Disconfirmation Bias
by MikeGeneWe've been talking about confirmation bias, which is the tendency to seek out data that confirm one's preconceptions, while ignoring data that conflict with those preconceptions. But there is a flip-side to this phenomenon known as disconfirmation bias.
In their paper, "A Disconfirmation Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments," psychologists Kari Edwards and Edward Smith (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1996, Vol. 71, No. 1, 5-24) explore this tendency. They begin their article as follows:
When evaluating an argument, can one assess its strength independently of one's prior belief in the conclusion? A good deal f evidence indicates the answer is an emphatic no. This phenomenon, which we refer to as the prior belief effect, has important implications. Given two people, or groups, with opposing beliefs about a social, political, or scientific issue, the degree to which they will view relevant evidence as strong will differ. This difference, in turn, may result in a failure of the opposing parties to converge on any kind of meaningful agreement, and, under some circumstances, they may become more extreme in their beliefs.
Edwards and Smith then summarize a classic experiment by Lord, Ross, and Lopper ( 1979). This study focused on "people's evaluations of arguments about whether the death penalty is an effective deterrent against murder."
They selected two groups of participants, one known to believe that the death penalty is an effective deterrent and one known to believe that it is not an effective deterrent. Both groups were presented with two arguments, one that pointed to the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty and one that pointed to its inefficacy as a deterrent. Each argument consisted of a brief description of the design and findings of a study supporting or opposing the death penalty (e.g., a study showing that a state's murder rate declined after institution of the death penalty) and was followed by criticisms of the study itself, as well as rebuttals of these criticisms. The best-known finding associated with this study is that the pro-death-penalty and anti-death-penalty participants became more polarized in their beliefs– and hence more different from one another–as a result of reading the two arguments. Note, however, that this result is a logical consequence of another more basic finding obtained by Lord et al.: When participants were asked to rate how convincing each study seemed as evidence (i.e., assessments involved participants' judgment of the argument's strength rather than their final belief in the conclusion), proponents of the death penalty judged the pro-death-penalty arguments to be more convincing or stronger than the anti-death-penalty arguments, whereas the opponents of the death penalty judged the anti-death-penalty arguments to be more convincing. This is the prior belief effect, and it has as one of its consequences the polarization of belief.
Edwards and Smith then introduce their model:
When faced with evidence contrary to their beliefs, people try to undermine the evidence. That is, there is a bias to disconfirm arguments incompatible with one's position. This idea can be developed into a disconfirmation model by making the following assumptions.
1. When one is presented an argument to evaluate, there will be some automatic activation in memory of material relevant to the argument. Some of the accessed material will include one's prior beliefs about the issue.
2. If the argument presented is incompatible with prior beliefs, one will engage in a deliberative search of memory for material that will undermine the argument simply. Hence, "scrutinizing an argument" is implemented as a deliberate memory search, and such a search requires extensive processing.
3. Possible targets of the memory search include stored beliefs and arguments that offer direct evidence against the premises and conclusion of the presented argument.
4. The outputs of the memory search are integrated with other (perhaps unbiased) considerations about the current argument, and the resulting evaluation serves as the basis for judgments of the current argument's strength.
Edwards and Smith then conducted two experiments that supported this model and also showed that emotional conviction influences the magnitude and form of the disconfirmation bias.
It makes sense that a disconfirmation bias would exist. If the human brain is wired to defend its preconceptions with confirmation bias, attacking beliefs that threaten those preconceptions would likely be part of the same strategy. This undercuts Michael Shermer's belief that "Skepticism is the antidote for the confirmation bias." In reality, hyper-skepticism, or selectively applied skepticism, may simply be another facet of the same brain processes that generate confirmation bias.
What does disconfirmation bias look like? I would like to propose three possible signs that disconfirmation bias is taking place, where one may be defending their preconceptions more so than playing the honest skeptic who is simply trying to "follow the evidence."
1. According to Edwards and Smith, "When one is presented an argument to evaluate, there will be some automatic activation in memory of material relevant to the argument." Searching one's "memory banks" can easily become relying on stereotypes. A stereotype, after all, is the brain's "summation" of previous experience that is linked by certain cues. Thus, I hypothesize that when one is confronted with an argument that challenges their preconceptions, the more that person relies on stereotypes, the more it is likely they are exhibiting disconfirmation bias to protect a preconception.
How can you tell if stereotype is involved? Often, it is obvious. For example, if a critic on the Internet poses his own argument against my design hypothesis, and I begin to rail against Richard Dawkins, obviously my brain has been tapping into information about Dawkins to interpret my opponent. Often times, however, the evidence is more subtle. And that takes me to my second sign.
2. If one's brain is on "a deliberative search of memory for material that will undermine the argument simply" and the "search include stored beliefs and arguments that offer direct evidence against the premises and conclusion of the presented argument," it stands to reason the person with disconfirmation bias will have a strong tendency to link a current argument with the perceived failures of previously-experienced arguments. This creates a mental inertia that leads to two expressions of disconfirmation bias:
a. Misrepresentation "“ Let's say that Jones develops an argument that threatens the preconceptions of Smith. But let us also say that Smith had previously successfully dismantled a similar, but different, argument that was once posed by Miller. The memory of this experience will shape the way Smith reacts to Jones. The brain processes involved in disconfirmation bias will cause Smith to morph Jones' position into that of Miller's. Smith will feel vindicated by the disconfirmation bias, while Jones will recognize that Smith is attacking a "straw man."
b. Faulty Extrapolation "“ This is a more subtle version of misrepresentation, where Smith's brain is so highly activated that it is sensitized to "cues" from Jones that lead Smith to believe that Jones is reaching for Miller's point. Smith will not focus on the actual argument Jones is making, but will be trying to "anticipate" where he thinks the argument is going in order to cut it off. In this case, Smith is not really disconfirming Jones' argument; he is creating an illusion of disconfirmation in his mind because he thinks he knows where the argument is going (when it may not even be going in that direction).
3. Finally, to put this lengthy blog (and tired blogger) to bed, there is the dead give-away of personal attack. When someone attacks another person by questioning their motivations or with ridicule (and more), they are seeking to discredit the argument by discrediting the person who makes the argument. If such personal attacks are linked to stereotypes, it becomes clear the person's brain is adopting an "end justifies the means" approach to disconfirmation bias.
In summary, skepticism is a good thing, but skepticism can be just another facet of the way brains defend "their territory." Add tribalisitic group behavior to the picture and the whole process is amplified and entrenched. I propose that you can detect disconfirmation bias at work, in individuals or groups, when hyper-skepticism, stereotype, misrepresentation, faulty extrapolations, and personal attacks occur more often than not.
July 14th, 2006 at 8:05 am
It's interesting that they seem to mix up 'evidence' and 'argument' a lot in their piece. I definitely agree with this though:
That's the history of creationism in a nutshell.
This was good (emphasis added):
I have yet to find a better description of Dembski's blog…
Comment by Odd Digit — July 14, 2006 @ 8:05 am
July 14th, 2006 at 9:39 am
[whimperswiththepain] ithinkijustblewanironycircuitinmybrain [/whimperswiththepain]
Comment by BenK — July 14, 2006 @ 9:39 am
July 14th, 2006 at 10:42 am
"It's interesting that they seem to mix up 'evidence' and 'argument' a lot in their piece. I definitely agree with this though:
When faced with evidence contrary to their beliefs, people try to undermine the evidence.
That's the history of creationism in a nutshell."
Let's avoid the question of whether deficient evidence should be undermined. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with attempting to undermine the "evidence" presented by the opposition. There is something wrong with not listening to another's view before doing so. Debunking evidence from then other side is as old as mankind and evolutionists are not averse to this tactic.
"I propose that you can detect disconfirmation bias at work, in individuals or groups, when hyper-skepticism, stereotype, misrepresentation, faulty extrapolations, and personal attacks occur more often than not.
I have yet to find a better description of Dembski's blog"¦"
You're ignoring other internet discussion forums where personal insults directed at IDers are par for the course.
Comment by Bradford — July 14, 2006 @ 10:42 am
July 14th, 2006 at 12:41 pm
As I read this post, I said to my self, "well thought out, who wrote it?" MikeGene — I should have guessed.
As I read "misrepresentation", YEC flashed through my mind. There has clearly been an attempt to paint ID with the YEC brush. I remember the case against YEC. The strongest case was the case of age. Of course the case of age does not apply to the ID position. What I do note about this situation, however, is that when a poor position, such as YEC is brought forward, it produces grist for the opponents of stronger cases to follow.
In the "faulty extrapolation" camp, we see the "coming theocracy" phobia. This, of course, is another way of expressing what is often called the "slippery slope" argument. You may only be asking for a dime, but I know that your real strategy is to get me to give you my house, or something like that. We see it all of the time.
However, there is another faulty confirmation bias that is not discussed here. This is the argument from authority. It comes in a couple of varieties. There's the expert's claim — "Gould said so." There is the "so and so rebutted that", argument. But very often we see something like, "its a settled issue" or "scientific studies have shown" (no specific citation made.) This class of argument seems to me to be in the "the logic of this is beyond me, but its not beyond my champion" class. One big problems with this class of argument is that the position of the champion is not clearly spelled out, and cannot be debated. The champion's view is held up with the authority of divinity. Another problem is that the champion is often misquoted, with their position overstated and massaged to fit the given argument.
Comment by bFast — July 14, 2006 @ 12:41 pm
July 14th, 2006 at 1:03 pm
I am struck by the way both extremes in the creation/ evolution debate reflect the others bad thinking and behavior. If I didn't know any better I would think that they are trying to flatter each other. For example, both sides use a form of circular reasoning that I call "could…does logic". I've explained how something could happen, the argument goes, therefore, it almost certainly did happen. YEC's, for example, try to explain the earth's geological strar by appealing to a global flood… a whole house of card's built on could does thinking. Darwinist's when confronted with something that appears to be IC brush it aside by giving us a "could-does" just-so story. Neither side ever bothers a rigorous real world scientifically testable explanation. Could..does apparently settles it all.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — July 14, 2006 @ 1:03 pm
July 14th, 2006 at 1:15 pm
Hi Mike,
It seems, Mike, that you are a postmodernist. Everyone's pov is equally valid or invalid, because everyone is hopelessly biased. Science is an exercise in futility, because everyone is going to get the result they are expecting to get before they conduct any research anyway.
But wait, there is hope! Edwards and Smith only found "disconfirmation bias" because they ignored data which conflicted with their hypothesis! So maybe science really can distinguish between theories supported by decades of observational evidence and vague notions we would like to be true. Its possible there's a point to scientific research after all.
Comment by Aagcobb — July 14, 2006 @ 1:15 pm
July 14th, 2006 at 1:44 pm
Paraphrasing Aagcobb: "They guys who reported on conformation bias and disconformation bias have their own conformation bias, therefore their work can be dismissed — conformation bias is not part of science." Cool.
First, of conformation bias (and disconformation bias) let me suggest that this bias has a positive component to it. If we jump positions every time someone makes an argument we become "a double-minded man, unstable in all that [we do]." It is quite reasonable for there to be some hysteresis, some threshold of stability in the opinion of the scientific community.
One must remember that the discussion here is about "bias", "A preference or an inclination" (from dictionary.com). It is because confirmation bias is a phenomenon that I find people of knowledge who change camps to be particularly telling.
I find Behe's story to be significant. My understanding is that he is Catholic, and as such has no religous obligation to abandon neoDarwinian evolution. I understand that upon comletion of his Ph.D. he was a content evolutionist. I understand that upon reading Denton's "Evolution, a Theory in Crisis", his internal conformation bias was defeated, making him one of the primary champions of ID.
I also find the story presented recently on the UD forum to be telling. I forget the guy's handle, but as a Ph.D. student he was a content evolutionist, and an athiest. (In the latter statement (athiest) is a clear implication of confirmation bias.) As he did his dissertation on ATP Synthase, he concluded that NDE was in error, and that there must be some sort of designer. He has not defined this designer, he reports no particular "religious experience" causing any new confirmation bias. He was, as he says, "convinced by the science".
It may be my own confirmation bias speaking, but I have not found a whole lot of people abandoning the ID camp, saying, "ops, ID seemed right for a while, but the arguments have convinced me otherwise." I have found a number of people, including myself, who have abandoned the YEC camp with exactly such a statement.
Comment by bFast — July 14, 2006 @ 1:44 pm
July 14th, 2006 at 5:07 pm
Aagcobb:
It seems? Come now, Aagcobb. Rather than rely on post-modern qualifications, tell it like it is.
Of course, I am not arguing that "Everyone's pov is equally valid or invalid, because everyone is hopelessly biased." Nor am I arguing that "Science is an exercise in futility, because everyone is going to get the result they are expecting to get before they conduct any research anyway." So is this another example of faulty extrapolation?
Comment by MikeGene — July 14, 2006 @ 5:07 pm
July 14th, 2006 at 5:25 pm
I think it is likely misrepresentation for the sheer joy of suggesting you're Post Modern Mike.
Someone said something along these lines in recent comments (prob. the confirm. bias post) - Human subjectivity is why we must be as intellectually honest as possible and logic properly applied is indispensable in countering our own subliminal agendas.
For instance, a key insight is that observation is theory laden. There is no such thing as a blank slate observation. We all come to the table with certain expectations - and when those expectation touch the depth of our world views, few are brave enough to hold them up to serious scrutiny.
JS Mill, speaking of political liberty
Comment by todd — July 14, 2006 @ 5:25 pm
July 14th, 2006 at 10:58 pm
JOHN_A_DESIGNER:
There are two things to consider:
1) It depends on the Creationist. Many creationists view what they do as starting with scripture. They are not attempting to prove scripture (though some are), but instead using scripture as a starting point for inquiry. Obviously this is not normally the nature of belief for many debating on the web, but most of the Creation researchers do in fact take scripture as an axiom rather than something to be proved. (For my own defence of this practice, see here)
2) Depending on what exactly you are arguing, "could" may in fact be all you need. For example, if all you are arguing is that X should be allowed as a research inquiry, then "could" is definitely sufficient. If on the other hand you are arguing your theory to the exclusion of others, then indeed "could" is insufficient.
Comment by johnnyb — July 14, 2006 @ 10:58 pm
July 16th, 2006 at 9:10 am
Hi bfast,
That may be because, IDism, unlike YECism, doesn't commit itself to any specific scenario, so for a teleologist, there is nothing to abandon.
Comment by Aagcobb — July 16, 2006 @ 9:10 am
July 16th, 2006 at 9:15 am
Hi Mike,
My comments were somewhat tongue in cheek, but a lot of your posts do seem to indicate that you believe your work is not subject to the normal process of scientific review because mainstream scientists are so hopelessly biased they are incapable of objectively evaluating the evidence.
Comment by Aagcobb — July 16, 2006 @ 9:15 am
July 16th, 2006 at 10:16 am
Hi Aagcobb,
I understand. In fact, that is the common complaint of the crank. Yet you overlook the fact that I don't think my own views or "work" qualify as science. Am I complaining that I am biased against myself?
I started down this line of inquiry many years ago as a reaction to a common criticism. That criticism takes on the following basic form: "If there was any substance/truth to ID, the mainstream scientific community would acknowledge and embrace it; the mainstream scientific community does not acknowledge/embrace ID; therefore, there is no substance/truth to ID.
My posts are not some attempt to defend my delicate, little ego. My posts challenge the essence of this criticism.
Since then, I have developed a type of "stand-alone" interest in the complicated nature of this whole debate and the manner in which others would cast our complicated human reality in cartoon-like terms. For example, when you have a community of people who have frightened themselves by concept X (largely because of what X is perceived to mean), can these people truly evaluate X in an objective fashion? Since the human condition is predisposed to things like tribalism and confirmation/disconfirmation bias, and emotion feeds these things, I don't see why it is rational to sweep the question under the rug.
Comment by MikeGene — July 16, 2006 @ 10:16 am
July 16th, 2006 at 3:49 pm
I'm probably aware of no area where disconfirmation bias is at play than when a pilot learns to fly on instruments. He must learn the ability to disregard his brain's interpretation of orientation and motion, lest, while he is unable to see, he crashes his airplane.
For example, he might fly his airplane into the ground as thinking he is in straight and level flight (because his body says so) when he is really on his way to the ground. Teaching pilots to selectively apply disconfirmation bias is quite an art, and quite an experience if one is a pilot.
We have here then an example of the ability to consciously disconfirm a reasonable input (one's natural senses) in favor of a more deeply priortized flow of information (his instruments). The question then is how does one learn the appropriate disconfirmation bias? In the case of flying, it's the one that keeps the pilot alive.
In the case of peer-review….it's the one that keeps the scientist employed.:mrgreen:
Salvador
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova — July 16, 2006 @ 3:49 pm
July 17th, 2006 at 7:26 am
JOHN_A_DESIGNER, you say:
If there is one thing I hear a lot it's that scientists come up with 'just-so' stories. I don't think this is accurate at all. I have written about this at length here.
Comment by Odd Digit — July 17, 2006 @ 7:26 am
July 17th, 2006 at 11:06 am
"If there is one thing I hear a lot it's that scientists come up with 'just-so' stories. I don't think this is accurate at all. "
Well, no.
What you may hear a lot is that 'Darwinists' (i.e. 'modern evolutionary theorists') "come up with 'just-so' stories." And the reason you may hear it a lot is because it's true (and, in fact, "scientists" also frequently point out this fact).
It really doesn't matter what you are willing to accept/admit is accurate: truth is truth, regardless.
Comment by Ilion — July 17, 2006 @ 11:06 am
July 18th, 2006 at 12:22 pm
Johnnyb:
I'm not sure exactly what you mean when you say that "could in fact be all you need". I was thinking of "could" in the broad metaphysical sense. For example, there is nothing logically or biologically impossible about a unicorn. Unicorns could exist but so far there is know evidence that unicorns do exist or have ever existed. So, for the present unicorns lay outside the scope of empirical science. Of course, that raises the question about whether SETI should be considered a science. Afterall, it is based only on the possibility that ET's exist somplace out there. Actually I'd love it if unicorns really did exist. They're apparently really cute and our world needs more cute things. Of course, we do have bunnies and they're kind of cute. But, as the Lord knows WE HAVE TOO MANY BUNNIES!:grin:
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — July 18, 2006 @ 12:22 pm
July 18th, 2006 at 3:53 pm
Odd Digit, I read your "Imagination Deficit" blog. You point out the proper use of the "just so story" quite nicely. The example you give is of a scientist creating a "just so story", and calling it an hypothesis, then methods of validating/invalidating the hypothesis are created. At some point confirming evidence moves the story from a fancy to a validated theory. This is the scientific method at work.
Consider, however, Behe's assertion that the bacterial flagellum is an example of something that is sufficiently irreduceably complex that the chance of it happening via NDE is too small to consider. (I know, the scientific community reject UPB, and consider that any allignment of the stars is reasonably explainable by chance. It happened, chance happens, therefore it happened by chance. That's hooey.) Because this was one of the points of falsification set out by Darwin himself for his theory, the fact that Behe has presented such an example obligates a response.
Now, there is a "just so story" floating around which explains, mutation by mutation, how the flagellum may have come to be. Behe and others have considered the story to be more "just so" than a Florida election. However, because of the existance of said "just so story", and the existance of a molecular machine made of a subset of the flagellum's genes, Behe's assertion is considered to be answered. (We point out that despite co-option being considered by Behe as a non-issue prior to the discovery of this mechanism, evidence suggests that the latter machine devolved from the flagellum rather than the flagellum evolving from it.)
As you point out in your post, however, a "just so story" is not an end in itself, it is only an hypothesis. The fact that such an hypothesis exists, and is reasonably testable (lets make a working molecular machine that does something useful which is one mutation away from a working flagellum) falsifies one of the NDE community's charges against ID. Though the ID meta-hypothesis may not be falsifiable (there will always be another twist on it) Behe's specific assertion that the bacterial flagellum is irreduceably complex is certainly falsifiable. Of course, if a scientist takes on the challenge of falsifying Behe's assertion, ID will be producing good scientific research even if proved wrong, wouldn't it?
Alas, it would now seem that the only reason that ID is not producing large volumes of good scientific research is because the scientific community is determined to disallow the ID community a seat at the table or an entry in the journals.
Oh, by the way, does ID really stand for imagination deficit or is NDE suffering an imagination overdose.
Comment by bFast — July 18, 2006 @ 3:53 pm
July 18th, 2006 at 10:11 pm
"Oh, by the way, does ID really stand for imagination deficit or is NDE suffering an imagination overdose. "
I'm fairly confident that in the mind (oops! there's that pesky word!) of the typical 'ID Critic,' ID does indeed stand for "Imagination Deficit."
For a while, several months ago, there was a growing use among the junior-level on-line 'ID Critics' of the charge that the "problem" with (or weakness of) ID, and the explanation for why most people reject 'modern evolutionary theory,' is lack of imagination. I haven't seen that bruted about in a while. Perhaps even they realized how stupid that sounds when you come right out and say it.
Comment by Ilion — July 18, 2006 @ 10:11 pm
July 19th, 2006 at 6:01 am
bFast:
Behe's assertion has already been falsified. The bacterial flagella is not irreducibly complex. There are scientists out there working with bacterial flagella. I doubt they care in the slightest about Behe's falsified claims.
Comment by Odd Digit — July 19, 2006 @ 6:01 am
July 20th, 2006 at 12:37 pm
In an earlier post on the Confirmation Bias Thread I asked "odd digit" why there was so much hostility from his side. He kindly answered some of my questions but didn't directly answer my statement "I'm still trying to figure out how anger, hostility, belittling and berating helps the anti-ID side." I've also noticed that in another thread Nick shared a conversion story: He was once a YEC now he accepts evolution. Did Nick become an evolutionist because he was belittled and berated? Or, was it because he was encouraged to think through it on his own? Was his "conversion" a result of coersion? Are you anti-ID people really trying to persuade anyone or are you simply trying to be obstructionist? Do you even think that sound reaoning can be persuasive?
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — July 20, 2006 @ 12:37 pm