correct on Schwartz's argument, but I have also adopted the wrong tone, and furthermore I was wrong (both in tone and in substance) to accuse you of bait-and-switch (I actually tried to edit that out but was too late).
I am technically correct about Schwartz because even an eliminativist does not have any difficulty with brain changes resulting from information processing in the brain, as Schwartz claims.
All we need is reliable data that tells us what we need to know. Whether I watch Dexter take the test with my own eyes, or he does it in a protected room, makes no difference.
This is true with Dexter but is is not true with Carl that is the difference between athleticism and intelligence.
You can infer intelligence from artifacts alone but you can't infer athleticism in this way. At least that is true when we are talking human style intelligence and human style athleticism. I find this strange.
I wonder are intellegence and creativity the only characteristics that can be inferered frome artifacts alone. Now that I think about it creativity and intellegence could be considered synonyms. wow
but these artifacts all evidence athleticism even though he was not observed making them, since he was alone in the arena. Right? Or do you contend that I am wrong?
NO!!! if he was sufficiently intelligent he could fake it
Pez is making a great point. Deep stuff.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 30, 2008 @ 11:41 pm
I must repeat that only dualists believe that thoughts/mental states can change without a corresponding change in brain states. Materialism would be refuted by such a finding.
If they're property dualists, odds are no. If they're substance dualists, it's still not necessitated – hence Plantinga and Swinburne. If they think consciousness is epiphenomenal, or emergent, or otherwise intimately related to the brain – still no. Or at least it doesn't automatically follow, and may harm a specific stance.
And materialism could fall back just as it's done repeatedly. They could go the mysterian route, argue it's all physicalism, but we just don't know how. They could go the promissory note route, and say it's physical, we don't know, but we will eventually. I'm sure other methods are available.
If the OCD was relieved but scans found no evidence of brain change (of the sort Schwartz found), then Schwartz would surely have touted that as evidence of dualism, because immaterial mind must have been operating to change behavior without the involvement of the physical brain. Given the brain changes did occur, Schwartz touted that as evidence of dualism too, because"¦ he believes in dualism.
Maybe, maybe not. I don't know the guy. And the materialists in that case could have gone the routes I've listed. Hell, right now there's a large resistance to the suggestion that quantum effects may play a major role in consciousness by many materialists – but I think we'd both agree that if said effects were demonstrated, the definition would change instantly, and we'd hear talks about materialism being vindicated. Because clearly quantum effects are physical.
It is neither more or less difficult to "integrate" Schwartz's findings into either metaphysics.
That's getting into judgment calls about the capacities of particular philosophies to neatly integrate given data. I'll just put that aside – everyone makes their respective cases for that, I have my own views, and others have other views.
Now, that said: Schwartz is very good at treating OCD, and Michael Egnor is a successful surgeon. However, in my opinion, Schwartz is confused about what the predictions of materialism and dualism are, and Egnor is confused about virtually everything he writes on the topic. Can we leave it at that?
That's the stuff of opinion, so sure. I know your view. My view is more sympathetic to both, even if I'm less committed about philosophy of mind positions.
I hate it when somebody looks at a reductio ad absurdum and thinks it's not absurd. Can you tell me how "athleticism" might explain some aspect of flagella please?
It depends on how you're defining athleticism. You talked about 'athleticism' explaining the capacity of the flagella to move the way it does. I could take that to mean that athleticism is a reference to its properties of locomotion (it has these features which move this way which propels etc so, which is an athletic property). Granted, that's defining athleticism. But isn't 'if you provide the definition, you can get somewhere' the point?
But it's worse than that – these very pages reveal constant and unrecognized equivocations between functional and behavioral definitions of "intelligence". It's not just that these definitions need a bit of tightening up – it is that IDers run blithely around in circles claiming that if they define "intelligence" as the ability to generate CSI then finding CSI in biology will be evidence of Intelligent Design.
My view of it is that they know that humans are capable of generating irreducibly complex structures, propose that 'intelligence' (further defined as will, intention, knowledge, what-have-you) is the reason, and that said intelligence becomes a viable explanation for some aspects of nature. Some postulate what forms intelligence can take, what routes an intelligent entity can take to affect a result, etc. Again, I don't see this as science myself – my lone opinion – but I'm still intrigued by it, I admit.
I don't think I've caught up with it yet, actually. It's less about us living in a simulation for me, and more about why AI isn't an absolute defeater for Dembskian characterizations of intelligence (i.e. the "not by law or chance" definition).
I don't think we necessarily need to be in a simulation either, though the potential alone has some fun ramifications. For another topic, though.
Just when I think you and I don't really disagree about much, along comes this. My answer is no, it is not a scientific statement, for all the reasons we've been discussing: If you hypothesize the statement is true, then if some candidate agent failed to create life, it would mean only that it lacked either the requisite intelligence or the appropriate knowledge or ambulatory abilities. Without an independent method to measure intelligence and knowledge of arbitrary entities, your statement is scientifically undecidable.
I'm not taking a position on it – in a way, I don't really care about what is or is not considered scientific, so long as the rules are fair.
But what do you mean by scientifically undecidable? That seems to hinge on an eternal failure to create life from non-life in a laboratory. But what if someone (say a human) succeeds? Does the statement become scientifically valid then? Note that I'm not saying 'an intelligent agent created the original life on earth', only 'an intelligent agent can create life from non-life, full stop'.
What if I hypothesize 'A human with the right knowledge and tools is capable of creating life from non-life'? Admittedly, falsification would have to come in the form of 'eternal failure', but it seems like a predictive hypothesis, 'something that could come true in lab conditions in a repeatable way'. I ask this more in the spirit of entertainment than anything else – again, the philosophy's where I root myself on this one.
Behaviorism.
Schwartz said it held sway and was still gaining popularity when he was studying in the eighties. You say it was dead. http://www.psychologicalscienc...
Roddy Roediger"¨APS President says:
A third answer is that there is, thank you, nothing wrong with behaviorism today. The premise of the analysis at the beginning of this column is simply wrong. Behaviorism is alive and well and nothing "has happened" to it. The Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior is still a lively outlet (and edited now by my colleague, Len Green), as is the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis. Both journals are published by the Society for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, which has been going strong since 1957. The primary meeting of behaviorists is the Association for Behavior Analysis, or ABA, which has over 4,200 members in 2003, and at the 2002 meeting there were 3,200 registrants. Counting affiliate organizations around the world, there are some 12,000 members (Jack Marr, personal communication). ABA has grown tremendously over the years and still attracts around 250 new members a year just in the U.S. The Society for the Quantitative Analysis of Behavior meets before and during ABA, with its own mathematically sophisticated membership. Much of the work reported at these meetings is based on research with humans (and not just pigeons and rats, as in the stereotype).
Why the enthusiasm? Because behavioristic analyses work!
I think until somebody actually writes a technical glossary for the terms you are using we will be talking past each other. Why do you say foresight cannot occur by virtue of physical necessity?
I said it's not demonstrated.
Furthermore, if something does one thing and one thing alone no matter what the circumstance, whether by physical necessity or not, would you say that demonstrates foresight? Of course not.
If that one thing requires foresight, sure.
So, since you can't tell if the Designer was capable of doing anything else in any other situation, you can't tell if the Designer had foresight.
You've assumed your conclusion.
Imagine a spider and a human both making spider webs. Two entities make the very same artifact, but in one case we had a highly intelligent human being figuring out how to make a silk web, and in the other case a sterotyped instinctive animal who apparently lacks enough foresight to solve any novel problems, but making the very same artifact.
I have not seen a complexity and specification argument on spider webs so I'm going to draw my conclusion intuitively. The web has intricate patterns of sticky surfaces and those a spider can walk on. It has signalling devices built in to alert the spider to the presence of prey. It is uniquely arranged in a complex pattern which is hard for me to evaluate like this. I would say that natural forces can create more complexity than a spider web's appearance would indicate. But I'm going to go with design.
Let's just pretend that the math and irreducibility arguments will bear out my finding and we can use this as a case in point.
I've just inferred design of the spider web. It has a designer. It is constructed on purpose and with foresight. It's designer has foresight. etc.
Does the spider have foresight? Not necessarily, but the web's designer has. Did my dominoes, or the remote control car? No.
So, what am I saying here? If instinct can be defined and demonstrated to eliminate design, creativity, foresight, etc. then a design instantiated by and instinctive creature is not finally caused by that creature. I am saying that the spider might be an automaton like the assembly-line robot and which has been designed to bring webs into being.
But then perhaps I can learn something about the spider (not the design) by studying the spider. It turns out that they can learn, have memory, exhibit social recognition … in short, are far more complex cognitively than they were previously given credit for (have you ever noticed that this increasing complexity is a constant trend in our studies?). So it is not illogical for me to presume that the spider itself has the foresight and (thanks Brembs) the non-determined, non-random spontaneity, to build its web via its own cognitive ability interacting with its instincts (programs).
Sure, I have lots of tests for athleticism! Don't you have lots of tests for intelligence?
Sure do. Including a couple individual tests used to draw an universal design inference. Have you one like that for athleticism?
No, the test for athleticism in horses is different. Likewise, you couldn't give a horse a Stanford-Binet IQ test, right?
That's right. You've moved into a quantitative analysis now, however.
No, only the tests are species specific. How about for intelligence – is your definition species specific?
You're just being silly. You know it's not.
Do you have tests that are not temporally defined?
Yes.
Your dragon is well-slayed, but I'm sure you'll try to resurrect the corpse, so please show me a test for athleticism which is not temporally defined.
Can't you see by now that I can keep this up as long as you'd like,
Only if you disrespect dialogue and honest communication.
and you will never be able show that "athleticism" is any more subjective or useless or vacuous in the context of ID than "athleticism" is? Both of these labels are simply loose, descriptive terms for various abilities that we informally lump together, but which can be given specific operational definitions only for particular entities.
No they aren't.
This sort of talk is like saying that the moon is athletic because it moves around the Earth so fast.
If the definition of "athleticism" is strictly about speedy movement then I would say you are right – the moon is athletic, the term is vacuous, and the argument is dumb. But that's not analogous to ID. And it's not what you were already claiming above when you were changing the tests species by species.
ID does not say this. ID specifies what kind of complexity indicates purposeful arrangement of parts.
I don't care how ID characterizes biological forms;
I do. And you misrepresented it in the comment that I responded to and in your comment that referred to that. And now you are changing the subject as though I was on a different point.
I care about how ID attempts to characterize the cause of these forms. If ID restricts itself to talking about how complex and purposeful flagella are, then it has nothing to say about what caused the flagella.
But you are wrong, because ID does talk about what caused flagella. They say it was "intelligent cause". ("Certain features of biology and universe are best explained by intelligent cause" – does this ring a bell?)
How am I wrong when I said this:
Aiguy: I was pointing out that ID must not simply define intelligent design as "that which can create complex designs", because in that case ID is clearly vacuous (it offers a "dormative principle" conceptualization of intelligence).
Pez:ID does not say this. ID specifies what kind of complexity indicates purposeful arrangement of parts. Allen's dormitive argument regarding the "Intelligent" in "Intelligent Design" was lame when he said it it's still a non-starter. We've already discussed what its purpose in the title of the project is. Redness causes redness is not the equivalent of "certain features of life are best explained with reference to the purposeful arrangement of parts."
?
"certain features of life are best explained with reference to the purposeful arrangement of parts."
The way I said it is the way all of the leading ID authors say it – why did you change it? Do you deny that "intelligence" is required to create a "purposeful arrangement of parts" This seems like nothing but obfuscatory wordplay to me.
The way you said mischaracterized the claim about the complexity repeatedly. ID does not claim that intelligence is evidenced when complexity is found and it does not define intelligence as the thing that creates complexity. You defined intelligence as that which creates design and we know that design, in ID, requires purpose, foresight, creativity, and, yes, intelligence. Intelligence is not defined as that which is intelligent, and Allen and your dormitive accusation is unjustified. Intelligence has been defined for you many times.
First, of course he is saying intelligent cause can't be the result of law plus chance – his explanatory filter asks us to distinguish the result of intelligent cause on one hand from the result of any combination of law+chance on the other hand. If intelligent cause is itself the result of law+chance, this makes no sense.
Sure it does. If intelligence evolved by law and chance then it can design.
And besides, you have said this yourself, e.g. "By virtue of physical necessity? Right. That does not demonstrate foresight."
I did say that. A thing could come into being by virtue of physical necessity and then go about designing.
But that is that only empirical test ID offers! In other words, that is the operational definition of intelligence in the context of ID. And that is exactly why I say "intelligence" in the context of ID is a dormitive principle:"¨Q: What caused the CSI in biology?"¨A: Intelligence."¨Q: What is intelligence?"¨A: It is operationally defined in ID as "that which can cause CSI"
A test is not a definition.
We can agree when we agree on what free will and intent are. If we can't agree that the test demonstrates free will and intent we can still agree on what the data show. If "spontaneity", for instance, is not "free will" it is still spontaneity.
Yes, we can show that the subject showed behavior that was not random and not triggered by environmental cues. This has nothing to do with ID. We can't show free will and intent, and that means these are not scientifically useful terms in the context of ID.
You're stealing. You said that free will and intent are open questions. You can't claim that they are not proper inferences if they are open questions. When we show that a behaviour is not random and is not deterministic then it is something. It is now open whether or not that something is unexplained or if it demonstrates will and intent. This is a valid scientific inference.
Eliminate necessity and random chance – the things offered as defeaters of the argument to purpose.
1) You cannot show that necessity+chance does not account for intelligence itself. You have admitted this yourself in your very last post.
Nor do I want to.
"¨2) You cannot eliminate all necessity and random chance, because you are not omniscient, and cannot say what other forms of necessity there may be
I don't have to accept promissory notes either. Science can only go by what it currently knows.
"¨3) Even if you eliminate necessity and chance, there is nothing to tell us what might be remaining. It might be "mojo" or "magic" or "free will" or "the intrinsic geometry of hyperspace inversions" or"¦
And that open question can be answered in good faith.
But, again (but of course not once and for all) the definition of intelligence is irrelevant because the inference is to design. What is meant is obvious in the terms design, purpose, foresight, etc.
Again, if you are not saying that "intelligence" is "the best explanation for certain features of biology"¦" then you are not talking about what I'm interested in.
We are talking about the same thing but you won't stop trying to use the definition (moot) to deny any need to converse.
If the definition of intelligence is irrelevant, then you are not talking about intelligent agents creating life, and I really don't know what you are talking about, but it is not what I think of as "intelligent design". Once again, from the DI website:"¨The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause
Yes, I saw that many times. And I've explained how it relates and you've made the word "intelligence" moot so why don't you quit pretending that you can bring it back in to dismiss it as a tautology?
And why did you highlight this reminder instead of the fact that I answered your request (for neither the first nor the final time) for a defintion of intelligence as ID is using it? I answered it int he very clip you quoted here. And then you asked twice again what it is.
Moi:
That which acts with foresight and toward a purpose. Alternatively, that which chooses/selects with reference to a goal.
"¦and we are not forbidden from an inference in the hopes that some other explanation will pop its head up one day. We've covered this. The inference is assertible regardless of naturalism's blank cheques.
These are two of ID's tricks that do not work:"¨1) Conflating "no known explanation" for "ruling out chance and necessity"
That's not what ID does. It demonstrates a rationale for inferring that chance and necessity are insufficient.
"¨2) Casting "intent/purpose/intelligence" as the default conclusion once chance and necessity has been "ruled out".
That's not a trick but a valid inference. IDists go to great lengths to demonstrate that they have good reason to believe these are the only games in town.
Using ID's own tricks:"¨1) I rule out chance and necessity as explanations for protein folding, because nobody can explain how proteins fold by any combination of chance and necessity. That means nobody will ever find out how proteins fold inside of cells in terms of law+chance."¨2) Since it's not chance and necessity, it must be "magic"
So I've demonstrated that proteins fold inside our cells by means of magic.
Sweet, what's magic?
What does carve statues and swing axes?
Human beings.
And chimps.
So human-like intelligence is not necessarily associated with a human brain? Or it is?
Nobody knows for sure. It is not logically necessary. There is reason to believe that either the specific neurological structures in human brains, or a physical analogue of those structures, is required. If a physical analogue will work, nobody can say what particular physical features must be present (will transistors do? what about artificial microtubles?).
Good. So an alien intelligence, which is in some way human-like, is a perfectly sound qualification for you?
But while we're at it, what's physical and why must it be physical? You have "reason to believe" that the human mind requires physicality, but you are presuming that a human-like mind must. Why can't a human-like mind be non-physical?
It need not be human-like in every and all aspects to be human-like. The ability to choose, deliberate, imagine and hold goals seems human-like enough to me.
Again, without operational definitions these are useless. A thermostat chooses and deliberates – prove me wrong empirically. How do you test for when something is "imagining" if it can't talk?
You device tests like CSI and IC which require foresight.
AIGUY: Tell me how to look at some arranger which is arranging some parts, and decide if this arranger is purposeful or not."¨PEZ: It contingently arranges parts which are well-matched to perform a function in such an improbable manner that defies random chance.
Aiguy:I think this can be done by things that are not purposeful. How can we empirically decide who is right (since we can't just ask if somebody is doing it on purpose or not).
You show me such a thing. We know wind and rain can't do. What can?
PEZ: But define "spontaneous" please."¨AIGUY: They said it right in the page: "the international team of researchers showed for the first time that such variability cannot be due to simple random events but is generated spontaneously and non-randomly by the brain." Spontaneous here means "not in response to environmental cues". They defined this operationally, so they could test it, and they tested it by removing environmental cues to see if the behaviors persisted. See what I mean?"¨PEZ: So spontaneous is "not determined and not random". Sounds like something I've heard somewhere else. And yet, here you accept it.
Are you doing this on purpose? You keep changing "not in response to environment cues" into "not determined". Did you think we would not notice?
Actually, I changed, "Such a signature can only be found in systems whose indeterminate behavior is not due to noise but originates in their design…This in turn means that the brain areas controlling turning behavior must be tuned very precisely to generate unpredictable output and are unlikely to be a by-product of the general complexity of the brain. … This nonlinear signature eliminates the two alternative explanations of spontaneous turning behavior in flies that would run counter to free will, namely complete randomness and pure determinism. …So if there is anything remotely close to free will, it must exist somewhere between chance and necessity" to not determined. Yes, I'm hoping you'll notice.
So how can pure determinism run counter to free will if it means only "cued by the environment" It can't. The author is clearly not saying merely what you are claiming he is.
Really. And what would it be if it were in response to environmental cues? Since the behaviour is "indeterminate", "unpredictable", and "unlikely to be the by-product of the brain" in what way is it deterministic if it is generated by the brain not by accidental errors, not at random, and not in response to environmental cues?
Of course "determined" is different from "in response to environmental cues"!"¨I take "determined" to mean "necessitated by antecedent physical cause".
Beauty, me too. …. oops, here you go …!
The authors are not claiming that the fly's behavior is not caused by antecedent physical cause – only that it triggered by internal rather than external cause.
Yes, actually they are.
This nonlinear signature eliminates the two alternative explanations of spontaneous turning behavior in flies that would run counter to free will, namely complete randomness and pure determinism. …So if there is anything remotely close to free will, it must exist somewhere between chance and necessity
===
What determines it?
They've told you what they think. Once again:
"Regardless of our speculations on free will, the most important scientific aspect of our work is the evidence we found for a brain function which appears evolutionarily designed to always spontaneously vary ongoing behavior."
They are talking about a physical brain which implements a physical function that generates physical signals to initiate physical behaviors, where the function does not use input from environmental cues.
Saying ohysical a lot doesn't make their position one of determinism. They already said its not "pure determinism", it's not "simple determinism" and it's not of "necessity". Determinisim, by wiki:
"Causal (or nomological) determinism is the thesis that future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature."
[The author] says what he means:
"On the other hand, if our action was completely determined by external factors such that there was no alternative, again the person would not be held responsible"
The fact that you confused the notion of "determined by external factors" with "determined by physical cause" illustrates once again the need for careful definitions. The behaviors in the fly's brain are determined (as far as we can tell!) in the philosophical sense of determinism, but the antecedent causes arise within the brain function they describe rather than being caused by external cues.
The fly's brain is not determined, as far as we can tell scientifically, in the philosophical sense of determinism. The philosophical sense would entail necessity and the authors do not see this evidenced. And philosophically it isn't either, to the author's satisfaction, as they are led to speculate philosophically that the fly has some kind of free will. As far as we can tell, the two alternatives to free will as an explanation for the fly's spontaneous behaviour have been eliminated.
So? Appealing to a computer program that reacts to a soundwave without attending to it merely begs the question in the same way that your "athleticism" example does.
Neither of these examples beg the question, and you have not said how you think they do. You just dismiss them by claiming they beg the question, but they don't.
How do we see if a computer has chosen to attend to a sound wave?
Thanks to Nullasalus for saving me some typing on this subject. I appreciate the participation. And I hope it continues "¦ hint.
I think you should take some points from nullasalus – he is quite a bit more clear about these issues I'd say, and I disagree with very little of what he says in general.
I wish I could be much more like nullasalus. Thanks for more of your very handy advice.
Not so. They can test the effect of willful attention and show its effects. Also, not all the subjects can respond in the same way even though they received the same environmental stimuli.
None of this is evidence for dualism.
Please answer this question: If dualism is false, does this mean your conception of ID is also false?
Not at all. Please answer his, does calling Schwartz an idiot and pretending that he's not shown any evidence of dualism say anything about whether Libet interpreted his own studies as reducing free will to an illusion?
This is irrelevant. Monkeys respond differently to the same sound wave depending upon their attention and expectations. This difference in response is reflected in brain changes.
So you think this means monkeys have immaterial minds? (hint: computers respond differently to the same sound wave depending on their attention and expectations).
This answers your, yet again, false claim. You said the sound wave itself is what caused the change. Then you said it was because it was a particular soundwave. Now you have to admit it was the attention paid that caused the change so you claim that a computer can, likewise, pay attention.
Musicians respond differently to the same soundwaves when attending to them in different ways.
As do computers.
You say you don't want to debate the philosophy of mind with me and I have no particular urge to either. But if you're in the mood perhaps you can show me how the computer's different responses due to its attention are analogous to those of a musician. Or not.
Who said anything about "eliminativism" Stop it with these bait-and-switch bluffs, Pez – do you think we won't notice?
No bluff. See previous comment.
If you continue reading your Wiki you will see that not all materialism is eliminativist materialism. I know many materialists but I've never actually met an eliminative materialist.
If you'll read your comments there was no requirement that every materialist be an eliminatvist.
And even with that error that you've made, you've still confused the claims of even eliminative materialists!
There was no error.
Just because they say "intent" does not exist does not mean they believe no brain changes could occur when someone is trained in Schwartz's technique! They of course would all believe that brain changes must occur!
What's his technique then?
Neither you nor Schwartz understands these positions, apparently. First, can you name anyone who is a Skinnerian behaviorist? I didn't think so (shall I accuse "immaterialists" of thinking God hurls lightning bolts at Churches?). Really, this is a joke – Skinner's failed behaviorism is rejected by every materialist cognitive scientist I know.
Just the cognitivists, huh? See my previous comment.
I do not want to argue philosophy of mind with you, however – sorry. I'm quite familiar with all of the arguments you've cited, but thanks for the references anyway.
You're very welcome. As you can see, they support my point.
1) Do you or do you not believe that ID Theory claims that "intelligent cause" constitutes a scientific explanation for the complex form and function we see in biology? If you do not think that ID attempts to do this, I think we needn't go any farther.
it does.
2) How can I decide if Carl Lewis is athletic if all I have is a picture of him at the finish line and I don't know how fast he's run? Maybe somebody carried him there, or it took a year to crawl the track.
You can't. See above.
Likewise, how can we decide if something uses foresight if all we have is the resulting artifact and we don't know if it can solve problems? Maybe the Designer has no foresight at all, and the one and only thing it does is output these life forms.
There is no likewise. The test is a test for foresight and you can accept it or deny it.
And finally, one more time:
Me too, please.
How can I decide if the bear is athletic from only GPS, if I don't know how long it takes him to traverse the snow, or even if he moved under his own power? I cannot.
That's right. You can't.
How can I decide if the Designer used foresight to create a flagella if I don't know if the Designer is capable of solving novel problems? I cannot.
Because the inference, unlike that to athleticism, does not demand knowledge of the temporal nature. The inference requires only the artifact and you have not yet supplied any reason to treat athleticism as analogous in this regard.
Hey Fifth Monarchy Man,
Thanks for your notes on the athleticism/intelligence non-analogy.
===
Hi Aiguy,
As you can see, the analogy failed.
You've gone off sideways again with your distinction about my having set up the experiment in the Poindexter case (making me an observer, of sorts), but that is irrelevant. I set up the experiment in the Lewis case as well. One came back positive and the other inconclusive. Athleticism and intelligence are not analogous as explanations as you were using them and claiming they were.
You repeatedly said that as 'athleticism' fails so fails 'intelligence' but we saw that this was not the case.
Take 2:
You've now reworked the tests for athleticism in a manner you were unwilling to before. You've now set up your own test for Jock McClock's athleticism which includes not only the presentation of artifacts but sets it in a timed context.
Let's have a peek.
Previously you said that 'athleticism' as an explanation of observed fast running was useless. That, I submit, is true. But in your new test, as you attempt to make it match my very poor and disappointing Poindexter case, 'athleticism' is not intended to explain an observation of fast running. Instead it explains how McClock fetched the markers. This is a condition completely foreign to your repeated challenges.
First an operational definition of athleticism, as you've supplied:
Athleticism is that which enables efficient locomotion.
Athleticism is the ability to move with efficiency, agility, power, and speed.
And now your test:
When he comes out he shows me he's managed to grab a marker off of a ten-foot-high shelf without anything that could be used as a ladder, and he's grabbed another marker from an elaborate obstacle course I've rigged to require great speed and agility to navigate in time before the marker is automatically locked away. Okay, he might not be Jock McClock, but these artifacts all evidence athleticism even though he was not observed making them, since he was alone in the arena. Right? Or do you contend that I am wrong?
Let's take the test as reliable and your representation of it as faithful. The course could have been accomplished by a human being only if he had great speed and agility. The other marker, ostensibly, retrieved only with a powerful vertical.
So, yes, human 'athleticism' has been demonstrated in the case of Jock McClock.
Athleticism does not explain Jock's ability to run fast, or jump high, but it explains his possession of the artifacts. That is, of course, if all other possible explanations are impossible or completely improbable.
So, without a bare eyeball observation, but under certain parameters, this test has both demonstrated athleticism and explained the artifacts by reference to the artifacts.
This is a nice example of how we can gain knowledge about a subject without an actual observation or even previous knowledge about him.
However, this does not make the case of 'athleticism' analogous to the case of 'intelligence', even as adapted.
Unfortunately, without the preconditions of the test (a de facto observation) the markers are meaningless. They indicate nothing about 'athleticism' absent the context given. This is not the case with the artifacts that tested for 'intelligence'.
Likewise they fail the requirement of providing an analogy to 'intelligence' because the test was human-specific. There is no generalized way to refer to 'athleticism' which would apply to any subject, whether human, horse, cheetah, space ship or natural satellite. The definitions provided do not find any way to identify a minimal universal property we could call 'athleticism' or recognize any one thing it would be required to produce.
'Athleticism' is married thus far to its necessary qualifications and contexts whereas 'intelligence' is not.
To refute my argument, please tell me either
1) Why "athleticism" is actually an informative explanation for natural phenomena in general, such as how cheetahs run fast or how proteins fold up in cells so quickly
As you can see, in order to make any meaning out of the analogy you had to do much more with it than you had allowed in your challenges.
[or] 2) Why "intelligence" is different from "athleticism" when both of them refer generally to the ability to do certain types of behaviors, and when neither of these concepts can be given a single, objective, uniform method to empirically decide what is athletic and what is not, or what is intelligent and what is not.
Intelligence had been shown to be far different from athleticism in these aspects. Intelligence, as indicated by the design inference, is generalized, is not context-dependent, and applies uniformly to all subjects.
The necessary revision you made to the test for athleticism demonstrates that both conditions 1 and 2 above are false. To make the test do even some of what the test for intelligence did the target had to be changed as well as the methodology. Now, instead of 'athleticism' explaining why the subject is able to run fast athleticism, defined as the ability to run fast, etc., becomes the thing evidenced by the test. It explains not how the subject runs fast but how he came to be in possession of the markers. And this test would only work in the case of the human being and, as was asked before, in a temporally isolated situation. It lacks all of the universality of the tests for design>purpose>intelligence.
The above two methods you stipulated as the only ways to refute your argument do not even apply to the argument you finally made.
Further to your claim that I tested only Poindexter's intelligence and not intelligence in general is the fact, outlawed by you but falsely so, that yes, only something with foresight/intent/purpose could have prepared those artifacts for me.
Send a variety of lifeforms, including a dog and a crow, in with Poindexter and if the same artifacts come out then something in that room was intelligent by the definition
Send the same out with McClock and you return no such evidence for athleticism – as per the definition/test.
As I said before.
3) I'm sorry but your athleticism analogy doesn't interest me any more than it interested Bradford. This is not because we are afraid of its very severe implications but because it is not analogous the way you are using it and we are just fine discussing the actual topic at hand.
AIGUY: All we need is reliable data that tells us what we need to know. Whether I watch Dexter take the test with my own eyes, or he does it in a protected room, makes no difference.
FMM: This is true with Dexter but is is not true with Carl that is the difference between athleticism and intelligence.
I just went to considerable length to explain why this was not the case at all; please see above re: Jock McClock. There I show that we can find evidence for athleticism in just the same way – by having Jock record his athletic feats in a protected room.
You can infer intelligence from artifacts alone but you can't infer athleticism in this way.
I have shown just the opposite – you can test both of these attributes whether or not you are physically present when the test is taken.
AIGUY: but these artifacts all evidence athleticism even though he was not observed making them, since he was alone in the arena. Right? Or do you contend that I am wrong?
FMM: NO!!! if he was sufficiently intelligent he could fake it
In a very funny way, someone athletic might fake being intelligent. How you ask? By moving so incredibly quickly through blind trial-and-error that he arrives so quickly at the selection that it seems like he's intelligent!
It depends on how you're defining athleticism. You talked about 'athleticism' explaining the capacity of the flagella to move the way it does. I could take that to mean that athleticism is a reference to its properties of locomotion (it has these features which move this way which propels etc so, which is an athletic property). Granted, that's defining athleticism. But isn't 'if you provide the definition, you can get somewhere' the point?
No, the point is that neither the dictionary definition of the word "athleticism" nor the definitions I've made up here ("efficient locomotion" and so on) have any explanatory power whatsoever, because a definition does not constitute an explanation.
In order to test the assertion that athleticism is responsible for flagellar motion, we would need to be able to characterize athleticism in a way that allowed us to see if it really was what we were seeing or not. But there is no test for athleticism that can be applied to both Carl Lewis and a flagellum. You could simply redefine athleticism as "that which enables things to move around", but then you have a dormitive principle. You would need to somehow make a recognizable characterization of how things move under the influence of athleticism in order to test it.
In the same way, you could simply define intelligence as "that which enables agents to design things", but that obviously cannot explain the designs in biology. And there is no operational definition for intelligence that can be applied to both human beings and the Designer of Life.
So, for the common meanings of "athleticism" and "intelligence", there is no way to test for the presence of these things in arbitrary contexts, because you need to devise a new operational definition for each type of entity you observe. And while you can make up operational definitions that suit a particular context, it won't tell you anything you didn't already know to then call something "athletic" or "intelligent".
But what do you mean by scientifically undecidable? That seems to hinge on an eternal failure to create life from non-life in a laboratory. But what if someone (say a human) succeeds? Does the statement become scientifically valid then? Note that I'm not saying 'an intelligent agent created the original life on earth', only 'an intelligent agent can create life from non-life, full stop'.
I mean that the empirical ambiguity around the term "intelligent agent" prevents us from evaluating the truth of the assertion.
Say I find a new species of animal and I put it in the laboratory, and lo and behold I see it create life from non-life in a test tube. Have I demonstrated the truth of your hypothesis? Have I demonstrated that an intelligent agent can create life? Of course not – not until I also show that this animal was intelligent. (I trust you see why you can't simply say it must have been intelligent or else it couldn't have succeeded – by definition!)
What if I hypothesize 'A human with the right knowledge and tools is capable of creating life from non-life'?
No problem at all – that is a perfectly scientific question, since identifying what is and what is not a human being is unproblematic on grounds independent of their ability to succeed.
AIGUY: Furthermore, if something does one thing and one thing alone no matter what the circumstance, whether by physical necessity or not, would you say that demonstrates foresight? Of course not.
PEZ: If that one thing requires foresight, sure.
You seem to have changed your mind – previously you stated "By virtue of physical necessity? Right. That does not demonstrate foresight." Which is it?
I have not seen a complexity and specification argument on spider webs so I'm going to draw my conclusion intuitively. The web has intricate patterns of sticky surfaces and those a spider can walk on. It has signalling devices built in to alert the spider to the presence of prey. It is uniquely arranged in a complex pattern which is hard for me to evaluate like this. I would say that natural forces can create more complexity than a spider web's appearance would indicate. But I'm going to go with design.
Oh, goody. Me too
Let's just pretend that the math and irreducibility arguments will bear out my finding and we can use this as a case in point.
Count me in.
I've just inferred design of the spider web. It has a designer. It is constructed on purpose and with foresight. It's designer has foresight. etc.
Does the spider have foresight? Not necessarily, but the web's designer has. Did my dominoes, or the remote control car? No.
The spider is the cause of the design, but does not have foresight. OK.
Now, you make another assertion: Even though we found something of complex form and function (if a spider web isn't high-CSI enough for you, try a termite mound), and we found the entity responsible did not have foresight, you assert that there has to be a pony in here somewhere, and you bet if you found out who made that spider in the first place, it would be plenty intelligent. But of course that is only an assertion, not something that comes from the evidence. As far as the evidence shows, we have a design that comes from something without foresight, and we don't have to know who designed the spider in order to know the spider isn't an intelligent designer.
I am saying that the spider might be an automaton like the assembly-line robot and which has been designed to bring webs into being.
And so might that which created the spider be just another automaton. And so on, as far as you'd like to go.
Now, you argue that ultimately there must be an intelligence, and I argue that you can't base that belief on the evidence. You claim that something with foresight somehow came into existence, or existed forever, and proceeded to create the automaton spider. I claim that some automaton (natural process, you'd call it) somehow came into existence, or existed forever, and proceeded to create the automaton spider. You can look at flagella all day long and it won't help you distinguish between these two possibilities.
But then perhaps I can learn something about the spider (not the design) by studying the spider. It turns out that they can learn, have memory, exhibit social recognition "¦ in short, are far more complex cognitively than they were previously given credit for (have you ever noticed that this increasing complexity is a constant trend in our studies?). So it is not illogical for me to presume that the spider itself has the foresight and (thanks Brembs) the non-determined, non-random spontaneity, to build its web via its own cognitive ability interacting with its instincts (programs).
The lack of foresight in various wasps and spiders has been demonstrated many times in experiments which show some of these creatures do indeed display a profound lack of problem solving skills, repeating the same futile motions in novel situations when a simple bit of foresight would have saved them. The famous sphex wasp is a perfect example. But this is moot, because we both know you can't subject the Designer to the sorts of experiments you need to decide the matter.
AIGUY: Sure, I have lots of tests for athleticism! Don't you have lots of tests for intelligence?
PEZ: Sure do. Including a couple individual tests used to draw an universal design inference.
What are the tests used to draw universal design inferences? You mean if you can create CSI you must be intelligent, because the operational definition of intelligence in ID is "able to create CSI" Good thinking!
Have you one like that for athleticism?
Sure – you test for the ability to do tasks that require athleticism – exactly like your test for intelligence!
AIGUY: No, the test for athleticism in horses is different. Likewise, you couldn't give a horse a Stanford-Binet IQ test, right?
PEZ: That's right. You've moved into a quantitative analysis now, however.
Agreed again – both intelligence and athleticism require different tests for every sort of thing you want to test.
AIGUY: No, only the tests are species specific. How about for intelligence – is your definition species specific?
PEZ: You're just being silly. You know it's not.
What I know is you have no test for intelligence that can be applied universally. Some things that create CSI are intelligent (people) and some are not (spiders). Some intelligent things create CSI (people) and some don't (dolphins). CSI is no kind of test for any mental ability at all. You need to be able to test the entity's ability to solve novel problems in order to see if it has foresight. I'm getting tired of saying this.
Your dragon is well-slayed, but I'm sure you'll try to resurrect the corpse, so please show me a test for athleticism which is not temporally defined.
How many times must I smite you before you surrender? I shall call you Don Quixote!
My non-temporal tests for athleticism: Someone who can jump very high is athletic, or one who could run for a long distance without stopping, or anyone who can sink fifty free-throws in a row.
AIGUY: Can't you see by now that I can keep this up as long as you'd like…
PEZ: Only if you disrespect dialogue and honest communication
Ok, this time you have crossed the line – I do not deserve that, thank you.
AIGUY: This sort of talk is like saying that the moon is athletic because it moves around the Earth so fast.
PEZ: If the definition of "athleticism" is strictly about speedy movement then I would say you are right – the moon is athletic, the term is vacuous, and the argument is dumb.
Athleticism is not only about speedy movement, but positional manipulation in general.
But that's not analogous to ID.
This is the third time you have said this without saying why it is not analogous!
And it's not what you were already claiming above when you were changing the tests and definitions species by species.
Yes, it is all the same – it is all about athleticism – controlled and efficient locomotion.
Now, you say that whatever enables a human to build a computer is the same thing that enables the Designer to build a flagella – it is all "intelligence", right? Well, if you tell me how you decide that the same thing enables the Designer to make flagella also enables humans to build computers, then I'll tell you how I can tell that the same thing that allows cheetahs to run fast allows the moon to orbit the Earth.
(By the way, research into Athletic Causation is proceeding all the time, and we are evolving our definitions of "athletic" just as ID is evolving its definitions of "intelligence" – I've heard a whole lot of those!)
AIGUY: I don't care how ID characterizes biological forms;
PEZ: I do. And you misrepresented it in the comment that I responded to and in your comment that referred to that. And now you are changing the subject as though I was on a different point.
You care about the biological forms themselves, and I'm just interested about what you claim caused those forms. That's ok – we seem to be interested in different things. I think I've consistently expressed interest in the "intelligence" aspect here, and everybody here can see that's what I've wanted to talk about. Sorry if you think I've changed my focus, but I don't think that's the case.
ID does not say this. ID specifies what kind of complexity indicates purposeful arrangement of parts.
This ambiguity is truly the heart of our miscommunication, so let's try extra hard on this one right here: Does "purposeful" refer to the fact that the parts work together to perform a function, or does it refer to the sort of mental process that was responsible for assembling the parts, or does it refer to both, or does it refer to whatever you'd like it refer to depending on what question is being asked?
Now, if "purposeful" refers to the way the parts work together, then you are just describing what you see in biological forms and not trying to say anything about the sort of thing that caused these forms to exist. In that case I'm just not interested in talking about that here.
If on the other hand "purposeful" refers to the sort of mental process that was responsible for putting the biological form together, then you are assuming your conclusion whenever you call some biological form a "design". You can't just prove that intelligence was involved by using this definition – you actually must provide evidence that intelligence was involved.
AIGUY: The way I said it is the way all of the leading ID authors say it
PEZ: The way you said mischaracterized the claim about the complexity repeatedly. ID does not claim that intelligence is evidenced when complexity is found and it does not define intelligence as the thing that creates complexity.
I took the quote directly from the DI website. Where should I have gotten it from?
You defined intelligence as that which creates design and we know that design, in ID, requires purpose, foresight, creativity, and, yes, intelligence. Intelligence is not defined as that which is intelligent, and Allen and your dormitive accusation is unjustified. Intelligence has been defined for you many times.
Good grief.
I ask what you mean by intelligence and you say it's not about intelligence, it's about design.
I ask what you mean by design and you say it is purposeful arrangements of parts
Then you say the purposeful arrangement of parts requires purpose! Huh?
And also it requires intelligence.
I return to our central confusion: Is "purpose" defined in terms of the characteristics of the arrangement of parts, or is it defined in terms of the characteristics of the arranger?
AIGUY: If intelligent cause is itself the result of law+chance, this makes no sense.
PEZ: Sure it does. If intelligence evolved by law and chance then it can design.
No, I did not mean to ask if intelligence evolved by law and chance – I meant to ask if intelligence processes themselves operated according to law and chance. In other words, if ID rests on dualism, then the empirical evidence for ID is no better than the empirical evidence for dualism. In other words, there is none.
I did say that. A thing could come into being by virtue of physical necessity and then go about designing.
Again, the issue is not whether or not a thing comes into being by physical necessity. The issue is whether the thing operates according to physical necessity as it designs things. The question is open, as there is no way to demonstrate this one way or the other.
AIGUY: In other words, that is the operational definition of intelligence in the context of ID.
PEZ: A test is not a definition.
What do you think "operational definition" means?
AIGUY: You cannot eliminate all necessity and random chance, because you are not omniscient, and cannot say what other forms of necessity there may be
PEZ: I don't have to accept promissory notes either. Science can only go by what it currently knows.
For the third time nobody is talking about promissory anything. What is it you think I am promising? Whether or not we ever figure it out, the fact remains that our ignorance does not constitute support for any particular theory.
AIGUY: 3) Even if you eliminate necessity and chance, there is nothing to tell us what might be remaining. It might be "mojo" or "magic" or "free will" or "the intrinsic geometry of hyperspace inversions" or…
PEZ: And that open question can be answered in good faith.
The answer is easy: We do not know.
That's not what ID does. It demonstrates a rationale for inferring that chance and necessity are insufficient.
How is that different from "what we currently know" In fact, you just said "Science can only go by what it currently knows". So what you are saying is that if we do not currently know how chance and necessity can account for something, then this means chance and necessity must be insufficient, and so we can say "intelligence" was responsible without any actual evidence that the cause did anything but followed physical necessity. Argument from ignorance, pure and simple.
AIGUY: Casting "intent/purpose/intelligence" as the default conclusion once chance and necessity has been "ruled out".
PEZ: That's not a trick but a valid inference. IDists go to great lengths to demonstrate that they have good reason to believe these are the only games in town.
Nonsense. If ID can offer "unspecified intelligent cause" without any independent evidence that such a thing exists, then obviously "unspecified unintelligent cause" is just as valid, without any independent evidence either.
Good. So an alien intelligence, which is in some way human-like, is a perfectly sound qualification for you?
I don't understand this question, sorry.
But while we're at it, what's physical and why must it be physical? You have "reason to believe" that the human mind requires physicality, but you are presuming that a human-like mind must. Why can't a human-like mind be non-physical?
I never said it must be physical. I'm just following the evidence where it leads. In our experience, all intelligent agents have physical bodies that we can see.
You device tests like CSI and IC which require foresight.
I do not believe that IC and CSI require foresight, and you have never said why this is assumed to be the case.
AIGUY: Tell me how to look at some arranger which is arranging some parts, and decide if this arranger is purposeful or not.
PEZ: It contingently arranges parts which are well-matched to perform a function in such an improbable manner that defies random chance.
AIGUY: I think this can be done by things that are not purposeful. How can we empirically decide who is right (since we can't just ask if somebody is doing it on purpose or not).
PEZ: You show me such a thing. We know wind and rain can't do. What can?
I claim a computer is not purposeful. I claim computers can contingently arrange parts which are well-matched… that defies random chance. You cannot say how to refute these claims. You can only fall back on the "who designed the designer" argument and ask me how the computer was designed. But if I ask you who designed your designer, you will dodge the question.
Bottom line: You say an unspecified agent like a human designed living things, and I say a unspecified agent like a computer (or a natural process) designed living things, and neither of these notions can be tested.
So how can pure determinism run counter to free will if it means only "cued by the environment" It can't. The author is clearly not saying merely what you are claiming he is.
What in the world are you talking about? Do you actually think these guys are arguing for libertarian, metaphysical free will? Read this:
We have shown that even a fly brain possesses a function which makes it easier to imagine a brain that creates the impression of free will." says Brembs. It remains to be shown how this faculty is implemented in the brain and if it plays part in creating the subjective experience in humans of being able to do what one will. The next step in this direction will be to localize and understand the brain circuits responsible for the spontaneous behavior in flies. The results from this step could lead directly to the development of robots with the capacity for spontaneous nonrandom behavior.
(emphasis added). I'm sorry, Pez, but if you can read what they wrote and still believe these people believe their paper supports libertarian free will, I don't think there's much I can say.
AIGUY: The authors are not claiming that the fly's behavior is not caused by antecedent physical cause – only that it triggered by internal rather than external cause.
PEZ: Yes, actually they are.
So they also must believe that physical brain circuits operate in ways that cannot be understood in terms of physics? And that they will replicate this effect in robots? When do they add the special magic "free will" components to their robots so their robots can exhibit the same sort of contra-causal free will that the fruitfly has?
How do we see if a computer has chosen to attend to a sound wave?
The same way we see if a person has chosen to attend to a sound wave. It can tell us so, or it can exhibit some other behavior that we find indicative of comprehension.
PEZ: This is irrelevant. Monkeys respond differently to the same sound wave depending upon their attention and expectations. This difference in response is reflected in brain changes.
AIGUY: So you think this means monkeys have immaterial minds? (hint: computers respond differently to the same sound wave depending on their attention and expectations).
PEZ: This answers your, yet again, false claim. You said the sound wave itself is what caused the change. Then you said it was because it was a particular soundwave.
Yes, so? This is the exact same situation as the person – it matters to a person what soundwaves they hear, and it matters to a computer too.
Now you have to admit it was the attention paid that caused the change so you claim that a computer can, likewise, pay attention.
Of course a computer can pay attention! I don't think it is concsious of doing so, but it certainly pays attention!
PEZ:Musicians respond differently to the same soundwaves when attending to them in different ways.
AIGUY:As do computers.
PEZ: You say you don't want to debate the philosophy of mind with me and I have no particular urge to either.
Unfortunately, ID is utterly mired in philosophy of mind, which is precisely why there is no science of ID.
But if you're in the mood perhaps you can show me how the computer's different responses due to its attention are analogous to those of a musician. Or not.
If the computer is engaged in figuring out the time signature of a song, it pays attention to amplitudes over the entire sound spectrum; if it is trying to guess the key it pays attention to frequency intervals, and so on.
AIGUY: Just because they say "intent" does not exist does not mean they believe no brain changes could occur when someone is trained in Schwartz's technique! They of course would all believe that brain changes must occur?
PEZ: What's his technique then?
The point was that even eliminative materialists would predict that there would be brain changes accompanying every possible interaction between the patient and Schwartz and accompanying every possible change in behavior.
AIGUY: Likewise, how can we decide if something uses foresight if all we have is the resulting artifact and we don't know if it can solve problems? Maybe the Designer has no foresight at all, and the one and only thing it does is output these life forms.
PEZ: There is no likewise. The test is a test for foresight and you can accept it or deny it.
Not sure we can go much farther here. You say CSI can only be generated by intelligence.
I ask what intelligence is and you say it uses foresight and intent to create designs.
I ask how you can tell when something uses foresight and intent, and you tell me otherwise it couldn't create designs.
You've gone off sideways again with your distinction about my having set up the experiment in the Poindexter case (making me an observer, of sorts), but that is irrelevant. I set up the experiment in the Lewis case as well.
That is correct – you set up the experiment in both cases. You did not, however, set up the experiment in the case of ID. In this case, you can't devise a test for the Designer – you can't give the Designer different tasks to do to see if it can find the solution of a Rubick's cube or write a poem or take an IQ test.
One came back positive and the other inconclusive.
I think they both came back positive. Carl Lewis is athletic, and so is Jock McClock, and Dexter is intelligent. Great!
Athleticism and intelligence are not analogous as explanations as you were using them and claiming they were.
Yes, they are.
You repeatedly said that as 'athleticism' fails so fails 'intelligence' but we saw that this was not the case.
May 20th, 2008 at 4:28 pm
Hi all -
Bradford has kindly directed me to this thread to continue our interesting discussion regarding what the word "intelligence" might mean in the context of "Intelligent Design Theory" (I was not allowed to continue posting on the previous thread, called "So Then How Did It Happen").
Before I answer the previous posts directly, I think it would be of great benefit to try and agree on some fundamental concepts.
I'll start with a few working definitions that I believe will help us to tease apart our actual positions. These are just definitions, not statements of fact. We can all decide if these definitions are clear enough and otherwise acceptable:
design (noun)
A complex, functional mechanism, like a watch or an eyeball or a flagellum
design (verb)
To cause a design (noun) to exist. The term does not imply anything else about the cause – only that it resulted in the existence of a design (noun)
intelligence (noun)
The ability to design (verb)
(Note this is a very unusual definition, but there are many different definitions of intelligence used in different disciplines. I think this definition is good for ID, but perhaps you'd like to add other attributes commonly associated with intelligence, such as the ability to learn from experience, or solve novel problems).
intelligent (adj)
Exhibiting intelligence
consciousness (noun)
The private, first-person experience of being aware of our thoughts and our environment.
conscious intelligence
The quality of being both conscious and intelligent
OK. Now, here are some propositions that use this terminology, and hopefully we can begin to discuss which of these statements are true or false with better clarity:
1) Both living things (like humans and spiders) and non-living things (like computers) can design things. In other words, humans, spiders, and computers are intelligent.
2) As far as we know, only human beings (and perhaps some other "higher" animals?) are conscious.
3) So, something does not have to be conscious in order to be intelligent (this follows from 1&2).
4) We can tell if something is intelligent or not. We don't need to know the origin of the thing, or how it works, in order to decide if it is intelligent or not. (Note: If you accept my definition of "intelligence" above, then we can tell if something is intelligent or not simply by observing the products of its behavior. Otherwise, if you want to say that intelligence entails learning or novel problem-solving abilities, then you would need to actually observe behaviors in order to see if something was intelligent).
I'll leave it there for the time being, just to see if we can agree on a few terms and these propositions before trying to see what it all means for ID.
Comment by aiguy — May 20, 2008 @ 4:28 pm
May 20th, 2008 at 4:49 pm
This thread is a continuation of a discussion on intelligence and foresight from here.
Comment by Zachriel — May 20, 2008 @ 4:49 pm
May 20th, 2008 at 4:55 pm
Thanks, Zach.
Let me add another definition here for a term that has come up:
foresight (noun)
The ability to make a plan – a representation of conditions that do not exist in the world – that can be used to find a solution to a problem without actually implementing trial-and-error in the world.
Comment by aiguy — May 20, 2008 @ 4:55 pm
May 20th, 2008 at 6:12 pm
Hey Aguy:
Why not just use the common definitions from the dictionary? If you can choose to define something in an ad hock manner you can win any argument. Didn't we learn anything from George Orwell?
Words have meanings !!!!!!
from here:
http://www.merriam-webster.com...
Design (Noun)
1: a particular purpose held in view by an individual or group b: deliberate purposive planning 2: a mental project or scheme in which means to an end are laid down
Note artifacts are not designs but the result of designs
Design (verb)
1: to create, fashion, execute, or construct according to plan : DEVISE, CONTRIVE2 a: to conceive and plan out in the mind
Note: the dictionary definition is all about the cause (a plan)
intelligence (noun)1 a (1): the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations
Note: I believe you will find there are not different definitions but only different wordings of the one standard definition
Intelligent (ADj)
having or indicating a high or satisfactory degree of intelligence and mental capacity
Note this has to do with what one is not what one does
consciousness (noun) the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself
Note This is pretty much what you said except it does not needlessly emphasize the subjective nature of consciousness. I have no problem with your definition but it seems to be a way of sneaking in something that you have no right to do.
conscious intelligence
The quality of being both conscious and intelligent
Note this is your definition I have no problem with it as long as we define both consciousness and intelligence correctly
foresight (noun)
an act of looking forward; also : a view forward
note this is much simpler than yours
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 20, 2008 @ 6:12 pm
May 20th, 2008 at 6:31 pm
now to your propositions
1) Agree but in the case of all nonliving intelligent things we know of there are livings things at the begining of the causal chain doing the programming
2) I have no way of knowing for sure anything is conscious except me. I can and do assume other entities are conscious based on a lot of factors.
3) Agree but this flows from the dictionary definitions not from your propositions.
4) Agree but we do need to know the characteristics of a thing to know if it is intelligent.
We might need to know if it has the ability to learn or design using foresight for example
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 20, 2008 @ 6:31 pm
May 20th, 2008 at 6:53 pm
Aguy:
That is simply incorrect If you know an artifact required foresight to produce you know it's creator is intelligent per the dictionary definitions .
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 20, 2008 @ 6:53 pm
May 20th, 2008 at 7:39 pm
Hi FMM –
Yes, words have meanings, and they have different meanings in different contexts. For example, I might say someone used "force" to make me give them money, but the word "force" in that context doesn't mean exactly the same thing it means in physics!.
So dictionary definitions are quite often unsuitable for scientific or philosophical discussions. In science and philosophy, then, the first order of business is always to clarify a technical vocabulary, so that we can say exactly what we mean when we describe our theories.
Now, let's look at the changes you've proposed…
Design (noun)
I defined this word to mean a complex functional mechanism, like an watch or a flagellum. Using my definition, we can then begin to ask how such a thing comes to exist – in particular, whether or not some conscious mind was involved.
Using your (dictionary) defintion, the answer to those questions is already assumed in the definition. So if we are to use your definition, we need another word for a complex functional machine that does not already carry the connotation of mental cause. So I believe my definition is simpler to work with in this context, but if you'd like we can use a definition more like yours.
Now, the dictionary definition you propose doesn't really work for ID in general – if you want to call a flagellum a "design", you don't really mean a "purpose" or a "mental project" – you really mean the physical, integrated, functional, physical components working together in the cell. So how about this instead:
Design (noun): "Something that was created by a conscious mind".
OK?
Design (verb)
Likewise, you are suggesting that we incorporate reference to a conscious minds whenever we talk about the creation of complex functional objects. Again, I would like to be able to ask the question of how a complex functional mechanism comes to exist without already assuming that conscious minds are involved. So, again, I think my definitions are more clear and simple, since they do not presuppose the answers to these questions. But I'm willing to use a meaning like the one you propose:
Design (verb): "To create something by means of conscious thought".
OK?
I am quite sure you are mistaken on this point, and that I can find a large number of very different definitions (not just rewordings, but very different meanings) provided on this board, on other ID resources, in academic references from psychology, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and so on.
But I'll accept your definition for now, if you are sure you want to use this particular definition. (I will bet that other ID-friendly folks with want to change it though!).
intelligence (noun): "The ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations"
This differs from most ID usage in that in ID, "intelligent" usually refers to a property that something either has or doesn't – a binary property. You would like to say that the adjective only applies if something has a certain level of "mental capacity", right? Ok, let's go with that then. If something has the ability to learn or understand and deal with new situations, but not to a high or satisfactory degree, then by your definition it is not intelligent, right?
I wasn't "sneaking" anything in, no. Your definition is just fine, though, as long as you realize that we have no way of objectively observing consciousness. I hope we agree that humans are capable of consciousness (when they are not unconscious of course), but that deciding when things other than waking human beings are conscious or not presents a scientific challenge.
I think that the metaphorical "looking" presents a problem here; we really aren't talking about eyesight of course. But if you'd like, we can separate these two concepts:
1) plan (verb) to create a representation of conditions that do not exist in the world that can be used to find a solution to a problem without actually implementing trial-and-error in the world.
2) foresight (noun) the ability to consciously create plans
Can we agree on these changes?
And now the propositions:
You agree that both living and non-living things (like computers) can be intelligent – good. (And yes, all nonliving intelligent things we know of are created by living things).
OK, but what else in our experience do you assume is conscious besides some subset of animals?
Ok. Consciousness and intelligence are distinct, and there is no empirical basis for claiming that anything which is intelligent must be conscious or vice-versa, right?
Agreed. My point was we do not need to know how it came to exist, for example, or if it is physically deterministic.
This means, for example, that if you conclude that the cause of flagella was intelligent, you needn't necessarily be able to answer the question of "who designed the designer?" or "how did the designer design it?". Right?
I think there is some confusion here.
Yes, of course if we use your definitions, once you say an artifact required "foresight" then you have already assumed conscious intelligence was involved. So then the question simply becomes, how do we know when something required "foresight" instead of "planning"
We've already agreed that a computer can be intelligent, and that it can plan, but it has no foresight. And we agree that this remains true whether or not we consider the way the computer works, or the origin of the computer.
So even if we agreed that evolutionary processes would not result in a flagellum, and that planning was required, we would need additional evidence that foresight was required.
Also, since your definition of "intelligence" entails learning and dealing with novel situations, you'll need to explain how ID might be able to support the claim that the cause of complex biological structures was intelligent. If, for example, the only thing that this cause is capable of is creating these life forms, then it would neither have to learn nor deal with novel situations, right?
Comment by aiguy — May 20, 2008 @ 7:39 pm
May 20th, 2008 at 9:42 pm
Aguy:
.
It might be a good idea for you to check this thread out. http://telicthoughts.com/favor...
toward the end I said:
the question of knowing something is a question of consciousness not intelligence does a computer know anything when it predicts a chess move I will make based on my past history? Probably not. Does it show foresight? yep
I don't in any way assume consciousness
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 20, 2008 @ 9:42 pm
May 20th, 2008 at 11:00 pm
Hey Aguy:
Actually all that's required is to specify which dictionary definition you are using in this case the 1st vs the 3rd
I have no problem with clarifying. what I object to is changing meaning ad hock with no specific agreed upon reason
For example look at your changes to my common dictionary definitions
No, A computer or a wasp can create a design and I don't believe that computers are conscious it's best to stick with the dictionary here.
No, A beaver designs it's dam and I don't believe beavers are conscious it's best to stick with the dictionary here.
That is almost correct. We are dealing with degrees when we are speaking of intelligent the ants from the other thread are intelligent but not to the same degree as the musical genius Sting
Once again why not go with the dictionary?
Plan: to arrange the parts of : DESIGN
2 : to devise or project the realization or achievement of
3 : to have in mind : INTEND
This seems adequate to me
Foresight has nothing to do with consciousness again best to stick with the dictionary here
No you need to give compelling reasons before you change common language I've yet to see any.
God ,Angels, Demons. The jury is still out on my old pickup
There is no empirical basis for claiming you are conscious. That does not mean I don't assume you are and for good reason.
According to the dictionary definition, if it was designed it was designed using foresight so we already know how it was designed by definition. Now do you see why it is important to stick with common definitions when possible?
Not if we concluded it was designed and stuck to the common English definitions of words.
I could define "learn" and "deal with novel situations" for you but I trust you know by now where I'd get that information.
In order for your stament to make sense you would have to explain to me why you would not consider the creating of the bacterial flagellum at a specific point in time using multiple interconnecting pieces a novel situation?
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 20, 2008 @ 11:00 pm
May 20th, 2008 at 11:30 pm
FMM –
From this I gather you believe that "knowing" entails consciousness, and so a computer probably doesn't "know" anything. However, you seem to be saying that "foresight" does not entail consciousness, since you say a computer can show foresight. Do I have that right?
So when ID suggests the cause of life was "intelligent", this does not necessarily mean "conscious", right? It might be an unconscious intelligent process?
Again, your dictionary definition for design (n) was "a particular purpose held in view by an individual or group b: deliberate purposive planning 2: a mental project or scheme in which means to an end are laid down". But since you say you do not assume consciousness, then you must be saying that none of these words entail consciousness, right? In other words, you think something can be deliberately purposive, but have no conscious awareness of the fact that they are deliberately purposive, right?
So "knowing" entails consciousness.
"Design" does not entail consciousness.
"Conceiving" and "planning out in the mind" do not entail consciousness either.
"Foresight" entails "looking forward", but it does not entail consciousness.
Do I have that straight? Is there somewhere all of this is written down, or do ID folks just make this up as they go along?
It's important, because "intelligence" is the sole explanatory concept offerred by ID, and so we ought to be able to say generally what "intelligence" is, and to be clear about it. If we mean something that knows what it is doing, consciously reflects on its goals and desires, the way people do, then that is one sort of claim (and something the evidence can't possibly support). And if we don't necessarily mean any of those things, then we need to say what we do mean.
Again, if you are not assuming consciousness, then you need to make clear that concepts like "to have in mind" and "intend" have no connotation of consciousness (which is not, I think, what most people would say).
I think we're seeing exactly the opposite here: While you might believe that words like "intent" and "foresight" and "deliberate planning" do not imply consciousness, others (including others here at TT) would disagree with you. And for some odd reason you've taken the word "know" to imply consciousness! (I would say my word processor knows how to compute line spacing without consciousness). So you see, without a precise technical lexicon, people constantly talk past each other about these issues.
I don't think we need technical definitions for these, unless we find we mean different things.
The cause of the flagellum might be completely physically determined – hard wired – to create the flagellum, without ever having "figured it out" for itself. Thus, it would not be "dealing with" – generating an intelligent response to – this "situation", but rather producing this particular solution "by instinct", the way a spider makes a web. The only way we could tell if the cause was actually intelligent would be by presenting it with other situations that it had not yet encountered to see if it could generate novel responses. This is exactly what ethologists do when studying animal intelligence (or lack of same).
Comment by aiguy — May 20, 2008 @ 11:30 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 12:06 am
aiguy,
It's not like there's a single ID proposal out there – everyone from Dembski to Behe to even MikeGene, I believe, have pointed out how ID is at this point a collection of points of view, sometimes with proposals, other times with differing definitions.
You often point out that intelligence, consciousness, mind, etc are hard things to pin down – and you seem to agree that it's possible some aspects of them may well defy the physicalist paradigm, or at least require a new understanding of physics.
But even if you accept all that – are you saying they shouldn't bother trying, or even holding an opinion based on the data?
But even those results are debatable. We can say which animals performed similar on a given test, but justifying the interpretation is a whole other ballgame. Should they not even bother trying to determine if there's 'actual intelligence' present? Is the guy who says 'Fish can't feel pain, they don't have a neocortex' justified? What about the guy saying 'Fish can feel pain, look how they react to an irritant'? Are we outside the scientific realm at that point?
All this before mentioning that something can be both 'hardwired / physically predetermined' yet still intelligent. If nothing else, I'm glad ID proponents are calling attention to these questions, difficult and thought-provoking as they are.
Comment by nullasalus — May 21, 2008 @ 12:06 am
May 21st, 2008 at 12:41 am
nullasalus,
I understand. What I fault these authors for is not having different opinions on critical aspects of what might collectively be called ID Theory, but rather for failing to make each of their assumptions and commitments explicit. On the contrary, I think Dembski and Behe go to great lengths to disguise the fact that they are making any sorts of commitments about mind at all.
No, I'm saying that people need to say what they mean. ID generally equivocates on the meaning of this explanatory concept ("intelligence" or "intelligent cause" or "teleology"), and so it isn't possible to evaluate the strength of the evidence for its claims. If ID posits an eternal and immaterial personal being who consciously reflects on His goals and desires as the creator of the universe, then I would say the empirical evidence is pretty weak for that. However, if ID suggests that some process uses memory and learning to devise new complex forms, I'd say the evidence is overwhelmingly strong. (Of course evolution uses memory and learning!)
Well, scientists do not look for actual intelligence in animals, because that would be to reify an instrumental concept. But they do carefully operationalize their definitions, so they can identify any common components of inter-species mental abilities.
Yes.
Actually these are the definitions of Fifth Monarchy Man – not me. In contrast to your views, he makes no assumption of consciousness.
I can't tell if you're joking here. It feels to me that I have for the most part dragged people kicking and screaming into the discussion. Again, it is nice to encounter some understanding and interest in these central issues here at TT, even if a couple of other folks here apparently think the matter is completely irrelevant.
Comment by aiguy — May 21, 2008 @ 12:41 am
May 21st, 2008 at 1:12 am
aiguy,
I understand how you can say that on one level, but on another – intelligent design immediately suggests we have to tackle minds and mental. I don't know about Dembski, but Behe's focused on some mechanistic limitations of evolution – I don't think he'd necessarily get into issues of mind over 'the edge of evolution' anymore than, say, Fodor would have to when he makes his criticisms.
I don't think 'ID' does – it's a loose association, ranging from Behe and Dembski to (I suppose) MikeGene and John Davison, among others.
As for eternal and immaterial beings – whole other subject, and one even ID proponents seem not to want to bother getting into. Their focus is typically whether design, full stop, can be detected – and if so, how. They do take it as fundamental that something distinct called 'design' does exist.
I also don't think ID proponents wholesale reject evolution. I'm positive some do – others do not, still others I think do so in name, but accept all the mechanisms. The word has been abused too much, to the point where some people will fight the name alone.
Then we have a problem, and it's not ID. Because there's quite an army of people on both sides of that particular debate who do think it's a scientific issue. Among many others related specifically to design, mind, consciousness, and otherwise.
I'm just pointing out the obvious here. Rehashing.
I'm dead serious. ID, as a school of thought, is promoting a lot of inquiry and discussion about contentious issues – and most importantly, helping to show how contentious said issues truly are, and showing a variety of ways to look at and consider them. I liken it to the internet explosion versus standard journalism; yes, there may be aspects of it I dislike, but I'll take the mess over what preceded it.
Comment by nullasalus — May 21, 2008 @ 1:12 am
May 21st, 2008 at 1:53 am
My two cents, given FMM's definitions it seems like the resulting intelligent designer could very easily be something I would call a natural law. I suspect most people assume a conscious being when they think intelligent design, but we can't even prove other humans are conscious when we have 6 billion of them to study so it seems truly impossible to prove some proposed being we cannot observe is conscious. But removing the attribute of conscious from your definition of intelligent opens up all sorts of possibilities. This seems to include the possibility that evolution, as we understand it today from a purely materialist perspective, might itself qualify as intelligent.
Comment by Todd Berkebile — May 21, 2008 @ 1:53 am
May 21st, 2008 at 2:01 am
nullasalus,
Dembski equates intelligent cause with libertarian will, but only when pressed; otherwise, he pretends that "you know, intelligence" is a satisfactory definition. If Behe stopped after pointing out mechanistic limitations, I wouldn't have a beef with him; instead, he invokes "intelligent cause" without qualification, leaving us to wonder exactly what mental attributes does he believe are in evidence.
My point here was the range of possible interpretations of "intelligence" in this context is so vast that it could describe an evolutionary processes – or a god.
Sorry, I lost you here. I said yes, we are outside of science when we take a stand on whether or not fish consciously suffer pain. I don't rule out future discoveries that might enable us to support some answer, but I don't think we have evidence now one way or the other.
Well, yes. I suppose that would be easier to see if the people going to see Expelled came out discussing dualist metaphysics and the Chinese Room instead of how Darwinism causes moral decay.
Comment by aiguy — May 21, 2008 @ 2:01 am
May 21st, 2008 at 2:06 am
Todd – Exactly so. Very well said!
Comment by aiguy — May 21, 2008 @ 2:06 am
May 21st, 2008 at 4:39 am
aiguy,
I'm not familiar enough with Dembski re: libertarian will, and I don't think it's necessary for ID as a whole, so I'll pass on that. But if Behe's not being specific about the mental attributes, it may well be because he considers that an avenue to explore rather than a question to pass judgment on. Considering where that question is right now, I don't think there's a qualification out there that would help much – see the fish/pain response.
Or it could describe a god that employs evolutionary processes. And 'God' can be further explored in a number of different directions, under the 'Christian' heading alone. Or it could mean just an intelligent force of undetermined origin; maybe there's a way to identify a pattern without needing a body, however faintly. (And if there's no way? That, too, is just as important to make clear – because frankly, 'design detection' was around before ID. It was just erroneously billed as 'negative', and some people wish for those good ol' days.)
Maybe a lot of things. I don't see much harm in people considering this question for themselves (much less being made aware that there's a question to address), or at least no more harm than is already standard in the discussion.
I know what you yourself say. But honestly, that doesn't seem to be the view most people involved in the argument take. Some groups (Including politically charged ones like the PETA) field scientists talking about how, yes, fish certainly do feel pain, and we must take action. Other groups (Including fly fishing organizations) cite scientists and argue no, they absolutely don't feel pain, and no action is needed. The scientists involved on either side don't seem to think it's outside their field, and they cite what they consider and bill as strong evidence.
I guess where I'm going with this is, one common complaint about ID is that the view and its proponents are somehow damaging science. I've stated how limited I think the case is in either direction – but I don't buy the 'threat to science' line, as if ID (or anti-ID) brings a new twist to the table. Research is abused left and right to prop up everything from grant requests to social/political causes to otherwise, and usually no one cares unless they have an opposing view to what's being said. Nothing new is up with the ID debate – it just has more people involved than flyfishers and vegans.
I haven't seen the film, but my understanding is that link was only one part of the presentation. I think that topic is worth attention, but with greater precision than is typically offered in either direction.
I'm hesitant to comment on Expelled before watching it myself, but I will admit outright my opinion of universities as bastions of open discussion and free thinking is low to say the least. I'd say I hope the effect is a more open (sans repercussion) conversation about these subjects at universities is in the cards, but in my heart I'd rather most of them were choked by an autodidact culture.
Comment by nullasalus — May 21, 2008 @ 4:39 am
May 21st, 2008 at 8:45 am
Aguy:
It is written down in the dictionary
I will grant that most folks think that way. It's because folks haven't thought about it deeply enough.
That is the reason that we give our pets names and pay good money to bury them. My hound dog "intends " to tree a coon when he is on it's trail and he has in mind a treat when he begs at my feet but I don't think he is conscious .
Just because we are often loose with our attributing of consciousness in some situations does not mean we should be.
Since the attributing of consciousness is a subjective philosophical thing that is to be expected is it not.
The term know was in response to the comment from hrun
I believed he was using it in the sense of (being aware) of what would happen in the future to know in this sense implies consciousness IMHO. But you are using it in a different sense (know how) this is equivocation and can be addressed by going to the dictionary and pointing out which definition you are using
If that is the case it's the cause of the cause that's intelligent. The thing that did the hard wiring
That is exactly what we have done. Remember secondary causes must have causes. If we found say a bacterial flagellum natural law we would have to ask ourselves is its cause intelligent and based on the fact that it caused a bacterial flagellum natural law for this particular novel situation and other laws in others we would have to say yes.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 8:45 am
May 21st, 2008 at 8:49 am
Todd
Only if a natural law has the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations. laws can't be intellegent by definition
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 8:49 am
May 21st, 2008 at 9:53 am
CJYman *defines* "intelligence in terms of foresight and foresight in terms of awareness (or consciousness) of future targets that do not yet exist."
Then intelligence does not require foresight. Induction is a type of learning. It uses incremental memory, not foresight.
Then foresight does not require consciousness. Computers can use foresight, manipulating models and making decisions.
Most mammals are considered conscious, however, only primates, cetaceans and pachyderms have been shown to be self-conscious.
Comment by Zachriel — May 21, 2008 @ 9:53 am
May 21st, 2008 at 10:26 am
Hey Zach:
I would disagree but this only emphasizes the subjective philosophical nature of consciousness. We would agree on the definition of intelligence and that's what is important for the subject of ID is it not?
Inductive reasoning requires us to assume that nature will continue to be uniform (foresight)
We agree here
Your argument is with Aguy not me he said only humans are considered conscious I assumed he was talking about something like self-consciousness but since determining consciousness is a subjective philosophical thing I ran with it
I only know for sure that I'm conscious.
We can all be right because like Aguy says there is no way to know empirically.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 10:26 am
May 21st, 2008 at 11:07 am
It's more than just a difference concerning terminology. CJYman builds a long, circular argument on this definition.
No assumptions are required for mechanical induction. In this respect, it is no different than computer modeling.
Comment by Zachriel — May 21, 2008 @ 11:07 am
May 21st, 2008 at 11:23 am
How do chess programs beat world champions?
That may have some relevance to the issues of foresight and consciousness.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 21, 2008 @ 11:23 am
May 21st, 2008 at 11:32 am
nullasalus,
And again: Rather than saying "I've shown it's not evolution, and I don't know what might be responsible – let's explore", he instead says "I think intelligent agency is the answer". He, like Dembski (and FMM here and 99% of ID folks I've talked to), assumes that "intelligent agency" is a perfectly meaningful term that we all understand because, well, we are intelligent agents for example. But of course a sample of one does not define a class, and offering "intelligent agency" as a hypothesis is really a Rorshach Inkblot of an answer, where each ID enthusiast gets to imagine whatever they'd like to believe about it and pretend that that is what the evidence supports.
Or it could describe evolution alone, which learns and remembers and so is "intelligent" too (even though it is nothing but a blind natural process).
So, again, this "mysterious answer" strategy supports everything from an evolutionary algorithms to God Almighty – which is another way of saying it supports no concrete answer at all.
We've been here: My problem is with folks like Ben Stein, and with everyone at the DI who tries to claim scientific support for just one of these answers in order to make science consonant with Christian Theology.
I think they're wrong. A human being with frontal lobe damage can experience pain without emotional affect… and we think we can scientifically describe what a fish on a hook feels?
Not yet they're not, but they're trying pretty hard to mess up high school classes by "protecting the right" of science teachers to start teaching all sorts of nonsense.
To this and comments re: Expelled: Multiple wrongs do not make a right.
Comment by aiguy — May 21, 2008 @ 11:32 am
May 21st, 2008 at 11:33 am
FMM:
No, I'm afraid it isn't, because as I've shown dictionaries do not say which of these words are actually supposed to imply human-like conscious awareness and which do not, nor do dictionaries spell out the empirically accessible properties that these definitions are based on. Just because the dictionary defines "soul" or "God" or "magic" does not mean these concepts are suitable as scientific explanations.
Yes, you're right: people do not think about these issues very carefully. That is the reason ID "theorists" need to spell out exactly what they believe the evidence supports, instead of using ambiguous terms and letting everybody read into the "theory" whatever they'd like to believe. That is the problem.
We strongly disagree: I absolutely believe my dogs are conscious. I have absolutely no idea how we might ever settle our disagreement scientifically, however. And so again, how can anyone argue that "ID Theory" might be able to decide the matter for "The Cause of Life" when we can't even settle the matter for our dogs?
Correct: To the extent that "ID Theory" is supposed to be serious science, it should NOT be loose with this attribution, and let its proponents interpret it however they'd like to.
And since ID leaves the meaning of it's central explanatory concept ambiguous in this regard, I say ID is nothing but a "subjective philosophical thing".
Nope, sorry – dictionaries don't say if knowing implies consciousness. Scientists actually do have to pin down single, operationalized definitions for their terms (if they want to get published, anyway).
Unless that cause is hard wired too, of course. And what about that cause? What caused that one?
We can play this game as long as you'd care to. You can posit a conscious final cause, and I can posit an unconscious final cause, or we can posit no final cause at all, and we'll just be running through the same old philosophical arguments that people have used for millenia. ID brings nothing new to this.
No, nobody can subject the Intelligent Designer to experiments to see what He would do in novel circumstances.
Processes operating strictly in accordance with "natural law" can be intelligent. Evolutionary processes are an example.
Comment by aiguy — May 21, 2008 @ 11:33 am
May 21st, 2008 at 11:34 am
kornbelt,
Deep Blue beats human chess champions because it is really good at thinking about chess.
Saying Deep Blue doesn't think about chess is like saying airplanes don't fly because they don't flap their wings
-Drew McDermott
Comment by aiguy — May 21, 2008 @ 11:34 am
May 21st, 2008 at 11:46 am
Right. While there are conscious agents in the causal chain, Deep Blue itself is (presumedly) unconscious, and yet has "goals", "plans", "foresight", and "experience" that leads to a "designed" outcome in the face of an uncertain "environment." All without consciousness.
I think the hangup about consciousness with regards to any proximate designer of earth life is a needless diversion and should be jettisoned.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 21, 2008 @ 11:46 am
May 21st, 2008 at 11:57 am
Kornbelt,
We agree. We are making progress!
Now, what does it mean to have a "deliberate intent" if this intent is not conscious?
Comment by aiguy — May 21, 2008 @ 11:57 am
May 21st, 2008 at 12:11 pm
In the case of Deep Blue, "intent" is its goal of capturing the opponent's king. "Intent" and "goal" seem to me to be synonyms in this case.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 21, 2008 @ 12:11 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 12:19 pm
It's not we who is making progress it's you. We IDers (as far as I can tell) were here from the get go.
Who cares? Deliberate intent has not been brought up in this discussion and was not defined at the outset. Does deep blue have deliberate intent? Does it matter? Does a beaver have deliberate intent? does it matter? how would you know?
Why do you insist here on deveining into things that we can't know empirically? We can know if something is intelligent empirically. Most folks believe we can know if something designed empirically. Why is that not enough for you?
We can talk about conciousness all day but it's not nessary for ID. Get over it
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 12:19 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 12:25 pm
Aguy:
you operate strictly in accordance with "natural law" and you are intellegent so this is a given
please explain how RM/NS can learn or show foresight.
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 12:25 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 1:00 pm
Deliberate intent? you be the judge"
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 1:00 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 1:00 pm
FMM,
First of all, as nullasalus points out often, "IDers" as a group do not agree on very much, so even if you happen to think consciousness is not an important part of "ID Theory", others (like nullasalus) disagree with you. If you happen to agree with me that these sort of mental attributes can't be inferred from the evidence, then that is great – we agree. But there are plenty of "IDers" (including the leading ID authors, like Dembski) who argue that a human-like mind is exactly the conclusion that ID supports.
(Added in edit:) And secondly, once one removes the intuitive notions of folk psychology from the "intelligent cause" of ID, it is not clear to most people what remains. So now that we know we agree that consciousness and free will have nothing to do with it, we need to be precise about what does have to do with it.
Again, many IDers would strongly disagree with this statement (they even define intelligence as "not by law or chance" or even as "counterflow: that which nature would not otherwise do"). It really is difficult for me to argue about ID when every IDers thinks such radically different things. If you happen to agree with me on certain points, just realize that in that case I am arguing against others who disagree with both of us.
RM&NS is a learning process, because adaptations that increase reproductive success are preserved in the gene pool. RM&NS does not exhibit "foresight" if we look at its inner workings (which is what we do). However, it may be that all foresight is achieved by some generate-and-test process. Deep Blue's foresight is achieved this way, and maybe human brains do something similar. In other words, maybe all foresight is accomplished by random variation and selection. In that case, one could view the entire evolutionary process as implementing "foresight" (but we get to see the intermediate tests rather than just the products of the search).
Comment by aiguy — May 21, 2008 @ 1:00 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 1:46 pm
Please provide documentation that Dembski believes that a designer must be conscious I goggled around but found no such thing.
It might also be helpful to provide a link where nullasalus says that consciousness is required for intelligent design.
Just because something is in accordance with natural law does not mean it is reducible to natural law this is what we IDers are getting at with comments like that.
Why do you feel the need to argue at all? Can't we all just get along?
All IDers agree that the question of whether we can infer design empirically is interesting. Most of us think that there are aspects in nature that are best explained as being the result of design. That's about the extent of our agreement.
If you want to argue about something else feel free but realize you are not arguing with ID when you do so.
How does this prove intelegence? All it says is that each generation will be more fit than the last. RM/NS does not learn anything it is the same coming out as it was going in
It might be that the evolutionary process is "implementing" foresight for another entity (maybe the universe) but it does not exhibit foresight and therefore is not intelligent.
I gotta get back to work
peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 1:46 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 2:04 pm
FMM,
From this very thread:
Again, if you think IDers do not believe the evidence supports a conscious designer with free will, then that's great – we are all in agreement. I'm not going to look up references for you to find quotes to the contrary.
Well no. Just look at Dembski's "Explanatory Filter" to see why you're mistaken here.
Which is completely ambiguous, since many (I think most) IDers believe that to "infer design" means to "infer a conscious being was responsible for some artifact".
And you agree on nothing because you disagree about what "the result of design" means.
What I argue is that unless you make explicit what these terms like "result of design" is supposed to mean, then there is no "ID Theory" at all.
You asked me to explain why RM&NS was capable of learning. Learning is what it does.
Huh? Each generation is different, incorporating the lessons learned in the last generation. Evolution learns from the environment which traits are most fit. Its goal is to produce more fit organisms.
And I think it is exhibiting foresight, just like Deep Blue does.
Comment by aiguy — May 21, 2008 @ 2:04 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 2:15 pm
Humans seem to exhibit creativity, which is beyond generate and test. Or is it? Did Deep Blue have creativity? (Kasparov claimed to have detected it, which made him accuse IBM of human intervention during the game.) What is creativity? That might be the most difficult word to define. When I write music, my goal is something pleasing to my "aesthetics" while also being "unique" in "certain respects."
At any rate, in the case of the origin of earth life, I think the issue of creativity can be sidelined. The proximate issue isn't how the designer and its goals and abilities came to be, but what minimum requirements the designer must have. The proximate designer need not be creative at all. It need only have a goal (created by itself, or assigned to it by another agent), algorithms and data sufficient to find solutions to achieve it goal given the environment.
One difference is, Deep Blue came to the game with a vast arsenal of "front loading." What did the "agent" of evolution, whether that be the laws of nature or something more complex, come to the "game" with? This is the question, isn't it.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 21, 2008 @ 2:15 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 2:44 pm
kornbelt,
We do know that generate-and-test can result in creativity, because we build systems using generate-and-test algorithms that produce novel solutions to problems. Deep Blue is an example of this. (Kasparov claimed to have detected "intelligence", but as we've seen these dictionary-defined mentalistic terms are all too vague for discussions like these). Some people (like Penrose) think human cognition has other methods besides gen-and-test to come up with novel solutions, but none of these ideas are very well developed yet.
Everything is always "front-loaded" by the nature of whatever exists. What you really mean by front-loading, I think, is that the generator is somehow constrained, so the tester has fewer candidates to test. But natural law constrains everything that happens, in evolutionary processes and everything else. There may be other constraints that we don't understand (this is what people like Stuart Kauffman think, and I think he's right).
Yes indeed – I think you and I are pretty much on the same page here. But we need to either drop these connotation-laden words like "agent" from the discussion or give them precise definitions!
Comment by aiguy — May 21, 2008 @ 2:44 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 2:53 pm
aiguy,
Behe has said it may well be natural mechanisms that were front-loaded – he believes in common descent, certainly evolution (though he also seems to question certain explanations for generating useful mutations.) You say '99% of the ID folks you talk to' butcher agency – my response is that 99% of the ID critics I talk to butcher agency and evolution. They know 'mutation + stuff dies or reproduces' and that's it. They don't know neutral drift, epigenetics, some think the very thought of punctuated equilibrium is a creationist conspiracy, and so on – and few critics seem to care about that. And, in the exact mirror, many believe that 'evolution shows there is no intelligence and that's what the evidence supports'.
I think the only assumption is that 'intelligent agency' is meaningful enough to be a point at which people start exploring. Just as it was meaningful enough to completely discard before they started taking the angle they did.
I don't think, especially if it is 'God Almighty', that a concrete answer can be given besides on the scale of evolution or cosmology. Interestingly enough, neither do ID proponents in the mainstream; most of the time I see them insisting that the designer can't be identified nor does it need to be, so what's lacking here is a concrete answer to a question they're not engaging directly anyway.
Again, I have no problem with that question not providing a definite answer. I think the recognition of the question's difficulty and nature would be a drastic improvement over the recent past.
First, there are plenty of people who try to claim scientific support for just one answer in order to make science consonant not with agnosticism, but atheism.
Second, I wouldn't deny that a whole lot of the motivation behind ID was in response to that sort of game (Though frankly, I think there are jews, buddhists, muslims, even deists and others who are attracted to ID at this point, at least in the broad range.) But if critics are motivated against ID first and foremost because they don't like the attempts to make or view science compatible with faith – then this isn't really about science anyway. I'm not going to swallow a line of 'well, they just think science should remain pure of political influences and not be used to back up metaphysics'.
Third – ID does have the advantage of approaching a less aggressive question, and investigating ways to identify artifacts made by beings even vaguely analogous to humans. Sure, it's less of a focus due to the political and theological fights, but that doesn't bother me – the potential there is intriguing, to me at least.
You think they're wrong, sure. I think they're wrong. It's possible that many scientists, if pressed, would say they're getting outside of science. Yet it happens – and the excess is nothing new, nor is it limited in scope. Asking why this happens is a question that could lead to some interesting revelations.
And I agree. The problem is, what's the absolute 'right' way to handle ID? Pretend science was completely objective, lacking distortion and politicizing and misunderstanding, until ID came along? That can't be it, because that's nonsense. We can argue that ID is different because many of the proponents are motivated by metaphysics, perhaps? But so are many of ID's critics. Should we highlight the problems of defining and discovering agency/intelligence? Alright, but that leaves us with gaping questions and a natural urge to at least square inclinations with the data anyway.
I've offered up one of my own ways out – recognize the complexities (and validity) of the issue being raised, yet also the limitations of science to definitely rule on the answer. And I think this path has been examined, and rejected, because it's believed that there's vastly more to gain socially/politically by pretending otherwise.
And, just saw this.
Or we need to explore what the varieties of 'agent' may well cover, and recognize the variety involved. 'Evolution' is connotation-laden and lacking a precise definition, but there's no reason to drop that word.
Comment by nullasalus — May 21, 2008 @ 2:53 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 4:36 pm
nullasalus,
I think there are significant differences between the butchering of evolutionary ideas and the offering of "agency" as a scientific explanation. There certainly are well defined scientific evolutionary hypotheses, and those hypotheses are well-understood, and are declared to be false (or inadequate) by IDers and others (like me). In contrast, there is no well-defined scientific hypothesis of "agency" that can even be evaluated against the evidence; we don't know what the evidence is supposed to show.
I'm always in favor of people realizing that clarity and certainty are rarely understated.
All of science is always consonant with both theism and atheism.
Sorry but that really is my line. It's about not co-opting science to support things that science can't support, no matter what it is. Dawkins co-opts science to hawk atheism; I complain. Dembski does it for theism; I complain about that too.
If you subtract the anthropomorphic intuitions, there is nothing remaining of this analogy. That is what I think this thread will show. In contrast to your views, FMM here denies that IDers even try to demonstrate conscious intent, and believes this "vague analogy" has nothing to do with consciousness or volition. Once those are taken out of the discussion, it becomes difficult to imagine any meaningful criteria to distinguish intelligent from unintelligent processes.
Correct. ID is just made it a lot worse.
Yes, this is exactly what we must do. Our "natural urges" are sated by philosophy, religion, and our every day musings, just like always.
It has not been rejected by me – I am 100% in favor of your method. Recognize the complexities of the questions, and recognize the limitations of science, and respect those limitations!
Sorry, I disagree: No theoretical constructs that are advanced as explanations in evolutionary theory are difficult to relate to our shared empirical experience. Mutations and differential reproduction and drift and epigenetic information… all of these have unproblematic, concrete meaning. We just don't happen to think these things fully account for life, but that is a different problem.
Comment by aiguy — May 21, 2008 @ 4:36 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 5:06 pm
aiguy,
But we can explore it. We can take certain things to be express assumptions, and then have a look at the data, and see where we go – even while admitting that we're running with assumptions. Is it scientific? Personally, I don't think so. Yet it's still valid and worth the ink. And it was happening (crudely, flippantly) before ID arrived on the scene; they just added more voices.
I don't want to get into questions of motives. I'll just say again that this abuse was rife in 'science' well in advance of ID, even without YEC being involved. I'm willing to bet that there's a PETA member out there who thinks all this ID talk is nonsense, and the real abuse of science is from guys like James D Rose.
My third point was related to questions of smaller design, like literally finding an artifact on (say) another planet, or exploring ways to more positively identify specifically human-like intention.
More than that, I don't think anything is necessarily wrong with 'anthropomorphic intuitions' so long as they're qualified. I've read FMM's comments in other threads, and think they're interesting – if he's saying an agent can truly be an agent, but doesn't necessarily have to be conscious as humans know it, that's just one more avenue to explore.
I disagree. I think ID's just the yin that's finally balancing out a whole lot of yang. So to speak.
That's fine, it's a great ideal. I'd love for it to happen. But can you really name any time when science wasn't filled with all kinds of fights and controversies like this, and it wasn't because the topic was so conventionally dull and low-stakes anyway?
That's not to say it shouldn't be pursued.
And if you were representative of the majority of people interested in this fight, there'd be no fight for me. Unfortunately, it's not the case, and the result means a convoluted discussion. I'd be interested in seeing a scientific heavyweight waltz out and denounce all sides, ID proponent and no-ID proponent. I think Ken Miller was moving in that direction, but apparently Myers spooked him out of it.
But I'm not talking about the constructs within the theory, but the word itself. If it were just 'change over time' that would be one thing, but it means a lot of different things to a lot of different people, not all of them necessarily ignorant.
Comment by nullasalus — May 21, 2008 @ 5:06 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 5:11 pm
OK, I'll tentatively buy that definition of creativity: novel solutions to a goal.
Assuming a mechanistic sort of reality at the bottom of the ontological pond, I would agree that there is always an implicit order at any state of the system that entirely predicts any future state. But is it safe to assume that? Is this something that can be sidelined?
I would say that things that add to the Front Loading Factor (FLF) would be specificity of the goal, more and faster algorithms to generate and test for a solution, information about previous attempts at the goal. More of these things in a given closed system means more front loading, by my definition.
By "agent" I meant simply "goal seeker" or "problem solver." I have no problem dropping that word from the thread.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 21, 2008 @ 5:11 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 5:40 pm
Aguy:
.
Quote:
All appearances to the contrary, the only watchmaker in nature is the blind forces of physics, albeit deployed in a very special way. A true watchmaker has foresight: he designs his cogs and springs, and plans their interconnections, with a future purpose in his mind's eye. Natural selection, the blind, unconscious automatic process which Darwin discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the existence and apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It has no mind and no mind's eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind watchmaker.
End quote Dawkins The Blind Watchmaker (1996) p.5
It's impossible to argue with you Darwinists you believe such radically different things
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 5:40 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 5:49 pm
Ah, but is aiguy a Darwinist?
Comment by Alan Fox — May 21, 2008 @ 5:49 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 7:58 pm
aiguy (to fmm):
Um, did you skip the discussion on the Limiting the Designer thread, where Allen MacNeill said:
and…
I realize you were asked by fmm specifically about "RM/NS," but since mutation isn't random nor the most important source of variation, and selection isn't the only important factor in preservation and proliferation of geno/phenotypes, I don't see how you can dismiss things like foresight with an appeal to RM/NS.
Comment by Joy — May 21, 2008 @ 7:58 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 8:50 pm
It really doesn't matter except for my little joke
What matters is that in order for anyone to take his opinion seriously he needs to
1) show that Dawkins (and the vast majority of scientists) are mistaken scientifically
or
2) Show that Dawkins' (and the vast majority of scientists) opinions here are not scientific
Either way he will need to be making the same kinds of arguments that ID does and facing the same kind of opposition. From now on when ever he presents arguments for his opinion I will ask what sort of papers he has published and point out that he has yet to present a distinguishing testable prediction.
Once he has done all that we can finally get down to our disagreements about the nature of intelegence.
Welcome to our side Aguy. Good luck
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 21, 2008 @ 8:50 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 9:19 pm
Random refers to random with respect to fitness, which is generally well-supported.
Evolutionary processes are a type of learning, certainly by induction. That genomes can store information for later use can be considered a type of "foresight". Aiguy repeatedly used scare quotes and included an explanation of what he meant, as in this statement.
The usual concept of foresight is that we in some way model the future. We then make changes to the model *before* we implement our solution. Evolution implements and tests at every step. Evolution rewards the prepared, so we can imagine a type of "foresight", for instance, genomes that keep spare parts around that have been useful in the past, or developmental patterns that allow for rapid adaptation. But this is stretching the definition somewhat.
In any case, evolution does learn by induction, and that makes it intelligent. Intelligent Design equivocates on the term "intelligent".
Comment by Zachriel — May 21, 2008 @ 9:19 pm
May 21st, 2008 at 10:32 pm
Keep in mind that CJYman is using different defintions.
By target, you seem to mean an unrealized goal. Computers can find paths to unrealized goals. Indeed, they are quite adept at designing novel logic circuits. Your example doesn't seem to distinguish between ordinary intelligence and "true intelligence".
Comment by Zachriel — May 21, 2008 @ 10:32 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 12:44 am
nullasalus,
In order to explore these questions we must at least separate the clearly analytic from the synthetic propositions. To say "an agent can truly be an agent" is to be making some specific assumptions about what a "true agent" is supposed to be. If noone has said just what "true agency" means, we can hardly go looking for it.
And to me that's another way of saying "two wrongs make a right."
If you ask most biologists to explain what it means to say speciation was caused by evolution, they will tell you what that means – they disagree about the details, but agree on the basics. In contrast, if you ask IDers what it means to say speciation was caused by intelligence, you will get radically different answers (not physically determined, caused by conscious deliberation, caused by an unconscious physical process that is "intelligent" because it… something or other…).
As for anything I didn't respond to: I agree with you.
kornbelt,
I'm not assuming a "mechanistic sort of reality" (whatever that is, given QM and all) at bottom. But biological complexity isn't evidence of any "non-mechanistic sort of reality". Otherwise we agree.
Alan,
As it happens, I suppose I'm really not a Darwinist (I have a hunch biology is built into physics in a way we don't understand).
Joy,
I did not dismiss things like foresight with an appeal to RM&NS. Let me try to explain this point again.
At a high level of abstraction we can think of every problem solver (i.e. every intelligent agent) as working by generate and test. In one extreme version of this method, the generator is random (with regard to the solution space), and so all of the work in finding a solution is done by the tester. At the other extreme, the generator is constrained to produce only valid solutions, and so the tester does nothing. In between these extremes, the generator produces some set of candidate solutions and the tester filters them.
It could be the case that the generator in human problem solvers does all of the heavy lifting, so our minds can somehow "see right through the problem" to the solution. Penrose has ideas about how this might work; Cartesian dualists might say that this is part of the job description for res cogitans and leave it at that. Others think that our mental generators are more like those in evolutionary processes, cranking out all sorts of wild candidates, while our tester watches and waits for something that will work.
But no matter how our minds manage to get the job done, we consider ourselves to have foresight, yes? Even if we someday find out that our brains really are like neural Darwin machines – massively parallel algorithm processors that sift through astronomical numbers of wild guesses, analogously to RM&NS – we would still consider ourselves to be intelligent creatures with foresight. And by the same token, we could consider RM&NS itself to be an intelligent process. The reason it doesn't appear to exhibit "foresight" is because we observe the intermediate candidates from the generator, before they are filtered. But when we look at the end result (complex biological forms), we can see it really is an intelligent process after all.
So, that was my point: The hypothesis that "intelligence" and "foresight" are responsible for life forms is so vague that it doesn't even eliminate evolution as a candidate. ID always needs to say something more specific about what it is proposing in order to be meaningful.
Now, you've shown where MacNeill points out that the generator for biological evolution isn't random (or even random with regard to fitness), and the tester is not limited to natural selection. I don't see how that goes against anything I've said.
FMM,
I didn't say it was impossible to argue with IDers, of course. I just don't want to be accused of battling strawmen because you happen to have a different take on ID.
Neither Dawkins nor anybody else has ever published a paper concluding anything about the "intelligence" or "lack of intelligence" of Darwinian evolution. Yes, Dawkins' expositions of the theory to the lay public, as well as introductory textbooks, will speak of "lack of purpose, lack of a mind's eye, lack of foresight" and so on. But these are not scientific conclusions, and they are obviously using the same vague, ambiguous senses of these mentalistic terms that we find in the dictionary. As I've said many times, these defintions are not sufficiently precise to allow for debate on these matters.
So, the differences arise because we are using these mentalistic words differently, and not from differences in what we believe about evolutionary mechanisms. Mentalistic concepts have nothing to do with evolutionary theory! I have other differences with Dawkins, but we both mean the same thing when we talk about evolutionary processes like RM&NS.
Huh?
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 12:44 am
May 22nd, 2008 at 2:36 am
Well, certain words have become popularly pejorative: Darwinist, atheist, evilutionist, idiot, creationist etc. It becomes increasingly difficult to avoid the charge of name-calling.
As a lapsed biochemist, I don't disagree with what I understand of what you have posted, and I commend your effort in proposing an agreement "on terminology. I am also immediately suspicious of anyone who claims certainty so saying "…we don't understand" is persuasive:smile:
Intelligence; there's a hard one. "Ability to design" makes "intelligent design" somewhat circular, but perhaps that's your point. "Foresight" needs work; you and Dawkins do not appear to be using the same definition. (good catch, fifth monarchy man) and that leaves "random" to tackle, at least.
I suggest, if you can get agreement on terms your argument is virtually won.
On the other hand, this discussion is philosophical. This is admirable and my only issue with those who promote Intelligent Design is whether there can be a scientific (i. e. testable) hypothesis of Intelligent Design (note caps; there ought to be a clear distinction between intelligent, in its everyday use, and "Intelligent" as used by Bill Dembski, for example).
So, all can be resolved with the careful application of semantics: discuss.:wink:
ETA: I wonder whether I should add "genuinely, for its own sake" after "those who promote Intelligent Design", but perhaps that would be a little pejorative.
Comment by Alan Fox — May 22, 2008 @ 2:36 am
May 22nd, 2008 at 9:46 am
Hey Zach
I'm glad to see you are not going down the same road as Aguy with foresight. As I've shown that road is fraught with all kinds of problems
I do find it very interesting that you would also choose to say that evolution is intelligent. I've often marveled at the way that some folks see all kinds of humanlike attributes in evolution It's been said to do all kinds of things that we would normally expect in agents. It sounds like Animism and if you are serious it would be an ID view IMHO.
Welcome to our side.
Before we discuss whether what RM/NS does can be called induction lets do some preliminaries.
Please explain how an abstract and intangible concept like evolution can be said to learn. Can gravity learn or justice or thermodynamics. It seems that you are making a category error here. In fact can you name a single abstract entity besides evolution that can be said to learn or plan or sleep for that matter?
Is evolution today more intelligent than evolution a million years ago?
What sorts of things does evolution know? Does it know math for instance?
Is evolution universally connected so that evolution on different planets profits from the learning that evolution does on earth?
I realize this is Philosophical but most folks think that if a computer becomes intelligent enough it will be conscious do you expect evolution to do this?
has it already?
Does evolution disserve our admiration for all it has accomplished? Worship?
Like I said very interesting
Aguy
Ask Zach
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 9:46 am
May 22nd, 2008 at 9:52 am
Yes, I agree. An argument can be made, but I think that the tangent is a bit too subtle for this discussion. There are more fundamental issues (as we can see following).
We have defined intelligence as "the ability to learn … or to deal with new or trying situations."
Evolutionary *processes* are learning processes that are capable of dealing with new situations. Evolutionary *processes* subsumes several mechanisms, including reasonable fidelity of transmission across generations (memory).
Evolutionary algorithms accumulate adaptive information in a library we call genomes.
The content of the library is somewhat different.
The library includes the knowledge of how to make pandas and people.
No. Evolution is adaptive to local conditions.
It's not merely philosophical. Learning and the ability to adapt is an empirically demonstrable property. That's why the definition is important.
Comment by Zachriel — May 22, 2008 @ 9:52 am
May 22nd, 2008 at 10:47 am
Zach:
So in a sense we are all part of evolution. First Animism and now Pantheism I had no idea you were so spiritual.
I agree but I was talking about intelligences' connection to consciousness. Consciousness is not an empirically demonstrable property. I know you ascribe consciousness to most mammals is degree of intelligence the determining factor? If so can we expect evolution to become conscious? Is it already?
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 10:47 am
May 22nd, 2008 at 11:01 am
aiguy:
And this is no doubt what makes the "RM/NS" shorthand so popular among both IDers and DDs. The DDs like it (and teach it to everybody's children as the most instruction in biological evolution a huge majority of them ever receive) because it's catchy like a propaganda slogan, it's easy to impart, and it artificially supports their preference for selection as life's designer. IDers like it because it's so easily revealed to BE simplistic, dumbed-down pablum that looks a lot like ideological sloganeering, which leaves wide open the actual source and nature of biological evolution.
The deal is, it is known that biological evolution doesn't work exclusively or even primarily by RM/NS. It's not a good – or even adequate – description of what's going on. Obviously the pablum doesn't sell well to the public (or their children), since upwards of 60% don't believe it even after taking the requisite indoctrination and passing the test. The DD answer to that situation?
"Waaaaaa! You don't know enough to make that judgment!"
Which is darned lame. Of course they know enough to judge RM/NS insufficient for explanation – they were taught it on purpose, supposedly so they'd have enough knowledge to judge. When they DO judge, the truth comes out clearly – they were taught simplistic pablum that science knows very well to be insufficient! Tell me, aiguy… whose fault is that?
I'm just reading, don't care to enter into the arguments here. I simply note that you're pushing the pablum as if we're all 15-year old hormone-addled school children, when reality is that we are well beyond the RM/NS scam and have been for a long time. It's just a little bit insulting when you resort to this smokescreen when objects to your definitional distractions, that's all.
Comment by Joy — May 22, 2008 @ 11:01 am
May 22nd, 2008 at 11:10 am
That's been known since Darwin.
As my statements were empirical, the attribution of spirit indicates that you have misunderstood the points raised.
I used *your* definition of intelligence, the ability to learn … or to deal with new or trying situations.
consciousness, the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself.
It depends on the precise usage. We can often infer from behavior when organisms are aware of things, including when they are aware of themselves. But people also use these words to refer to the actual subjective experience"”something outside of the purview of science.
Comment by Zachriel — May 22, 2008 @ 11:10 am
May 22nd, 2008 at 11:15 am
J: The deal is, it is known that planets don't orbit exclusively or even primarily by tracing ellipses. It's not a good – or even adequate – description of what's going on.
Turns out that elliptical orbits are a oversimplification of chaotic planetary dynamics. Why do they lie to children!?
Comment by Zachriel — May 22, 2008 @ 11:15 am
May 22nd, 2008 at 12:29 pm
Me: So in a sense we are all part of evolution.
Zach: That's been known since Darwin.
Is the environment also a part of evolution as you are using the term?
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 12:29 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 12:32 pm
Joy,
You've completely misunderstood the point, even though I think I made it quite clearly: I was not describing biological evolution, but the general way cognitive scientists think about problem solving. And I was not saying that biological evolution or all problem solving is random variation and selection. So you got everything wrong.
Again, at a high level of abstraction, all problems can be viewed as search problems, and all search problems can be viewed as some variation of generate-and-test. All search algorithms (constraint search, means-ends, best-first, etc) and all other problem solving strategies (even a "pure insight" into a solution!) can be conceptually subsumed under an abstract view of G&T.
As I explained:
How you interpreted this as me saying that either human thought OR biological evolution used random generation of variants is difficult to imagine – unless of course you didn't actually read what I wrote and went off half-cocked.
I think everybody here knows this; I certainly did.
I actually think it's your fault for failing to read my posts carefully. I don't think anybody here is suggesting that RM&NS is adequate to explain biological forms; I'm certainly not, and I've said so.
I think you are not only demonstrably confused about what I've said here, but it would appear that you are so predisposed in your views with such hair-trigger responses that you really don't care.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 12:32 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 12:39 pm
FMM,
You've failed to engage my argument. I'll just pick up one thing you said to Zach as an illustration of lingering confusion:
As any psychologist will explain, learning does not entail becoming more intelligent; rather, intelligence stays relatively constant throughout one's life, and as we learn we gain knowledge.
Again the problem is playing fast and loose with mentalistic concepts just keeps the confusion going. If instead you actually tried to define your terms precisely, and then stuck to those definitions, you'd find a whole new world of clarity (and a world where "ID Theory" really didn't mean what you intuitively believe it to mean).
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 12:39 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 12:49 pm
Before any one will take your arguments seriously you must convince the vast majority of scientists that what is taught in science class is not science. Good luck
You are free to believe anything you want (some folks believe trees have souls) but don't expect me to care. That is until you come up with a distinguishing testable prediction.:wink:
That is exactly what Ive done hence my disscusion with Zach
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 12:49 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 12:56 pm
FMM,
Too late – a lot of people take these arguments very seriously. Even on this board, ID-friendly folks like nullasalus have taken these arguments seriously and engaged them with serious responses. So I guess it's just you.
That is nonsense. Nobody here is arguing that biological science is not science.
A prediction for what theory? I have proposed no theory, nor any hypothesis. The question of whether or not evolutionary processes are to be called "intelligent" is not a question of fact, but of definition. It is a semantic issue, and not an issue of science. It is a matter of clarifying our terms.
Once again: Because evolution learns, and is goal-oriented, and employs a problem-solving strategy similar to what other "intelligent agents" do, I argue that the term "intelligent" (once we divorce it from consciousness and will) fairly applies to evolutionary processes.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 12:56 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 12:58 pm
Now, this takes the cake.
Comment by olegt — May 22, 2008 @ 12:58 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 1:13 pm
aiguy:
Ah, so. So when you say "every problem solver" – as every "intelligent agent" – operates via "generate and test" and liken it specifically to RM/NS as a "learning process" [all quotes your words], you didn't really mean that RM/NS might equate to "foresight" so as to postulate that intelligent design can simply be good old RM/NS.
You know, if you weren't so stuck on confusing every issue with twisted logic and distractive sleight-of-mind, you just might make some sense.
I don't really care. I was just calling you on this ridiculous contortionist act. But since that's your entire schtick, carry on. FMM obviously doesn't mind playing your game.
Comment by Joy — May 22, 2008 @ 1:13 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 1:13 pm
aguy:
I thought you were arguing for foresight. Are you abandoning that argument?
If you are abandoning the foresight argument I agree.
Since we have a good standard definition of intelligent all we need to define evolution.
I suggest using the dictionary
quote:
: one of a set of prescribed movements
2 a: a process of change in a certain direction : UNFOLDING b: the action or an instance of forming and giving something off : EMISSION c (
1): a process of continuous change from a lower, simpler, or worse to a higher, more complex, or better state : GROWTH (
2): a process of gradual and relatively peaceful social, political, and economic advance d: something evolved
3: the process of working out or developing
4 a: the historical development of a biological group (as a race or species) : PHYLOGENY b: a theory that the various types of animals and plants have their origin in other preexisting types and that the distinguishable differences are due to modifications in successive generations; also : the process described by this theory
5: the extraction of a mathematical root
6: a process in which the whole universe is a progression of interrelated phenomena
hows that?
Quick questions
Does it include us?
Does it include the environment? or is it limited to an abstract concept like justice or thermodynamics
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 1:13 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 1:24 pm
Joy,
As you yourself acknowledged, I was specifically asked about RM&NS! Did you forget this point already? Need I say once again I am not arguing for RM&NS as an explanation for anything? Did I not explicitly refer to possibilities for how human thought might not use randomly generated candidate solutions (e.g. dualism, or Orch-OR?)
Are you denying that evolutionary processes (RM&NS or otherwise) can reasonably be said to learn? Are you denying that even a problem solver which did employ a random generator could still be seen as intelligent if only the successful solutions were accessible?
If you weren't so closed-minded and every-ready with the angry rhetoric, you might just understand what I'm trying to say here and have your perspective broadened. As it is, you just wish I'd stop challenging the way you think about minds, and so you brand me (of all things) a Darwin Defender, pretend that I'm arguing for RM&NS, and otherwise hurl all of your vitriol… at straw men. And then you say you "don't care"
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 1:24 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 1:27 pm
olegt
Do you disagree that the vast majority of scientists and science textbooks teach that evolution lacks foresight?
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 1:27 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 1:31 pm
Even if bias is clearly evidenced through a selection process anti-teleologists will claim the bias is a manifestation of underlying physical forces which are themselves blind, brute forces of Nature. It is the teleological goal of anti-teleologists to exclude conscious design. That will induce them to make philosophical pronouncements about Nature which are truthfully open questions both from philosophical and empirical perspectives. Since anti-teleologists cannot even specify what the selection criteria was which caused a functional genome in the first place and which led from that to a replicating cell, they are in no position to assert that issues centered around conscious intelligence are in any way empirically settled. That won't keep them from trying though.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 1:31 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 1:36 pm
FMM,
No, I'm not. Are you?
Again, I argue that saying "intelligence" is the cause of biological forms is meaningless. First, different IDers mean very different things by this word; second, IDers generally fail to make their own particular meaning explicit; third, once consciousness and will are subtracted from the concept, the concept is so vague that it can fairly be applied even to evolutionary processes.
Are you trying to say that something can be intelligent without foresight? Or have foresight without intelligence? Or that "Intelligent Design Theory" should be called "Foresight Design Theory"
Your definition of intelligence is this: "the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations". It doesn't say anything about "foresight". And your defintion of foresight doesn't mention intelligence: "an act of looking forward; also : a view forward". Please tell us how do you determine when something is "looking forward"
So, since we've established that evolution has the ability to learn (remember, that doesn't mean "increase one's intelligence"!), it appears that evolutionary processes ought to be called intelligent by your own definition. And I'll wait until you provide a way to tell when intelligent things use foresight or not.
Useless, as always. Dictionaries are not scientific textbooks… did you somehow learn they were?
Does what include us? What is the referrent for "it" here?
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 1:36 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 1:39 pm
Bradford,
Great! Here FMM is arguing that IDers do not assume consciousness, nor do they deny that physical forces may underlie intelligent phenomena… and you say these positions are "anti-teleological".
Wouldn't you agree there is quite a bit of confusion on these issues here?
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 1:39 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 1:44 pm
I need to know what you mean by evolution before we can establish anything Zach believes it includes us do you agree? Does it include anything concrete or is it just an abstract process per the dictionary definition
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 1:44 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 1:45 pm
What is with you and Joy and these strawman arguments? Can you show where anyone here has said issues around conscious intelligence are in any way "empirically settled" Can you show me how any of my arguments depend on specifying the selection criteria for a functional genome?
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 1:45 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 1:48 pm
Why make assumptions about philosophically and empirically open questions?
Not what I said. Anti-teleologists behave as if open questions already have been resolved scientifically.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 1:48 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 1:50 pm
In that case we'll have to await further data before assessing the plausibility of intelligent design.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 1:50 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 1:52 pm
aguy:
I don't think it can that's why Dawkins' view is important to this conversation but he (or anyone else I know) does not mention evolution learning so if you want to limit your arguments to this you would not be in conflict with him.
Later on you will have to convince me how something can learn and not have foresight but we should take this one step at a time
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 1:52 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 2:17 pm
Bradford,
My point is that you can't assess the plausibility of "intelligent design" until you say precisely what "intelligent design" is. If you say it entails consciousness (and apparently you do, as does nullasalus, but not FMM), that's one thing. If you say it is not the result of physical necessity (and you do, but not FMM) that's another thing. If you define it simply in terms of what it can do – create complex form and function – that's another thing. If you define it to mean anything that can learn and remember, that's something else again.
So no, we can't assess the plausibility of ID without specific statements about exactly what ID is supposed to entail. It is obvious from this thread (and everywhere else) that different IDers have very different ideas about what they are talking about, even when they don't realize it.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 2:17 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 2:25 pm
FMM,
I have already explained that I do not disagree with Dawkins on matters of fact, but only on the way we are using the words "foresight" or "mind's eye" or "intelligence". He is using these words in colloquial ways to make his point; I am attempting to have us all pin down specific technical meanings so we can actually discuss what the evidence supports.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 2:25 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 2:30 pm
It is unnecessary to have to exclude different "interpretations" of intelligence at this point. Once a case has been made for any particular form the philosophers from the competing camps can take their knives out and carve out arguments aimed at excluding undesireable metaphysical implications.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 2:30 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 2:55 pm
It might be helpful, though.
Comment by Alan Fox — May 22, 2008 @ 2:55 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 2:55 pm
aiguy,
I'm not sure what you refer to here. I think there are plenty of concepts of 'true agent' floating around. Few if any aren't controversial, but there's still a starting point available here.
I think ID's opposite continuing to exist without challenge would have been vastly more wrong. But, yes, you want clarity in the debate, and take the position that anything that detracts from clarity is negative. Fair enough.
Well, hold on now. Biologists versus 'anyone who supports ID'? Ask most people who oppose ID what it means to say speciation was caused by evolution. The basics they agree upon will be 'random mutations and natural selection'. I actually haven't seen much 'big name' ID treatment of speciation, other than MikeGene touching on it with front-loaded genes.
'Evolution' as a word is employed far and wide. Cultures evolve, animals evolve, public transit systems evolve – hell, sometimes even universes evolve. Does evolution automatically mean 'darwinian'? Answers on both sides range from 'yes' to 'no' to 'depends on what you mean by darwinian'.
Comment by nullasalus — May 22, 2008 @ 2:55 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 2:55 pm
Because we all know that no matter what "intelligence" really is in the end, it certainly was required to create living beings.
Comment by hrun — May 22, 2008 @ 2:55 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 3:33 pm
As long as it's not "conscious intelligence.":wink:
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 3:33 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 3:35 pm
Bradford,
Well, fine then – ID theorists will actually need to say what particular thing they are attempting to make a case for and then go about trying to make the case. As it is, they do not do this at all. Instead, they leave it ambiguous (and typically resist all efforts to actually be specific) and still they claim various data as evidence for "intelligence" or "teleology" without saying just what it is they mean.
And that is my whole beef with ID. I'm not against the ideas in general, nor am I a Darwin Defender at all. If IDers would simply make their assumptions explicit, instead of collectively lumping everything from a mechanical search to an omnipotent God all together under the label of "intelligent cause", then I would wish you all well and look for any interesting developments.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 3:35 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 3:42 pm
nullasalus,
Sure, always the same issue: If you pick one particular concept of what a "true agent" (as opposed to a false agent? a fake agent?) that can be characterized with reasonable clarity, then by all means proceed. Just don't trade on ambiguity!
No – you could just say "leading ID authors" instead, and the point still holds. Who else should I refer to?
Dembski and Behe explain speciation, of course. The explanation is "intelligent cause".
Of course! That is why we do not use dictionary definitions in science! (Are you listening, FMM?)
But when evolutionary biologists write papers, there is no confusion over what sense of the word they are using. There are of course strong disagreements among evolutionary biologists, but they simply do not equivocate on the meaning of the word "evolution", because nobody offers that single word as an irreducible (or unknown) mechanism.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 3:42 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 4:02 pm
Hi aiguy,
Actually, they don't.
Behe, for instance, finds intelligence is evidenced to the level of classes, with a tentative case from orders to genera. Speciation, he sees, as accessible to blind, unintelligent, evolution.
page 222, The Edge Of Evolution
Comment by Pez — May 22, 2008 @ 4:02 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 4:29 pm
Pez,
Thanks, I stand corrected, although the point isn't relevant to the present discussion. The salient point is simply that Dembski and Behe and other DI folks explain "certain features of biology and the universe" by "intelligent cause".
In the case of Dembski, it's clear he describes a conscious, deliberate agent with libertarian free will (or "directed contingency" as he prefers to call it). Clearly, there is no scientific evidence that whatever caused these biological features actually had conscious awareness or could transcend physical causality the way Dembski describes.
For other ID "theorists", we don't know whether "intelligence" is supposed to mean some unspecified, unconscious, physical process, or some unspecific, ominscient God, or something else entirely (but still unspecified!). This characterization is simply too vague to begin to evaluate against the evidence.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 4:29 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 4:37 pm
Pez:
Behe is a clever fellow. He knows that speciation has been observed without any evidence of a designer, so he can't make the case that speciation requires a designer. He also knows that history has wiped out pretty much all evidence of the initial speciation events that eventually gave rise to what we now call separate classes, so he can safely declare design without having to worry too much his claim can be refuted with direct evidence. Very convenient.
Comment by Raevmo — May 22, 2008 @ 4:37 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 4:40 pm
aiguy,
Pez gives a good reference, though I'd go one further – I don't think 'intelligent cause' is offered as a mechanism necessarily. Ken Miller, if he really wanted to, could cite 'intelligent cause' to explain speciation – and then cite any and all of the mainstream proposals as mechanism. 'Intelligent cause' can't explain Houdini's tricks on its own, but it could (to me, certainly is) well be a property of the explanation.
I don't see 'agent' as being equivocated on, if only because the ID question tends to be whether there is a way to discern between resulting acts of intelligence, or of chance. I'll say again I think the question is ultimately damn complex, but I'm glad enough there are now two sides to the argument popularly given rather than one. I know that you disagree and wish there were proper limits in place, but we've covered that.
Comment by nullasalus — May 22, 2008 @ 4:40 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 4:52 pm
nullasalus,
First, let's get away from the specific case of "speciation" – I should not have focussed on that rather than "biological features" in general. Our discussion here is about what it means to explain anything by appeal to "intelligent cause" (or "intelligence" or "intelligent agency" etc), not just speciation.
As for explaining Houdini's tricks, I would say adding "intelligent cause" to any sort of explanation would convey zero information. Once you knew that Houdini did something, and you knew what it was he did, what could you possibly learn from being told "and it was intelligent, too!"
I don't think "chance" explains anything either, but let's not get sidetracked on that. But yes of course "agent" is equivocated on; just from this thread we see it could mean anything from a physically determined search routine to an omnipotent immaterial godhead… and that I think is a bit too much leeway.
I'd be happy if IDers said
"I think these features of biology and the universe were caused by…
… an immaterial being with a conscious mind or
… an extra-terrestrial life form or
… a physical process that retains information (learns) over time
or something equally specific, and then proceeded to list the evidence which was supposed to support their assertion.
Instead, IDers in general insist on lumping all of these things together, so if there is any reason to believe any one of these (or any number of other possible interpretations of "agent"), they can claim support for all of them – a fallacy of over-generalization. This is not intellectually honest.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 4:52 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 5:08 pm
The relevant point, from an empirical perspective, is a clear hypothesis and resulting supporting data. If, for example, researchers were to find that an evolutionary process shows bias rather than randomness with respect to fitness and consequent predictable outcomes based on this, then they can leave the inevitable critiques to theists and atheists who will argue about the implications of the finds.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 5:08 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 5:22 pm
Bradford,
Bias with respect to fitness would of course be fascinating. At that point, we would want to begin to advance hypotheses to try to account for this observation.
The point I am making in this thread is that it is mistaken to believe that the hypothesis of "intelligence", if found to be true, serves to explain this observation. As we've seen, this term simply could refer to anything that results in such a bias, from unknown physical laws, to unknown processes that act according to physics as we currently understand it, to a conscious god… Without further specification, "intelligence" just doesn't rule anything out – as long as it results in the bias, it could be called "intelligent" according to some definition of that term.
So, while researchers should most definitely look for interesting things like mutation bias, their project should not be called "Intelligent Design Research"… unless, of course, they really do make clear what they mean by "Intelligent Design" so we can all see if their conclusions are truly warranted.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 5:22 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 5:33 pm
aiguy,
'Houdini did something' implies intelligence and agency straightaway in that case. The intelligence adds explanation to the 'what it was he did' – there were more than physical actions going on, there were mental ones as well. Or so we'd assume.
I don't see why it would be 'too much leeway', especially since the former can be employed by the latter for all we know. I think questions of agency are inherently confusing and foggy, so it's not 'intentionally being vague and misleading' so much as 'focus on a topic which is itself vague and difficult to grasp'.
In this same thread we have Raevmo talking about how speciation occurred 'without any evidence of a designer' and how therefore designers aren't necessary to the process. Is that an intellectually honest conclusion? Hell, is it an intellectually honest way of framing the topic?
IDers routinely say they don't need to get into the question of a designer's identity, and that they're concerned with design itself. I'm sure many would be and are willing to engage the topic of designer possibilities as a distinct question. Maybe an immaterial being with a conscious mind could employ a physical process that retains information towards an end. Maybe an ET could. Maybe processes have consciousness or something close to it, in part and in totality. Maybe those processes and their consciousness are part of an even greater 'intelligence' that is conscious. But it's worth asking if there is something about 'intelligence' that could be shared between all these things regardless of what is specifically asserted, and if such a thing can be identified in the universe apart from other things.
Again, at the end of the day, I'm just glad enough that the debate is on – and if what are confusing topics have their inherent confusion highlighted, wonderful. Someone should write a book called 'Intelligent Design, Chance and Science: Why Absolutely Everyone is Wrong'.
Comment by nullasalus — May 22, 2008 @ 5:33 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 5:36 pm
It could. It would depend on the constraints identified and alignment with theory. The main point I am making in this thread is that theists and atheists will never agree about the "ultimate reality" connected with physical processes because of bones of contention irrelevant to science itself.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 5:36 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 5:54 pm
nullasalus,
Since you cannot tell me how to distinguish physical actions without mental actions from physical actions with mental actions, this appears to be moot. Saying "intelligence" was involved in what he did adds nothing at all to our understanding. Let's try it:
Q: How did Houdini escape from the cage?
A: He used a hairpin to pick the lock.
Q: Aha! I have one more question: Was intelligence involved?
Now, what difference could it possibly make how we answer this?
That's just fine, as long as the researchers say "We don't really know what this means". But this is hardly the case. Instead, they insist on saying "We know from experience that intelligent agents do such-and-such", which implies that there is some well-understood class of things called "intelligent agents" and this class shares certain well-defined properties and so on. This is all completely BS.
Obviously these statements (like Dawkins') are to counter what is being perceived as the arguments from ID folks. This simply supports my point: The debates go round-and-round talking past each other because nobody bothers to define terms, period. So by all means, let us leave all talk of "designers" and "intelligence" out of biological science unless they are given precisely operationalized definitions!!!
That is a completely confused statement. Who says a "designer" must have an "identity" Evolution doesn't have an "identity", so saying that there is something with an "identity" already plays on our intuitions about what sorts of things have identities (people and anthropomorphic projections have identities). And they need to say if "design itself" means "something created by a conscious mind" as some ID proponents would say…
Right. And maybe it has nothing to do with consciousness at all – like FMM thinks.
I think what you are saying is that it is worth trying to come up with a specific definition of "intelligence" that could be used in this research context. If that is what you are saying, we again are in full agreement
Or "Intelligent Design – How to Leverage Ambiguity and Equivocation for Specious Argumentation".
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 5:54 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 5:55 pm
nullasalus:
Isn't it? Speciation is not terribly difficult to understand from a purely mechanistic point of view. The observed instances conform to this view. Nobody ever noticed any designer playing a role.
Comment by Raevmo — May 22, 2008 @ 5:55 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 5:59 pm
Ok. Here is an interesting thought experiment. It often is quite useful to determine if a project that is being pursued might actually have the desired 'payout'.
Let's look at the best case scenario for intelligent design as it stands right now. Let's just assume that ID research managed to convince all biologists, every single one of them, including all granting agencies, that their design detection works and that, without a doubt, life on earth is the product of the design of an intelligent agent.
What do you think would happen now at this junction? How much knowledge would we have gained? How would biological research be altered? Please, be as specific as you can possibly be.
Comment by hrun — May 22, 2008 @ 5:59 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 6:05 pm
Bradford,
Let's stick with your example here. Say we find evidence that mutations are biased, which means something fundamental is wrong with current evolutionary theory. That's great. Now, you want to call this finding evidence of "intelligence" Or you want to say that this bias actually is an instance of intelligence? What?
I think that the only reason you want to bring the concept of "intelligence" into it is to allude to some beliefs that you have which are not warranted by this type of finding of bias in mutations.
We completely agree about this. I'm adding that if the overly vague and connotation-laden label of "intelligence" was left out of the discussion, and people stopped trying to equivocate on its meaning, then scientists could research problems with our current theories, look for things like mutation bias, and whatever else they wanted to do, and nobody would ever accuse them of bringing religion into the lab or science classroom.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 6:05 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 6:22 pm
aiguy:
Not to distract you from your excellent quest for operational definitions of intelligence, but what does it mean to say that mutations are biased? Most mutations are bad for fitness. In that sense they are biased. How could they not be biased? Indeed, some influential models of sexual selection rely on biased mutation in the sense that extreme male traits (such as the peacock's tail) are more likely to deteriorate than to become even more extreme under the influence of mutation.
Comment by Raevmo — May 22, 2008 @ 6:22 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 6:31 pm
Raevmo,
This "bias" was Bradford's example. The specifics weren't important to my argument, so I didn't dwell on them. I took it to mean something like finding an increased frequency of mutations for some specific phenotypic change that is beneficial in some particular environment.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 6:31 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 6:37 pm
aiguy,
For most people, the question was already answered before 'How did Houdini escape from the cage'.
Yes, I know about the problem of distinguishing the mental from the physical. My response is that it, at least, is a topic to be explored. If there's no way to truly distinguish between 'that which is caused by an agent' and 'that which is not caused by an agent' – and I'm willing to accept that – then THAT must be recognized too.
I'm willing to accept there's a certain amount of BS being flung around – but I think it's being flung on all sides. You've already said 'two wrongs don't make a right', but I still stick with 'what are the realistic options?' Or further, how much blame can be placed on ID proponents for playing the science game by what amount to established rules?
I also don't think Dawkins' statements are only there 'to counter ID' – they're there to promote a certain point of view, and to promote it as the stuff of scientific discovery. The Blind Watchmaker was being touted well in advance of the Discovery Institute – the whole line of thought was present in advance of that as well. Even Darwin himself attacked certain ideas of agency through examples that relied on an interpretation of the mental.
I think whether evolution has an effective 'identity' is an interesting topic, but not one I want to get into right now. Even defining 'conscious mind' is a trick.
Again, at least ID has called attention to a whole lot of worthwhile questions and distinctions on the subject. I'd rather have multi-party BS fights than a lack of controversy and only one side's BS is offered, and therefore taken as correct. I don't think ID is as vilified as it is because of a real belief that it's 'harming science'. I think it's largely a political fight, and what was supposed to only be evidence to support one viewpoint (Dawkins', etc) is now being rallied as evidence to support a swarm of opposing viewpoints (Dembski's, Behe's, even Miller's and Heller's, etc). And if the argument-ender is dropped and it's recognized that questions of design and designers can't be ruled on in either direction by science, it's a step backwards for a side that used to enjoy relatively unfettered BS rights.
Raevmo,
As has been said, it's a BS counter. No one needs to notice a physical designer nearby, shooing portions of the population to another area, for design or a designer to be in play. 'I didn't notice one kind of designer, therefore all kinds of designers are ruled out'.
Comment by nullasalus — May 22, 2008 @ 6:37 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 6:39 pm
My own view is that setting ID on a sound empircal footing awaits a theory of information that would extend understanding initially advanced by Shannon. A theoretical Shannon Part II which would focus on transmission, storage and error correction of information within systems governed by chemical constraints. Beyond this I share Mike's view that ID is a concept that does not have to be scientifically supported and I do not mean by that physical systems cannot be cited in favor of ID. There are causal scenarios not best described by reductionist approaches but that is the topic of a likely future blog entry.
As far as what would happen at this junction, knowledge and research would be impacted by whatever it was that brought empirical credibility to an ID theory. So if, for example, an information theory made distinguishing predictions about information arising with as opposed to without the input of intelligence or provided a useful information entropy concept then biological systems so affected would incorporate such thinking as hueristic guides.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 6:39 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 6:52 pm
nullasalus,
Philosophers and cognitive scientists keep exploring! No problem!
Agreed.
Yes, BS on all sides. Dawkins' ultra-Darwinism and insistence that we know nothing else is at work is BS. We need to keep this stuff out of the classroom (it is already kept out of the journals, however).
You're right.
I have noticed that people are more interested in AI since this whole thing started, which can't be a bad thing
Hold on, though. I agree we need to rip out talk of "mindless" evolution and "purposeless" and "blind" and "no mind's eye" and so on. This stuff has no place in biological science. That doesn't mean there is a controversy about the rest of it, or that it would somehow help to pretend ID has scientific merit.
Everybody is going to keep writing outrageous BS in their popular books, and we can't even try to change that. The heart of the matter is what is sanctioned by scientific institutions. Talk of minds and purpose are not published in biology journals (I suppose somebody will prove me wrong here, but I'm right for the vast majority of papers). So we need to make sure it's out of biology textbooks, and we're done.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 6:52 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 6:56 pm
nullasalus:
Of course it's not a BS counter. If there is no evidence of a designer and the observed process conforms to a mechanistic theory, then the designer hypothesis is totally superfluous. Occam's razor.
Comment by Raevmo — May 22, 2008 @ 6:56 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 6:59 pm
So, as far as I can tell from your answer: Biological research would be completely unchanged?
Comment by hrun — May 22, 2008 @ 6:59 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 7:02 pm
Bradford,
Maybe so. (I think the tie between information and meaning (the problem of intentionality), much less conscious understanding, can't actually be approached from this direction, but that's another discussion).
And I always need to emphasize that it is specifically the claim to scientific support that I object to. Anyone can speculate about the nature of mind and its causal role in the universe; just don't pretend that there is some concrete hypothesis there that has evidential support. (I think the ambiguity in the way many IDers speak about these issues would be rejected by philosophers too, though).
When you say "as opposed to without the input of intelligence" it means absolutely nothing to me. I have no way of telling what you could possibly be talking about. As far as I can tell, maybe you mean "living things" (life as we know it from Earth) or something. Or maybe you mean "not the result of physical necessity", which is something very different. Or maybe you mean…
I know I'm repeating myself, but I'm not sure why you don't take this point. Without saying which of these definitions/characterizations you mean, it means absolutely nothing to say things like "without the input of intelligence"!
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 7:02 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 7:07 pm
Completely is too strong a word. I'm of the view that if an evolutionary theory never existed we would stilll use conserved concepts but would reference homology to some other paradigm making genetic similarities intelligible. So I'm not of the view that current research is driven by our understanding of geologic events.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 7:07 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 7:10 pm
Bradford:
Huh?
Comment by Raevmo — May 22, 2008 @ 7:10 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 7:12 pm
So in the absolute best-case-scenario for ID, explanatory filter, CSI, IC all accepted by all biologists around the world, biological research would remain virtually unchanged. Hmm. That seems so odd to me, I don't even know what to say.
Does anybody else have any ideas how biology would change in this aforementioned best-case-scenario?
Comment by hrun — May 22, 2008 @ 7:12 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 7:15 pm
This is not a problem for me. I start with obvious polar opposites and worry about boundaries later. If you wish to view quintessential examples of intelligence consider the works of Newton or Einstein. Intelligence can be bluntly obvious. Mike uses the example of a subcode in a genome detailing biblical events.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 7:15 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 7:22 pm
Bradford,
I see – you must mean "without the input of white, male human beings". Is that right?
No, I think that is an example of something that an "intelligent agent" might create, rather than an example of an intelligent agent per se, right?
"Without the input of intelligence". What does this mean? I have studied intelligent systems for thirty years, and I honestly, truly cannot say what you mean by this phrase.
(And please don't ask for a canonical definition of the "intelligent systems" I study, because as everyone in the discipline knows, there is none. We just study systems that people generally like to call "intelligent", and that's all there is to it. Nobody argues if any particular system is intelligent or not, because we all know it is meaningless).
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 7:22 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 7:22 pm
Raevmo,
There's plenty of evidence for a designer – it's simply not conclusive. Want to play with Occam's razor? Let's go.
1. There are two proposed kinds of speciation – 'natural' and artificial.
2. Artificial speciation has a designer – this is a certainty.
3. Whether natural speciation has a designer is an open question.
4. No designer needs to be physically present to have artificially arranged speciation. They can rely entirely on foresight (Front loading, etc).
5. Artificial speciation can explain all speciation.
Add Occam's razor, and a designer becomes the only reasonable explanation. Now we know why he was a monk. Maybe nowadays he'd be into Nick Bostrom's simulation theory. Hell, maybe he'd be both.
aiguy,
I'd be fine with ID being recognized as 'not science', if no-ID is also recognized as 'not science'. If Dawkins' and Stenger's nonsense were attacked with half of the gusto ID is attacked with (by the people who 'want to defend science'), I'd be satisfied. It's not happening. I don't think it will happen. Hell, outfits like Templeton are attacked with more hostility, and they at least effectively oppose ID.
That work still lies ahead of us. And even with that aside, there are other aspects to it – Behe's "Edge of Evolution" was just a book. Even if it's flawed, the treatment it got – the amount of anger present in reviews alone – indicates a problem. Especially compared to the sympathy the no-ID counters are received with. Because if you assert there's evidence of design in nature, you're a threat to science – but if you assert there's evidence of no-design in nature, you're either defending rational thought or 'just expressing your view, and that's okay'.
Comment by nullasalus — May 22, 2008 @ 7:22 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 7:34 pm
nullasalus,
If you assert there is evidence of "design" in biology, then you have said nothing until you say what "design" means without equivocation.
If you assert that "design" implies conscious mind, then you really do not have evidence of this, and so this appears to be nothing but an animistic explanation that was purged from science for very good reason long ago.
If you assert "no design", then you've said nothing for the same reason. If you assert "no conscious mind" directing biology etc, then you too have made a statement that can't be evaluated by scientific means.
Science can say, however, that we have no empirical evidence for a conscious mind that started or directed the creation of biological structures.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 7:34 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 7:44 pm
aiguy,
And no empirical evidence against – this before getting into 'conscious', 'mind', and 'conscious mind' all being topics we have serious trouble figuring out even with humans, where we supposedly know (yet have no real empirical evidence of) consciousness and minds are certainly in play.
Trying to pass off 'no evidence of design' as 'evidence of no design' is BS writ large, a subtle switch with big ramifications – and one which intentionally ignores the ocean of issues and limitations present in talking about such things.
Comment by nullasalus — May 22, 2008 @ 7:44 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 7:46 pm
nullasalus:
Yeah, sure. Like what?
Give me an example of artificial speciation.
Fantasy. Where's the evidence?
You can't be serious. You're saying it looks just like a process without a designer, but in fact a designer set it all in motion a long time ago. You're *adding* a designer to the explanation. You're violating Occam's razor.
Comment by Raevmo — May 22, 2008 @ 7:46 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 7:55 pm
nullasalus:
You killed JFK. There's no evidence that you killed JFK, but hey trying to pass that off as evidence that you didn't kill JFK is BS.
Yeah, right.
Comment by Raevmo — May 22, 2008 @ 7:55 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 8:00 pm
nullasalus,
Right.
Right. But I didn't try to pass it off – I didn't say the latter, only the former. Still, I understand your point.
If you and I can't reach common ground on this, I don't think any two people with differing beliefs about all this can. Here's my revised proposal for what is the right thing to do: We actually teach our budding scientists about how scientists study mind, introducing the difficulties in studying consciousness, the difficulties in measuring intelligence, how we try to model behaviors in AI, what neuroscience shows, and so on.
The measure of our success in this will be the following: When somebody says "Do you think intelligence was involved in the creation of life?" our students will correctly reply "What is that supposed to mean?"
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 8:00 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 8:08 pm
Raevmo,
Plenty. Do you deny any designers exist at all? Do you think there are aspects of nature which are in principle beyond the understanding of any designer? Can evolutionary principles be used by designers in the here and now?
Better yet – why don't you tell me what you're advocating as opposed to a designer? Primal chaos that just happens to be rational and understandable?
Let's go with the wikipedia example – look up speciation, head down to artificial speciation. That'll do for my purposes.
Depending on the degree, where isn't it? In a weak sense, all I'd have to do is isolate populations in different environmental niches and wait. Maybe I'd have to wait a long time, but down the road it would happen. If I had more foresight, maybe I could tell what kind of changes would happen in a given environment over time. Maybe I could even tell when there would be another separation of population.
Do I have knock-down evidence that this is what happened? Nope – but I said there was no conclusive evidence in either direction.
When did I say that? I'm saying that someone is asserting this 'natural speciation' as opposed to 'artificial'. The only difference between the two is that in artificial speciation, we have foresight and arrangement. But artificial speciation can explain all we see, including the natural speciation. So I'm chopping away the distinction – artificial's all we have.
You're the one adding something to the explanation; it's why you have to discern between two types of speciation to begin with. But what exactly are you adding? Again: Primal chaos?
Oh, calm down Raevmo. I don't honestly think my example is going to convince you – I'm pointing out that I can play the Occam's Razor game as well as anyone else. There's a reason a lot of people nowadays roll their eyes when it's brought up, you know. Namely, it doesn't really do the work everyone would like to think it does. No better way to illustrate that than cutting something people favor with it.
aiguy,
My apologies – I didn't mean to say you were trying to pass it off. I sometimes throw in 'you' to mean 'anyone'. Bad habit.
As for your example, it sounds reasonable enough. I'd probably add in some education about philosophy in general. But as an ideal, maybe it's close enough.
Comment by nullasalus — May 22, 2008 @ 8:08 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 8:54 pm
No more so than I mean the particular hydrogen and oxygen molecules that bonded to form a molecule of water as a description of chemical reactions involving the combustion of hydrogen and oxygen. Assuming intelligence is a parochial quality limited to white males is stupidity.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 8:54 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 9:20 pm
aiguy,
So then, to get back to the original dialog where you objected to "an intelligence designed life" as being meaningless, if we define the term "intelligence" using Deep Blue as an example of intelligence, with it's goal orientation, database of information, and generate-and-test abilities, will that suffice to make the statement "an intelligence may have designed the first earth life" meaningful to you?
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 22, 2008 @ 9:20 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 9:23 pm
Interesting thought provocation.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 22, 2008 @ 9:23 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 9:47 pm
Bradford,
And here is the difference: We can characterize quite precisely what we mean by "water molecules". You cannot, however, provide any useful characterization of what you mean by "intelligent agent". You can only give examples, and you cannot tell us how to generalize from those examples. I gave you a (ridiculous) guess at what might be the common attributes you were trying to illustrate in hopes that you would see what you were missing here.
So I still don't know what you mean when you say "without the input of intelligence".
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 9:47 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 9:49 pm
kornbelt,
We need a definition rather than an example. Would you like to offer "goal oriented, with a database of information, and generate-and-test abilities" as your definition of "intelligent"
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 9:49 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 10:25 pm
I haven't decided. I'm just testing your waters. Is "goal oriented, with a database of information, and generate-and-test abilities" meaningful enough for you? Or how about "goal-seeking algorithmic process?"
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 22, 2008 @ 10:25 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 10:26 pm
Hey all
I go away for a little while to see the new Indiana Jones flick and the whole nature of the conversation changes.
I don't remember if there are any loose ends that I need to clean up so if I have not answered anyone's questions let me know. I willing to let my outstanding questions go unanswered so don't worry about them
The fact that you get "conscious, deliberate agent with libertarian free will" from "directed contingency" is evidence only of your bias I don't get any such thing I can see a computer coming up with the answer to a math problem as "directed contingency"
Actually it's just a sign of the early stage of this discussion. We have a hunch it's only a hunch and would like to explore it that's all.
At some point the assumptions (and definitions) will get more explicit but it won't happen as the result of a discussion on the internet. It will happen as folks try to turn their hunches into hypotheses and their hypotheses into theories. If you don't have the patience to wait feel free to ignore the discussion I'm sure it will get along just fine with out you.
relax man
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 10:26 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 10:34 pm
KB,
I do think these are meaningful, yes. I also think this particular definition encompasses evolutionary processes, which I do not believe is the intent of most ID proponents.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 10:34 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 10:37 pm
When I suggested a "human-like intelligence" you rebuffed me for being too vague. A human mind is a "particular thing." We may not completely understand how it works, but we know the kinds of things it can do. To say a "human-like intelligence made the first life form" may contain many unknowns, but so does "a human-like intelligence designed the Empire State building." The point is, whether or not it is true, it is not a meaningless statement.
BTW, I'm not an ID "theorist". If anything, I'm an ID conjecturist.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 22, 2008 @ 10:37 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 10:38 pm
aiguy, the term intelligence surfaces in research studies. Presumably the intelligent scientists using the term have some sense of the word. But it does serve as a wedge for atheistic motivated arguments.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 10:38 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 10:40 pm
FMM,
I'm not talking about you – I am taking about Bill Dembski. He describes intelligence as transcending physical causation, and he has written extensively expressing his opinion that algorithmic machines cannot be intelligent, meaning they cannot generate CSI. So your charge of "bias" is misplaced.
Cool – I like hunches and exploration. I also like science, but that's a whole different matter.
People have been attempting to make more explicit assumptions, definitions, and hypotheses about mind for thousands of years. Philosophy of mind is ancient, and relatively little has changed over the millenia. The entire "ID Movement" has brought nothing new to any of these issues, but I'm sure philosophers and theologians thinking about these issues (as well as the actual scientists who explore mind in the cognitive sciences) will get along just fine without you.
Cheers!
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 10:40 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 10:44 pm
Bradford,
"Intelligence" is never offered as an explanation of anything in any scientific discipline. Moreover, whenever the term is used (in psychology or other cognitive science) it is given an operational definition (such as "as indicated by the Stanford-Binet IQ tests"). Only ID attempts to pass off "unspecified intelligent cause" as an explanation.
So nice try, but my insistence on a meaningful definition of this term is not driven by any "atheistic motivated arguments". It is simply a requirement for having a technical discussion in science or philosophy.
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 10:44 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 10:46 pm
Which is the same thing as saying that nature itself is a front-loaded process.
Edit: i.e, nature is a "goal-seeking algorithmic process".
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 22, 2008 @ 10:46 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 10:50 pm
Wrong. It has been correlated to behavior and even used to explain fitness metrics involved in evolutionary developments.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 10:50 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 10:56 pm
Bradford,
I believe in each case (of published science of course) you'll find an operational definition specified. If there is no definition offered, what definition are they using?
Edit: Really – an unspecified intelligent cause? I really find that hard to believe. Could you suggest a reference?
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 10:56 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 10:57 pm
KB,
Front-loaded by what?
Comment by aiguy — May 22, 2008 @ 10:57 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 11:05 pm
Hey Aguy,
Yet your "whole beef "with ID is that it hasn't come up with any in less than 20 years. I'd say we are doing pretty good
Did you know you were on a blog whose owner says explicitly that ID is not science?
Who said we were trying to bring anything new to these issues? I for one could care less about these issues. I'm interested in if design can be detected empirically that's all. I leave you to worry about mind
They have so far and I have no intention of horning in now
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 22, 2008 @ 11:05 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 11:12 pm
Foul. That's outside the scope of the topic of our dialog, which is the nature of the proximate designer of the first earth life.
Or are you implying that we need to determine what caused the proximate cause no matter what the nature of the proximate cause is before we can progress?
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 22, 2008 @ 11:12 pm
May 22nd, 2008 at 11:30 pm
That's no problem aiguy because an operational definition is context dependent. That's what is lacking with your complaints. You are creating sweeping negatives without consideration of context.
Comment by Bradford — May 22, 2008 @ 11:30 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 1:57 am
FMM,
No, my beef about ID is that it equivocates on the meaning of "intelligence".
That's good.
Hmm, let's see. Your chosen definition for design includes "to conceive and plan out in the mind". But you aren't "worried about" mind? Seems odd.
kornbelt,
Fair enough. (Again it's a terminology issue, this time regarding "front-loaded". I now conclude that in your usage, the term "front-loaded" does not imply that something intelligent was responsible).
Bradford,
First, if you have references for these scientific papers that explain something by reference to an unspecified intelligence, I'd like to see them. I really think you'll find that in each case, the paper is talking about some specific animal, and not "intelligence" in the abstract. Moreover, if "intelligence" is offered as an explanation, a specific operationalized definition for "intelligence" in that context will be given.
Second, if it's no problem to provide an operational definition for "intelligence" in the context of ID Theory, please tell us what that might be.
Third, I don't know what you mean when you say I create "sweeping negatives without consideration of context". Can you explain this?
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 1:57 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:06 am
Reading through, aiguy seems to be making some effort to get agreed definitions to avoid misunderstandings. Why not try working with "intelligence, intelligent" for the general use and "Intelligence, Intelligent" when referring to the specific use, as, I presume it has, among ID theorists. The same could easily apply to "designer" and, I suppose, "evolution".
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 2:06 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:21 am
From the point of view of the gene pool of the organism undergoing selection, there is absolutely no distinction between artificial and natural selection. A dog breeder is effectively the environment. The selection process involves differential success in producing progeny. The breeder has no method of evaluating outcomes of breeding experiments other than by viewing the results. It is the same process.
ETA:
A breeder cannot add to or alter the genome*, but can only select animals with the desired traits in the hope those traits will be heritable. Variations in genomes arising from mutations are the source of variation. The breeder is only exploiting the natural process. There is no substantive difference between artificial and natural selection.
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 2:21 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:41 am
Oops. forgot to add:
*Of course genetic engineering suggests the future possibility of "designer genes", but the day a DNA sequence can be written from scratch by a human designer which, when introduced into an embryo, produces a predicted result, is a very long way off. Until that day it's "generate-and-test".
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 2:41 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 3:10 am
Nullasalus:
John Davison (front loading advocate par excellence) states "The environment had nothing to do with [evolution]". Yet we always find species adapted to their niche, move an organism to a hostile environment and the population adapts or becomes extinct. How does "front-loading" account for that observation. Presumably the genetic information is present already, but what mechanism is there that unpacks the information in the right time and place?
By Occam's razor, differential survivability and reproductive success is the more powerful and simpler explanation, no?
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 3:10 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 4:32 am
Design = environment
Intelligent Design = Intelligent environment
The Designer Designs the environment to design life?
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 4:32 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 6:52 am
Alan Fox:
I disagree Alan. He's using definitions in an attempt to avoid the (for him) unpleasant reality that intelligence can be detected through physical evidence even if the source is unidentified. There are clear theological motives for doing this. For many years mainstreamers have asserted that biological processes and their origin have been devoid of telic features and some have even adopted imagary to stress the point; hence the blind watchmaker. But if physical processes are cited to support an argument favoring a particular theoretical lense then those same processes must be open to falsification or modification due to new data. This in turn can lead to new or revised theories. If this is not to be then we have a religious story about origins and not an empirical theory.
I recall with much intereest the work of Jane Goodall who established through direct observation that animals other than humans were able to use tools. In that case the animals were chimps and the tools used to secure insectal meals. The point was made that the use of tools was evidence for a high level of intelligence. Since then other primates have been found to use tools. What is indicative of the flexibility of evidence is the capacity to detect first evidence of primate tool utilization prior to actually observing primate useage of branches, twigs, stones etc. Evidence at a scene can indicate tool useage where observation of primates using them has not taken place.
There is a parallel previously pointed out at TT where space exploration offers future possibilities of identifying evidence of intelligent design even when no intelligent organisms can be found. That would occur if the ruins of an advanced civilization were found on an uninhabitable planet once occupied by intelligent non-human organisms.
SETI currently searches for non-human intelligence based on bandwidth but there are rumblings among SETI enthusiasts of a need to diversity the search and look for other fingerprints in electromagnetic waves detectable on earth. The emphasis is on an identifiable physical entity (electromagnetic radiation) even as a source remains unknown or even perhaps non-existent.
A signal or a physical object, through its physical nature, can reveal an intelligent cause. To argue otherwise is to hide reality in a fog of obfuscating fears.
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 6:52 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 7:22 am
Well, there's the problem in a nutshell. You use the word "intelligence" in that sentence, and I am wondering what you mean by it. By my convention, intelligence may be detectable, as you later talk about intelligence in bonobos, as they are observed to design and manufacture tools, (this tallies with aiguy's suggested definition) but are you not talking about "Intelligence" here, which means something different? This is what I am hoping to see a definition of. You used intelligent/intelligence eight times in your post.
Telic. I guess I was educated in the mainstream of the day, and I never came across its use in my classes, so I have only seen this word in the last three years after becoming interested in the ID phenomenon. It would help if there could be a consensus definition of teleology (and teleonomy) too.
ETA: mea culpa, chimps not bonobos at Gombe.
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 7:22 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 7:39 am
On establishing definitions:
Principia Mathematica page 379!
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 7:39 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 8:05 am
Merriam-Webster gives:
Teleology,
1 a: the study of evidences of design in nature b: a doctrine (as in vitalism) that ends are immanent in nature c: a doctrine explaining phenomena by final causes
2: the fact or character attributed to nature or natural processes of being directed toward an end or shaped by a purpose
3: the use of design or purpose as an explanation of natural phenomena.
Teleonomy,
: the quality of apparent purposefulness of structure or function in living organisms due to evolutionary adaptation.
Presumably telic derives from teleology and not teleonomy;)
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 8:05 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 8:20 am
BTW looking at Barry A's thread at UD as an example of "was it designed". The tree grew by cell division into the shape constrained by its environment including the actions of the gardener. So is the shape of the tree a product of design or of its environment? And does that get us anywhere?
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 8:20 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 8:49 am
Hi Alan,
Your false dichotomy makes a Dembskian point quite nicely. Design can be detected without knowing how or where it was implemented. Design can inhere in the environment and constraining conditions. The point of his project is that it be evidenced in the artifact in question. It is not a mechanistic claim and that secondary question can be explored separately.
In the case of the tree, the design was implemented through the environment and likely some direct implementation. That there was a plan/conception and a purpose takes us to the fact that said environment was designed by the intelligence.
Whether the trophic characteristics of the tree, necessary for the implementation of this design, also reflect design is yet another question – perhaps out of reach. If an investigator is comfortable chalking them up to natural law then the design is seen to be realized through environment and natural law, ie. constraint and necessity. And yet the design is detectable.
But perhaps this is a question to be discussed more fully at UD?
Comment by Pez — May 23, 2008 @ 8:49 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 8:52 am
aiguy is doing no such thing. IF you were to define what you mean by intelligence, then we could actually look if said intelligence could be detected through physical evidence evenif the source is unidentified.
For example, if your definition of intelligence is "capable of using tools to shape artifacts" then we can and do detect the activity of intelligent beings all the time, without (or prior to) identifying a source. But since you can't or won't say what you mean by intelligence, we have no way to evaluate your claim that in general "intelligence can be detected".
It's just absolutely laughable that you can claim to be able to detect something, but you are unable to tell us exactly what it is you are detecting and how you are detecting it.
Oh. So Jane Goodall established an operational definition of intelligence during her research and then showed that chimps are intelligent, just like some other creatures who use tools.
How surprising. She actually does exactly what aiguy said any scientific paper would do– which is exactly the opposite of what you like to do.
Comment by hrun — May 23, 2008 @ 8:52 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 9:04 am
I think it's pretty clear the shape was designed by a particular, rather lazy species of ape known for such things.
Comment by Zachriel — May 23, 2008 @ 9:04 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 9:31 am
@ Pez
False dichotomy? Please elaborate? If a false dichotomy is "typically used in an argument to force your opponent into an extreme position — by making the assumption that there are only two positions", then are you saying there is designed, not designed and another explanation? Is something not always either designed or not designed?
I am just asking what is meant by "design" and intelligence. Combining aiguy's definitions, how do you feel about intelligence being "the ability to cause a complex, functional mechanism to exist"
Not much change since Dembski said:
As for your example, I'm not going to take the bait. You're asking me to play a game: "Provide as much detail in terms of possible causal mechanisms for your ID position as I do for my Darwinian position." ID is not a mechanistic theory, and it's not ID's task to match your pathetic level of detail in telling mechanistic stories. If ID is correct and an intelligence is responsible and indispensable for certain structures, then it makes no sense to try to ape your method of connecting the dots. True, there may be dots to be connected. But there may also be fundamental discontinuities, and with IC systems that is what ID is discovering.
So, as I said, does that get us anywhere?
Yes via a 5 minute internet search using the watermark and finding pooktre's website. Would the explanatory filter have produced a similar result?
Perhaps not for those of us who have difficulty with the registration procedure;)
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 9:31 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 9:44 am
Reaping what you've sown, Renard?
Why, just make up another name.
Comment by Pez — May 23, 2008 @ 9:44 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 9:52 am
It's not that easy, young jedi. Do I need to explain ip blocking? Any substantive response to my comment?
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 9:52 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 11:17 am
For Pez
Déjà -vû
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 11:17 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 11:47 am
Hi Alan,
There was no substance to your comment which was not answered the first time. Was it a product of design or its environment? Why, yes. Both. No dichotomy.
As for AI guy's definitions, I'd have responded to them without your prompting if I thought that discussion needed me. Nonetheless, your question is answered and the definitions are not germane to your objections.
Your trotting out of Dembski's accurate statement is wiki-rhetoric and painfully predictable. Identifying the design of the the tree-chair didn't require an internet search nor does it require a mechanistic explanation of the designer's procedure.
Zach can see that the design is pretty clearly.
Comment by Pez — May 23, 2008 @ 11:47 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 11:50 am
For Alan
So what?
Comment by Pez — May 23, 2008 @ 11:50 am
May 23rd, 2008 at 12:08 pm
So, apologies to Pez for my flippancy.
Well, until I checked, I couldn't eliminate photoshop trickery or that the structure was an artificial construct and, as you say:
Thanks for the compliment:P
Now, my question still stands, does looking at a picture of an espaliered tree get us anywhere? I understand, I think, what design is in a general sense, but what progress can be made if you are coy about defining "Design" and "Intelligence"
.
Comment by Alan Fox — May 23, 2008 @ 12:08 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 12:46 pm
Bradford,
I've asked you twice now to tell us what you might be referring to, but you haven't responded. I must assume now you've found that I'm right: No scientific discipline ever offers the concept of "intelligence" in the abstract as an explanation for anything. Only ID tries to do this.
I have also pressed you several times to provide the operational definition for "intelligence" that you believe suits the purposes of ID research, and again you have not responded. I must assume you realize there is no definition of "intelligence" that will support the goals IDers. Either your definition will invoke metaphysical suppositions that you can never evidence (like causes that "do not result from physical necessity") or your definition will be so broad that it encompasses all sorts of processes, such as a process of Darwinian evolution.
Here you have abandoned any attempt to address my points, and instead begin to focus on my emotional motivations. These do not constitute arguments against my position (and in addition they are false).
If you read Goodall, or any ethologist studying animal intelligence, you'll see just what I've explained to you: Intelligence is not an explanation of anything.
I never understand why ID folks look to SETI for support (the compliment is certainly not returned). SETI researchers use evolutionary biology to guage the probability that biological life form exist on other planets, and then they go looking for them by looking for signals that are not otherwise found in nature. In stark contrast, ID observes things that are found in nature (biological life forms) and goes looking for something completely undefined – except for its purported ability to create living things.
If ID wants to suggest that extra-terrestrial life as SETI hypothesizes it is the cause of life on Earth, then they can join Crick and the others who have toyed with this idea. That at least is a theory with some content, since at least we do have knowledge of biological life forms from our experience of life on Earth. Unfortunately, that theory has languished for lack of evidence, and also for lack of interest (since it fails to answer the question of biological life came to exist).
The more you cast aspersions on my motives, the more it appears you are projecting. In any event, let's see if we can stick to the issues, yes?
I will ask one more time: What is the operational defintion of intelligent cause that you would like to use in this context?
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 12:46 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 1:10 pm
Hi Alann,
Thanks.
Photoshop trickery produced by the environment? Nope. By intelligent design. You saw the design regardless of its source and regardless of the degree of environmental influence.
Who's being coy about definitions? The beginning of this thread seems plastered with definitions.
Behe told us what he meant by design at his first at bat:"Purposeful arrangement of parts".
The word intelligent is not added as an additional, to-be-defined-descriptor, but as clarification of what is being said when we say "design". This is in reaction to coy definition mongering by those who recognize the design and call it "apparent" or say that it is created by chance.
Behe further tells us that the design entails planning, foresight and knowledge.
His use is in keeping with commonly held positions, the dictionary and that of fifth monarchy man at the beginning of this thread.
I haven't followed it throughout so I don't know if this steps on the toes of others who have different definitions, but I see no coyness here.
Comment by Pez — May 23, 2008 @ 1:10 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 1:18 pm
All of these things are "found in nature." What do you mean by "otherwise?" and how do you know the first life form on earth shouldn't be in that catergory?
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 1:18 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 1:19 pm
Fine. So does anybody try and detect purpose in biological systems that allows them to detect design?
Likewise, does anybody try to detect the amount of planning, foresight and knowledge required for any biological structure?
Comment by hrun — May 23, 2008 @ 1:19 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 1:26 pm
Hi hrun,
Yes to the first.
I'm not sure about the second.
If this is a complaint about the wet-bench experimental work or lack of same by ID proponents it's a separate complaint altogether from what I am discussing with Alan.
===
Alan,
Neither do you have to re-ask whether inferring ID is of any use to us. Increasing our true knowledge of the world is of use to some and pointless to others. for any utilitarian benefits you can search or talk to someone else.
Comment by Pez — May 23, 2008 @ 1:26 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 1:37 pm
kornbelt
This is what SETI researchers describe. They look for narrow-band transmissions because no other known astrophysical process generates them.
We know is that life on Earth exists; we don't know why.
Pez
You'll see no agreement on these defintions! The fact that ID is supposed to be a "theory" that offers "intelligence" as its sole explanatory construct, yet fails to provide a technical definition for this term, is truly hard to fathom.
Here you have a definition of the word "design" as a noun. This is a completely different definition than the one ID-friendly FMM here suggested above in this thread! Unfortunately it says nothing about what sorts of causes might result in "designs". To say some artifact is "purposeful" does not mean that the cause of that thing had a conscious or deliberate purpose in mind… or does it?
If the term "intelligent" is supposed to clarify something, then please write down one single clear definition of this term in the context of ID!
Look again.
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 1:37 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 1:47 pm
Cells and their internal mechanisms are are not caused by any known physical processes either, except from previous cells that know how to make them.
Of what use could any narrow-band signal not known to be generated by astrophysical processes be in determining whether "intelligent life" (whatever that means) generated it? What could we ever conclude from it?
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 1:47 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 1:50 pm
What does "intelligent" mean in "SETI" If it merely means something "other than astrophysical processes", how does that clarify anything?
It would seem to me that SETI is no more scientific than looking for a designer's signatures in genomes.
Is looking for "Yahweh did it" in the genome science?
How is SETI more scientific than that?
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 1:50 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 1:51 pm
Hi AI Guy,
I didn't say there was agreement. I suggested there might not be. But since Behe's name has come up, and since he is so closely associated with the concept, I think his lack of coyness in defining design answers Alan Fox's question quite well.
It looks equally like a verb to me. Is that relevant? The cause is purposefulness; that is, intent, will, foresight, desire, etc.
I believe it does. Bradford and nulasallus may not agree, but I am certain that is what Behe et al are claiming.
I already did. !
Design is the purposeful arrangement of parts.
With clarification:
Design is the purposeful arrangement of parts by an intelligent agent in contradistinction to purposeless forces.
For what?
Comment by Pez — May 23, 2008 @ 1:51 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:05 pm
kornbelt
Yup, except for that!
SETI folks argue that evolutionary theory points to the possibility of biological life as we know it might evolve on other suitable planets. To see if this is true, they try to think of what life as we know it might do to make their presence known, and they've decided that we would send signals out into space that were different from all of the other signals out there (narrow-band EM transmissions).
Unlike ID, SETI doesn't try to explain anything by using that word. They aren't positing some unspecified abstract "intelligence" or anything. They are talking explicitly about biological life forms as we know them. The descriptive term "intelligent" applied to the life forms SETI looks for means nothing but "able to send signals into space" in the context of SETI.
SETI is looking for extra-terrestrial life forms. ID can't say what it is looking for. (And by the way, SETI is not a theory).
Pez
I see. Yes, I appreciate anyone who actually attempts to provide technical definitions rather than, say, arguing that they are not important
Yes: Much of the confusion surrounding what ID posits results from conflating the noun and verb forms of the word "design". Just look at what FMM says above vs. what Behe says to see how IDers use these words in completely different ways from each other.
I do not believe that "purpose" is characterized as a cause in a way that we can detect when it is or is not operating. If you disagree, please tell me what the method is for detecting "purpose".
More of the same. What is the test for "will", Pez?
IDers disagree about the fundamental tenets of ID theory – the very meaning of the sole explanatory concept offered by ID. I'm trying to see if there is any common ground at all. In any event, nullasalus thinks consciousness is a critical component of ID, but admits there are no empirical tests that could be applied in the context of ID.
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 2:05 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:36 pm
I pointed out that evidence for intelligence is context dependent. The use of tools can be one context. Patterns in electromagnetic radiation another context. The ability to solve a test problem requiring spatial aptitudes another context. The ability to compose music another context. The ability to construct high technology (by 21st century human standards) anywhere in the universe by any type of being is another context. The ability to construct encoded systems utilizing symbols is another context. The list is, for practical purposes, endless. There is a common denominator to all. The traversing of a causal pathway to whatever the outcome involving intelligent input is marked by the capabilities of a mind(s) overcoming critical obstacles along the way. That morsal of food would not have been obtained without the use of a tool. Symbolism within a code was assigned to effect communication within a system etc. Of course I'm not explaining anything you have not been exposed to so the question is why do you pretend definitions are an insuperable obstacle to intelligent design? If they are not then why the effort on your part?
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 2:36 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:36 pm
They must be implicitly "explaining" something. At bare minimum, the sender must have an "intelligence at least as powerful as ours" since "it can send out signals like we can." Like it or not, that says something meaningful about the senders beyond the bald fact that they send signals out.
OK, perhaps they should call it, "Search for Extra-terrestrial Critters Who Would Send Out a Signal Like We Can." Or SETCWWSOSLWC for short.
Several people in this thread have tried: purpose, foresight, knowledge. In order to send out a signal, they would need those at least in the same abundance as humans, do you agree?
You didn't address what I said. SETI looks for signals. How is that different than looks for "signals" or signatures in a genome? Anyway, I agree, SETI is not a theory. It's merely a research program.
What ID is looking for is signs of intelligence (purpose, foresight, knowledge), as a prerequisite for earth life, particularly the first life form, as my interest goes.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 2:36 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:42 pm
Why use the term abstract when every time I use an example I refer to concrete circumstances? We don't use the word evolve in the abstract either do we even though the word is fraught with multiple meanings and ambiguity. Like the term evolve the term intelligence is context dependent. By ignoring specifics and pretending that useage is an abstraction you are confirming that the definition charade is a poor attempt at debunking ID.
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 2:42 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:43 pm
So which one of those many "definitions" you cited is the operational one for ID?
Comment by hrun — May 23, 2008 @ 2:43 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:48 pm
What is not said is revealing. The ability to send signals into space presumes a level of highly developed technology. The signals are evidence of a secondary implication requiring a mind to effect. And we cannot tell anything about the source other than that it is intelligent; presumptions about biological make-up notwithstanding.
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 2:48 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:50 pm
Bradford:
My explanatory filter tells me that Bradford must be losing the argument. He is resorting to insults again.
Comment by Raevmo — May 23, 2008 @ 2:50 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:50 pm
All can be operational within their respective contexts. What is your definition of evolve and how is it operational for all contexts and at the same time non-trivial?
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 2:50 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:53 pm
An insult is personal Raevmo. Pointing out an ineffective line of reasoning is not except perhaps to sensitive types who feel threatened by disagreement. Is that an insult? If the shoe fits…
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 2:53 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:55 pm
SETI is looking for electromagnetic wave patterns that it is believed originate from life forms analogous to humans.
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 2:55 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:58 pm
Bradford, we are not looking for a definition of intelligence that is operational for all contexts. We just want a definition of intelligence that is operational in the context of ID, where it somehow can be detected.
Is this really such a difficult notion?
There is the claim that the action of an intelligent agent can be detected in the design of certain features in biology. THIS is the context we are talking about here. Can you tell us the operational definition of intelligence in THIS context?
Comment by hrun — May 23, 2008 @ 2:58 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 2:59 pm
That necessary to replicate and evolve. Have you figured out how an initial genome would be formed?
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 2:59 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 3:00 pm
Bradford:
Sure Bradford. Keep up the charade.
Comment by Raevmo — May 23, 2008 @ 3:00 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 3:01 pm
That necessary to replicate and evolve. Have you figured out how an initial genome would be formed?
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 3:01 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 3:17 pm
That is your operational definition of intelligence? So a bacterium has intelligence? So a bacterium could have been the intelligent designer which might be responsible for all those features in biology? That surely doesn't make any sense.
Comment by hrun — May 23, 2008 @ 3:17 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 3:17 pm
Bradford,
Your examples are concrete, but the cause that ID hypothesizes is utterly abstract, to the point where ID can't even say if this abstract, unspecified "intelligent agent" is even a physical thing. It doesn't get more abstract than that.
The single word "evolve" is never meant as an explanation obviously; there is a huge literature describing all of the mechanisms of evolution. Yet when I ask IDers to expand on the single word "intelligent", we get either a description of metaphysical assumptions (such as free will) or we get something that describes all sorts of things that IDers don't really want to include in their theory (like evolutionary processes).
The explanatory concepts in evolutionary theory are all defined quite specifically, and there is no ambiguity about what "mutations" or "differential reproduction" or "heritability" and these other concepts mean, and everyone agrees on what they mean. In contrast, there is great disagreement (even among IDers on this very board!) on what this single explanatory concept ("inteligence") is supposed to mean in the context of ID.
No, in SETI minds aren't implied by signals; minds are implied by brains, which are implied by the encephalization quotients predicted by SETI researchers using evolutionary theory. See here for example: http://www.space.com/searchfor...
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 3:17 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 3:21 pm
Bradford,
There are now 180 messages on this thread, and we still do not have an empirically accessible definition for the "intelligent cause" that ID offers as its sole explanatory concept. Even the IDers disagree fundamentally about what it is supposed to mean.
Won't you admit that this means we can't yet being to evaluate the plausibility of "ID" against the evidence, since nobody can say what is being suggested?
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 3:21 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 3:21 pm
HI AI Guy
I don't see a problem with any conflation. Behe's definition is equally applicable to design as a verb or a noun.
noun: Parts purposefully arranged.
verb: To purposefully arrange parts.
That's the entire point of ID; can we detect purpose? The proponents say yes. Interestingly, so do their critical counterparts who say we've tested for it and found it absent.
It's the same test as that for not-purpose and not-will.
Comment by Pez — May 23, 2008 @ 3:21 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 3:24 pm
AI Guy,
On "mutations" there is great ambiguity. Just try arguing that there is more to variation than mutations to find out how much. And then try throwing in the equally ambiguous descriptor "random".
There is also much ambiguity in the definitions for life, species, gene, etc. And yet we have a whole science devoted to studying these.
Comment by Pez — May 23, 2008 @ 3:24 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 3:38 pm
Odd. I always thought that mutation was quite well defined as changes in the genome sequence. What's the ambiguity? It's well defined. We can use this definition to see if something is a mutation. We can use this definition to test what causes mutations. And so forth.
Now. Can you give a similar definition for intelligence in the context of ID?
And note that we can go ahead and also give you workable definitions of the terms used here, like genome and sequence. So, if you give a definition of intelligence that includes terms like 'purpose' or 'foresight' can you also tell us how we can detect those things?
Comment by hrun — May 23, 2008 @ 3:38 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 3:39 pm
Is there anybody who claims to be able to detect 'not-purpose' or 'not-will'?
Comment by hrun — May 23, 2008 @ 3:39 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 3:45 pm
kornbelt,
Nope – they are hypothesizing that life exists elsewhere (based on evolutionary theory) and they're looking for it.
What does it mean – that if they took our human IQ tests, their scores would be higher than ours? That's ridiculous. We would know nothing except that they could send these signals. SETI folks would say their hypothesis that life exists elsewhere has evidence.
The only reason we would suspect that they had human-like minds is because based on evolutionary theory SETI hypothesized that life forms similar to us may have evolved elsewhere. This doesn't come from some theory of intelligence, it comes from our knowledge of life on Earth and the SETI assumptions based on evolutionary theory.
There is no such thing as a "sign of intelligence" in the abstract. There are only signs of actual living things who we may wish to call intelligent.
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 3:45 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 3:49 pm
Pez,
Before you even ask the question, you must say what "purpose" is supposed to mean. In cybernetics, a purposeful system is defined as one that uses negative feedback to navigate toward a goal. Is this what you mean?
What you are missing is that none of these concepts are ever offered as an explanation of anything! Whenever something is hypothesized to explain some phenomena, scientists must characterize the explanatory concepts with sufficient clarity so we can see if that is actually what is responsible or not. For example, consider:
Q: Why do worms reproduce?
A: Because they are alive
This is NOT a helpful explanation because life is (loosely) defined as things that reproduce and have metabolisms and… whatever. Likewise:
Q: How can squirrels find acorns?
A: Because they are intelligent
This is NOT a helpful explanation either, for the same reason. In contrast:
Q: Why do giraffes have long necks?
A: Because ancestor giraffes were born with genetic mutations that cause longer necks, and the offspring of these had disproportionate numbers of offspring….
Whether you think this explanation is true or not, it does not suffer from ambiguity of terms. We all agree on what these concepts mean.
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 3:49 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 4:14 pm
Hi Hrun,
Is that what a mutation is? Then why are we constantly told that RM and NS is a strawman? Is the ambiguity in the word "random" then? MacNeill posted a long list of mutations to counter the ID strawman objection that random mutations can't account for the variation necessary for evolution.
By the way, he thinks that science has demonstrated a lack of foresight in evolution (the word he proposes we replace"random with).
Others who've tested for purpose:
http://media.ljworld.com/pdf/2...
http://members.iinet.net.au/~s...
http://www.google.com/search?c...
http://www.evolutionnews.org/2...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G...
etc.
====
AIguy,
As for a definition of purpose, back to normal use and dictionaries for me.
Purpose is the intended goal, the effect or result of a desire, the reason that something is done, .
As a verb, to intend or determine an outcome.
Comment by Pez — May 23, 2008 @ 4:14 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 4:18 pm
As I said, neither is "intelligence".
Intelligence is the clarifier for those who were ambiguous with the term "design".
What is being inferred in ID is design, ie. the exercise of purpose.
This implies intelligence. But some claim design and purpose do not require intelligence (by definition then, they deny the design and purpose they are seeking to describe), so, as a popular term, intelligence is added to the name.
Comment by Pez — May 23, 2008 @ 4:18 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 4:37 pm
Is it not? I think it is a pretty clear definition and I don't think many scientists would argue about it.
Of course that is where ambiguity is. Mutations are not random in the sense that they are not evenly distributed across the genome. Mutations are not random in the sense that not every base is affected equally by every mutagenic agent. And so forth
So, if somebody claims that mutations are random, then I would suggest to ask what they mean by random, no?
Comment by hrun — May 23, 2008 @ 4:37 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 4:49 pm
I identified the common denominator to design examples and explained that distinguishing empirical evidence is context dependent. I've also been asking for "a non-trivial, empirically accessible definition for "evolve." The answer is the same. It is either context dependent or a trivial change over time bit of nonsense.
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 4:49 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 5:06 pm
There is no ambiguity about mutations and there is also no ambiguity about the theoretical framework and imagary attached to mutations. Their non-telic presumption is based on other concepts like randomness and the lack of a rudder to an evolutionary process. But these concepts also suggest what could constitute evidence of bias and direction to a mutation process.
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 5:06 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 5:08 pm
It is the default presumption. That does not guarantee its accuracy.
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 5:08 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 5:12 pm
Of course you left out the reference to an initial genome which explains the replication capacity of bacterium. You assume the cause aligns with your perception of reality even though you are unable to cite the cause.
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 5:12 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 5:30 pm
Pez,
Not so good, I'm afraid. You now say that purpose is "the reason that something is done". Therefore, the purpose of rainclouds is to rain, and the act of raining is purposeful, thus intelligent.
This makes no sense. You are offering "purpose" or "will" as a cause of certain phenomena. I ask how can we tell that it really is "purpose" or "will" and not something else that is involved. If you can't come up with a way, then we can't tell if ID is true or not.
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 5:30 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 5:37 pm
No. We would know they were at least as intelligent as we are when it comes to making radios that can send signals. That says something meaningful about them beyond the mere fact of the signal itself.
What would the signal require as a minimum to indicate intelligence over "known astrophysical processes?"
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 5:37 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 5:38 pm
Bradford,
No, you have identified no common denominator, and no, you have not given any method to distinguish intelligence in the context of ID (where the supposed "intelligence" is a completely abstract reference).
No – I'm no biologist, but even I know this: Darwinian evolution explains biological forms like this: Organisms vary in ways that affect their ability to reproduce, and these variable traits are at least partially heritable. In situations where the organisms compete for resources, traits that serve to enhance reproduction will spread throughout a population…. and so on.
Your examples are concrete, but the cause that ID hypothesizes is utterly abstract, to the point where ID can't even say if this abstract, unspecified "intelligent agent" is even a physical thing. It doesn't get more abstract than that.
No, in SETI minds aren't implied by signals; minds are implied by brains, which are implied by the encephalization quotients predicted by SETI researchers using evolutionary theory. See here for example: http://www.space.com/searchfor...
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 5:38 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 5:43 pm
kornbelt,
Think about what you are saying! Here, try this:
I'm thinking of something. Can you tell me anything about what I'm thinking about? No, not yet… I haven't told you anything about it yet.
What if I tell you it can emit narrow-band EM signals? What do you know about it now? You know that it can emit narrow-band EM signals, and that is all you know.
What if I tell you it is intelligent? What do you know about it now?
You know not a single thing more than you did before I said this, because "intelligence" doesn't have any meaning when applied in the abstract like this (or like it is in ID).
What do you mean by "intelligence"
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 5:43 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 5:48 pm
Evolutionary theory adds precisely nothing to the basic intuitive notion that "life may exist that can send signals from elsewhere because we know we exist and we can send signals."
Who's being abstract? A signature in the genome that clearly indicates a message to us wouldn't be abstract at all. Neither would finding a radio signal full of images of aliens jumping in a swimming pool. Both testify of a goal, foresight, and knowledge, the hallmarks of intelligence, in my opinion. So far, I have no reason to think otherwise.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 5:48 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 5:55 pm
kornbelt,
Yes, SETI relies heavily on evolutionary theory, for example to estimate how long it might take for organisms with sufficiently large and complex brains to evolve on a suitable planet.
ID refers to "intelligence" in the abstract, rather than a specific thing (like a biological life form, say).
You have not yet told us what that means yet – in the abstract.
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 5:55 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 6:04 pm
From that alone I would not conclude it was from an intelligent source. Some things that intelligent beings do are indistinguishable from non intelligent processes. I'd have to wait for something that was indistinguishable. Primes up to 3001 would be pretty convincing to me, and I would guess most people. If a genome contained a series of primes up to 3001, I would probably conclude the same thing: I was designed from a source with goals, foresight and knowledge, the hallmarks of intelligence.
I would think you were full of new wine.
Nothing. And I would not assume it was from an intelligent source.
What if the signal contained all primes up to 3001? That would tell me a hell of a lot about the source.
Something that exhibits a goal, foresight, and knowledge. See above and past posts. How many times do I need to say it?
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 6:04 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 6:10 pm
They're welcome to do that. But it's unnecessary. We already know this galaxy has intelligent life capable of sending complex radio signals. Evolutionary theory adds nothing to that empirical knowledge.
ID who? Not ID me. You're talking to me here, not "ID", nor the DI, and not Bill Dembski. I couldn't give a damn what they say.
I don't know. You're the one with ideas of "abstract intelligence." I've already defined intelligence: goals, foresight and knowledge.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 6:10 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 6:14 pm
kornbelt,
Not to SETI researchers looking for life forms. For them, where the signal comes from is a critical indicator. If a signal of primes emanated from a planet suitable for life, that would be good evidence that living things sent it. If it came from, say, inside a neutron star, then they would likely hypothesize some non-biological source instead.
Ok, fine. A goal, foresight, and knowledge. First of all, since we know machines which operate strictly in accordance with physical necessity meet these criteria, we know that intelligence is not something that transcends physical necessity (and so you are saying Bradford is wrong about this). You are saying that an unconscious, deterministic, process that blindly follows natural law can be called intelligent, as long as it exhibits a "goal, foresight, and knowledge". Do you agree so far?
edit:
Again, the point here is that ID confuses pointing to an actual thing which we might call "intelligent" with simply referring to "intelligence" without any reference to any kind of thing in particular. This latter usage is what I call an "abstract" reference to "intelligence", and what I claim has no meaning at all.
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 6:14 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 6:43 pm
Good for them. If they conjectured a non-biological source for a signal with primes up to 3001, I would count them as insane, eat a cookie, drink a Guinness Draft, and go to bed.
See here.
Yes. Deep Blue was an instance of it.
As previously stated, the proximate cause of the first earth life is all I'm concerned about here.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 6:43 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 6:55 pm
kornbelt,
Well, we disagree. Sequences of prime numbers can quite plausibly arise from non-biological sources, I'd say, and it's hard to imagine biological life inside a neutron star (since there aren't even atoms in there!) But I think we're a bit off track here.
And sorry – I lost track that you'd already said that intelligence can be mechanical/non-conscious. (We should have different names for these different versions of ID).
I don't think you responded to my point about how we are supposed to detect "goals". Is the "goal" of a river to put water into the sea?
So too with knowledge. If an electrical engineer produces a high-voltage arc, does the engineer "know" about arcs? If a thundercloud produces a high-voltage arc, does the thundercloud "know" about arcs?
And that leaves foresight. You believe there is a class of things that exhibits foresight, and these are known as "intelligent agents". Just to make sure I understand, I'll describe something with foresight, and you tell me if you'd call it intelligent:
"A blind, undirected, natural process that cannot learn nor adapt to novel circumstance, and whose behavior is completely determined and predictable by physical law, and cannot do anything at all except one class of behaviors which is "producing complex life forms", which it does by utilizing foresight".
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 6:55 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 7:04 pm
I haven't been using "intelligence" in an abstract way or meaningless way. But just to clarify:
Goal: an intention or motive to obtain something, abstract or concrete, whether an object or a status change, that you don't possess presently.
Knowledge: what has come to you via your five (or six) senses, and information communicated from others. Not always reliable.
Foresight: the ability to use knowledge to predict a series of events, as causes lead to effects, which in turn become causes to other effects. Not always accurate, but with a goal, forms the basis of action.
Humans have these properties. Computers can be programmed to have them.
The way I see it, no consciousness or transcendence is required by the proximate designer of the first biological life on earth. A cell (for example) has a finite amount number of molecules that can have a particular arrangement. It is conceivable to me that a computer and certain kinds of hardware could be programmed with a goal to achieve such a construction. Transcendence or consciousness or something else might be required up the causal line (who knows? we don't know enough about Reality to know what is necessary for anything, ultimately), but not at the proximate design point to earth life as we know so far.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 7:04 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 7:05 pm
I'd be interested in hearing how that might be done.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 7:05 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 7:08 pm
kornbelt:
Oh, that last straw to hang on to. What will you do when it breaks?
Comment by Raevmo — May 23, 2008 @ 7:08 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 7:15 pm
kornbelt,
We know when people have goals, because we can talk about them (and we are subjectively aware of our own goals). But how do we tell when other things have goals? Does a river have a goal of getting water to the sea? How can you tell?
So now you're saying that nothing has knowledge without the same sort of physical senses we have? No, you don't really mean that, right? But… what about the thundercloud?
It is conceivable to me that natural processes that we do not understand could achieve such a construction. How? I don't know – we don't understand it. But I know that tagging on the label of "intelligence" certainly doesn't help, because it doesn't tell us anything we didn't already know.
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 7:15 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 7:26 pm
No problem. But it just goes to show, "ID" is not a monolithic cult ruled by DI on high.
Perhaps. A goal is a motive or impulse to change from one state to another. A personal goal of mine is to feel more pleasure than pain. Same deal. It's all about motive toward certain state changes.
Knowledge is relative. Someone who does scientific experiments with electricity (or studies those who have) will certainly "know" different things about arcs than one who merely experiences an occurrence of one.
As for thunderclouds knowing about arcs, I would say a storm system may "know" about an instance of a bolt if by that we mean that it alters the state the system. This does violence to the common usage of the term, but if we're speaking on strict epistemological terms, then I'd say yes, in a sense the "system knows" a lightning bolt has occurred. Knowledge is relative, and this would be quite low on the scale.
Here's what I said:
A computer chess game knows the rules of the game, has knowledge of past games and knowledge of the current game, and has a goal of capturing the opponent's king. Its foresight consists of running through various scenarios using the aforementioned facilities, down to many levels of cause and effect, and finding the best next move in light of the goal and the current state of the board.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 7:26 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 7:44 pm
Hey Aguy,
I've been thinking about you charge that ID equivocates the term intelligence and I think that if there is equivocation it's not intentional.
ID is like AI in that there are strong and weak varieties.
Weak AI and strong AI have are not separate disciplines Strong AI is just the extreme edge of Weak AI. Many but not all AI researchers believe strong AI is possible yet their attention is focused on the weak kind.
The same is true for ID all the action is in the weak kind at least right now it's what Kornbelt and I are interested in It also seems to be what Behe and Denton have in mind.
Bradford seems to be looking more for the strong variety but it is mostly philosophical IMHO like strong AI.
Suppose we all inferred that the flagellum was designed would that prove the designer was a conscious agent with free will? I don't think so. Folks like Penrose and our own thought provoker would continue to assume the universe was the designer. No ones faith would be challenged we would only have some more information about the world.
Folks like Bradford would then have to get busy looking for an additional test like the Turing test but for artifacts that will convince folks that the designer was consciousness. It would have to be better than Turing to convince me however!!!!
Do I think that a conscious designer exists of course I do but I don't think there is a way to know that empirically the same way I don't think there is a way to know if a computer is conscious empirically.
Many folks prehaps most would be convinced by a computer that passed the Turing test but this is just a way to draw an arbitrary line in the sand it does not prove consciousness.
I would be excited if some empirical proof for the conscious intelligence that Bradford is talking about and I would be even more excited if we found specific empirical proof beyond the shadow of a doubt for the God of the Bible but I just don't expect to see this.
Does that mean that ID is not interesting, far from it. If fact it's my conviction that Strong ID is improvable that makes weak ID potentially scientific IMHO and it's what allows people of good will to come to this subject with an open mind.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 23, 2008 @ 7:44 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 7:48 pm
kornbelt,
Got it.
We might as well say the goal of gravity is to try and pull objects together and so on. This just doesn't help at all. On one hand you disavow that you're talking about anything conscious, but it seems that words like "motive" and "impulse" are all about conscious awareness.
As I've argued here consistently, common usage vocabulary will get us nowhere except in deep confusion when we speak of issues regarding minds. The whole point here is settle on a technical vocabulary that will make all of IDs assumptions explicit.
So for "know", like "goal", it appears that just about any dynamic system in nature qualifies as having a goal and knowledge, according to your definitions. EDIT: And why wouldn't the thundercloud "know" as much as the engineer knows about making arcs (e.g. about voltage, ionization, etc)?
I don't spot any contradictions between what I said and what you said. Do you?
Comment by aiguy — May 23, 2008 @ 7:48 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 8:01 pm
Rivers "tell" us their goals (motive to change state) by doing just that if we allow them. Motives and impulses seem like the least mysterious aspect of the entire question.
Right. I lapsed anthropocentric there for a second. (I'm only human, after all
.) "Knowledge" is defined as permanent or semi-permanent state change in a system. It can be caused externally or within the processes of the system itself. It is useless of itself, but is referenced by the mechanism that has foresight. (Induction capabilities should be added to the list of intelligent attributes. But I admit I need to think about this more, given it's an ad hoc by a tired and semi-intoxicated brain.)
The chess game is a good example. For example, there is knowledge preset by the programmer, knowledge gained by past games and the current game, and knowledge of past internal searches. The foresight "engine" (if you will) utilizes this in its determinations. Nothing you don't know, I sure, aiguy.
I agree. Whether it could and/or did is of great interest to me. (But not in this thread.)
In other words you're still claiming that it is "meaningless" to say "an intelligence designed life" as oppose to "nature designed life." It could be a matter of scale between saying "nature designed this" and "a human design this" and "a sophisticated computer designed this." But there is a meaningful difference. Take the Deep Blue computer. One could make the claim "human intelligence didn't design that, only natural forces are needed." Regardless of whether the claim is true or not, the contrast between the goal/knowledge/foresight powers of nature and the goal/knowledge/foresight powers of humans are vast, that we know of. You could say that in a human mind, knowledge and foresight are concentrated with certain level of sophistication not found "otherwise in nature." I'm not sure how to quantify it, exactly, but it's a meaningful difference.
The bottom line with respect to my participation in this thread is, saying one thing is more intelligent than another, and that in particular, "a human-like intelligence may have been required to create the first earth life" is not meaningless.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 8:01 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 8:06 pm
No, I don't mean it as an attribute of consciousness. Just think computers and A.I. Deep Blue had a "motive" or "impulse" to take the opponent's king. Back when I was a kid my electric train power supply had "impulse", and when it was on, it oscillated the voltage levels to the tracks. If that term throws you, just toss it out. "Motive" is sufficient. "Goal" is sufficient. Doesn't matter. It does no violence to the language to say that computers are programmed with goals and motives.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 8:06 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 8:14 pm
Think A.I. and Deep Blue. There is no "goal" in a lightning storm other than the next proximate effect. Unlike the next proximate effect in nature, Deep Blue's "knowledge" concerns a different level of matter arrangement, and it's "goal" and "foresight" engine looks into the future far beyond the next proximate molecular or electrical effect, and it uses non-proximately derived information in an attempt to get to that goal.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 8:14 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 8:20 pm
I don't admit that the OOL mechanism on earth could not learn. If anything, only the goal, and perhaps the foresight algorithms would be fixed. The knowledge base would certainly be expected to expand.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 8:20 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 8:24 pm
Turn on Physical Graffiti and get drunk, I guess.
What the hell are you talking about?
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 8:24 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 8:25 pm
Please don't forsake this one. I'm all ears.
EDIT: Of course, computers are non-biological sources, and they can generate prime numbers, so I guess you got me there. But did you have something else in mind?
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 23, 2008 @ 8:25 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 9:14 pm
Hi Aiguy,
Have no fear, you've merely equivocated on the word reason; that's why you've drawn a faulty conclusion.
As you can see from the beginning of the sentence, we are working from cause to effect. If the intention of the effect is the reason for the cause then we have purpose. The goal is reached because it is the reason for the action, the effect is reached because it is intended or desired.
In the case of the rain cloud you are going backward. The rain cloud is the reason for the rain. It is not, as you say, that the rain is the reason for the rain cloud. Since there are perfectly good purposeless (as far as we can tell without dipping into philosophy and metaphysics) proximate reasons for the rain cloud there is no reason to think it exists in order to cause rain.
It just may be that will not be able to tell if ID is true or not.
But let us backtrack. You weren't asking if ID was true, but whether it was damned by its use of the word "intelligent".
We see that it is not. As I've pointed out, and you even admitted by defining intelligence as that which designs, the word is quite superfluous to the ID project. As I said, it is merely offered to reinforce and clarify what design actually means. And 'design' does not suffer any vagueness of definition – purposeful arrangement of parts.
We know that there is the appearance of this design in biology and of the apparent purpose in nature; even such diehards as Dawkins will tell you so. Nature looks like it has a purpose, the universe looks like it knew we were coming, we must remind ourselves that the features we are looking at are evolved and not designed…
So how can he be intellectually fulfilled while denying the reality of this design and purpose? Because he has a test for purpose/will/design/intent, etc. His test entails the demonstration to his satisfaction that RM/NS (metaphysics, but what the heck) can create the appearance of design – as well as a healthy dose of Darwinian "that's not what a designer would do (more metaphysics).
So far so good. But along comes ID and argues that RM/NS (oops, strawman) cannot account for the appearance of design and purpose. Therefore, it is perfectly valid to infer that the appearance is real, in the absence of a purposeless, random, chance, unguided, etc. cause of said design.
It's not true, you say?
Fine by me. But we aren't discussing the validity of the inference, but the logic of drawing it based upon the definitions. There is nothing untoward in doing so.
Unlike with the rain cloud, we have the appearance of design and purpose without (to the IDer) a way to explain it away in terms of purposeless, non-design. Can anything but purposeful design account for such appearances? they ask. No, they answer.
Comment by Pez — May 23, 2008 @ 9:14 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 10:52 pm
You're insisting on your personal philosophical preferences. You would have no idea of what physical entity lies at the other end of a signal based on the signal itself. Your only reference point is based on your knowldge of life on earth- a tiny speck in the universe. To insist that the mind sending the signal is constrained by your limited understanding of mind/brain connections (based in turn on your limited earthly experiences) tells us nothing more than that your analysis is limited by your imagination.
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 10:52 pm
May 23rd, 2008 at 11:00 pm
Since the examples included primates using tools to secure food, humans solving analytical spatial puzzles and an advanced technological device found elsewhere in the universe explain to us how the food was secured, the puzzle solved or the device constructed without cognitive input enabling outcomes that would not have come about otherwise. The input is the common denominator.
Comment by Bradford — May 23, 2008 @ 11:00 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 2:45 am
*pops head in*
Any consensus on definitions, yet?
Unless something novel evolves from this discussion, I think I will take the hint from Mike Gene's thread. May I commend you to consider Gould's NOMA.
*heads for garden*
Comment by Alan Fox — May 24, 2008 @ 2:45 am
May 24th, 2008 at 5:16 am
Kornbelt,
I'll wait for a new, improved version then. This definition of knowledge includes just about everything… including, say, the erosion of a hillside.
That's right – the difference is undefined.
This claim would assume that human intelligence somehow transcends natural forces, which is a metaphysical assumption that can't be supported empirically.
I agree completely: A human-like intelligence is a perfectly meaningful concept. But that would mean would could expect this human-like intelligence to be able to take a standardized IQ test, like a Stanford-Binet test, and score at least somewhere around 100 or so. That is a meaningful hypothesis: There exists some being that created life and could score at least 100 on a Standford-Binet IQ test. Now, please tell us how you might go about testing your hypothesis, and I'll admit there is something to this ID thing after all.
I disagree. The overall goal of a lightning storm appears to be to equalize built-up electric charges between the clouds and the Earth. If you disagree, could you tell me the method you use to discern these "goals"
It's not a matter of admitting that it can't learn. The question is can you think of any way to determine if it could or couldn't learn?
Not computers; what I had in mind was how prime number sequences can evolve in nature (as in Cicada cycles). So I find it plausible that non-biological systems could also be evolutionary.
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 5:16 am
May 24th, 2008 at 5:16 am
Pez,
So you say, but you don't say what method did you use to figure this out. I think everything exists for a reason, and the reason we have rain clouds is to make rain. So I think you need a new definition of "purposeful".
As it is, you can't even try, because you haven't provided a testable definition of intelligence for anything, much less the Creator of Life.
Yup, it really is. Half of you here think it has to do with consciousness, and half don't; this is a fundamental difference. None of you can characterize what "intelligence" is supposed to mean in a way that can be tested in the context of ID.
The purposeful arrangements of parts we see in biology is caused by that which causes the purposeful arrangement of parts? Is that your final answer?
I disagree with Dawkins on a number of topics, and you I'm sure do too. I think he's confused about philosophy of mind in particular.
This argument is, in other words, if we don't know how something works, we can say "intelligence" was responsible. Otherwise, we can't say that.
That is not a good argument, and it certainly doesn't tell us what "intelligence" is supposed to mean in this context.
Everywhere you argue for "intelligence" as a cause, replace it with "magic" instead. You'll see that none of your arguments change at all.
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 5:16 am
May 24th, 2008 at 5:17 am
Bradford,
You give a bunch of examples of things, and you claim they are all instances of the same thing in different contexts. I ask you what it is they are instances of, and you tell me "intelligence". Then I ask you how you characterize "intelligence" so I can see if your claim is true or not, but you can't. All you can do is give me examples. You can't tell me how to find my own examples. I have no idea if an example I come up with will meet your personal criteria for being intelligent or not.
Intelligence, alas, is like Edwin Meese's pornography: He couldn't define it, but he knew it when he saw it!
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 5:17 am
May 24th, 2008 at 5:28 am
Bradford,
I find these sorts of statements aren't constructive.
According to SETI researchers, they would assume a certain EQ (encephalization quotient – see the link I provided). I'm not an astrobiologist, so I can't really comment on that.
I think you need to take this up with the SETI researchers, not me. I didn't bring SETI into this in the first place.
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 5:28 am
May 24th, 2008 at 9:09 am
You have your inference backwards.
Extraterrestrial signals are hypothesized based on extrapolations of our knowledge of life on Earth. There is a possibility that such a discovery could be accidental and not entailed in the hypothesis, but presuming it was discovered with the tell-tale Doppler shift associated with a planet orbiting a suitable star for the evolution of carbon-based organisms, it would be considered a significant confirmation. Of course, then new hypotheses would be proposed to either undermine the initial determination or to guide future research into discovering characteristics of the purported source.
So far no one has discovered these signals, so one or another of the assumptions that make up the hypothesis are inaccurate or simply incorrect.
Comment by Zachriel — May 24, 2008 @ 9:09 am
May 24th, 2008 at 9:38 am
Hi Aiguy,
You are welcome to that philosophical approach (and you'd probably be right, metaphysically) but since natural forces and physical laws can account for the cloud it's superfluous.
You already defined intelligence. Further than that it needs no definition.
Nor does it need to be tested. The test is for design.
That's right, if you want to take the name of the idea and make that its explanation then that's what you get. Like I said, the word "intelligent" in ID is merely clarifying what the word "design" already told us before it was highjacked.
His feet might smell, too, but that doesn't touch the fact that virtually anybody who thinks on the subject will admit that the watch looks designed and the universe appears to be a out-up job.
The question is, is that design real? Is it what it seems or is there another satisfactory explanation for it as there is for the raincloud? Some find RM/NS intellectually fulfills the world view that demands it and some find it comes up short.
The argument is that in the absence of the argument forwarded to explain away the apparent design, and in the presence of arguments to the reality of the design, then design is the better explanation. Appearances are often misleading but we need good arguments and evidence to determine that.
Magic can substitute for a lot of explanations, like chance, and luck, and random, and multiverses, and brute facts … Even Dawkins, smelly feet and all, allows himself one big lucky break at the OOL to get things started – a lucky break his compatriots say might as well be a miracle.
On the other hand, the argument is not for intelligence but for design. Intelligence is part of the package, as per your own definition. Intelligence means that which can produce design (per you) and design is the purposeful arrangement of parts (per Behe) and purpose is the intended goal, the aim of the desire or will (per the dictionary … and Behe. Do certain features of life and the universe indicate intended goals or does chance and law account for everything?
That you don't find the argument for design compelling is hardly newsworthy, but that it can be dismissed on the basis of the name of the project is unsupportable.
What this really boils down to is the same basic idea that you need independent evidence of the designer before you can infer design. Your version is placed in the domain of a rigorous testable definition (which would provide independent evidence of the designer) but that knowledge is unnecessary. Even Allen MacNeill, whose feet my be just as smelly as Dawkins', has recently confirmed that such previous knowledge is unnecessary.
Comment by Pez — May 24, 2008 @ 9:38 am
May 24th, 2008 at 9:46 am
aguy
suppose I programed my computer with the answers to a standard IQ test after you adminstered the test would you conclude it had human like intelligence?
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 9:46 am
May 24th, 2008 at 9:59 am
I have characterized intelligence- repeatedly. Again, it is the exercise of a cognitive function to surmount an obstacle that would not be surmounted in its absence. When a chimp uses tools to secure food, otherwise unobtainable without a tool, the chimp shows a level of intelligence that surpasses most other animals who don't possess this aptitude. I can't help the duh responses. The existence and applicability of intelligence is clear to those not having an ideological axe to grind.
Comment by Bradford — May 24, 2008 @ 9:59 am
May 24th, 2008 at 9:59 am
The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection. "” CFSC
Intelligent Design is the study of patterns in nature that are best explained as the result of intelligence. "” William Dembski
Intelligent Design is the study of patterns in nature that are best explained as the result of intelligence. "” ISCID
Perhaps you can see why people might be somewhat confused on this.
Comment by Zachriel — May 24, 2008 @ 9:59 am
May 24th, 2008 at 10:04 am
Hi Zach,
That's a good counter point, but like I said like I said, "intelligence" is merely clarifying what "design" already tells us.
Identify purpose and you identify design and you identify intelligence.
Comment by Pez — May 24, 2008 @ 10:04 am
May 24th, 2008 at 10:10 am
I assume we are working within the scientific paradigm. And leaving aside the straightforward statements of ID luminaries.
If by design, you mean pattern, then nature is full of patterns, many with well-known causes. If by design, you mean a purposeful arrangement, that would seemingly require substantive investigation of the perpetrator's characteristics and modus operandi. Without this rigor, then we may as well say the purpose of the Monsoons is to pump water over Asia.
Comment by Zachriel — May 24, 2008 @ 10:10 am
May 24th, 2008 at 10:15 am
Scientists attempt to determine the level of intelligence of Neanderthals by looking at the artifacts they left behind. Couldn't we test this hypothesis the same way? If not why not ?
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 10:15 am
May 24th, 2008 at 10:19 am
Again, I'm assuming you are making statements meant to have scientific validity.
Calling intelligence "an exercise of a cognitive function" doesn't provide an operational definition required for empirical research.
That seems to contrast intelligence to natural causes. This doesn't seem very useful, especially if we are not omniscient of all possible natural causes, or if intelligence itself is due to natural causes. A typical and empirically useful definition of intelligence might be based on the ability to learn or remember.
Comment by Zachriel — May 24, 2008 @ 10:19 am
May 24th, 2008 at 10:22 am
Neanderthal intelligence and technical achievement is compared to that of other organisms, including closely related hominids. The size and structure of the brain can be shown to closely correlate with intelligence (defined in terms of learning, memory, problem-solving, etc.). Sometimes, scientists even replicate the technologies to determine the difficulty of fashioning the artifacts. How did you think this was done?
Comment by Zachriel — May 24, 2008 @ 10:22 am
May 24th, 2008 at 10:33 am
Zach:
That sort comparison is what is being proposed for the designer
Except when it doesn't http://www.amazon.com/Mismeasu...
or except when the intelligent agent does not have a brain ie a computer.
Scientists are even as we speak are attempting to replicate the technologies involved in creating life. Does the difficulty of this say anything about the intelligence of the designer?
The more I think about it the more I like this hypothesis
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 10:33 am
May 24th, 2008 at 10:44 am
Bradford: it is the exercise of a cognitive function "¦
"to surmount an obstacle that would not be surmounted in its absence"- the complete sentence lays out a general description that a context would furnish specifics of.
The exercise of intelligence does not have to contravene natural laws. I am not contravening natural laws by typing this. I'm manipulating physical effects to convey a message.
That's part of it. There is also a capacity to reason which enables problem solving.
Comment by Bradford — May 24, 2008 @ 10:44 am
May 24th, 2008 at 10:45 am
You provided a definition of intelligence earlier, the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations. According to this definition, evolutionary processes are intelligent.
You do understand what a 'correlation' means? Have you actually read the Mismeasure of Man?
My comments clearly referred to biological organisms.
You've never stated a valid scientific hypothesis.
Comment by Zachriel — May 24, 2008 @ 10:45 am
May 24th, 2008 at 10:49 am
Legs? That's empirically useless.
That's better. So, can we empirically measure the ability to learn, to remember, to solve problems? If so, do evolutionary processes do these things?
Comment by Zachriel — May 24, 2008 @ 10:49 am
May 24th, 2008 at 10:54 am
Zach:
I have no problem with that if we include the environment and organisms in "evolution".
The 64 thousand then question becomes how intelligent
I think so and your point is?
It was not me who offered the hypothesis it was Aguy your beef is with him. I just sugested a way to test it
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 10:54 am
May 24th, 2008 at 10:59 am
The Theory of Evolution has always included organisms and their environments. There's your 'Intelligent Design'.
Comment by Zachriel — May 24, 2008 @ 10:59 am
May 24th, 2008 at 11:02 am
So when you say Evolution what you really mean is "the Universe" this is just pantheism and explains nothing.
To top it off it appears that the universe might be incapable of designing certain things we see around us because it is not intellegent enough. Hence the disscusion
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 11:02 am
May 24th, 2008 at 11:15 am
Not at all. Evolution is a carefully defined scientific theory. It is characterized by reproduction, fecundity, variation and selection. Each of these terms has a discrete empirical meaning, and the process can be directly observed, and its history inferred from a variety of evidences.
(By the way, "environment", an important aspect of selection, does not equate to "the Universe". Environment is local by definition, O.Fr. environ "compass, circuit".)
This discussion concerned inconsistent usage of the word "intelligence". As to "intelligent enough", well biological evolution is a rather slow learner, on the order of millions of years, but its long-term memory can be excellent.
Comment by Zachriel — May 24, 2008 @ 11:15 am
May 24th, 2008 at 11:19 am
Knowledge is information that is available to a goal-seeking process. Think Deep Blue's database.
One could make the claim "human intelligence didn't design that, only otherwise natural forces are needed." Is this a meaningless statement to you?
Great. We're making progress. You didn't originally, on the other thread.
Yes, perhaps 150.
I don't know. That's a different topic. My interest in this thread was your statement about "human like intelligence" being a meaningless statement. I'm not interested in getting you to "admit there is something to this ID thing after all."
By it's productions. The goal of Deep Blue is to beat a human or human-like chess player. Weather systems don't do things like that. They do not contain processes searching for solutions to problems where the goal is removed from the next proximate effect.
Humans learn, computers can learn. Deep Blue was programmed to learn facts about the game, the player, which it could use in it's goal seeking algorithms in future plays and future games towards the goal of taking the opponent's king.
By evolve in nature, I assume you mean they were produced without intelligent intervention. Do you have evidence Cicada cycles were produced that way?
Cicada's are non-biological? At any rate, I don't find it plausible at all that a non-biological system, other than a computing system designed by a human-like intelligence, could produce primes up to 3001. If you got any ideas about how it could be done, please elaborate.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 24, 2008 @ 11:19 am
May 24th, 2008 at 1:06 pm
Zach:
Agreed but you are not saying reproduction, fecundity, variation and selection are intelligent. You are saying evolution is intelligent and by evolution you mean "the universe"
Yes but when we are talking about "Evolution" (what you are calling intelligent) we are talking about a universal phenomena therefore it must include all environments so it is equivalent to the Universe.
Right and I'm using it consistently.
however now we are focused on human level intelligence and it is far from clear the universe has that level of intelligence
How excellent? Do you have a measurement? Does it meet the standard of human level intelligence? It appears that it can't pass the segregate IQ tests that Behe proposes in his latest book. At lest we have not seem any evidence that it can.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 1:06 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 2:24 pm
They might reflect the cognitive acts investing direction into such processes but that remains to be seen. I'm currently reading a book about an ongoing attempt to create life from scratch. Those involved in the endeavor are learned and very intelligent but the obstacles they face are imposing.
Comment by Bradford — May 24, 2008 @ 2:24 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 2:35 pm
Pez,
Yes, all attributions of purpose and reason (in the senses you are using) are non-empirical, you're right. That is why I am complaining about you claiming that such concepts can be used to define a cause (intelligent cause) for which you claim empirical evidence.
Either "intelligence" is something that can be shown to cause things or not; you cannot evidence "intelligence" by finding gaps in our knowledge.
You are just digging deeper into these terminological dodges. Instead of arguing that "intelligence" has an operational defintion in ID (it does not) you say ID relies on the defintion of "design" instead. But of course you have no operational definition of that either, because as I've pointed out, there is no operational notion of purpose.
I don't know what you mean by "designed", unless you mean "built by a human being". I don't think that's what you mean, and you really can't tell me. I think rainclouds look like they are their for the purpose of making rain, and you can't show my why I'm wrong, so this whole "detecting purposeful arrangements" thing is whistling in the wind.
Two things wrong with this approach: First, it is an argument from ignorance, and second, you failed to characterize "design" (or "purpose") in a way we can test.
None of which count as scientific explanations of anything (which the exception of the speculations regarding multiverses which nobody claims is anything near settled science). Your conception of "intelligence" is indistinguishable from "magic" because it is a perfectly mysterious concept. In real theories, the explanatory concepts are less mysterious than phenomena being explained.
The detection of "the aim of the desire or will" is nothing but an excercise in subjective interpretation because it has no operational definition. We can never agree on what things have desires or "will" and what things don't when we know nothing about what sort of thing is responsible.
Why can't law account for intended goals?
No, you need an independent way of detecting "design"/"intelligence" before you can claim evidence for it. Your definition of "design" do not allow us to decide what things are purposefully arranged and what things are not.
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 2:35 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 2:37 pm
FMM,
Of course not! Human-like intelligence allows humans to solve novel problems, not just problems that they have already been taught. If I teach a computer to take IQ tests in general, and it can take any IQ test and score well on it, then yes, I would claim to have created a human-like intelligence.
You need to think a bit more about AI, FMM. You'll be surprised how much light it sheds on these issues, I think.
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 2:37 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 2:37 pm
Bradford,
Yes, you have. You've said it is "not the result of physical necessity", for example. Do you still hold to this characterization, or have you changed your mind?
The challenge is to characterize intelligence in a way such that people can independently identify what things are intelligent and what things are not intelligent. That way, we can evaluate evidence of "intelligence" in the context of ID. Until you do that, we can't.
Chimps can't really design very much; at best they make a bed of leaves, or strip twigs off a branch for digging out termites. The termites, however, can build incredibly complex structures with heat-regulation and ventilation, specialized chambers for agriculture with irrigation, and so on. Does that mean termites are more intelligent than chimps?
Exactly! You can't provide any characterization of this thing you are trying to use as a scientific explanation in a way that we can all agree when we see it and when we don't!
In order for an explanation to be empirically supported, it needs to be clear to everyone no matter what their ideology is. The fact that you can't come up with a clear characterization of this "thing" (intelligence) isn't my fault. The sort of subjective criteria you are pushing doesn't cut it, because of course people will continue to disagree when we can't appeal to empirically grounded characterizations to show who is right!
Intelligence is "that which allows something to surmount an obstacle that would not be surmounted in its absence" Are you being serious? If so, this is perhaps the worst definition of any scientific explanation I've ever seen.
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 2:37 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 2:39 pm
Kornbelt,
Ok, that's better. I suggest for "goal-seeking process" you try "process using negative feedback". This makes the whole thing operational – congratulations.
Unfortunately what you describe has very, very, very little resemblance to anything that people really mean when they talk about intelligent design. But at least what you are promoting might actually be investigated!
Nope, that one's good.
Really? I don't think so – of course I think "human-like intelligence" means something. Scientifically speaking, the meaning is operationalized via IQ tests, as I've mentioned.
Sure! If you find the Designer and Her score on Stanford-Binet is 150 I'll become a believer.
The meaning of "human-like intelligence" is either a subjective notion (meaningful to us, but not useful in science until it's operationalized, like the meaning of "beautiful sunset") or its meaning is made scientific by means of an operational definition (like the score on an IQ test).
Sorry, but you're dropping into epicycles on your definitions here. Now you've brought something in about "searching for solutions". So intelligent things need to "search for solutions", and if they know the solution right away without searching, that means that they are not intelligent? (The storm achieves non-proximate effects – the long-term equalization of electrical potential).
Yes, humans and computers (and the vast majority of living organisms) can learn. Learning is considered by most cognitive scientists to be a critical component of intelligence. My question was, how could you ever show that whatever created life was capable of learning?
I was talking about plausibility if you recall.
I don't know a lot of things. Just because we don't know how something works doesn't mean that "intelligence" constitutes a useful explanation. It didn't when people didn't know how tides worked (or seasons or lightning or planetary motion or… all of the other failed "applications of ID theory")
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 2:39 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 3:43 pm
You left out the part about cognitive function. Some obstacles cannot be surmounted by brute forces of nature. A guiding hand is required. Jane Goodall had no trouble with the word intelligent. She did not anticipate having to use it but was not hindered by needless parsing when she did.
Comment by Bradford — May 24, 2008 @ 3:43 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 4:08 pm
You're betraying your ignorance. Citing physical causation does not refute ID. From an origins perspective the issue remains unresolved.
Comment by Bradford — May 24, 2008 @ 4:08 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 4:11 pm
Bradford,
Renaming is not explaining. You can call "intelligence" "cognitive function", but until you somehow tie these terms to things we can objectively observe we will never have a shared way of deciding what constitutes "cognitive function". I happen to consider evolutionary processes to constitute a type of "cognitive function", so to me your definition includes evolutionary processes.
Goodall described the chimps as being intelligent – she did not attempt to explain her chimps behavior by appeal to intelligence as a causal thing.
We've been over this – you claimed that scientists explained things by offering "intelligence" per se as a cause, but you couldn't support your claim (because it isn't true).
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 4:11 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 4:15 pm
Bradford,
You seem to have trouble keeping these sorts of comments out of our discussion. Are you feeling angry?
Yes of course – we can never refute "ID" (in some sense) because just beyond the reach of science, there may always be some conscious mind at work.
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 4:15 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 5:18 pm
I'm noting that when critics like you equate ID to fantasies about how tides work you are appealing to the swamp crowd that yuk yuks over these "witticisms."
Comment by Bradford — May 24, 2008 @ 5:18 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 5:23 pm
Of course she did. Her work was groundbreaking at the time because it was thought that only humans used tools. The linkage to intelligence was explicit. There is simply no other way to approach these discussions than to use terms you find objectionable. To claim that the chimp behavior was explainable without an appeal to their superior intelligence (by comparison to most other organisms) is a stuck on stupid strategy.
Comment by Bradford — May 24, 2008 @ 5:23 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 5:46 pm
Termites and other insects have some sophisticated adaptive mechanisms programmed into them. This illustrates a difference between insects, chimps and humans: Many insects lay down scented trails helping them find their way back to a hive, nest etc. It can be impressive watching them find their way back. If however a scented trail is disrupted they can wander endlessly even if within a short distance from their objective and even with a number of easy landmarks nearby. There is a lack of flexibility to their behavior contrasting with flexible cognitive responses found in higher forms of intelligence. Chimps and humans can recognize familiar landmarks and then reason from this that the destination must be near. They can readjust based on new information and an analysis of it.
Comment by Bradford — May 24, 2008 @ 5:46 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 5:56 pm
Evolution is "the universe"! Are you really that confused over basic terminology, such as "evolution? Especially as I made direct reference to the Theory of Evolution.
I have no idea what you are talking about. Evolution is a specific process that involves clearly defined mechanisms, including reproduction, fecundity, variation and selection.
Comment by Zachriel — May 24, 2008 @ 5:56 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 6:40 pm
Bradford,
No, your strategy is "stupid". So there.
Goodall discovered that chimps shape and use tools. That was her contribution – that was her discovery. Now, you can choose to call "tool use" a criterion for intelligence if you'd like to (which would leave out dolphins, unfortunately), and so if you'd like to, you can go ahead and call chimps "intelligent" on account of their tool use (Goodall did; I would too). But it makes not one bit of difference whether or not one calls them intelligent! The data here is tool use, not "intelligence".
Goodall could have reported all of her scientific results without ever referring to the concept of "intelligence": Headline: Chimps Found to be Tool-Users!. This would have conveyed 100% of the finding. In contrast, she could never have reported her findings by leaving out the concept of tool-use! If she had simply reported "Headline: Chimps found to be Intelligent!" then she would have had to immediately begun to explain what in the world she was talking about! (Did she discover they could build complex machinery? Prove math theorems? Compose symphonies? What?)
So in science, you begin with some particular organism, observe its abilities, and report on what it can and can't do. If its abilities include running fast and jumping high, you might choose to say the animal is "agile" or "athletic". If it can do things like remember locations or memorize mazes, you might choose to say the animal is "intelligent". But the fact is conveyed by the description of what the animal can do, and not on the post hoc label of "athletic" or "intelligent".
In contrast, ID begins with some observation (complex machinery in living things) and tries to explain it. Obviously the ability that anything (including evolution) would need in order to create complex biological machinery is… the ability to create complex machinery. And obviously if you'd like to say "creating complex machinery" is a criterion for intelligence (which unfortunately would leave chimps out) then you can call the cause of life "intelligent". But you have learned precisely nothing in this little naming excerise – all you've done is to say that whatever caused life, it was intelligent by definition. And if evolution turns out to really be the cause of complex biological machinery, then by your defintion, evolution is intelligent.
Humans have even more sophisticated adaptive mechanisms programmed into them.
The canonical example of this sort of inflexible intelligence is the sphex wasp, a favorite of philosophers of mind.
I agree – this is a different type of intelligence; one that lacks flexibility. (Experiments reveal that humans have areas in which they repeat the same mistakes endlessly too, so it seems we might be "sphexish" as well).
I think one way for you to think about what ID needs to do is to think of a way to decide if something has flexible (human-like) or non-flexible (sphex-wasp-like) intelligence. What you'll find is that the only way to tell the difference is to observe the behavior of the animal in question. Since this is not possible in the context of ID, ID can never say if the "intelligence" responsible was the kind a sphex wasp has, or the kind a human has. And then you need to decide if you are going to call something that might well be perfectly sphexish – without any ability to flexibly respond to novel circumstance – "intelligent" in the first place!
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 6:40 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 6:55 pm
Right Einstein. Using a tool to attain a goal is not intelligence. Noone claimed it was. The claim is that intelligence enables humans and chimps to use tools and sometimes in highly innovative ways reflecting the intelligence of the organisms.
Comment by Bradford — May 24, 2008 @ 6:55 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 7:04 pm
Bradford,
Obviously, because you are incapable of characterizing intelligence of arbitrary entities in any way that can be tested.
I just got through explaining this: It is not "intelligence" that enables humans and chimps to use tools any more than it is "athleticism" that enables cheetahs to run fast. Please read my last post.
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 7:04 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 7:08 pm
Aguy,
So you are saying all those scientists who are trying to determine if Neanderthals were intelligent (human like) are wasting their time? Is the evidence for the great leap foward in human development 40000 years ago just idle speculation and will it forever remain as such?
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 7:08 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 7:31 pm
You just got through explaining? As if you were an authority on the subject. I suppose it's the vast right wing conspiracy that leads people to think intelligence is linked to the capacity to use tools to construct rockets that take us to the moon. Can't be intelligence.
Comment by Bradford — May 24, 2008 @ 7:31 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 7:37 pm
FMM,
Physical anthropologists study all sorts of primate behaviors; they are trying to see where in the array of mental abilities studied for various primates the Neanderthals may come in. We can make educated assessments about the mental abilities of humans 10,000 years ago, or 2000 or 200 years ago too, since we believe humans then had similar mentality to humans now. This research depends heavily on our understanding of brain evolution and primate neurology too.
In contrast, we have absolutely no clue whatsoever about what type of mental abilities the Creator of Life might or might not have. All we know is whatever it was, it could somehow produce living things.
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 7:37 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 7:40 pm
Bradford
Not only have you failed to respond to the arguments in my post, but your tone is increasingly hostile. I think everybody else is having a very nice, stimulating discussion on the topic here, though.
Here, just try responding to this: It is not "intelligence" that enables humans and chimps to use tools any more than it is "athleticism" that enables cheetahs to run fast.
Now, do you think "athleticism" is a useful explanation for our observation of fast running? Or, what do you think the difference is between these two types of labels, "athleticism" and "intelligence"
Comment by aiguy — May 24, 2008 @ 7:40 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 8:07 pm
aguy
So you are saying your original stament is incorrect
you said:
What you meant is that there are all sorts of ways to tell the difference you just can't think of a way when we are talking about the Creator of life.
Quick question
Why should other people's investigations be limited by your lack of imagination?
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 24, 2008 @ 8:07 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 8:28 pm
Exactly. The linkage between intelligence and the capacity for using tools is so obvious readers would know a discovery was made which further documents the relatively advanced intelligence of chimps.
Comment by Bradford — May 24, 2008 @ 8:28 pm
May 24th, 2008 at 9:09 pm
Or maybe he is saying that "mental abilities" has explanatory utility that "intelligence" lacks.:wink:
Comment by Bradford — May 24, 2008 @ 9:09 pm
May 25th, 2008 at 2:12 am
Hi Aiguy,
It's not about finding gaps, it's about having explanations other than purpose. You call these 'gaps' in bias toward your own answers. It is not that the designed artifact appears not to be designed but since we have no other explanation we infer design. Rather, the designed artifact appears designed, and its parts have apparent purpose behind their arrangement … AND there is no good reason to suspect anything other than design. There is no empirical evidence of any explanation other than design.
Rain does not appear to be the reason for rain clouds and rain clouds do not appear to have been designed for the purpose of raining. The reason for rain clouds appears to be evaporation and condensation, the regular working of the meteorological phenomena.
I'm not dodging. Why do you challenge Bradford's negative characterizations of your argumetns and then do the same to mine?
I don't say this, you do. I showed that your definition of "intelligence" makes the question of its definition moot as you've already defined it as "that which designs" so whether in ID or in your propositions the situation relies not on the definition of intelligence. So be it. Now all we have to do is deal with is "design".
What do you mean "operational"
Purpose is that which is willed, intended, desired, and brought about by foresight. It is a goal or prescribed target or, alternatively, depending on how lax I've been, purpose is the will, intent, desire acting with foresight.
I mean that which exhibits parts purposefully arranged. Like a beaver's dam, or its lodge. Something for which natural laws and chance do not account. No, this is not an argument from ignorance unless you choose to appeal to our ignorance of unknown laws and hopeful chances.
Sure I can. Things which happen by chance or lawful necessity don't appear to have been arranged purposefully – a design inference is superfluous, but not necessarily wrong. If a tree has fallen and it has rotted roots and lose dirt about its base and lies in the direction of last night's strong wind then there is no inference to purpose. If it's trunk has been struck through by repeated blows with a sharp instrument applied such that it lies between complex structures which it would likely have hit if falling by chance but didn't, then we can infer its purposeful felling.
It is not an argument from ignorance. It is a decision not to appeal to unknown entities and an inference to the best explanation for the design and purpose apparent.
Your argument is reducing to the same old "ID is untestable". This debate has been ongoing in its current incarnation for over a dozen years and there's no need for us to rehearse it here. Your question, or so I thought, was about whether or not we needed a rigorous definition of "intelligence". Instead it is ending as nothing but the same old objections against design; it's untestable, argument from ignorance, it's not science, you need independent evidence of the designer, etc.
These all have defences and have been attacked on many threads here. I thought you were after something other than a defence of ID. I admit to being late to this party and I have no knowledge of the ideas you were arguing on the thread that preceded this one, so maybe I've misinterpreted your project.
"With the exception of"… so, at least one of these does count. As do "chance" and "luck". Magic is an adequate substitute for these explanations as it is in your characterization.
I haven't offered a conception of intelligence. But you are incorrect about your assertion about explanations being less mysterious than the things they explain. The human mind and its will are very mysterious but explain very mundane things like thumbtacks quite well. An explanation is just as complex and just as mysterious as needs be.
This is an appeal to our ignorance and wishful thinking about potential future discoveries. We have a test. We have IC, CSI, and statistical arguments against the alternatives to design. You don't like these, I'm more than certain, but your displeasure is not the same as their nonexistence.
One can draw the conclusion that if physical regularities account for an artifact then there is no obvious intent involved in the arrangement of the parts – "intent" is not evidenced and its inference would be superfluous. One can make an argument for the purposeful arrangement and action of matter which results in our inference of the law itself, but that is another story.
We have. We see if parts are arranged with respect to a final function or end goal. If that final arrangement evidences foresight by the fact that randomness, chance, unintentional repetitive movement of particles and luck do not account for it then that end arrangement demonstrates the existence of purpose, will, determination, desire, etc.. These are the kinds of causes which can choose from among infinite options and ensure a particular contingent outcome.
We can then infer the existence of the kind of thing that possesses will, desires, foresight, purposes and goals.
Comment by Pez — May 25, 2008 @ 2:12 am
May 25th, 2008 at 2:20 am
FMM,
No, my original statement is correct.
That is correct. How can one possibly decide if some type of animal is capable of adaptive behaviors unless you actually observe the behaviors?
I have no idea what you are talking about. We know a tremendous amount about the behaviors of animals… because we have observed their behaviors. We know what various primates can do in novel circumstances… because we have observed primates in novel circumstances. We know about how brain capacity correlates to abilties in vertebrates… because we have observed these correlations.
What do we know about "intelligent agents" in the abstract? Absolutely nothing. What can we observe that might illuminate the characteristics of the "Creator of Life" Not one, single, solitary thing.
I have no idea what you are talking about.
Comment by aiguy — May 25, 2008 @ 2:20 am
May 25th, 2008 at 2:20 am
Bradford,
I have explained this several times now; the fact that you refuse to answer my point tells me you have no response. I will try again:
Here, just try responding to this: It is not "intelligence" that enables humans and chimps to use tools any more than it is "athleticism" that enables cheetahs to run fast.
Now, do you think "athleticism" is a useful explanation for our observation of fast running? Or, what do you think the difference is between these two types of labels, "athleticism" and "intelligence"
Or maybe you should read what I write
The explanation for the existence of a stone axe from 30,000 years ago is not "intelligence". It is not agency. It is not something that does not result from physical necessity. The explanation is living things made it. More specifically, animals, primates, Homo Neanderthalis. You can call them intelligent or not, and it makes no difference to anyone; all we'd like to know is what they were and were not capable of doing.
It is not "intelligence" that enables humans and chimps to use tools any more than it is "athleticism" that enables cheetahs to run fast. Why can't you understand that?
Comment by aiguy — May 25, 2008 @ 2:20 am
May 25th, 2008 at 3:05 am
Pez,
You said "Unlike with the rain cloud, we have the appearance of design and purpose without (to the IDer) a way to explain it away in terms of purposeless, non-design."
In other words, if nobody can explain it otherwise, then the answer must be "purposeful design" (whatever that means). This really is a classic argument from ignorance, god-of-the-gaps approach.
First, it means nothing to say something was "designed" unless you actually say what sort of thing you are talking about. Now, you don't have to have all of the details of course. You don't have to say "Fred Smith designed it". You don't even have to say "A human being designed it". Maybe just "Some sort of animal designed it" or even "some unknown life form". At least these things have some meaning, so we learn something by these explanations. However, saying nothing at all about the cause tells us (guess what?) nothing at all. Saying nothing but "an unspecified thing" is completely vacuous of content. And adding "Oh, and this unspecified thing was intelligent" tells us not one thing more.
It means nothing, and nothing follows from that claim. You can't say one single thing more about this unspecified thing once you've been told it was "intelligent". You can't tell me if it can write a book, or write a symphony, or solve a crossword puzzle, or understand a joke. You can't tell me if it is aware of its actions, or if it can learn, or anything at all. This explanation is 100% empty of any informational content – it is a vacuous statement.
Motion does not appear to be the reason for flagella, and flagella do not appear to have been designed for the purpose of moving cells. The reason flagella appears to be whipping around in circles, the regular working of biological phenomena.
Give me a break here, Pez. We can keep this up as long as you'd like, but eventually you'll need to acknowledge that "purpose" is not something you can objectively detect if you have no way to observe whatever is that is supposedly acting with purpose!
My apologies – I should not have said it was a dodge. It does appear that you are trying to redirect the confusion surrounding the concept of "intelligent cause" with confusion surrounding the concept of "purpose".
OK, good enough. "Intelligence" is "that which designs".
Read here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O...
I also see that page echoes my point (and is something freshman psychology students learn):
Come on Pez, how am I supposed to know what is "willed, intended, and desired" and what isn't in the context of ID? I can't ask the designer of life if He meant to do it or not!
How do you know that natural laws and chance do not account for me designing a car, or writing these sentences? (Answer: You don't. That is a metaphysical speculation that you cannot support with evidence).
You can infer a human being felled it, and we already know what humans do "on purpose". We have no such knowledge about Designers of Life.
Yes of course ID is untestable, but my point is very much about the theoretical vacuity of ID, and how equivocation on the meaning of "intelligence" lays at the root of so much confusion here.
Nullasalus believes that intelligence entails consciousness, but agrees that ID cannot empirically support claims that the Designer was conscious. Kornbelt believes that intelligence does not entail consciousness, and in fact describes "intelligence" in a way that cannot be distinguished (at least by me) from other physical causes. You and Bradford say intelligence acts do not result from "natural law and chance"; others here disagree, and some agree that machines which are physically determined can be intelligent. If you ask ten IDers what they mean by "intelligent", you will get twenty very different contradictory answers.
Like I said, there are so many completely different explanations being offered it's hard to keep track.
I do not agree that "will" explains thumbtacks. Can you show me how we can tell if will is involved or not? I believe that "human beings" explain thumbtacks, but not "will".
What??? What future discoveries? Ignorance and wishful thinking??? I am saying something that is not exactly controversial here: There are no empirical tests for will.
You are saying that CSI is a test for "will" Seriously?
Comment by aiguy — May 25, 2008 @ 3:05 am
May 25th, 2008 at 8:02 am
We have a robust Theory of Evolution, so according to your own reasoning, there is no reason to infer design.
That clearly demonstrates your God-of-the-Gaps reasoning. Before people had reasonable scientific explanations, they did say that rain was caused by design. But this is not a scientific argument.
For an assertion to have scientific validity, you need to propose a hypothesis, and then test its entailed predictions. These predictions should be specific and distinguish between your hypothesis and other competing hypotheses.
Have you taken this up with the rest of the ID Community? They seem to think ID has something to do with Intelligence. In any case, your definition of design appears to include "purpose". You haven't solved the problem.
Simply, that which we can distinguish by an objective empirical test. How do we test for
intelligencedesignpurpose? Your previous argument was based on analogy and a gap; the intuitive recognition of design and a lack of a known explanation.Human ignorance is well-established. Gaps exist. Ignorance prevails.
Sure it is. The scientific method is very basic, hypothetico deductive. We take your claim and tentatively accept it as true, the hypothesis. We derive from that hypothesis *entailed* empirical predictions. These predictions should be specific and distinguishing.
I have my magnifying glass and notepad at the ready.
Comment by Zachriel — May 25, 2008 @ 8:02 am
May 25th, 2008 at 9:13 am
aguy:
You were discussing how to tell whether a being had the human kind of intelligence and one way is by looking at the artifacts they leave behind. That's how we do it with extinct hominids. There are other ways as well we just have to be creative.
But we have not observed the behavior of extinct hominids at all yet scientists can and do attempt to determine whether they were intelligent (like us)
That's a common symptom of lack of imagination
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 25, 2008 @ 9:13 am
May 25th, 2008 at 1:41 pm
FMM,
I haven't observed your behavior, or the behavior of countless other humans, but I can make all sorts of reasonable assumptions about something given only the information that it is human, because I know so many things about humans in general. Likewise, if you told an ethologist that you found a new species of primate that is closely related to chimps, she would instantly know a tremendous amount about this animal and what it might be able to do. Scientists know a tremendous amount about animals, and primates in particular, and that is how scientists can guess what sort of abilities Neanderthals had when they interpret the evidence of their activities.
In stark contrast, we know absolutely nothing about "intelligent agents" in the abstract. If you don't specify what sort of thing you are talking about (a life form? an animal? a primate? a non-physical spiritual being? a fifteen-dimensional vortex of dark energy plasma?) then we have nothing to go on. We can't say one single thing about the possible mental abilities of an unspecified "intelligent agent", whether or not we find artifacts from them.
Maybe the agent was consciously aware of producing the artifact, and maybe it wasn't. We can't use our knowledge of similar animals with similar brains to guess about this, because we have no idea whatsoever about anything having to do with an "intelligent agent" without knowing anything specific about the sort of thing it is.
The funny thing is, I actually think it is the lack of imagination of ID folks that makes this hard to see. You think that all "intelligent agents" will somehow be similar, so that when you say an "intelligent agent" is responsible for something, that actually tells us something about it. If you use your imagination, however, you realize that any assumption you make about what an "intelligent agent" is is just a projection of human traits (or the traits of primates, or even animals or life forms). If you had a better imagination, you'd see that what is true of us animals might be completely different from other sorts of "intelligent agents"!
Maybe we have volition (a "will") and can choose to do what we want, but other intelligent agents don't, and are completely determined by their physical makeup. Maybe we have awareness of what we are doing, and we reflect on our beliefs and desires, but other intelligent agents don't. Maybe we have mental images that we use to think about the future, but other intelligent agents do not form images in their mind at all. Maybe we can appreciate music and poetry and literature, but other intelligent agents can't. And so on.
If you had a better imagination, you could see that we can't know anything about the abilities or characteristics of "intelligent agents" when we know nothing else about them. In constrast, we know a tremendous amount about Neanderthals, and that is the knowledge we use to guess about their mental abilities when we interpret evidence of their activities.
Comment by aiguy — May 25, 2008 @ 1:41 pm
May 25th, 2008 at 8:39 pm
Hi Aiguy:
No, it really isn't. It's not merely that there is no other explanation, but that, first and foremost, there is the explanation of design warranted by the observation. Then there is also the fact that any argument which is supposed to make this design argument superfluous, or that would argue for a mere appearance of design fails.
Now you've added 'god-of-the-gaps' to your argument along with, untestable, vacuous, independent knowledge of the designer, etc. This is looking more and more like a typical critique. If I thought we were just going to rehearse all the lines we'd heard a million times before I'd have saved myself the trouble of responding to your first queries.
Been said – purposeful arrangement of parts.
So saying some animal designed it is an explanation where saying something with will, foresight, imagination, a plan and desire isn't? Our opinions differ greatly. Appealing to some unknown life-form is more informative than appealing to something that designs with purpose? I fail to see how, given all you say to fmm about possible life-forms and our lack of knowledge about them.
I didn't say that it was intelligent and I've specified what can be specified by the evidence."¨
I didn't say it was "intelligent" but rather that it exhibits purpose. What more needs to be said?
Who cares about its other talents? That's hardly necessary as part of the explanation.
I think most observers will disagree with you here. Biology is fraught with anthropomorphic language for the very reason that these things do appear to be designed for the purposes they are accomplishing.
Is that a dare?
Aha! Back to independent evidence for the designer. Same old objections. We don't need to observe that which is acting with purpose. That much is clear. "¨
Thanks.
I don't see confusion in either.
Good enough."¨"¨
Relax, Aiguy, we're suposed to be having a stimulating conversation, right?
You don't need to ask the designer anything and you don't need to observe the designer and you don't need independent evidence of the designer. You need to know if the artifacts you are studying are best explained by reference to design, if the purposeful arrangement of its parts are evidenced or if lack of purpose suffices as an explanation.
Your project is not at all what it appeared to me when you listed your propositions.
"¨"¨
Ah, very metaphysical indeed. I don't know that natural laws do not account for the designer just because I find evidence for design. But I can study the design and draw conclusion about whether or not atural laws themselves account for it.
Back to your independent evidence thing. What if the felled tree were on a desert island with no humans but there was a chimp seen carrying an axe over his shoulder? Can we still conclude purpose in the felling of the tree?
"¨
I think we've seen that in theory it is not the least bit vacuous. "¨
You get a similar plot when you ask about randomness and natural selection in evolution but that is not enough to invalidate a line of thought."¨"¨
If you read with more charity I think you would find the explanations don't differ a great deal. Mine differs mainly by focusing on the definitions that you wanted to deal with. I avoid explanations of the "intelligence" because your definitions don't require any discussion of it. Some others have generously acquiesced to discussing that issue with you nonetheless.
See how mysterious the explanation for the mundane thumbtack is? You can't even tell if the explanation (human design) has or requires will. You've made my point; the explanan need not be less mysterious than the explandum."¨
"¨
I might have pasted my response on the wrong question. The appeals to ignorance are those which claim that, even in the absence of a natural law or empirical observation to the contrary, we ought to reject the better explanation because such future discoveries may lie on some imagined horizon.
Yep. These are tests for design, and design is marked by purpose, will, intent, desire, foresight, etc. Yep. If the inference is sound then the test identifies will.
"¨
===
Zachriel,
"¨"¨
Evolution! Why didn't somebody say so? If only we'd known that evolution explains the design it would have saved us all so much time! I wonder if Behe ever heard of evolution?"¨
But, as I said before:
"Some find RM/NS intellectually fulfills the world view that demands it and some find it comes up short."
Pez: Rain does not appear to be the reason for rain clouds and rain clouds do not appear to have been designed for the purpose of raining. "¨"¨
There's that post-enlightenment folk history again. The people I know of may have colloquially referred to the design behind rain and assumed the providential actions of God in specific instances of rain, but they also understood that there was a complex water cycle which accounted for the phenomenon in a regular and natural way."¨"¨
Pez: Now all we have to do is deal with is "design"."¨"¨
Asked and answered.
Yes, it "appears" to include purpose by the fact that I've written that half a dozen times.
"¨Pez: What do you mean "operational""¨"¨
Question-begging. Who says that my explanation isn't the known explanation? What we lack is an explanation from those who deny mine.
Pez: No, this is not an argument from ignorance unless you choose to appeal to our ignorance of unknown laws and hopeful chances."¨"¨
Sounds about right. And while it may we don't have to accept I.O.U.s as explanations when we have others.
"¨Pez: It is not an argument from ignorance. "¨"¨
Thanks for the link. Is it really to a page explaining the scientific method? That is such a generous gesture.
So let's start with the first. Let's say you take the claim and tentatively accept it as true instead of resist it with every fibre of your being. Now, accepting as you do the possibility that life may indicate purposeful arrangement of parts, what would you propose as a test for this purpose? A sequence of steps that requires foresight and action toward an end-goal or plan? How would we test for that?
Or do we return only to that infamous requirement that we produce a video tape or the designer's signature?
Please keep your private affairs and development to yourself.
Comment by Pez — May 25, 2008 @ 8:39 pm
May 25th, 2008 at 8:48 pm
Hello aiguy,
My apologies, but I can't find answers to my question that I posed on the other thread "So the how did it happen?"
I only have a bit of time right now, but I would love to continue on our discussion some time. I think that we are both asking the right fundamental questions and I'm positive that our discussion will be beneficial one way or the other.
One little thing, though. In your last comment here, you state that "we can't know anything about the abilities or characteristics of "intelligent agents" when we know nothing else about them." Are you merely being sarcastic?
How else can you know anything is intelligence apart from patterns that they leave, either in the form of actions, speech, writings, artifacts, etc?
I leave you with this quote from Reid: "No man ever saw wisdom [read "design" or "intelligence"], and if he does not [infer wisdom] from the marks of it, he can form no conclusions respecting anything of his fellow creature. How should I know that any of this audience have understanding? It is only by the effects of it on their conduct and behavior, and this leads me to suppose that such behavior proceeds only from understanding. But says Hume, unless you know it by experience, you know nothing of it. If this is the case, I never could know it at all. Hence it appears that whoever maintains that there is no force in the argument from final causes [design], denies the existence of any intelligent being but himself. He has the same
evidence for wisdom and intelligence in God as in a father or brother or a friend. He infers it in both from its effects and these effects he discovers in the one as well as the other…. From marks of wisdom and intelligence in effects, a wise and intelligent cause may be inferred. (Reprinted in Lectures on Natural Theology, University Press of America, 1981.)"
IOW, even when you have an experience with your fellow man, you can only determine his intelligence, or lack thereof, by the effects he leaves upon your senses. If everyone around was randomly bumping into walls and mumbling incoherently, there would be no effects for you to consider as signs of intelligence.
Remember that little question which begins ID research: "Can previous intelligence be detected from its effects, when nothing else is known about the intelligence?" But even then, that "anything else which is known about the intelligence" will itself only be stated in terms of the effects which that intelligence produces. Seems that so far, as long as intelligence can be defined (one aspect of which I believe I have done so already) the answer to that question is "yes."
Comment by CJYman — May 25, 2008 @ 8:48 pm
May 25th, 2008 at 9:13 pm
Simply, that which we can distinguish by an objective empirical test. How do we test for
intelligencedesignpurpose? Can you provide an operational definition of purpose?Now you have it. Ignorance is not evidence of design.
Yes, I do believe you have it now! Those are exactly the sorts of questions ID Supporters need to answer.
Comment by Zachriel — May 25, 2008 @ 9:13 pm
May 25th, 2008 at 10:09 pm
Neither is it a rebuttal.
But we do have evidence of design, we have parts arranged in such a manner that they could not have been without purpose.
What is "purpose" Operationally we can test for purpose in a system by examining to see: if all of the parts of that system contribute to the whole and to its function; if each is necessary in order for that system to function; if removal of any of the parts causes the system to lose function; if there is a statistically-determined unlikelihood of the parts coming together by chance; if the arrangement of the parts is not demanded by any law describing the regularity of motion and interaction of matter.
Done.
Denying these tests, and accepting the possible truth of the claim, how would you test for it?
Comment by Pez — May 25, 2008 @ 10:09 pm
May 25th, 2008 at 10:35 pm
Pez,
Yes. We have knowledge of life forms, so when you say some living thing was the cause of something, I have some idea what you are talking about. When you say something unspecified was the cause, I have no idea what you are talking about. And when you add "it designs with purpose" it tells me not one thing more, because we have no idea how one can tell when some unspecified thing has purpose.
You have to say how I know when something is exhibiting purpose and when it isn't.
Unless you can say something else about the cause of biological forms, then what you are saying is that whatever created life is something that could… create life. That is not a helpful explanation.
How do you propose we decide who is right? (there is no way)
People use anthropomorphic language for all sorts of things. My car didn't want to start this morning. My computer didn't know what day it was. The electron can see that both slits are open. Does this mean my computer or my car have knowledge and desires? Or that electrons can actually see? No, of course not.
Right. I think we're doing pretty well, really.
No. The problem is not only independent evidence (although that would be nice if you want to get a paper published). The problem is that you commit the fallacy of over-generalization every time you call a human being an "intelligent agent". You can't give any example of an "intelligent agent" that isn't an animal. You can't specify what criteria determines membership in the class of "intelligent agents".
Yes, a chimp is not some abstract, unspecified thing called an "intelligent agent". It is an animal, and we know a lot about chimps. Because we have this knowledge about chimps, we would assume the chimp did it.
But if there was a dolphin swimming nearby, we would not assume that the dolphin did it. Why not? Isn't a dolphin as intelligent as a chimp? (hint: there is no meaningful answer to that question). But why then, if a dolphin is an intelligent agent, would we not include the dolphin as a likely candidate? Because being an "intelligent agent" doesn't mean anything. The way we assess the likelihood of what chopped down the tree had nothing to do with "intelligent agency"! The only way we could figure it out is by using our knowledge of specific abilities of the various animals in question!
Comment by aiguy — May 25, 2008 @ 10:35 pm
May 25th, 2008 at 10:46 pm
CJYman,
No, I'm completely serious.
The only way to discover if something is capable of learning is to interact with it. If you could not observe it in novel circumstances, you would never know if the thing is able to learn or solve novel problems. Now, you haven't said here what you mean by "intelligent", but many people consider that learning and solving novel problems are critical components of intelligence. So artifacts don't help – you need to be able to perform experiments.
Consider this: I find a trap-door fitted to cave with a lasso and a diving bell inside. I also find a pile of leaves and a twig with the branches missing. Which one of these sets of artifacts reveals a true flexible problem-solving intelligence? Answer: The pile of leaves is what a gorilla is capable of designing, while spiders design trap doors, lassos, and diving bells. However, spiders are capable of only the most rudimentary conditioning, and are incapable of devising solutions to novel problems. Gorillas, of course, are far more flexible in their responses and ability to learn.
Comment by aiguy — May 25, 2008 @ 10:46 pm
May 25th, 2008 at 11:41 pm
HI Auguy,
Oh, but I think not. "Life" is not an explanation for anything and its definition is too ambiguous.
Recall:
===
That's the entire point of the ID project. It's not found in definitions nor in the name of the project but in argument and experiment.
No, it's saying that whatever created them created them intentionally. That may be nothing to you, but to others it is something. It says something about the nature of the universe we live in and about the planet we inhabit.
If you make a philosophical claim then you can argue philosophically. If you are making an empirical claim then we can test your claim against other factors and determine that your attribution of design is superfluous.
We can also decide who's right by discussing the matter and finding out one's true position. We will find yours at the end of this comment. Short answer:( there is a way.)
But if it actually appears that any of these uses is appropriate then one would have to provide an argument or evidence to show why it is not.
I hope you aren't adding "peer-review" to the laundry list of cliche objections.
But one thing we know about chimps is that they don't fell trees with axes.
In fact, the evidence, the artifact in question, has given you information about the cause, not vice versa. You have now updated your knowledge of chimps not by observing them but by inference from examining a design. Knowledge can be obtained about the agent by looking at the design.
In fact, in the first case you said we could infer design because we presumed humans did it and we know humans can do it. Now you've inferred that a chimp could accomplish the design, even though you don't have previous knowledge of such activity, because you already inferred the design.
This is exactly what happened to you with regard the neandertal.
You claim to have in-principle objections but they are actually very specific only to the argument you have already rejected.
You have no knowledge about this specific ability. You infer it.
Recall that we were actually addressing this question:
In the first situation we had a tree felled with no indication of design and you inferred no design – even though a designing agent could have leveled it, there is no evidence that one did. We've now had an extended discussion on this and we see that you have no defence of inferring design in the first situation. My point is made.
So your claim that you think rain clouds appear designed to produce rain does not hold water in light of your treatment of the tree.
In repetition of the next point: In the second case you inferred design and said it was because we know what humans can do. You claim to be making this inference based upon what humans can do, but as above, humans could also have felled the tree in the situation where no design was inferred. So the examination itself was at least integral, if not the only justification, in your inference.
But when humans are removed and replaced with a chimp you still infer design. Now, of course, you are learning about the presumed agent and not about the inferred design. You don't infer design here because chimps are known to be capable of such a design, rather, you infer that a chimp could have created the design because you've already inferred the design.
Let us add to this experiment now.
We know that we can infer design even though we don't presume humans cut the tree down.
We know that we can infer design and then apply that information to our knowledge, or assumptions, about other agents.
Now let's look at the felled tree and observe that there are neither humans nor chimps about or evidenced within the presumed time frame of the tree's falling.
Do you chalk it up to chance, law and natural causes, or do you take note of the obvious design and wonder about the kind of agent who might have accomplished the task?
Have we not learned something about the agent, even if we don't know anything else about it? Wouldn't we at least have some knowledge about what to look for (ie. a human or chimp, or something with at least similar abilities in this regard, but definitely not a dolphin swimming nearby)?
Comment by Pez — May 25, 2008 @ 11:41 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 12:31 am
Pez,
Touche, Pez – you're right. Let me speak more carefully about that issue:
I have granted here (in various posts in this thread and the Bunny thread) that the hypothesis of "human-like" intelligence (as opposed to "intelligence" unqualified) actually is meaningful in the context of ID. We know about human mental abilities, and to say that other mental abilities are similar certainly has some meaning. (The problem for ID is that there is no way of telling what particular mental abilities the Designer might have, so we can't know how "human-like" is its intelligence).
Likewise, saying that "life as we know it" from our experience of life on Earth would confer some information; it would not be entirely meaningless. Still, any reference to "intelligence" with no qualifiers at all is devoid of meaning in the context of ID.
When somebody has a way to perform an experiment to discern purpose in arbitrary systems, then you might have an argument.
I think that would be something, but the way I understand intentions is necessarily connected to conscious intentions. And I can't think of any way to ever know if the Designer of Life was conscious. You can complain that I'm just flogging old horses regarding testability, but it goes deeper than that: There is simply no way to resolve the issue by any standard except pure personal preference.
Unfortunately we have no theory to tell us when these uses are "appropriate" and when they are not. They seem appropriate to people whenever they talk about complex systems that are difficult to predict. But nobody thinks that cars really have desires.
LOL! I actually was thinking the chimp did it, because it was carrying the axe and I think a chimp could be trained to do it! Ok, there's some comic relief…
Oops, I lost you there. Ok, I'm back to what I originally thought: Given what I know about chimps, I would have guessed the chimp chopped the tree down. But if I saw the dolphin with the axe, I still wouldn't have guessed the dolphin did it.
Ok, I see. Well, you're wrong: It was all about what I already knew about chimps. For example, I know that chimps have hands that can hold things like axes (but dolphins don't). I know that chimps sometimes imitate people and can be trained to do things… and so on.
Right – it's all about our specific knowledge of humans and other animals, and has nothing to do with any general understanding of "intelligence".
I don't know what a "designing agent" is, but I would not have guessed anything but the rotten roots were involved (no termites, beavers, lightning, or other possible causes).
Well, no. It's all about particular causes – termites, rotten roots, trained chimps, humans, lightning, whatever. We look for clues to see which of these causes could be involved. Intelligence and purpose have nothing to do with any of it.
Yup, it does. My opinion about the "purpose" of rain clouds is just as credible, or fanciful, as yours or anyone else's. We have no way of discerning the "purpose" of things (unless we are talking about somebody who did it and who can communicate what they had in mind).
Again: I see axe marks on the tree, so I figure something used an axe, rather than rotten roots or lightning or termites, etc. Now I want to know what swung the axe. I see a dolphin, but I know dolphins can't use axes. I see a chimp and know about what chimps can do so I figure the chimp did it. Intelligence and purpose had nothing to do with it.
I love experiments.
I don't know what you mean by "design", so I can't say yes or no to this.
Sorry I don't understand this either. I think you mean that everything with any mental abilities will have the same (or similar) mental abilities? If that's what you mean, then that is obviously false.
Are there axe marks? Rotten roots? Electrical burns? Termite droppings? If none of these, then I would say "I don't know". If there were axe marks, I'd say "Something with an axe, but I don't know what".
You mean that it cut down the tree? That's a bit circular, no?
I wish I understood your argument, but I don't. Yes, we'd look for something that could swing an axe. It has nothing to do with purpose or intelligence.
Comment by aiguy — May 26, 2008 @ 12:31 am
May 26th, 2008 at 2:16 am
Hi Aiguy,
You have? I thought you said the opposite to FMM. I'm glad to know you find this hypothesis meaningful.
If the inference is correct we certainly know something about its particular mental abilities. It has foresight. It can plan and act to realize that plan. It can create that which natural law and chance alone cannot. It can exercise intent.
But saying "life-forms", which you would accept, says nothing, especially given the run-down you did previously. A life-form can be something completely beyond imagination to us – at least as much as "intelligence" can be. Saying 'life as we know it from our experience on Earth' (all of which, I presume, you are claiming was implied) is no different from saying "intelligence" and implying " as we know it from our experience on Earth". We have no more idea to what extent a "life-form" is like what we experience on Earth than we have about how human-like the intelligence in ID is. Yet you classify one as meaningful and one as vacuous.
What do you mean here by "arbitrary" How could one discern purpose where there is none and, therefore, no evidence?
You are putting definitions and labels before evidence. If the evidence warrants the inference to design and that entails intention and intention entails consciousness then consciousness has been evidenced as well. You can't rule it out just because you don't like it. You can't claim there is no test for it if the test for design ultimately demands consciousness. You seem to want to say here that we can't test for consciousness, therefore we can't test for intent, therefore we can't test for intelligent design. That is coming off as backward to me.
Exactly. And they don't devise theories which would make them feel intellectually justified in denying the desires of a car. But they do when they try to deny the actuality of the design and purpose they see as apparent in biology and in the cosmos. They then write textbooks saying that they have refuted the actuality of said apparent design. I doubt you'll see that with regards to Ol' Betsy.
Ah, but you know the tree was chopped down. You have inferred design, and now you are presuming the chimp could be the culprit. Pretty clever chimp to calculate the angle the tree would fall.
What you know about chimps does not account for the felled tree. You did't know that chimps can make such precision blows, or even create the appropriate swinging motion before you had made the design inference. But you knew the tree was chopped down anyway and in attributing it to the chimp you have learned about chimpanzee capabilities (hypothetically, of course).
Even granting your desired point here, note the admission that you no longer have to observe the agent in question to gain the information about it; you are inferring from other agents (in this instance extrapolating to add to the human-like qualities of the chimp) and from the design apparent.
As with the rain cloud and the implication about reasons. You didn't infer that the tree fell in order to expose its roots to the air.
They do indeed. With no evidence that intelligence and purpose were required you did not infer intelligence or purpose. With specific conditions met causes like termites, rotting roots, lightning and 'whatever' are insufficient to explain the event and intelligence and purpose are inferred.
Sure we do. With the tree we can infer that an intelligent agent wanted the tree chopped down. We can also infer that part of its purpose was to avoid the destruction of property. It had foresight and a plan and acted to fulfill these. We also refer to the conditions to determine if this action could have occurred without the intelligent agent and the answer is no.
The wind can swing an axe as well. Would you infer that the wind used the axe to cut down the tree?
Oh. I wasn't clear. Purposeful arrangement of parts.
You think I mean that? Really?
Here's what I mean. You inferred design from the examination of the tree, its marks, and its position.
We can apply the information gained about an agent's attributes from this inference – that it desired the tree to fall, calculated the cuts and the direction of the fall, is capable of balanced swinging of an axe and can aim its blows – to any likely candidate regardless of our previous independent knowledge about that agent or our observations of it. In the case of the chimp you increased the pool of 'human-like' attributes it has to include such things as the ability to swing an axe efficiently and with the appropriate precision to cut down a tree and ensure the direction of its fall.
Yes, there are axe marks, the situation is as before. So we've learned two things here:
1) You don't really think that by my definitions you can justify attributing purpose to things and events that don't give any evidence of being designed for a purpose (neither rain clouds nor the uprooted tree). When you have limited knowledge of purposes you now say "I don't know".
2) On the other hand, your protestations notwithstanding, in the case where marks of agency are left you actually have gained some knowledge of the agent involved – it is something with an axe and it chopped the tree down.
Again, you've gained knowledge about the responsible agent even without independent prior knowledge – or even a candidate. It's a) not a dolphin and it b) can swing an axe. I doubt you'd accept as a candidate a rope with a knotted loop in the end hanging from a tree.
Comment by Pez — May 26, 2008 @ 2:16 am
May 26th, 2008 at 4:09 am
Pez,
Yes, as when I said: http://telicthoughts.com/bunny...
You can ascertain none of these things, no, because you have no way of interacting with the Designer to see what it can and can't do. Moreoever, it is not at all clear that human beings "excercise intent" (cf. the volition experiments), so how can you possibly say the Designer of Life excercises intent?
No, not at all – as I said, astrobiologists refer to life as we know it from Earth.
Again, I believe that both "life as we know it from Earth" and "intelligence as we know it from humans" are meaningful enough. However, neither "life" nor "intelligence" (nor lots of other descriptive categories, like "athleticism") are meaningful without such qualifiers, because what else these things might be is – as you say – potentially beyond our imagination.
I mean *any*. You could discern purpose in a human being by asking them what they intend to do, and then see if they end up doing it or not. But you could not, for example, ask a thundercloud if it intended to hit a church steeple with a lightning bolt.
I don't know how to discern purpose in arbitrary systems.
I now think that by "design" you mean "something created by a human-like mind". Is that right? If so, I would think the evidence that a human-like mind was responsible for designing human-like brains would be quite weak (especially given the apparently necessity of human-like brains for human-like minds).
I like it just fine. I just don't see how you can think there could possibly be any evidence of "intention" that you could find in the context of ID. We can't even tell if a flea intends to jump on a dog, and we can watch them do it in high-def slow-motion.
We can't test for consciousness, AND we can't test for intent, AND we can't test for "intelligent design".
Right. People talk like cars have feelings. People inuit that cars don't have feelings. Some suggestive evidence for cars not having feelings comes from brain studies which show certain neurological structures are necessary for human-like thought and emotion, and these structures are not present in cars.
Huh? People talk like something with feelings created biology and the cosmos. Some people intuit that this is actually the case, and other people don't. I have no idea how we could ever find a way to determine if this was the case or not.
If you are objecting to textbooks saying things to the effect of "Science has proven that mind and purpose was not involved in evolution", then I agree with you. That is not a statement that can be evaluated scientifically, and has no place in a science textbook.
Um, right – wasn't there chopping marks on the tree stump, and a chimp carrying around an axe?
No, not at all. I simply figured out that it was probably the chimp with the axe that made the tree fall over.
Uh oh, I seem to have missed something. Did you say something about the angle that the tree fell? Sorry if I missed it.
No, I couldn't have guessed that the chimp did unless I knew about chimps specifically. I really do believe that a chimp can learn to chop a tree down with an axe – I would bet money on it. This has nothing at all to do with any design inference.
Huh? No, I know about chimps in particular. I've read books about them, seen 'em in zoos, on Discovery Channel…
No, the tree fell to return its nutrients to the Earth.
Nope. There were possible causes, and clues that would indicate each of these causes. Intelligence and purpose had nothing to do with it.
I don't know what an "intelligent agent" is. But if we figured out a human chopped down the tree from the clues, then we know that the human was conscious (because of what we know about humans).
Actually I don't think that "wind" can swing an axe, no. A strong wind could blow the axe over and make it slide across the ground, but it couldn't make it swing repeatedly into a tree. This is nothing to do with "intelligence" or "purpose" either.
No, I did not infer design. I inferred that something chopped it down with an axe.
We can determine that whatever chopped down the tree was capable of chopping down the tree. If we have no other related knowledge about it – if it is a completely unspecified type of thing that cannot be observed – then that is absolutely all we know. We do not know that it desired anything. Or that it intended anything. We don't know if it learned to chop trees down, or was born with that hard-wired instinct, or… We don't know if it was compelled to chop the tree down by virtue of its physical structure, or if it had free will and could have done otherwise. We can know none of this unless we can interact with this thing. Which we can't.
I can ascribe purpose and intent to anything I think might feel these things; you might disagree, but we have no way we can figure out who is right.
There were no "marks of agency". There were "marks of an axe". I don't know what an "agent" is, but I know what an "axe" is, and I also know what a "chimp" is. When I saw the chimp with the axe, I used all my chimp-knowledge and axe-knowledge and abduced how it must have gone down: The chimp did it with the axe in the forest.
This had nothing to do with purpose, agency, or intelligence.
Figuring out if chimps can cut down trees with axes has not one single thing to do with the concepts of "purpose", and everything to do with things like "hand-eye coordination". Like I said, I bet a chimp can do it… but I might be wrong. In any case, purpose and agency have nothing to do with it.
What are you talking about? This is all about independent prior knowledge, and that is all that it is about! If the only thing I knew about a dolphin was that it was an "intelligent agent", then I would have absolutely no way of knowing if the dolphin was the culprit or not. But instead I used my independent prior knowledge about dolphins. I remembered that they have no arms, and figured this would make it difficult to use the axe.
Um, right. Ropes can't swing axes. Neither can dolphins. But I think chimps can, and maybe even a bear (they can ride bicycles). Termites can build fancy houses, and beavers build dams. Computers can play chess, but they can't write a screenplay. Dolphins do a lot of cool thing and everyone considers them really intelligent, but they can't design any artifacts except bubble rings. Thunderclouds can make high-voltage arcs; so can human electrical engineers.
Some of things we call "intelligent" and some things we don't, but it's not important. Things do what they can do.
Comment by aiguy — May 26, 2008 @ 4:09 am
May 26th, 2008 at 8:31 am
Right again! Ignorance is not evidence.
That's your claim.
That's all I asked.
The word "function" seems to presuppose "purpose". We might say a heart has the purpose of pumping blood, or of sustaining life. We might say a Monsoon has the purpose of pumping water, or of sustaining life.
Well, there's your argument from ignorance. If we don't know what causes a Monsoon, then by your reasoning, we would be warranted in concluding it is design.
Also, notice that your 'hypothesis' is sterile. It doesn't generate new hypotheses.
In other fields of research that involve purpose, we look for evidence of the chain of causation between the artist, art and artifact. But there is no current scientific evidence of ID, so it's rather difficult to know where to begin.
That's a perfectly acceptable religious or metaphysical doctrine. But there is no scientific evidence supporting design in biology.
A clearly stated hypothesis is an essential component of the scientific method. That's how we cut through the problem of naïve induction.
Based on our knowledge of chimps, trees and axes, that might be a reasonable hypothesis"”which then has to be supported by additional observations. It might also just be a practical joke.
That is incorrect. Aiguy already noted that it would not be a reasonable hypothesis if a dolphin was found with the ax. We know quite a bit about chimps, including that they have opposable thumbs. And again, we would then investigate the chain of causation more closely, making and testing hypotheses.
Comment by Zachriel — May 26, 2008 @ 8:31 am
May 26th, 2008 at 9:41 am
Obviously, your own goal-seeking process is looking for some minimum level of detail for the process itself. Why don't you specify it and save me the trouble of trying to read your mind. (One wife is enough.)
That's fine, if you add to your "IQ test" the ability to design human-like machinery and processes. Intelligent is as intelligent does. "Human-like" encompasses the very best that humans can do.
What does "right away" mean? If you mean by proximate, Deep Blue doesn't operate that way. The search algorithms (goal,foresight) had to search a minimal amount of data (knowledge) in order to make a decision about it's next move.
A storm may "achieve" non-proximate effects, but the system has no goal and no foresight beyond the next proximate effect. There is no looking ahead to the future beyond the next proximate effect.
Showing that the designer was capable of learning is not my job presently. We're defining terms.
"Plausibility" is a vacuous term without some idea of how possible it is. And its possibility is unknown. (Granted, that's off topic for this thread.)
I agree. I favor a demonstrable reductionist explanation if one is available.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 26, 2008 @ 9:41 am
May 26th, 2008 at 12:34 pm
Hi Aiguy,
Okay, if you think human-like intelligence is meaningful but then add a caveat as above I'm going to need a definition of this human-like intelligence. Does human-like intelligence mean it has to have hands with which to manipulate a pencil, or vocal chords with which to communicate to humans? Does it have to be able to take the test to qualify? Are you not merely saying that "human-0like intelligence" is an attribute of humans?
We don't need to interact with it to study its designs. If its designs demonstrate foresight then we infer the designer has foresight. We can ascertain human intent from the purposeful arrangement of parts in our artifacts and we can ascertain human-like intent in those of the designer.
When do they say this? Do the insist that all life-forms must be life as we know it from Earth? Do they say that any ETI must be from such a life form? When you said "life-form" do we take this as implicit? So saying a life-form unlike that found on Earth would not be meaningful then?
I have a feeling that you are conflating the two. Does your idea of a meaningful use of this phrase entail that said intelligence be attached to a human body?
By design I mean that which plans and purposes with foresight. Our best example of that is the human mind, so it would be human-like in this regard.
I don't know why you've added the bit about it then designing human-like brains. Looks like you are trying to change the subject with a mind-reduces-to-brain argument. Is this a subtle way of doing what I said above, now constraining "human-like" intelligence to the human body? And "life-forms" to those found already on Earth (even though the term has no definition)?
Is your argument reducing now to an extreme empiricism where only what we've seen exists and only what we've seen occur can occur?
Then you reject their project. But you do not do so because it is incoherent or poorly defined, but because you just don't see it. The arguments and definitions are in place. The reason for the inference is in place. You just don't agree.
Axe cuts are purposefully arranged parts. Or are they not? Could they have resulted from a force which had no purpose?
You did miss it, I guess. Apology accepted.
Will you be changing your response now?
You've never seen them cut down a tree with an axe.
Argument from ignorance. You aren't trying hard enough. A short, confined burst of wind could fling the axe through the air causing its blade to strike the tree. It could swirl and remove the axe from the tree and repeat the process. The axe may have been caught in a small but intense whirlwind where it was swung repeatedly striking glancing blows to the tree in just the right spot to chop it down and cause its apparently, but not actually, directed, felling.
Which is design. The axe cuts are purposefully arranged.
We do know it intended to cut the tree down because the cut is designed. We don't need to know if it learned to cut the tree down, was programmed to cut the tree down or intuited how to cut it down to recognize that the blows and the felling were intended.
Yes we have. We have arguments, definitions and tests with which you can agree or not. If you are asking if we can ultimately know, for certain and for all time, proof beyond proof, then you are not talking about science and you are not subjecting this inquiry to normal levels of critique.
Designed marks of an axe.
So without any independent knowledge of the culprit you know some things about it. For you, it has arms. For me, it has foresight and intent.
Argument from ignorance. I have independent knowledge of ropes swinging tires, children, apes, stones, camping gear, etc. I'm quite sure a rope could swing an axe, even though I haven't seen one do it on Discovery.
That's right, and things with foresight and intent purposefully arrange parts.
Comment by Pez — May 26, 2008 @ 12:34 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 12:54 pm
Hi Zach,
Exactly. That's the claim. It is supported by argument and evidence. we all know that you already reject ID but I'm not here to prove it right, merely argue that it is not proven wrong by mere reference to its definitions or it initials.
You've been disputing this subject for years on all kinds of forums. You had no reason to ask. These have been laid-out from the beginning. By the way, we already know you disagree with ID.
Not really. Irreducibility and the apparent foresight required indicate purpose – it is not presupposed just because there is a physical result of some action.
We look for exactly the same in ID. We already know that you disagree that it is scientific.
If we have no reason to attribute the monsoon to design we do not do so – known cause or not.
By your reasoning all explanations are arguments from ignorance because all explanations rely upon the fact that they are the most probable among candidates. Nothing is 100% proven so every explanation accepted is accepted on the basis of ignorance of unknown factors and reliance upon likelihoods.
Intriguing. Is this going to culminate in a few pages on nested hierarchies? If so, you could just direct me to talk.origins or something and leave this thread for what it was intended.
The design inference was made prior to additional observations. Appeal to practical jokes reinforces the design inference.
But we didn't investigate the chain of causation more closely. We saw the felled tree and inferred design. Aiguy claimed we inferred design only because we presumed a human did it. Then he inferred design because he presumed a chimp did it. But there is no independent knowledge that a chimp can do it. The design inference preceded the chimp inference.
Comment by Pez — May 26, 2008 @ 12:54 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 3:14 pm
KB,
Well, here's the rub: You want to explain how complex biological machinery comes to exist. You say that "intelligence" is the cause. I ask "What is 'intelligence'?" and you say "Intelligence is 'the ability to create complex machinery'". This is not a helpful theory. You need to have some meaning of intelligence that is independent of the phenomena you are trying to explain.
Right – Deep Blue searches (lots of data, zillions of possible moves/countermoves). Deep Blue is intelligent. Weather systems don't even have to search for the solution – they know what to do right away, without searching for it. Seems even smarter to me.
I think you're right, but we have the advantage of being able to observe weather systems. If you could not observe weather systems, but could only know that over time, these clouds managed to equalize the electrical potential between them and the ground, you couldn't say of there was "looking ahead" involved or not. That is the situation in ID: We can't observe the creation of life, so we can't know if there was "looking ahead" or not.
Ok… so for you, learning is an essential component of "intelligence", yes?
Comment by aiguy — May 26, 2008 @ 3:14 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 3:14 pm
Pez,
I am thinking of human-like intelligence the way scientists who study human intelligence think of it. We define it in terms of what humans can do that we can test. Human intelligence is tested with standard tests called IQ tests.
Obviously. Then you will know all about the designs and nothing about what caused them.
You can't tell if something uses foresight just by looking at some artifact. When a person builds a car they use foresight. When robot builds a car it doesn't. You will here make the mistake of pointing out humans build robots. Who cares? You needn't consider the causal origin of something to determine if it has foresight or not. Robots have no foresight, and humans do, but both of them can build complex machines, and you can't tell which type of thing was responsible just by looking at the car. Maybe the first step in the causal chain had foresight, and maybe it didn't.
Yes, they say this. If I provide you a reference to SETI researchers saying this, will you concede the point?
I do not understand the idea of "attaching intelligence" to a body. This is like "attaching athleticism" to a body. These are not things that can be "attached" to other things. They are descriptions of abilities.
I thought "design" meant purposeful arrangement of parts. I guess that would be the noun. Now you say design is "that which plans and purposes with foresight". So this is also a definition of "design" as a noun? (Perhaps you meant "designer"). And I see you use "purposes" as a verb here… hmm. I think I'm confused now.
No, I've never said anything about that at all. I did mention that according to everything we've learned about minds and brains, it appears that human minds require human brains. If you want to follow the evidence where it leads, you'll certainly need to consider the evidence for that.
The "design inference" is supposed to be empirically driven from our experience of "intelligence agents". Fine. I'm trying to figure out what "intelligent agents" are by reference to my experience. I see some intelligent agents are people, and some are other animals, and some are machines. If we focus on human-like intelligence, I see that human brains are necessary for human intelligence (I didn't say sufficient, I said necessary).
I said I didn't see evidence for "intention". I take this to mean the feeling of conscious intent that human beings experience and report. I say this is meaningful, but unsupportable in the context of ID. As for "intelligent cause" – I reject this because it is meaningless in the context of ID.
If you provide a way to determine what things act with purpose and what things don't, then we could answer this question. But you can't, so we can't.
I've seen them drive a car though, and play trombone (they're not very good at either, but they manage).
If that is your best guess, then I would not want you to be my lab partner in science class. Still, you can advance that hypothesis if you wish. When you get around to testing your hypothesis you'll find you've misjudged the ability of wind to wield axes. My intuition was more along the lines of the chimp with the axe. I'd test my hypothesis by teaching a chimp to swing an axe. I bet you I could while you are still waiting for the wind to chop your tree down.
How can you tell?
I disagree. How can we tell who is right?
You have given me absolutely no test that can be performed to see if things are intended or not (unless you can ask the intender). The reason you haven't told me any test that can be applied is because there is no such test. You can argue and define all you'd like, but I disagree, and since we cannot appeal to our shared experience to resolve the matter, we will forever disagree. That's just fine, no problem. There are lots of issues like this. I happen to think the Moonlight Sonata is beautiful, but I can't demonstrate that as fact, and that's OK too.
So let's just agree to disagree, and agree that there is no possible recourse to our shared experience that can ever tell us if whatever caused life to exist intended to do so or not.
After all, you can't even tell me if my goldfish intends to swim or not.
Comment by aiguy — May 26, 2008 @ 3:14 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 3:36 pm
That's not all I've said. Do I need to repeat everything I've said in each post, or whenever I use the word "intelligent?" If you're having trouble with sub-thread continuity because of the different views and definitions of those with whom you converse, I can understand. Is that what's happening here?
I have provided.
Weather systems have no goal or foresight about anything other than the proximate effect so they don't need to search for a solution. Deep Blue has a next proximate effect and non-next proximate effects. That's a significant difference. Weather systems seems less smarter to me. Much less front loading (a hallmark of intelligent design.)
I've got a question for you: what is the difference between natural selection and artificial selection?
Correct.
Also correct. Nobody scientifically or empirically knows how the first life form came to exist and what its nature was. It's those interesting machine-like features within in the cell coupled with the fact that no confirmed scientific theories exist for the origin of life, that makes some of us wonder greatly. And wonder often leads to understanding. But that's another topic.
If depends on the goal. Some intelligently endowed tasks can be performed without learning anything external, like calculating primes. Some cannot, like vacuuming the house.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 26, 2008 @ 3:36 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 3:58 pm
aiguy,
Another question for you: in what sense, if any, was the existence of humans the goal of nature?
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 26, 2008 @ 3:58 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 5:04 pm
Hi Aiguy:
"¨
A robot does not build a car. The human builds it using the robot as a tool. Rubber mallets, conveyor belst and rivet guns do not build a car either. And yes, the human has foresight and the building of the car demonstrates this foresight. And no, this is not a mistake.
The secondary or proximate cause may demonstrate no foresight or purpose but if design is indicated then that foresight had to have been an element of the system and indicates a designer. The robot is a great example.
We can tell if it did by examining the artifact. If the robot has no foresight it is because the human did and built in the necessary contingencies based upon this foresight.
"¨
I was going to say that I don't really need a reference because we are now clear what it is that you are saying. But as I thought about I think I would like a reference. I would like to see if their meaningful search for intelligence and life-forms is as limited as yours. I doubt that they are looking for human brains and Earth's life-forms residing on other planets when they search for ETI.
From all of the above we can see that, as I suspected, you only accept "human-like intelligence" as meaningful insofar as it is just a fancy way of saying "human".:
===
"¨
Yes, that was sloppy. I often word my answers in direct response to certain sentences in your comments and then when I look back they don't seem to quite fit. I thought looking back earlier that I had meant to say "designer" but, in retrospect, I think it was just bad syntax. But you ought not be confused; none of the concepts there is new or contradictory.
As I said before (although I'm not sure why I used design as a verb in this case…) :
Nothing new and nothing confusing – just a little grammatical awkwardness.
We know their purposes by studying what they do."¨
And if I fail the test? Or rely upon deep time and unobservable and unobserved events? Then you are still just arguing from ignorance because you've not used enough imagination. Personal incredulity is not proof.
Because of their specified complexity. They are at the appropriate angle for felling the tree and in the appropriate location for its directed fall. They are not randomly located or of arbitrary incidence and yet they are contingent and not dictated by law or preceding conditions.
I've said before and you quote me below.
I presumed you read my response to Zach. We have tests:
The wording will have to change a little in the case of the unknown lumberjack, but the principles and operation are the same.
I agree that we disagree.
Perhaps that's only because nobody has tested goldfish … the way they have, say, fruitflies.
http://www.brembs.net/spontane..."¨
Comment by Pez — May 26, 2008 @ 5:04 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 5:37 pm
Without a clear definition, there is no way to evaluate the validity of the claim. That you think this is unimportant is telling.
Irreducibility can evolve through various mechanisms.
You keep arguing in circles. Design conflated into purpose, then into function, now foresight, none of which provided with a useufl scientific definition. You just change the terminology and say you've provided the evidence.
We? How many cites do you require?
Dembski: Identity Problem — Who is the designer? Note that the last four questions are not properly questions of science.
Intelligent Design and Evolution Awareness (IDEA) Center: Intelligent design theory makes no claim as to "how" the design occurred, whether it was by natural, or even supernatural causes.
We have very good reasons. The Monsoons are a purposeful mechanism whose purpose is to pump water in order to sustain life.
Comment by Zachriel — May 26, 2008 @ 5:37 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 8:17 pm
KB,
No, I remembered what you had said KB: You wanted the "IQ Test" for the Designer to be "the ability to design human-like machinery and processes". Since you can't ask the Designer to design a new car, I assume the evidence for the Designer being able to pass this "IQ Test" is the evidence of biology itself. Thus, my charge of circular reasoning: The Designer of Life must be intelligent because intelligent is defined as being able to create machinery like we see in biology.
Seem more smarter to me.
I think front loading is not a hallmark of intelligent design.
I thought artificial selection was when human beings tried to control which animals mated with which other ones. Right?
I don't know how to figure out goals in nature. Nobody does.
Comment by aiguy — May 26, 2008 @ 8:17 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 8:17 pm
Pez,
Nope, robots build cars. Humans don't even have to be there.
No, you're mistaken. Robots build cars. You seem to think that just because humans designed robots, robots aren't responsible for building cars – but that can't be right. Didn't the Designer design human beings? Do you think that means that humans don't build cars, but the Designer does?
Just because humans are designed doesn't mean they aren't intelligent/purposeful, right? And just because a robot is designed doesn't mean it isn't intelligent/purposeful right?
How can you tell the human had foresight, rather than being built with the necessary contingencies based on the Designer's foresight?
From here: http://www.space.com/searchfor...
Also, read this: http://www.space.com/searchfor...
First of all, you will notice you need to test the actual animal in order to see what sort of behavior it is capable of. These scientists were not testing the artifacts created by fruit flies to see if fruit flies have intent. Second:
Like I said: Nobody can say if anything has free will, and nobody can say of anything intends to do anything.
Pez, I don't sense any forward motion here. You think scientists have methods to detect free will, intent, and purpose simply by looking at an artifact. I am quite sure scientists can do no such thing, and the scientists never claim to be able to any such thing. Perhaps you are thinking of psychics.
Comment by aiguy — May 26, 2008 @ 8:17 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 8:23 pm
All,
Thanks for the discussions. Bradford has locked me out of another thread (the "Intelligence: A Useful Concept" thread). Apparently my questions were too difficult for him to answer – he never did try to respond to my "athleticism" analogy. I'd like to see if somebody here has any response to that. But I think I'll curtail my participation here at this point, since I seem to be making the moderators too uncomfortable.
Comment by aiguy — May 26, 2008 @ 8:23 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 8:36 pm
This discussion (between you and me) is about definitions, prompted by your initial rejection of my specification that the designer would possess "at least human like intelligence", which you rejected as meaningless when I first issued it. Since then I've defined what I mean in a non-circular way. Saying the designer must at least possess human-like intelligence (as defined by me) is not equivalent to saying that the designer is intelligent because intelligence is defined as being able to create machinery like we see in biology.
The statement that the designer of the first life on earth must possess at least human like intelligence is not a meaningless statement. It may be false, and you may disagree with it, but it's not circular, and it's not meaningless.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 26, 2008 @ 8:36 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 8:40 pm
KB,
It is not meaningless conceptually, but it is meaningless in terms of empirical science unless you specify what it means in terms of what sorts of things we could observe. We cannot give the Designer an IQ test, and so all we could possibly do is look at what we see in nature and then say that constitutes an IQ test. Again, thus my charge: Operationally at least, you are defining the intelligence of the Designer as that which could build biological forms.
Comment by aiguy — May 26, 2008 @ 8:40 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 8:46 pm
Exactly.
Who's talking science here? I've been merely talking definitions.
I'm comfortable with engineering and philosophy. For now I'll leave any ideas about "ID science" to the big boys.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 26, 2008 @ 8:46 pm
May 26th, 2008 at 10:41 pm
KB,
I don't think it has anything to do with engineering at all. All you are saying is that you would like to use whatever definitions of human intelligence there may be… and there are dozens of different ones of course, with nothing approaching a consensus on the matter, even among human psychologists.
Since you don't want to say how one might ever try to figure out if any of these definitions might actually apply in the context of ID, then I really don't think it has much to do with philosophy either.
But yes, you could meaningfully assert that you believe something with human-like intelligence (conscious, prone to certain optical illusions, musical, forgetful, etc) was responsible for life.
Comment by aiguy — May 26, 2008 @ 10:41 pm
May 27th, 2008 at 12:33 am
Hi Aiguy.
Their presence is not required for them to build the car. The determined the design, the parts necessary, the order of assembly, etc. The robot is merely doing the lifting. Hammers don't build houses and robots don't build cars.
Responsible? Sure, like a car is responsible for an accident.
Humans have foresight and intention, unlike the robot, and are responsible for their creations.
First hand experience and introspection.
Right.
That's not why they aren't intelligent and purposeful. You already admitted they build without foresight.
First of all, you can't test the actual animal. They tested the pathway of the animal, ie., the artifact.
You can only study intelligence, wisdom, will, etc. by its effects. The agent need not be there for that study.
Neither do I. But thanks for the discussion.
Psychics. No, I'm thinking of scientists. Many scientists study artifacts to determine intent and purpose.
Ciao.
Thanks for your time.
Comment by Pez — May 27, 2008 @ 12:33 am
May 27th, 2008 at 1:20 am
Pez,
I tell you that X has produced an artifact, and I give you the artifact to study. You conclude (somehow) that this artifact is a "design", by which you mean it displays "purpose". I ask you what you think caused this design, and you tell me it must have been something with intent, purpose, and intelligence.
Then I tell you what produced the artifact: It was a machine built out of metal and wires and electronic circuits. At that point, do you change your mind, and decide that it must not have been the machine that had intent, purpose, and intelligence, but rather something else with intelligence must have built this machine? Or do you accept that this machine actually was truly intelligent?
Consider the former choice: You first decided that the producer of this design was intelligent, but then you changed your mind when you found out it was a machine. This would mean you could not really detect intelligence just from looking at artifacts.
Consider the latter choice: You believe that deterministic physical processes (like machines, or like natural evolutionary processes) can be truly intelligent.
Either of these choices negates your position. You will probably respond by saying that what you could detect from the artifact was that true intelligence was involved at some unspecified position in the causal chain. Even if the proximal cause of the design was not intelligent, nor even if the cause of that cause wasn't, nor the cause of that cause, and so on back into the past… at some point there must have been a true intelligence with foresight.
Yes, well, this is an ancient argument – theologians have always argued from ultimate cause. You can believe it if you'd like, and I won't, and there really is not much else to say about it. But obviously this has nothing to do with science.
It has never once happened, no. Scientists study artifacts to determine what sort of animal was responsible. Whatever they may know about (some operationalized notion of) intent and purpose of what created it they learn from interacting with similar animals. Whatever they can guess about how the animal used it also comes from our knowledge of animals and what they do. None of this has any relevance to figuring out the origin of life.
Comment by aiguy — May 27, 2008 @ 1:20 am
May 27th, 2008 at 3:23 am
By the way, thanks for the SETI links:
I see what you mean about the search for life like Earth life. But this is still far and away less restrictive than your "human-like intelligence is human".
Then again, apparently some astrobiologists think we can detect life even if it is unlike that on Earth.
http://www.airspacemag.com/spa...
This does not preclude intelligence. But car-building robots are not intelligent and you evidenced this yourself. They are not the designers.
Not so. If the machine has no intelligence, foresight, planning ability, etc., but the design is evidenced then the intelligence has to be elsewhere. Consider ID's project in which design can be inferred even if it was instantiated through secondary, unintelligent causes. Identifying design does not entail discovering the most recent, most proximate cause. As design theorists will tell you, ID is not an interventionist mechanistic project. Inferring instances of design does not locate the action temporally.
The machine is a deterministic physical process? Then it is not intelligent and is not the designer.
Indeed I will. As I already did in our investigation of the automated auto factory.
You are a little loose with "cause" here. A facilitator is not the cause.
Believe what you will. But whether or not it is science was not your question. It's based upon empirical study, its a valid inference derived logically from defined terms and observation, it is an attempt to explain nature, its ideas can be tested, etc. Call it what you will but it does not fail due to lack of or uncertain definitions.
Sure it has.
No, they often already know what sort of animal was responsible and then try to determine if that responsible animal actually was responsible. Real scientists with real degrees study artifacts and determine intent and design, differentiating it from chance and natural causes in cases of cases of death/homicide, abuse, criminal poisoning, arson, etc.
Comment by Pez — May 27, 2008 @ 3:23 am
May 27th, 2008 at 4:05 am
Pez,
I'm having a hard time figuring out what you mean here. You say a machine can be intelligent, but if it is a deterministic physical process then it cannot be intelligent. So, do you mean that only indeterministic machines can be intelligent?
To be more precise, are you defining "intelligent" to entail "not deterministic", or do you claim to somehow be able demonstrate that nothing "intelligent" is deterministic?
What is the difference, and how can we test for which one something is?
The only sense I can make out of your definitions is that you are talking about our conscious experience of intent. And if you think there is any way to empirically establish the existence of some unspecified thing (force, process, cause, animal, spirit, God, ghost, monster…) that created life and also experienced conscious intent, then I'm afraid there is little I could say to dissuade a faith as strong as that.
I'm understanding less and less of what you're saying. Now you say that an animal can be responsible for creating an artifact, but not actually be responsible for creating the artifact. You've putting a bit too fine a point on it for me I'd say.
Sorry, we've miscommunicated again. Archeologists and police detectives know what sort of thing they are studying, because it is always the same: a human being. Forensics experts have no need for definitions of "agency" (most would think you were speaking of a police "agency"!) or "intelligence" (they would think "CIA"!). They have not studied the methods of "intelligent design". They do not need the concepts of CSI or IC. They do not read about complexity or and study the issues surrounding free will. Instead, they know about human beings and what human beings do.
So the machine isn't intelligent because a human built it, but the human is intelligent, even though the Designer built it… and you know this because you know that you are intelligent. Do I have this right? And you can use this same reasoning to assure us that the Designer is intelligent like you are, and not like a super-computer is?
Plenty of deterministic robots have foresight, just not car assembly robots.
What are you talking about? I'm talking about the link you gave me about the fruit fly. They had the little critter strapped down right in their lab! Really – it's on video!
Wisdom? You have an empirical test for wisdom? Wow, that's cool! Anyway, I can't see how you can seriously say these guys didn't need the agent (the animal) in order to study it. Please go to your own reference and read what they did to these little fruitflies, OK?
Comment by aiguy — May 27, 2008 @ 4:05 am
May 27th, 2008 at 4:27 am
Just a quick one as I have no time.
The scientist's did not study the fruitfly. They studied the fruitfly's flight pattern. Their inference was drawn from that pattern, not from the fruitfly.
Ok, two more …
No, you don't have this right. You know you don't because you asked it already and it was answered. The machine does not lack intelligence because it was built by a human.
You said:
And tehy certainly do detect intent and purpose from an artifact.
Now you want to say "well, they didn't use IC or CSI". And to that I say (without defending that they probably did use at least an implied version of CSI and certainly the explanatory filter) so? Move goalposts much?
Actually, they know what chemicals do, how fires behave, what nature can/cannot create, what marks ropes make, the natural levels of toxins, etc.
When events indicate "unnatural" (read, improbable) states involving these elements they infer agency, design, intent, purpose, etc.
Just like a fella looking at a readout of a fruitfly's flight path, for instance.
Comment by Pez — May 27, 2008 @ 4:27 am
May 27th, 2008 at 4:56 am
Pez
The difference between "detect" and "infer" probably sums up the difference between scientists and philosophers:wink:
Comment by Alan Fox — May 27, 2008 @ 4:56 am
May 27th, 2008 at 4:58 am
Pez,
Pez, these guys had a fly stuck to a pin in their laboratory, observing and photographing what the fly was doing. You are trying to tell me that they did not need to have the fly there? What were they doing with it then, since they weren't studying it? Playing with it?
I have this weird feeling that you are serious about this. Maybe you are making some metaphysical distinction between the thing-in-itself and how we perceive it? (I really hope not). In any event, I'm very comfortable with my assertion that in the experiment you cited, the scientists were studying a fruitfly, and they could not have done their experiment without having a fruitfly there.
No, nobody has ever done this. Please read this carefully, because I know why we are miscommunicating. In your view:
1) Detective finds a shoe
2) Detective sees that the purpose of shoes is for walking
3) This indicates design
4) Therefore the shoe was made with conscious intent
5) Therefore the detective has inferred intent from an artifact
Right? Now, here is how I see it:
1) Detective finds a shoe
2) Detective knows that humans have feet, walk on them, need to protect their feet, (and he might even know that humans make shoes)
3) This indicates humans made the shoe
4) Humans have conscious intent
5) Therefore the shoe was made with conscious intent
6) Therefore the detective has inferred intent from an artifact
Do you see the difference?
You were right up until the end. They infer human causation, not "agency". They don't know what you mean by "agency".
Comment by aiguy — May 27, 2008 @ 4:58 am
May 27th, 2008 at 10:06 am
Hi Aiguy,
They tracked it. If it were a deer they could have followed its trail through the woods. If they had a hound dog he could do it chemically. They didn't ask the fly questions. They didn't probe his feelings. He didn't tell them what he was thinking like you say we need to do with the designer. They studied what he had done.
Is that so weird a take?
That's not what's done, the difference is irrelevant and the shoe does not trigger a design inference.
Detective finds a body dead in a garage.
Detective finds doors shut.
Detective finds a running car engine.
Detective determines cause of death to be carbon monoxide poisoning caused by a conscious human working on the engine.
Detective doesn't care about consciousness or free will arguments.
Detective determines accidental cause of death.
Detective finds same situation.
Finds garage doors are locked from the inside.
Finds cracks were sealed with towels.
Finds no evidence that the deceased had been doing repair work.
Detective determines the deceased deliberately killed himself.
Detective finds same situation.
Detective finds a suicide note.
There is an injury to the victim's head.
There is no carbon monoxide in his system.
Detective determine's the suicide is faked to cover an homicide.
A human actor is responsible in all three cases but this is not the reason the detective or the lab scientist infers intent. He does so on the basis of the artifacts left.
Even scientists know how to read dictionaries.
Anyway, thanks for admitting I am right, so let's eliminate the word "agency" and see just how right I am.
Notice that they compared the situation to what one could expect nature to create on its own, what chance and laws could account for. Notice this is a negative argument and one depending upon improbabilities and yet we did not claim it was an argument from ignorance. A nice step forward.
From the study of the situation, and not the direct observation of a human, they determined that natural causes cannot account for the situation and they rightly infer intentional interference.
They don't speculate on free will and human capabilities but examine ligature wounds to see if they are consistent with cause of death. If they match a specified pattern and can't be expected to have done so by chance then they determine (one each for you Alan) that non-chance (intent) was in play. They examine knife wounds and study their number, pattern, direction and depth to determine if they were accidentally caused by a careless slip of the blade or not.
Now, having determined the cause of death they rightly presume that, based upon their knowledge of people, a person instigated this cause. This assignment follows the design inference.
Comment by Pez — May 27, 2008 @ 10:06 am
May 27th, 2008 at 10:28 am
re: animals and responsibility, machines and determinism, designers and facilitators …
Jill walks into her house and lets her cat in ahead of her.
It jumps up on the counter where she feeds it and pulls at a treat bag as it does when it is hungry. The treat bag is attached to a string which sets off a remote-control car which drives across the floor and sets off a chain of dominoes. After many hundreds of them topple, having traversed inclines and even triggered a pendulum, a message is spelled out on the floor that says "Jill, will you marry me".
She can barely contain her excitement and cries "Yes! Yes! Of course!" as, in the piece de resistance the final domino pushes a cart carrying an engagement ring down a slope toward her.
But then she realizes that she can't decide between marrying her cat, the remote control car or the hundreds of dominoes.
And, unfortunately, polygamy is still illegal in her state.
Comment by Pez — May 27, 2008 @ 10:28 am
May 27th, 2008 at 11:38 am
The way a detective works is by collecting evidence and proposing theories of how a situation occurred. An important aspect of this process is comparing the situation to a library of similar situations either in personal experience, or in professional libraries.
Comment by Zachriel — May 27, 2008 @ 11:38 am
May 27th, 2008 at 12:34 pm
Pez,
Here is what they did:
They put the fly in a novel situation and watched to see what it would do. This is not something you can do in the context of ID.
Nor (as they admit) did they demonstrate that the fly did anything with purpose, intent, or with free will! Here is what they found:
Now they could not have even shown this without interacting with a live fruitfly, and even though they had a fruitfly right there in their laboratory, they could not show that the fly had free will, intent, or purpose. So exactly how are you going to do this for some hypothetical intelligence that nobody can even see?
It was weird that you said they had not studied the fly. Putting the fly in a novel experimental circumstance and then observing what the fly would do is studying the fly by any reasonable use of language. I think my point has been made here – nobody can learn about the behavior of an unknown type of entity without actually observing the behavior of the entity.
Shoes aren't designed? Wow, this is harder than I thought.
Sorry, I thought you were talking about identifying what sort of entity (intelligent or not) caused some phenomenon. Your detective wasn't trying to do anything of the sort. He just wanted to figure out if the human being did it, or some other human being did it, or if no human being at all did it.
Can you please show me how you think scientists detect intelligence when they have no idea what sort of entity was responsible for some phenomenon and cannot observe the entity in question? That is what ID is trying to do.
As we've seen, dictionaries don't define scientific theories.
Comment by aiguy — May 27, 2008 @ 12:34 pm
May 27th, 2008 at 2:04 pm
Hi Aiguy,
Wrong still.
They did not derive their knowledge from observing his behaviour and they did not study him behaving. They observed the effects of his behaviour and they studied what he had done. They did not derive their findings from looking at the fly or asking him questions but by studying their record. They did not compare the artifacts (recordings of 'flight' patterns) to things they knew flies could do from their previous independent knowledge of flies. They didn't look at him trying to fly in the lab and compare this to their independent knowledge of how he flies in nature looking for food. Rather, they compared the record of his behaviour to what they considered to be the effects of randomness, and determination. And they concluded that he was not acting randomly or completely deterministically but, rather, exhibited a degree of spontaneity solely as a non-random effect from his mind. They made their inference as to his motivations (whether they existed at all and to what degree) based upon the artifact left behind from his acting. They studied a pattern in nature and analysed it mathematically – finding it to be very different from random noise. Anybody could study the data, the artifacts left behind, and the fly does not even have to be there – nor do they even have to know that it was a fly that generated the patterns to conclude that they were non-random.
I'll repeat that: Even if the did not know what produced the data, their analysis would have shown the same thing>. In fact, they still don't know the agent or cause of the spontaneity as their next planned step is to study the brain and see if they can find it there. They have inferred this lack of determination and chance without knowing its cause. As in other cases, they are now applying what they've inferred, non-random spontaneity, and considering it new knowledge about their candidate, the fly's brain. As you inferred design and then added axe-wielding to the repertoire of chimp behaviour, Bermes is adding spontaneity to the features of the fly's brain.
We study patterns in nature and determine whether they reflect randomness and determinism or not.
I think your point has been lost. Anybody can study the effects of a behaviour without independent knowledge of the agent.
Only if you're going to be silly about it. Detectives don't look at shoes and ponder their design.
Nope. He was trying to figure out if it was done intentionally. I was talking about whether the patterns studied would indicate purposeful arrangement.
That's all I've done for days. They look at patterns and use various methods to determine if these were the result of randomness, chance, luck, or physical necessity. When they are not the inference is to purposeful arrangement of parts. They may or may not have a candidate for having purposefully arranged this but they still have the inference. Then they apply that inference to potential candidates – human beings, chimps, neurological connections, ETI, panspermia directors, human-like minds, unembodied intelligent beings, etc.
Comment by Pez — May 27, 2008 @ 2:04 pm
May 27th, 2008 at 2:41 pm
Pez,
Well, I really can't say anything about this except what you say is patently false as can be seen by reading the page from the link you yourself provided.
Did they observe the fly's behavior?
From your page:
I would say this indicates that scientists observed the animals behavior.
And also:
I would say this indicates that they observed the temporal structure of the fly behavior.
It is beyond reason for you to continue to pretend that these scientists did not observe and analyze the behavior of these animals, when it says exactly that explicitly on the page you cited.
Yes, that is exactly what they did, and they say so. Not only did they look at the fly with their own eyes, they took videos of the fly, and they connected the fly with instruments. I have to ask again if you are being serious here.
Flies can't talk, Pez. What in the world are you talking about? And because flies can't talk (and neither can the Intelligent Designer as far as we know) that is why the scientists can not figure out what the fly consciously intended to do, even when they were studying the fly directly (which they most emphatically were doing).
This is precisely what they did. You may view a video of this very fly trying to fly in the lab:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v...
Do you not believe this video is real?
This had nothing to do with their experiment. They were trying to see if flies exhibited unpredictable, spontaneous behavior when presented with constant stimuli. They could not determine this unless they put the fly in a novel situation – one where there were no external spatial cues available to the fly. So they put the fly in the lab and they studied the fly.
Honestly, Pez, this is all so plainly spelled out on your cited page that I find this conversation ridiculous.
This is nonsense. They could not possibly have collected data on the behavior of this animal in the controlled experimental setting that they had devised if they did not know what was producing the data.
Uh, it was the fruit fly, Pez.
"The biological implementation of this mechanism is currently unknown, but there is evidence from a previous study that a brain area called the ellipsoid body (sometimes called the "fly motor cortex") might be involved."
So yes, they assume there is a biological implementation (as opposed to say, a magical implementation or a spiritual implementation, which would not be amenable to scientific study at all).
Unbelievable. The single study that you cite in order to make your point could not possibly be more clear that it is utterly essential to be able to study the organism directly in experimentally controlled situations. You have yourself provided the evidence that you are utterly confused about how scientists study animal intelligence.
There is not one single reference to any scientist who has ever "detected intelligence" of anything without knowing what sort of entity they were studying. The only reference you have provided was to a study where they were directly studying a fruit fly, watching it behave in a controlled experimental setting.
Comment by aiguy — May 27, 2008 @ 2:41 pm
May 27th, 2008 at 3:37 pm
Hi Aiguy,
1) You keep saying "novel" environment. It is not that the environment is "novel" but that it specifically provides no cues and cannot be the cause the of the patterns.
2)
This is about previous explanations about animals in general and has nothing to do with "knowing what fruit flies are capable of" and then comparing the new observations to that.
3) The very next sentence:
…demonstrates that this is a new perspective gained from a new analysis and does not depend on independent prior knowledge.
4) Previous studies claimed that flies foraged due to environmental cues. The conclusions here do not rely upon this information and Brembs does not say "we can conclude this pattern indicates spontaneity because fruit flies are independently known to exhibit spontaneity". Instead, this study added knowledge not derived from prior investigations to the complex of what a fruit fly is capable of.
5) The conclusion of spontaneity is not drawn from looking at the video or eyeballing the fly but by analysing the graphed traces.
6) Anybody could analyse these and say that this pattern is not randomly generated. They don't have to know how they were generated.
Give the data to another analyst and ask "is this random noise?" and he will say "no".
7)
But they can gain information about the mental processes without independent prior knowledge and without asking the fly questions and by merely studying the artifact. Sounds like a lot of in-principle objections have bit the dust.
There are plenty of references to studying a pattern but not an entity and concluding that the pattern was not generated randomly or lawfully and where the conclusion then is purpose. In the case of the fly the conclusion is "spontaneity" but it defeats the eliminative, argument-from-ignorance, can't-study-an-artifact objections.
This time we agree to agree.
Comment by Pez — May 27, 2008 @ 3:37 pm
May 27th, 2008 at 4:17 pm
Pez,
The environment was novel in the sense that it is different from the environments in which flies exist. It was also novel in the sense that this particular fly had not encountered the environment previously. The salient point is that the experimenters devised the environment to test hypotheses about the fly's abilities and behaviors. That is the only possible way to learn about any entity's abilities and behaviors (without direct knowledge of similar animals of course).
No, this describes the present study, where scientists observed the animals responding differently in absence of external spatial cues. It is exactly what they did.
This shows that the scientists recorded the behavior of animal, rather than finding artifacts after the fact.
The issue of "independent prior knowledge" is relevant when attempting to make inferences about behaviors of entities that are not being observed. That is how I knew that chimps could swing axes but dolphins could not, even though I did not observe either one in action.
This was not the situation in the experiment you cited, because the scientists were actually observing the behaviors in question. The scientists had captured the flies, and they actually observed them in their laboratory. Thus the issue with prior independent knowledge is irrelevant – they were not relying on prior knowledge because they were collecting knowledge directly by observing behaviors.
Exactly. They collected new facts about fly behavior by observing flies behave.
What could your point possibly be here? What is the salient difference between recording video images, recording "graphed traces", or jotting down notes? All of these are records of behaviors, and constitute actual observations of actual behaviors of actual animals. This could not possibly be more clear! You can only study behaviors by studying behaviors, period!
But there would be no pattern unless somebody had observed the flies under controlled conditions! They would have had no way of testing the hypothesis that flies exhibited spontaneous behavior unless they had performed the experiment on flies that they had captured and placed in the controlled setting of their laboratory where spatial cues had been removed! Why else do you think they went to all that trouble?
And if somebody gave us detailed records of observations of the Intelligent Designer in action – video tapes of Him operating by trial-and-error, say, or telling us in advance what sort of animals He planned to create – then you would have analogous data. But I hope you know that no such evidence exists. Maybe the Designer built flagella by trial and error with no pattern of his trials that indicated systematic thought. Maybe the designer exists outside of space and time (as some religions describe) and so this trial-and-error process went on forever before life appeared on Earth. Or maybe the Designer went about his work the way a human would, making blueprints and reflecting on His goals and methods before He started.
If we had some records of His behaviors, we would have something to go on when we tried to describe His mental abilities. But we have no observations of his behaviors, and no records of his behaviors, and no prospect of ever finding any. We have only our observations of things which we want to explain, but these things tell us precisely nothing about what mental abilities the cause may or may not have had.
They could have gained not one iota of information about mental processes without actually experimenting on an actual fly. My in-principle objections are perfectly intact, while your misunderstanding of how scientific research on animal behavior and mentality is performed has cost us quite a bit of confusion.
No, there is not a single such study. Just saying these studies exist do not make it so; you must actually reference one where "purpose" or "intelligence" of an unknown type of entity is evidenced.
You can study artifacts all you'd like. If you don't study the actual entity, however, and also you have no prior independent knowledge of (even remotely) similar entities, then you can not possibly learn anything at all about its purpose or mental abilities. And such is the situation in ID, where "ID" attempts to explain the emergence of the original life forms (I'm not talking about Crick's panspermia, etc):
1) We have no prior independent knowledge of anything even remotely similar to anything that could be intelligent without being a life form.
2) We cannot observe the behaviors of the Designer in different situations
Therefore it is impossible to infer anything at all about the mental abilities or characteristics of the Designer.
Comment by aiguy — May 27, 2008 @ 4:17 pm
May 28th, 2008 at 2:20 am
Hi Aiguy,
No, it is about the previous studies in which scientists attribute variability to random errors. They do not attribute the fly's behaviour here to these same causes and are not drawing their inference based upon this previous knowledge/observation of flies.
Right, they recorded the motions detailing the pattern which they then analysed. They did not draw their conclusions from watching the fly and they certainly didn't draw them by saying "here's what flies are capable of, so how do we interpret this data? They aren't spontaneous so the data does not show that they are…"
They were not observing spontaneity. They concluded spontaneity from analysing the data, not from watching the fly nor from reviewing their video. And when they analysed their data and drew their conclusions they did not confine them to prior knowledge of flies but in fact added to the knowledge.
They drew their conclusions not from observing flies behaving but by studying the record that behaviour created.
Studying the data generated by a behaviour is not the same as observing a behaviour. One can study the data and draw the conclusion without observing the fly. Oh wait, I forgot this … !
Of course the data had to be generated in some manner. If the fly marked his travels they could have observed those marks. If the fly was a polar bear they could put a collar on him and track him with GPS. They don't have to watch the animal and see it in action to draw the conclusion.
Here's another one … ! They look great.
We have the record. We have the artifact.
No, your reaction and protection of a failed point has.
Assertion upon assertion.
re: assertion of second sentence: Yes you can.
re: 1) What about evolution and computers and robots? Given up your previous assertions already?
Oh yes, and we need no independent knowledge of such to draw our conclusions about the artifact. Oh yes, and this has nothing to do with ID failing by definition.
re: 2) We don't have to.
re: last quoted sentence: No it's not.
When you say "therefore" your conclusion should follow from your premises.
As for investigations that infer purpose without independent knowledge of possible designing agents, yes, there are plenty. The forensics situations above are perfect examples. Archaeology provides another great example. We don't even have to know the purpose of an artifact to know that its creation was intentional and that it had a purpose. Archaeologists can find artifacts and use these to add to the knowledge about the presumed designers rather than interpreting their data in light of independent prior knowledge of said agents – much the way Brembs did with the flies. Much the way archaeologists do with finds which force them to infer levels of intelligence by inferring behaviours (unobserved) by studying artifacts among human groups known through prior independent knowledge to lack these behaviours and the associated intelligence. They can infer from artifacts that these primates were capable of symbolic thought, foresight and planning at a time earlier than our independent prior knowledge would allow. This makes them a different kind of being with a different kind of intelligence than they were thought to be before the discovery of the artifacts.
I didn't say anything about an unknown type of entity. I said that there are plenty of cases where purpose and intent are concluded by studying the patterns and not the entity. A forensic arsonist determines an intentionally set fire because he knows how fires spread naturally and has an opinion about how the fire in question spread. He doesn't need to know that "humans might set fires with multiple sources" to know that a fire originating from multiple sources is designed. You act like investigators once thought that accelerants spread themselves around a room and then a trail was spontaneously ignited by chance – until one day a study came in deomstrating "sometimes people set fires this way" and then the forensic arsonists said "oh wow, so it wasn't natural afterall. Too bad we didn't know that about arsonists before…".
On your next reminder that we presume people to be the perpetrators in these cases and that we have knowledge of people:
I have to admit that no investigators have been able to remove themselves to a time and place where humans were unknown before coming to their conclusions about intentional pattern-making. This doesn't affect the nature or object of their studies, however, nor the fact that they determine new things about specific agents and about people in general through their investigations of their designs and not solely the other way around.
Comment by Pez — May 28, 2008 @ 2:20 am
May 28th, 2008 at 2:45 am
And then again, don't forget the reason we are discussing fruitflies.
This study shows us that purpose/intent/will is amenable to scientific investigation and does not rely solely upon asking a designer what his intent was. Further, the experiment shows us that we can study the intentional aspect by studying the outputs and results of behaviour.
Comment by Pez — May 28, 2008 @ 2:45 am
May 28th, 2008 at 4:44 am
Pez,
The data was gathered by watching the fly.
As I just explained, prior independent knowledge is not relevant when one is actually observing the subject itself, which was the case in this experiment.
In science, the term "observation" very often does not refer to a direct perception with one of our senses. If I observe an acceleration of a mass, that doesn't mean I somehow directly can see the acceleration; it means I've instrumented the mass appropriately, and have computed the change in velocity, and deduced that acceleration was taking place. There is always some interpretation in every observation, but please let us not get bogged down in philosophy of science issues.
Again, observing locations using a GPS is an observation nonetheless; we do not have to use our bare eyeballs to make a scientific observation.
Aha – I see yet another source of our miscommunication. You are conflating a record of a behavior with the result of a behavior (the "artifact"). You are saying that our observations of the artifacts that the Designer makes (that is, biological forms) are analogous to the records of the observations of the behaviors of the fruitfly! Wow! Let's see if we can debug this.
According to ID, biological forms are the result of something that an Intelligent Designer did. The Designer – purposefully and with intent – thought up these complex forms and somehow brought them into existence. This designing and creating of forms is the behavior of the Designer, and these behaviors resulted in the physical artifacts of biology. This is analogous to a shoemaker who, through a set of behaviors, creates a physical artifact (a shoe).
So, in ID, we cannot observe the behaviors of the Designer, we can only view the results of the behaviors – the physical artifacts (the designs) that these behaviors caused.
Now consider the situation in the fruitfly experiment. There are no physical artifacts involved; the fruitfly does not design anything and bring it into existence. There are only behaviors. The scientists observe the behaviors of the fruitfly.
Now, you want to say that the records of the scientists' observations are somehow like the physical artifacts of ID, but that is very wrong: In the case of the fruitfly, it is the scientists who create these records, not the subject! The fruitfly does not write out the data, and the polar bear does not record his locations. The record is simply capturing what the scientists observe about the subject.
In contrast, in ID it is the subject (the Designer) who is ostensibly creating what we end up observing – the physical artifacts which the Designer designed.
In order to understand the mental capabilities of some unknown type of entity, it is not enough to simply see what it did (its artifacts). We would have to watch how it did it. That's how it always works; there's no other way. For example, for all we know, no matter how complex some design is, the cause of the design might be capable of only creating a design like that, and be unable to do anything else.
Hopefully we've cleared that up now. Whew.
Obviously not – these disciplines have a huge amount of independent knowledge about what it means to be a human being. That is how they identify the activity of human beings. This doesn't work for "agents" in general, because they have no knowledge of "agents" in general.
I did! That is the case in ID, where all that is said about the Designer is that it is "intelligent".
Read it again, this time taking the authors' caveats seriously. If you want to go this route, I can always claim that the experiments of Libet, Wegner, et al prove we have no free will. But let's both admit the issue lacks empirical resolution, shall we?
Comment by aiguy — May 28, 2008 @ 4:44 am
May 28th, 2008 at 12:17 pm
H Aiguy,
Nice to see we have some movement this morning. So we do not have to observe the designer, the fly or the polar bear with our bare eyeballs in order to understand what the agent is capable of or to make inferences about its mental capabilities. Check.
Now you admit that we can look at the tracks left by the fly or the bear as recorded and we can garner our conclusions from these. Check.
You've gotten stuck there, unfortunately, as you try to draw a distinction that will still leave the designer on one side of the line and the observer on the other. Your defence entails telling me I am very wrong, the use of a few more exclamation marks and the fact that the scientist created the record and the fly did not. To tell the truth, I can't tell which of these three is your strongest argument.
Let's go with the claim that it is the scientist creating the record and not the fly. As they say, this is a distinction without a difference. We have the record of the flight and this indicates spontaneity and tells us something about the mind of the fly.
With the polar bear we can record his actions in a similar way by tracking him. We do not have to be there, eyeball him, follow him in real time, or anything of the kind. We can sit down years later, without knowing it's a record of a polar bear even, and find the pattern made by the movement of the signal.
In snow we could do the same thing by following his footprints – a record
is left, created by his movement, without observation, without a camera, and without a scientist aiding in its making.
The pattern left by the animal can be millennia old if preserved in the proper medium and the scientist need not help create it but only needs to interpret it and find out something about the animal's mind he can make inferences about its habits and diet and even its intelligence.
So, in principle, we do not have to observe the animal to make a determination about its its mental abilities and we do not have to be involved in making the record of its behaviour – we only have to look at the results.
We have made such a determination in the case of the fly and your in-principle claims that we had to be there, had to watch it, had to take part in creating the record, are all null.
Now of course, you'll return to your 'independent prior knowledge' defence (one even Allen MacNeill has admitted is no defence).
Yes, we have to compare the record to something but that something doesn't have to be another of the same creature or entity. In the case of the fly we compared the record to that generated ostensibly at random by a computer and analysed it mathematically. This can be done whatever the source of the record and whether or not we have any involvement in its making.
Now shown to be irrelevant.
This assertion is refuted by the argument above. We do not need to learn everything about its mental capabilities, but we can learn something about them.
This new demarcation will not save your project, either. If it is only capable of creating that single purposeful arrangement of parts it is still capable creating that purposeful arrangement of parts. That is something we can learn about its mind.
We just might have. Thanks for your effort. I hope you've seen the light.
Same hole, same shovel. We don't infer the design of the Antikythera mechanism because we know humans can do such a thing but because of the thing itself. The knowledge of humans is incidental. Unfortunately, we will always have the background knowledge of what humans are and can do so you can wave this card all day. It's just not a very stimulating position and its not actually relevant.
What is said of the designer is also that it is capable of purposefully arranging parts using foresight and planning. ID doesn't say its an unknown type of entity at all; It is an entity capable of these types of things reflective of the action of a mind. It is unidentified in the case of ID, but not entirely unknown or unknowable. But you claim we'd be identifying the entity to the rigorous satisfaction of your project if we'd at least say "it is a life-form" or "it has human-like intelligence". I'd like to say it has "human-like intelligence" in that both we and the designer seem to share foresight, intent and the ability to arrange parts, but then it turns out that by "human-like intelligence" you've actually laid a trap and really mean "human … period". That kind of conclusion is unwarranted from the inference and our experience with humans.
I took his caveats seriously. Perhaps you should read it again and take his claims seriously. He says that his work has put us on the path to possibly investigating free will and he suggests that the question is not out of reach. He indicates that on the continuum which places his flies at "spontaneity" humans would far exceed this.
Also, what do you think he has tentatively shown here and which he calls "spontaneity" The fly's actions are neither wholly determined by the environment, are not generated by brain-processing errors and are not random. What does this mean?
Does this case show that we can empirically prove free will exists? No. But it doesn't mean that one is unjustified in making the inference based upon scientific rigour, either.
Libet, you say?
Get your ad hominems ready for the citation…Jeffrey M. Schwartz, The Mind And The Brain, page 305.
But rather than trail so far away from your propositions and your claims about definitions let me just say that you are unjustified to clam that we cannot properly infer from scientific study whether something has or has not free will. That the matter is not settled to the consensus pleasure of the establishment does not make one position more correct or more scientific than the other.
And in addition, since you freely admit to the intelligence, foresight and designing capabilities of humans free will is just a red herring anyway.
Comment by Pez — May 28, 2008 @ 12:17 pm
May 28th, 2008 at 1:58 pm
Pez,
Right! Not with our bare eyeballs. Video, GPS tracking, and other instrumentation are just fine when observing behaviors.
Well, as long as the instrumentation supports the conclusions, yes. Let's take an example so we're clear on this.
Let's say I have a hypothesis that a polar bear is athletic. In order to determine if I'm correct, I collect some GPS data, and see that at one point the bear is in location A, and then at some other time it is in location B. I see that location A is 100 miles from location B. These are my observational data – can I support my hypothesis?
Well, no. In order to test whether the bear is athletic, I need to make sure the bear can move quickly between point A and point B. It is not enough simply to know that it was in both locations. I need to observe how the bear moved between them (was the bear on a truck, or did it move itself by walking or running?) and I also need to observe how much time passed (if it took fifty years for the bear to traverse the distance, then it wouldn't have been an athletic bear).
First, you keep forgetting something: In each case, at some point in the process, somebody or some instrument has actually been in the presence of the bear, recording something about what the bear is doing. Without these observations of the bear per se, we would have no idea about a "bear" was!
Moreover, even though in this example somebody has actually made observations of an actual bear, you fail to see that one must make observations which support a particular hypothesis. Remember, my example showed that two GPS locations, without any information about time or method of transportation/motion, cannot be used to evaluate the proposition "bears are athletic". In exactly the same way, finding some complex biological machinery does not allow us to evaluate the proposition "the cause of biology is intelligent". In both cases, we must observe the behaviors involved. The only way to evaluate statements about behavioral capacity (e.g. athleticsm, intelligence) is to observe behaviors – there is no other way.
I could summon my own authorities, but I'd rather actually argue the issues. But no, the issue here has nothing to do with "independent prior knowledge", as I have pointed out repeatedly, since in the case of the fruitfly and the bear there is no need for independent knowledge. Why? Because we can actually make observations of the animal's behavior.
That is because the scientist carefully operationalized the definition of what they were looking for – spontaneity, defined as non-random changes in behavior that is not triggered by environmental cues. As they said,
(By the way, can you look at their data and answer the question "Is the fruitfly athletic" I would like to know the answer.)
On the contrary, hopefully you now see why it is essential.
I agree that being able to learn something – even if it isn't everything – about the mental capabilities of an entirely unknown type of entity (one that is so different from anything in our experience that it may even exist outside of time and space!!!) would be a very good trick. Unfortunately, we can learn nothing at all about the behavioral capacity of something without being able to observe behaviors.
This is like saying even if the bear took 1,000 years to go from location A to location B, and the bear didn't even walk – it happened to be dead and its body was actually carried along by a glacier – we can still conclude the bear was athletic because point A was so far away from point B. Simply by seeing the end result (the ending location), it is impossible to judge anything about the behavioral capacity of the bear. In order to see if the bear was athletic, we would have to test the actual behaviors of the bear.
In just the same way, simply observing biological forms can tell us nothing at all about the intelligence of the cause of these forms. Perhaps the cause was unable to understand anything – it could not conceive of purpose, and had no foresight. Perhaps it was a blind, purposeless, unconscious, natural, physical process that is not intelligent at all.
Nope, it is because humans build machines that look like that.
It is precisely the reason we can detect human activity, so it is perfectly relevant. And it's not just humans!
If I see a net crafted from rope and strung up to catch prey, I do not infer an "intelligent agent" in the abstract. Depending on what the net looks like, I would infer a human being trying to snare a lion or a spider trying to catch a fly. I can't tell you if a spider is intelligent or not (I would say not really, but perhaps you'd disagree). But because I know about what spiders do and what humans do, I can guess about which one is responsible.
Of course it is a completely unknown form of entity! Is it an animal, vegetable, or mineral? Is it even a physical thing? Does it exist in space-time? ID specifies nothing about this entity at all, which is what I mean by "unspecified" and "unknown".
You won't tell me what you are talking about, or how to observe it, and you cannot characterize it in a way that allows me to empirically decide if it exists or not. Thus, it is to me unknown and unknowable (I'm talking about empirically-based knowledge of course).
We know what human intelligence is, so if you are talking about human intelligence that is a meaningful concept. It is very different from spider intelligence, or thermostat intelligence, or chess-playing computer intelligence. If you want to claim that the Designer has human-like intelligence, then I will take your claim seriously, and ask you to evidence your claim (showing, for example, that the Designer's mental processes are in fact similar to human beings).
Of course you have no way of supporting that claim, however, so instead you try to relax your claim and say it isn't really human-like intelligence, it's just, you know, intelligence in the abstract. Unfortunately, nobody in ID has any idea what it means to decide if something is intelligent in the abstract (except of course "having the ability to design living things!"), so this doesn't mean anything at all.
The authors are careful to distance their carefully operationalized definitions of spontaneity from the philosophical issue of free will. The reason they do this is because they are scientists. In contrast, ID proponents attempt to equivocate on all of these mentalistic words – intelligence, will, choice, purpose, intent, and so on – and deny that operationalized definitions are required for any of them in order to investigate them.
I think the researchers are clearly on the right track:
I asked you not to go down this path. Libet wanted to support the notion of free will, but his experiments showed it did not exist as he had hoped to show. Many people interpreted his results to mean that free will was illusory (or, more properly, it is a perceptual inference rather than a causal force). Libet and others modified the notion of free will to try and make it compatible with the experimental results, including the idea that maybe we are still free to veto our actions. Further experiments (including a dramatic recent publication in Nature) have reinforced the idea of conscious will as non-causal, at least in many sorts of decision-making situations.
Now, either you want to argue that the matter has been empirically supported or you will take my advice and agree that there is no empirical resolution available to us (and no experiment that anyone has ever thought of that would resolve the issue once and for all).
Oh, goody! Here you go: Dr. Schwartz makes some of the most idiotic claims about the mind-body problem I've ever read. Here's my favorite: His highly effective treatments for OCD entail his verbal training of patients. He takes before-and-after brain scans, and shows that actual physical changes in the brain occur as a result of his verbal admonitions to patients about ignoring OCD urges. He points to these physical changes and claims they are evidence of "mind over matter", where an immaterial mind has been experimentally shown to change the physical brain.
When you stop laughing, you can mention to Dr. Schwartz that the physical change in the brain that occurs after the physical events of his treatments and accompanying the behavioral changes he observes is exactly what a materialist theory of mind would predict. If there were no physical changes accompanying the behavioral changes, he would have his evidence for dualism.
Not only can't anyone design any experiment that would resolve the issue, but the experiments that have been designed to be even suggestive about the issue have not been good news for libertarian free will proponents, who have had to introduce epicycles like "free won't" in order to salvage their ideas.
Moreover, all of these experiments are performed on subjects that are available for empirical study. Even if we could ever demonstrate "free will" in humans (and apparently we cannot) this would have no bearing the question of whether it was involved in the creation of life.
In general I'd say so, but you'll need to be more specific about those abilities for serious study. I'm not sure that humans are athletic either – i.e. if they have agility, dexterity, endurance, and acrobatic capabilities. Do you think so? Do you think the Designer of Life was athletic?
Comment by aiguy — May 28, 2008 @ 1:58 pm
May 28th, 2008 at 2:00 pm
Pez –
I'd like to compliment you on your debating. I know we disagree very strongly about all sorts of things, but you are staying on the issues and making your arguments in good faith. Thanks.
-aiguy
Comment by aiguy — May 28, 2008 @ 2:00 pm
May 29th, 2008 at 2:48 am
Hi Aiguy,
Thanks for the compliment. It's rare that somebody will accuse another of arguing in good faith. I've enjoyed this discussion quite a bit. I'm not sure we're getting far enough to justify many more exchanges, but time will tell.
I return the compliment on your participation in this discussion … with the following exceptions.
1) The first half of of your comment is entirely built upon your assertions and ignoring the refutations I have already provided. (On a second read after starting this I have responded to some individual points again, but I don't think I'll include many here.)
You return to the claim that we don't need independent prior knowledge of the entity if and only if we have actually observed the entity's behaviour. Untrue. I already delivered you the case of the polar bear footprints as well as purportedly dinosaur footprints. We can examine these with no knowledge of the entity or any observation of its behaviour and make scientific conclusions about the behaviours. We could analyse the tracks in much the same way we did the fly's flight pattern and make determinations about it.
2) This failure to support your assertions follows over into the next portion of your comment where you assert we know nothing about the designer because we can't observe his behaviours. That position is unsupported by any compelling argument and defeated by the arguments about analysing tracks and patterns after-the-fact.
3) I'm sorry but your athleticism analogy doesn't interest me any more than it interested Bradford. This is not because we are afraid of its very severe implications but because it is not analogous the way you are using it and we are just fine discussing the actual topic at hand.
And records are just fine in their absence. They are even preferable when it comes down to actual analysis.
Now you admit that we can look at the tracks left by the fly or the bear as recorded and we can garner our conclusions from these. Check.
On second thought, let's tackle this athleticism idea with which you are so enamoured and slay it forever so that it need not get you banned from any more threads. For its purported analogue, "intelligence", you've provided me the definition, "that which makes design possible, or that which designs, or the ability to design" etc.
So I don't actually have to (and have not in these discussions) refer to "intelligence". Instead I point out where design is inferred.
Please share the equivalent for "athleticism".
No, I don't forget this. What you've forgotten is I've already covered the fact that we don't need somebody or some instrument recording what the bear is doing. We can find out what he did by observing the records he makes himself. We don't even have to know what a bear is to look at the record and make our inferences.
This is not exactly the same way as you've established no correlation. And, again, I've not said "the cause is intelligent" I've said "this is designed".
We are getting very near the end of this exchange as these assertions are not changing, are unsupported, and have no grounding in argument. It seems we will have to just disagree on some things.
That is not "why". The reason is that we can actually analyse the results of that behaviour whether it is observed or not. In the case of the fly the analysis shows that the prior knowledge was incomplete and that observing the behaviour was inadequate.
Good. No comparison to another similar creature or entity is needed. Therefore, this entity could be the only one of its kind. Therefore, analysing the data, with a well-defined target, is sufficient to draw conclusions about mental capabilities.
Define this subjective attribute, please, and together we will slay your dragon.
Nope. You've given me nothing by which to alter my opinion.
Same assertion, still wrong.
It's nothing like saying that.
You've demonstrated no analogy yet. The mere fact that the two words can be used as nouns describing an attribute does not make them analogous.
Same assertion.
Then it wasn't the cause of the design.
That's exactly what has been claimed in rebuttal to the design argument and that is exactly what the design argument shows is not the case. Blind, purposeless, unconscious, natural, physical processes not intelligent at all do not explain certain patterns in nature as well as design does.
Nope. It's because a blind, purposeless, unconscious, natural, physical process that is not intelligent at all could not have and never has and has not been observed to have.
That's because ID does not draw conclusions beyond the evidence. You do not learn everything there is to know about a thing by finding out if it is an animal or not, if it is physical or not, or where it is temporally located. You can't learn from those descriptors whether or not it is capable of planning and realizing a design utilizing foresight. You can draw such an inference by studying its artifacts, however.
You can have knowledge about it without observing it. You can have knowledge, for instance, about a serial killer without observing him. I know, we have experience with people ( "Who's on first.. I don't know's on third base!")…
But, again, that is not the deciding factor in our knowledge acquisition. It is not even necessary.
By way of saying "it's human" Sorry, that's not in the cards. And it's not necessary.
My evidence for the claim that the Designer was/is human? …there is none.
No, it really is human-like in these aspects. You've just made up a definition whereby "human-like = human … period" and are now claiming this as a fact. This is not a fact.
That doesn't answer the question. What do you think they've demonstrated?
And I failed to heed your warning.
Many people didn't. Libet didn't.
They didn't have to modify the notion. First and foremost, the idea barely touches free will and the demonstration is of a readiness potential, not a determinative activity. This is evidenced by studies which don't dramatically make the lunch-hour news shows or the New York Times.
Second, the idea that free will survives and has empirical experimental support was claimed by Libet in his veto-power idea. He didn't say "maybe".
And even if this were the only aspect to free will to survive (and it is not, even by Libet's standards) the notion of veto power is intrinsic to free will and goes back to Sherrington prior to Libet, and to William James over a hundred years ago ("consciousness…will, if endowed with causal efficacy, reinforce the favorable possibilities and repress the unfavorable or indifferent ones"). It is not a post hoc salve.
"At the end of the 19th century, William James recognized that the array of things we can attend to is determined passively by neural conditions but the amount of attention an aspect of consciousness receives after it has caught our mental eye is determined by active mental processes, by what he called 'spiritual force'." 369
And then there was that fellow Paul who said as much, sans the reference to neurology, over 1800 years earlier.
That interpretation is controversial and has added nothing new to the argument. I missed the drama in it, I'll admit.
The matter is not resolved but free will has much empirical support. So the claim that one cannot state that this or that entity has free will is unwarranted. The claim that this can not be a part of a scientific conclusion is as well.
Nice of you to oblige.
This might be idiotic if this is what he had done. But it's not. He didn't admonish people to ignore their urges and it wasn't the sound of his voice or the "physical treatment" that caused the mental changes or the actual physical changes to the brain.
Materialistic theory is always telling us what it would have predicted – except it didn't. Materialistic theorists told Schwartz that he could not cause the changes by introducing such concepts as volition and attention and materialist theory does not account well for them. On the other hand, Schwartz did predict his results and he was the first to experimentally verify them.
He has plenty of evidence for his view that conscious intention and volition are responsible for the changes.
p.s.
None of your responses against Schwartz touches upon what he was reporting in the cite; the fact that Libet's own studies did not dissuade him of free will.
This is not an introduction nor an epicycle. This goes back as far as the idea. St. Paul told us that we had the choice between our good impulses and our bad ones and that the negative ones could be ignored and overridden.
I know the above has been needlessly off-topic, (and after your kind words, too) but I think clearing the air of these misconceptions justifies it.
We'll have to wait on your specifics about that ability.
Comment by Pez — May 29, 2008 @ 2:48 am
May 29th, 2008 at 5:02 am
Pez,
Again: You neglect the fact that the artifacts need to be relevant to the attribute you are investigating.
Footprints are records of where something with feet has been, and so if you were investigating where the subject walked, then you could evaluate your hypotheses against footprint data.
But if you were studying if the subject could do a crossword puzzle, the footprints wouldn't help you.
And if you were studying athleticism, you would need not only GPS readings, but also time information; else you couldn't determine if the subject was athletic.
And if you were studying foresight, you would need not only to see complex biological machinery. You would also need to see if the subject (the Designer) could solve novel problems – problems that it has not already encountered, or was born knowing. If the Designer could not learn, analyzing new problems and devising solutions, then It would not be intelligent. It would be a natural process that churned out life forms because that is what it does, just like gravity causes stars (presumably) without foresight.
And so, without being able to observe the Designer's behaviors, we can never know if It had foresight. We can't tell if an unspecified intelligent agent or an unspecified unintelligent process was responsible.
Yes, this definition renders ID a vacuous tautology (what causes the designs in nature? that which can).
Athleticism is that which enables efficient locomotion. Of course it does other things as well, just as intelligence does other things besides just enabling design, right?
One more time, then: Depending on the record you have, you can tell some things but not others.
If you are merely attempting to say that anything with behaviors that, in the end, result in complex biology machinery must be intelligent by definition, then again your theory is devoid of content.
So you are attempting to answer the question "Did the cause of living things exhibit intelligent behaviors?" and "Did It design living things intentionally, with a purpose in mind?" These sorts of questions are fraught with difficulty even for animals, where we have complete access to our subjects. But in the context of ID, where we cannot access the subject, there is no possible way to begin to answer them.
So the cause is not capable of foresight and purpose? Or foresight and purpose do not comprise intelligence? I'm trying to get this straight, really, but I've come across a lot of different takes on this.
And how do you see this applying in the context of ID? You can operationally define "intelligence" as "the ability to design living things", and you have a perfectly empty theory. And you have no other operational definitions that you could ever hope to confirm. Please, I would very much love to hear a truly operational definition of intelligence in the context of ID.
Athleticism is the ability to move with efficiency, agility, power, and speed. The exact operational definition will vary depending on the context. Just like "intelligence".
You seem to have just assumed your conclusion. (I suspect it is yet again a confusion over analytic vs. synthetic propositions). I say that biological forms may be due to unspecified unintelligent causes rather than unspecified intelligent causes. You say if the cause was unintelligent, then the cause was… not the cause. Did you mean you don't believe that any physical process could result in biological forms? Or did you mean if it wasn't intelligent then by definition it didn't cause biological forms, because biological forms are "designs" (I think it might have been clearer if you defined away the word "design" rather than the word "intelligent"…)
Therefore ID does not draw any conclusions.
On the contrary: If I tell you that something is capable of planning and realizing a design using foresight, you will have learned not one single thing that can ever be observed about this subject. If you disagree, please tell me one concrete thing you could ever observe even in principle, or tell me one single thing that it would or would not do in any situation that you can imagine. Here:
1) I tell you only that entity "X" is intelligent, capable of planning and realizing a design using foresight.
2) You tell me one single thing about "X" in any context that could be observed, even in principle
No, you can't, because you don't know if it planned or foresaw anything. It may have been following its physical structure deterministically.
It is absolutely necessary, and (to me) quite obviously so. The concept of "serial killer" does not even make sense in a world without humans/animals, so how can it not be important that we are talking about human beings?
(emphasis added in my quote) I said "human-like" and "similar to"; why do you change this to "is human" I understand you are not suggesting a human being was responsible. But you are suggesting that something with mentality somehow like a human being was involved. You are obliged to actually spell out operational definitions of the way(s) this thing's mentality was like ours, and then we can go about seeing if your claim is true.
They've demonstrated that flies exhibit spontaneous changes in flight behavior without external cues.
They didn't have to modify the notion.
They? Libet did. He really did want the data the other way around.
You may have missed Soon et al recently in Nature…. but it doesn't matter…
No, I think you're wrong, and even so other people disagreed with him… but it doesn't matter…
Yes every possible idea about volition has been advanced over the past millenia. I'm not trying to claim empirical support against causal will, even though the majority of cognitive scientists interpret Libet, Wegner, Soon, etc this way. So I think we ought to agree that at this point the question is simply open.
I agree with most neuroscientists who believe that it has none whatsoever, yet I am still willing to consider the matter open.
You are mistaken here, since there is no way to test if such a conclusion is true. Therefore, the conclusion cannot be considered scientific.
I think you'll find the opposite is true: He did indeed speak to his patients, and instruct them in mindful awareness techniques to help them with their urges. Do you not believe these verbal instructions took place? Do you not believe these verbal instructions were encoded in a physical (acoustic) medium, rather than, say, telepathically transmitted? In that case, yes of course his speaking to his patients had these effects, in a manner perfectly consistent with physicalism:
Do you think that if I entered voice commands into my computer, the physical structure of the computer could not change as a result?
Do you think this means my computer has an immaterial mind?
Sorry, I have no idea what you are talking about. A materialist is bound to believe that every mental change entails a physical change, and so obviously (and trivially) materialism predicts *some* change for every behavioral change. I am not offering his OCD treatments as some sort of evidence for materialism; my point was that it provides not one iota of support for dualism.
His therapy and his predictions are 100% consistent with materialist theories of mind, notwithstanding the anonymous and confused materialists who expected brains could register information without physical change.
Comment by aiguy — May 29, 2008 @ 5:02 am
May 29th, 2008 at 1:13 pm
HI Aiguy,
1) You've introduced a new definition of intelligence.
2) The natural process churning out life forms is a lawful necessity in your scenario and this is what the investigation rules out.
Not if foresight is part of the hypothesis.
If you thought it taulological you were dealing in bad faith by offering this as a definition. But, as I've said, the name, ID, does not define the project.
OK. How do you determine efficient locomotion?
You've added to the definition. Does agility, power and speed define "efficient" as it pertains to locomotion?
That is correct.
This is another ID strawman. The claim isn't "this is complex so it is designed". The claim is that we can measure the type of complexity and assess whether or not, being contingent, it was created by natural law, random chance, a combination of the two, or purposeful arrangement. Lots of complexity does not apparently require purpose.
Yes, there are difficulties. No, you can not rule on the possibility merely because you feel like it any more than you can on the basis of the definitions involved or the supposed tautology in the name.
You made and admitted that the term "intelligence" is moot long ago.
I showed Zach how purpose can be tested for operationally quite some time ago.
Did you not agree with it?
I see it applying to ID in that it has eliminated another of your complaints. We now know we can infer design even if we have no candidate agent and no agent identical to it from which to draw prior independent knowledge.
Given a proper record, granted, and a sufficient methodology.
1) You defined intelligent.
2) I mean that if the design is design then it demonstrates purposeful arrangement of parts and mindless, purposeless, natural, law-like, blind, random, physical, etc. causes don't do this.
Ouch. A zinger.
So you don't believe there is any evidence for ID. That's the argument in a nutshell. You've used definitions, demarcations, claims of vacuity, claims of testability, prior independent knowledge, and now "no evidence". The playbook is almost complete.
X is not completely controlled by a combination of deterministic and random forces. If I measured outputs of the activities of X they would demonstrate this.
If we can rule out chance and necessity this is not the case.
This seems odd coming from an AI guy. Does serial killer not make sense in a world of intelligent and responsible robots? Can you not tell if the activity required the actions of such a robot as opposed to that of a summer breeze? Can you not find something new about the robot by looking at what it has done … "it's killing them … on purpose!"
No, I have not slipped by referring the design back to robots, of whom we would have, in this scenario, prior knowledge. I am appealing to a particular case to defeat another of your claims – this one about serial killers and humans.
Your objections are becoming so fine-tuned that it is apparent that there is only one in-principle common denominator – "ID is wrong .. for some reason".
Because you already defined "human-like" for me. You told me that it necessarily arises from a human brain. How can I say that about the cause of a design by merely looking at the design?
It arranges parts purposefully.
But define "spontaneous" please. How does "spontaneous" relate to free will and why is it so necessarily implicated that Brembs felt obliged to comment upon it and then, in your opinion, distance himself from the conclusion?
The question of empirically proving/disproving free will? Yes, I agree that is open.
Not so. If most neurologists, Nature, and New York Times can say that free will is scientifically disproven (even if you don't agree that it has … quite yet) then the assertion of free will is just as scientific. The tests they think weigh on the one side fail and others feel , in fact, weigh on the other. You can't tell me that it is unscientific to say X has free will if it is scientific to say X does not.
Yes, the verbal instructions took place.
Your non sequitur has masked an enormous leap of logic. Yes, there is a physical imputation of soundwaves into the brain. These have a physical effect. 1) They receive countless soundwaves a day which have no such effect, so it is not the physicaity of the soundwaves that elicited an effect, but the information (non-material) content of those sound waves.
2) The physical effect caused by receiving those waves, nor the physical effect caused by the information received in those waves, caused the brain changes studied later. Those changes were the result of volitional focused attention.
3) The difference between receiving soundwaves and attention has been demonstrated experimentally.
That's not analogous to Schwartz' cases.
No they are not. Materialist theories of the mind do not/did not allow (until shown otherwise) that intention of the mind can be the cause of physical changes of the brain. Materialist theories of the mind told Schwartz that the changes could not be initiated internally.
Comment by Pez — May 29, 2008 @ 1:13 pm
May 29th, 2008 at 2:50 pm
No, you didn't. You merely introduced other terms that require operational definitions of their own rounded by an argument from ignorance. Any time you have something 'complex' and no ready explanation, then your argument leads to a conclusion of "purpose".
More fundamentally, nothing in your operational test is entailed in the hypothesis. So even if you identify something that meets the requirements there is no logical necessity for it to be connected to the assumption.
Comment by Zachriel — May 29, 2008 @ 2:50 pm
May 29th, 2008 at 3:13 pm
Pez,
Charcterizing intelligence in terms of problem solving and learning is hardly new. If your technical definition of "intelligence" for ID ignores these critical features, you may want to adopt a new term for your conception in order to prevent any confusion people might have
In any event, aren't you using "capable of producing purposeful arrangements of parts using foresight" I'm saying that if something does one thing and one thing alone, no matter what the circumstance, by virtue of physical necessity, it does not use foresight. Do you disagree with this?
What investigation might you be referring to? How does any investigation rule out that the cause of life forms operates according to lawful necessity?
1) I see complex machinery and wish to know how it came to exist.
2) I have two hypotheses: an unspecified intelligent cause, and an unspecified unintelligent cause
3) In order to decide which hypothesis is true, I need to see if the cause exhibits any behaviors which illustrate foresight, i.e. certain types of problem-solving behaviors.
Not bad faith at all – I have been clear from the very start that I believe ID is scientifically vacuous! My point is just that: If you define the "intelligence" of ID as "that which can create complex machinery like we find in biology", then obviously ID is completely vacuous. That is why we are arguing about how to gather evidence for foresight.
Like I said, the operational definition is different for each context, just like intelligence. In human beings, one test for intelligence might be a score of 70 or more on a Standford-Binet IQ test. In human beings, one test for athleticism might be running a mile in under four minutes.
Like I said, intelligence is more than the ability to design, and athleticism is more than the ability to move efficiently.
Agility, power, and speed are requisite in order to enable something to move efficiently. Carl Lewis (olympic track star) was quite obviously athletic – do you disagree? His agility, power, and speed enabled him to move very efficiently. Albert Einstein was obviously intelligent, with the foresight and purpose to come up with brilliant theories.
(Perhaps this dragon of mine is a bit tougher to slay than you'd hoped. In fact, it is a reductio of your position that you will not be able to counter. Keep trying though – it's really fun.)
Yet again we miscommunicate by confusing analytic (definitional) and synthetic (factual) propositions! I was pointing out that ID must not simply define intelligent design as "that which can create complex designs", because in that case ID is clearly vacuous (it offers a "dormative principle" conceptualization of intelligence).
Are you referring to the arguments promoted by Bill Dembski by any chance? That we can somehow all agree on what is "specified" and what is not? And that "specified complexity" has been proven to result only from "deliberate choosing" or directed contingency" or something? Is that what we're talking about now?
I think Bill Dembski's definitions of CSI are subjective, and his reasoning about "law plus chance" as opposed to "purposeful arrangement" (what Bill calls "intelligent cause") is utterly specious, since it simply assumes that intelligent cause is not itself the result of law plus chance, and fails to provide any independent characterization for how to identify intelligent cause.
So if this whole argument is going to reduce to an assessment of Dembski's notion of "specification" and CSI, that will be too bad indeed. Dembski never shows how we can ever empirically evaluate the proposition "only intelligent cause can generate CSI", because he never says how to determine if anything is intelligent except by seeing if it generates CSI!
This has nothing to do with how I feel. It is simply obvious that if we have no access to the data required to decide some question then we cannot answer the question. Even when we have access to a real, live organism in our lab, and we can gather all the data we can think of collecting, we still have can't agree on what things act with free will or conscious intent. It is therefore clear that when we can gather no data at all, we can't begin to answer these questions.
What you said to me was "It's the same test as that for not-purpose and not-will.", which is not helpful unless you say what the test for not-purpose is.
To test for gravity, we measure masses, distances and accelerations and compare them to the precise characterization of gravity provided by Newton's or Einstein's theories.
To test for purpose or will, we _______________________ (please fill in the blank).
That would require an operational definition of purpose which you are unable to provide. (Cybernetics provides an operational definition for purpose, but apparently ID folks don't like that one). So my complaint stands: While the fruitfly experiment provided a perfectly valid operational definition of "spontaneity", ID cannot (or will not) provide an operational definition of "intelligence" or "purpose" or "will" that can be applied in the context of ID.
Again, if you accept my definition (that which creates complex form and function) then you and I have just agreed that ID is perfectly vacuous, because it attempts to explain the complex form and function in biology by that which can create complex form and function.
So, once and for all, please, I beseech you: Write down the definition that you believe ID Theory employs for the term "intelligent"! It is beyond reason that a definition which offers "intelligent cause" as its sole explanatory concept leaves the meaning of "intelligent" up to the reader to decide!
More confusion! You say things like "the cause is not the cause" and "if the design is design". When you say these things, you are obviously using these words in two different ways in the same sentence (because if you not, you are saying "If P and not-P…").
I cannot tell if your statement is supposed to be true by definition or if you think it is a true contingent fact about the world.
And is this supposed to be an empirical claim, or simply the definition of "design" If the former, you must say how to show the claim is true (you can't). If the latter, you are making tautological assertions.
I still do not understand what ID is supposed to mean, because of all of this confusion regarding definitions. After all this time here in this thread, there is not one single post which summarizes the claims and definitions, and there is no single reference on the web that will do it either. Purpose, will, foresight, physical necessity, law plus chance, blind, natural… everybody has a different definition. ID hides behind a vast fortress of ambiguity and equivocation.
And you still haven't begun to tell me why offering "athleticism" is any more subjective or meaningless an explanation for some phenomenon than offering "intelligence".
This "playbook" is an enumeration of perfectly valid criticisms against ID, and you spin it like a liability for my position!
So you do indeed believe (as opposed to many others here on this forum) that in ID, intelligence must transcend physical cause. Fine, glad we got that clear.
Now, describe one single experiment that has ever been performed on anything that demonstrated any output was not the result of determinstic and random forces. Not even in the fruitfly experiment did anyone demonstrate that the behavior was not completely by deterministic and random forces! Of course there is no such experiment.
You can't say how to rule out chance and necessity, so this is moot. Dembski tries to rule out chance and necessity in his "Explanatory Filter", but of course he doesn't – he simply rules out known explanations. So the result of his E-Filter is "we do not know" rather than "something intelligent did it".
More terminological confusion: I don't consider robots "alive", so they can't be "killed".
You and other IDers keep saying things like "as opposed to a summer breeze" or "as opposed to the wind swining the axe" or "erosion and rain could not shape Mount Rushmore". This is the fallacy that I was just explaining: Just because you eliminate one paricular "unintelligent" theory (like a summer breeze) does not mean you have eliminated a whole class of explanations! Nobody thinks that rain carves statues or that wind swings axes or that "chance" creates life forms. These are all perfectly stupid theories.
Let me refresh your memory:
1) ID fails to provide a set of consistent interpretations for its theoretical concepts of "intelligence" and "design"
2) ID fails to provide operationalized definition of the terms it uses like "purpose", "will", "intent" and so on, and so ID's propositions can't be evaluated empirically.
3) ID asserts that intelligent behavior cannot be the result of law+chance without attempting to support this assertion
4) ID offers an unspecified "intelligent cause" as an explanation, but rejects "unspecified unintelligent cause" as an explanation.
These are just a few of the reasons. There are others.
No, you are putting words in my mouth. I said there was reason to believe that human-like mentality would necessarily be associated with a human-like brain, but this is an empirical hypothesis and not a logical or definitional assertion. I would say human-like intelligence would entail conscious awareness, mental imagery, sensory processing, similar characteristics of remembering and forgetting, sensory illusions, and in particular it would need to have similar emotional components (as psychologists have found that our affective processing is inseperable from our rationcination).
The only operational definition I know of for "purposeful" is "utilizing negative feedback to approach a set point"; I can help you see how that definition is operational if you'd like.
But I do not see how your "arranging parts purposefully" can be emprically determined or not. Since I do not know how to empirically detect when something is purposeful or not, you need to tell me how to do it. Once and for all: Tell me how to look at some arranger which is arranging some parts, and decide if this arranger is purposeful or not.
They said it right in the page: "the international team of researchers showed for the first time that such variability cannot be due to simple random events but is generated spontaneously and non-randomly by the brain." Spontaneous here means "not in response to environmental cues". They defined this operationally, so they could test it, and they tested it by removing environmental cues to see if the behaviors persisted. See what I mean?
As he said, these are philosophical issues. There is now way to resolve these issues by appeal to our shared experience.
Spontaneous in this paper does not mean "not random and not deterministic"!!! It means "not random and not in response to environmental cues"!
Great! Agreement!
First, I don't believe anyone says free will is "disproven" of course, because scientists and responsible journalists know that science does not "prove" things this way. (Can you provide some quotes here?) Second, obviously if some New York Times article said something like that, it doesn't mean it is science – it means the reporter misspoke.
You, I, and every cognitive scientist I have ever read agrees that neither of these statements represents a settled science, and that the question is indeed open.
The non sequitur is yours I'm afraid: There is nothing about voice recognition that requires processing anything but the "physicality" of soundwaves. When I speak into my computer, it analyzes the soundwaves and reacts based on the information encoded in those waves. No immaterial mind is involved. Information is encoded in physical media which have physical effects on physical information processing devices.
(Please note again I am showing how Schwartz's data is consistent with physicalism; I am not arguing that physicalism is necessarily true).
The changes were found later yes, after a long chain of neural events that were precipitated by the initial physical stimulus of the verbal instructions. As far as anyone can demonstrate, the brain changes were simply resultant from a causal chain of physical events.
"Receiving soundwaves" It matters what the "soundwaves" were! My computer does not respond to all soundwaves in the same way! It pays attention to my voice commands and ignores background noise. But I don't think it has an immaterial mind.
Your terse and unsupported response tells me you can't think of a way it is not analogous. Of course it is – I have shown that a physical deterministic machine does exactly what Schwartz is talking about (changing in response to information in verbal commands) without (presumably) an immaterial mind. QED.
This is utter fantasy. If you disagree, please identify this "materialist theory of mind" or its author. You won't be able to, because no materialist mind theorist would ever say such a stupid thing. My computer can spontaneously (not randomly, but not in response to environmental cues) cause physical changes inside itself. No free will. No immaterial mind. Just a machine.
Comment by aiguy — May 29, 2008 @ 3:13 pm
May 29th, 2008 at 3:33 pm
Hi Zach,
Really? When I gave you the operational tests for purpose you said that was what you had been asking for.
You then wound up on another thread indicating that the test for irreducible complexity is, in fact, a potential test for foresight.
Comment by Pez — May 29, 2008 @ 3:33 pm
May 29th, 2008 at 4:09 pm
Pez,
What Zach and I are trying to get you to see is this: What you call an operational test for "purpose" is instead an operational test for irreducible complexity. IC is (ostensibly) a property of the watch, not of the watchmaker.
We are interested in a way to demonstrate that the watchmaker acts with purpose, not in a way to demonstrate that the watch is complex, functional, or irreducibly complex. After all, "Intelligent Design" theory is supposed to say something about how to explain biological complexity, it isn't just supposed to talk about how complex and irreducible biology is… right?
Comment by aiguy — May 29, 2008 @ 4:09 pm
May 29th, 2008 at 4:19 pm
I reiterated that I was asking for an operational definition. I asked, but you still didn't answer. That's clear from the context.
In other words, I explained why you didn't provide the requested operational definition.
I had attempted to operationally define foresight in such a way that would entail empirical implications that could distinguish it from orthodox evolutionary theory. And it wasn't based on irreducible complexity which can evolve through normal evolutionary mechanisms.
In any case, you should direct those comments there.
Comment by Zachriel — May 29, 2008 @ 4:19 pm
May 29th, 2008 at 5:33 pm
aiguy,
1) Schwartz's assertion seems to rest primarily not on the doctor saying things to the subject, but the subject's internal reflection and thought. Pointing out that Schwartz spoke to the person, and soundwaves are physical, and there was a physical change in the brain, therefore the evidence is compatible with a 100% physical description… that's like saying that the patients followed signs to get to the testing lab, and sight is physical, therefore one would expect a physical change in the brain. Technically true, but too hamfisted.
2) At best, you're establishing that any normal person is going to be bombarded with sounds and sights and experiences that have what amounts to a physical experience, and thus any physical change in the brain cannot be utterly divorced from past physical events. That doesn't lead to 'physicalism is triumphant' but 'all bets are off'.
3) Given 1 and 2, it certainly doesn't seem that Schwartz is just some idiot who doesn't understand the complexities of what he's dealing with. If he thinks that physicalism re: the brain is utterly and obviously defeated, naturally that's going too far. If he thinks that his experiments and views call mainstream physicalism into question – the facts he's outlined grant him some justification. That someone's internal reflection and directed awareness can lead to the sort of brain changes he talks about is something to ponder, and informs dualist theories of mind as well as any other.
ID proponents approach questions like that in a variety of ways. For my money, there's a lot to be said in pointing out that everything we see in nature – whether complex and irreducible or not – can have an origin point in a purposeful agent. There are disputes about whether certain IC structures can occur through an unguided process – along with questions about what constitutes an unguided process to begin with.
Or, 'pointing out issues of complexity, irreducibility, and (through humans) known potential of intelligence and purposefulness is fair game with ID'.
Comment by nullasalus — May 29, 2008 @ 5:33 pm
May 29th, 2008 at 6:01 pm
nullasalus,
Materialist theories of mind hold that everything we think and do is the result of physical causality. When the OCD patient resists the urge to wash his hands, materialists believe that this is the result of the totality of all physical interactions the person has experienced and the physical operation and structure of the person himself. Both Schwartz's therapeutic intervention (his talking to them) and the patient's own internal information processing (what his brain is doing) are – in the materialist view – all causal factors in the patient's behavioral and neurological changes. Dualists like Schwartz want to say that the "internal reflections and thought" involved something besides physical changes in the brain, but they have no way to demonstrate it.
The fact that changes do occur in the brain whenever external stimuli, internal thought, or behavioral changes occur is precisely what materialism requires. Thus Schwartz's evidence is 100% consistent with materialism's (trivial) predictions. What Schwartz needs for his evidence for dualism is exactly the opposite: He needs to show that some mental/behavioral event takes place without a change in the brain.
Again – I say these are trivial predictions, because they do not allow us to claim evidence for materialism. They are consistent with materialism, but too "hamfisted", just as you say, to tell us if materialism is true.
I agree 100%, and I've indicated as much quite consistently.
Yes, it really is the case I'm afraid. He really, really does say that this "mind over matter" stuff somehow amounts to empirical evidence for dualism! The same mistake is made by other ID-friendly neuroscientists like Mario Beauregard, who claim that every time we see a placebo effect, it is an empirical demonstration that an ontologically dualistic, immaterial mental cause is interacting with our physical bodies. These are sophomoric errors.
You can ponder and question all you'd like. What these ID folks say, however, is that these data support dualism over physicalism, and that is simply false. Physicalists are perfectly aware that we humans reflect internally and are aware of things. And they would be the ones who would be surprised if these internal reflections did not always correspond with neural changes. Surprised… and completely defeated, because that would mean dualism is true. Honestly, I learned this stuff in Philosophy 101 (literally "Philosophy 101", I believe).
Yes… or not. Now, I happen to know you mean "conscious" agent when you say this, so at least I know what you are talking about. As for Kornbelt, I know he does not mean conscious agent. Bradford means an agent that transcends physical necessity (but he really doesn't know what else he means, and is unable to articulate his ideas). I'm still not sure what Pez means.
And here you are saying "guided" and "unguided" as though somebody has bothered to tell us guided by what? Guided by unconscious natural law? Guided by conscious mind? Who knows?
Comment by aiguy — May 29, 2008 @ 6:01 pm
May 29th, 2008 at 6:37 pm
aiguy,
Absolutely not. Dualists are dualists – both mental and physical are involved by their view. There is no need for mental events that take place without physical changes – that view is closer to idealism than anything. Hell, Swinburne and Plantinga – not philosophy of mind specialists by a longshot – are both on record as saying they believe mental states will correlate with brain states.
Now, they have no way to demonstrate dualism beyond objection (and conversely, no one has a way to rule it out), but they can provide evidence and argue for what they feel is a judicious interpretation of the data re: their philosophical perspective.
No, they're not errors. They are empirical evidence that Schwartz and Beauregard are interpreting within their philosophies, and against other philosophies. Schwartz, Beauregard, and others provide empirical evidence that they argue is best understood within a dualistic framework. If doing this is an error on the grounds that materialists can argue in another direction, then the entire field is absolutely riddled with tremendous abuse of data – this, where formal dualists are currently the minority.
Again, they argue that the data is better understood within a dualist perspective compared to typical physicalist/materialist alternatives. That may come across as 'dualism is clearly right, and physicalism is false', but once more, if taking such a bold stance is indicative of idiocy, the field is full of idiots. Dennett is an idiot. Hofstadter is an idiot. Crick is an idiot.
As I always say, the mere fact that that argument exists, is important to highlight. I don't feel it WAS highlighted prior to ID.
Comment by nullasalus — May 29, 2008 @ 6:37 pm
May 29th, 2008 at 7:34 pm
nullasalus,
Whoa! Here is ID's own Dr. Egnor on the matter:
from http://www.godandscience.org/e... , emphasis added.
ETA: "Dualism predicts that mental function and brain function won't always correlate, because mental function isn't the same thing as brain function." – Egnor, same page
Yes, dualists believe in the reality of both material and mental stuff. But unless there are at least some mental phenomena that occur absent physical cause, then mind-stuff is obviously a superfluous hypothesis.
Really – they say mental states must always, without exception correlate with brain states? (reference for clarity please?) This is surprising, since it entails that without a brain there can be no mind, which is not something I think would sit well with either of these gentlemen.
Again: A dualist/interactionist believes that mental states are (at least sometimes) immaterial causes, so that we can have a change of mind without any associated change in our brain. Just like the brilliant neurosurgeon Michael Egnor tells us
OK… but these subtle distinctions get lost, and what comes out is not that they are interpreting data from a philosophical perspective, but rather than scientific evidence supports their view.
No, those guys are all pretty smart. Schwartz isn't really an idiot either, even though he has made some very bad arguments. Egnor and Beauregard are just idiots
More seriously, take a look at what was said: As Pez reports, Schwartz says that materialism predicted that no brain changes would occur when the patient thought about something:
That is just an error, no matter how you spin it.
I agree, I suppose… but I think "ID" is at least 6,000 years old, and it has been highlighted ever since (under a different name).
Comment by aiguy — May 29, 2008 @ 7:34 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 5:28 am
Hi Aiguy,
By virtue of physical necessity? Right. That does not demonstrate foresight.
The test for irreducible complexity, complex specified information, information counter-flow … ID.
The machinery is the indication.
That's not the definition we've been using.
So you don't have a test for "athleticism" itself? Does a four-minute-mile test for athleticism in horses? Is your definition species-specific? Do you have tests that are not temporally defined?
Actually, as I reread this I am willing to work with the 4 minute mile as one sufficient test of athleticism, at least for human beings. See below…
Carl Lewis is/was athletic. Einstein was intelligent. How do you test for agility, power and speed?
In retrospect, I've returned to this comment and think I'll take it up a bit regardless of your forthcoming answers. In so doing I've decided to remove some of my other answers from above. I'll save them and reserve the right to refer you back at a future date.
Let's say an athletic-looking fellow around forty years old or so tells me he is Carl Lewis. I don't believe him and he shows me half a dozen olympic medals. he says he has more at home. This is pretty good evidence, I think, but not enough.
So I send him alone into a locked indoor arena and I man the only door.
I give him a couple of stop-watches and some instructions. When he comes out he shows me one watch stopped at just over 11 seconds. That's the time he ran the 100 in. Off Lewis' mark in his prime, but still pretty darn quick. He shows me the other and it's stopped at 3:58. No record, but I go it about 6 minutes.
Next I accompany him to the long-jump pit and he shows me his mark. An impressive 8 metres.
Okay, he might not be Carl Lewis, but these artifacts all evidence athleticism even though he was not observed making them, since he was alone in the arena. Right? Or do you contend that I am wrong?
ID does not say this. ID specifies what kind of complexity indicates purposeful arrangement of parts. Allen's dormitive argument regarding the "Intelligent" in "Intelligent Design" was lame when he said it it's still a non-starter. We've already discussed what its purpose in the title of the project is. Redness causes redness is not the equivalent of "certain features of life are best explained with reference to the purposeful arrangement of parts."
Yep. I did reference CSI, right? There's also Irreducible Complexity.
We don't all have to agree. That is not a prerequisite in any scientific endeavour. In fact, disagreement is to be welcomed and expected.
Science is not about proof. But yes, CSI is the result of choosing between contingent possibilities.
He admits so himself. As are most definitions and all observations.
I'm not sure he says that an intelligent cause can't itself be the result of law + chance. That would be telling us something we can't know about the cause of the design. And again, it's irrelevant. who designed the designer is not an argument, nor is 'was the designer designed'?
That is one test.
Right. And we have the data and don't need access to the subject.
We can agree when we agree on what free will and intent are. If we can't agree that the test demonstrates free will and intent we can still agree on what the data show. If "spontaneity", for instance, is not "free will" it is still spontaneity.
I thought you might have seen my response to Zach. See Zach's comment above where he quotes it. Thanks, Zach.
Eliminate necessity and random chance – the things offered as defeaters of the argument to purpose.
Nope, "perfectly vacuous" was not part of the definition I accepted. When possible I try to avoid the royalties due PvM so I tend away from the word "vacuous" altogether.
That which acts with foresight and toward a purpose. Alternatively, that which chooses/selects with reference to a goal.
But, again (but of course not once and for all) the definition of intelligence is irrelevant because the inference is to design. What is meant is obvious in the terms design, purpose, foresight, etc.
If the pattern you've called "design" does not implicate purposeful arrangement of parts it is not design.
If the thing most proximately responsible is incapable of purposeful design then it is not the cause of the design and the actual cause is yet to be found. Refer here to my domino analogy. Neither the cat, the dominoes, nor the toy auto were responsible for the design, yet each has some role as an immediate, efficient or material cause.
Induction and inference to the best explanation.
The confusion is of your own making.
I didn't say it was subjective. I want to find out what you think athleticism is and then I will show you why your inability to identify it does not likewise damn the inference to design.
Is "completely controlled by deterministic and random forces" coterminous with "physical"
Promissory notes are not science and we are not forbidden from an inference in the hopes that some other explanation will pop its head up one day. We've covered this. The inference is assertible regardless of naturalism's blank cheques.
Did you do that on purpose? The robot is not the victim but the murderer. Oh…. are you going to pretend that because it takes the death of an animal to constitute a killing then we need reference to human animals to gain knowledge of the killer?
I must say that this is the smokiest of smoky.
Once again:
Aiguy's response … robots can't be killed.
Smoke.
What does carve statues and swing axes?
Why are you so unable to draw appropriate conclusions? If it's not wind and rain what unintelligent force is it? Gravity? EM?
Why can't we learn something about the robot by seeing how it killed a person, or by accounting for the number of people it has killed? If the event is compatible with natural laws and yet is contingent then we have a case against any yet-to-be discovered natural laws explaining it anyway because none will have the power to select from a myriad of more probable states.
Disagree.
I'm still not convinced of this.
That which possesses the intelligence implied may be unspecified, but that is not the IDP's equivalent of saying "maybe there is something we don't know about or may one day discover that will explain this without recognizing its actual design".
So human-like intelligence is not necessarily associated with a human brain? Or it is?
It need not be human-like in every and all aspects to be human-like. The ability to choose, deliberate, imagine and hold goals seems human-like enough to me.
It contingently arranges parts which are well-matched to perform a function in such an improbable manner that defies random chance.
So spontaneous is "not determined and not random". Sounds like something I've heard somewhere else. And yet, here you accept it.
Really. And what would it be if it were in response to environmental cues? Since the behaviour is "indeterminate", "unpredictable", and "unlikely to be the by-product of the brain" in what way is it deterministic if it is generated by the brain not by accidental errors, not at random, and not in response to environmental cues? What determines it?
What did the co-author mean here, then:
?
====
Great!
Information encoded in a physical medium is not physical.
Who said anything about "voice recognition? You are changing the subject to justify yet another computer analogy. In fact, experimental evidence shows that a brain receiving an auditory signal is differently affected depending upon the focused attention given that signal. The signal can be identical each time and have different results.
So? Appealing to a computer program that reacts to a soundwave without attending to it merely begs the question in the same way that your "athleticism" example does. You've presumed that because the sound wave is physical and the computer reacts to it that this is all that is involved in the studies referenced. This is false.
The information was carried on the physical wave but the wave was not the information. The information could have been conveyed in writing and then you'd say "see, it was encoded in photons". The key here is that it was encoded. We are looking not at physical carriers but the immaterial information carried. AND … it was not the reception of the information itself that had the effect on the brain's neurology.
Thanks to Nullasalus for saving me some typing on this subject. I appreciate the participation. And I hope it continues … hint.
Not so. They can test the effect of willful attention and show its effects. Also, not all the subjects can respond in the same way even though they received the same environmental stimuli.
This is irrelevant. Monkeys respond differently to the same sound wave depending upon their attention and expectations. This difference in response is reflected in brain changes. Musicians respond differently to the same soundwaves when attending to them in different ways.
No you haven't. Not at all. Your inference from terseness is faulty.
You should watch your language. You're going to make yourself get upset and lose the opportunity to be stimulated by saying "stupid" so often. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E...
Intent is the key thing Schwartz was working with, and the belief in that intent.
Skinner, an eliminative materialist is one of the most prominent theorists discussed by Schwartz and his and other behaviourist's ideas were in direct opposition to Schwartz's method. Skinner argued that our subjective experience of mind as something special or different is just an illusion (a la Dan Dennett).
Below are some links to epiphenomalists. I know it's currently a trend to say they are not materialists, but:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entr...
http://plato.stanford.edu/entr...
But you're right, few would say it. But they have to fight hard to deny that it is true of their theories.
These are discussions and critiques of the implications of eliminative materialism and reductive physicalism. It's a bit of a literature dump and is unnecessary reading given that my point is made above.:
http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/ph...
http://www.phil.mq.edu.au/staf...
Comment by Pez — May 30, 2008 @ 5:28 am
May 30th, 2008 at 8:14 am
That's a serious category error. When we eliminate known sources of chance and necessity the remainder includes vast reaches of human ignorance. Indeed, any time you have something 'complex' and no ready explanation, then your argument leads to a conclusion of 'purpose'. We use hypothetico-deduction in order to break through this problem of naïve induction. Propose a valid hypothesis.
Comment by Zachriel — May 30, 2008 @ 8:14 am
May 30th, 2008 at 10:33 am
"Category error" defines a specific category of errors. That was not one of them – no matter how egregious you think it.
'Complexity' does not eliminate chance and complexity+ignorance does not=purpose.
Comment by Pez — May 30, 2008 @ 10:33 am
May 30th, 2008 at 10:40 am
Hey aiguy,
I'm sorry for sounding so pessimistic, but it seems that you do not wish to carry on a conversation with me. Is that the case? I'm only asking because again in your last comment to me here in this thread, you merely repeat my argument about how intelligence is detected by its effects as perceived by our senses.
I gave you a quote from Reid and a brief explanation. I posted:
"How else can you know anything is intelligence apart from patterns that they leave, either in the form of actions, speech, writings, artifacts, etc?
I leave you with this quote from Reid: "No man ever saw wisdom [read "design" or "intelligence"], and if he does not [infer wisdom] from the marks of it, he can form no conclusions respecting anything of his fellow creature. How should I know that any of this audience have understanding? It is only by the effects of it on their conduct and behavior, and this leads me to suppose that such behavior proceeds only from understanding. But says Hume, unless you know it by experience, you know nothing of it. If this is the case, I never could know it at all. Hence it appears that whoever maintains that there is no force in the argument from final causes [design], denies the existence of any intelligent being but himself. He has the same evidence for wisdom and intelligence in God as in a father or brother or a friend. He infers it in both from its effects and these effects he discovers in the one as well as the other"¦. From marks of wisdom and intelligence in effects, a wise and intelligent cause may be inferred. (Reprinted in Lectures on Natural Theology, University Press of America, 1981.)"
IOW, even when you have an experience with your fellow man, you can only determine his intelligence, or lack thereof, by the effects he leaves upon your senses. If everyone around was randomly bumping into walls and mumbling incoherently, there would be no effects for you to consider as signs of intelligence.
Remember that little question which begins ID research: "Can previous intelligence be detected from its effects, when nothing else is known about the intelligence?" But even then, that "anything else which is known about the intelligence" will itself only be stated in terms of the effects which that intelligence produces. Seems that so far, as long as intelligence can be defined (one aspect of which I believe I have done so already) the answer to that question is "yes."
To which you responded:
1. When did I ever say anything about learning?
2. I already defined intelligence for you in the thread "so then how did it happen" and you have not yet responded to my definition — which was all that you wanted in the first place.
3. If you actually read my comment before you responded, you would notice that I said that the only way to detect intelligence is through the effects that it leaves which we subsequently pick up through our senses. So, there is no difference between an "artifact" and an "experiment" since in running an experiment you will be picking up artifacts of intelligence through your senses in the form of visual, audible, and tactile clues.
I already stated, following IMO Reid's adequate rebuttal of Hume, that you can't know anything is intelligent except by the effects that it leaves upon your senses. The age of the effect, whether it is seconds, minutes, or centuries old makes no difference. An effect of intelligence is an effect of intelligence.
IOW, even when you have an [immediate] experience with your fellow man [or observe the actions of a gorilla or trapdoor spider], you can only determine his intelligence, or lack thereof, by the effects he leaves upon your senses. If everyone around was randomly bumping into walls and mumbling incoherently, there would be no effects for you to consider as signs of intelligence.
Likewise, you can determine that an ancient manuscript or a camera discovered on the other side of the universe originated in intelligence (as I have previously defined it).
aiguy, you also state:
Yes, differing levels of intelligence do exist and can be researched. Again, the level of intelligence is decided by the effects that it produces.
Furthermore, you seem to have ignored how I've defined intelligence and how I've explained that it is not a vacuous notion and can be used as a partial explanation when dealing with conditions — potentially necessary conditions. Does this mean that you now understand how foresight (as I have defined one aspect of intelligence) is not a vacuous notion as was your original claim. I have explained this in the thread "so then how did it happen." Apparently you wanted a different thread to respond to me but as far as I can find, you have not yet done so. In fact, all that I can find is that you have "explicitly" ignored me (if such a thing is possible).
Also, you will notice that concepts such as purpose and will (as brought up by other commenters here as definitions of intelligence) are implications of a system which has foresight and the ability to apply that foresight. Again, I have previously explained this by referring to how one "wishes" to arrive at a specific destination and then plans their future route in advance. Therefore, if you agree with my understanding of intelligence and how it can be used as a condition (albeit not the whole story as I've already explained), then you may have to consider that these notions of purpose and will, since intricately linked with foresight as I've previously defined it, most probably do have an explanatory value (when seen as an implication derived from foresight).
Comment by CJYman — May 30, 2008 @ 10:40 am
May 30th, 2008 at 11:45 am
I'm not quite sure how you are using your terms. I'll attempt to parse your statements.
Complexity implies organization, so in that aspect, it is not a random arrangement. However, complexity can arise from or be comprised of processes that include aspects of chance.
That's right, but your test for 'purpose' hinges on the equality. You observe something 'complex' and not having a ready explanation in necessity or chance, you conclude 'purpose'.
Comment by Zachriel — May 30, 2008 @ 11:45 am
May 30th, 2008 at 12:32 pm
CJYMan,
No, I'm interested in talking to everyone here. The views among IDers here have been so varied I'll admit it's been hard to keep track of who thinks what. I'll try again with you here.
I've tried to explain this to Pez; let me try again. If one is attempting to answer some question about a subject's capacity for a type of behavior, like intelligent behavior or athletic behavior, one needs to observe the relevant behaviors.
If I want to know if spider is intelligent, it is not enough for me to observe the artifact it leaves behind (the web that it builds). I need to observe the spider in novel situations to see if it can exhibit, say, problem solving skills. If the spider can't learn or use foresight to adapt to new circumstances, but instead just blindly follows hard-wired instinct to build these webs, then I would probably not consider the spider to be intelligent. However, if a human being built the very same artifact (a web made of silk), and we studied human beings to see if they used foresight to do this, we would come to a different conclusion: Humans would have to learn how to make a web, because they do not know this by instinct, so this would probably mean they are flexible and adaptive enough to be considered intelligent.
Again: Two entities make the very same artifact, but in one case we had a highly intelligent human being figuring out how to make a silk web, and in the other case a sterotyped instinctive animal who apparently lacks enough foresight to solve any novel problems.
Likewise if I want to know if bears are athletic, it is not enough for me to observe the "patterns that they leave". I might see footprints in the snow that go for many miles, but unless I can tell how long it took for the bear to traverse some distance, I can't know if the bear moved efficiently and with agility and speed, so I could not say if it should be considered athletic.
Hopefully you can see now why looking only at artifacts, without anyone ever being able to record the subject in situations where their actual behaviors can be observed, is not sufficient in order to answer questions about behaviors.
If an animal is incapable of learning anything, then I have no idea why you would ever say it has foresight. Foresight (if I understand you) requires seeing the solution to a problem in advance of actually trying it. Another way of saying this is that the subject figures out or learns a solution that was previously unknown to the subject.
So, most scientists who study behavior including "learning" as a critical component for considering an animal intelligent. If an animal repeats the same behaviors no matter what circumstance it is in even when those behaviors result in the animal's death or failure to reproduce (like a spider), it's hard to see that animal as intelligent. Likewise, if an animal was incapable of moving quickly or efficiently, it would be confusing to call that animal athletic.
If you want to use this same word "intelligence" in a technical definition that is very different from the way we use the word in common usage, of course you can. I just wonder why you wouldn't pick another word, since most people do not think of things that can't learn to solve novel problems by using foresight as intelligent.
Bradford locked me out of that thread, so our discussion was cut off. Can you refresh my memory? (Again, I've been given a large number of very different definitions here!)
Please read my response above once again to see that the issue is not whether we are observing behaviors in person or after the fact by means of records. Rather, the issue is that we must record data about the actual behaviors we are interested in. For athleticism, this would be data about how quickly the animal moved (evidence of athletic power). For intelligence, this would be data about how flexible and adaptive they are (evidence of foresight and reasoning).
No, not at all. Rather, the level of intelligence is decided by the problems the subject can solve. An entity hard-wired to do one thing and one thing alone no matter what the circumstance does not evidence foresight, no matter what that one thing is.
Again, IDers are all over the map with what they mean by "intelligence", even on this one forum. My claim was that ID needs to qualify the term in order to have content. You've chosen "foresight"; others have chosen all sorts of other attributes.
Again, for reasons known only to Bradford, he has blocked my access to two threads now, relegating me to this thread. He doesn't like my arguments, apparently.
Pez – I'll respond to your post in a bit.
Comment by aiguy — May 30, 2008 @ 12:32 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 12:33 pm
I reread your comments, but can't find your definition. It's a rather long thread. Can you please provide your definition without elaboration? Thanks!
Comment by Zachriel — May 30, 2008 @ 12:33 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 1:22 pm
Hi Aiguy,
This is not an explanation but an assertion.
And a refuted one at that.
Comment by Pez — May 30, 2008 @ 1:22 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 2:22 pm
Pez,
I think until somebody actually writes a technical glossary for the terms you are using we will be talking past each other. Why do you say foresight cannot occur by virtue of physical necessity?
Furthermore, if something does one thing and one thing alone no matter what the circumstance, whether by physical necessity or not, would you say that demonstrates foresight? Of course not. So, since you can't tell if the Designer was capable of doing anything else in any other situation, you can't tell if the Designer had foresight.
I've already said I believe these ideas (CSI, IC, and especially "counter-flow") to all be hopelessly confused. No scientists who study intelligence use any of these concepts. But I don't want the discussion derailed here, so let's just bracket this. I will only say that whatever these ideas are, they are characteristics of artifacts, and not characteristics of the cause of the artifacts.
Imagine a spider and a human both making spider webs. Two entities make the very same artifact, but in one case we had a highly intelligent human being figuring out how to make a silk web, and in the other case a sterotyped instinctive animal who apparently lacks enough foresight to solve any novel problems, but making the very same artifact.
Sure, I have lots of tests for athleticism! Don't you have lots of tests for intelligence?
No, the test for athleticism in horses is different. Likewise, you couldn't give a horse a Stanford-Binet IQ test, right?
No, only the tests are species specific. How about for intelligence – is your definition species specific?
Yes.
Can't you see by now that I can keep this up as long as you'd like, and you will never be able show that "athleticism" is any more subjective or useless or vacuous in the context of ID than "athleticism" is? Both of these labels are simply loose, descriptive terms for various abilities that we informally lump together, but which can be given specific operational definitions only for particular entities.
For about the fourth time: The issue is not if we are physically present with our bare eyeballs or if we see records of the relevant behaviors. The issue is that we observe data on the relevant behaviors. If we get a record of the distances and times from Carl's motions, we can judge his athleticism. If we only get a photograph of him crossing the finish line, however, we have no idea if he is athletic or not.
What would really be dumb would be to attempt to explain how Carl managed to run so fast by saying "It is because he is athletic". Hopefully you can see this tells us nothing we did not already know!
So you still haven't slain my dragon, Pez – he is still standing in front of you, and taunting you to reply: How is calling some "intelligent" any more informative than calling something "athletic" when you have no idea what sort of thing you are talking about? Is the moon athletic because it circles the Earth so quickly? Is a termite colony intelligent because it can build a complex functional structure? Can't you see these sorts of questions are matters of definition rather than discovery?
I don't care how ID characterizes biological forms; I care about how ID attempts to characterize the cause of these forms. If ID restricts itself to talking about how complex and purposeful flagella are, then it has nothing to say about what caused the flagella.
But you are wrong, because ID does talk about what caused flagella. They say it was "intelligent cause". ("Certain features of biology and universe are best explained by intelligent cause" – does this ring a bell?)
The way I said it is the way all of the leading ID authors say it – why did you change it? Do you deny that "intelligence" is required to create a "purposeful arrangement of parts" This seems like nothing but obfuscatory wordplay to me.
First, of course he is saying intelligent cause can't be the result of law plus chance – his explanatory filter asks us to distinguish the result of intelligent cause on one hand from the result of any combination of law+chance on the other hand. If intelligent cause is itself the result of law+chance, this makes no sense.
And besides, you have said this yourself, e.g. "By virtue of physical necessity? Right. That does not demonstrate foresight."
But that is that only empirical test ID offers! In other words, that is the operational definition of intelligence in the context of ID. And that is exactly why I say "intelligence" in the context of ID is a dormitive principle:
Q: What caused the CSI in biology?
A: Intelligence.
Q: What is intelligence?
A: It is operationally defined in ID as "that which can cause CSI"
Yes, we can show that the subject showed behavior that was not random and not triggered by environmental cues. This has nothing to do with ID. We can't show free will and intent, and that means these are not scientifically useful terms in the context of ID.
1) You cannot show that necessity+chance does not account for intelligence itself. You have admitted this yourself in your very last post.
2) You cannot eliminate all necessity and random chance, because you are not omniscient, and cannot say what other forms of necessity there may be
3) Even if you eliminate necessity and chance, there is nothing to tell us what might be remaining. It might be "mojo" or "magic" or "free will" or "the intrinsic geometry of hyperspace inversions" or…
Again, if you are not saying that "intelligence" is "the best explanation for certain features of biology…" then you are not talking about what I'm interested in. If the definition of intelligence is irrelevant, then you are not talking about intelligent agents creating life, and I really don't know what you are talking about, but it is not what I think of as "intelligent design". Once again, from the DI website:
The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause
These are two of ID's tricks that do not work:
1) Conflating "no known explanation" for "ruling out chance and necessity"
2) Casting "intent/purpose/intelligence" as the default conclusion once chance and necessity has been "ruled out".
Using ID's own tricks:
1) I rule out chance and necessity as explanations for protein folding, because nobody can explain how proteins fold by any combination of chance and necessity. That means nobody will ever find out how proteins fold inside of cells in terms of law+chance.
2) Since it's not chance and necessity, it must be "magic"
So I've demonstrated that proteins fold inside our cells by means of magic.
Human beings.
Just stupid, I guess.
I have no idea what it might be, but I'm sure it's not wind and rain – so wind and rain have nothing to do with it.
1) We can't explain how proteins fold inside cells. Wind and rain can't explain it, so it must not be any unintelligent force.
2) Therefore a little intelligent demon must live inside each of our cells folding up our proteins, day in and day out…
Nobody knows for sure. It is not logically necessary. There is reason to believe that either the specific neurological structures in human brains, or a physical analogue of those structures, is required. If a physical analogue will work, nobody can say what particular physical features must be present (will transistors do? what about artificial microtubles?).
Again, without operational definitions these are useless. A thermostat chooses and deliberates – prove me wrong empirically. How do you test for when something is "imagining" if it can't talk?
This sort of talk is like saying that the moon is athletic because it moves around the Earth so fast.
I think this can be done by things that are not purposeful. How can we empirically decide who is right (since we can't just ask if somebody is doing it on purpose or not).
Are you doing this on purpose? You keep changing "not in response to environment cues" into "not determined". Did you think we would not notice?
Of course "determined" is different from "in response to environmental cues"!
I take "determined" to mean "necessitated by antecedent physical cause". The authors are not claiming that the fly's behavior is not caused by antecedent physical cause – only that it triggered by internal rather than external cause.
They've told you what they think. Once again:
They are talking about a physical brain which implements a physical function that generates physical signals to initiate physical behaviors, where the function does not use input from environmental cues.
He says what he means:
The fact that you confused the notion of "determined by external factors" with "determined by physical cause" illustrates once again the need for careful definitions. The behaviors in the fly's brain are determined (as far as we can tell!) in the philosophical sense of determinism, but the antecedent causes arise within the brain function they describe rather than being caused by external cues.
Same subject: Both computer and OCD patient recognize the meaning of the information contained in the soundwaves.
This is of course exactly the same for computers. Depending on the state of the computer, it may pay attention to commands, interpret them differently, or ignore them altogether.
Neither of these examples beg the question, and you have not said how you think they do. You just dismiss them by claiming they beg the question, but they don't.
I have consistently pointed out that it is neither demonstrably false nor demonstrably true, but certainly nothing that Schwartz has shown is in any way inconsistent with or would not be (trivially) predicted by materialist theory.
Both the computer and the human interprets the immaterial information carried. I think we agree that the computer does not have an immaterial mind, however.
You and Schwartz believe this, others may not, and there is nothing you can do to decide the issue. That is why Schwartz was wrong to imagine he had evidence for dualism.
I think you should take some points from nullasalus – he is quite a bit more clear about these issues I'd say, and I disagree with very little of what he says in general.
None of this is evidence for dualism.
Please answer this question: If dualism is false, does this mean your conception of ID is also false?
So you think this means monkeys have immaterial minds? (hint: computers respond differently to the same sound wave depending on their attention and expectations).
As do computers.
Either tell me why the computer analogy is faulty or withdraw your claim; your unsupported charge just doesn't cut it.
Who said anything about "eliminativism" Stop it with these bait-and-switch bluffs, Pez – do you think we won't notice? If you continue reading your Wiki you will see that not all materialism is eliminativist materialism. I know many materialists but I've never actually met an eliminative materialist.
And even with that error that you've made, you've still confused the claims of even eliminative materialists! Just because they say "intent" does not exist does not mean they believe no brain changes could occur when someone is trained in Schwartz's technique! They of course would all believe that brain changes must occur!
[here you have some completely irrelevant historical information about behaviorists...]
Neither you nor Schwartz understands these positions, apparently. First, can you name anyone who is a Skinnerian behaviorist? I didn't think so (shall I accuse "immaterialists" of thinking God hurls lightning bolts at Churches?). Really, this is a joke – Skinner's failed behaviorism is rejected by every materialist cognitive scientist I know. Moreover, even a Skinnerian behaviorist would never say that no brain changes would result either from external stimuli of training or further processing of information inside the brain.
Pez, I'd like to clear up issues with you regarding how ID tries to infer mental attributes of the Designer by studying the evidence of biological forms. I do not want to argue philosophy of mind with you, however – sorry. I'm quite familiar with all of the arguments you've cited, but thanks for the references anyway.
I think these are the main points remaining:
1) Do you or do you not believe that ID Theory claims that "intelligent cause" constitutes a scientific explanation for the complex form and function we see in biology? If you do not think that ID attempts to do this, I think we needn't go any farther.
2) How can I decide if Carl Lewis is athletic if all I have is a picture of him at the finish line and I don't know how fast he's run? Maybe somebody carried him there, or it took a year to crawl the track.
Likewise, how can we decide if something uses foresight if all we have is the resulting artifact and we don't know if it can solve problems? Maybe the Designer has no foresight at all, and the one and only thing it does is output these life forms.
And finally, one more time:
How can I decide if the bear is athletic from only GPS, if I don't know how long it takes him to traverse the snow, or even if he moved under his own power? I cannot.
How can I decide if the Designer used foresight to create a flagella if I don't know if the Designer is capable of solving novel problems? I cannot.
Comment by aiguy — May 30, 2008 @ 2:22 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 3:00 pm
All –
I'm looking for the best way to cut through all the confusion and the miscommunication that I see at the heart of these debates. People use all of these words differently, and we continually talk past each other.
I think that words "intelligence", "intelligent cause", "foresight", "will", "purpose", "intent", "mind" and others are constantly being used in ways that make no sense with respect to our experience in the context of ID. By this I mean either the words are used in ways that are too ambiguous to interpret in the context of ID, or they are used in meaningful ways that can't be evaluated against our shared experience by looking at the data.
So I'd like to focus on this analogy that I've come up with that I believe makes these issues much clearer.
"Athleticism" is the label we apply to various sorts of behaviors; the same is true of "intelligence". The tests for athleticism vary for each thing we test; we give a human a different test than a racehorse. Same with intelligence – we test the intelligence of an octopus one way, and a human being another way, and the Cause of Living Things yet another way.
Given that, I propose: "Athletic Cause Theory (ACT) says that certain features of biology and the universe are best explained by athletic cause".
Now, I believe that ACT is a perfectly ridiculous theory, because it really doesn't mean anything at all to apply the notion of "athleticism" to natural phenomena in general. I claim that it is meaningless to say, for example, that the speed of light is so fast because light is athletic.
However, I claim that this loose notion of athleticism is perfectly analogous to the loose notion of intelligence. Neither one of these ideas can serve as a useful explanation for anything. It is just as meaningless to say that "intelligence" explains the complex forms in biology as it is to say that "athleticism" explains how cheetahs can run so fast.
Can anyone refute this argument? To summarize my argument:
1) Explaining the speed of light or the running ability of a cheetah by appeal to "athleticism" is vacuous.
2) Explaining the existence of complex forms in biology by appeal to "intelligence" is vacuous in the same way, for the same reason.
To refute my argument, please tell me either
1) Why "athleticism" is actually an informative explanation for natural phenomena in general, such as how cheetahs run fast or how proteins fold up in cells so quickly
OR
2) Why "intelligence" is different from "athleticism" when both of them refer generally to the ability to do certain types of behaviors, and when neither of these concepts can be given a single, objective, uniform method to empirically decide what is athletic and what is not, or what is intelligent and what is not.
Anyone? Anyone? Beuhler?
Comment by aiguy — May 30, 2008 @ 3:00 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 3:06 pm
HI Aiguy,
I don't have time even to look over your comment right now but I do want to work on this dragon of yours.
You aren't answering my question. Can I tell that this fellow, who shows me the stop watches and shows me marks in the sand is athletic?
That's a later question – and, as I said, it is not analagous. For now, we have a question about this would-be Carl Lewis.
That's all he can do right now.
You've dashed off with a half-dozen questions, but I asked you only one on this subject.
This fellow I didn't observe running or jumping, is he athletic?
Using your terminology, is the fact that one stop-watch is stopped under four-minutes and the other at 11 seconds best explained by his athleticism? Is his athleticism indicated by the marks in the sand?
Comment by Pez — May 30, 2008 @ 3:06 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 3:39 pm
aiguy,
As far as we can tell, which is 'not very much at all'. Determinism, especially when related to brains, is an open question. The door has always been opened enough for determinists to think 'Well, if we had perfect information, it would be determinist' and their opponents to think 'Well, we can't have perfect information, because it's not determinist'.
I'm pounding on this point, but I think it's fair game: You're taking Schwartz to task for acting as if the evidence were consistent with a dualistic (and there are many specific dualist points of view) perspective, perhaps moreso than a physicalist one. Do I even need to quote Dennett's infamous treatment of dualists, ranging from Swinburne to Chalmers to otherwise? How about others' treatment? Why did Lycan feel it necessary to, even as a physicalist, write a paper admitting that the case for dualism is roughly as good as the case for physicalism with regards to the merits of reason?
Maybe it's not a popular position nowadays, but they do exist. I think Pez is saying that Schwartz's discoveries were difficult to integrate with some physicalist schools of thought, and consistent with some dualist schools of thought. We all know that this field is wide open – you can believe in a soul by way of neutral monism, you can be a dualist and a materialist.
This really all seems to be coming down to 'Schwartz & Co. do what just about every other person in this field does, with as much justification.'
You and I both know why Skinner's behaviorism is classified as 'failed' – because once upon a time (on the order of years, rather than many decades or centuries) it was popular. Deeper investigation into the mind combined with popular motion among philosophers and scientists led to its downfall – but it had an 'up' to fall down from.
Not really my thing, but just for the hell of it: Because intelligence draws a circle that includes questions and possibilities of 'mind' (potentially defined in a broad number of ways) as the instigating event, while athleticism can only be drawn around a physical capacity to perform (unless, of course, it presupposes a mind or the mind-like).
Comment by nullasalus — May 30, 2008 @ 3:39 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 6:37 pm
Pez,
He is ready to smite you.
I'm sorry, I don't understand – you are asking me if you can tell that some person who is showing you the times and marks is athletic or not? If so, then yes, if you give him tests to see if he is athletic, then you can answer that question.
Likewise, if you give me information regarding Lewis' running times and jumping distances in various standard events, I can tell you if he is athletic or not.
As I said, it is quite analogous, because both "intelligence" and "athleticism" are descriptive terms for various different types of behaviors, and neither have operational definitions that can be applied in arbitrary contexts. You have never yet said why you think the analogy is not valid.
I can't say, since I don't know what he can do (except relay to you the results of Lewis' performance). You would need to have this fellow participate in some track events (or golf, or ping-pong, or whatever sport he might do) before we could say if he was athletic.
Athletic Cause Theory explains Lewis' ability to run fast by appeal to the concept of "athleticsm". The stop watch is an instrument used to measure Lewis' running speed; other instruments could be used instead. Lewis' athleticsm does not explain the stop-watch readings, however, since the stop-watch might have been stopped by all sorts of things. We would need to ascertain that the watch reflected the time Lewis actually took to run under his own power the complete distance involved.
Not necessarily, no, since the marks in the sand might have been made by something that was not athletic at all. You need to observe that Lewis himself made those marks by jumping from a certain point, without intermediate touchdown, and without a jet-pack strapped to his back, and so on. Once you observe that Lewis actually accomplished an athletic feat, you can (according to ACTheory) explain the result on account of his athleticism.
Comment by aiguy — May 30, 2008 @ 6:37 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 6:37 pm
nullasalus,
Yes, for all we know, flies might have immaterial, contra-causal minds. (And so might rocks for that matter, but that's just getting ridiculous I suppose).
Yes, and QM makes all of this even more harder to sort out.
No, I take him to task for saying things that are false: He claims that materialist theories predicted that no brain change could occur from people thinking about things like "mindful awareness". But not even the behaviorists would have made this claim, much less modern materialist theorists, so that is patently false.
What, his mysterian remarks? Sure, quote away – I'm really not a Dennett fan at all.
And I agree with most of what he said too.
I've already told you I'm no materialist. I don't even think "materialism" makes sense, because it really alludes to a type of material – of physical cause – that nobody has believed in since the quantum revolution. Are quantum probability waves "material" or not? I can't say. Besides, I consider qualia a hard problem that can't begin to be couched in terms of any physics we can conceive of. So I call myself a neutral monist, but I don't pretend it means too much. Nothing explains our phenomenology, but it's not the sort of physical stuff we usually think of as "physical" so I'm not physicalist, and it doesn't help to call it irreducible res cogitans either so I'm not dualist. So neutral monism is the way I can say essentially nothing about what I think is going on, but at least not multiply my ignorant hypotheses
But he never even tries to show what makes it hard to integrate his results within materialism – he simply pretends that his results violate the predictions of materialism, which you and I know is not the case.
So you know I understand: I was an undergraduate at a major university in 1972-1976, more than a decade after Chomsky et al took radical behaviorism apart. Still and yet, that is exactly what I was taught – because that is what my professors knew. Imagine my disillusionment when I finally found out behaviorism was incapable of explaining behavior.
But now it is thirty years hence, and for Schwartz to position his findings against Skinnerian behaviorism at this point really is a strawman argument. And besides, once again, what he said about materialism wasn't true even if he takes Skinner to be the touchstone for current materialist thought. Even Skinner would not argue that the brain would not change when a behavior changed. (Skinner just wouldn't care about that particular issue, actually, because it was not the sort of "behavior" he was interested in.)
As usual, nullasalus, you are spot-on. Yes, that is the salient difference… but it's a bit worse than you suggest.
"Intelligence" is a word that we use in informal and inconsistent ways to describe mental abilities of various sorts. "Athleticism" is a word that we use in informal and inconsistent ways to describe physical abilities of various sorts. Either of these words can be given precise operational definitions, but only for particular contexts – there are no meaningful empirically grounded definitions of either of these words that can apply universally to any sort of animal or entity.
Now, while it sounds reasonable to most people to explain how something like a flagellum comes to exist by appeal to "intelligence", it does not sound reasonable to explain how something like a flagella moves by appeal to "athleticism". Why should this be?
The reason is because most people reify the concept of intelligence, but not the concept of athleticism. The reasons most people offer for treating "intelligence" as a causal thing instead of a descriptive label are very confused, because they can't stop mixing up intelligence with our subjective experience of volition.
Most IDers deny that these issues are problematic for ID, but of course they are central to the very core tenets of any version of ID. In order for ID to even have meaning that we can evaluate the truth of, it must argue for some particular theory of mind that shows intelligence is a causal force rather than a description of our abilities. There are no books on ID per se that even attempt to do this! There is, however, a book listed on this forum's right margin – "Agents Under Fire" by Menuge – that does address these issues (poorly, in my opinion, but at least he's in the ballpark).
In order to have a meaningful ID theory, IDers need to drop the equivocations, the pretense that folk psychology is adequate to their needs, and put a stake in the ground for dualistic interactionism – or whatever they really are talking about when the use this damnably undefined term of theirs. They won't, however, because then they must drop their pretense that ID has somehow moved from philosophy/theology into the realm of science.
In the end, the athleticism analogy shows that it is perfectly absurd to attempt to explain anything by reference soley to "intelligence" without any other qualification, the way ID tries to do in it's canonical definition of "…features best explained by intelligence cause". It is exactly as absurd as explaining something by reference to athletic cause.
Comment by aiguy — May 30, 2008 @ 6:37 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 8:28 pm
aiguy,
No need to even move to 'immaterial and contra-causal' – our current knowledge of physics alone is a big question with regards to determinism in brains, even fruit-fly brains – and that's what I was mainly referring to here.
Dualists and materialists agree that a change in brain will correlate with a change in thought (they may disagree on which is prompting which, etc), and 'there will be a change in brain state from moment X to moment Y' is trivial when generalized that much. But the focus is on whether an internal mental dialogue and directed thought could lead to the sort of changes Schwartz records. Are you honestly telling me that every and all materialist theories about the brain presupposed that problems like OCD could be overcome by mental focus and dialogue? Or even the clear majority of them?
I'm not saying 'Can some materialist theory accept this with modification' or 'Is there a materialist theory that could accept this'.
I know you're not. But just for the hell of it:
Dualism (the view that minds are composed of some nonphysical and utterly mysterious stuff) . . . [has]been relegated to the trash heap of history, along with alchemy and astrology. Unless you are also prepared to declare that the world is flat and the sun is a fiery chariot pulled by winged horses "” unless, in other words, your defiance of modern science is quite complete "” you won't find any place to stand and fight for these obsolete ideas.
I know you're not. And I agree with you entirely about materialism – I think the word (along with 'naturalism', for what it's worth) is comedy at this point.
But I'm pointing out that you're coming down on Schwartz, Beauregard, etc hard for asserting that developments in mind/brain studies and philosophy have bolstered dualism (on the grounds that there are physicalist or materialist theories that can accept them), when the fact is that these books are not just in the minority of writings, but frankly tend to take a defensive stance. Because the general attitude is (wrongly, as we both know) that dualism was put to the sword by neurology studies, as if it wasn't until Freud that people, dualists included, had a feeling this 'brain' thing was involved in thought.
Disagree with Schwartz, sure. Question his tone. But you're throwing out 'idiot' and, in essence, 'liar' for what amounts to a drumming up of support for a dualist friendly stance, in an arena where Dennett among others (And for as much as we both have a low view of some of his thoughts, we have to admit he's not exactly a small name in philosophy of mind) can.. well, hey, I did provide the quote. Again, I know you said you agree, but: Why did Lycan write what he did? Apparently, it was because he knew that the field was and is rife with an utter fabrication of the rational standing of dualism in philosophy of mind.
I think all I'm saying here is: Okay, I know you dislike ID, and you likely disagree with Schwartz's tone. But come on. Let's have some perspective here.
The issue is what changed the behavior, how it changed. Again, 'the brain will change between time X and Y' is trivial – almost everyone can get behind that. Once we get past that, the question is whether developments highlighted by Schwartz or the placebo effect, etc, are best described as 'physical acting on physical' or 'mental acting on physical'. Schwartz and others (of varying positions) think something closer to the latter is in play, rather than the former, and make their arguments accordingly. I'd criticize them (however limited, given the circumstances) if I saw them making ridiculous, over the top claims. I don't see it here. Instead it's the sort of fight you get in philosophy of mind debates that are reasonably cordial.
Mostly because athleticism may or may not involve something mindlike, so while athleticism may potentially explain an aspect of the flagella, it's leaving other questions unanswered. For my money, you may as well replace 'athleticism' with 'physicalism' here, so this example isn't doing the work some would like it to.
Honestly, in my following of ID and related news and views, the fight is largely about philosophy anyway, on all sides. But hey, I'm biased on that point.
Your complaint amounts to 'you need a firm definition of intelligence in order to test it or propose it in the scientific arena', which I agree with. I think there've been attempted moves towards this (Dembski apparently tries to establish something with math, Behe by appeals to limits of evolution), but I remain a skeptic of the ID end of science. On the other hand, I think questions of 'could intelligence have directed past causes' are wide open, even testable to a point – just hit the computer simulation. In fact, I think the mere existence of computer simulations has permanently exploded this debate, even if the ramifications haven't caught up with most of the philosophers yet.
Actually, that's an interesting question: Is 'an intelligent agent with the appropriate knowledge and ambulatory abilities could create life from non-life' a scientific statement? How about 'humans are able to front-load particular events in nature'? I mean, I always knew 'intelligence' of that type could be considered or offered up, but I'd like to know if those are scientific proposals.
Comment by nullasalus — May 30, 2008 @ 8:28 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 9:02 pm
Hi Aiguy,
I'm still short on time but I will respond to your gasping dragon again and see if you will let him out of his cage to fight me.
Let him out. You understand perfectly well. You have the situation and the data. Can you tell if this fellow is athletic or not? You aren't giving him more tests or other tests. He has already been given the test. He has the stopwatches and the long jump marks as data. What say ye?
You'll see if you quit wet-nursing this ferocious dragon that none will face.
Ah. I should have read the whole thing before baiting your fierce dragon. Here comes the poor thing, limping out to face me.
Poor dragon is a goner now. He got killed and doesn't even know it.
There you go.
Not necessarily? Try not at all.
You need to observe Lewis himself making the marks. You don't know if he walked out to the mark and rubbed out the other ones. You don't know that he didn't stop the watches while he sat on a chair having a smoke.
Now, consider the following:
Let's say an intelligent-looking fellow around years old or so tells me he is local wiz kid, Dexter Poindexter. I don't believe him and he shows me half a dozen academic awards, He says he has more at home. This is pretty good evidence, I think, but not enough.
So I send him alone into a locked examination room and I man the only door.
I give him a a few tests and some instructions. When he comes out he shows me one one previously well-scrambled Rubick's cube, now solved. He gives me his IQ-test answers and his score reveals an IQ of 157.
Next I accompany him into the room and he shows me a beautiful model of a three story loft he made with the lego blocks I gave him. He also gives me the proof of Pythagoras' theorem written out in the blank note-book I gave him as well as a poem he wrote.
Okay, he might not be Dexter Poindexter, but these artifacts all evidence intelligence even though he was not observed making them, since he was alone in the arena. Right? Or do you contend that I am wrong?
There's your dragon – analogy failed.
There are ways to have faked the tests given the ostensible Mr. Lewis which would in no way implicate athleticism as the cause. Yes indeed, you would have to observe him in order to conclude that athleticism was the cause of the artifacts. The artifacts can not evidence athleticism.
Contrast this to the Pindexter case and you see that intelligence is at play regardless of the ways you will now try to dismiss it. Did he cheat? Even if you excuse away every instance as someone else's work or some kind of cheat memory, learning, creativity and foresight are all indicated. The artifacts themselves demonstrate this. None of your reasons for demanding a different level of observation apply equally to the test for intelligence as they do for athleticism. The necessary qualifications for athleticism are just irrelevant in the case of intelligence.
You should be able to light your cigarette with your dragon's last breath.
Do give him a proper burial.
===
Oh, one more thing. I see Nullasalus (thanks, Null) has addressed a complaint you had about me referring to eliminitivism. You are calling it a bait-and-switch, as though it does not address your question.
But it does.
You said:
Eliminitivism is a materialist theory and is applied. So is epiphenomalism a materialistic theory, although now primarily rejected and distanced from the materialists. As is Dennett's functionalism, which is a denial of mental states at all, including "intent", which is what Schwartz is relying upon.
None would ever say it? False.
Comment by Pez — May 30, 2008 @ 9:02 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 11:12 pm
Nullasalus,
I must repeat that only dualists believe that thoughts/mental states can change without a corresponding change in brain states. Materialism would be refuted by such a finding.
If the OCD was relieved but scans found no evidence of brain change (of the sort Schwartz found), then Schwartz would surely have touted that as evidence of dualism, because immaterial mind must have been operating to change behavior without the involvement of the physical brain. Given the brain changes did occur, Schwartz touted that as evidence of dualism too, because… he believes in dualism.
There were no materialist theories of brains that either presupposed or predicted OCD could be overcome this way. Some materialists might have thought so, and others may not have, but neither of these opinions derived from either materialism in general or any particular materialist theory of mind. Likewise for dualism. It is neither more or less difficult to "integrate" Schwartz's findings into either metaphysics.
This shows that materialists are measured, smart, and correct, while you dualists shouldn't be allowed to drive. What's the problem?
Ok, you're right about this, I'm wrong. Thanks for pointing it out.
First a defense: I said his arguments were idiotic; and when I called the people idiots I indicated that was not (completely) serious. Now, my confession again: The tone of my rhetoric was out of line in any case, but especially so in light of your point regarding materialist polemics.
Now, that said: Schwartz is very good at treating OCD, and Michael Egnor is a successful surgeon. However, in my opinion, Schwartz is confused about what the predictions of materialism and dualism are, and Egnor is confused about virtually everything he writes on the topic. Can we leave it at that?
I hate it when somebody looks at a reductio ad absurdum and thinks it's not absurd. Can you tell me how "athleticism" might explain some aspect of flagella please?
But it's worse than that – these very pages reveal constant and unrecognized equivocations between functional and behavioral definitions of "intelligence". It's not just that these definitions need a bit of tightening up – it is that IDers run blithely around in circles claiming that if they define "intelligence" as the ability to generate CSI then finding CSI in biology will be evidence of Intelligent Design.
Dembski is the absolute master of equivocation on this point. I've seen quotes from him defining intelligence as "directed contingency" (something indistinguishable from libertarian free will) on one hand, then turn around and claim the definition is that which creates CSI, and finally complain bitterly when we press him to decide what meaning he'd like us to take. I won't use any bad ad hominem words here, but this guy… takes the cake.
I don't think I've caught up with it yet, actually. It's less about us living in a simulation for me, and more about why AI isn't an absolute defeater for Dembskian characterizations of intelligence (i.e. the "not by law or chance" definition).
My answer is no, it is not a scientific statement, for all the reasons we've been discussing: If you hypothesize the statement is true, then if some candidate agent failed to create life, it would mean only that it lacked either the requisite intelligence or the appropriate knowledge or ambulatory abilities. Without an independent method to measure intelligence and knowledge of arbitrary entities, your statement is scientifically undecidable.
Comment by aiguy — May 30, 2008 @ 11:12 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 11:15 pm
Pez,
If I understood, I would have said "I understand". But you'll see I said "I don't understand", which means that I do not understand.
I'm sorry but I'm confused (by which I do not mean that I am not confused). There is Carl Lewis, and there is another person, right? This other person – call him P – has a stopwatch showing some times and a record of the long jump marks, right? And you would like me to tell you if P is athletic? Or Lewis is athletic?
Pretty much right, yes. We have to have reliable evidence that Lewis actually ran the distance in the requisite time, or actually jumped the distance. There could be other records besides a visual record, but we must have some record of all the relevant observational data.
Oh, Pez, I'm sorry, but I actually was hoping for a bit better than this.
You did not simply come across a bunch of artifacts that would be hard for you to design, with no idea about how they came to exist. This is the case in the context of ID, but not in this situation. In this case, you picked a bunch of tasks that would test this person's ability to solve problems using foresight and intent and creativity, and you gave this person these tests. That is precisely what I have been saying needed to be done all along: You must actually test the entity's abilities to solve problems!
You have focussed on completely irrelevant aspects, over and over again, even though I keep saying the same thing, over and over again. I shall put it in bold this time: The issue has nothing to do with observing the person with bare eyeballs. All we need is reliable data that tells us what we need to know. Whether I watch Dexter take the test with my own eyes, or he does it in a protected room, makes no difference. What matters is that I observe… perhaps the term "observe" is what is confusing the issue, so let's just say "find out". If I find out that Dexter is capable of passing tests for problem solving, then I have learned about Dexter's abilities. If all I see is some complex problems that would be hard for me to solve, then I have learned nothing about what solved them. Maybe it was something intelligent, or maybe it wasn't. (I beg you not to say "Well, if it wasn't intelligent, then it couldn't have solved the problems!")
Yes of course the records can evidence athleticism in precisely the same way that the records evidenced intelligence in Dexter. If the provenance of the evidence is not in question, then the only requirement is that the data is of the type we need in order to make our assessment. On the chance that you still do not understand, I shall spell it out for you:
Let's say an athletic-looking fellow tells me he is local sports hero, Jock McClock. I don't believe him and he shows me half a dozen sports awards, He says he has more at home. This is pretty good evidence, I think, but not enough.
So I send him alone into a locked examination room and I man the only door.
I give him a a few tests and some instructions. When he comes out he shows me he's managed to grab a marker off of a ten-foot-high shelf without anything that could be used as a ladder, and he's grabbed another marker from an elaborate obstacle course I've rigged to require great speed and agility to navigate in time before the marker is automatically locked away. Okay, he might not be Jock McClock, but these artifacts all evidence athleticism even though he was not observed making them, since he was alone in the arena. Right? Or do you contend that I am wrong?
Please, I know you can do better than this, Pez. I just know it.
I am technically correct on Schwartz's argument, but I have also adopted the wrong tone, and furthermore I was wrong (both in tone and in substance) to accuse you of bait-and-switch (I actually tried to edit that out but was too late).
I am technically correct about Schwartz because even an eliminativist does not have any difficulty with brain changes resulting from information processing in the brain, as Schwartz claims.
Comment by aiguy — May 30, 2008 @ 11:15 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 11:41 pm
Aguy,
This is true with Dexter but is is not true with Carl that is the difference between athleticism and intelligence.
You can infer intelligence from artifacts alone but you can't infer athleticism in this way. At least that is true when we are talking human style intelligence and human style athleticism. I find this strange.
I wonder are intellegence and creativity the only characteristics that can be inferered frome artifacts alone. Now that I think about it creativity and intellegence could be considered synonyms. wow
NO!!! if he was sufficiently intelligent he could fake it
Pez is making a great point. Deep stuff.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 30, 2008 @ 11:41 pm
May 30th, 2008 at 11:45 pm
aiguy,
If they're property dualists, odds are no. If they're substance dualists, it's still not necessitated – hence Plantinga and Swinburne. If they think consciousness is epiphenomenal, or emergent, or otherwise intimately related to the brain – still no. Or at least it doesn't automatically follow, and may harm a specific stance.
And materialism could fall back just as it's done repeatedly. They could go the mysterian route, argue it's all physicalism, but we just don't know how. They could go the promissory note route, and say it's physical, we don't know, but we will eventually. I'm sure other methods are available.
Maybe, maybe not. I don't know the guy. And the materialists in that case could have gone the routes I've listed. Hell, right now there's a large resistance to the suggestion that quantum effects may play a major role in consciousness by many materialists – but I think we'd both agree that if said effects were demonstrated, the definition would change instantly, and we'd hear talks about materialism being vindicated. Because clearly quantum effects are physical.
That's getting into judgment calls about the capacities of particular philosophies to neatly integrate given data. I'll just put that aside – everyone makes their respective cases for that, I have my own views, and others have other views.
That's the stuff of opinion, so sure. I know your view. My view is more sympathetic to both, even if I'm less committed about philosophy of mind positions.
It depends on how you're defining athleticism. You talked about 'athleticism' explaining the capacity of the flagella to move the way it does. I could take that to mean that athleticism is a reference to its properties of locomotion (it has these features which move this way which propels etc so, which is an athletic property). Granted, that's defining athleticism. But isn't 'if you provide the definition, you can get somewhere' the point?
My view of it is that they know that humans are capable of generating irreducibly complex structures, propose that 'intelligence' (further defined as will, intention, knowledge, what-have-you) is the reason, and that said intelligence becomes a viable explanation for some aspects of nature. Some postulate what forms intelligence can take, what routes an intelligent entity can take to affect a result, etc. Again, I don't see this as science myself – my lone opinion – but I'm still intrigued by it, I admit.
I don't think we necessarily need to be in a simulation either, though the potential alone has some fun ramifications. For another topic, though.
I'm not taking a position on it – in a way, I don't really care about what is or is not considered scientific, so long as the rules are fair.
But what do you mean by scientifically undecidable? That seems to hinge on an eternal failure to create life from non-life in a laboratory. But what if someone (say a human) succeeds? Does the statement become scientifically valid then? Note that I'm not saying 'an intelligent agent created the original life on earth', only 'an intelligent agent can create life from non-life, full stop'.
What if I hypothesize 'A human with the right knowledge and tools is capable of creating life from non-life'? Admittedly, falsification would have to come in the form of 'eternal failure', but it seems like a predictive hypothesis, 'something that could come true in lab conditions in a repeatable way'. I ask this more in the spirit of entertainment than anything else – again, the philosophy's where I root myself on this one.
Comment by nullasalus — May 30, 2008 @ 11:45 pm
May 31st, 2008 at 12:01 am
Behaviorism.
Schwartz said it held sway and was still gaining popularity when he was studying in the eighties. You say it was dead.
http://www.psychologicalscienc...
Roddy Roediger"¨APS President says:
I said it's not demonstrated.
If that one thing requires foresight, sure.
You've assumed your conclusion.
I have not seen a complexity and specification argument on spider webs so I'm going to draw my conclusion intuitively. The web has intricate patterns of sticky surfaces and those a spider can walk on. It has signalling devices built in to alert the spider to the presence of prey. It is uniquely arranged in a complex pattern which is hard for me to evaluate like this. I would say that natural forces can create more complexity than a spider web's appearance would indicate. But I'm going to go with design.
Let's just pretend that the math and irreducibility arguments will bear out my finding and we can use this as a case in point.
I've just inferred design of the spider web. It has a designer. It is constructed on purpose and with foresight. It's designer has foresight. etc.
Does the spider have foresight? Not necessarily, but the web's designer has. Did my dominoes, or the remote control car? No.
So, what am I saying here? If instinct can be defined and demonstrated to eliminate design, creativity, foresight, etc. then a design instantiated by and instinctive creature is not finally caused by that creature. I am saying that the spider might be an automaton like the assembly-line robot and which has been designed to bring webs into being.
But then perhaps I can learn something about the spider (not the design) by studying the spider. It turns out that they can learn, have memory, exhibit social recognition … in short, are far more complex cognitively than they were previously given credit for (have you ever noticed that this increasing complexity is a constant trend in our studies?). So it is not illogical for me to presume that the spider itself has the foresight and (thanks Brembs) the non-determined, non-random spontaneity, to build its web via its own cognitive ability interacting with its instincts (programs).
Sure do. Including a couple individual tests used to draw an universal design inference. Have you one like that for athleticism?
That's right. You've moved into a quantitative analysis now, however.
You're just being silly. You know it's not.
Your dragon is well-slayed, but I'm sure you'll try to resurrect the corpse, so please show me a test for athleticism which is not temporally defined.
Only if you disrespect dialogue and honest communication.
No they aren't.
If the definition of "athleticism" is strictly about speedy movement then I would say you are right – the moon is athletic, the term is vacuous, and the argument is dumb. But that's not analogous to ID. And it's not what you were already claiming above when you were changing the tests species by species.
I do. And you misrepresented it in the comment that I responded to and in your comment that referred to that. And now you are changing the subject as though I was on a different point.
How am I wrong when I said this:
?
The way you said mischaracterized the claim about the complexity repeatedly. ID does not claim that intelligence is evidenced when complexity is found and it does not define intelligence as the thing that creates complexity. You defined intelligence as that which creates design and we know that design, in ID, requires purpose, foresight, creativity, and, yes, intelligence. Intelligence is not defined as that which is intelligent, and Allen and your dormitive accusation is unjustified. Intelligence has been defined for you many times.
Sure it does. If intelligence evolved by law and chance then it can design.
I did say that. A thing could come into being by virtue of physical necessity and then go about designing.
A test is not a definition.
You're stealing. You said that free will and intent are open questions. You can't claim that they are not proper inferences if they are open questions. When we show that a behaviour is not random and is not deterministic then it is something. It is now open whether or not that something is unexplained or if it demonstrates will and intent. This is a valid scientific inference.
Nor do I want to.
I don't have to accept promissory notes either. Science can only go by what it currently knows.
And that open question can be answered in good faith.
We are talking about the same thing but you won't stop trying to use the definition (moot) to deny any need to converse.
Yes, I saw that many times. And I've explained how it relates and you've made the word "intelligence" moot so why don't you quit pretending that you can bring it back in to dismiss it as a tautology?
And why did you highlight this reminder instead of the fact that I answered your request (for neither the first nor the final time) for a defintion of intelligence as ID is using it? I answered it int he very clip you quoted here. And then you asked twice again what it is.
Moi:
That's not what ID does. It demonstrates a rationale for inferring that chance and necessity are insufficient.
That's not a trick but a valid inference. IDists go to great lengths to demonstrate that they have good reason to believe these are the only games in town.
Sweet, what's magic?
And chimps.
Good. So an alien intelligence, which is in some way human-like, is a perfectly sound qualification for you?
But while we're at it, what's physical and why must it be physical? You have "reason to believe" that the human mind requires physicality, but you are presuming that a human-like mind must. Why can't a human-like mind be non-physical?
You device tests like CSI and IC which require foresight.
You show me such a thing. We know wind and rain can't do. What can?
Actually, I changed, "Such a signature can only be found in systems whose indeterminate behavior is not due to noise but originates in their design…This in turn means that the brain areas controlling turning behavior must be tuned very precisely to generate unpredictable output and are unlikely to be a by-product of the general complexity of the brain. … This nonlinear signature eliminates the two alternative explanations of spontaneous turning behavior in flies that would run counter to free will, namely complete randomness and pure determinism. …So if there is anything remotely close to free will, it must exist somewhere between chance and necessity" to not determined. Yes, I'm hoping you'll notice.
So how can pure determinism run counter to free will if it means only "cued by the environment" It can't. The author is clearly not saying merely what you are claiming he is.
Beauty, me too. …. oops, here you go …!
Yes, actually they are.
===
Saying ohysical a lot doesn't make their position one of determinism. They already said its not "pure determinism", it's not "simple determinism" and it's not of "necessity". Determinisim, by wiki:
"Causal (or nomological) determinism is the thesis that future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature."
The fly's brain is not determined, as far as we can tell scientifically, in the philosophical sense of determinism. The philosophical sense would entail necessity and the authors do not see this evidenced. And philosophically it isn't either, to the author's satisfaction, as they are led to speculate philosophically that the fly has some kind of free will. As far as we can tell, the two alternatives to free will as an explanation for the fly's spontaneous behaviour have been eliminated.
How do we see if a computer has chosen to attend to a sound wave?
I wish I could be much more like nullasalus. Thanks for more of your very handy advice.
Not at all. Please answer his, does calling Schwartz an idiot and pretending that he's not shown any evidence of dualism say anything about whether Libet interpreted his own studies as reducing free will to an illusion?
This answers your, yet again, false claim. You said the sound wave itself is what caused the change. Then you said it was because it was a particular soundwave. Now you have to admit it was the attention paid that caused the change so you claim that a computer can, likewise, pay attention.
You say you don't want to debate the philosophy of mind with me and I have no particular urge to either. But if you're in the mood perhaps you can show me how the computer's different responses due to its attention are analogous to those of a musician. Or not.
No bluff. See previous comment.
If you'll read your comments there was no requirement that every materialist be an eliminatvist.
There was no error.
What's his technique then?
Just the cognitivists, huh? See my previous comment.
You're very welcome. As you can see, they support my point.
it does.
You can't. See above.
There is no likewise. The test is a test for foresight and you can accept it or deny it.
Me too, please.
That's right. You can't.
Because the inference, unlike that to athleticism, does not demand knowledge of the temporal nature. The inference requires only the artifact and you have not yet supplied any reason to treat athleticism as analogous in this regard.
Comment by Pez — May 31, 2008 @ 12:01 am
May 31st, 2008 at 2:02 am
Hey Fifth Monarchy Man,
Thanks for your notes on the athleticism/intelligence non-analogy.
===
Hi Aiguy,
As you can see, the analogy failed.
You've gone off sideways again with your distinction about my having set up the experiment in the Poindexter case (making me an observer, of sorts), but that is irrelevant. I set up the experiment in the Lewis case as well. One came back positive and the other inconclusive. Athleticism and intelligence are not analogous as explanations as you were using them and claiming they were.
You repeatedly said that as 'athleticism' fails so fails 'intelligence' but we saw that this was not the case.
Take 2:
You've now reworked the tests for athleticism in a manner you were unwilling to before. You've now set up your own test for Jock McClock's athleticism which includes not only the presentation of artifacts but sets it in a timed context.
Let's have a peek.
Previously you said that 'athleticism' as an explanation of observed fast running was useless. That, I submit, is true. But in your new test, as you attempt to make it match my very poor and disappointing Poindexter case, 'athleticism' is not intended to explain an observation of fast running. Instead it explains how McClock fetched the markers. This is a condition completely foreign to your repeated challenges.
First an operational definition of athleticism, as you've supplied:
Athleticism is that which enables efficient locomotion.
Athleticism is the ability to move with efficiency, agility, power, and speed.
And now your test:
Let's take the test as reliable and your representation of it as faithful. The course could have been accomplished by a human being only if he had great speed and agility. The other marker, ostensibly, retrieved only with a powerful vertical.
So, yes, human 'athleticism' has been demonstrated in the case of Jock McClock.
Athleticism does not explain Jock's ability to run fast, or jump high, but it explains his possession of the artifacts. That is, of course, if all other possible explanations are impossible or completely improbable.
So, without a bare eyeball observation, but under certain parameters, this test has both demonstrated athleticism and explained the artifacts by reference to the artifacts.
This is a nice example of how we can gain knowledge about a subject without an actual observation or even previous knowledge about him.
However, this does not make the case of 'athleticism' analogous to the case of 'intelligence', even as adapted.
Unfortunately, without the preconditions of the test (a de facto observation) the markers are meaningless. They indicate nothing about 'athleticism' absent the context given. This is not the case with the artifacts that tested for 'intelligence'.
Likewise they fail the requirement of providing an analogy to 'intelligence' because the test was human-specific. There is no generalized way to refer to 'athleticism' which would apply to any subject, whether human, horse, cheetah, space ship or natural satellite. The definitions provided do not find any way to identify a minimal universal property we could call 'athleticism' or recognize any one thing it would be required to produce.
'Athleticism' is married thus far to its necessary qualifications and contexts whereas 'intelligence' is not.
As you can see, in order to make any meaning out of the analogy you had to do much more with it than you had allowed in your challenges.
Intelligence had been shown to be far different from athleticism in these aspects. Intelligence, as indicated by the design inference, is generalized, is not context-dependent, and applies uniformly to all subjects.
The necessary revision you made to the test for athleticism demonstrates that both conditions 1 and 2 above are false. To make the test do even some of what the test for intelligence did the target had to be changed as well as the methodology. Now, instead of 'athleticism' explaining why the subject is able to run fast athleticism, defined as the ability to run fast, etc., becomes the thing evidenced by the test. It explains not how the subject runs fast but how he came to be in possession of the markers. And this test would only work in the case of the human being and, as was asked before, in a temporally isolated situation. It lacks all of the universality of the tests for design>purpose>intelligence.
The above two methods you stipulated as the only ways to refute your argument do not even apply to the argument you finally made.
Further to your claim that I tested only Poindexter's intelligence and not intelligence in general is the fact, outlawed by you but falsely so, that yes, only something with foresight/intent/purpose could have prepared those artifacts for me.
Send a variety of lifeforms, including a dog and a crow, in with Poindexter and if the same artifacts come out then something in that room was intelligent by the definition
Send the same out with McClock and you return no such evidence for athleticism – as per the definition/test.
As I said before.
Comment by Pez — May 31, 2008 @ 2:02 am
May 31st, 2008 at 4:15 am
FMM,
I just went to considerable length to explain why this was not the case at all; please see above re: Jock McClock. There I show that we can find evidence for athleticism in just the same way – by having Jock record his athletic feats in a protected room.
I have shown just the opposite – you can test both of these attributes whether or not you are physically present when the test is taken.
In a very funny way, someone athletic might fake being intelligent. How you ask? By moving so incredibly quickly through blind trial-and-error that he arrives so quickly at the selection that it seems like he's intelligent!
Deep something!
Comment by aiguy — May 31, 2008 @ 4:15 am
May 31st, 2008 at 4:17 am
Nullasalus,
No, the point is that neither the dictionary definition of the word "athleticism" nor the definitions I've made up here ("efficient locomotion" and so on) have any explanatory power whatsoever, because a definition does not constitute an explanation.
In order to test the assertion that athleticism is responsible for flagellar motion, we would need to be able to characterize athleticism in a way that allowed us to see if it really was what we were seeing or not. But there is no test for athleticism that can be applied to both Carl Lewis and a flagellum. You could simply redefine athleticism as "that which enables things to move around", but then you have a dormitive principle. You would need to somehow make a recognizable characterization of how things move under the influence of athleticism in order to test it.
In the same way, you could simply define intelligence as "that which enables agents to design things", but that obviously cannot explain the designs in biology. And there is no operational definition for intelligence that can be applied to both human beings and the Designer of Life.
So, for the common meanings of "athleticism" and "intelligence", there is no way to test for the presence of these things in arbitrary contexts, because you need to devise a new operational definition for each type of entity you observe. And while you can make up operational definitions that suit a particular context, it won't tell you anything you didn't already know to then call something "athletic" or "intelligent".
I mean that the empirical ambiguity around the term "intelligent agent" prevents us from evaluating the truth of the assertion.
Say I find a new species of animal and I put it in the laboratory, and lo and behold I see it create life from non-life in a test tube. Have I demonstrated the truth of your hypothesis? Have I demonstrated that an intelligent agent can create life? Of course not – not until I also show that this animal was intelligent. (I trust you see why you can't simply say it must have been intelligent or else it couldn't have succeeded – by definition!)
No problem at all – that is a perfectly scientific question, since identifying what is and what is not a human being is unproblematic on grounds independent of their ability to succeed.
Comment by aiguy — May 31, 2008 @ 4:17 am
May 31st, 2008 at 4:18 am
Pez,
You seem to have changed your mind – previously you stated "By virtue of physical necessity? Right. That does not demonstrate foresight." Which is it?
Oh, goody. Me too
Count me in.
The spider is the cause of the design, but does not have foresight. OK.
Now, you make another assertion: Even though we found something of complex form and function (if a spider web isn't high-CSI enough for you, try a termite mound), and we found the entity responsible did not have foresight, you assert that there has to be a pony in here somewhere, and you bet if you found out who made that spider in the first place, it would be plenty intelligent. But of course that is only an assertion, not something that comes from the evidence. As far as the evidence shows, we have a design that comes from something without foresight, and we don't have to know who designed the spider in order to know the spider isn't an intelligent designer.
And so might that which created the spider be just another automaton. And so on, as far as you'd like to go.
Now, you argue that ultimately there must be an intelligence, and I argue that you can't base that belief on the evidence. You claim that something with foresight somehow came into existence, or existed forever, and proceeded to create the automaton spider. I claim that some automaton (natural process, you'd call it) somehow came into existence, or existed forever, and proceeded to create the automaton spider. You can look at flagella all day long and it won't help you distinguish between these two possibilities.
The lack of foresight in various wasps and spiders has been demonstrated many times in experiments which show some of these creatures do indeed display a profound lack of problem solving skills, repeating the same futile motions in novel situations when a simple bit of foresight would have saved them. The famous sphex wasp is a perfect example. But this is moot, because we both know you can't subject the Designer to the sorts of experiments you need to decide the matter.
What are the tests used to draw universal design inferences? You mean if you can create CSI you must be intelligent, because the operational definition of intelligence in ID is "able to create CSI" Good thinking!
Sure – you test for the ability to do tasks that require athleticism – exactly like your test for intelligence!
Agreed again – both intelligence and athleticism require different tests for every sort of thing you want to test.
What I know is you have no test for intelligence that can be applied universally. Some things that create CSI are intelligent (people) and some are not (spiders). Some intelligent things create CSI (people) and some don't (dolphins). CSI is no kind of test for any mental ability at all. You need to be able to test the entity's ability to solve novel problems in order to see if it has foresight. I'm getting tired of saying this.
How many times must I smite you before you surrender? I shall call you Don Quixote!
My non-temporal tests for athleticism: Someone who can jump very high is athletic, or one who could run for a long distance without stopping, or anyone who can sink fifty free-throws in a row.
Ok, this time you have crossed the line – I do not deserve that, thank you.
Athleticism is not only about speedy movement, but positional manipulation in general.
This is the third time you have said this without saying why it is not analogous!
Yes, it is all the same – it is all about athleticism – controlled and efficient locomotion.
Now, you say that whatever enables a human to build a computer is the same thing that enables the Designer to build a flagella – it is all "intelligence", right? Well, if you tell me how you decide that the same thing enables the Designer to make flagella also enables humans to build computers, then I'll tell you how I can tell that the same thing that allows cheetahs to run fast allows the moon to orbit the Earth.
(By the way, research into Athletic Causation is proceeding all the time, and we are evolving our definitions of "athletic" just as ID is evolving its definitions of "intelligence" – I've heard a whole lot of those!)
You care about the biological forms themselves, and I'm just interested about what you claim caused those forms. That's ok – we seem to be interested in different things. I think I've consistently expressed interest in the "intelligence" aspect here, and everybody here can see that's what I've wanted to talk about. Sorry if you think I've changed my focus, but I don't think that's the case.
This ambiguity is truly the heart of our miscommunication, so let's try extra hard on this one right here: Does "purposeful" refer to the fact that the parts work together to perform a function, or does it refer to the sort of mental process that was responsible for assembling the parts, or does it refer to both, or does it refer to whatever you'd like it refer to depending on what question is being asked?
Now, if "purposeful" refers to the way the parts work together, then you are just describing what you see in biological forms and not trying to say anything about the sort of thing that caused these forms to exist. In that case I'm just not interested in talking about that here.
If on the other hand "purposeful" refers to the sort of mental process that was responsible for putting the biological form together, then you are assuming your conclusion whenever you call some biological form a "design". You can't just prove that intelligence was involved by using this definition – you actually must provide evidence that intelligence was involved.
I took the quote directly from the DI website. Where should I have gotten it from?
Good grief.
I ask what you mean by intelligence and you say it's not about intelligence, it's about design.
I ask what you mean by design and you say it is purposeful arrangements of parts
Then you say the purposeful arrangement of parts requires purpose! Huh?
And also it requires intelligence.
I return to our central confusion: Is "purpose" defined in terms of the characteristics of the arrangement of parts, or is it defined in terms of the characteristics of the arranger?
No, I did not mean to ask if intelligence evolved by law and chance – I meant to ask if intelligence processes themselves operated according to law and chance. In other words, if ID rests on dualism, then the empirical evidence for ID is no better than the empirical evidence for dualism. In other words, there is none.
Again, the issue is not whether or not a thing comes into being by physical necessity. The issue is whether the thing operates according to physical necessity as it designs things. The question is open, as there is no way to demonstrate this one way or the other.
What do you think "operational definition" means?
For the third time nobody is talking about promissory anything. What is it you think I am promising? Whether or not we ever figure it out, the fact remains that our ignorance does not constitute support for any particular theory.
The answer is easy: We do not know.
How is that different from "what we currently know" In fact, you just said "Science can only go by what it currently knows". So what you are saying is that if we do not currently know how chance and necessity can account for something, then this means chance and necessity must be insufficient, and so we can say "intelligence" was responsible without any actual evidence that the cause did anything but followed physical necessity. Argument from ignorance, pure and simple.
Nonsense. If ID can offer "unspecified intelligent cause" without any independent evidence that such a thing exists, then obviously "unspecified unintelligent cause" is just as valid, without any independent evidence either.
I don't understand this question, sorry.
I never said it must be physical. I'm just following the evidence where it leads. In our experience, all intelligent agents have physical bodies that we can see.
I do not believe that IC and CSI require foresight, and you have never said why this is assumed to be the case.
I claim a computer is not purposeful. I claim computers can contingently arrange parts which are well-matched… that defies random chance. You cannot say how to refute these claims. You can only fall back on the "who designed the designer" argument and ask me how the computer was designed. But if I ask you who designed your designer, you will dodge the question.
Bottom line: You say an unspecified agent like a human designed living things, and I say a unspecified agent like a computer (or a natural process) designed living things, and neither of these notions can be tested.
What in the world are you talking about? Do you actually think these guys are arguing for libertarian, metaphysical free will? Read this:
(emphasis added). I'm sorry, Pez, but if you can read what they wrote and still believe these people believe their paper supports libertarian free will, I don't think there's much I can say.
So they also must believe that physical brain circuits operate in ways that cannot be understood in terms of physics? And that they will replicate this effect in robots? When do they add the special magic "free will" components to their robots so their robots can exhibit the same sort of contra-causal free will that the fruitfly has?
The same way we see if a person has chosen to attend to a sound wave. It can tell us so, or it can exhibit some other behavior that we find indicative of comprehension.
Yes, so? This is the exact same situation as the person – it matters to a person what soundwaves they hear, and it matters to a computer too.
Of course a computer can pay attention! I don't think it is concsious of doing so, but it certainly pays attention!
Unfortunately, ID is utterly mired in philosophy of mind, which is precisely why there is no science of ID.
If the computer is engaged in figuring out the time signature of a song, it pays attention to amplitudes over the entire sound spectrum; if it is trying to guess the key it pays attention to frequency intervals, and so on.
The point was that even eliminative materialists would predict that there would be brain changes accompanying every possible interaction between the patient and Schwartz and accompanying every possible change in behavior.
Not sure we can go much farther here. You say CSI can only be generated by intelligence.
I ask what intelligence is and you say it uses foresight and intent to create designs.
I ask how you can tell when something uses foresight and intent, and you tell me otherwise it couldn't create designs.
That is correct – you set up the experiment in both cases. You did not, however, set up the experiment in the case of ID. In this case, you can't devise a test for the Designer – you can't give the Designer different tasks to do to see if it can find the solution of a Rubick's cube or write a poem or take an IQ test.
I think they both came back positive. Carl Lewis is athletic, and so is Jock McClock, and Dexter is intelligent. Great!
Yes, they are.