Demarcation, Demarcation, ….
by Steve PetermannCategorization seems to be an important cognitive mechanism. It enables us to deal with the complexities of life by putting things in buckets that represent what Wittgenstein called "family resemblances". Family resemblances have properties (albeit blurry) that provide a ready made way to relate to new cognitive input. Wittgenstein's family resemblances were, however, not isolationist. He recognized that they can overlap and interact with each other. [This has been confirmed by neuroscience explorations of neural networks] On the other hand, there also seems to be a human inclination to go beyond a family resemblance type of categorization to a more stark form, demarcation. Demarcation(from the dictionary): 1. The setting or marking of boundaries or limits. 2. A separation; a distinction: a line of demarcation between two rock strata. It's not hard to find examples of this: mind/body, science/non-science, science/religion, objective/subjective, synthetic/analytic, fact/value, theory/implications, etc.
But what is the purpose of demarcation? Obviously setting boundary conditions (reduction) in experimentation facilitates data analysis. But that only works if in reality those boundaries are real. Emergence research (organization studies) are raising the issue that, in fact, reductionism actually may obscure the truth of things. It may be that demarcation is more of a protectionist strategy than a progressive one. It may be that instead of moving things forward demarcations create an intransigent stagnation. It is not hard to find demarcation attempts surrounding the ID/Evolution debate. Prominent among these is the science/non-science demarcation. A couple of other ones that I would like to discuss here are attempts to demarcate science/religion and theory/implications.
There are those interested in the relationship between science and religion who adopt the stance that there is categorically no conflict between the two. This no-conflict position is typically asserted with the claim that religion and science deal with totally different things. Stephen Gould with his non-overlapping magesteria is one example. More recently Father George V. Coyne, Director of the Vatican Observatory takes such a position:
I would essentially like to share with you two convictions in this presentation: (1) that the Intelligent Design (ID) movement, while evoking a God of power and might, a designer God, actually belittles God, makes her/him too small and paltry; (2) that our scientific understanding of the universe, untainted by religious considerations, provides for those who believe in God a marvelous opportunity to reflect upon their beliefs. Please note carefully that I distinguish, and will continue to do so in this presentation, that science and religion are totally separate human pursuits. Science is completely neutral with respect to theistic or atheistic implications which may be drawn from scientific results. [My emphasis]
The question Coyne raises, is whether or not science is truly neutral with regard to implications? Of course this may also be an issue raised by ID proponents who wish to have ID theory considered apart from its implications. But what does "implication neutral" mean? It could mean that science just doesn't care about the implications of its discoveries. I think, however, what is more likely implied is a claim that science is "objective" and religion or ethics are "subjective". Or that science deals with facts whereas religion deals with values. If science is only a fact based endeavor and strictly objective then it would be implication neutral. However, to be fact based, objective, and completely neutral with regard to implications it must also not unscientifically or arbitrarily bias those implications one way or another. Can it do that? One approach to answering this question has come under the rubric of the fact/value dichotomy in philosophy of science. Some say that science is about fact and religion or ethics is about value, meaning that science comes up with facts and the implications (beliefs, values, norms, etc.) are flushed out in some other pursuit (i.e. religion, philosophy, politics, etc.). But this can only be the case if science is value neutral.
The fact/value dichotomy dates back prominently to David Hume ("No ought from an is.") but the real battle ensued surrounding the logical positivist school in philosophy during the 1920's. For the positivists it was essential to distinguish between statements of fact (synthetic) and statements of convention (analytic), a distinction that Kant formulated. The positivists wanted to find a way to demarcate between "empirical discourse" and all other forms (i.e. aesthetics, ethics, etc.), which it did not consider cognitively meaningful and instead lay in the realm of metaphysics. To do that they needed a fullproof way to distinguish what is fact and what is convention. They didn't succeed.
It is widely accepted today among philosophers that W.V.O. Quine demolished the analytic/synthetic distinction in his famous essay Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Then what followed closely on its tail was the corresponding collapse of the fact/value dichotomy. Philosopher Vivian Walsh wrote:
To borrow and adapt Quines' vivid image, if a theory may be black with fact and white with convention, it might as well (as far as logical empiricism could tell) be red with values. Since for them confirmation or falsification has to be a property of a theory as a whole, they had no way of unraveling this whole cloth.
Subsequently Hillary Putnam finished the job on the fact/value dichotomy in his work The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy. He claims that science has values too, empirical values.
The classical pragmatists, Peirce, James, Dewey and Mead, all held that value and normativity permeate all of experience. In the philosophy of science, what this point of view implied was that normative judgements are essential to the practice of science itself. These pragmatist philosophers did not refer only to the kind of normative judgments that we call "moral" or "ethic"; judgments of "coherence", "plausibility", "reasonableness, "simplicity," and of what Dirac famously called the beauty of a hypothesis, are all normative judgments in Charles Peirce's sense, judgements of "what ought to be" in the case of reasoning. p. 30
As Putnam states, the logical positivists tried to "avoid conceding that theory selection always presupposes value.
But just as these empiricists philosophers were determined to shut their eyes to the fact that judgments of coherence, simplicity (which is itself a whole bundle of different values, not just one "parameter") [See Robert Koons' arguments on simplicity here], beauty, naturalness, and so on, are presupposed by physical science, likewise many today who refer to values as purely "subjective" and science as purely "objective" continue to shut their eyes to this same fact. Yet coherence and simplicity and the like are values. p. 31 [My emphasis]
Now Putnam clearly does not deny that there are differences between epistemic and ethical values, just as there are differences between different ethical values themselves. While he doesn't go into detail concerning the differences between epistemic values and ethical values, those differences do not create a demarcation scheme. Since he is a pragmatist, he sees value in what Peirce called "The Method of Authority" and "The Method of What is Agreeable to Reason". As a pragmatist he realizes there is a circularity inherent in these methods but "If this is circular justification, it is still justification enough for most of us. p.32"
In my view what Putnam is saying is that even though all experience and interpretations are value laden, that does not necessarily lead to a relativism. However, what I think it does mean is that a sharp demarcation between religion and science cannot be made.
Putnam claims there is a profound entanglement of "facts" and "values":
If we look at the vocabulary of our language as a whole, and not the tiny part that was supposed by the logical positivists to be sufficient for the description of "facts", we will find a much deeper entanglement of fact and value(including ethical and aesthetic and every other sort of value)even at the level of individual predicates. p.34
If Putnam and others are correct then simplistic attempts to put religion(and other value interested pursuits) and science in neat protected environments not only fails but as Putnam says:
The worst thing about the fact/value dichotomy is that in practice it functions as a discussion-stopper, and not just a discussion-stopper, but a thought stopper. p. 44
Instead Putnam recommends:
The solution is neither to give up on rational discussion nor seek and Archimedean point, an "absolute conception" outside of all contexts and problematic situations, but–as Dewey taught his whole life long–to investigate and discuss and try things out cooperatively, democratically, and above all fallibilistically. p. 45
Science and religion do have intersections of inquiry. While there is much between science and religion where there is no shared interest, both are very interested either explicitly (particularly in quantum theory and foundational theology) or implicitly in ontology (being) and causality. Ultimately both these fall into the realm of metaphysics and with it value. If science adopts metaphysical positions such as methodological naturalism, it is no longer implication neutral. That very decision delimits inquiry, is value based, and biases the implications that follow.
Those like Gould, Coyne ("that science and religion are totally separate human pursuits.") and even ID proponents who attempt to cordon off "safe, protected" realms for science and religion do no service to culture or progress. I am of the opinion that instead of trying to sustain ill conceived demarcations, the enormous entanglements of facts/values and the objective/subjective in areas of inquiry should be exposed and become part of the discussion. Perhaps just that realization could contribute to the climate that Dewey has recommended.
February 22nd, 2006 at 1:22 am
Steve Petermann:
Fine for: science/non-science, science/religion. I would add science/pseudo-science. The second set of examples (mind/body, objective/subjective, synthetic/analytic) is not usually brought as an example of demarcation but rather of "transcendental dualism". The fact/value "dichotomy" is to be specifically attributed to Putnam, and "classical pragmatists".
As for theory/implications, it is rather a methodological distinction that, at least implicitly, was already in existence with Galileo. In fact it constitutes the "backbone" of the Galilean hypothetical-deductive-experimental method.
The purpose of demarcation, unless we want to obfuscate, like "sociologists of knowledge" do, is encircling the field of what, properly speaking can be object of Natural Science. That is why whole classes of phenomena (religious, anthropological, psychological, sociological), have always enjoyed a problematic "status" as "natural science". I believe the distinction by Wilhelm Dilthey between "nomothetic"(=positing laws) and "idiographic" (=describing individuals) sciences, is still much more fruitful than other approaches that tend to blur the dividing line.
This is correct, in the strict sense of the words. Objective means that science's statements ignore any possible subjective element in the object of their consideration. The subjective element (understanding, intention, will, etc.), on the contrary, is always at the core of the consideration of religion and ethics.
Father Coyne, in his paper ("˜Science Does Not Need God. Or Does It? A Catholic Scientist Looks at Evolution', 2/1/2006 Catholic Online) doesn't deliver at all according to his promises. I can document this with detailed comments to his paper.
This is only due to the fact that logical positivists held to the myth of scientific general statements as a result of inductive inference. But as Popper has amply demonstrated, no valid induction from the particular to the general is valid.
I think some expansion on Popper's falsificationism (which is just as fundamental as demarcation, in his epistemology), would have been in point here.
It is rather disconcerting to see Gould, Coyne and "even ID proponents" all bunched together. But while Gould, with his desperate attempts to overcome the pitfalls of ToE (see his theory of "punctuated equilibria" ), and Father Coyne, a staunch advocate of "strict naturalism" may have a lot in common, ID proponents, even of the most "agnostic" denomination aim at including Intelligent Agency in their picture.
That the pragmatist philosophical approach, with its "blurring of the line" (like idealism, for that matter), can be of much use in fostering science (other than perhaps cognitive science) is IMHO more than dubious. Richard Rorty is a good example of how the pragmatist approach can be very fruitful in political science (with all due reservations for its fundamental post-modernistic nihilism), but absolutely nil for natural science.
Comment by Servetus — February 22, 2006 @ 1:22 am
February 23rd, 2006 at 11:30 am
Steve Petermann:
I do hope that my comments have not 1. "set the boundaries" so tightly or 2. made the "line of demarcation" so rock-hard as to discourage you from any further counter comment.
Comment by Servetus — February 23, 2006 @ 11:30 am
February 23rd, 2006 at 2:48 pm
Hi Servetus,
Nope. I really didn't take much of an issue with anything you said relative to the topic. The symantics issue (demarcation, transcendental dualism, etc) might be interesting but its a tangent that, imo, doesn't really contribute to the thread. What I was arguing was that the idea that there is a demarcation(setting sharp boundaries) between science and religion and theory/implications(as is common among both Darwinists and many religionists like Coyne) is ill conceived. I didn't see anything really definitive in your post rejecting that.
However, I will comment on a couple of things.
This may be true but if it is accepted that sharp distinctions between fact/value and objective/subjective are ill conceived then that does open science to explore and evaluate how values and metaphysical presumptions shape its method and output.
What is the purpose of this encircling? Is science about discovering and describing the true causal structure of reality wherever that leads or is it about attempting to discover and describe that structure within some preconceived boundaries. If ID type explorations really are getting at the truth of things and science excludes them then perhaps there should be another category of inquiry that is empirically driven but not metaphysically constrained.
Comment by Steve Petermann — February 23, 2006 @ 2:48 pm
February 23rd, 2006 at 8:37 pm
Hi Steve,
nice to hear from you.
Actually I do draw a distinction, even a sharp one, but unlike Darwinists and "religionists like Coyne" (I would say the definition pretty much applies to, say, Kenneth Miller), I distinguish between
a. "methodological naturalism" (which I believe it is essential to retain, if we still want to talk about science in the Galileian sense of the word)
b. "metaphysical naturalism" (or "metaphysical reductionism") which means, in simple words that, even if one admit s that reality is not merely comprised of physical phenomena, one considers anything outside nature irrelevant as a efficient cause of natural events.
Basically, I agree in toto with Richard Dickerson's "Rule #1". The essence of what I believe, in this respect, is formulated in my comments to the Post by the same title ("Dickerson's "Rule #1") initiated by MikeGene on Saturday, February 11th, 2006 (filed under Intelligent Design, Nature of Science).
Values and metaphysical presumptions certainly shape science. (Arthur Koestler's "The Sleepwalkers" about the gradual development of scientific Astronomy, which I have in my hands these days, is an excellent example). I would say though, that rather than its "method" (which, AFAIAC, remains the Galileian sequence hypothesis => deduction => observation/experiment) and its "output" (which basically consists of the results of observation/experiment organized through the grid of hypothesis/theory), it is hypotheses and theories themselves which are influenced by "values & metaphysics". But maybe it is just a matter of perspective, and we have in mind the same thing.
IMHO, once again, what is properly speaking called Natural Science (the "Natural Philosophy" of old), should be restricted, at least in principle, to:
1. empirical phenomena, without any consideration of "agents" within or behind them (Demarcation). IOW, "Dickerson's "Rule #1"
2. falsifiable theories (and easily falsifiable, I would add)
Does ID satisfy the above criteria? Not really. That is why I believe that ID is not, strictly speaking "natural science". Yet ID has enormous value, because it has introduced the notions of IC/CS structures/functions and some empirical evidence about them.
Again, I would not call the "constraints" of science metaphysical but methodological. And there is no reason to exclude Intelligent Design just because it is not science (BTW, MikeGene seems to take this for granted): for ID I think a more suitable appellation would be Rational Enquiry
Comment by Servetus — February 23, 2006 @ 8:37 pm
February 23rd, 2006 at 9:51 pm
Steve Peterman asks (rhetorically):
I don't know if science can find the true causal structure of reality; it's really complex. I would say that science is more about building better and better models that have increasing fidelity to a wider range of observations. (But I'm not a scientist.)
I do, however, agree with the spirit of your rhetorical question; this is all about describing the structure of reality, causal and otherwise. People will be sure to adopt the ID point-of-view when they see that the people who are unconstrained by methodological materialism are producing a superior description of the causal structure of reality. Perhaps you would point us to that description.
Comment by Freelurker — February 23, 2006 @ 9:51 pm
February 23rd, 2006 at 11:08 pm
Servetus : "Values and metaphysical presumptions certainly shape science… I would say though, that rather than its "method" "¦ and its "output""¦ it is hypotheses and theories themselves which are influenced by "values & metaphysics""¦"
How are the "˜outputs' safe from values and such if the "˜inputs' "“ that shaping you mention first "“ aren't ?
You define "˜method' and "˜output' by using "˜hypotheses and theory' yet you also say they (method/output) are free from that which infects "˜hypotheses/theory' (value/metaphysics).
anyway, rather than line drawing and rule making why not recognize that all lines are drawn by humans; rules are broken and made by humans (often for the better; sometimes for the worse "“ Values!) and allow different views, methods, perspectives to flourish, thrive, or die-out without maligning differences/changes as "˜non' "˜pseudo' "˜subjective' etc"¦ Ok I have a rule of my own now to propose: survival of the fittest"¦ environments are complex places/times "“ with data, values, politics etc"¦but all views compete and some even survive"¦ that's it"¦You can call it : the real rule #1.
Comment by de_nacisse — February 23, 2006 @ 11:08 pm
February 24th, 2006 at 10:40 am
Servetus,
But don't methods flow from metaphysical positions? I don't see how one could come up with a method without first at least intuiting a worldview.
But ID is more than philosophy. It also embraces empiricism. Personally I don't care whether ID is called science or not. At least in the context of ID/Evolution the term "science" is more of an ideological or political term than a descriptive one. Those who truly embrace the spirit of inquiry will also embrace anything that might facilitate getting at the truth. Perhaps ID could be described as a metascience.
Comment by Steve Petermann — February 24, 2006 @ 10:40 am
February 24th, 2006 at 10:50 am
Hi Freelurker,
The description that I think is gaining a lot of traction is some form of idealism (absolute idealism is my preference) or panpsychism. These are related to ID because they all posit that mind is primary and/or constitutes reality. They are also not just philosophical positions. Quantum theory has interpretations that support the primacy of mind.
Comment by Steve Petermann — February 24, 2006 @ 10:50 am
February 24th, 2006 at 1:30 pm
de_nacisse:
You may well, if you like it, call it "your own rule", "the real rule #1". Karl R. Popper is not there anymore, to complain about the infringement of his copyright. In his "Offene Gesellschaft, offenes Universum" (Franz Kreuzer im Gespräch mit Karl R. Popper, 1982), Karl Popper compares scientific theories to organisms as "tentative inventions", which are tested by experiment and observation in some kind of "selective process": well designed (or simply lucky?) theories "survive" the process of "falsification".
Comment by Servetus — February 24, 2006 @ 1:30 pm
February 24th, 2006 at 1:45 pm
Steve Petermann (February 24th, 2006 at 10:40 am)
Steve,
No, unlike you I think that, while methods (say "demarcation", "falsification", "hypothesis-deduction-experiment/observation") can be (and normally are) conscious conventions, that is arbitrary constraints imposed on the activity of Natural Science), it is hypotheses and theories, on the contrary, that issue from (often subconscious) metaphysical assumptions. The "absolute time" and "absolute space" of Newtonian cosmology are a perfect example.
ID certainly is "more than philosophy", and it certainly also "embraces empiricism". But so do many other "empirical enquiries that we would not include in the domain of Natural Science: think of "alternative medicine", or of "psychic research" or of "anthropology of religion".
I used the appellation Rational Enquiry, you use Metascience. Anything goes, as far as I am concerned, provided we do not remove and dismiss a demarcation which has proved extremely fruitful, and that (with Richard Dickerson), I still consider METHODOLOGICALLY FUNDAMENTAL.
Steve Petermann to Freelurker (February 24th, 2006 at 10:50 am) :
Certainly Leibniz, or Hegel, or Fritjof Capra, or any practitioner of science espousing Hindu/Buddhist philosophy/theology would agree with you. I do not believe such strong philosophical positions need to be adhered to, in fact I think they would be as (specularly) biased as "metaphysical materialism".
And quantum phenomena happen even if no observer is there to make them "coalesce". In fact to adopt such "panpsychism" would sort of wind toe clock back, and give science a mystical twist that would really make, more than "coalesce", altogether collapse.
Comment by Servetus — February 24, 2006 @ 1:45 pm
February 24th, 2006 at 3:07 pm
IMHO, once again, what is properly speaking called Natural Science (the "Natural Philosophy" of old), should be restricted, at least in principle, to:
1. empirical phenomena, without any consideration of "agents" within or behind them (Demarcation). IOW, "Dickerson's "Rule #1"
2. falsifiable theories (and easily falsifiable, I would add)
Does ID satisfy the above criteria? Not really. That is why I believe that ID is not, strictly speaking "natural science".
–Servetus
Interesting how that demarcation is slipped in there and w/o further comment by the correspondents, even though it leapt right off the page and smacked me right between the eyes. Not the least reason for which is that Criterion #2 contradicts Criterion #1: Natural science, the cognitive and behavioral sciences, do expressly investigate agents, how they think and how they act.
There could be a reason why the IDers or TelicThinkers let it slide: They accept it. They accept it because their ideas about "intelligent design" are ultimately grounded in ideas about an agent, a very special agent, that cannot be in any way subject to scientific investigation, as this agent has special powers and abilities that set him apart from the natural world that scientists investigate. In other words, You-Know-Who.
Or maybe I'm wrong about that?
Nonetheless, I do accept that they make a practical demarcation here. But we've had little to say about the practical demarcations that scientists erect, as opposed to broadly "metaphysical" demarcations.
The disciplinary structure of science is a species of demarcation, and not one established on metaphysical but practical considerations. And the disciplinary structure is hardly rigid. Ask a chemist what he studies and he'll probably have no problem describing chemistry as his field. Ask a computer scientist what he studies and he may describe the field of chemistry the same way the chemist does.
Maybe computer science is a special case, because computing is a universal empirical phenomenon.
Maybe we could say that computer science is an applied science and not a natural science. That ain't gonna work either. And I think it illustrates why for science all such "metaphysical" demarcations fail.
They fail because there is not a single instance in which they are said to hold that a scientist can't show that they fail–they all fail Servetus' Criterion #2.
Which is why I accept (although not according to Popper) Criterion #2 as the only "metaphysical" argument that ever holds for any science.
Comment by Rock — February 24, 2006 @ 3:07 pm
February 24th, 2006 at 4:46 pm
Rock:
Actually I've made this same point in the Dickerson thread. I also think that ID can make (and has made) testable, and falsifiable hypotheses. Both predictive and accomodative. Which would satisfy criteria #2.
Comment by Guts — February 24, 2006 @ 4:46 pm
February 24th, 2006 at 4:59 pm
Servetus,
So how do you come up with a method? I didn't quite follow your argument but are you saying they are generated arbitrarily?
You continue to use the term "Natural Science" instead of "Science" so I wouldn't argue against your exclusions because they are definitional and you consider "alternative medicine", "psychic research", etc. to be explorations of the non-natural. That is, however, open to debate. Still to be clear, you'd really need to explain what you mean by "natural".
But the assertion of this thread has been that all forms of inquiry are metaphysically ladened. I guess you still maintain that "methods" are somehow exempt from metaphysical grounding.
Comment by Steve Petermann — February 24, 2006 @ 4:59 pm
February 24th, 2006 at 8:20 pm
Servetus, I believe K.Popper had theories that were tested individually with predictions, crucial experiments; not really so much in a competitive environment where theory would struggle for survival (with every other theory and value in that place and time -history) "¦ so I don't think I've infringed too much on him "¦ maybe I'm infringing a bit on Laktos tho "¦
Comment by de_nacisse — February 24, 2006 @ 8:20 pm
February 25th, 2006 at 12:12 pm
Rock (February 24th, 2006 at 3:07 pm):
I definitely do not agree with you, Rock, that "cognitive and behavioral sciences, do expressly investigate agents". I fact I explicitly contradicted that notion (see my exchange with Lutepisc at the "Dickerson's Rule #1"). And "behaviourism" (in spite of the artificiality of its constraints) can still be called "science" in the "naturalistic" sense of the word, precisely because it concerns itself (very similar in this respect with Pavlovian reflexology and other forms of "physio-psychology") only with phenomenic and empirical aspect of the object of its study. Quoting myself:
Next quote from Rock (February 24th, 2006 at 3:07 pm):
Who are you referring to, by "they"? IDers? TelicThinkers? Scientists in general?
And, once again, demarcations need not be "metaphysical". They are (or should be to epistemologically aware scientist, scholars and interested people in general) methodological demarcations (again, Dickerson's Rule #1)
I really do not understand what you are trying to say here. All demarcations fail "Servetus' Criterion #2" (thank you for the special mention, but it is only Popper's Falsification criterion), yet you seem to accept Falsification as "the only "˜metaphysical' argument that ever holds for any science".
No, I really do not understand. Something is amiss.
Comment by Servetus — February 25, 2006 @ 12:12 pm
February 25th, 2006 at 12:15 pm
Guts to Rock (February 24th, 2006 at 4:46 pm):
I would really like to know what you have in mind as "testable and falsifiable hypotheses", "predictive and accommodative".
To my knowledge, the only challenge, so far, that ID has seriously posed to standard ToE, is that some specific structures (e.g. the flagellum) and functions (e.g. the blood clotting cascade) are Irreducibly Complex. These are specific empirical claims, hardly "hypotheses" at all.
Comment by Servetus — February 25, 2006 @ 12:15 pm
February 25th, 2006 at 12:20 pm
Steve Petermann (February 24th, 2006 at 4:59 pm):
Steve,
Let me quote myself, from the conclusion of my comment of February 11th, 2006 at 8:47 pm , where I declare that (unlike Michael J. Behe) "I prefer to see it [Dickerson's Rule #1] like a "Professional Rule" :
Back to Steve Petermann (February 24th, 2006 at 4:59 pm):
Without getting into philosophical quagmires, Wikipedia's definition of Nature Nature suits me fine:
Back to Steve Petermann (February 24th, 2006 at 4:59 pm):
Again (and with K.R. Popper), I agree with the first part ("all forms of inquiry are metaphysically laden"). And I confirm that, to me, "methods" are more like "Professional Rules"
Comment by Servetus — February 25, 2006 @ 12:20 pm
February 25th, 2006 at 2:03 pm
I didn't mention "psychology." Biology generally investigates agents (life forms) behaviorally and traditionally doesn't impute any "psychology" to the objects investigated (or at least its certainly not common over the past century to hear or read such imputations). E.g., a biochemist investigating the chemotactic SR behavior does not consider it a "psychological response" of flageallted bacteria. And obviously the cognitive sciences generally investigate agents' behaviors in the attempt to determine the material cognitive or computational basis for the behavior.
Demarcation Criterion #1 is purely artificial and arbitrary as it doesn't even allow me to explain science itself! Science is the interaction (behavior) of cognitively endowed agents (scientists) with the natural world.
Criterion #1 is falsified by Criterion #2 (in the usual good old-fashioned, non-Popperian, way), by the obvious observation that branches of science investigate agents scientifically. A scientist, as a life form, is no less subject to scientific investigation in exactly the same way a bacterium is.
Your two criteria for demarcation self-contradict and Criterion #2 suffices to eliminate all such arbitrary demarcations.
(Maybe the "metaphysical" assumptions of Criterion #2 should be explored more thoroughly. Maybe a thouroughgoing philosophical or metaphysical analysis of natural science will prove its all bunk!)
Comment by Rock — February 25, 2006 @ 2:03 pm
February 25th, 2006 at 8:15 pm
Rock,
This, I understand, and I fully subscribe to, although I doubt that it contributes much to the discussion about science. The rest of your comment, I sincerely cannot make neither head nor tail of.
All I can say, as you keep talking of "[my] two criteria for demarcation", is that however much I may feel flattered that you attribute them to me, someone has already stated them long before me: they are nothing but the criteria that Karl Raimund Popper himself set at the beginning of his "The Logic of Scientific Discovery". The original work is dated 1934, and I do not think that anybody has come up with anything more relevant yet.
"¢ Kuhn, with his "paradigm shifts" has only made any idea of "accumulation" or "growth" of knowledge impossible. Unfortunately he has also set a very fortunate trend, and hatched a whole gaggle of "sociologists of knowledge".
"¢ Lakatos, Popper's pet pupil, has transformed the discourse of Science in pure convention and talk, talk, talk.
"¢ Feyerabend, with his spectacular anarchic twist, has transformed science into an unruly madhouse where "anything goes", even "¦ lycanthropy (no joke, unfortunately).
I believe we should hold on to science's methodological rules, and distinguish them from metaphysical prejudice.
Comment by Servetus — February 25, 2006 @ 8:15 pm
February 26th, 2006 at 4:55 pm
I apologize for being obtuse, but this Richard Dickerson's Rule #1. It states, "Let us see how far and to what extent we can explain the behaviour of the physical and material universe in terms of purely physical and material causes, without invoking the supernatural."
Is not this "what is properly speaking called Natural Science (the "Natural Philosophy" of old), should be restricted, at least in principle, to:
1. empirical phenomena, without any consideration of "agents" within or behind them (Demarcation). IOW, "Dickerson's "Rule #1"
Comment by Rock — February 26, 2006 @ 4:55 pm
February 26th, 2006 at 4:57 pm
Servetus Says:
Interesting what the second elipsis in your quote replaced from the original:
That "especially" sets off an alarm, particularily when one is gonna try to use the definition as part of some demarcation test. It implies some gradient, and not a clear line of demarcation. It is also interesting to see what Wikipedia chooses to include in "natural science":
This would seem to include ID as part of "natural science".
Comment by RogerRabbitt — February 26, 2006 @ 4:57 pm
February 26th, 2006 at 6:56 pm
RogerRabbitt (February 26th, 2006 at 4:57 pm):
Not necessarily. Wikipedia declares the ambit of natural science, so it resorts to criterion #1. And, from this point of view, there is no doubt that ID, which considers real animals, and not phoenixes, the chimeras or centaurs, certainly satisfies the criterion.
But criterion #2 (falsification or falsifiability) is not so easily met by ID: how could one, even in principle, falsify a statement like: «Behind all Irreducibly Complex structures/functions there is, invariably the operation of an Intelligent Agent»? That is why, like MikeGene, whereas I take Irreducible complexity very seriously, I do not consider ID, strictly speaking, as Natural Science", but as "Rational Enquiry" or, as Steve Petermann proposes, as "Metascience".
Comment by Servetus — February 26, 2006 @ 6:56 pm
February 28th, 2006 at 6:23 am
Servetus Says:
Yes, but this appears to be a source of some dispute. Witness the hubub over the KS BOE definition of science. The issue of falsifiability isn't what is at issue, but whether the "natural" refers to the ambit, or the mechanism.
Actually, the form of that claim, putting aside the issue of whether it is an appropriate test for ID, makes it rather simple to falsify. One need only find a single case to falsify it.
Now, one could argue that we can never know for sure that IA's aren't behind some structure or function. True enough at an absolute level, but there is a lot in science that can't usefully survive such scrutiny. And at the top of the list is Darwinian Evolution.
I'm pretty willing to let other folks come up with any rules of science they wish. But if the rules are gonna be a litmus test, folks offering up such must be bound by their own rules.
So what is it about evolutionary science that you think can survive that level of scrutiny?
Comment by RogerRabbitt — February 28, 2006 @ 6:23 am