Limitations of a scientific theory of human consciousness
by MikeGeneI myself don't follow the mind-brain debates closely, but I do know there are several readers of our blog who are quite interested in that topic. If you are one of them, you will probably be interested in an article in the recent issue of BioEssays by Alfred Gierer (from the Max Planck Institute for Developmental Biology) entitled "Brain, mind and limitations of a scientific theory of human consciousness" (BioEssays 2008; 30:499"“505.) Here is the abstract:
In biological terms, human consciousness appears as a feature associated with the functioning of the human brain. The corresponding activities of the neural network occur strictly in accord with physical laws; however, this fact does not necessarily imply that there can be a comprehensive scientific theory of consciousness, despite all the progress in neurobiology, neuropsychology and neurocomputation. Predictions of the extent to which such a theory may become possible vary widely in the scientific community. There are basic reasons"”not only practical but also epistemological"”why the brain"“mind relation may never be fully "˜"˜decodable" by general finite procedures. In particular self-referential features of consciousness, such as self-representations involved in strategic thought and dispositions, may not be resolvable in all their essential aspects by brain analysis. Assuming that such limitations exist, objective analysis by the methods of natural science cannot, in principle, fully encompass subjective, mental experience.
An excerpt is below the fold:
Analogous to this, the characteristic properties of consciousness, like the generation of behavioral dispositions, are also self-referential. We appear in our own memories, fears and hopes, desires and plans"”as we are, or as we believe ourselves to be, or as we wish to be seen by others, as we want or do not want ourselves to become and as we see our past, and our future possibilities. Behavioral dispositions are influenced by these "˜"˜self-images", which of course do not represent concrete spatial conceptions, but are rather abstract representations of features of the individual in his or her own brain. Self-images are often contradictory and can never be complete because no physically existing entity can contain a complete duplicate of itself. Self-images change in the course of time and alternate within conscious experience. They interact with one another and feed back on themselves. Perhaps these multiple self-images belong to the aspects of consciousness that cannot be determined fully by analysis of the physical state of the brain.
To sum up these considerations, it is not a stringent consequence of the applicability of physics to the brain and the unique correspondence of mental states to physical states of the brain that all behavioral dispositions will be deducible from the physical state of the brain in a finitistic process. We have more reason to believe that there are limits to the decidability of brain states with respect to mental states. According to everything that we know, the brain follows the same physical laws as do machines; but machine that we were capable of understanding could not do everything like a human, and a machine that could do everything like a human would be impossible for us to fully understand. If we know the mental state of a human, expressed by means of language and gestures, we may know more than would be possible to know through a purely physical analysis of her or his brain, however elaborate that analysis may be.
At the beginning of the 20th century a commonly held belief was that mathematical mechanics at least in principle would be capable of calculating and predicting all physical processes and states"”this becomes asymptotically more and more attainable, the more effort that we put into it. Since around 1927"”namely since the advent of quantum physics"”we know that this is not true. Correspondingly, most mathematicians around 1900 believed in the asymptotic solvability of all logical questions that could be reasonably formulated"” including the logical validation of logic "“ and since Goedel's work of 1931, we have known that this is not true either. Nowadays, in the beginning of the 21st century, many neurobiologists and researchers into consciousness believe in the asymptotic solvability of the brain"“mind relationship; they hold that our knowledge depends essentially on our efforts, which corresponds to the mainstream position in mathematics and physics early in the 20th century. Will this situation look the same in 2030 or in 2100? I am one of those who think that is unlikely"”one of those who believes that there are basic questions in this field that are, in principle, irresolvable.
Enjoy. In the meantime, I'm working on comb jelly and receptor tyrosine kinase postings.
April 29th, 2008 at 1:37 am
It seems quite possible that we are incapable of understanding how consciousness arises just a dog is incapable of understanding maths. This might be because of something to do with self-reference ang Goedel ( but then again we are probably incapable of understanding why we don't understand). I can't see any religious implications. It is just a fact.
Comment by Mark Frank — April 29, 2008 @ 1:37 am
April 29th, 2008 at 5:08 am
Mmmm but a dog doesn't ponder why it doesn't understand maths
Comment by willo — April 29, 2008 @ 5:08 am
April 29th, 2008 at 6:00 am
But here we see the general state of affairs in biology: we claim that it is too complex to understand. The real problem, however, is that we do not have the right models and that we work with the wrong theories. Although biologists are quick to claim that 'nothing makes sense except in the light of evolution', they don't even try to explain workings of the brain in evolutionary terms. The dogma seems to be that the end result is independent from its evolution and that basically anything can happen as long as a scientists can fantasize about a putative fitness advantage.
Comment by AdR — April 29, 2008 @ 6:00 am
April 29th, 2008 at 7:23 am
"I can't see any religious implications. It is just a fact. "
The limitations of a a prior materialistic assumption may have some thing to do with the current difficulties in using materialistic terms to describe consciousness.
Its not called THE HARD PROBLEM for nothing.
Angus Menuge:
" All neuroscientific descriptions of the brain
are in the third person, yet consciousness is
characterized by a first person experience. "
Physical descriptions do not lend themselves to describe concousness-this is just a fact! It has metaphysical implications.
Comment by MikeGod — April 29, 2008 @ 7:23 am
April 29th, 2008 at 9:35 am
Or it may be that what is looked for never occurred that way. Lack of understanding takes place when we look in the wrong places based on skewed perceptions. ID is consistent with the concept that biological function arose from intelligence, not the other way around. This would explain the stuck in neutral position of those vainly striving to explain how intelligence arises from matter.
No you can't. You approach the issue from a materialist point of view which is blind to a central idea of many religions namely, that intelligence preceeds matter and energy. The failure to explain consciousness from a materialist perspective is consistent with religious implications drawn from an ordering of events.
Comment by Bradford — April 29, 2008 @ 9:35 am
April 29th, 2008 at 10:32 am
First-order logic and first-order geometry are consistent and complete (as the terms are used in in mathematics). Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems apply to recursively enumerable systems, such as number theory.
That is incorrect. The most important evidence concerns cognition among various evolutionarily related animals. Primate cognition is of particular interest, with relatively advanced cognitive functions identified, such as deception and a sense of equity.
Evolutionary history shows clear signs of (generally) increasing intelligence in animals over time; from worms to predatory swimmers to reptiles to humans.
Comment by Zachriel — April 29, 2008 @ 10:32 am
April 29th, 2008 at 11:13 am
The implications are that there are non-physical entities affecting reality. Nobel Laureate Wigner suggested a solution to Quantum Regress is the possibility that there are non-physical entities…..
But something to consider: you are made of molecules today which you weren't made of 20 years ago, yet your consciousness has persisted independent of the exact physical material you were made of. The only thing in technology that even remotely resembles this non-physical trancendance is software. Software seems to have a reality that trancends the physical medium on which it resides.
Physicist Pual Davies suggests it is a category error to argue conciousness, like software, is reducible to the hardware on which it runs. It is like asking "what kind of atoms can make a Wednesday" (it is essentially a nonsensical question rooted in a category error). Davies received the Templeton Prize for Religion for that and other insights….
Davies went even further and argued if software is transportable from one assemblage of computer hardware to another, in principle, consciouness can be transportable and thus "disembodied". Disembodied consciousness can thus lead to disembodied intelligences. If for example, artificial intelligence can be rooted in a software algorithm, we have demonstrated that at least some intelligence can be disemboidied. But whether an artificial intelligence is a conscious "being" is another story!!!
Even from the fact that you are made of different atoms than you were some time ago, it seems reasonable consciousness, like software, at it's root, has some transendance from the the physical material which makes it possible…
Whether Wigner is ultimately right is probably an undecidable question. But from a basic empirical standpoint, I've often argued, if we die and meet God someday, we'll know for sure, for all intents and purposes, answers to these questions….thus the question of consciousness and God and ultimate ID is, at least strictly speaking, something that is remotely amenable to some level of falsification…..
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova — April 29, 2008 @ 11:13 am
April 29th, 2008 at 11:28 am
You could not step twice into the same river; for other waters are ever flowing on to you. "” ΗÏ?άκλειτος
Comment by Zachriel — April 29, 2008 @ 11:28 am
April 29th, 2008 at 12:04 pm
Zachriel,
This is not a refutation of Geirer. FOL and Euclidean geometry are simply a subset of the set of all logical questions.
Comment by chunkdz — April 29, 2008 @ 12:04 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 12:07 pm
There indeed clearly is evidence of gradations of intelligence among organisms. However, this is one of those instances where citing an evolutionary process provides a false sense that there exists a satisfactory explanation of consciousness. An explanation would lie at the level of biological function if science were to yield one. Salvador had some incisive commentary:
So it would appear. There is no model predicting how thought and matter interact so as to explain how the former emerges from the latter. A category error signifies we will never know based on the assumption that a causal connection can be chemically derived. More from Salvador:
Software can exist at different levels like the software enabling computer function. The binary code and higher level languages are analogous to the genetic code and the higher level cognitive functions evidenced in humans.
Comment by Bradford — April 29, 2008 @ 12:07 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 12:51 pm
Yes, but his statement included "the logical validation of logic". Take it as a clarification.
More than that. Cognition appears to have evolved along with the rest of life, and that various types of cognition conform to the nested hierarchy of descent.
Comment by Zachriel — April 29, 2008 @ 12:51 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 1:07 pm
Last time I checked, Russell and Whitehead failed to logically validate logic. Mentioning two limited systems that do not refute or support the logical validation of logic as a whole seems more obfuscation than clarification.
Comment by chunkdz — April 29, 2008 @ 1:07 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 1:09 pm
This is a non-explanation for cognition itself. It does nothing more than assert a relationship among organisms having cognitive functions. Unless and until interconverting explanations are forthcoming involving thought and matter these statements are of little value.
Comment by Bradford — April 29, 2008 @ 1:09 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 1:12 pm
Hi Bradford,
You wrote…
Isn't this form of ID inherently religious?
While I know it is more fun to frame things as either/or, what is wrong with a Third Choice?
I am not a materialist, but most people would classify me as anti-religious.
If consciousness is interconnected, via Quantum Mechanics, with the universe and other consciousness, then neither intelligence nor "Matter" proceeds the other.
They are inherently linked. Kind of like computer hardware and software.
Comment by Thought Provoker — April 29, 2008 @ 1:12 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 1:39 pm
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova "”But something to consider: you are made of molecules today which you weren't made of 20 years ago, yet your consciousness has persisted independent of the exact physical material you were made of. The only thing in technology that even remotely resembles this non-physical trancendance is software. Software seems to have a reality that trancends the physical medium on which it resides.
And every other aspect of my physical being has "persisted" as well, but hardly independently. The persistence of "consciousness" is due to the fidelity with which those very material substrates (my "consciousness" is grounded in) are reproducible. There is no "non-physical transcendence" involved. But even if my "consciousness" is persistent, it can hardly be said that its contents are [wholly persistent or even reproducible].
In any case, "Consciousness is overrated."
Comment by Rock — April 29, 2008 @ 1:39 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 1:41 pm
[quote]Bradford: There indeed clearly is evidence of gradations of intelligence among organisms.[/quote]
And also within one organism over time. You were once but a single cell, now you are an intelligent, sentient being. When did consciousness appear? Was it suddenly, or gradually?
[quote]Salvador: Davies went even further and argued if software is transportable from one assemblage of computer hardware to another, in principle, consciouness can be transportable and thus "disembodied".[/quote]
Sure. And no one would suggest there is anything spiritual about software.
Comment by The Pixie — April 29, 2008 @ 1:41 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 1:51 pm
Regarding the evolution of consciousness in terms of material causes, it is like asking at what point does software "exist". We can say it has been downloaded and exists on a given piece of hardware at such and such and such a time. But at what point did the software come to life?
Problematic also is that the same piece of software can exist on a miillion computers simultaneously. Is it one entity existing in multiple places simultaneously or is it several identical entities existing in several places?
The same issue arises on a temporal basis. What if the software migrates from one computer to another. Is it the same software? This is not too far from the notion of your consciousness migrating from one set of molecules to another, which it surely does since your mind is not composed of the same molecules it was 20 years ago. Davies suggests that if consciousness has properties of software, it can be disembodied and migrate from one set of physical matter to another. And indeed, strictly speaking consciousness does, since we are not made of the same molecules we were made of 20 years ago.
If consciousness migrates from one set of hardware (molecules) to another, what is its essence? It's like asking what is the essence of software is in terms of molecules. The question seems to be a bit of a category error. The same software can run on computers made of vacuum tubes as much as on transistors, provided there are sufficient achitectural similarities. There seems to be trancendance. Curiosly, in the computer world, DAEMONS, are considered real entities. Why not angels.
We could argue this sort of compartmentalization of software and hardware is just an artifact of how we choose to perceive reality. But what if that is the way reality is, that there are non-material entities like software after all. From an operational standpoint at least, we surely act like there is a non-material transendance. Whether such a transendance is real is a philosophical question, but it seems we at least act (even in the high tech industry) as if the trancendance is real.
Software is a mathematical abstraction like numbers. Are these platonic entities eternal? If consciousness, artificial intelligence, etc. are abstract mathematical entities like software and numbers, it is not a stretch to suppose these entities can also be eternal, they only need a medium to instantiate them. Physicist Frank Tipler has suggested this is also a reason we can't dismiss the possibility of eternal life. If the universe will evolve to become an infinitely powerful computer, then eternal life is possible where the "software" of consciousness will be able to run forever.
The UPB puts limits on the computing power of the universe, but Tipler suggests ideas how this can be circumvented….I'm a bit foggy on the specifics at this time….Tipler believes that physics actually demands this Ultimate Computer, driven by God is a necessary consequence of the laws of physics. We'll see, it's a bit of stretch, but who knows, it's an interesting speculation on the fringes of ID theories….
Wigner suggested such a trancendance is a necessary condition for Quantum theory to be logically consistent for von Neumann's regress to terminate. I don't think the questions are settled. It does seem however the question of God and eternal life are within the realm of rational possibility with these considerations in mind.
Tipler's 1983 article in the journal Nature led him to consider these possibilities. Unfortunately, I'm not far enough in my studies to fully appreciate that article or comment on it.
Comment by Salvador T. Cordova — April 29, 2008 @ 1:51 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 1:58 pm
Salvador:
Oh no! That would mean potential immortality. Imagine the boredom.
Indeed, the time has come that I can reveal now that this has already happened. As some of you may remember, a while ago I copied Joy atom by atom, unbeknownst to her. What I didn't tell you at the time was that I stored her consciousness on my hard disk. It's right here, under my fingers. From time to time I reboot Joy and we communicate a little. During these sessions I sometimes tease her a little with the fact that she finally had to admit that consciousness is entirely physical. She usually gets so upset that I have to switch her off again.
Comment by Raevmo — April 29, 2008 @ 1:58 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 2:18 pm
You left the context out TP. The quote was in response to this comment:
A religious response to a religious statement. ID as a philosophy is not dependent on religion; only on a set of coherent postulates. As a scientific thesis ID must be linked to empirical data. Don't confuse by mixing and matching.
Comment by Bradford — April 29, 2008 @ 2:18 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 2:22 pm
If your question is grounded in empiricism there is no definitive answer. Humans are unique in this respect are they not? Unless you are able to link a biological event to a time frame how can you answer your own question?
Comment by Bradford — April 29, 2008 @ 2:22 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 2:23 pm
Bradford:
Now you made me curious. What set of coherent postulates?
Comment by Raevmo — April 29, 2008 @ 2:23 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 2:54 pm
No, that would be Hilbert and Ackermann, with Gödel proving completeness in his 1929 doctoral dissertation. Russell and Whitehead were attempting to prove the consistency of arithmetic.
Exactly. The scientific evidence indicates that cognitive functions evolved through descent with modification.
Comment by Zachriel — April 29, 2008 @ 2:54 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 3:06 pm
Hi Bradford,
You wrote…
And I suggest that a set of coherent postulates that presumes "intelligence preceeds matter and energy" is inherently religious. Let me repeat the follow up you chose not to respond to…
While I know it is more fun to frame things as either/or, what is wrong with a Third Choice?
I am not a materialist, but most people would classify me as anti-religious.
If consciousness is interconnected, via Quantum Mechanics, with the universe and other consciousness, then neither intelligence nor "Matter" proceeds the other.
They are inherently linked. Kind of like computer hardware and software.
Comment by Thought Provoker — April 29, 2008 @ 3:06 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 3:17 pm
TP:
Why is that TP? Is the negation of the above inherently religious too?
As for the third choice, if it is philosophical in nature I have no problem with it (sound familiar?). If it is an empirical position it needs empircal support. BTW, it does not close the door to materialism, religion…
Comment by Bradford — April 29, 2008 @ 3:17 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 3:29 pm
All of this seems to be assuming that consciousness exists in some real sense. This axiom, which is common among both scientists and theologists, really seems to have no supporting empirical evidence and is driven mainly by our instincts. We instinctively perceive consciousness, yet our instincts have a horrid track record when it comes to helping us deeply understand nature. All we know is that there seems to be some sort of emotional response generated in our brains when our mental model of "self" is invoked. But our brains respond emotionally to everything that we perceive, so this hardly seems surprising. Jeff Hawkins simply stated, "Consciousness is what it feels like to have a neocortex." The more I think about this the more that seems to make sense to me, consciousness is simply another emotion. Why should we treat consciousness any differently from any other emotion we experience?
Comment by Todd Berkebile — April 29, 2008 @ 3:29 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 3:41 pm
Because it involves thinking not necessarily emotions.
Comment by Bradford — April 29, 2008 @ 3:41 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 3:49 pm
That the order and intelligible laws by which the universe operates are not logical prerequisites of Nature. This universe, and others that might exist in a multi-universe system, could have become disorderly and unintelligible had initial conditions of their associated origins been different. The orderliness signifies purpose and design. The narrow range of conditions hospitable to life on earth is a further indicator of purpose and design. So too are the information rich genomes essential to the development, sustaining and diversification of life on earth.
Comment by Bradford — April 29, 2008 @ 3:49 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 4:02 pm
Hilbert picked up where Russell and Whitehead left off, focusing in part on geometry. All were attempting formalization. Gödel put the kabash on all of them. But it is interesting to note that his incompleteness theorems were published as "Ãber formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme". Do you need to be reminded who wrote Principia? (Hint: it wasn't Hilbert or Ackermann.)
Either way it is now obvious that you were merely trying to obfuscate the point that Gierer was making. Why?
Comment by chunkdz — April 29, 2008 @ 4:02 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 4:13 pm
The Pixie,
Considering what 'software' is in that context, someone easily could. And probably do.
I'm always amazed at how the non-religious routinely tell the religious what facts or considerations about the universe they're allowed to consider spiritual or relevant to faith. I'll consider consciousness, QM, and even fluid dynamics as indicative/an aspect of a spiritual nature if I damn well please, thank you. Your mileage may vary.
Comment by nullasalus — April 29, 2008 @ 4:13 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 4:18 pm
I see you ignored the point. Concerning the "solvability of all logical questions that could be reasonably formulated"” including the logical validation of logic," there are two clauses. The first is correct. The second is not completely accurate. All logical questions that could be reasonably formulated are not solvable. However, first-order logic is not just consistent, but complete. First-order geometry is also mathematically consistent.
I am discussing cognition with others, but you seem to be stuck on this simple point. I even suggested taking my comment as a mere clarification to minimize the distraction.
Comment by Zachriel — April 29, 2008 @ 4:18 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 4:27 pm
nullasalus:
It is humorous.
Comment by Bradford — April 29, 2008 @ 4:27 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 4:29 pm
That sort of demarcation problem is not uncommon in categorization. When does a stream become a river? Where does the land become the sea? How hot is hot?
Comment by Zachriel — April 29, 2008 @ 4:29 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 4:31 pm
If you don't already think your consciousness exists in some real sense, then I doubt anyone could ever convince you otherwise.
As one who puts consciousness first, above and beyond all intellectual deduction and inference, simply because my consciousness is the primary "I", I really marvel such statements when I encounter them. Everything I experience could be wrong and illusory, including the productions of logic and reason. Yet beyond all that, I know I'm consciouss in a way I can't know any of the rest.
But it's the secondary productions of logic and reason that would get you to say such a thing. Do you think the productions of logic and reason are more primary than your consciousness?
But the thing that is "knowing" and "seeming" and "emoting" is more primary than what you're deducing logically here. A secondary thing can never take precedence over the primary thing.
One can have his neo-cortex damn near shut off and still be plenty consciousness. (Trust me, I know.) Bottom line is, his logical productions are not as primary as his conscious experience. Unless you guys really have a different nature than guys like me.
There's your problem. Your "thinking about this" is an secondary action of the rational brain operated on by primary consciousness, which, if you are like me, was already there "on fire and full of rays" long before you could reason your way out of your crib.
I know I'm conscious in a way I can't know the productions of reason are true.
In my conversations with many people on this subject, I find that there are two kinds of people. One kind immediately agrees with my view and can't believe that anyone could not see it, and the other kind that doesn't see it and never does. Very fascinating.
Anyone else here have the same experience?
I think Descarte had it wrong with, "I think therefore I exist." I prefer to say, "I am conscious, I am, period."
Another way of saying this is, nobody (if you have the same nature as I) need conclude they exist. Consciousness already knows it exists, even when the logical facility doesn't say "by gosh, I exist."
Make it a great day.
Comment by kornbelt888 — April 29, 2008 @ 4:31 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 4:48 pm
If I were to produce a virtual world populated with intelligent beings, would it be "religious" for them to postulate my existence? If so, I guess I could be considered the "god" of every thing I design. Seems rather silly, though.
When I think of the word "religion" I think of stained glass, hymns, prayers with hands folded, genuflection, steeples, priestly robes, and incense censers. When I merely surmise an intelligence source for our intelligence it does not make me feel the slightest twinge of religiousity in my bones.
Does it for you?
I guess this is a subjective matter, but I vote "no."
Make it a great day.
Comment by kornbelt888 — April 29, 2008 @ 4:48 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 4:52 pm
Zach,
Geirer never said they weren't. You are obfuscating.
We can argue all day about consciousness. I am more interested in what makes someone try to obfuscate about a fairly obvious and unassailable point. Since I can't put an MRI on you, I am simply picking your brain.
Comment by chunkdz — April 29, 2008 @ 4:52 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 5:24 pm
Todd B:
So… for you consciousness is mere axiom? That's an odd way of looking at things, given that it's consciousness that does the looking at things. And I am not actually surprised that you don't know that the word "instinct" applies to behaviors, not to primary organismal functions or perceptions. Which are something else entirely. Your heart beats, but not upon instinct. It beats because if it doesn't you'll die. Your consciousness isn't involved and nothing instinctual occurs. You perceive the sky is blue. This isn't a behavior, it's a perception and is feed-forward to your consciousness (wow, that sky is really blue!), a primary interaction with the world, not an afterthought.
Get the terminology and concepts straight or give up the pretense, Todd. There's no such beastie as a "Theologist" either, btw.
I figure that someone who pretends to be an 'expert' in all things scientific, but who can't keep either the terminology or the concepts straight for things like consciousness, cognition, perception, behavior and emotion, is most probably a poseur or a 'bot (non-conscious at that). Which are you?
You've given yourself away.
Comment by Joy — April 29, 2008 @ 5:24 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 5:51 pm
Off-topicSo you openly admit to trolling. Good luck with that. I made my relevant point above.
Comment by Zachriel — April 29, 2008 @ 5:51 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 6:01 pm
People report awareness, but "consciousness" may not be a single, well-defined object. Consider split-brain experiments.
Comment by Zachriel — April 29, 2008 @ 6:01 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 6:03 pm
Zach,
No, more like a hyena picking off weak and sickly arguments from the herd.
Comment by chunkdz — April 29, 2008 @ 6:03 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 6:37 pm
I have. And what the subjects report is interesting and strange. "My right hand was trying to keep my left hand from slapping the dog", etc. But underneath the wierd things going on, there is still a unity of consciousness.
Make it a great day
Comment by kornbelt888 — April 29, 2008 @ 6:37 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 6:48 pm
I don't know you get a "unity of consciousness" out of that.
Comment by Zachriel — April 29, 2008 @ 6:48 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 7:01 pm
Why? Whole brains are the norm. Split ones an aberration. What purpose would be served by considering only genomic mutations to the exclusion of stable genes?
Comment by Bradford — April 29, 2008 @ 7:01 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 7:02 pm
Sal
The stronger the analogy to software, the weaker the case for a spiritual explanation!
Bear in mind that the mind has state, so it is more than just a program. It is not analogous to MS Word, but to a certain configuration, editing a certain document.
Bradford
That is the point. We both agree that we have intelligence, consciousness, and I guess we both agree that a few decades ago we were merely single-celled organisms inside our mothers, with neither. At some point intelligence and consciousness appeared (not necessarily the same point), but as you say we cannot link that to any time frame. Why should we imagine that evolution cannot cause intelligence and consciousness to aoppear in a species? If it did, how could we hope to understand that when we have no clue how or when it happens to ourselves, to children we can observe.
nullasalus
I might have been hasty in my generalisation, but I think it is a safe bet that very few people would say software is spiritual in anyway. Are you aware of anyone?
I was not instructing you, I was making an observation. If you want to consider that software is spiritual, we can discuss that. Somehow I doubt you will. Indeed, someone who believes software is spiritual would probably have a different idea of what spiritual meant to you, and might be a lot closer to what I believe, but with diferent labels.
Comment by The Pixie — April 29, 2008 @ 7:02 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 7:05 pm
To learn something about how the brain works. The evidence doesn't go away because you wave your hands. Facts are pesky like that.
We're not considering "only" split brains. We're considering whole brains and split brains.
Comment by Zachriel — April 29, 2008 @ 7:05 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 7:09 pm
"My" and "my". Odd confliction actions. One "experiencer", internal "eye-witness" to the whole thing. There are never simultaneous points of consciousness despite the odds things the brain tries to do, at least not evident by what is actually reported by the subjects.
Now, Zachriel, scratch your head, and hum a tune, and ask yourself how mere molecules could create the total experience of that, as you experience it, as the one consciousness that you are. (If indeed you do. Maybe you're a zombie, I would have no way of knowing.)
Comment by kornbelt888 — April 29, 2008 @ 7:09 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 7:17 pm
The Pixie,
In the context of the mind contained in the brain as a dynamic process, and people referring to it as 'software' to communicate a similar but still distinct concept? Plenty.
Everyone has a different idea of what 'spiritual' is. And 'soul', and 'self', and even 'mind'. Considering the context software was being compared to, I think you're making quite a stretch by making it sound like we were talking about Microsoft Vista, as opposed to 'human consciousness, experience, and self'.
Edit: I just noticed you said to Sal 'The stronger the analogy to software, the weaker the case for a spiritual explanation!' No; that's something you may tell yourself to feel better about the observation. Material things and processes can be considered entirely spiritual. We're coming to getcha, Pixie - we're not just going to claim your science points towards design, we're going to say your biology points towards spirituality.
Comment by nullasalus — April 29, 2008 @ 7:17 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 7:39 pm
Its not about doubting whether I am self-aware, its about questioning whether awareness of self is something different than awareness of anything else. Or whether awareness of self is even anything more than simple stimulus-response. Yet we call awareness of self consciousness and treat it as something different than, say, awareness of ducks and rabbits. Instinctively it certainly seems different. Its the "specialness" of self-awareness that I question. I suspect that because we have an emotional attachment to our mental model of self that we seem to assume consciousness is something special like our disembodied mind or some special quantum phenomenon or has some specific physical existence outside our brain. All I'm saying is these feelings are simply assumptions.
I accept as axiom that the universe is rational and thus logic and reason apply to the universe. The physiology of our brains depend on this in order to operate at all, so in that respect one might say they are primary. I suspect you are referring to how we carry out activities like reasoning in our minds, though. I suspect the most core function of the brain is storage and retrieval of invariant hierarchical auto-associative temporal patterns. All other activities of the brain seem either trivial or derived from this functionality, potentially including our perception of consciousness. Since I'm not convinced that consciousness is anything more than an emotional response generated by the retrieval of certain patterns stored in our brains I am certainly not willing to suggest that consciousness is our "most primary" function. To state otherwise is to accept consciousness as an unquestioned axiom.
You might be right, but none the less it is still an assumption that consciousness is primary and not simply an emotional after-effect. I'm not claiming that you are wrong, just that I question your position.
I'd be interested to hear about your experiences in this regard, perhaps you can share them in an open thread. Regardless, I do not simply know this to be true and I do not accept knowledge by revelation.
You give an interesting description and I think you rightly hint that this is a matter of perception. I experience the same sensation of simply "being" that you seem to describe. I guess its just my naturally skeptical nature that compels me to question even my own experiences. Upon questioning whether consciousness is something special I'm not convinced that it is.
If consciousness is not an axiom then you must deduce it's existence somehow. What logic proves we have consciousness? You either simply define humans as having consciousness in which case it exists by definition but becomes simply an abstract concept or else you define consciousness in some objective terms in which case we might not actually have that property. As an abstract concept applied by mere definition the term is fairly meaningless because we can't classify other things as either having or not having the same property.
in·stinct /ˈɪnstɪŋkt/ - noun1. an inborn pattern of activity or tendency to action common to a given biological species.
2. a natural or innate impulse, inclination, or tendency.
3. a natural aptitude or gift: an instinct for making money.
4. natural intuitive power.
It seems only the first of four definitions says anything related to "behavior." Definition four exactly fits my meaning above. Still, you are assuming that consciousness is some primary something that is somehow different from stimulus-response. Can you prove that we are truly capable of anything more than "behavior?" Prove that we can do anything more than simply process inputs and generate behaviors. It is simply an assumption that our brains are doing something more than this.
Princeton University disagrees:
theologist - nounsomeone who is learned in theology or who speculates about theology [syn: theologian]
Now can we ignore minutia and stick to the points?
I wonder what percentage of Joy's posts are just an excuse to lob insults at people? By the way, I've never claimed to be an expert on anything scientific. It doesn't surprise me that you are willing to blatantly lie in order to throw insults though.
Comment by Todd Berkebile — April 29, 2008 @ 7:39 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 7:44 pm
David Chalmers wrote in his book, The Conscious Mind that' "Consciousness is a surprising feature of our universe. Our grounds for belief in consciousness derive solely from our experience of it. Even if we know every last detail about the physics of the universe"”the configuration, causation, and evolution among all the fields and particles in the spatial temporal manifold"”that information would not lead us to postulate the existence of conscious experience. My knowledge of consciousness in the first instance comes from my own case, not from any external observation. It is my first-person experience of consciousness that forces the problem on me." (p101,102)
Chalmers goes on to argue that the best conceptual framework to begin with is to consider consciousness as ontologically basic and therefore non-reducible. He suggests that if we are ever going to study and explain consciousness scientifically we need to discover new psychophysical laws. He also suggests that there may be consciousness everywhere, which he concedes is a form of pan psychism. I like Chalmers. He has significant contributions to the study of consciousness. However, I wonder if he is on the right track.
For example, wouldn't psychophysical laws be just another kind of reductionism. Is every aspect of higher consciousness subject to law or necessity? Is their something such as volition creativity and free choice? This is especially true of human consciousness. We are capable free creative if not spontaneous choices. For example, right now I'm thinking about what I will do after I finish typing this. It's a nice day, I could go for a walk, or I could go home and watch a program on the "Discovery Channel" (there is a show I really would like to see) or I could go out and get a hot fudge sundae. Those are the three options I'm facing right now and like all three. I also have reasons for doing something else and rejecting those three. Nothing is law like compelling me one way or another. It is a free volitional choice.
The other place that that Chalmers and I part company is pan schism. To be fair he admit it is a very speculative idea. However, I'd rather start from a skeptical standpoint and assume that until something indicates some kind of consciousness, such as animals, that it is not conscious.
Now, I think I'll go out and have a hot fudge sundae.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — April 29, 2008 @ 7:44 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 7:50 pm
Evolve means to change over time. To say that the explanation for consciousness is change in organisms over time amounts to a trivial point. If one points to specific genes and changes in them which would lead to consciousness well… that's a different matter.
Comment by Bradford — April 29, 2008 @ 7:50 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 8:17 pm
It's not quite that simple, and much more subtle.
Comment by Zachriel — April 29, 2008 @ 8:17 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 8:40 pm
What is an "emotional after-effect?" Emotion is an aspect or mode of consciousness. It's not an "effect" from the "outside", it is part and parcel of what you are as an instance consciousness.
You cannot separate emotion from consciousness like you can separate logic from consciousness. Computers can perform logic. But they are not conscious (that we can tell.) Humans can have brain damage that limits or destroys its logical faculties and yet consciousness persists. Would you think a person is dead just because their reason is impaired? What seems more like death to you, lack of logic, or lack of consciousness?
When a part can drop off and yet the thing that experiences remains, it is shown to be non-essentially, and so I would have to say that the experiencer is more "me" than the things that are non-essential. But consciousness is gone, I'm gone, since it's the thing that actually experiences. (Does an unconscious computer "experience" Or an unconscious brain?)
I should modify some of my original statements, however, with regards to the primacy of consciousness. I think it better to say that consciousness is the fundamental "you", and logic isn't. Not that consciousness is primary and logic secondary. Logic is a tool of consciousness. And as a tool, it is not the "real me". (Sarcasm preemptive strike: although some people have certainly called me a tool, yuck yuck.)
Make it a great day
Comment by kornbelt888 — April 29, 2008 @ 8:40 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 8:54 pm
Yep. But did anyone ask him, "how many consciousnesses are you?"
The brain is a computer that presents information to what the conscious thing is (and what that is, is certainly debatable), and it can get confused, making the consciousness experience the confused information. Confused experience is common for these split brain subjects. However, it is always a single confused person, and a single confused experience. Not multiple conscious experiences or persons. People who are artificially hemisphere separated (using a drug to disable the callosum), and tested in similar manner as the example you gave, and then come back to normal, have no trouble expressing how, while there were in a bizarre state, they were still "one person" with a single consciousness, etc.
Once I had a dream where I was looking at a door and thru it at the same time. I could see the fine detail of the wood, and yet see thru it as if were glass, perceiving what was behind it. Obviously an abnormal state of perception. How can that work? Who knows, but it was a single conscious me experiencing both "modes" concurrently.
No subject I've ever read about (and I've read plenty) ever described anything like multiple consciousness. If you have any please share.
Make it a great day
Comment by kornbelt888 — April 29, 2008 @ 8:54 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 8:58 pm
kornbelt888,
Just to back this up - from what I read, the predominant view (even with Sperry himself) is that there is a single unified consciousness even in these split-brain patients. Granted, that's a mere appeal to authority - but the more I read about the split-brain experiments, the more I personally see that (in those given cases) there's a single, unified consciousness in play, even if damage has impaired some operation.
Comment by nullasalus — April 29, 2008 @ 8:58 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 10:12 pm
I'm sure the answer would be "one". But do you understand why?
Comment by Zachriel — April 29, 2008 @ 10:12 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 10:41 pm
To use your language, an after-effect would be a "secondary thing", as in caused by or at least dependent on something else. By adding the word "emotional" to that I mean to describe a secondary thing resulting from the emotional responses in the brain.
I'm actually surprised to hear you say that, I guess I would have expected consciousness to generate emotional response as a secondary thing if it was consciousness in the drivers seat, so to speak. I described consciousness as potentially simply being an emotion, so obviously I would therefore agree that they are not separable.
I hope not, otherwise I could be labeled dead every time I go to a bar!
As I said before, I share similar experiences as to the apparent importance of consciousness, I'm just not willing to claim that the intuition gained from those experiences says anything fundamental about nature. So consciousness "feels" critically important to me as well, but that emotion isn't enough reason for me to make any assumptions. As to brain death, I would think the inability to access my stored memories is what would seem most death-like. I would say my memories, and thus my past experiences, most define who I am rather than my awareness of self (which is potentially simply an emotional secondary effect of recalling those stored memories). Besides, I typically lose consciousness once a day and it makes me feel more alive the next morning.
Seriously though, if it is truly our capacity to remember our experiences using hierarchical auto-associative invariant temporary patterns that most defines "who" we are, well that seems like a process that is potentially very mechanical and could potentially be mimicked by a computer. Further that potentially indicates that our experiences of the primary importance of consciousness might be mistaken. Despite this our powerful feelings of a separate mind inside are brain are enough to make most people accept the axiom that it is consciousness which defines who we are. Still this is simply an axiom.
Comment by Todd Berkebile — April 29, 2008 @ 10:41 pm
April 29th, 2008 at 10:47 pm
That's why the brain was designed with two hemispheres.:wink:
Comment by Bradford — April 29, 2008 @ 10:47 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 1:07 am
kornbelt888 wrote:
…and nullasalus wrote:
In the Gazzaniga experiment, the right hemisphere knows something that the left (speaking) hemisphere does not: that a picture of a snowy scene was projected on the screen. Indeed, lacking this information, the left hemisphere concocts a story to explain why the hand pointed to the shovel.
The two of you maintain that consciousness is nevertheless unitary in this case. If you're right, then the knowledge of the snowy scene is unconscious, and the subject's decision to point to the shovel is unconscious as well.
Is this what you're claiming?
Comment by watchmaker — April 30, 2008 @ 1:07 am
April 30th, 2008 at 6:04 am
nullasalus
Then we are talking at cross-purposes. I was thinking of that as a way to explain the mind without invoking spirituality.
Not following you. MS Vista is software. The mind may well be analogous to software. In my idea of "spiritual", MS Vista is not spiritual, and it shares that with all computer software. Remember that the software issue was raised by Sal when he said "The only thing in technology that even remotely resembles this non-physical trancendance is software."; as far as I am concerned we are talking about computer software being analogous to the mind, as opposed to using software as a metaphor for the mind. Are you aware of anyone who considers computer software to be spirtitual?
But when you do that you end up on my side! If spiritual just means atoms and fields and wavefunctions, how is your metaphysics any different to mine? We just label them differently.
Comment by The Pixie — April 30, 2008 @ 6:04 am
April 30th, 2008 at 2:34 pm
Hi, Zachriel,
The problem with the split-brain experiments, and relating them to consciousness, is that it implies (however indirectly) that language is necessary for consciousness, because the results were qualified to a large degree from what the patients told the experimenters. I don't think language is necessary for consciousness, and for that reason I think that the split-brain experiments have no bearing on consciousness. For example, Hellen Keller, when she went deaf and blind at the age of nineteen months, must have had a consciousness, or else how would her father have been able to develop a rudimentary sign language with her. I would say that consciousness, when all non-essentials are factored out, is simply awareness, which implies self-awareness. If that is true, than any attempt to reduce consciousness to brain parts (to the degree that cells are broken down and studied) is hopelessly impossible. Consciousness is not language bound.
That's not to say that the split-brain experiments wern't valuable. They simply shed no real light on consciousness.
Also, I don't think that consciousness is bound to personality either. Because of the many well known cases of people with mulitple personalities.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 30, 2008 @ 2:34 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 2:43 pm
Correct!
Comment by Zachriel — April 30, 2008 @ 2:43 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 3:12 pm
They provide no insight into the origin of a sense of personal identity. Consciousness has no evident connection to properties of matter and energy. If matter and energy is all there is consciousness is an unwelcome guest.
Comment by Bradford — April 30, 2008 @ 3:12 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 3:19 pm
Not me.
Here's something you can probably relate to: the conscious experience of sight and smell don't overlap, they are utterly different experiences. It may seem like a silly question at first, but do you consider the experience of these to be two consciousnesses or one? Brains, and confused brains, can throw all kinds of bizarre information to the unity conciousness, and split brain experiences do not result in multiple consciousness any more than difference concurrent sense experiences do.
Comment by kornbelt888 — April 30, 2008 @ 3:19 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 3:31 pm
The Pixie,
Then you haven't spent much time considering the variety of claims, considerations, and thoughts within 'spirituality' - and frankly, few people do. Typically when philosophers or scientists argue that there's a way to describe mind with no reference to soul or spiritual things, they're really saying 'Here's a way to describe mind and I'm not going to call any part of it soul or spiritual'.
Once again, plenty of people, with the right qualifications in mind - analogous does not mean identical. Do you realize this whole 'the brain is a necessary component of human thought and consciousness' wasn't a recent consideration, right? Or one that flew in the face of religious / spiritual views?
'Side' here is meaningless. As an example: Materialism used to mean solid stuff, stuff clunking against stuff, newtonian physics. Then QM came around and threw a wrench in that idea. So for the people who still wanted to be materialists, electrons and particles and waves became material, in any interpretation of QM. Hell, even information is material, on the logic of 'well, it's information about matter! Sorta!' Then concepts of dark energy, dark matter, and particles that seem to exist but can't be directly observed came around. Sure, it's even less like the material originally envisioned, but what the hell, let's swallow that too and call it matter. Wait, some materialists believe in reductionism, and others discard such a view or believe in emergence or other concepts? Oh well, it's still materialism no matter who's right!
In other words, you only have a side insofar as you insist that absolutely anything that actually exists is 'naturalism' or 'materialism' or 'physicalism' or whatever you like to call it. Nothing but labels, with a large dose of politics. You think human consciousness is dependent on matter to exist? A heavy chunk of the scholastics agree with you.
Comment by nullasalus — April 30, 2008 @ 3:31 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 3:49 pm
Hi Watchmaker,
This is interesting, and there is another way to interpret it. One could say that the snowy scene was constructed by the unconscious to provide a plausible scenario, and this is what the patient was consciously aware of.
The reasoning is that even with normal brains we don't consciously construct the visual scenes that we see, not in any direct way. Our senses operate autonomously. What I'd be interested in knowing is more about the snowy scene. How detailed was it? How vividly did the patient see it? This might help us to understand the visualization that appears in dreams. Unfortunately, all I've read about the experiments focusses soley on the errors associated with the patients' explanations.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 30, 2008 @ 3:49 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 4:12 pm
Hi, Bradford,
Watson, quoting from Behaviorism:
And I would say that unconscious life harkens back to microscopic things sliming around in the mud.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 30, 2008 @ 4:12 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 4:21 pm
Hi Bradford,
You wrote…
NO evident connection?
Even in Quantum Mechanics?
So what is your answer to the Schrödinger's cat paradox?
Are you suggesting the Penrose/Hameroff Orch OR model also has NO evidence suggesting the possibility?
Comment by Thought Provoker — April 30, 2008 @ 4:21 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 4:41 pm
Watchmaker,
Not me either. I think Kornbelt888 has a good response - for me, I'm not so ready to tie unitary consciousness to conscious or unconscious access. Too much ontology tied up in the question for it to resolve easily.
Comment by nullasalus — April 30, 2008 @ 4:41 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 5:28 pm
Hello everyone! I'm new here but have been sifting through alot of the threads getting to know everyone and their individual opinions… must say there are lots of knowledgable people on both sides of each topic discussed. So that being said it's nice to meet all of you!:grin:
The ongoing discussion of the concept, nature and reality of consciousness is a personal favorite of mine, so hopefully I can learn from all of you and add some of my own insight to the discussion.
One thing that I have noticed is that "conciousness" is kind of a loaded word with all kinds of linguistic and conceptual baggage. I "think" that we need to bring it down to a more basic definition first to figure out what it is and what it is possibly tied to.
what exactly are we discussing? The ability to experience? the ability to observe? A combination of the two?
I do have more thoughts…. unfortunatly I have to go coach my kid's soccer team now.
I will finish quickly with some food for thought though…. I don't see a correlation between emotion (which we know to be constantly fluctuating chemical states) and the experience/observation of said states.
To me consciousness seems to much more steady in its state. Even under extreme emotional outbreaks there remains a sense of "Why am I so….whatever..mad, happy… hopefully you all get my drift on that idea, that it still seems to seperate itself from that emotional fluctuation in some way or has some kind of buffer mechanism. Which can become more pronounced with more focused observation during such states.
Nice to meet you all, I'll try to explain myself better when I get back later this evening.
Comment by Kuma — April 30, 2008 @ 5:28 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 6:24 pm
I don't follow this. I agree that awareness is one of the more common meanings of consciousness, but awareness is actually very easy to reduce to brain parts, chemistry and physics. Awareness simply means that as a temporal pattern enters our senses we can map it against a database of similar patterns and find the previously experienced patterns that most closely match. The act of mapping the incoming pattern to the stored patterns triggers a set of cells unique to the abstract concept that has been associated with that pattern. The hierarchical nature of our memory storage means different patterns from different sources entering the bottom layers of our brain connect to the same top-level name cells if the patterns relate to the same abstract concept. Thus when we either see or hear or smell a dog our "dog" cells fire and we become aware of the dog.
Comment by Todd Berkebile — April 30, 2008 @ 6:24 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 6:36 pm
Bradford:
There appears to be a fairly evident connection between brains and consciousness. Brains consist of matter and use lots of energy. As usual, you claim that something can *not* be explained. The lack of creativity is, frankly, appalling. Tell us something positive for a change Bradford. In your opinion, what is it beyond matter and energy that is required for consciousness? Feel free to speculate.
Comment by Raevmo — April 30, 2008 @ 6:36 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 6:55 pm
Here is what John von Neumann said after a lecture in 1948, when asked "but of course a mere machine can't really think, can it?"
The point being that we first need to learn a lot more about what goes on inside the brain when we think. Then we can try and model it with computers, and then we'll see how far we can get with mere matter and energy.
Comment by Raevmo — April 30, 2008 @ 6:55 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 7:09 pm
Raevmo:
I see you've gone into soft science mode. For clarity let's look at a real explanation. There are transcription factors involved in gene expression. To be functional these proteins need a capacity to bind DNA. A subset of them have leucine zipper properties. They are formed by two polypeptides which dimerize. This is made possible by leucine amino acids found at alternate turns of an alpha helix shaped construction. Opposing leucines enable the joining of the polypeptides in a zipper effect- hence the name. An adjacent protein region enables the actual binding through a sequence of basic amino acids conferring a positive charge which is opposite the negatively charged region of DNA. There is explanation specified by means of protein shape, amino acid identities and charge. That's an explanation.
Your explanation mentions matter and energy. That is presumed in the above. The point was so trivial as to not be worthy of mention.
This is biochemistry, not an art class.
I agree with Paul Davies. The belief that consciousness is reducible to matter and energy is a category error. Thought is a separate entity. Unless and until you are able to provide a precise transitional equivalence, like exists with matter and energy, the explanations grounded in emergent property assumptions will continue to be of trivial significance.
Comment by Bradford — April 30, 2008 @ 7:09 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 7:17 pm
John von Neumann:
The man was brilliant but was strutting like an NBA all-star when he said that. Build a machine that can reconcile some of the great unsolved scientific mysteries. You think JvN could have constructed a machine in 1910 capable of expressing GRE?
Comment by Bradford — April 30, 2008 @ 7:17 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 7:25 pm
Bradford, I see you can recite a textbook on cell biology. That's great. But you didn't answer my question:
This is all you could come up with:
Are you saying that Paul Davies believes that there is more than matter and energy? Give us a quote please. And while you're at it, please give us a definition of thought, so we can work out why thought is a separate entity.
Comment by Raevmo — April 30, 2008 @ 7:25 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 7:34 pm
Pixie wrote:
Can you make a computer conscious like HAL supposedly was in the movie 2001?
Yes, like consciousness software both artificial and natural transcend it material/chemical hardware, but does that transcendence alone give rise to consciousness? If it does explain to me how; as a real life designer that is something that I certainly would be interested in learning about. Where does the secret of consciousness lie? In the brains neural circuitry? The sheer size and complexity of that circuitry? Some abstract algorithm? Is consciousness just some incredibly complex calculation? What about creativity, will, and intention? What purpose, planning and foresight? Are computers in principle capable of those kinds of things? Do you know the answers to any of these questions? Do you know anyone who does?
The reading that I have done on the subject (Chalmers, Searle, Dennett and others) indicates that these are the kind of problems and questions that the serious researchers are struggling over. Of course, there are also the dreamers and wishful thinkers who believe that major breakthroughs are just around the corner. But they only have their dreams.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — April 30, 2008 @ 7:34 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 7:34 pm
Bradford:
I think you're missing the point of von Neumann's quip. The point is, as I see it, that we first need to have some clear definitions of consciousness/thinking before dismissing an explanation based on matter/energy. The fact that you're so eager to dismiss it without clearly defining what we're talking about only goes to show that you are not really interested in an honest answer because you think you already know the truth. Namely, the existence of some unphysical "soul".
Comment by Raevmo — April 30, 2008 @ 7:34 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 7:37 pm
Raevmo,
Why don't you give us a definition of thought? Hell, give us a definition of mind while you're at it. I thought one criticism of ID was that proponents frequently criticize, never contribute? Or is this back to 'We don't know, but we know what it isn't'?
Paul Davies has said outright he believes materialism is dead in the water. Henry Stapp, Richard Conn Henry, and quite a few others seem to agree with as much. Process is as or more important than components besides, and slapping 'matter/energy' in front of process hardly saves that position.
Bradford,
Isn't that the dream of Kurzweil and the futurist/transhumanist bunch?
Oddly enough, I find the declaration moot. Any machine we can construct would be intimately related to its (human) creators. I'm not sure how JvN meant that phrase, but it strikes me as one that says a whole lot more about the potential of humanity than the potential of computers.
Comment by nullasalus — April 30, 2008 @ 7:37 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 7:44 pm
JAD:
You do realize that variation in cognitive ability among species is correlated to their brain size, right? Even the simplest brains are already so complex that we cannot properly model them yet. So we are still quite far from being able to model the human brain. Yet, you seem to feel confident already that such a future endeavor will be fruitless. That's your ideology blinding you.
Comment by Raevmo — April 30, 2008 @ 7:44 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 7:51 pm
Raevmo:
Thought is what takes place when you read this. Thought is what is provoked by TP. How's that for a start? TP wouldn't lie about what he provokes.:mrgreen:
Comment by Bradford — April 30, 2008 @ 7:51 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 7:55 pm
He's not blinded. To the contrary he has his eyes wide open and is skeptical based on what he sees. Now if he sees the unexpected and continues in unbelief then we have an ideological problem.
Comment by Bradford — April 30, 2008 @ 7:55 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 7:56 pm
kornbelt888 (to watchmaker):
Actually, that's not precisely true. As a synesthete I can assure you that percepts do overlap in a significant number of people, and this means the particular quale (what it feels like) you might assign to, say, "redness" is not the same quale in all humans. Though there is indeed a quale of "redness" that those capable of perceiving red feel. Some simply have that quale plus (smooth metal, G below C, tart, whatever).
Perception is a physical tool of consciousness for its interaction with the world. Perception is thus a primary function of the physical embodiment of consciousness FOR (purpose) facilitating interaction with the world. There is no "red consciousness" or "treble consciousness" or "sour consciousness." What is seen, heard and tasted is information input and processed, then fed-forward to the unitary consciousness. Who knows by that processed information that the ball is red, the singer is soprano and the apple is unripe.
Whether or not the unitary consciousness can convince you with language that the ball is red, the singer soprano or the apple is unripe - to your satisfaction - depends on entirely different circuitry than the sensory processing or knowledge gained. Inability to communicate the knowing to someone else is no real indicator of a lack of knowing. It could just be a lack of ability to communicate what is known.
There is no particular brain circuit or region that hosts the user/observer of unitary consciousness. It could simply be that the brain and body are all tools of that consciousness.
Comment by Joy — April 30, 2008 @ 7:56 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 8:00 pm
Speaking of TP, and vaguely on-topic, a couple additional mind/biology inputs.
http://arxiv.org/abs/0804.2646 - Possible use of quantum zeno effect in birds. (Wasn't Von Neumann involved with this concept? I forget my QM history.)
Everyone here loves quantum/mind interactions, right?
Comment by nullasalus — April 30, 2008 @ 8:00 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 8:02 pm
Nullasalus, I see you're also not willing to define what you're so willing to declare outside the scope of matter/energy. That's the problem with you guys. You already "know" that there is more than matter/energy, so no need to make clear definitions.
I asked where Davies said that there's more than matter/energy, and you answer that according to Davies materialism is dead in the water. But that doesn't answer my question. What else is there besides matter/energy? And where did Davies say as much? Simple questions.
I agree that process is more important. Of course it is. But why isn't process involving just matter/energy not enough?
Comment by Raevmo — April 30, 2008 @ 8:02 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 8:20 pm
Hi, Todd,
What I said:
The body can be studied in ways that consciousness cannot, and this is why I say this: when one of the bodily systems is broken down, like the cardiovascular system, the study ultimately is of movement, and the movement is self-contained to within the body. This is not the case with the senses, which includes the external world. If I look at a dog, or at picture of a dog, sure I can say that I'm seeing a dog, and that there is neuronal flow between the rods and cones in my retina and various parts of my brain. But where, to put it crudely, is the viewing screen? If I pick out a particular spot on the dog, which set of rods and cones is picking that up? Where exactly in the brain is it showing? Visual information goes to different parts of the brain. How is it processed exactly? We don't know.
Why can people see illusions? When a deranged individual points to the corner of the room and says he sees a pink elephant, then what's going on with those rods and cones, what's going on with his optic nerve, in that case? Or is his brain simply mapping to his memory of a pink elephant. But then how can he even see it, since it's in contradiction to the reality that is actually entering his eyes?
Just the existence of memory itself is baffling. In fact, our knowledge of memory is pretty much still in the functional block diagram phase, and is even less understood than the senses. I wasn't even making memory intregal to consciousness. Memory is integral to pattern matching, such as matching a dog with a memory of a dog, but I think consciousness, in its simplist form, is not bound by the abilty to pattern match. But if it were, then memory would have to be understood before even consciousness could be understood. But I think consciousness can be kept to simple awareness…in other words, perception without necessarily knowing what is perceived.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — April 30, 2008 @ 8:20 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 8:21 pm
Raevmo,
And I see you're not willing to offer up definitions and claims of your own. Just wanted to get that out of the way.
Also - you're telling me what I think about the consciousness debate? Frankly, I'm open-minded. I can find 'soul' in the most physicalist depiction of the universe as easily as I could in any substance dualist perspective. Sometimes I lean heavily towards Leibniz-style dynamism. Other times, hylomorphism - a pretty down to earth concept, especially in light of what we've discovered with information. As for your other question..
Have a look at my response to Pixie - what counts as 'materialism' or even 'matter' has shifted rapidly, and recently. The moment you talk about the primacy of process, 'matter/energy' no longer strikes me as enough to ground the view to even in principle. Especially when you consider the trend towards viewing information as a fundamental 'thing' in the universe, where mere availability of it has process consequences. Is that enough to shift the debate to 'matter, energy, and information'? Or do we try to cram information under m+e on the grounds that 'well, it's emergent from those things, or about those things, or expressed via those things'? That comes across as desperate.
Comment by nullasalus — April 30, 2008 @ 8:21 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 8:45 pm
I asked kornbelt888 and nullasalus:
kornbelt888 replied:
Kornbelt,
Your example doesn't make sense because a person's sight and smell do not themselves constitute separate consciousnesses. They are separate experiences of a unitary consciousness.
To see this, suppose I'm sitting in a restaurant when someone places a loaf of bread in front of me. At exactly the same time, I experience a sudden, strong smell of gasoline. I will be surprised, but why? The sight of bread is an ordinary sight. The smell of gasoline is an ordinary smell. I register surprise only because I am aware of both sensations, and they don't seem to go together. Two experiences; one consciousness. Without a unitary consciousness, no feeling of surprise.
In the Gazzaniga experiment, the left hemisphere — the one doing the speaking — is aware of the chicken, but completely unaware of the snowy scene. It cannot connect the shovel with the snowy scene, because it has no idea that there was a snowy scene.
The right hemisphere is aware of the snowy scene, which is why it points to the shovel.
The experiment shows — absolutely clearly — that there is awareness of the chicken, and awareness of the winter scene. It shows just as clearly that the entity that is aware of the chicken — the speaking left hemisphere — is unaware of the winter scene. Therefore, either 1) a separate entity is aware of the winter scene, or 2) there is a unitary consciousness, but no conscious awareness of the winter scene.
It has to be one or the other. The position that you and nullasalus hold is self-contradictory.
Comment by watchmaker — April 30, 2008 @ 8:45 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 9:01 pm
You can define thought by the effects it can bring about. That covers a lot of territory but includes everything from simple arithmetic to very abstract and complex problem solving. IQ tests are a form of thought measurement.
Comment by Bradford — April 30, 2008 @ 9:01 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 9:01 pm
watchmaker,
Since when? My response was that there's too much ontology at play to make a clear distinction - not much contradiction to be had there. But hey - let's have a look at your declaration here.
And what happens after the formal experiment, watchmaker, when the situation is revealed to the subject? Now both the left and right hemisphere are aware of both scenes. Did their consciousness just reunite? Is it fragmented as long as the split stays, even if there's a unified stream of information between both hemispheres and communication (but hampered communication) between the two? What about situations where there's apparent communication across the brain stem - are we only sometimes dealing with a separate entity in the split-brain case?
I don't think the situation can be reduced to a simple '1 or 2' question. From Tye to Chalmers, a decent number of philosophers seem to hold as much. When too much ontology comes into play, I just shrug my shoulders and take it all with a grain of salt - the only thing clear is that things aren't clear.
Comment by nullasalus — April 30, 2008 @ 9:01 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 9:09 pm
Obviously there is no "hard" problem. You see, it's very simple. Brain causes mind, without brain there is no mind. There, problem solved.
Comment by Jean — April 30, 2008 @ 9:09 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 9:36 pm
Nullasalus, you wrote:
What is it about the split-brain experiments that persuades you of this "single, unified consciousness"
I've shown you why Gazzaniga's results are evidence against such a view.
What are your arguments in favor of your position?
Comment by watchmaker — April 30, 2008 @ 9:36 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 9:44 pm
Jean,
I've never been too impressed with those (and Libet style) studies, myself. I could go off on a number of criticisms, but the principle one for me is - 'conscious planning' preceded the unconscious decision to act. It had to, because the subjects agreed to the test and listened to the instructions before their act.
So even the most 'prepped' scenario seems to involve a chain/cycle of unconscious acts and conscious acts. Conscious decisions inform and alter unconscious decisions alter and inform conscious decisions, etc. That before realizing the 'hard problem' touches on different questions than will and unconscious activity besides.
But maybe you were joking, I feel all uptight and serious at the moment.
watchmaker,
No, you haven't shown. You've implied, maybe argued. I responded with a whole lot of questions (I guess only certain people are expected to defend their positions - seems to be a theme, lately) that illustrate the problem of using the experiment as certain currency to claim the consciousness isn't unified.
Tell me, watchmaker - Am I talking to a unified conscious right now? 2 persons, because you have two hemispheres of brain in your skull? As many persons as you have neurons? What if you're drunk - am I dealing with a different and distinct 'you' because your thinking is impaired?
I can go on and on. What part of 'there's so much ontology involved in this question that trying to pare it down to a 1-or-2 choice is fruitless' don't you believe?
Comment by nullasalus — April 30, 2008 @ 9:44 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 10:08 pm
Nullasalus,
You have told us that the split-brain experiments bolster your conviction that these patients possess a unitary consciousness:
Do you stand behind this claim, or not? Can you defend it? How, exactly, do the split-brain results support the idea of a unified consciousness?
Comment by watchmaker — April 30, 2008 @ 10:08 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 10:14 pm
watchmaker,
Am I speaking with one person, two, or an indeterminate number in you, watchmaker? I'm tired of people taking positions where they always attack, never defend.
Answer me this one question, and I shall answer you in full. Or you can cut and run - the ball's in your court.
Comment by nullasalus — April 30, 2008 @ 10:14 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 10:25 pm
Nullasalus,
Why so prickly? I'm simply asking you to back up a claim that you chose to make.
If you can't back it up, that's fine. Just admit it, and we can go on to discuss other things.
Comment by watchmaker — April 30, 2008 @ 10:25 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 10:27 pm
watchmaker,
Run, rabbit, run.
Or should I say duck. Keeping with the theme here and all.
Comment by nullasalus — April 30, 2008 @ 10:27 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 10:27 pm
So when brain function is impaired an individual misperceives his environment.:shock:
Comment by Bradford — April 30, 2008 @ 10:27 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 10:38 pm
Your assessment contradicts experiments where the collosum is temporarily blocked with a drug. Subjects perform identically as those with brain injuries or defects, but when the drug wears off the subject remembers a bizarre experience of being aware of the "winter scene" (or equivalent) viewed via the right hemisphere, react emotionally, but unable to rationally assess (a left hemisphere function) the experience of it during the test, as that part of the experience was like a dream, where one experiences things but is unable to will any action (including logical analysis) against that experience coming in through the right hemisphere.
Comment by kornbelt888 — April 30, 2008 @ 10:38 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 10:47 pm
Bradford wrote:
No. In Gazzaniga's experiment, each hemisphere correctly perceived the image that was flashed in its half of the visual field.
The right hemisphere correctly perceived the winter scene, and therefore the left hand (controlled by the right hemisphere) pointed to the snow shovel.
The left hemisphere correctly perceived the chicken, and therefore the right hand (controlled by the left hemisphere) pointed to the chicken foot.
There is no misperception.
Comment by watchmaker — April 30, 2008 @ 10:47 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 10:58 pm
Sure there was. The two hemispheres were designed to work together. What do you infer from this experiment?
Comment by Bradford — April 30, 2008 @ 10:58 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 11:19 pm
Bradford,
The left hemisphere correctly perceived the chicken. The right hemisphere correctly perceived the winter scene.
Where is the misperception?
Comment by watchmaker — April 30, 2008 @ 11:19 pm
April 30th, 2008 at 11:40 pm
Kornbelt,
Are you suggesting that the subject in Gazzaniga's experiment is simultaneously conscious (in a unitary sense) of both images — the chicken and the winter scene — but is nevertheless unable to act on the winter scene, describe it, or even mention its existence, though he can do all three things effortlessly regarding the chicken image? What sort of awareness is it when you can't even mention the thing you are supposedly aware of?
I think there is a much simpler explanation of the memories of patients who have had their corpora callosi blocked by drugs: consider that in a normally functioning person, the hemispheres form memories in tandem and recall them in tandem. During the procedure, while the corpus callosum is blocked, memories are formed separately in each hemisphere, with no input from the other hemisphere. After the procedure, memories are recalled in tandem again, as if they had been recorded that way (because that is how the brain is wired, after all). I would hardly expect those memories to fit together seamlessly — it would be be like pointing two video cameras in different directions, recording for a while, and then playing back both videos simultaneously on the same screen while trying to interpret the resulting mishmash as if both cameras had been pointed in the same direction all along.
P.S. I'd be interested in reading those studies of "chemical callosotomies". Do you have a link or a cite?
Comment by watchmaker — April 30, 2008 @ 11:40 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 2:10 am
While we do not know the exact details (there's nothing about which we know the exact details) we do actually know a lot about these questions. Persistence of sensory input is thought to be generated by the feedback mechanisms of the brain, mainly the neocortex. For every synapse leading from a sensory input deeper into the neocortex there are more than ten synapses leading from the deeper regions back towards the sensory inputs. This large amount of feedback is thought to be what generates a constant worldview from the scattered input we collect. The feedback represents the various abstract concepts that are currently applicable. For example, I am in my den, I am looking at my computer monitor, it is showing my web browser, the web browser is showing Telic Thoughts, words are displayed on the screen. My brain has patterns stored about all of these these concepts and much of what I see is actually the recollection of these familiar elements and is not even being generated by my sensory inputs. If you consider the bandwidth between the eye and the brain and the saccades performed by the eye its quite clear that we are only truly perceiving a small portion of the steady image we think we perceive, the rest must be coming from memory.
The brain is a pattern matching engine. Given a jumbled or confusing input pattern the brain will still always manage to find a "closest match" even if the best it can do is something that doesn't make logical sense. Also, given that we are only actively perceiving a very small portion of what we see in our mind's eye and that most of the visual image is filled in by memory its not surprising that you can be fooled into seeing incorrect things. Potentially it is only the limitation of our technology that prevents us from seeing exactly what a person a thinking. A brain reading machine would need to be trained for the specific person who's brain it is reading, but conceivably once trained it could detect every abstract through passing through your mind. Given current understanding it is likely that such a machine could operate simply by detecting electrical activity at the brain column level (a brain column tends to be about 100 neurons). Obviously this is very theoretical at this point but its an area of active research. The point is some day we will likely be able to examine in great detail the functioning of both healthy and damaged minds and then we can answer all these questions.
The most common view would state that a memory is a strengthening of a junction between a dendrite and an axon for two neurons in the brain in response to a sensory input pattern. These patterns tend to be temporary so very likely the strengthening depends on the feedback from the previously experienced input in addition to the currently experienced input. In fact once a pattern is learned even if the next input in the sequence is missing the feedback from the previous input can cause the column to fire (in other words when a memory is active we see what is expected rather than what is actually perceived by our senses). The strengthening of a synapse can be seen as a decrease in the resistivity between the two neurons meaning when the lower level neuron fires the higher level neuron is more likely to fire at the same time. There are a number of very detailed theories about how the layout and connectivity of neurons in the neocortex generate our memories. There are even computer programs that are successfully using brain structure models to make invariant storage for things like image files.
Obviously the theory I proposed suggests consciousness is absolutely bound to memory/pattern matching. My only claim here is that this theory is enough to show that there is reason to question the more common assumption that consciousness is something beyond memory+emotion. Most people agree with you, but it is simply an assumption which might be wrong.
A digital camera can perceive without knowing what is perceived. I suspect you intended something slightly different than that. Can you clarify?
Comment by Todd Berkebile — May 1, 2008 @ 2:10 am
May 1st, 2008 at 4:23 am
Hi, Tod Berkebile,
Me:
You:
There is a mine field of semantics here. For example, "awareness" implies much more than what I specifically had in mind. And "Knowing" implies a high order concept that I'd rather not use, and which also seems to butt oppositely against "awareness", because doesn't knowledge mean that awareness is present? So how can one be conscious and aware but unknowing? So I'll try to use different words.
There is no good analogy I can think of. What I'm saying about consciousness is that I think that we are born with it. It's the ability to have perceptions. A newborn perceives. Train his head in the same direction that you and I are looking in, and he will receive the same input. He is conscious and has a consciousness. He will not understand concepts like sameness and differenceness, color, depth, and so on. He will have no understanding of what he is having perceptions of. But he has a consciousness. That's what I mean.
In a relative sense, from lower order to higher order, I would place consciousness right down there with perception. Above that I would have memory and pattern matching (a prelanguage understanding of sameness, difference, color, and also prelanguage learn-by-experience concepts like hardness, softness, bitter, sweet, etc). Language would be at the top of the heap, representing the highest physiological/psychological function that humanity can reach. I think consciousness is the prerequiste, with nothing necessary for it other than the sense organs and a functioning brain.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — May 1, 2008 @ 4:23 am
May 1st, 2008 at 5:15 am
nullasalus
Thinking about software, take away the medium and the software disappears. In the naturalist view of the mind, take away the body, and the mind disappears too. Christians (in common with most and perhaps all theists) believe there is something more, i.e. the soul. Something that exists after the body has disappeared. Is that different to how you understand the word?
Sorry I see no where in your reply that answers my question: Do you know anyone who thinks computer software is spiritual?
Of course analogous does not mean identical to. What could have led you to think I was cofused about that? And I have no idea what the relevance of the history of the argument might be.
Oh. I thought we were having a debate, with you arguing one position, and me arguing the other. That would be your side of the argument, and my side of the argument. Seems I misunderstood. Er, what exactly are we doing?
That rest of your posts seems to be railing against the labelling of philosophical positions, which is not something I particularly care about or see as relevant to our discussion.
JOHN
I do not know the answers to the questions you pose, but a lot of people are working to find those answers as you acknowledge. They presumably believe the questions can be answered, and when they have been I think (but do not know) we will be able to build a computer that is conscious. My position (my side in the argument if you like) is that human consciousness depends on the brain which is analogous to the computer hardware and the mind, analogous to the software. I see no reason to suppose that either human or AI require anything more in the form of a spirit or soul.
Comment by The Pixie — May 1, 2008 @ 5:15 am
May 1st, 2008 at 5:38 am
The Pixie,
Go look up 'soul' on the wikipedia. Go look it up in the Catholic encyclopedia. Look elsewhere if you like. What you're going to find isn't definition, but debate - even within a single formal faith, many times. And a belief that consciousness and is anchored, either partially or entirely, to the body is an age old belief even in Christianity. Have a look at the Apostles' creed. I think most christians, and most people period, have some conception of soul, but undeveloped or cursory at best.
Just look at the way you're approaching the subject on your own. Something that exists after the body has disappeared? But bodies don't disappear - they rot, they change, they burn. They, and their constituent parts, don't wink out of existence. Some processes remain in flux (we can still feel the effects of, say, Aristotle - even though Aristotle is long dead), and information about the self lingers (perhaps totally? It's an open question.)
'Depends on the software.' If we're into artificial intelligence, it's an open debate - some people think computers could/would have a spiritual nature akin to a human. As for the relevance; you're the one drawing lines in the sand, where if a conception of self is reliant or involves the material, then it's an argument against the soul. My response has been that that's a false framing of the debate, unless you want to go ahead and count Aquinas as a naturalist on the topic of the mind.
Considering the entire discussion between you and I is focused on the range of conceptions (and labels) with regards to soul, self, and matter, I'm surprised you don't see it.
To me, the debate you're interested in - soul versus material - is a non-debate. It's like 'evolution versus God created man'. The debate falls apart when you realize the two aren't mutually exclusive. In that vein, a discussion about labels is extremely important because they tend to be deceptive - with naturalism or materialism, they obscure a recent and staggering history of changes to the concept. With soul, it's usually an oversimplification. Soul, as understood by Scooby Doo episodes.
Actually, a good illustration of the root problem of definitions is in Stephen Stich's 'Deconstructing the Mind'. It's more about Stich's eventual rejection of eliminative materialism, but it goes a long way in showing how definition and labels work into discussions like this in a big way.
Comment by nullasalus — May 1, 2008 @ 5:38 am
May 1st, 2008 at 7:00 am
nullasalus
Actually I did, and I very nearly quoted it in my last post. I will do so now:
From the Catholic Encyclodia:
I am not going to argue that soul or spirit is poorly defined; I agree entirely. I am hoping (or ratther was hoping) we can come to some consensus about what it is not, at least.
This sounds like hair-splitting. Do you think a rotting corpse has consciousness, a mind or a soul? I would say no to each. For the purposes of this discussion, the body has ended its role as a vehicle for the individual. In effect it has disappeared. It is my understanding that most theists, including Christians, believe that the soul survives the death of the body, whether that body winks out of existence, slowly rots in the ground, is incinerated or whatever.
Do you think the effects we feel of Aristotle are connected to the existence of the spirit or soul? I would disagree. This sounds like a red herring.
I think we need to be careful about terms here. A spiritual nature could mean capable of pondering questions of spirituality, and I would agree that an AI could potentially do that. The real question here is whether the AI would have a spirit or soul, some essence of its consciousness that would potentially survive the destruction of the computer (including the destruction of the software).
Okay, so where does this leave us? We have this thing called a soul, that might or might not exist, that we cannot define, and that might be entirely naturalistic or supernatural or maybe a bit of both. I guess the point is that the concept of the soul can be used to cover anything we want really. Personally, I do not find that a useful concept if that is the case.
Then I suggest we relabel the debate into naturalism vs supernaturalism, and ask the specific question; do we have to invoke the supernatural to explain consciousness? Personally, I would call the stuff that some people believe is required for consciousness, the supernatural stuff that survives the death of the body as a "soul", but apparently that only confuses the debate.
Refering back to Sal's comment about software, I contend that no one (or at least virtually no one, and no "deep thinkers" on the subject) invokes the supernatural when they are trying to explain computer software.
Comment by The Pixie — May 1, 2008 @ 7:00 am
May 1st, 2008 at 7:30 am
Kurzwell and Tipler at least think it will be when it is complex enough
This Christian follows Thomas Aquinas is saying that the soul is no less and no more than the "form" of the body. It can exist with out a particular set of cells but has no independent existence.
check this out it will give you a quick overview of this view if your interested
http://www.veritas.org/media/t...
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 1, 2008 @ 7:30 am
May 1st, 2008 at 8:58 am
Correct.
It's a right-hemisphere awareness. The right hemisphere is able to recognize in non verbal and non logical ways, but unable to vocalize or reason about it.
I doubt it, given what the subjects actually say after the temporary disabling wears off. I'm certainly not going to volunteer myself to find out first hand what it's like.
Not offhand. It's been years since I was actively studying this and it was not from Internet sources. Sorry.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 1, 2008 @ 8:58 am
May 1st, 2008 at 9:07 am
Did each hemisphere perceive the scene in its entirety?
Comment by Bradford — May 1, 2008 @ 9:07 am
May 1st, 2008 at 9:23 am
Hello all,
What if the Penrose- Hammeroff Orch OR holds out to be true or at least something like it? Obviously this idea is deeply tied yet to the physical body/brain and the fundemental physical universe. Is this considered the "supernatural" as the quantum world is beyond our perception, yet absolutly exists in reality.
I suggest perhaps this is where our "spirituality" comes into play, that we may partially be percieving the quantum despite our involvment in the objective universe at large and this gets us sometimes to ask the question, "Is there something more?" and truly there is.
and yet this is not Supernatural… it is part of the physical universe. What this would mean as far as a soul is concerned I have no idea.
On a side note does anyone know why science has chosen to follow the Neuron over EEG model as evidence of consciousness? I am asking because I do not know.
It would seem to me that there is definetly some evidence to pursue both.
Comment by Kuma — May 1, 2008 @ 9:23 am
May 1st, 2008 at 9:40 am
It can be shown that each hemisphere is unaware of what the other has experienced. It's clear from the example given, even if you don't see it.
Each hemisphere saw a difference scene, and acted based on what it saw. The narrative hemisphere then concocted a post hoc explanation for the behavior of its counterpart.
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 9:40 am
May 1st, 2008 at 9:46 am
When defined in such a manner, it would seem that "spirit" is consistent with Philosophical Naturalism. Indeed, it would be completely reducible to known physical processes.
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 9:46 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:00 am
Kuma:
Welcome to Telic Thoughts, Kuma! I see your post spent some time in the filter, glad you made it out. Now your posts should come straight in unless they have a suspicious link in them, in which case you can do a shout-out to the board for moderation and one of us will go retrieve it.
You're right the subject of consciousness is a sticky one, so we can use all the insight we can get!
I agree with you about the observer/experiencer of mind/body states. The chemical composition of those states fluctuates constantly - induced by thoughts or emotions (a great idea gives a mind-rush, sudden fear and slamming on the brakes gives us a big body-rush, etc.) or even changes in body position or environmental temperature. The self experiencing it all is still the same self.
I personally view the physical body as the tool of the consciousness that lives in it for as long as it can function. Has a heart that beats, lungs that intake oxygen, blood that circulates, nerves that signal, brain that calculates. These are physical constructs doing physical things, not a one of them can be pointed to and identified as 'self'. Even though all can be identified by the self as 'mine'.
I'd be interested in your further thoughts on the subject. §;o)
Comment by Joy — May 1, 2008 @ 10:00 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:04 am
These observations are trivial.
Comment by Bradford — May 1, 2008 @ 10:04 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:06 am
IOW there are physical processes associated with thought. Noone disputes that anyway.
Comment by Bradford — May 1, 2008 @ 10:06 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:16 am
Trivial enough to win the Nobel Prize in Medicine.
"”
According to the theory mentioned by nullasalus, not merely associated with, but *completely reducible* to known physical processes.
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 10:16 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:24 am
Kuma:
Hi again, Kuma. I took the UA course in quantum consciousness in 1999-2000, and despite having to cram beforehand on 'required reading' and getting back snippets of knowledge I'd buried twenty years prior, there was an awful lot of detail to learn, in more subjects than I'm comfortable in. Including Artificial Intelligence, quantum cryptography, and other non-physics non-medical fields I was not familiar with. The profs were all quite tolerant and patient, but some of it went right on over my head.
I had also been making a valiant attempt to follow a couple of other models of consciousness I found very interesting, including JJ McFadden's EM Field model and Matti Pitkaanen's TGD model based on p-adic primes. My conclusion was that McFadden was describing an aftereffect rather than a cause, and Matti was ahead of Penrose by virtue of being willing to go where Penrose was only willing to point. I think they're onto something.
There must 'of course' be physical mechanisms of consciousness [PCCs]. Something that will be found in highly specialized form in neurons, but present in life generally. The tubulin-MT-Actin-MAP system looks like a definite possibility. That said, appeal to the quantum level of reality for ultimate causation is most likely a mistake. I don't think we'll find any ghosts or souls there.
What we can do is accept that quantum processes are the substrate of the mechanisms, thus allowing for our beliefs that consciousness enjoys degrees of freedom that rocks do not. Things generally cannot be entirely deterministic if the quantum level is a real substrate of manifestation. And it is. But even the quantum level is matter/energy in action. I think that as these models develop further we'll find that the operative extremal (Penrose postulates graviton) is itself an effect of causes in more dimensions than we experience here.
And if that is true, all bets are off.
Comment by Joy — May 1, 2008 @ 10:24 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:32 am
I don't see the references to "spirit" discussed here but it must have been philosophical implications that are driving this thread. From the link:
Comment by Bradford — May 1, 2008 @ 10:32 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:36 am
Zach:
"Completely reducible?" Where's that coming from, Zach? I don't think anybody here denies that there are physical mechanisms that facilitate the operations of consciousness (and subconsciousness, and entirely automatic central control), or that these are to be found concentrated in the organ in our heads that we call "brain."
But the physical processes that facilitate the operations of the CPU in our heads *are not* our 'self' and *are not* consciousness itself (as if we've got an actual definition of that, which we don't). If that were not so, even the staunch materialists who desperately want to reduce consciousness to zombiehood wouldn't have to appeal to "emergent properties" that magically poof into existence because things are so complex that they can't understand what's going on.
That's what's real at state-of-the-art right now. Please don't waste our time pretending otherwise.
Comment by Joy — May 1, 2008 @ 10:36 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:41 am
What are you talking about? The exchange had nothing to do with "spirit". Here it is.
You claimed the observations were "trivial". By any reasonable measure, that is incorrect.
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 10:41 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:46 am
Sorry, I had misattributed the comment above.
According to fifth monarchy man's cite, if software is "complex enough", then it can be considered spiritual. As software is completely reducible to known physical processes, then assuming the claim is correct, then at least some instances of spirit are completely reducible to known physical processes.
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 10:46 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:49 am
What is trivial is the undertone of this thread. We've been through this metaphysical door before and it is one the Nobel Prize winner's work does not sustain. Let's drop the pretenses. This, like similar threads before it, is being used to debunk "spirit" or "soul" concepts; a distinctly unhealthy scientific preoccupation.
Comment by Bradford — May 1, 2008 @ 10:49 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:53 am
I'm not smart enough or interested enough to do "undertone". I have trouble enough keeping track of the conversation as it is. Perhaps you mean the Under Toad.
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 10:53 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:56 am
The software I use has some very intelligent sources directing the physical processes of the hardware manufacturing containing the intelligently generated software.
Comment by Bradford — May 1, 2008 @ 10:56 am
May 1st, 2008 at 10:58 am
That's a surprising declaration coming from you since you were the one using the term "spirit." Do you have a scientifically rigorous definition of spirit?
Comment by Bradford — May 1, 2008 @ 10:58 am
May 1st, 2008 at 11:14 am
And that with respect to a different thread of the conversation, the term being introduced by others. I could trace the entire conversation, but you might read upthread where Salvador T. Cordova talks about software being "disembodied", then The Pixie drawing a distinction between being "disembodied" and "spiritual". And so on.
(I understand that most blogs can't multithread conversations, but it's usually still possible to follow along.)
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 11:14 am
May 1st, 2008 at 11:15 am
Bradford
I had no idea this was an "undertone" or there was any "pretense". As far as I am concerned, I have been openly discussing whether a supernatural spirit or soul is required to explain consciousness.
In your first post on this thread you said:
To my reading that statement fits right into the debate on the soul/spirit vs naturalism.
Who do you think is preoccupied with the issue? Do you think anyone on this thread has an unhealthy obsession with regards to this issue? Or are you thinking about a philosopher, mayb?
Comment by The Pixie — May 1, 2008 @ 11:15 am
May 1st, 2008 at 11:32 am
Yes, there is a distinction. A concept is not embodied.
Comment by Bradford — May 1, 2008 @ 11:32 am
May 1st, 2008 at 11:35 am
You approach the issue from a materialist point of view which is blind to a central idea of many religions namely, that intelligence preceeds matter and energy. The failure to explain consciousness from a materialist perspective is consistent with religious implications drawn from an ordering of events.
TP did this too. Failed to supply the context. Religion was introduced into the thread by Mark Frank, a fellow critic. No surprise.
Comment by Bradford — May 1, 2008 @ 11:35 am
May 1st, 2008 at 1:09 pm
Zach:
Ill bet the copywrite lawers at Microsoft would disagree
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 1, 2008 @ 1:09 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 1:23 pm
My statement was a complex conditional. Are you saying they would disagree with the syllogism, or one of the clauses?
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 1:23 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 2:07 pm
I disagree, given what the subjects actually say about their experience when the drug wears off. Not so clear as you would have it.
Yep, post hoc, but who are you to say it is incorrect? Why don't you volunteer for such an experiment. I'll pay for it.
Make it a great day.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 1, 2008 @ 2:07 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 2:17 pm
The Pixie,
You can try, but what are you saying it isn't? From my perspective the standards are 'If it's something that actually exists, it can't be the soul or anything spiritual.' A little too simple.
For my purposes (and most theists') a corpse doesn't have to have a mind or soul. Let's play by the most naturalist, materialist rules here - it's not like when someone is born there's suddenly more matter or energy around, or that any of it disappears when they die. Instead, we have the creation of a process/processes, and information. Processes are tricky, because it isn't as if every process that starts in the body/brain stays there. Nothing generally controversial there, though plenty of specifics may be. Is the information gone? Doubtful; just because information is lost doesn't mean it can't be retrieved. Will it? You'd probably say no, I'd lean towards yes.
And that's before getting into more controversial questions. Does consciousness continue immediately after death? Maybe; Aquinas seemed to lean against such a view, barring intervention. It wouldn't have any access to the faculties it needed its brain for (sensation, memory, etc.) Maybe raw individual consciousness is its own thing, nonphysical or at least something very much beyond our understanding. As I said earlier, my thoughts on it all vary. But again, even before getting that far, seeing the instrumentality of the physical with the soul isn't much of a stretch. And 'software' as a concept is hardly a threat to the concept. If anything it complements it.
What happens when you just take the software out of the hardware? Now you've got a chunk of apparently static media. No processes running. No consciousness experienced. If the software lingers around forever, but is never again put into the hardware, is the AI dead? Somewhere between life and death? What if the software is destroyed, but can be recreated perfectly, down to the particle? Again, by the most naturalist, materialist view, all you're dealing with is information.
Which is why I think software is a good illustration in these discussions - for all we know about software, once you're working mind, soul, and consciousness into it, it shows just how complicated and interesting the questions are, even with the most generously basic views of the world.
And 'mind/self' can cover every view of human persons, from substance dualism to dual-aspect monism to non-reductive physicalism to eliminative materialism to.. etc.
But it's still useful, because the whole point is that it's a topic which is explored from a variety of avenues. Most people don't think about either mind or soul all that deeply (atheist or theist), but some do, and arrive at strengthened conclusions or declarations. All I did was point out that your claims of 'that's not soul, because it involves some aspect of what I call naturalism' doesn't get off the ground. It's a false limit, just like 'If it isn't substance dualism, it isn't mind' would be a false limit when talking about that topic.
Unfortunately, that's where I'd turn right around and point out the same issues between 'mind' and 'soul' are as or even more alive when talking about 'natural' versus 'supernatural'. Again, look up supernatural, and you're going to find a debate rather than definitions.
Hell, software makes an almost identical return to the field. If we were in a computer simulation, would the actions of the programmer be supernatural? When we make computer simulations of reality, is what's going on inside of the computer subnatural to us? Natural to anything in the simulation? But you can have all of this going on within a purportedly 'naturalist' context. And if an AI materialist figured out she was an AI in a simulated world, well.. then 'materialism' would extend to include 'everything that is inside and outside the simulation'.
Zach,
If the physical processes that would make a true AI are known, go code one up. You'll make a fortune.
Can everything be reduced to basic physical processes? Funny - even the naturalists and materialists can't agree on that. Some are anti-reductionist, and the reasons to be so vary. Amusingly, the reductionists at times claim the anti-reductionists are effectively asserting the existence of magic. Just one more reason the labels are meaningless except for ego reasons. This before getting into how much quantum interaction is involved in consciousness. (Apparently it's no longer a question of whether there's any quantum interaction involved - from what I've read recently, there's certainly some indeterminacy involved in the brain at the level of ion channels.)
And here we have Zach asserting it's entirely possible the soul's been proven to exact. Welcome to the club, Zach.
Comment by nullasalus — May 1, 2008 @ 2:17 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 2:38 pm
When the drug wears off, the narrator concocts a clearly post hoc explanation.
Because we can test for that possibility. The subject didn't choose the shovel because of anything to do with chickens. We know why the subject started walking, and it wasn't to get a drink of water.
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 2:38 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 3:18 pm
Obviously. But you're giving the fact that it's post hoc unwarranted significance given their actual descriptions. Sure, they could be delusional, but then again, you could be wrong. They describe it as if a single consciousness was involved. I believe them until someone can demonstrate otherwise.
Make it a great day
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 1, 2008 @ 3:18 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 3:23 pm
Zach,
Kornbelt888 is talking about a situation with a temporary impairment due to a drug, with a subject response after the drug wears off. Your example, unless I'm missing something, is about a more permanent impairment where 'rejoined' hemispheres don't occur. The subject responses are on different planes; one is still impaired, one isn't.
Even with that aside, at what point did the subject decide to concoct the story? Only when they were asked why they were walking? The moment they felt the urge to walk? Did they even feel an urge, or just react to an unwilful movement? Other split-brain experiments show some conflict within the same body and subject awareness of conflict, after all.
Comment by nullasalus — May 1, 2008 @ 3:23 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 3:59 pm
Zach:
Again, this "completely reducible" very much includes intelligent design. There is no known software in existence that was not intelligently designed (by a human programmer). Not any of it. Even worse, there's no hardware that we know can run the software that came into existence without intelligent design.
So are you now attempting to include intelligent design under the heading of "known physical processes?"
Comment by Joy — May 1, 2008 @ 3:59 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 4:02 pm
The narrator providing the description *is* a single consciousness (more or less).
I discussed both examples. The effect is the same, except as the drugs wear off we can observe as the narrator becomes aware of the memories of the other hemisphere and constructs post hoc explanations for those memories.
Excellent question.
That would be my guess. Similar to how people may forget why they've entered a room for something. For a moment, at least, they're walking with no intention. Then they may suddenly stop and try to remember, or scan the room looking for clues. Even in a normal brain, subsystems may temporarily lose intercommunication.
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 4:02 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 4:20 pm
Zach,
Right, but the 'except' is the exact issue under consideration here. You're claiming that the memory the subject has is in effect a false one - they remember the stimulus but at the time had no way to interact with it or refer to it. Kind of an odd choice of 'post hoc explanation'.
I'm less than convinced we can glean that much from the data. But really, guess all you like - just, a guess is a guess. I have them, kornbelt does, the researchers do.
Comment by nullasalus — May 1, 2008 @ 4:20 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 4:29 pm
Intelligent Design wasn't the issue. (I assume you reviewed that aspect of the thread.) The issue was what constitutes "spirit".
My contribution was to point out that if software can be considered 'spirit', then we have at least one example of 'spirit' which is completely reducible to physical processes. It's a logical implication of what others were saying, and I wanted them to respond to that point as it seemed contradictory to normal conceptions.
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 4:29 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 4:37 pm
The evidence indicates that the narrator has no access to the experience or memory of the other hemisphere until the drug wears off, then it integrates the somewhat disjointed remembrances with its own. We can determine this by carefully controlling the experiences of each hemisphere.
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 4:37 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 4:50 pm
Zach:
What are you talking about? Software is not reducible at all to physical processes if it was then copywriters would not be able to claim software as intellectual property.
In the days before windows I took a computer class and as part of the class we were required to write some simple software I had no PC at the time and there were times when my software program existed only in my mind.
This is the opposite of "completely reducible to physical processes."
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 1, 2008 @ 4:50 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 4:51 pm
Bradford
nullasalus pointed out that the "materialist" label is nonsense nowaday, and yet "my side" still cling to it. In my experience the "materialist" label is employed far more frequently by the theists than by the atheists.
I approach the issue from a naturalistic point of view because I am accept naturalism. I rather suspect you approach the issue from a Christian point of view, what with you being a Christian. A Buddhist would probably approach it from a Buddhist perspective. It would be rather odd if we did other wise.
I have spent most of this thread trying to persuade nullasalus that theists in general posit a soul or spirit that is supernatural, i.e., beyond matter and energy. Thank the Lord you are supporting my claim.
It is true that naturalism cannot explain consciousness to well. Can the theistic point of view? Perhaps we could compare the two and see which does best.
So right from the very first response both sides have been discussing whether consciousness requires a soul/spirit. Where then is the pretense? Where is the undertone?
nullasalus
Entirely natural (i.e., the soul is not based on the natral world, but is something beyond that).
Then let us both reject that argument straightaway.
Naturalists too. Where I think (or at least until this discussion) was that theists believed that the soul survived death (but not as the soul of a corpse, of course).
I am not sure what your point is here. I think consciousness stops at the point of death. I would say that when the mental processes stop - i.e. brain death - that is it, game over (just like turning off a computer; it stops thinking; it is dead).
Sorry, I do not understand what this means.
Yes, I agree.
It depends how you define "soul". My concept of soul (which is not so far from the Wiki one) is that the soul is necessarily supernatural.
Certainly. For a person in the simulation, nature is the simulation; anything outside that is supernatural.
No. Everything happening inside and outside the computer is entirely natural, entirely within our natural world.
Comment by The Pixie — May 1, 2008 @ 4:51 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 5:03 pm
Zach,
The evidence also accords with what the subject replied with; 'access, but no reference possible'. Oddly enough, John Searle had a very similar (naturally, controversial) view on what it may be like to have your brain slowly replaced by artificial components.
I'm fine with 'we can determine', though in this case, 'determine' just means 'guess'.
You assume too much, which is a shame because I went out of my way to phrase this in the most physicalist-friendly terms. Chalmers believes that it would be entirely possible for an AI to have a consciousness. But Chalmers is well known for believing that qualia are not reducible to the physical. 'How' qualia show up, he's open on. Emergence? Panpsychism? Is it entirely passive?
So no, even going that far doesn't necessarily settle the issue. I guess 'If you assume there's no non-physical aspect of consciousness, then it's all physical' works. But, eh. You can figure out the criticism there.
The Pixie,
The problems with distinguishing between natural and 'not', I addressed at the end of my last post.
And I gave reason they could still believe as such, even in a physicalist framework.
Then the difference between you and the conventional theist would be 'theists believe you can turn a computer back on'.
The 'wiki one' gave a wide variety of viewpoints. Even the Catholic definition responded with more than one possibility. And beyond that, you still have to contend with the line between natural and supernatural.
See the problem? If everything inside or outside the computer is natural, but to a person inside the computer anything outside the computer is supernatural - then the supernatural can well be natural. And I'd say the simulation concept is very analogous to the (vague, argued) standard views of supernatural.
So the value of labelling things 'natural' or 'physical' dwindles more and more.
Comment by nullasalus — May 1, 2008 @ 5:03 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 6:10 pm
U.S. Copyright Law (17 USC § 102) only allows copyright of works of authorship that are in a tangible medium of expression. This might include the printed page, a sound recording or software. I'm not sure what country you are in, but many countries have similar copyright laws.
Ideas in your mind are not covered by copyright law. In any case, software is completely reducible to physical processes. Software in a computer is just an arrangement of electrons.
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 6:10 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 6:15 pm
The evidence strongly indicates otherwise. You can reject it if you want, but that is the determination of decades of research.
Determine means "to find out by investigation".
That wasn't my assumption. Do you agree with fifth monarchy man that computer software is spiritual?
Comment by Zachriel — May 1, 2008 @ 6:15 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 7:09 pm
Pixie wrote:
Okay then, let's try a really simple thought experiment. I build a computer with all the correct drives, circuits and other hardware. I plug it into an energy source. Will it then create its software from its drives and circuits? Is that what you believe? Isn't software something that we know that has to be designed separately? So how does Nature (or, is it nature) know how to do that? Isn't what you described to me above something you are taking on faith? Why should I believe something like that?
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — May 1, 2008 @ 7:09 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 8:28 pm
Zach,
No, it's your (and maybe someone else's) guess after looking at the data. And you're welcome to that guess, but the 'strong indication' is 'Zachriel says he feels strongly about this, and knows others who do too'.
And in this case the investigation yielded a hint of data, which involves going against the subject's own claims. Call the subject unreliable if you want due to impairment - and clearly they are impaired - but that just makes the case even harder to figure out.
Hey, I wouldn't be concerned if it WAS a 'post hoc explanation'. I'm not wedded to the idea that there's an undamaged unity of this aspect of consciousness in a split-brain experiment. But I'm not going to say 'Well, clearly the patient's report is unreliable, and this is the explanation I think works best, therefore my guess is correct'.
FMM specifically made reference to Kurzweil and Tipler, who in turn were talking about a type of program that does not currently exist. Chalmers doesn't use the words 'spiritual' or 'soul', but conscious - 'experiencing qualia' - with a non-reductive non-physical component. And Chalmers believes computers could have such, but (except in panpsychism, which is only one option he mentions as resolving the issue if his objections hold) it would be a future development.
You may as well ask me 'Does Chalmers believe a human could exist and be completely physical with no non-physical component?' And the reply would be, 'Sure. He calls them zombies.'
Comment by nullasalus — May 1, 2008 @ 8:28 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 9:47 pm
Thanks for the kind greetings Joy!:grin:
If we assume credence in the program/computer model of the self/brain, with the added benefit of extremly complex networking abilities should we not expect to find conscious states within a system like the internet?
Our programmed AI's aren't going to come anywhere near to the organized complexity of that system. Not even close. Our programmed AI by virtue of our having to do the work of creating a simplified system for it to guide istself in a human LIKE manner that its facilities will be handicapped from the start. I say this by way that we will have to completly generalize our data of human capacity and by virtue of generalization the programming will be by default more simplistic than we are. and thus should not fundementally complex enough for a so called "emergent" consciousness.
The internet is a much more likely place for some type of spontaneous abnormality to happen given it's vast complexity of electrical signaling and information disemination. Much like the brain is.
But I do not see that being very likely until quantum computers become part of the network. The interesting idea that a theory of a Quantum/classical brain and consciousness is that the quantum allows for the extra perspective required of what we truly experience as consciousness. An analog classical system is either it is or it is not regardless of how many switches are thrown. The quantum computation adds the potential for it is and is not to exist simultaneously allowing the possibility of a new point of view or the observer.
Obviously i am talking from a philisophical context but philosophy has merit to help direct the flow and use of aqcuired knowledge.
Now let me ask the question of, If we assume that consciousness is merely a byproduct of mechanism, then why is main stream science so resistant to the idea of tackling the subjective experience head on. If it is solely derived of mechanism (than it is objective as no subjectivity can truly exist) than we should be able to find the mechanism that tells me that I should believe i am alive and experiencing what I experience. there should be a fundemental mechanism of self deciet…you would think right?
Only our ability to experience allows us to know or even realize that we have a brain in our head or that others have one in theirs regardless of mechanism. Experience must be part of the equation when reverse engineering our brain because it is the point we should start to reverse engineer from as like I said it is the only thing that lets us see or speculate that there may or may not be more than what is apparent or obvious.
Comment by Kuma — May 1, 2008 @ 9:47 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 10:09 pm
And Mozart on a phonograph album is just bumps on vinyl and Hamlet is just smudges on paper. It's the information that makes the music or the play or software or the consciousness. Bumps and electrons and smudges are just bumps or electrons or smudges.
But I should of known better than expect a philosophical materialist to see the art and not just the medium.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 1, 2008 @ 10:09 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 10:35 pm
Imagine that we rerun Gazzaniga's experiment with a twist:
1. Instead of a single subject, we seat two subjects side-by-side in front of the screen.
2. The subject on the right has his left hand tied behind his back.
3. The subject on the left has his right hand tied behind his back.
4. The subjects are completely normal.
6. We flash the image of a chicken on the screen so that only the right-hand subject can see it.
7. We simultaneously flash the image of a snowy scene on the screen so that only the left-hand subject can see it.
8. We ask the subjects to choose a matching image.
9. The subject on the right, who saw the chicken, points to the chicken foot with his free hand.
10. The subject on the left, who saw the winter scene, points to the snow shovel with his free hand.
None of this suprises us. It makes perfect sense, because each person points to the image that matches the one he was shown.
Notice that the results of this experiment match the results of Gazzaniga's experiment. In our experiment, each person chooses the correct matching image. In Gazzaniga's experiment, each hemisphere chooses the correct matching image.
Those of you who resist the straightforward conclusion should ask yourselves a question: Exactly why do I accept the straightforward explanation when there are two subjects involved, but not when there are two separated hemispheres involved?
If you look deeply enough, I think you'll find that the answer has little to do with the implications of the evidence itself, and more to do with what you are comfortable believing.
Comment by watchmaker — May 1, 2008 @ 10:35 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 10:48 pm
watchmaker,
If the explanation is straightforward, why won't you explain what it is? I mean, I asked you a pretty simple question - are you, in your own (hemisphere-joined) body, 1 person, 2+ persons, 0 persons? You won't answer that. And you'll refer to how obvious the answer you derive from the experiment is, but you won't actually provide it. Just allude.
It really sounds like you want to criticize and question a conclusion you dislike, but you're not all that confident at providing your own for the same examination. 'If you all were reasonable, you'd say something I'd agree with, but won't actually mention' doesn't really come across as very persuasive. And since you want to psychoanalyze, I'll do the same: Because you lack confidence in your stance, and questioning your belief would be uncomfortable for you.
Comment by nullasalus — May 1, 2008 @ 10:48 pm
May 1st, 2008 at 11:15 pm
Nullasalus wrote:
I already have (see this plus my other comments in this thread).
It makes sense that the two hemispheres are separate seats of awareness in Gazzaniga's patient. The 300 million axons of the corpus callosum have been cut, after all. It also makes sense that the side-by-side subjects are separate seats of awareness in my recasting of the experiment. The experimental results are the same. Why would you interpret them differently in one case but not the other?
I've stated and supported my position, yet again.
You, on the other hand, made this claim, which you have never backed up:
You refuse to explain how the split-brain evidence supports your view, even when challenged repeatedly. Why is that? Can you support your claim, or not?
Instead of answering, you keep trying to change the subject:
To borrow a phrase of yours, that comes across as desperate.
Comment by watchmaker — May 1, 2008 @ 11:15 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 12:26 am
watchmaker,
Tell you what. I'm going to go ahead and answer - and then we'll see if you can tell me just how many persons are inside your head. I'm more than happy to spell out what I believe in. So are many others here.
Why do I think there's a single and unified consciousness in play? I'll start with the following reasons.
1) Because prior to the cutting of the corpus callosum, there exists a history - considering the context, a considerable one - of unity and cooperation between the hemispheres. The development, experience, capabilities (though functionally uneven), etc were shared. Post-cut, the mental communication between both hemispheres is hobbled (not obliterated - more on this below), but the history remains. Trivially true, but it highlights an important point: Even if there is an apparent distinction in what these hemispheres can access and experience in certain conditions, the left hemisphere is not totally (or even greatly) distinct from the right hemisphere. It calls on memories, experiences, etc that were shared, in a way unlike two humans (or even two conjoined twins) would share.
2) Even if the corpus callosum is cut, communication between the two hemispheres remains. Instead of relying on the CC, other cues - sound, sight, touch, etc - receive greater emphasis. The success of the communication is considerable; yes, there are some instances where the left and right hemispheres seem to work with disunity. But there's vastly more where the individual is able to function normally in life - on the flipside, there are plenty of people with an intact CC that experience and report considerable inner conflict. When someone expresses turmoil about wanting to quit smoking versus having one last cigarette, we don't (and shouldn't) ascribe the problem to 'multiple agents'. Nor do we when they report being unsure whether to hug or punch someone. We just stay out of arm's reach.
3) Communication is also proposed to happen across the brain stem in patients with a severed CC - functioning as an additional source of mediation, possibly more. So even on a physical level (should go without saying, but hey, let's emphasize it) split-brain patients aren't entirely parted neurologically; communication is hampered, but 'pure' mental communication and signalling/sharing is not utterly removed.
Now, all this before even getting into Kornbelt888's referenced experiment - I've not heard of it, so I'll put it aside, as interesting as it is - among other points. Between memory, past association, brain stem communication, bodily cooperation, etc, I see this as backing up my view: That we're dealing with a single, unified, damaged consciousness as opposed to two persons. Even if the CC were absent from birth, this would be the case given the facts in play.
I think that's a good start, watchmaker - I just explained in detail why I take a particular viewpoint with regards to the unity of consciousness with regards to patients with split brains. Think you can tell me if there are 0, 1, or 2+ persons inside your skull now? Or are you afraid to do what I just did, and answer a vastly more straightforward, simple question?
Comment by nullasalus — May 2, 2008 @ 12:26 am
May 2nd, 2008 at 4:15 am
Nullasalus wrote:
Finally, some answers! Having read through them, however, I can see why you were reluctant to put them forward in the first place.
Nobody disputes that awareness was unified before the corpus callosum was cut. The question is whether it was unified afterward.
Sure, there is some extracorporeal communication between the hemispheres — just as there is extracorporeal communication between two people sitting side by side. But the fact that two people are communicating does not make them collapse into a single awareness. Likewise, the fact that the two hemispheres can communicate extracorporeally doesn't make them fuse into one awareness. Each hemisphere, like each person, maintains a separate awareness.
Indecisiveness is not what these split-brain patients are experiencing. When you're indecisive, you're aware of your options, aware of why they are equally attractive to you, and aware of the need to adjudicate between them. None of this obtains for the split brain patient.
An indecisive person does not light a cigarette with the right hand, only to have the left hand grab it and put it out — again and again. An indecisive person does not have trouble getting dressed because her right hand picks a dress of one color, while the left hand grabs it, puts it back in the closet, and picks a different dress. These are the actual behaviors of split-brain patients, and they bear little resemblance to mere indecisiveness. Indeed, in these cases each hemisphere is exactly (and even forcefully) sure of what it wants. No indecision at all — as in the case of a split-brain patient who attacked his wife with one arm but defended her with the other.
We already know that such communication is not sufficient to maintain a single, unified awareness. In Gazzaniga's experiment, the left hemisphere is unaware of the winter scene, and the right hemisphere is unaware of the chicken. Why? Because the corpus callosum is severed.
You've failed to answer the obvious question: how can awareness be unified, if the left hemisphere is not aware of the same things that the right hemisphere is aware of, or if the left hemisphere wants something that the right hemisphere rejects?
Comment by watchmaker — May 2, 2008 @ 4:15 am
May 2nd, 2008 at 5:18 am
watchmaker,
Actually, watchmaker, plenty of people dispute the concept of a 'unified consciousness' prior to CC cutting. There are models that include the mind being awash in a variety of individual thoughts where streams of consciousness compete with each other for primacy, among others. But if you're approaching the question from a physicalist standpoint, you have an additional dilemma on your hands - since there was an 'indisputable' undamaged unified awareness prior to the CC being cut, then afterwards you're dealing with two hemispheres that both have access to a plethora of memories and experiences that would be identical (or identical, for all practical purposes.) This is particularly strong, since evidence indicates that memory isn't stored in a single location, but distributed throughout the brain. Teach a mouse how to run a maze, then start slicing out parts of their brain. They can finish the maze despite slice after slice.
Consciousness is unified, but damaged.
Excuse me, but 'awareness'? I said there was a single, unified, but damaged consciousness in play. I made no claim about awareness, either in my explanation or my original claim. Considering that even a person with a fully healthy and intact brain can experience moments of unconscious reflex, subconscious association - both without necessitating awareness until after the fact, or upon introspection - 'awareness' is a tricky part of a unified conscious experience. What about sleepwalking? Is that a case of possession by a rogue agent?
With all respect, watchmaker - you're pulling this out of your ass. (Oops, not very much respect, for reasons to be given below.) Indecisiveness is exactly what these split-brain patients are experiencing; they have a damaged, unified consciousness. What would normally be an internal dialogue and conflict becomes an external one; why? Because there is damage to the brain. For every example you can give of the two hemispheres working in opposition to each other, there exist a dramatically greater number where they work in harmony. You can remark about how what they're doing is no different than two individuals talking to each other - which is fine, so long as you ignore that these 'two individuals' had a direct hemisphere connection, a (at times, lengthy) unified past experience, a lingering mental connection at the brain stem and even post-connection inhabit the same body with a vast amount of information shared between them.
Single, damaged unitary consciousness.
You've failed at reading comprehension - I didn't say word one about awareness. You equated that with consciousness; your mistake, not mine. There is a unified consciousness, damaged. Shared awareness is possible, but hobbled considerably. You're still dealing with one agent.
By the way: You throw smug comments at me (despite displaying some tremendously sloppy thinking about this topic), but you won't answer a simple question. Are 0, 1, or 2+ persons inside your skull now?
Because you know that if you answer 0, you can be dismissed as a reductionist to the point of inanity. If you answer 2+, then you have some interesting explaining to do about just 'which watchmaker' I'm talking with right now, along with falling prey to the 0 responses. But if you answer 1, then you have to wrestle with whether cutting the CC creates 2 distinct individuals - and whether it's more justified to say there is a single, damaged consciousness (in which case, welcome to the club), a pair of individuals (In which case, where did the original one go? Are they both half a consciousness? Is one of them the original consciousness, and the other a newly created distinct consciousness?) or worse.
You're a coward, watchmaker. And it's a pleasure proving as much.
Comment by nullasalus — May 2, 2008 @ 5:18 am
May 2nd, 2008 at 7:31 am
The "someone" was Roger Wolcott Sperry who won the Nobel Prize in Medicine for his discoveries, and generations of neurologists who have confirmed and extended his findings. Oh, and the evidence.
The subject's reports are an essential ingredient of the experiments. We can control what each hemisphere knows, and demonstrate that they experience life independently.
I didn't see an answer.
The question was whether sufficiently sophisticated software could be considered a spirit in the sense that a person has a spirit or soul. Most would agree that software has no supernatural component. Most would agree that a recording of Mozart has no supernatural component"”even if they believe Mozart's genius did. If you are using the word 'spirit' in a different manner, that's fine. But please try to make clear distinctions.
I'm not a Philosophical Materialist.
Comment by Zachriel — May 2, 2008 @ 7:31 am
May 2nd, 2008 at 8:14 am
Computers are different to people. When people die, then cannot be turned back on. When a computer is turned off it is dead, but it can be brought back to life by turning it on again. Let us suppose this is an AI. I believe that when the computer is turned off it is no longer thinking, no longer conscious. Does that computer have a soul? Does it get a new soul each time it is turned on, or does its soul hang around in limbo while the computer is turned off?
You make a good case for abandoning the concept altogether.
Certainly. For a person in the simulation, nature is the simulation; anything outside that is supernatural.
No. Everything happening inside and outside the computer is entirely natural, entirely within our natural world.
I see no problem there. Presumably you would accept that the people in the computer world wouldf consider us to be outside their universe? Even though they are inside our universe?
The denizens of the computer simulation might well have completely different physical laws to us. How can that possibly be? The exist in their universe with its rules, but at the same time they exist in our universe with an entirely different set of rules. How can they possibly have two sets of physical laws?
JOHN
I thought we were talking about whether consciousness required a supernatural component. I said I see no reason to suppose such a thing. Is that taking it on faith? I do not see anything relevant in your post aside from that.
Comment by The Pixie — May 2, 2008 @ 8:14 am
May 2nd, 2008 at 8:17 am
That doesn't mean there isn't structure to those streams of awareness. There is a great deal of structure, in particular, specialization of the hemispheres. Sperry did some important work in this area. Previous theories suggested that areas of the brain were plastic and interchangeable, then transformed by experience. Sperry and others showed this not to be the case, but that the circuits of the brain are largely prewired.
You must be using the term in a special, personal manner. Please define "consciousness".
consciousness, the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself; the state or fact of being conscious of an external object, state, or fact; the totality of conscious states of an individual.
Comment by Zachriel — May 2, 2008 @ 8:17 am
May 2nd, 2008 at 1:10 pm
Zach,
I'll see your Roger Wolcott Sperry and raise you Sir John Carrew Eccles, the nobel prize winning neurophysiologist who advocated a form of what amounted to a quantum dualism in the brain, based on the evidence.
Really, Zach. If you're always going to fall back on 'Well this is someone who agrees with me, and I think his reputation is awesome', why bother? Argue on merits, argue for yourself. Or go sit in the bleachers.
You apparently didn't see a lot of things - you're making it sound like FMM suggested that Wordperfect has a spiritual nature. If that were truly his suggestion, I'd disagree. I'd think Kurzweil, Tipler, Chalmers, and others would disagree as well. Now, AI that experiences qualia and is more closely related to human-level intelligence across the board? Sure, I'd be willing to grant that. But then, consciousness still isn't reducible to physical processes.
If you want to stipulate 'If all consciousness is reducible to physical processes, would an AI that is a replica of a human mind be reducible to physical processes?', then, er. Sure, I guess so.
Who said there wasn't? I was responding to a claim that 'of course everyone believes that prior to a CC slicing that there's a unified consciousness'. Some people consider that to be more illusion, less fact.
Why would your definition not back up my view? Totality of conscious states of an individual. Being conscious of external objects, states, or facts. Quality or state of being aware of something, especially within oneself.
You have all that, in a damaged form in split-brain patients. You're acting as if more than the CC was cut - forgetting that they share a nervous system, a brain stem, a tremendous amount of pre-cut memories, unbelievably intimate post-cut memories and experiences. I've argued that this means we're dealing with a damaged but unified consciousness. Coward is arguing that they're two distinct individuals.
By the way, Zach - how many persons are in YOUR head? Maybe someone will answer that today.
The Pixie,
I may as well be asking you those questions, Pixie - you're the one who believes turning off a computer 'kills' it. If it's an AI complete with qualia and a stark similarity to human consciousness, sure, I'd at least be willing to entertain the idea that it has a soul. You're still making the mistake of viewing a soul as some kind of ectoplasmic substance. A soul can exist and not be experiencing anything.
As for 'people cannot be' brought back to life - we've had to continually redefine death, precisely because lines kept getting blurred. People who were clinically dead were resuscitated. Still happens nowadays. Granted, the hop from there to 'a person who was incinerated 1k years ago can be brought back to physical life' is big, to say the least. But why should I discount it? More than that, if they were brought back to life, it would have to be because some part of them lingered on for all those years. Information was available. While there's still many other definitions individuals probably entertain that may have some validity, that'd be soul enough for me.
Let's abandon mind, universe, matter, morality, physicalism and everything else that people argue about too, right? Because what's the point of having a definition of something, especially if it's a something you politically object to, if people express uncertainty or a willingness to develop the idea in light of evidence.
Then 'supernatural' and 'natural' aren't opposed whatsoever. It's, at least in large part, a question of perspective. Something natural can be supernatural. All things supernatural are, from the right perspective, natural.
And if that's the case, should we discard 'natural' because it can't be truly separated from any alternative?
The only 'problem' there is that it shows how useless the distinction between supernatural and natural can be, with a very concrete and (for our purposes) realistic example. I have no problem accepting it. You may.
Comment by nullasalus — May 2, 2008 @ 1:10 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 2:16 pm
What was the scientific study that Eccles used to demonstrate the validity of his idea? Did he win the Nobel Prize for his conjecture? Or was it for his work with ionic mechanisms in synapses? (By the way, the flow of information that Eccles requires to support his conjecture violates the law of energy conservation.)
Really, nullasalus. I repeatedly pointed to the evidence and you wave your hands about my "(and maybe someone else's) guess". try not to act surprised when someone responds directly to your comment.
The fundamental difference between Eccles' conjecture and Sperry's experimental work is that Sperry's experiments are subject to scientific validation. That is, we take a hypothesis, make predictions, then test them.
I'm trying to get a clarification, because that is what appears to be the implication of his statements (assuming sufficient complexity).
I think you will find that you have misunderstood the statement. There are various levels of organization that are integrated into a more or less single entity we call the "self". But it was perhaps worth a clarification, if that was your intent.
Because we can show that each hemisphere has separate awareness in split brain patients.
It's clearly not a unified awareness and it provides important information about how the brain works.
Comment by Zachriel — May 2, 2008 @ 2:16 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 2:38 pm
Nobel winner, Roger Sperry, concluded from his split-brain experiments that the "mind has a causal power independent of the brain's activities. This led Sperry to conclude materialism was false."
re:Changed Concepts of Brain and Consciousness 1985
http://www.blackwell-synergy.c...
Sperry's mentalism, dualism, emergentism …
http://www.encyclopedia.com/do...
Comment by Pez — May 2, 2008 @ 2:38 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 2:42 pm
Zach,
Between virtual particles and your thoughts on the law of causality being pretty dispensable, that should do nothing to hobble your view of the man's theory.
Sperry's experiments are subject to scientific validation - not in every way you conceive. I say you're overreaching on a specific claim. That leads you to 'Well, I have a Nobel prize winner on my side!' I'm not sure what you want out of me. 'I'm very proud of you for being on what you think is the side of a Nobel Prize winner, Zachriel.'?
And I've 'clarified' for you repeatedly, pointing out the context Kurzweil and Tipler were both speaking in, as well as introducing Chalmers' related thoughts on the subject. Then you shake off the clarification and repeat the question.
Are you going to tell me some people don't consider the self to be an illusion? And not just buddhists, pertinent as they are to this subject. If you don't think some regard the unity of consciousness as essentially an illusion - not real - then I don't know what to say to you. Go hit consc.net - read up on the varying views, from Dennett to Chalmers to Tye to otherwise.
As I said to Coward: Wonderful. I didn't say word one about awareness until 'consciousness' almost magically became 'awareness' in the conversation. I've argued that a split-brain patient has a damaged but unified consciousness. None of my points relied on utterly unified 1:1 awareness between the hemispheres; indeed, I expressly referred to memories, signaling via the brain stem, non-mental communication and cooperation, etc. The two hemispheres shared a brain. Share a nervous system. Share a body. Share memories. Have a brain connection, though it is clearly hobbled.
And, like Coward, I notice you won't answer about how many persons are in your head. But I'll ask again: How many persons are in your head, Zach? Because right now we've got two people who are stonewalling on what should be an utterly simple, straightforward question, while I'm happily laying out my views and defending them.
Is it a tough question, Zach? Is only your right hemisphere seeing the question, and the left hemisphere won't let you answer? Do you have trouble counting as high as you'd need to to answer? What's going on here?
Pez,
Oh dear Lord. Thank you for that. Now THAT will be some interesting reading.
Comment by nullasalus — May 2, 2008 @ 2:42 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 2:48 pm
Comment by Zachriel — May 2, 2008 @ 2:48 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 3:07 pm
Comment by Pez — May 2, 2008 @ 3:07 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 4:20 pm
I'll take that as you know of no such study.
You will notice my use of scare-quotes.
"”
Sperry seemingly explicitly rejects resorting to dualist, but looks to emergence from "interactionism", what we would call emergence.
Comment by Zachriel — May 2, 2008 @ 4:20 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 4:24 pm
Zach:
I'm short on time so I will just clarify. It is Tippler and company that think software can become spiritual if it is complex enough. I disagree if they mean human but am open to the possibility
However I think you are using naive definitions of supernatural and spiritual. The proper definitions are
Supernatural"¦.. relating to or attributed to phenomena that cannot be explained by natural laws
Spiritual"¦.. relating to the soul or spirit, usually in contrast to material things
I see Music or Art or software as both supernatural and spiritual in this sense. In fact I see all the artifacts of intelligence as such. The reason for this is obvious. If we have free will even a free will that is compatible with physical determinism our actions can not explained by natural laws or Materialism it's that simple.
I know you don't see things like art and music as supernatural. Chalk it up to different world views if you like. But if you can understand why I do you'll be a long way toward understanding why ID makes so much sense to folks like me as an explanation for things that look to be the result of intelligence.
Peace
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 2, 2008 @ 4:24 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 4:41 pm
Thanks. I appreciate your time, and do care about your views.
And, as we know that software is reducible to physical processes, then you are open to the idea that spirit can be reduced to physical processes.
I hadn't introduced or implied any definition. (In other threads, I have suggested that the distinction between natural and supernatural is not useful or well-defined.)
Well, artifacts are usually considered natural. They are made of stone or paint or sound. Perhaps you mean the inspiration of genius which leads …
Oh.
An animist thinks that everything, from rocks to trees, is full of spirit. Are they wrong?
ID generally makes a claim to scientific rather than religious respect.
Comment by Zachriel — May 2, 2008 @ 4:41 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 4:41 pm
Pixie:
You responded:
Where did I introduce the supernatural? I am trying to figure out what consciousness is. Apparently you are projecting what you believe my beliefs are onto what I am saying. I find that a little bit presumptive. You do believe in consciousness, don't you? Some materialists believe we need to get rid of the word. From their perspective consciousness is really just an illusion. How in the world do they know that? I am asking how the universe produces it, how living things produce it, how the human brain produces it.
That is why I found your analogy a bit curious; that consciousness is analogous to software and the computer hardware is analogous to the brain. The point I was trying to make is that this type of analogy raises more problems then it answers. Software is something that is abstract. It doesn't have physical existence even though it may require a physical substrate (hardware) to be functional. How can the universe, which is unconscious and unintelligent ever give rise to something like consciousness and mind? Is there any reductionistic explanation how that happened or even how it could happen?
If there is then you or someone could tell me how?
If there isn't, how can any open minded person reject that there are other logical possibilities?
In my opinion the origin of consciousness from a materialist perspective is even more perplexing than the origin of life.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — May 2, 2008 @ 4:41 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 5:11 pm
Hi Zach,
Yes, Sperry said he was not resorting to dualism (substance, I presume) but he resorts to a dualism of causation. The mental state has causal influence over the brain state.
But perhaps I offered the clarification on Sperry for no reason. I admit I haven't read this thread but merely saw you citing him as support for your position.
His scientific experiments demonstrated to him that consciousness and mental action are not reducible to brain states and that they have causal control over the physical.
True, he presumed that science would one day explain that causation (his personal opinion). But as you asked of Eccles:
It wasn't for his rejection of dualism or his conjecture about emergent properties.
But I apologize if none of this touches upon the case you were using Sperry to make.
Comment by Pez — May 2, 2008 @ 5:11 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 5:23 pm
Pez,
I don't know what Zach (Zachs?) will say, but for me, those links are of particular interest. Particularly this Sperry abstract:
Sperry, apparently, realized just what was going on in what he studied, and was open-minded about it.
Comment by nullasalus — May 2, 2008 @ 5:23 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 5:45 pm
No, it wasn't. At times, a senior scientist might lay out a broad vision as to where science should venture. I would consider it informed speculation. The scientific merit then depends on whether the vision leads to new discoveries.
Actually, I found it interesting and topical.
Comment by Zachriel — May 2, 2008 @ 5:45 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 5:54 pm
Hi Nullasalus,
I enjoy your comments on this and other blogs.
I'm glad you will get something out of a better look at Sperry.
He definitely saw in the experiments a reason to reject the materialistic, bottom-up, brain state=mental state explanations. By calling the effect "emergent" he, in my opinion, admitted that science does not have an answer.
Unfortunately, my source on this is J.P. Moreland via Lee Strobel's The Case For A Creator. I know such a reference will mean nothing here.
Here's Sperry himself trying to clarify his "mentalist" position.
http://people.uncw.edu/puente/...
"Find" Sperry's name in the references here to access links to several of his papers and papers about him.
http://consc.net/mindpapers/1....
Comment by Pez — May 2, 2008 @ 5:54 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 6:07 pm
null
Then let us forget the soul altogether. It seems to be just muddying the waters. My contention is that there is no need to invoke "some kind of ectoplasmic substance" to explain consciousness. Does that seem a reasonable claim to you? I guess not as you seem unhappy with the whole natural/supernatural division.
Sure. Like turning a computer back on. The problem with people is that the body quickly deteriorates, so it has to be turned back on very fast. That seems to fit the software as analogy claim.
You are objecting that there is no absolute "natural", therefore we cannot truly separate natural from supernatural from our perspective? I think there is a clear line between our universe and the universe of the computer simulation, and that clear barrier allows us to say that you, for instance, are a natural part of our world, bound by the physical laws of our universe, but a supernatural entity to the denizens of the virtual reality, not bound by their laws. Sorry, I still do not see a problem with this distinction. It seems both clear and useful. Maybe the fundamental issue here is whether the entity is bound by the laws of nature. I accept that even there we have problems until we know exactly what the laws of nature are.
JOHN
You did not. You responded to a comment of mine about the supernatural:
Perhaps you understood spirit or soul to mean something different, but I can assure you my statement was about the supernatural.
Well I hope we have cleared that up.
Sure.
See, again and again it is the IDists/creationists who use the "materialist" label.
I am not sure I would call it "abstract", but I think I see your point. But I think the mind is the same, with no physical existence, requiring the brain to be functional.
I do not think we have any explanation, reductionist or otherwise. Many people believe in a supreme intelligence that predates the universe; where does that come from?
So you are open to the possibility that intelligence evolved?
Comment by The Pixie — May 2, 2008 @ 6:07 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 6:23 pm
Only read half the Sperry paper so far, but his position seems very reasonable.
Comment by The Pixie — May 2, 2008 @ 6:23 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 6:27 pm
Yet you seem pretty hand-wavery when it comes to NDE results. What kind of evidence would be enough to merely indicate that consciousness trancends the physical brain? Because I don't see you dealing with that evidence, I merely see you dismiss it with no good reason given.
Comment by Jean — May 2, 2008 @ 6:27 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 6:32 pm
Get off yer soapbox, Pixie. Materialism, physicalism, all well-known labels used by even materialists themselves. There's also a Wiki on materialism and physicalism, no doubt NOT written by IDists/creationists. Also, pot kettle black for using the dreaded creationist label when Null certainly is not deserving of your silly mockery. Pixie doth protest too much.
Comment by Jean — May 2, 2008 @ 6:32 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 6:39 pm
The Pixie,
It's only recently come to my attention, but have a look at the abstract of Sperry on the subject. Why should I forget the soul, and not the mind, morality, universe, etc? It speaks to an important concept, one that developed alongside a long tradition of philosophical and scientific inquiry.
And I don't invoke 'some kind of ectoplasmic substance'. The problem is, Chalmers and others who think there's a non-physicalist component to consciousness wouldn't necessarily either. Even substance dualists don't necessarily rely on 'some kind of other substance' since many of them argue the alternative is immaterial. Hell, substance dualists always have to remind people that they are dualists - and that the material/physical aspect is essential to their views.
As always, it comes down to politics. The option can only be 'the soul does not exist', not 'there are conceptions of soul that integrate nicely with neurological insights'. For little reason more than, hey - if science can't exorcize religious concepts, what good is it?
And yet the amount of time that can pass before it's 'turned back on' is longer and longer. If you're a full-blown materialist (reductionist or not) then the only barrier between a resuscitation in 5 minutes, 5 hours, or 5 centuries is technological feasibility and practicality (ignoring simulation questions). Big jumps. Will either be realized? Who's to say. Personally, I'm not prepared to take the position of 'absolutely not' as a matter of dogma, any more than I'm willing to declare that qualia doesn't exist, or emergence, or supervenience, or.. etc, etc.
In a simulation context, our 'nature' and natural laws would be lines of code that could be altered. A programmer (or programmers) could interact with the simulated world in ways that would naturally defy our understanding and capabilities. The entity wouldn't be bound by any laws of nature in our universe. Sure, they could be bound by others laws; as I said, this is analogous to the more traditional debate on supernatural and natural. You say you accept the problems of delineating between natural and supernatural - good enough for me. Questions of supernatural, natural, and even subnatural doesn't go away even with a physicalist/materialist view.
Comment by nullasalus — May 2, 2008 @ 6:39 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 7:10 pm
Nullasalus,
You haven't acquitted yourself very well in this thread. Read it over and see what I mean.
Repeat that all you want. To be persuasive, you'll need to supply evidence for your view.
Desperate gambit #1: When you've lost an argument, try to redefine one or more terms so you can pretend you were arguing about something else.
Perhaps you can explain to us which of the following is wrong, and why:
1. "The right hemisphere was conscious of having seen the winter scene."
2. "The right hemisphere was aware of having seen the winter scene."
We're not talking about reflexes or subconscious associations. We're talking about two alert hemispheres, one of which is conscious of having seen a chicken, the other of which is conscious of having seen a winter scene. Both hemispheres understand the instructions given by the experimenter. Each analyzes the images, determines how they are related, and selects the correct matching image, without being aware of the other hemisphere's deliberations. There is nothing reflexive or subconscious about it.
I wrote:
You responded:
indecisive: marked by or prone to indecision
indecision: a wavering between two or more possible courses of action : irresolution
irresolute: uncertain how to act or proceed : vacillating
vacillate: to waver in mind, will, or feeling : hesitate in choice of opinions or courses
Yet in none of our examples was there any uncertainty, hesitation, or vacillation. The right hemisphere resolutely chose one course of action, and the left hemisphere resolutely chose another.
Suppose a woman is being attacked viciously by one man and defended resolutely by another. Would you argue that the men are being indecisive? Of course not. Yet you claim that when a split-brain patient's right hemisphere attacks his wife, and his left hemisphere defends her, that he is being indecisive.
That makes absolutely no sense, Nullasalus.
Hemispheres can work together just as individuals do. Indeed, they have a great incentive to do so, considering that they occupy the same body.
Shared history and shared experience do not alter the fact that the left hemisphere is fully aware of the chicken image, and the right hemisphere is fully unaware of it. Vice-versa for the winter scene. How can a unified consciousness be both completely aware of something and completely unaware of it at the same time?
Is the "single, damaged unitary consciousness" of Gazzaniga's patient aware of the chicken image, or not? Is it aware of the winter scene, or not?
A brain is only part of a person. You should think these questions through before asking them.
I'm not sure why you think that question should be so difficult for me.
Imagine a stream-fed lake in Minnesota. Over the years, geologic and climatic processes cause it to separate into two equally large bodies of water. Is each of those bodies of water a lake, or only half a lake? What happened to the original lake? Is one of the two bodies of water the original lake, and the other a newly created distinct lake?
There is really no difference between your questions about the number of "persons" in a split-brain patient's skull and my questions about the lake.
For the record, I would say that there are now two distinct lakes, each of which shares some of the characteristics of the original lake. The original lake no longer exists.
Likewise, there are now two distinct consciousnesses, each of which inherited characteristics of the "parent" consciousness, which no longer exists.
Was that so hard, Null?
Heh. Good luck convincing anyone of that.
Comment by watchmaker — May 2, 2008 @ 7:10 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 7:21 pm
watchmaker:
Consciousness is unified, but damaged.
Why should he bother when to prove otherwise split brains are used as the evidence?
Comment by Bradford — May 2, 2008 @ 7:21 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 8:07 pm
Watchmaker:
Actually I think he quite succeeded.
You dodged his question again.
Comment by Jean — May 2, 2008 @ 8:07 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 8:15 pm
Jean:
It's game, set and matchmaker.
Comment by Raevmo — May 2, 2008 @ 8:15 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 8:30 pm
Bradford wrote:
As I said to Nullasalus:
Bradford again:
If he understands the split-brain evidence, then you're right — he probably shouldn't bother. There's no plausible way to spin the evidence so that it favors his position.
Comment by watchmaker — May 2, 2008 @ 8:30 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 8:46 pm
That's the point. The evidence presented focuses on split brains. If I focus on a hospital, with only parapalegic patients, and remark that hospitalized patients are challenged with respect to paralysis, I have made an equally limited observation.
Comment by Bradford — May 2, 2008 @ 8:46 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 8:51 pm
Coward,
Why would either be wrong? Clearly there's conscious activity in both hemispheres. Clearly there's awareness in both hemispheres. But there is a unified, damaged consciousness in the whole individual, and between both hemispheres. I've outlined the ways they maintain a damaged unity - all you've got are evasions and attempts to parley my claims into something easier for you to question.
I see you won't be answering my question about the sleepwalker either, coward. But seeing as I'm not hiding from any questions, let's work with what you've given me: Both hemispheres are aware of the differing instructions, both analyze, both give a response with minimal reference to the other hemisphere. Those are the conditions during an experiment; it's trivial to point out that communication between both spheres is hampered beyond the original cut to the CC. Ignore the continued sharing of a nervous system, brain stem, body, memory and otherwise; there's going to be a renewed communication between the two, because the experiment conditions will end.
Referring to two hemispheres of a brain with a past joined CC and a connection at the brain stem, with shared development, memories, history, and cooperation as 'two different people' is what doesn't make sense. What would normally be an internal mental conflict becomes an externalized conflict because the CC is cut. The brain, and therefore the unity of consciousness, is damaged.
I can fire the example right back at you. If one man says 'I really feel like smoking today' and the other man says 'I have no intention of smoking today', it would be foolish to treat them as one agent. But a single person deals with that sort of conflicted desire, even within a single healthy brain. By your logic, the argument indicates they're two people.
Why? Because your logic (along with your argument) is actually pretty idiotic.
Fully unaware with a cut CC, in experimental conditions controlled to hamper any cross-experience and secondary communication. How can a unified consciousness have two parts of the same brain with hampered communication? Easy: Because the unified consciousness is damaged, but it's still communicating, and still cooperating. Even the experimenters pointed out how typical interaction with these subjects would have them seem 'normal' and fully functional. If you want to rally conflict and a cut CC as evidence they're distinct individuals, then cooperation, correspondence and intact nervous system/body/brain stem gets offered up as evidence of their being the same individual.
Already answered.
Hey, you rephrased my question more vaguely and answered the question you asked. I can't call you a coward anymore!
So it was an act of creation. When the CC was cut, Subject A disappeared. Subjects B and C are now on the scene. They just happen to have all of the memories, experiences, and physical development of A between them. They still have the body, the spinal cord, nervous system, identity, etc. They still function and operate as a single person. And, even though 'a brain is just a part of a person, rather than the person itself', cutting its CC creates two individual agents.
But wait. In Kornbelt888's example, the CC was was blocked via chemical means - and then the chemical wore off. So, there was consciousness A, which by your logic split into 'new' consciousness B and C, and then the link was restored resulting in.. what? Consciousness D? Consciousness A?
Now, you can turn around and say that consciousness is dynamic - it's always changing, because thoughts and physical makeup are always changing. But that means, in your lake example, the lake today isn't the lake tomorrow. It's changing constantly even if it remains unified. And if 'the original lake' doesn't even exist from day to day, or even minute to minute, because physical changes are always taking place.. then it makes no sense to argue 'the original lake no longer exists after it's split into two lakes'. The split is one more change; you can argue, with the same logic, that the original lake still exists, but has doubled in number. You can argue the original lake still exists, is still numerically one, but now the split in location is an aspect of that lake.
But a lake is a lake. A hole with water in it. We're dealing with a separation drastically dissimilar, because of shared history, shared physiology, etc. Along the lines of saying one lake has become two because, down the middle and 3 feet below the surface of the water, someone has built a wading path. And even that underestimates what connections are going on with split-brain subjects.
Yes, that was 'easy'.
Nah, you answered. You're not a coward now. But based on your answers, I now have an easier task: Showing everyone how inept your thoughts on consciousness are.
Raevmo,
It's always encouraging when someone shows up to play cheerleader, and can't even spell the name of the person they're convinced is right. So is this just a clumsy rush to show religious faith, or some miscommunication between parts of your brain?
Comment by nullasalus — May 2, 2008 @ 8:51 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 9:09 pm
nullasalus:
Who knows?
Has it occurred to you that you both might be right? On the one hand it's clear we have two hemispheres that are unaware of each other's sensory input and quite correctly reach different conclusions, on the other hand we still have a team that shares information and has to cooperate. It's a hierarchy. Yet it's also clear that the idea of a unitary consciousness won't do anymore. I can see how that upsets you, but I guess you all have to live with that.
Comment by Raevmo — May 2, 2008 @ 9:09 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 9:20 pm
Raevmo,
Believe it or not, I can come close to this.
I said early into this thread that the questions relied heavily on ontology. Obviously the question of a normal unitary consciousness isn't the same in a split-brain patient. I regard it as the same, unitary consciousness, with damage - and I think the argument for that view is strong, needing no appeal to the non-physical or dualism (though others make those appeals). If watchmaker were rolling in here simply to say he disagrees, that would be one thing. I'd remain unconvinced, but that would be that.
But 'you're clearly wrong, because if I describe the situation as an argument between two people, then it sounds like two people' is nonsense.
Comment by nullasalus — May 2, 2008 @ 9:20 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 9:27 pm
nullasalus:
Why shouldn't one describe a brain damaged split effect as unitary consciousness, with damage- particularly when prior to the damage no split effects were observed?
Comment by Bradford — May 2, 2008 @ 9:27 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 9:30 pm
Bradford,
I'm not clear on your question. I think they should be regarded as a unitary consciousness with damage. The distinction I was making between 'normal' unitary consciousness and split-brain is exactly that: One has damage incurred by a cut CC. The other does not.
Maybe I didn't come across clear enough there.
Comment by nullasalus — May 2, 2008 @ 9:30 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 9:45 pm
Bradford wrote:
As Zachriel explained to you long ago , we're not focusing only on split brains. We look at split brains and whole brains, noting their similarities and differences, and learning what we can from both.
Take your example of paralysis. How do you think scientists began to piece together how the motor system works? By observing cases of paralysis, and learning to associate specific kinds of nervous system damage with the types of paralysis produced.
Or take blindness. Some people have damage to the striate cortex, at the very rear of the brain. They are blind, despite having perfectly healthy, perfectly functioning eyes. Neuroanatomists didn't learn about the role of the striate cortex in vision by looking at healthy people — they learned by looking at blind people and noticing a pattern among some of them.
You learn an awful lot by observing how things fail, as well as how they work normally.
It does require an open mind, however.
Comment by watchmaker — May 2, 2008 @ 9:45 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 9:48 pm
More likely the lack of clarity was because of me. I agree with you.
Comment by Bradford — May 2, 2008 @ 9:48 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 9:52 pm
watchmaker, the split brain stuff is old news. Is it your position that individuals with normally functioning brains give evidence of split consciousness?
Comment by Bradford — May 2, 2008 @ 9:52 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 9:52 pm
Because consciousness does no interpreting, it only experiences the results of the independent hemispheres. For example, while the CC is disabled, if the right hemi is shown a picture of, say, a bucolic scene, it will make the subject feel emotionally just as if the subject were viewing the scene normally, except the subject will be utterly unable to verbally describe it or name it. If the left hemi is then shown the same scene while the right hemi is not, the subject will be able to describe it and name it, but will elicit no emotional response. When both hemis are then shown the scene, the subject will be able to describe, name, and emotionally react. Now, if the right hemi is shown a bucolic scene, and the left hemi is shown an ugly scene (like a mangled carcass), the left brain will elicit and description of the carcass with no emotional reaction, and the right hemi will trigger an emotional response of the bucolic scene. The subject still feels like one person with one consciousness. This demonstrates that whatever consciousness is, it is "stands behind" the processes of the right and left hemispheres, analogous to two movie projectors projecting onto the same screen, triggering different effects.
At no time does the subject ever report, during, or after the experience, that he feels like two instances of consciousness. In fact, they consistently describe that they still feel like one person. They do report odd memories after the CC is restored, since the verbal interpretation memory is combined with an unusual emotional memory, etc. That is to be expected if the hemis work as modular interpreters with consciousness as a target "downstream."
Your sense of sight, touch and taste are all radically different experiences, yet you wouldn't say that three consciousnesses are operating when you concurrently see, touch, and taste, would you? Just because the right brain is unable to process verbally or logically what it is seeing, what is does process is still passed to consciousness, even if the left hemi is interpreting something totally different. Consciousness, whatever it is, does not form a bridge when there is a disconnect of the hemis, that's all we know about it from the experiment. And the subject report all thru the experiment, despite confused action, that they are a single consciousness. Until that can be demonstrated in some reductive way to be wrong, I will have to take them at their word.
Leaving all that aside, reconsider sight, touch, taste. Focus on the unity experience that you have with these, and ask yourself: "what is this unified thing that I am. I wonder if it is similar to my experience.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 2, 2008 @ 9:52 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 10:16 pm
That's not correct. Each hemisphere can reason logically, even understand verbal commands. And each hemisphere has different experiences and memories. That's the whole point of the series of experiments.
Shown a snow scene, the right hemisphere chooses a snow shovel. Shown a chicken claw, the left hemisphere chooses a chicken. But when later asked to explain why the subject chose a shovel, the narrator in the left hemisphere"”who is unaware of the snow scene!"”concocts a story post hoc. Each hemisphere made a logical choice based on what is was conscious of. What is not logical is the post hoc explanation.
Similarly with the command "walk" whispered to the speechless right hemisphere. The subject starts to walk. But the narrator in the left hemisphere"”who is unaware of the whispered command!"”makes up a story to explain its behavior.
And an entire series of such experiments, by very smart researchers who have answered every objection mentioned on this thread, and more. The results repeated and extended by numerous other such studies.
Comment by Zachriel — May 2, 2008 @ 10:16 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 10:35 pm
THe Pixie has isolated some Sperry quotes:
Note that the consciousness is different from the brain. Sperry says this is not dualism [in the classis sense] but philosophers of the mind disagree and call him a dualist. Even Wiki knows that his position, emergent mentalism, is a form of property dualism.
This is an opinion and conjecture. He did not derive this view scientifically and this is not why he was awarded a Nobel prize. What he did derive scientifically was the view that there is a single consciousness over and above and causally interacting with the brain.
His observation is correct - there is a difference between mind and brain.
His explanation is the extra-scientific appeal to emergence.
What emerges here is a property other than the material brain - duality.
His conclusion of emergent mentalism or monism is no more or less scientific or Nobel-worthy than Eccles' conclusion of dualism.
As for ectoplasms, if you like a mind-body interaction devoid of such things there's always Thomas Aquinas.
Comment by Pez — May 2, 2008 @ 10:35 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 10:36 pm
Hi Zach,
There have been no repeatable experiments which demonstrated the emergence of mind from brain, have there?
Comment by Pez — May 2, 2008 @ 10:36 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 10:38 pm
So is gravity. Does that make airplanes obsolete?
My position is that in a normal brain, the two hemispheres are able to share conscious awareness of visual stimuli, for example, only because they are connected via the corpus callosum. When the CC is severed, each hemisphere remains conscious, but the consciousness is no longer unified.
Each hemisphere has its own sensations, experiences, thoughts, and desires. The behavior you see from split-brain patients is exactly what you would expect in this case.
Comment by watchmaker — May 2, 2008 @ 10:38 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 10:46 pm
There appears to be a very close link between mind and brain. For instance, memories can be stimulated by tinkering with the brain. And the split brain experiments create two separate centers of awareness. However, human science of the early 21st century is still very primitive.
My God, man. Drilling holes in his head isn't the answer. "” Leonard H. McCoy
Comment by Zachriel — May 2, 2008 @ 10:46 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 10:47 pm
watchmaker,
Except for all that cooperative, unified, 'hard to distinguish them from normal, singular people most of the time' behavior. And the shared brain stem, body, nervous system, memories, past history, etc.
If you want to consider them two distinct individuals, you're welcome to - but that's on strength or weakness of philosophy. The behavior you see from split-brain patients concords with that of a unified but damaged consciousness. Again philosophy.
Now, if you want to regard your philosophy as superior, go for it; I regard it as having drastic weaknesses. Regard mine the same way if you like. But waltzing in and saying yours is the scientific conclusion and every other conclusion goes against the experiment - in that case, you're making the data pull weight it's unable to.
Comment by nullasalus — May 2, 2008 @ 10:47 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 10:47 pm
Both sides can recognize, associate, and make a choice. But the right side does not logically reason thru a series of steps, and cannot identify the object's name. If by "logic" you mean recognize an object and associate with an action, then I certainly agree.
I didn't say it couldn't.
That's right. As I said:
That's right. When the CC is restored an unusual memory synthesis occurs.
The hemispheres can apparently do everything without consciousness, e.g, sleepwalkers unlocking doors, walking down the street, and conversing with others, etc. (I've slept-walked and conversed many times myself, and have been awakened, becaming conscious, in the middle of a conversation.) And while there is obviously evidence that hemispheres can independently operate, where is the evidence the there is more than one consciousness experiencing when they do?
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 2, 2008 @ 10:47 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 10:59 pm
Yes, indeed. Mind, or mental activity, is undoubtedly a brain function. And conscious experience is directly affected by brain states. But, I, for one, do not conflate "mind" and "consciousness." Rather "mind" is an experienced state of consciousness, and is completed determined by brain states. IOW, mind is like any other sense. It shapes or triggers the experiences of consciousness, but does not create consciousness. When a certain wavelength of light hits the retina, it is processed down to certain neurological paths, eventually leading to the subjective experience of "blue." The brain is put into a certain mode, but the "blueness" is entirely within consciousness. You could say, consciousness is triggered to "become blue" at that point.
The brain may be a complex tool of thought, with a bi-directional interface to consciousness, which is something wholly "other." I personally do not think consciousness fits into our science's understanding of physics. Time may tell. If consciousness really is something wholly contained within spacetime, then spacetime is much wierder than even QM describes.
I've babbled on enough.
Make it a great day.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 2, 2008 @ 10:59 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 11:03 pm
Except for one thing: no matter what the subjects do (sleepwalkers can do all kinds of stuff with no consciousness active - like I told Zachriel, I've woken up in the middle of a conversation after having walked to the other end of a large house, up two flights of stairs! Talk about a bizarre experience), they will always say they are still one person, with one conscious experience, etc.
Like nullasalus said well, one's philosophy can easily come into play here. And scientifically, anyone's philosophy is compatible with the facts as we know them at present. Admittedly, I have non-scientific reasons for thinking consciousness is something other than brain matter in a certain state.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 2, 2008 @ 11:03 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 11:09 pm
Is this evidence of a sense of humor?
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 2, 2008 @ 11:09 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 11:22 pm
Thanks, Zach.
It is true that science is at a primitive stage; far too primitive a stage to be ruling on such metaphysical questions. Especially when men like Sperry have to explain their observations and scientific conclusions with metaphysical speculations.
The brain and mind are, indeed, intrinsically connected. And just as physical tinkering with the brain can result in mental changes, so can mental tinkering result in brain changes. Just as there appears to be bottom-up causality there is just as strong evidence of top-down causality.
One question asked in this thread which is not answered by repeatable scientific experimentation is that implied in the OP:
Comment by Pez — May 2, 2008 @ 11:22 pm
May 2nd, 2008 at 11:56 pm
Nullasapiens wrote:
That's because we're not dealing with sleepwalking, O Brave One. In Gazzaniga's experiment, the subject is fully awake. It's the middle of the day. Each hemisphere is conscious of what it has seen, what it has been told, and what its task is. Each hemisphere reasons correctly and gets the right answer.
With no reference to the other hemisphere.
Of course it is. That's the point — by blocking the external channels of communication, we are able to see what information is passed by the internal channels. In this case, very little. Due to the callosotomy, each hemisphere has no clue as to what the other hemisphere sees or thinks.
The question isn't whether the body and brainstem are shared. Nor is it whether the hemispheres will be able to communicate when the experiment is over. The question is whether the hemispheres share a common consciousness.
The answer is that they obviously do not.
Suppose two best friends are placed in separate rooms, so that they cannot speak to each other. One is blindfolded. The second is shown a picture of a fire hydrant. The first person is asked what he is visually conscious of. Not surprisingly, he fails to mention the fire hydrant. His consciousness is not unified with that of his friend.
Would you complain that the experiment is invalid, because the best friends will soon be communicating again? Would you rerun the experiment, allowing them to communicate this time? Do you think the results would be valid in that case?
For FSM's sake, Null, think.
No. The mere presence of conflicting desires does not indicate dual consciousnesses. A normal person is aware of both the desire to smoke and the desire to abstain. The desires coexist within the same consciousness, and one or the other wins out.
In our example of the split-brain smoker, one hemisphere desires a cigarette. It decides to smoke, and proceeds to light a cigarette. It does not experience the other hemisphere's desire to put the cigarette out. The conflicting desires do not coexist within the same consciousness.
Only in the sense that two lakes were created when the first one was split. Nothing magical happened. No lakes poofed into existence ex nihilo.
No. If they did, then you wouldn't have one hand lighting a cigarette when the other one puts it out, over and over.
Hemisphere A wants a cigarette, and causes its hand to light one up. Hemisphere B doesn't want to smoke, and causes its hand to put the cigarette out. Something that has desires and is able to act on them certainly qualifies as an agent. That means there are two agents in the skull of our split-brain smoker, each trying to get what it wants.
You answer the question yourself, below:
This is true, and it points out one of the difficulties with labels. In one sense the lake remains the same lake, despite the changes, because there is an easily recognized continuity between the lake of May 1st and the lake of May 2nd. On the other hand, there are changes between the two. In this case the continuity wins out and we refer to the lake by the same name on both days.
When the lake splits, the continuity is still there, but after a while we deem the separation more important and begin to refer to two separate lakes.
Sure, you could make that argument. But by the same argument, the water you excrete is still part of you, because it was once contained within your cells. There has simply been a split.
We don't consider your urine or sweat to be part of you once they become separated from your body and no longer interact with it. Likewise, we don't consider the two hemispheres to form a single unified consciousness when they cease to act as if they are unified — when one is not aware of what the other one sees, for example.
Comment by watchmaker — May 2, 2008 @ 11:56 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 12:19 am
Watchmaker,
God, this is getting tiring. You bring up 'If hemisphere A and hemisphere B were two different human beings' examples as somehow relevant, but when I ask you whether a sleepwalking person is 'possessed' - since there's activity and intention without apparent consciousness - "well, we're not dealing with sleepwalking".
I'm not prepared to say no when they're connected by the brain stem, and even Sperry & co. believe that there's some rudimentary signaling going on. No is different from minimal.
There we go again. 'Very little' somehow becomes 'no'. Even granting that there's no communication across a cut CC, obviously, we've still got communication across the brain stem. Hell, we still have it via shared audio, visual, memory, etc links when they're not purposefully blocking that information. There's a reason cut CC patients have to be subjected to such particular conditions, you know.
And I respond that they share a unitary consciousness - and I can cite as much or more evidence in the study of split-brain patients to back up such a view. The difference between you and me is that I recognized right from the start that the questions we're grappling with here are largely ontological in nature. You're trying to get past this by playing a game where you say 'If I define a unified consciousness in a human as communication across the CC, and I cut the CC, then obviously there is no longer a unified consciousness.' Yes, and if I define physical as 'classical mechanics with no waves', I need one twin-slit experiment to prove physicalism is false.
The failing in both cases is obvious.
Here you go again. You say it's no indication of dual consciousness - would Dennett agree? I think he's utterly off his rocker, but I know better than to give a definition, say he violates it, and declare the matter over.
One more time - there is a unitary consciousness, and it is damaged. What would normally be an internal dialogue is forced to use other avenues of communication. But the communication is still there.
But one apparently poofed out of existence. Do you honestly not recognize when you've stepped out of science and into philosophy and metaphysics?
Yes. If they weren't, then you wouldn't have seamless cooperation in the majority of their life to the point where most people couldn't figure out they had a mental impairment.
The unitary consciousness decides it wants to go to the store and get a pack of cigarettes. It gets out of bed, showers, dresses, walks outside and down the street, throws down 6 dollars for a 2 pack of Kools, and has a cigarette out on the stoop, all without issue. That means there is one agent in the skull of our split-brain smoker, working cooperatively.
Do you see the problem with your assertions here yet?
It's not a mere difficulty of labels in this case. It's ontology, philosophy. You and I disagree, and considering I dispute not a whit of the actual data presented, you're not going to prove me wrong by referring to it. I'm not going to prove you wrong either, because this question goes beyond the data and into some damn reasonable philosophical questions.
And when the two consciousnesses do act as unified, what then? Because, again, the data shows that they are capable of some serious, seamless cooperation and unity in many and most situations. It's part of the reason they have to create such an artificial environment in an experimental situation. You say 'we don't consider..' when, yes, 'we' do. Just like 'No one questions whether there's a unified consciousness when the CC isn't cut' is untrue - yes, plenty do. Welcome to the world of philosophy.
I'm cutting out the insults, watchmaker, because I consider that a failing. The writing on the wall here is clear - we're into philosophy here, and neither one of us can be accused of rejecting the data of the experiment. If you want to go into the weekend slugging over this, you're welcome to. I'd much rather recognize that limits of the data (as even the OP refers to), the complexities of philosophy, and cool it. That and, hopefully, a realization that smugness and bravado doesn't help in these conversations - so maybe we can try knocking it off in the future.
Comment by nullasalus — May 3, 2008 @ 12:19 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 1:50 am
kornbelt888 wrote:
The reason the subject doesn't report that he feels like two consciousnesses is that the left hemisphere, which controls speech, isn't two consciousnesses, and therefore doesn't feel like two consciousnesses. The right hemisphere also doesn't consist of two consciousnesses, though it can't say so since it does not control speech.
Therefore we wouldn't expect the subject to report that he feels like two consciousnesses.
The speaking hemisphere does, however, recognize that the opposing limbs are apparently under the control of an 'alien' agent. From here:
You seem to be assuming the existence of some kind of super-consciousness looking down on the two hemispheres and encompassing their separate consciousnesses. After all, only such a super-consciousness would be directly aware of the sensation of having two simultaneous, disjoint consciousnesses — if that's even possible. Only such a super-consciousness could report this to the experimenter. Each hemisphere, by itself, is only aware of its own consciousness.
You seem to be referring to such a super-consciousness here:
I claim that such a super-consciousness, "standing behind" the two hemispheres, does not exist. Here's why: Suppose that such a super-consciousness exists. By your definition, this super-consciousness (henceforth SC) must encompass both hemispheres, and must therefore be aware of everything that each hemisphere is aware of, right?
Well, if the SC encompasses both hemispheres, then it is aware, during Gazzaniga's experiment, of both the chicken picture and the snowy scene. When the experimenter asks why the left hand pointed to the snow shovel, the SC, being aware of the snowy scene, should explain that snow shovels go with snow. This does not happen. Instead, the subject presents a bogus story about how the shovel is needed to clean out the chicken shed.
This leaves two possibilities:
1) There is no SC, and the patient responds as he does because his speech is controlled by the left hemisphere, which, after all, knows nothing about the winter scene. There is no SC to notice the subject's made-up story and object to it. This, obviously, is my position.
2) The only other possibility is that there is an SC, but it is merely a helpless observer. It sees the hands point to different images, but it can do nothing about it. It hears the left hemisphere make up a bogus story about why the left hand pointed to the shovel, but it is helpless to stop the left hemisphere from lying, and it is unable to step in later to correct the story.
A helpless SC of this kind is a logical possibility. The problem is that first of all, I don't think this is the kind of SC you had in mind (though it's the only kind that the evidence allows). Secondly, such an SC is scientifically undetectable. It is unable to move the body or say anything. It is a helpless spectator. There is absolutely no way to detect that it's there, or to prove that it isn't. That puts it into the category of invisible pink unicorns.
No, because sight, touch, and taste are all accessible to my single consciousness (remember my example of the bread that smelled like gasoline?).
The right brain is able to process its stimulus logically. It associates the snow shovel with the winter scene, with no help from the left brain. The fact that the left brain is more specialized for logical tasks does not mean that the right brain is incapable of logic.
That's the entire point. Each hemisphere forms a separate locus of consciousness.
Gazzaniga's experiment gives you the desired proof. The right hemisphere saw the winter scene and picked the snow shovel as a matching image. The speaking left hemisphere explained, incorrectly, that the left hand pointed to the shovel because it was needed to clean out the chicken shed. The left hemisphere thought it understood why the left hand did what it did, but it was wrong. You can't take the left hemisphere at its word in this case.
Not true. The facts fit much better with one hypothesis than with the other.
Consider an experimental setup in which you communicate remotely with two entities, A and B. You select images to flash to them, and their job is to pick a matching image from a set, just as in the Gazzaniga experiment. In one case, A and B are separate people. In another case, A and B are the right and left hemispheres, respectively, of a split-brain patient.
We know that you will get the same experimental results in each case. The natural conclusion is that A and B are separate entities with distinct consciousnesses. When you find out that A and B are separate people, you're fine with it. You accept it, as it fits in with what you already know about separate people in separate bodies. When you find out that A and B are two hemispheres within the same skull, you're surprised. Who wouldn't be? This result is downright bizarre.
It's healthy to be skeptical, because this is a very strange result. But this experiment, and others like it, have been repeated hundreds of times with the same results: the left hemisphere and right hemisphere are not aware of the same things. At some point you have to ask yourself if you are maintaining your beliefs in spite of the evidence, rather than because of it.
To your credit, you seem to have done so:
I commend you for recognizing that. Now you just have to ask yourself, as dispassionately as possible, whether these non-scientific reasons warrant your beliefs, when the evidence is so clearly pointing in a different direction.
Comment by watchmaker — May 3, 2008 @ 1:50 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 2:18 am
Just to back up the 'this is coming down primarily to ontology and philosophy' issue (from What Is the Unity of Consciousness? by Chalmers and Bayne):
Chalmers and Bayne are philosophers of course, and even being well known doesn't make them automatically correct. But the paper gives a pretty good overview of the different ways of looking at consciousness, particularly with regards to unity. I quoted most of the split-brain relevant part, but I encourage those interested to have a look at the article in its entirety.
And here's the conscious unity entry at Stanford.
Comment by nullasalus — May 3, 2008 @ 2:18 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 2:44 am
What Chalmers and Bayne describe as "phenomenal unity" without "access unity" is exactly what I described above in my comment to kornbelt888 as "a helpless SC".
As I stated then, a helpless SC is scientifically undetectable, even in principle. This puts it in the category of invisible pink unicorns — logically possible, but neither provable nor disprovable empirically. Ockham has a suggestion for what we should do with such entities.
Comment by watchmaker — May 3, 2008 @ 2:44 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 3:03 am
watchmaker,
Honestly, have a look at the stanford link. The views range from 'there's full unity in cases of CC cuts' to 'there's not even full unity in a normal brain'. You may as well argue that if Chalmers is right about qualia, then you don't think it's amenable to empirical investigation - and therefore, even if he's right, we should discard it. That says more about your philosophy than the subject itself.
Besides, I'm not sure I'd endorse it myself, but a 'helpless SC' happens to be exactly what the subject reported in the case of kornbelt888's temporary CC block case. You're arguing that your interpretation of the data - itself largely a philosophical view - is better, even though a SC (Which I'd distinguish from a unified damaged consciousness) is logically possible. If we're going to play with the razor (Which is about choosing the simplest solution, not the one most amenable to empiricism), we can deny there's consciousness at all. Or better yet, just assert solipsism; doesn't get simpler than that.
Comment by nullasalus — May 3, 2008 @ 3:03 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 3:55 am
nullasalus wrote:
I will. The SEP is a great resource, isn't it?
The difference is that people can report on their qualia. Granted, the reports are subjective, but at least they are reports. In the case of the 'helpless SC', aka 'phenomenal unity' with 'access disunity', not only is there no objective evidence, but the subject cannot even provide subjective reports. The 'phenomenal unity', if it even exists, is inherently and forever private and inexpressible.
How does a 'unified damaged consciousness' differ from a 'helpless SC'?
Ockham's razor is not about choosing the simplest solution; it's about jettisoning unnecessary complexity. As Einstein put it, things should be as simple as possible, but no simpler. To deny consciousness altogether would to ignore the evidence of our own experience. Simpler, but not sensible.
Solipsism at least comports with the evidence, but I disagree that it is simpler than the alternative. The solipsist must explain why he is conscious when other humans, who behave outwardly in the same ways as he, are not. That makes his position more complicated than a position that acknowledges the existence of mind wherever there is a normally functioning human nervous system.
Comment by watchmaker — May 3, 2008 @ 3:55 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 5:20 am
watchmaker,
Except it was apparently reported in a case where the CC's block was temporary. What's more, it was reported in stark accordance from what you'd expect of a SC with an access block - remembered as something that was definitely there, but which the subject had no chance to react to. You can dismiss that by arguing the subject's report is faulty; I've said I'm skeptical of it, personally, though I'm not closed off to it. But once we've hit a stage where we're asserting the subject's reports cannot be trusted - and remember, it's argued we're hitting such a point in other situations, like an experimental setup where left/right hemisphere input is made inaccessible to the other hemisphere - then the entire project takes a hit. It's easy to discount a subject's report as unreliable. It's harder to fill in the blanks with what they're really experiencing.
Because a UDC claim makes no assumption about a SC, for one. Susan Hurley touches on a similar idea with regards to 'partial unity', though I'd rest the argument on some different understandings. First, it's worth asking if there's any step between 'full consciousness unity' and 'utter consciousness separation'. I think it's easy to imagine UDC - 'A CC that's slightly cut, such that communication between hemispheres is imperfect, or delayed considerably.' You're still in possession of a unified consciousness, but it's clearly suboptimal at the same time. And once you recognize the possibility of damaged unity, the next question is 'how much damage can you take on before unity is actually severed?' (I find the SEP claims about from-birth acallosal subjects interesting, but too cursory to comment on.)
Further, I'd argue it's just as justified to ask 'What comprises my conscious life anyway?' I'm not convinced internal mental communication and dialogue/access exhausts the description - it's merely the line in the sand, the one thing a subject can do in a (apparently) utterly internal way. Still, people use external cues - post-it notes, purposeful mental associations, etc - to feed information back to their own minds, even with their brains entirely intact. I'm not sure I'd go as far as Chalmers' extended mind, but he does ask an interesting question about where we draw the borders of our mind.
From there on, you're in an argument about measures. Hell, I'd be willing to accept that there's a conceptual scale of consciousness from 'entirely unified' to 'entirely distinct', with most people falling somewhere on the high side of the middle. I've been seeing articles recently about people who have memory access of minute details of every single day of their lives. Do we have identical unity? Seems like a spurious claim. Either way, if you accept partial/damaged unity - not a crazy claim, I'd say - then I think a very strong case can be made for a split-brain patient being a case of UDC, not a pair of distinct entities, without requiring SC.
Sure, but denying free will would ignore similar evidence, yet plenty of people are willing to make that step. I suppose you can argue 'Introspection and honesty will reveal that there is no free will'. Then again, I'm willing to be people who deny consciousness could make the same claim.
Simple: Just say 'I am delusional.' If experience is leading you in the direction of complex conclusions, denying reason is the simpler path. Say you're a Boltzmann brain. Simplicity is more or less one rationale away.
Comment by nullasalus — May 3, 2008 @ 5:20 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 7:24 am
I don't see what all the fuss is about we Fundies knew about one body sharing more than one consciousness long before modern science. Except we call it demon possession.
Sometimes the second person even tries to do away with the first (Mark 9:14 - 20)
It looks like once again science proves the Bible right
Comment by fifth monarchy man — May 3, 2008 @ 7:24 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 8:10 am
Jean
I was making the point because null had earlier. It is his soapbox I am standing on. Materialism is different to physicalism or naturalism (and you can read the Wiki entries to see how), and can be rejected for the reasons null gave when he first brought the issue up. Yes, philosophical naturalists do use the term occasionally (Sperry in that article for one), nevertheless, in these debates it does seem to be the IDists/creationists who use it most. Like you did just then.
When did I call null a creationist? Certainly not in anything you quoted, which was observing that both creationists and IDists in general use the "materialist" label.
So you are suggesting that anyone who protests beyond a certain theshold is what exactly? And what is that thereshold; three mentions? Is that really too much?
null
Or read the whole paper. He argues that the mind is an emergent property, without invoking any supernatural elements.
Or the option: We can enlarge the definition of soul to cover the religious concept of an immortal essence that survives death and an emergent property of the brain that necessarily disappears upon death.
"full-blown materialist" See how much you IDists/creationists like to use the label.
The amount of deterioration in the body - especially the brain - is huge after only five hours. It would be necessary to rebuild the brain to its original state, which would mean recording what that state is at the point of death. In theory possible, I suppose. I have no idea what the relevance of that would be.
Nor me. My claim is only that they is no reason to invoke a supernatural component to explain consciousness. That is not the same as saying there is no supernatural component.
Exactly.
I will accept that.
By the way, I asked last time whether you agree with my claim. I see no answer. Here it is again: My claim is only that they is no reason to invoke a supernatural component to explain consciousness. Do you agree, disagree or do not know?
Pez
"isolated" You make it sound as though I am quote-mining. Do you think the quotes do not reflect what Sperry means?
Does it matter it we label it dualism or monism?
What I like about Sprerry's conjecture is that it does not invoke any supernatural entity (what I would call the soul).
Comment by The Pixie — May 3, 2008 @ 8:10 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 9:07 am
They're not two separate individuals, but two distinct areas of awareness. Don't let the normal meaning of "person" confuse you to what is actually happening with these experiments.
You can keep saying that, but there are two seats of conscious awareness. We can demonstrate that. The right hemisphere saw and reacted to a snow scene. The left hemisphere has no knowledge of that experience.
It's not philosophy, but a scientific conclusion.
Comment by Zachriel — May 3, 2008 @ 9:07 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 9:08 am
And when it's not restored, the two hemispheres continue with their separate experiences and memories.
The voice in your head says otherwise. But that's just your left hemisphere talking.
Perhaps you are using a special definition of "consciousness". Can you provide a test for this thing you call "consciousness", or is it outside of scientific investigation?
And that's strong evidence that such naïve views do not properly model the human mind.
Comment by Zachriel — May 3, 2008 @ 9:08 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 9:09 am
Well, not with regards to his split brain experiments, which have very clear scientific implications. There are two distinct seats of awareness, different experiences, different views on the world, and sometimes even different intents.
Sperry grew up in a time of change. First, psychoanalysis using words to probe the mind. Then behavioralism which dispensed with any notion of an internal life. This latter view is what Sperry is arguing against. The consciousness is an important aspect of brain/mind activity, and understanding their interaction, and all the other interrelated mental systems is important to understanding the human psyche.
Emergence is a testable quality. But Sperry's ideas, being still tentative, are expressed in broad terms.
Sure. And we may never know what stars are made of. Meanwhile, advances continue to be made. Despite what others on this thread say, the split brain experiments reveal important information about the nature of consciousness.
Comment by Zachriel — May 3, 2008 @ 9:09 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 10:05 am
Just for curiousity's sake….. Did Sperry conduct the split brain test on himself along with the others in the experiment?
If he did not he slams, right into the heart of the hard problem… what was it like to be split brained? He is making scientific assumptions that he would need to correlate with personal experience to say that indeed there is no communication at all between the two halves, some sort of experience that seems to or seems not to bypass the split in addition to the relevent other physical evidence he found.
It would be interesting to see all of these experiments run on the scientists involved as well as their experimentees…… and then see how they view the results…..hmmmmmm:shock::idea::grin:
Comment by Kuma — May 3, 2008 @ 10:05 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 10:22 am
Hi The Pixie,
Phooey.
I never said you quote-mined or implied such. I happen to hate the charge and think it's intellectual laziness and childish. I'm on record now.
You isolated the quotes and I commented on them.
Yes, I think the lines are very representative of Sperry, which is why I commented on them as they stood. If I were commenting on a quote-mine I would have expanded the context and show that you were being misleading.
1) It matters that his position is a dualistic one because I said so and was corrected on the matter. Childish pride.
2) You admit a metaphysical desire is motivating your argument and search. You want there to be no "supernatural" soul. So be it. But that's not science.
3) Sperry's conjecture about emergence is not science either. The science ended at the observations. His conjecture about physicalism and emergence is no more science and no less philosophy than is Eccles's conjecture about dualism.
4) (To nullasalus):""full-blown materialist" See how much you IDists/creationists like to use the label."
See how you like to claim scientific support for atheistic conclusions which science does not support.
5) You say "My claim is only that they is no reason to invoke a supernatural component to explain consciousness. "
Sure there is - if you want an explanation. There is no reason to invoke emergence, either, as it is no more demanded or afforded by the evidence than is the soul.
Consciousness is not explained by Sperry and his invoking emergent interactive mentalistic monism. You don't know if the supernatural is needed to explain consciousness or not because we have no scientific explanation of consciousness. The explanation lies outside of science.
To Zach,
As above.
I think so too. They led Sperry to reject materialism and bottom up accounts of consciousness, for instance, and conclude two way influence between the mental and physical. They caused him to invoke emergence rather than point to brain states as equal to mental states. That is an important advance in and of itself, in my opinion.
Comment by Pez — May 3, 2008 @ 10:22 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 10:46 am
Pez
I find the term "isolated" very odd, and I felt it was better to be clear what you meant by that. Why not say that I quoted Sperry, or that I gave some quotes by Sperry, rather than I "isolated" a quote? To isolate something is to remove it and to insulate it from its context, a prerequisit to quote-mining. However, at least we clear that no accusation was meant or implied.
Take it up with Sperry; i could not care one way of another.
I do not remember saying I desire no supernatural soul. What I have been saying is that there is no reason to suppose one. That is not science, no.
I do not think he claims it is science.
It was merely an observation. I never claimed it was science!
In all the responses I have had on this thread, this is the first to address my metaphysical position!
Oh, yes please. What is that explanation? I can assure you I would be very interested to see it.
When you say the "soul" are you thinking about some supernatural thing?
I prefer emergence as an explanation as it is simpler than invoking a supernatural explanation. We know emergence happens, we know there is an infrastructure for emergence, we know there are steps on the way (both in other animals and in the early development of a person). We have no knowledge of supernatural entities, we have no reason to suppose they can interact with the brain or how they might do that. And before you say anythuing, I know that is not science.
So far it has not been explained by invoking the supernatural, so we are even there. Then again, not quite. Sperry has put together an interesting paper based on the emergence theory, so until we see a similar one for the supernatural side, I think the emergence hypothesis is slightly ahead on that score.
Why? How do you know that?
Comment by The Pixie — May 3, 2008 @ 10:46 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 10:53 am
Pixie wrote:
Oh certainly. But you have to define what you mean by evolution. Is evolution something that is completely without plan or purpose? I think there are other possibilities: such as the possibility that evolution itself is designed. I think there is, in fact, a lot of evidence for that. Where do you want me to begin?
On the other hand you commented:
Where do your beliefs come from? If you can't give me an empirical reductionistic explanation isn't what you believe just a matter of faith?
So what do we have here simply faith vs. faith? I don't think so. I think it is explanation vs no explanation. Like Chalmers I start with the assumption that mind and consciousness are ontologically basic and irreducible which is why they are phenomena that cannot be reduced to something that physics, chemistry and biology can grab hold of.
IOW like matter-energy and space-time it is something we have to logically start with.
From the Spiritual Brain: A Neuroscientist's Case for the Existence of the Soul: Mario Beauregard,Denyse O'leary
Aren't you the one who is being ideological?
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — May 3, 2008 @ 10:53 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 11:44 am
Kuma,
are you in Manitowoc, WI?
Comment by Doug — May 3, 2008 @ 11:44 am
May 3rd, 2008 at 12:07 pm
JOHN
My understanding of the word "faith" implies a high degree of confidence in something being true. My beliefs on this are tentative.
I am really looking forward to this explanation.
I am not too convinced about that, but let us see where the explanation goes.
Oh, nowhere.
Comment by The Pixie — May 3, 2008 @ 12:07 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 1:28 pm
I disagree with your conclusions. But you can have the last word. Apparently nobody is going to convince anyone of anything on this thread.
Now, I think I'm just going to have a few Guinnesses and cool my hot hemispheres down a bit.
Make it a great weekend
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 3, 2008 @ 1:28 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 2:40 pm
Zach,
I question how 'distinct' they are, for one. Further, you're going to have to grapple with questions of the number of agents / persons / etc at play in a given mind, under given conditions. Have a look at the SEP, have a look at just how far the philosophical end of these debates extend. I'll stick by my view, it seems to fit the data best.
And I've outlined some pertinent questions of conscious awareness, including whether the choice is merely between utter unity and utter separation, or degrees. As well as what that leads to if you accept degrees.
It's an interpretation of the data - philosophy is not only in play, but is in a strong way. Go read the papers on consc.net. It's full of people (not every single one - but frankly, many) arguing that theirs is the scientific conclusion, despite outright contradictions. Is qualia irreducible to physical processes? No, say the qualiaphiles, the data shows they aren't. Yes, says the qualiaphobes, the data shows they are. We don't know, say the mysterians, the data may be forever inconclusive.
Comment by nullasalus — May 3, 2008 @ 2:40 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 2:59 pm
Ah but Null, you should know by now that materialists win by default, didn't you get the memo?
Comment by Jean — May 3, 2008 @ 2:59 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 3:46 pm
Pixie in response to Jean:
I would agree that that there is a difference between materialism and naturalism. For example, David Chalmers identifies himself as a naturalist. (I would suspect that he is also a non-theist) In his book, The Conscious Mind, he is highly critical of explanations for consciousness, which he labels as materialistic and reductionistic. Nor is he hesitant in labeling people that hold these kinds of views as materialists. It is definitely a postion. The term from my reading of the current debate is used fairly widely among secular scholars. Very few of those are self identiifed creationists or ID'ists.
The question is, what is your position? You seem to me, and apparently to others, to be holding something of a materialist view. We're just calling it as we see it.
For me to accept any other kind of evolution, you would have to prove to me that beginning with nothing that undirected natural processes alone have led to my existence.
I am open-minded to anything that can be proven.
I do not have enough faith to believe that the universe has created itself.
Comment by JOHN_A_DESIGNER — May 3, 2008 @ 3:46 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 4:24 pm
The Pixie,
And reductionists will turn around and say that emergence sounds an awful lot like magic. Meanwhile, we see how much trouble there is with delineating between natural and otherwise. It's easy when supernatural means 'a ghost that can float around and attack people'. It's not so easy when recognizing just how fuzzy some of the borders are.
Enlarge what definition? Aquinas' hylomorphism? Kant's substance dualism? Berkeley's idealism? It was never a small concept. Did mind 'enlarge' to include neurons? Or was that shrinking? Those terms are talking about more than the data.
Odd, since I'm not a creationist, and I'm not much of an IDist. I used the term to illustrate a point.
I think the relevance speaks for itself here, so I won't belabor the point.
And again, my response is 'what constitutes supernatural and natural is its own debate'. A non-physical thing? Then Chalmers apparently believes in the supernatural. Something present beyond natural processes? Then the emergentists have some explaining to do.
Back to the simulation - if we were in one and knew it, I could answer 'Agree' by arguing the programmer's world is part of mine. I could answer 'Disagree' by arguing that, since our nature is generated by code that is distinct from yet reliant on the world of the programmer, said reliance constitutes a supernatural component. Look at Sperry; He's arguing 'you don't need anything mystical to explain the mind' and then 'and what we know about the mind seems to confirm some/much of what religious and mystics claimed'.
So my answer? 'All of the above.' It works as much as any individual choice, as near as I can tell.
Jean,
=)
Comment by nullasalus — May 3, 2008 @ 4:24 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 5:17 pm
JOHN_A_DESIGNER quotes Beauregard and O'Leary:
Quite the opposite. Humans are instinctive dualists. Children intuitively see the mind as something distinct from the brain; studies have demonstrated this effect. It's only when we confront the evidence that we become materialists (at least most of us — I'm sure there are people out there who are materialists for ideological reasons, such as Marxists who embrace dialectical materialism). The fact that only a small fraction of neuroscientists remain dualists is a testament to the strength of the evidence. The fact that a majority of the public remain dualists reflects the public's unfamiliarity with the evidence. Witness the surprise of a person learning about the split-brain evidence for the first time.
As Steven Pinker puts it in this article:
JOHN_A_DESIGNER:
Alas, neither does dualism.
Proposing that consciousness emerges from matter, without explaining how this occurs, amounts to mere handwaving. In exactly the same way, proposing the existence of a non-physical seat of consciousness, without explaining how it gives rise to consciousness, is also handwaving.
Humans have some distance to go before they solve this problem.
Comment by watchmaker — May 3, 2008 @ 5:17 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 5:32 pm
I didn't know you took count.
Is this supposed to be a serious argument of yours (if it's truue)? Or do you recognize it for the fallacy it is, yet still consciously choose to perpetuate it?
Comment by Jean — May 3, 2008 @ 5:32 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 5:36 pm
No, it's a practical witness to the nature of their work. They believe there is a relationship between cells and cognitive function. So do those believing that the mind is not reducible to underlying qualities of matter associated with brain function. Their beliefs are unrefuted by a discipline that is poorly equipped to adjuducate the issue one way or the other.
It reflects their own familiarity with thought and their realization that it is qualitatively different from matter.
Surprise that brain damage leads to impaired function? The only ones harping on this are those believing it supports their metaphysical views.
Comment by Bradford — May 3, 2008 @ 5:36 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 5:40 pm
watchmaker,
But there's the problem. Even many of the neuroscientists who declare themselves distinct from dualists become anti-reductionists, emergentists, or similar. They abandon a poorly-defined dualism in name only, and typically take on a view that shares some striking similarity with dualism.
Again, look at Sperry. 'There's nothing mystical here. Yet it's in accord with many religious views.' Stephen Stich goes a long way in explaining one problem with the debate, being an ex-(eliminative) materialist.
Comment by nullasalus — May 3, 2008 @ 5:40 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 6:03 pm
Watchmaker:
Bradford responds:
Come on Bradford, let's be serious, how would "the public" "realize" that? Don't you think we should give some more weight to the opinion of the professionals, who studied the stuff for many years, compared to the "realization" of Joe public? No offense to Joe public of course.
Comment by Raevmo — May 3, 2008 @ 6:03 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 6:30 pm
It's simply a matter of epistomological preference. You're telling the public to distrust their familiarity with their own thought processes and they are responding "No thank you."
Comment by Bradford — May 3, 2008 @ 6:30 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 6:35 pm
Bradford:
And that's fine, but don't you agree that the opinion of neurologists counts for more than the uninformed opinion of the lay man?
Comment by Raevmo — May 3, 2008 @ 6:35 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 6:35 pm
In Bradfordese:
Translation: Joe Sixpack understands the relationship between mind and brain. Those who study it for a lifetime have no clue.
Imaginary (but representative) dialogue with Bradford, based on this thread:
Comment by watchmaker — May 3, 2008 @ 6:35 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 6:43 pm
JOHN
null said earlier: "Materialism used to mean solid stuff, stuff clunking against stuff, newtonian physics. Then QM came around and threw a wrench in that idea." That is it exactly. Do you really think I hold to a philosophy that has been refuted by quantum mechanics? Physicalism or naturalism hold that the physical universe is all there is (so materialism is subset of naturalism). That is the metaphysics I tentatively subscribe to.
Sure. And for me to accept religion, you would have to prove that God exists. Good to know we are as open-minded as each other.
And I do not have enough to believe anything else could do it.
null
Really? Then they should abandon reductionism, as emergence is well established.
Well then we can explore those borders. I am still not understanding why you think the compouter simulation is a problem here.
But the programmer lives in a universe with different laws to our own, he can make things happen in our world that defy the laws of our world - i.e. miracles.
I must admit I do not know why he says he is confirming what religions have claimed, unless he is talking about a specific aspect of the soul especially given that he insists his hypothesis is monism, not dualism.
Comment by The Pixie — May 3, 2008 @ 6:43 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 6:48 pm
Raevmo,
If we're going to talk about the authority of experts who devote their lives to study, then the natural response is - why should we ask neurologists about the soul? They aren't theologians. They aren't even philosophers.
Comment by nullasalus — May 3, 2008 @ 6:48 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 6:52 pm
You're equivocating. The issue was not biochemical familiarity. Neuro-scientists have no more insight into duality or its opposite than anyone else. Their expertise does not lend itself to a distinguishing determiniation on that issue.
Brain damage tells us nothing about the mind not being reducible to properties of matter.
Comment by Bradford — May 3, 2008 @ 6:52 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 6:58 pm
A claim to apparent, as opposed to actual duality, should be backed by empirical studues showing how thought and matter are different manifestations of some underlying commonality. Mere claims based on association are personal opinions.
Comment by Bradford — May 3, 2008 @ 6:58 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 6:59 pm
The Pixie,
And argued about. Hey, don't take it up with me - I'm very friendly to emergence. But these debates do exist. What, you think this field isn't controversial, even when no one's talking about souls?
And I don't understand why you think I think it's a problem. It draws attention to the limits of accuracy in some types of definitions, particularly when dealing with entities of this nature. (Not 'souls' but 'broad and convoluted topics'.)
But then miracles are no more 'supernatural' than anything else. They can be both real, yet explicable, yet natural, yet supernatural. Hell, he can make things happen with utter accordance in the laws of our world, and that holds.
And dualism isn't the only description of the soul, nor does religious belief necessarily reject monism. It's a nice, deep subject that too often gets cast in stark, incompatible terms for reasons other than the data or even the logic.
Comment by nullasalus — May 3, 2008 @ 6:59 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 7:03 pm
Raevmo:
If the subject matter is synapses- yes. If however, the contention is that synapses show that thought is simply an emergent property of matter then the neurologist is using his technical expertise to assert a philosophical primacy.
Comment by Bradford — May 3, 2008 @ 7:03 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 7:15 pm
nullasalus:
That's irrelevant, since, as you know, the comparison was not between neurologists and theologians/philosophers, it was between neurologists and the public. Don't you agree that the intuition of the public should count for less than the opinion of neurologists who have actually studied the brain?
But if you'll excuse me, I have to sleep now.
Comment by Raevmo — May 3, 2008 @ 7:15 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 7:34 pm
nullasalus wrote:
As Raevmo pointed out, you've changed the subject. Nevertheless, I'll answer you.
The difference is that neuroscientists and psychologists are the ones who are actually out gathering and interpreting the data. I'm all in favor of listening to those philosophers (Dennett and Chalmers, for example) and theologians who acquaint themselves with the evidence and allow their speculations to be constrained by it.
Comment by watchmaker — May 3, 2008 @ 7:34 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 7:55 pm
Raevmo,
No, it has direct bearing. Keep in mind that Eccles won a nobel prize for his neurology work, and he supported a kind of quantum dualism. Sperry's been the main subject here, and he (and after his split-brain work, no less) wrote of neuroscience confirming some religious intuitions. I could easily say 'Sure, neurologists know best, and some of the most outstanding and recent ones back up what I'm saying here, and how 'the public' typically feels'.
But no. Questions of mind are questions of neurology, philosophy, (for those of us who care) theology, and (some would argue - again, I'm neutral on it) quantum mechanics. I wouldn't automatically trust the theologian to talk about synapses, the philosopher to talk about the quantum zeno effect, the physicist to talk about the soul, or the neurologist to talk about dualism with the authority of an expert.
Besides, I rejected the characterization anyway. 'Everyone who's ignorant is a dualist, but the people who study become materialists' is incredibly deceptive. 'Most people have a vague inclination to some kind of dualism, but the people who study branch off into a wide variety of views from eliminative materialism, non-reductive physicalism, weak and strong emergentism, non-physicalist naturalism, mysterianism, or combinations/alternate options' sounds far closer to the truth.
watchmaker,
I've answered Raevmo - I don't think I'm the one changing the subject.
Just as you're more likely to pay attention to philosophers and theologians who work with the data, I'd be more likely to pay attention to neurologists who speak on theology and philosophy they've read up on. Frankly, few seem to - and I can't blame them, since it's not as if they need to bother to get their work done. As Chalmers once said (I paraphrase), 'Oddly, philosophers tend to reject quantum links to mind based on a perceived incompatibility with physics. But physicists tend to reject quantum links to mind based with a perceived incompatibility with philosophy.' In other words, he was highlighting a misunderstanding that came about due to the questions extending beyond their respective fields.
I think neurologists know far more about the brain than the average person. But not only is the topic so complicated and spread across multiple fields, but the options for philosophical explanation are incredibly broad in scope. The options aren't physicalism versus immaterialism - it wasn't before the sciences got where they were, and since then, the number of views has exploded.
Comment by nullasalus — May 3, 2008 @ 7:55 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 8:03 pm
Pez wrote:
Pez,
Be careful here. There is strong evidence that mental states supervene on brain states, but that is not the same thing as saying that there is strong evidence for top-down causation.
If top-down causality obtained in brains, then the low-level behavior of the matter in the brain would not be explicable in terms of the laws of physics — yet we have absolutely no evidence that this is the case.
Comment by watchmaker — May 3, 2008 @ 8:03 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 8:07 pm
Nullasalus wrote:
Which is the entire point Raevmo and I were trying to make in response to Bradford.
I'm glad you agree with us.
Comment by watchmaker — May 3, 2008 @ 8:07 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 8:14 pm
Nullasalus wrote:
Interesting, isn't it, that among the views you name, none are compatible with the "folk dualism" held by most in the general public.
The evidence rules out dualism, except for the watered-down, epiphenomenal Chalmers variety — which isn't all that objectionable to monists anyway.
Comment by watchmaker — May 3, 2008 @ 8:14 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 8:31 pm
What evidence rules it dualism?
Comment by Bradford — May 3, 2008 @ 8:31 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 8:42 pm
watchmaker,
I'm sure Bradford would agree with what I said. Unfortunately, the brain is not the mind. Different but overlapping spheres. So I agree with Bradford, while standing by my own claim.
Go read what Stephen Stich has to say about 'folk psychology', and why he ended up abandoning the eliminative materialist camp. I think a good summary is 'because what that group is being eliminativist about amounts to a strawman anyway'.
Which would be my response to your claims - the 'folk dualism' is popular, undeveloped, social, and vague. It's not even the dualism of Kant, certainly not the hylomorphism of Aristotle and Aquinas, etc. It's a mix of bare intuitions that vary from person to person, with particulars sometimes being on target, others being wrong. It's entirely compatible with a broad range of views, from emergentism to property dualism. Hell, you can make a good argument for substance dualism too, so long as you start from the premise that information is a substance.
And as far as I've read, you mischaracterize Chalmers' position. He believes there's no knock-down argument against epiphenominalism, but it's only one of several avenues of explanation, with him being more or less undecided. Emergentism, property dualism, quantum-interactive dualism, etc. Jaegwon Kim is the one who asserts that epiphenominalism is the only viable path, but it's not like that's an indisputable claim even there (Henry Stapp in particular likes to argue that physicalists like Kim are actually very out of date with their knowledge of what's 'physical'.)
I mean, back we go to the OP. There's a reason some (And we're talking even physicalists here) express skepticism at the claim of science explaining the mind completely, barring a radical transformation of our understanding of the world. Hell, even for dualism, check out what Lycan (himself a materialist) has to say about it. Naturally, a nice quote.
Quite a statement. Granted, you can disagree, but the presence of broad disagreement is the point I want to drive home here.
Comment by nullasalus — May 3, 2008 @ 8:42 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 8:51 pm
You've descended to dishonesty. Too bad watchmaker. Neurologists of course know more about the brain but do not know what is necessary to sustain the allegation that the mind is simply an emergent property of matter. Not their fault. They simply lack a test that makes the unambiguous case.
Comment by Bradford — May 3, 2008 @ 8:51 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 8:52 pm
Hi The Pixie:
I took issue with Sperry's use of the word and showed why. His simple use of the term is misleading when other experts say his position is dualistic. Denying the term dualism does not hide that his findings are dualistic in one sense and supportive of dualism in its general sense.
If you really don't care one way or another why remark again?
What is "like" if not an expression of desire?
This is what you like about his position. This part of his position is not scientific nor derived from evidence - neither is yours. It is prompted by desire.
Right then.
!
You've been talking metaphysics from your very first comment on spirituality.
Then why haven't you googled it? You can start with Thomas Aquinas.
Good, so we are well-agreed that your positions are based upon preferences and desires and not science.
Now, what was that about emergence?
Do tell how we know that "emergence happens" in any way that is relevant to the most complex structure known to man and the mystery of consciousness arising from matter.
We've seen more and far better from the supernatural side. Sperry found that consciousness is very much like what the religious, the dualists and the mystics said it was. He then conjectured philosophically about emergence.
If you want philosophy as an explanation of consciousness you can do much better. Start with, for example, philosophers. Since we know now that this is not a scientific question why bother yourself with a scientist's opinion - even if he is very clever and a Nobel laureate?
Comment by Pez — May 3, 2008 @ 8:52 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 10:46 pm
Bye bye, Keiths part 4
Comment by Guts — May 3, 2008 @ 10:46 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 10:55 pm
Well, I must say, I've never enjoyed a thread so much, and at the same time been in such awe of the sheer creative bullshit artistry that I've seen.
There are some very smart people hanging around here on "both sides."
Wow. Kudos to EVERYONE!
Make it a great day
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 3, 2008 @ 10:55 pm
May 3rd, 2008 at 11:06 pm
I feel I should report on my experiment today:
I attempted to chemically sever my collusum via excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages in the form of Guinness draft (very many of them.)
Sorry to report that the experiment was unsuccessful. While I have been feeling quite pleasant, the callosum did not appear to be severed, such as I could tell. Me neither.
I am fully committed to science, and shall try again next weekend and report on my findings.
Make it a great weekend.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 3, 2008 @ 11:06 pm
May 4th, 2008 at 6:21 am
Hi Pez
How easy it is to understand the minds of other people…
I like Sperry's conjection because it fits with what I suspect to be the case, not because it fits with what I want to be the case.
Oh, I see. You have an explanation, and you want me to find out what it is by Googling it. There was me imagining you might present it yourself. Or at least give a link to it.
So you believe this:
http://radicalacademy.com/aqui...
What are your positions based on? Do you have science to back them up? No sign of it yet. I gues your position is also based upon preferences and desires.
Actually I think there is some middle ground here, where we have clues pointing to a certain hypothesis, even if the science does not yet. Let us call it a nascent proto-scientific hypothesis.
I do not know. I thought I had made that clear.
Not in your replies to me we have not. A suggestion that I research it myself as opposed to a paper by Sperry?
Ah, so where Sperry agrees with you he "found that" and where he disagrees he "conjectured philosophically". Right. Good spin, Pez.
Perhaps you can quote the part of the paper where he "found that consciousness is very much like what the religious" and we can see what evidence he provides that consciousness is indeed like that. Because that bit slipped me by.
How do we know that? I agree there is no scientifically accepted explanation yet, but to claim the question is not scientific is a much bigger claim.
Comment by The Pixie — May 4, 2008 @ 6:21 am
May 5th, 2008 at 12:38 am
Hi The Pixie,
I didn't say I understood your mind. I didn't read your mind but your words. I commented on your desire and you claimed not to have mentioned your desire. I showed you where you said you liked Sperry's argument because it did not invoke anything supernatural.
That doesn't reflect your "desire" Fine, my mistake. I can only know you so far as what you write.
I can only know you by your words. You told me you were keenly interested in the explanation of the soul. I suspected that if you were you'd have looked into it by now since Aquinas has been mentioned several times on this thread and you've even been given a link previously. Since you did Google Aquinas this time I see you are interested.
re: the passage on Aquinas' views:
That's a start. No, I don't subscribe to every aspect of this write-up as I reject the pagan view of the soul's immortality. But Aquinas' explanation of the soul as the form of the body and its source is superior to the conjecture that the consciousness emerges from matter. It is an explanation similar to that accepted by atheist philosopher of the mind, Richard Boyd and commented on by Daniel Dennett as "looking pretty good". Boyd refers to form as "configuration" and accepts the idea of the logical existence of disembodied minds relying upon no particular material nor requiring for existence any material whatsoever.
Same as yours and everyone else's. Knowledge of the natural world acquired via the senses and authority, filtere