David Heddle's take on the Fine-Tuning Argument
by BilboDavid Heddle, reformed Christian and associate professor of physics at Christopher Newport University, responded here to a discussion about fine-tuning at Uncommondescent.com. He thinks there is something to the fine-tuning argument, but not the way it is usually presented:
There is no way to say, a priori, what the probability of the constants might be, and whether it is large or small. … IDers, time and time again, hoist themselves royally by hitching themselves to the indemonstrable low probability argument.
The fine tuning argument, made correctly, is this: life is sensitive to the values of the constants.
It says nothing about probabilities—of which nothing can be said.
Let me repeat: the power of the fine-tuning argument has nothing to do with low probabilities.
In fact (I know, I have said this a million times), the IDers get it bass-ackwards.
Suppose we accept that life is sensitive to the values of the constants. (That is still the going-in position—in spite of Stenger claiming otherwise—all he did was some toy calculations, the old blowhard—you will note the deafening silence from physicists of all stripes, nobody except Stenger (and his non-scientific followers) claims that Stenger solved the fine-tuning problem). But even if you believe Stenger, for the sake of argument let's accept the fine-tuning premise that life is sensitive to the constants.
Consider then two "probability" scenarios:
1) There is no explanation for the constants, they are a low probability random draw
2) There is a theory, as yet undiscovered, that predicts the constants—so in fact they are high (unit) probability
The first scenario favors, at least superficially, the multiverse—because that in fact is exactly what it predicts.
The second possibility—the unit probability—is the one the IDers should champion because *IF* life is sensitive to the values of the constants AND the constants are high (unit) probability, you are then in the situation where habitability of the universe is built right into the fabric of spacetime. You’ll never get any closer to scientific support for design—not with all the vaporware specified-complexity calculations you can imagine.
But still the IDers pursue the low probability case—exactly the opposite of where they should be looking.
If I understand David's point, and perhaps I don't, he would agree that the constants must be rather fine-tuned in order for life to exist. But then we have the question of why they are fine-tuned. He suggests the first scenario is that
There is no explanation for the constants, they are a low probability random draw
The first scenario favors, at least superficially, the multiverse—because that in fact is exactly what it predicts.
Of course, this follows only if we have no other explanation for the constants, such as God deliberately tuning them. But do we know that God didn't deliberately tune them?
The second scenario is that
2) There is a theory, as yet undiscovered, that predicts the constants—so in fact they are high (unit) probability
And he favors this one, since it would show that "habitability of the universe is built right into the fabric of spacetime."
And I think he's right about this. If we find out that the constants must be the way they are, then it is rather amazing that they just happen to be such that they allow life to exist. But then professor Robin Collins argues the same thing.
One criticism of the fine-tuning argument is that, as far as we know, there could be a more fundamental law under which the parameters of physics must have the values they do. Thus, given such a law, it is not improbable that the known parameters of physics fall within the life-permitting range.
Besides being entirely speculative, the problem with postulating such a law is that it simply moves the improbability of the fine-tuning up one level, to that of the postulated physical law itself. Under this hypothesis, what is improbable is that all the conceivable fundamental physical laws there could be, the universe just happens to have the one that constrains the parameters of physics in a life-permitting way. Thus, trying to explain the fine-tuning by postulating this sort of fundamental law is like trying to explain why the pattern of rocks below a cliff spell "Welcome to the mountains Robin Collins" by postulating that an earthquake occurred and that all the rocks on the cliff face were arranged in just the right configuration to fall into the pattern in question. Clearly this explanation merely transfers the improbability up one level, since now it seems enormously improbable that of all the possible configurations the rocks could be in on the cliff face, they are in the one which results in the pattern "Welcome to the mountains Robin Collins."
So yes, given professor Heddle's second scenario, he's in agreement with Collins, at least, that the fine-tuning argument works. The question then, is what about the first scenario?
It seems we are left with two alternatives: The constants were deliberately fine-tuned, or we live in a multiverse. For some reason David thinks that the multiverse is the only choice. Maybe he'll explain why. I'll write about what Collins has to say about the second alternative in another thread.
March 12th, 2010 at 12:46 pm
Design is inferred when there is a possibility of alternatives, not when there is an inevitability. Therefore a UNIT (100%) probability argument is anti-design.
Let's assume Dave is correct, that there is a UNIT (100%) probability. I think that would argue against design.
I think the possibility of different outcomes proceeds directly from quantum mechanics. If the universe originated from a quantum process (pure speculation of course, but reasonable), then there is the possibility for an infinitely large space of outcomes.
There is a fine distinction between multiverse and many-worlds. I'm not that familiar with multiverse, but the many-worlds sort of naturally proceeds from quantum mechanics. Whether there really are many worlds, or whether many-worlds (like imaginary numbers and infinite series representations) are more of a conceptual artifact than reality is another story….
But what do I know, Dave Heddle and Olegt are 1000 times more knowledgeable in these matters. I don't have a fraction of their knowledge. I defer to them on these question. I can merely point out my personal reservations about various ideas….
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova — March 12, 2010 @ 12:46 pm
March 12th, 2010 at 1:12 pm
Hi Sal,
David's (and Collins') argument is that given the inevitability of the values of the constants, why is it that they happen to be fine-tuned for life? So (contra Heddle) we still have an argument based on improbability.
As for the multiverse scenario, from the little I've read, it's a prediction of some forms of the combination of inflation and string theory.
Comment by Bilbo — March 12, 2010 @ 1:12 pm
March 12th, 2010 at 1:30 pm
This was the problem I ran into when looking into the fine-tuning argument (FTA). FTA is a fascinating subject which definitely has religious implications (as the Big Bang theory does and did). However, when one hitches their post to the probability argument, how do you even calculate the probability of a constant having the value it has? IMO, it would involve as much or more speculation than the Drake Equation.
This definition of FTA, as Dr. Heddle goes on to demonstrate, is on more firm ground.
It would appear to me that the FTA, similar* to the (weak) Antrhopic Principle (WAP), can be used as a guide/rule-of-thumb in scientific research (again, something Dr. Heddle has gone on to demonstrate effectively).
However, I am not entirely convinced that Dr. Collins and Dr. Heddle are making the same point, as Bilbo has claimed. I have to look more closely into this before I can put my reservation into words.
*I should note that I am ignorant of the differences between a scientific argument and principle and whether the two can act similarly. This is perhaps something either Dr. Heddle or olegt can address.
Comment by JJS P.Eng. — March 12, 2010 @ 1:30 pm
March 12th, 2010 at 1:44 pm
IMHO, it would appear that Dr. Collins inverted Dr. Heddle's argument with the result being that although they appear to be making the same point, they are effectively different. Note that Heddle* refers to unity or near unity probability while Collins refers to "improbability". Heddle's argument is more sound since it involves, in practical terms, one single probability, while Collins's use of the word "improbability" implies multiple values of probabilities that can be used and thus a means to calculate them. While Heddle defined FTA without resorting to probability calculations, Collins, in effect, snuck them in through the back door. I prefer Heddle's explanation as it is on more solid ground.
*Forgive the informality. I have great respect for those who have earned their degrees. With that in mind, perhaps I should be addressing olegt as Dr. olegt, eh?
Comment by JJS P.Eng. — March 12, 2010 @ 1:44 pm
March 12th, 2010 at 1:49 pm
Hi JJS,
I think both Professors Heddle and Collins agree on the first premise of the FTA– that the constants must be very finely tuned to allow for life. Collins proceeds to argue that if the value of the constants are contingent, then Theism is more likely than Atheism, and if the value of the constants are constrained by some more basic law, then it is still surprising that they are fine-tuned for life, and again Theism is more likely. For some reason Prof. Heddle only accepts the second version of the FTA.
Comment by Bilbo — March 12, 2010 @ 1:49 pm
March 12th, 2010 at 1:58 pm
I've heard arguments that the values of the constants are not inevitable. Some of the arguments were laid out in Paul Davies book, The Mind of God. Dave H. made passing mention of Davies in some of his writings…
The reason for the lack of inevitablity could proceed from the random processes of Quantum Mechanics.
On the other hand, it is possible that there could be inevitablity despite the random processes of Quantum Mechanics, but that is probably the question at hand which may never be resolved!
One such theory are the Strong Anthropic Principle, Participatory Anthropic Principle (Wheeler), and Final Anthropic Principle (Barrow and Tipler). They essentially argue that the constants are what they are, because the universe would not exist unless intelligent information processing systems like humans eventually appeared in the universe. This is specualtive times 1000. They make their claims on page 471 of The Anthropic Cosmological Principle.
The idea they put forward is not too distant from the notion of how quantum computers work toward an inevitable solution of UNIT (100%) probability. With a computation, deterministic outcomes of UNIT (100%) inevitability are desirable!!!
They argue the final solution must accord with the existence of intelligent life, and an intelligent all-powerful ETERNAL life on top of that! Speculative for sure. But if true, the design argument is moot, since if true, God exists and created the world, and questions of ultimate design are moot.
From Wiki on the Final Anthropic Principle
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F...
Here is a blurb on the Particpatory Anthropic Principle:
Participatory Anthropic Principle
I alluded to some of the other issues regarding QM by others far more qualified than I. See: Quantum Enigma of Consciousness and the Identity of the Designer. Take my offering with many caveats. There are objections to the ideas I quoted, and some have been mentioned at TT by Olegt.
Both Olegt and Dave Heddle are more qualified to speak on these matters. I merely highlight the work of others.
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova — March 12, 2010 @ 1:58 pm
March 12th, 2010 at 2:25 pm
I believe the wording of (Heddle's) FTA definition matters since according to it, there is no first or second premise of FTA. The definition stands on its own. Unless you are referring to the two probability scenarios set out by Heddle. If so, my apologies.
I should also point out that Collins argues for theism from the standpoint of both scenarios (a stacked deck, so to speak). You might find Collins's argument on multiple universe generators to be interesting.
Comment by JJS P.Eng. — March 12, 2010 @ 2:25 pm
March 12th, 2010 at 2:47 pm
I think the weak Anthropic Principle is common sense, it says:
That is to say, we can't measure physical laws and constants and then concoct theories that argue we don't really exist!
It's an observation about the constants (that they permit life), not really an explanation of why the values are what they are in the first place.
The stronger forms of the Anthropic Principle argue for reasons the constants are what they are. But I again caution, the stronger forms of the Anthropic Principle are speculative, the Weak Anthropic Principle is beyond doubt the correct observation, but is NOT an explanation, just an observation.
The stronger forms (though speculative) try to give an explanation.
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova — March 12, 2010 @ 2:47 pm
March 12th, 2010 at 4:45 pm
Sal:
LOL! I'd say that ones' definition or application of the FTA (weak or strong) is usually a reflection of where you're starting from, what logics and science you're using to make your point, and what your metaphysical extrapolation on QM may be.
Deal is, fine tuning is mere acknowledgement of specific physical values consistent with existence of life. The "argument" is about the reason for that fact. I read Heddle's blog post and didn't wonder why he was ignoring the probability equations.
"In order to produce a universe resembling the one in which we live, the Creator would have to aim for an absurdly tiny volume of the phase space of possible universes – at most about 1/10^10^123 of the entire volume." Penrose
IOW, put a zero on every single elementary particle inside and outside every single atom that exists in the entirety of our universe and add them all up and you wouldn't even come close to this "stupendous" number.
My take is that you'd have to give up on any metaphysical or philosophical means of 'renormalizing' probabilities with what's demonstrably real in order to make any objective sense. What is NOT real is just a counterfactual in any objectively 'scientific' description of any phenomenon. Can and often should be ignored.
Someone who simply accepts that we exist, thus must of course live in a universe where physics allows us to exist, doesn't have a problem with the "stupendous" number of other not-real alternatives. No multiverses required to account for the not-real, no gods required to keep the not-real at bay.
I've long maintained that the manifestations of matter/energy in this universe moment-to-moment exist mostly by habit and design. That could reasonably be assigned to some constraint(s) built right into the fabric of space-time itself. But the observed fact *is* that we as living organisms observe ourselves to live in a universe fine-tuned to allow the existence of living organisms. Duh. If we didn't, the question would never arise because no one would ask it.
Looks to me like the counterfactuals – "stupendous" improbabilities – are only useful in a metaphysical and/or philosophical argument for WHY reality is real. Standard dueling metaphysics.
Comment by Joy — March 12, 2010 @ 4:45 pm
March 13th, 2010 at 2:45 pm
I'm not sure what you mean by that.
Comment by Bilbo — March 13, 2010 @ 2:45 pm
March 13th, 2010 at 5:43 pm
I agree.
In a design scenario the laws and constants have a probability of one.
In "Signs of Intelligence" Walter Bradley has a chapter (12) titled "The "Just So" Universe".
It isn't until the end in which he says anything about probabilities and it is only in passing- meaning he presents positive evidence for design and then says something about "no cosmic accident" in 4 small paragraphs that end his essay.
Comment by ID guy — March 13, 2010 @ 5:43 pm
March 13th, 2010 at 7:56 pm
[Whoops, better fix the brackets.]
That is one design scenario — the second one that both Heddle and Collins refer to.
I haven't read Bradley's book. But if he wants to present the Fine-tuning argument as a design argument, then sooner or later it seems he would need to refer to probabilities. Otherwise, what's the argument?
[There, that's better.]
Comment by Bilbo — March 13, 2010 @ 7:56 pm
March 14th, 2010 at 10:56 am
Infinite multiverses do answer the fine tuning argument, but if there are infinite universes, anything that can happen, will happen and will happen an infinity of times. There are an infinite number of universes in which Hitler won and an infinity of universes in which he became Pope. Every imaginable world exists an infinity of times. Worlds with intelligent dinosaurs, molluscs, or insects dominate. Think of it, and it exists.
Comment by davmos — March 14, 2010 @ 10:56 am
March 15th, 2010 at 8:56 am
He did, at the end of his essay- just as I said.
However the design argument is from the positive case he made.
Designers setting design parameters and stuff like that.
Comment by ID guy — March 15, 2010 @ 8:56 am
March 15th, 2010 at 9:45 am
Robin Collins has some interesting things to say about that, which I'll start a thread on soon.
Comment by Bilbo — March 15, 2010 @ 9:45 am