Misusing Science
by BradfordA New York Times article entitled Science of the Soul? "˜I Think, Therefore I Am' Is Losing Force, illustrates how science can be misused to advance a mataphysical agenda. From the article:
Although he (Pope John Paul II) noted that in the intervening years evolution had become "more than a hypothesis," he added that considering the mind as emerging merely from physical phenomena was "incompatible with the truth about man."
But as evolutionary biologists and cognitive neuroscientists peer ever deeper into the brain, they are discovering more and more genes, brain structures and other physical correlates to feelings like empathy, disgust and joy. That is, they are discovering physical bases for the feelings from which moral sense emerges "” not just in people but in other animals as well.
Look at this. Neuroscientists have discovered that brain biochemistry correlates to feelings. Shocking huh. You know what's coming. Since there is a correlation, feelings are nothing more than manifestations of underlying biochemical reactions or perhaps we could say that feelings are an emergent property of brain biochemistry. That sounds impressive to a materialist without having to reveal anything new.
The result is perhaps the strongest challenge yet to the worldview summed up by Descartes, the 17th-century philosopher who divided the creatures of the world between humanity and everything else. As biologists turn up evidence that animals can exhibit emotions and patterns of cognition once thought of as strictly human, Descartes's dictum, "I think, therefore I am," loses its force.
Animals exhibit feelings and patterns of cognition previously thought to be the sole preserve of humans ergo Descartes dictum is losing its force? Descartes's dictum might have a philosophical statement to make about existence and consciousness but how was this mitigated by empirical findings? Don't hit a strawman on the way to the keyboard.
For many scientists, the evidence that moral reasoning is a result of physical traits that evolve along with everything else is just more evidence against the existence of the soul, or of a God to imbue humans with souls.
Or as V. S. Ramachandran, a brain scientist at the University of California, San Diego, put it in an interview, there may be soul in the sense of "the universal spirit of the cosmos," but the soul as it is usually spoken of, "an immaterial spirit that occupies individual brains and that only evolved in humans "” all that is complete nonsense."
"There may be soul in the sense of "the universal spirit of the cosmos,"- Thanks for your metaphysical input brain scientist but are you telling us that the negation of the second assumption ("an immaterial spirit that occupies individual brains and that only evolved in humans") is the result of an experiment you are aware of? For that matter was your prior statement empirically grounded as well? And what pope or scientist has declared that a soul had to evolve? Why would a scientist want to delve into this except to advance a personal metaphysical agenda?
July 1st, 2007 at 1:48 am
It's the New York friggin' Times, Bradford! Misinformation is their middle name!!!
Comment by Crandaddy — July 1, 2007 @ 1:48 am
July 1st, 2007 at 2:49 am
Bradford, never mind the correlations being discovered between physical states of the brain and mental states. What about correlations between physical states of stars and mental states? If we jiggered astrophysical states around a bit, maybe a lot of mental states would be correlated with those too. I'm not aware of that hypothesis having been properly tested, though I'm sure that every mental state is in fact correlated with some astrophysical state or other. So maybe the apparent correlation between brain states and mental states is merely coincidental. After all, such a merely coincidental correlation is bound to occur in at least one universe in an infinite multiverse, and so some people had to inhabit such a universe, and it just happens to be us.
And yet, oddly enough, only a few materialists think that minds are really just stars.
Of course, we already know that lunar states affect mental states. That why you sometimes hear 'brights' howling during the night like this:
Oooooooooooooowwwwwwwwwwwwwwww!:evil:
Comment by stunney — July 1, 2007 @ 2:49 am
July 1st, 2007 at 6:22 am
Bradford,
You are spot-on. I originally got into science-blog-debating on PT when I argued with Wes Elsberry about level playing fields. He said that an ID paper would receive a fair hearing — and in a sense he was right–an ID paper that proposed a test would be published. But in the sense I meant it, I was right: that metaphysical musing is permitted, even in peer reviewed science papers, if if is agreeable metaphysical musing–such as multiple universes. And what you have posted here. I am guessing that the metaphysical sentiment that the soul is obsolete makes its way into the literature in spite of the fact that genes related to empathy would do no more harm to the concept of a soul than genes related to violence would do to the concept of evil. This is, in fact, representative of a long understood truth–that God employs secondary means.
Comment by David Heddle — July 1, 2007 @ 6:22 am
July 1st, 2007 at 7:23 am
The sheer incompetence of scientists here is astonishing. Not in their science, mind you–I have no doubt they can do it. But when they speculate beyond the science, they have absolutely no conception of what they are talking about. If they did, they would know that their new scientific findings provide no new relevant information for the matter. We've known for a very long time that the mind and the brain interact. Now we have a better idea just where those interactions localize in the brain. That's great for neuroscience, but the mind-brain question, and the existence of the soul, have never been discussed on the basis of a centimeter here, a centimeter there. It's been based, philosophically, physical systems' inability to account for all of our experiences (reflective self-awareness, rationality, consciousness, free will, and so on); and historically and theologically, on knowledge gained through God's word.
Cornelia Dean's competence as the writer doesn't exactly shine, either–she seriously misunderstood one of her contemporary sources, as the correction at the end of the article now shows. I suppose she's a science writer, and therefore somewhat forgivably not in touch with the philosophical and theological issues, though.
The real blame goes to the scientists who are speaking so outside their field they can't even see it from there.
Comment by TomG — July 1, 2007 @ 7:23 am
July 1st, 2007 at 8:03 am
Given the precedents that have been established, fast-forward a couple of decades. Do you think there might be those who will argue that a neuroscientist who believes in the soul should be denied tenure, since such belief would demonstrate an inability to grasp science?
Comment by MikeGene — July 1, 2007 @ 8:03 am
July 1st, 2007 at 8:09 am
"Science of the Soul?"…
Update July 1: Other thoughtful responses to this article……
Trackback by Thinking Christian — July 1, 2007 @ 8:09 am
July 1st, 2007 at 8:15 am
Scary thought, MikeGene–not just because of what it would mean to our understanding of God, humans, and the world, but also because it would mean scientists had really cut themselves off from other fields of knowledge–even more so than today.
Comment by TomG — July 1, 2007 @ 8:15 am
July 1st, 2007 at 8:27 am
David Heddle:
I'm thinking that the soul is obsolete mantra will infiltrate the literature as well. At some point it could represent conventional wisdom backed by "scientific data." Actually the existence of genes that predispose one to violence, alcoholism etc. would be consistent with the concept that humans are innately sinful.
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 8:27 am
July 1st, 2007 at 8:35 am
TomG:
Good point. The inability to account for the experiences mentioned is revealed by phrases like "emergent property of" which is no more substantive than a proclamation that life is an emergent property of matter.
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 8:35 am
July 1st, 2007 at 8:46 am
Mike Gene:
PZ would deny tenure today on that basis. A steady drumbeat of papers echoing the theme that science has debunked the concept of a soul would act like a conditioning process greasing the skids for those wanting to exert a metaphysical claim and link it to the prestige of science.
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 8:46 am
July 1st, 2007 at 8:52 am
TomG:
There is a loss of a sense of scientific boundaries. Making claims about untestable matters, based on data that does nothing to actually test them, can politicize science.
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 8:52 am
July 1st, 2007 at 8:55 am
Crandaddy:
Articles like this can serve a purpose that the author did not intend for it.
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 8:55 am
July 1st, 2007 at 8:57 am
stunney:
Some of the claims have the force of astrology.
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 8:57 am
July 1st, 2007 at 10:27 am
The fact is that the concept of an immaterial soul has taken a battering at the hands of science. There is a reason that dualism has been pushed to the fringes of neuroscience, and it's not because some arbitrary metaphysical dogma is being foisted on neuroscientific practitioners. The reason is the evidence.
There are some arcane versions of the soul concept that have no empirical implications, and are thus inaccessible to science. Most people, however, throughout history and up to the present, have held ideas about the soul which do have observable consequences, and are thus quite amenable to scientific study — and falsification.
God's role in the universe has been circumscribed by scientific discoveries and relegated to the ever-shrinking gaps in scientific knowledge. In exactly the same way, the role of the soul has shrunk as well.
For example, many people believe that OBEs (out-of-body experiences) are not just apparent, but real, and that the soul actually leaves the body during these experiences and travels to other locations. Most people who have had an OBE report that their senses were intact (and often heightened, in fact) during the experience.
This presents a perfect opportunity for a scientific test. If the soul is capable of "seeing" during its peregrinations, then it should be able to acquire information that is unavailable at the location where the body is situated. This has studied experimentally by placing "targets" (e.g. random numbers) in certain locations and inviting OBE subjects to "travel" to these locations to read the the targets. Interestingly, the subjects are often quite confident that they have successfully read the targets, but they are wrong. No such capability has been demonstrated. See the second part of this comment for more on this.
Another example: many people see the immaterial soul as the seat of the will, and hold it responsible for the decisions a person makes (particularly the morally significant ones). The fact that the will seems to be utterly dependent on the brain and unable to function without it, and the fact that a person's morality can be dramatically altered by damage to the brain, both suggest that this idea is outdated. See this comment for an excerpt from a Scientific American article discussing the impact, on the will, of damage to a part of the limbic system.
Comment by keiths — July 1, 2007 @ 10:27 am
July 1st, 2007 at 10:35 am
Hi everyone,
Since it is Sunday morning, here's a thought. I'm not sure why such findings pose any problem with the traditional Christian worldview. According to this view, we are created as bodily beings, God incarnated as a bodily being, Christ was bodily resurrected, and the after-life includes a bodily resurrection.
Comment by MikeGene — July 1, 2007 @ 10:35 am
July 1st, 2007 at 12:21 pm
In fact the concept of evil (and free will in general) is being rendered obsolete, more by neurosciene than genetics, but it's part of the same thing — the more we know about the material basis of mind, the less room there is for traditional concepts of the soul and self. In law, we already have the concept of the insanity defense, recognizing that some people can't be held responsible for their actions — their brain made them do it. The problem is, that explanation holds for normal people as well as those suffering from insanity. We're all doing what our genes and brains are making us do.
In the presence of increasing scientific knowledge, the self, soul, and free will start to look like necessary fictions. But the "necessary" part of that is just as important as the "fictions". We can't get rid of our souls, but we don't, at present, have very good methods for integrating these fictions with objective scientific knowledge. A newspaper article is not going to be able to do more than note the tensions, but there are plenty of thinkers who have tackled these issues head on (Dennet, Owen Flanagan, Douglas Hofstadeter are the ones I know who are coming at it from the materialist side — Dennett's "The Self as the Centre of Narrative Gravity" is a good place to start.
Comment by mtraven — July 1, 2007 @ 12:21 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 12:39 pm
Hi Mike,
There may indeed be some Christians who would be comfortable with the idea that the soul is a purely material entity.
Other Christians would object, for one or more of the following reasons:
1. Free will and moral responsibility. Some people believe that if the will is materially based, then free will and moral responsibility are illusory. Sin and judgment then become problematic concepts.
2. Continuity of self. If the soul ceases to exist when the body dies, but is then reconstituted when the body is resurrected, then is it really the same soul, or just an identical one?
3. Creation of souls. If a collection of atoms arranged in a particular way constitutes a person with a soul, then humans may someday be able to create souls. This is problematic for those who believe that this ability is reserved to the Deity.
4. Specialness of humans. Some people like to think of an immaterial soul as a differentiator between humans and animals.
5. The period between death and resurrection. Many (if not most) Christians believe that the soul continues to function between death and resurrection, having thoughts, emotions, memories, pleasures and/or pains.
For example, the Catholic doctrine of purgatory holds that some souls, due to unabsolved sins, require a sort of purification by fire before being admitted to heaven. Augustine described the pain these souls experience as worse than any pain it is possible to experience on earth.
Clearly this doctrine makes no sense if souls are not capable of experiencing pain, and if they are not morally responsible and hence susceptible to purification apart from the body.
Of course, the best evidence that most Christians believe in an immaterial soul, and are threatened by the possibility that it might not exist, is the vehement opposition they mount in threads like this. I've seen it many times.
Comment by keiths — July 1, 2007 @ 12:39 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 12:56 pm
mtraven wrote:
Owen Flanagan's view of these issues is presented in his book The Problem of the Soul. I commend it to those interested in the topic.
Comment by keiths — July 1, 2007 @ 12:56 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 1:18 pm
Keiths:
Keiths, your claims that you are subjecting an immaterial concept to testing ring hollow. Unless you are able to specify properties of an immaterial x that could be tested by such and such under y conditions then you are merely indulging your own metaphysics under the guise of science. The out of body experience is an example. Results are mixed but any testing results do not address a central claim of the soul namely, its survival beyond the permanent death of the body of an organism. If you cannot deal with this claim and unequivicably resolve it empirically, then all the subsequent theories based on testing are blowing smoke and a waste of valued funding revenue.
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 1:18 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 1:31 pm
mtraven:
Only when you enter the analysis with a skewed view of the data and what is being tested. Evil is focused around a value system and that is not determined by a genomic readout. Right and wrong cannot be rendered obsolete by neuroscience or genetics because those disciplines are not suitable vehicles by which to determine what is right and wrong.
The legal concept is instructive. It revolves around a determination made, largely by ordinary people, not particularly well versed on the underlying issues, who must decide issues based only on the expert testimony presented at trial and the skilled argumentation of opposing counsel. Hardly the makings of an objectively arrived at scientific conclusion. Biochemistry does influence behavoir. That is not in dispute. What is in dispute, and not scientifically established, is the contention that free will is solely reducible to underlying brain biochemical activity. Those advancing a materialist argument have a metaphysical axe to grind on pseudoscience.
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 1:31 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 2:35 pm
Bradford wrote:
I am able to do so. Didn't you read what I wrote about OBEs? The hypothesis is that
1) there is an immaterial soul that inhabits the body;
2) the soul can leave the body and travel during OBEs;
3) when traveling, the soul retains its ability to see;
4) afterward, subjects remember what their souls "saw" during their journeys.
This hypothesis has empirical consequences. If it is true, then we should be able to carry out experiments in which OBE subjects obtain knowledge via OBEs that they could not have gathered while remaining "inside" their bodies.
Such experiments have been carried out, with negative results.
Furthermore, it's not just that OBE subjects fail to obtain the target information. Many of them are confident that they have succeeded, yet turn out to be wrong. This is a big problem for the hypothesis.
So we have a hypothesis (based on someone else's metaphysics, by the way, not mine) which makes testable predictions, and we have experiments which test these predictions and fail to confirm them. How does this amount to "indulging my own metaphysics"
No, but why should knowing what happens to the soul after death be a prerequisite for asking what functions, if any, it serves during life?
And if science shows that it has no independent functions during life, then what would it even do after death? Why suppose it even exists, if there is no evidence for it? Why should your religious preconception be the default hypothesis, to be retained until it is conclusively disproven? Why not pick the hypothesis that best matches the evidence?
That's absurd. It's like saying that unless we know how humanity will end, then there is no reason to study humans now — all of history and psychology and neuroscience are "blowing smoke and a waste of valuable funding revenue".
And speaking of funding, most of the research that has undermined the concept of the soul has been undertaken for a different reason: to understand how the brain works. The health benefits alone justify the funding for this research. The fact that it is helping us to jettison an ancient and outmoded superstition is a bonus.
Comment by keiths — July 1, 2007 @ 2:35 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 2:41 pm
Suppose someone's brain is missing. Would a person's will be able to function without it? Well, not in this world. Why? Well, because someone whose brain is missing would be dead. Similarly, someone whose heart is missing would be dead. But we don't say that the mind just = the heart, even though for a human intellect and will to act in the world, humans need a heart (and lungs, and other body parts too).
What about damage to the brain? Or just general anaestheia? Well, what about it?
One needs to think about how to design an embodied, spatiotemporal creature endowed with rationality and moral autonomy. What kind of universe would be required for, and consistent with, such a creature? I referred to the kind of universe it would have to be from a purely physical point of view in another thread.
But a creature endowed with what the term 'soul' refers to, namely conscious rationality and moral autonomy, needs more than just physics, because the essential properties of rational thinking and autonomous willing are just not physical ones nor reducible to physical ones. (Incidentally, in denying the existence of the soul on my definition of that term, one would be denying the existence of conscious rationality and morally autonomous willing–which is surely incoherent.)
So God needed, in order to create bodily creatures endowed with conscious rationality and moral autonomy, to design and instantiate some psychophysical laws as well as some purely physical laws (and constants). And these laws are contingent. That is, such laws are not, or do not represent, necessary truths. There are logically possible worlds in which Ohm's Law, say, doesn't obtain and in which there are zombies. In other words, both the physical and psychophysical laws that obtain in our world needn't have obtained, but they do, by God's design.
Consider this possibility: the psychophysical laws God has designed entail the following propositions:
1. A living human body is causally necessary for all mental states that body has.
2. A living human body is causally sufficient for all mental states that body has.
3. Propositions 1 and 2 are not necessary truths, but contingent truths.
4. Mental states are neither identical with, nor reducible to, their bodily causes, since effects in general are neither identical with, nor reducible to, their causes.
5. Some mental states cause some bodily states.
6. A human being is one substance, which has physical and non-physical properties.
What is the origin of human reason"”the type of rationality that enables us to discuss this issue, as well as do very abstract mathematics and apply it in particle accelerator experiments, to build particle accelerators, to translate Japanese into Finnish, and to fret about the limits of free speech, the causes of rising gas prices, and what to do about global warming?
If we look at the emergence of modern homo sapiens, something very dramatic does seem to have occurred roughly 50,000 years ago. My theory would be that God, say 50,000 years ago, created a new contingent connection between certain human brain states and certain types of essentially non-material higher mental states"”—those, for instance, involving language, abstract thought, morality, and so forth. I think I would also say that earlier, either at the OOL point or subsequently, God created a contingent connection between physical life (or forms of physical life of a certain minimal degree of complexity), and what we can call broadly sentience—"”which would then give rise to various species of consciousness: frog consciousness, bat consciousness, dolphin consciousness, bonobo consciousness, etc all the way up to fully developed human consciousness.
In short, God, not matter, designed qualia and intentionality (God is the creator, after all). For it's extremely implausible that an impersonal natural process would generate a contingent connection to such a thing as a rationally conscious mind (with all its knowledge of complex necessary truths of mathematics, logic, physics, chemistry, etc). So, such a connection in my view almost certainly had to have been created on purpose by a very intelligent non-material agent.
People say nice things about the mental abilities of chimpanzees and such like. But chimpanzees and other similar primates are no closer to mastering theoretical physics than their ancestors of 1,000,000 years ago. At the very least, giving a persuasive naturalistic account of how very complex, very abstract mathematical beliefs such as those involved in set theory, Lie groups, and the like are justified is far from easy, which is worth mentioning if only because of how much reliance is placed on mathematical beliefs in the methods and practice of the natural sciences.
An additional reason for insisting on the contingent nature of organism-consciousness connections derives from one of Saul Kripke's celebrated arguments against mind-brain identity: roughly, if the mind just is the brain, this would have to be a necessary truth (since for all x, x=x); and surely it is not. For if it were a necessary truth, that would entail that in every possible world containing minds, those minds would all be human brains. But that seems extremely implausible. It seems quite possible to conceive of minds that are not identical with human brains. These could include God's mind, angelic minds, alien minds, robot minds, Cartesian minds, etc; or, perhaps just as or even more plausibly, our minds. But then, if the connection is a logically or metaphysically contingent one, it's extraordinarily improbable for it to have arisen unintentionally. Which is why the naturalist needs to sing this song again:
Here comes the multiverse, do do do do
Here comes the multiverse, and I say
It's all right
Little darling
It's been a long cold lonely winter
Little darling
It feels like years since it's been here
Here comes the multiverse, do do do do
Here comes the multiverse, and I say
It's all right
Little darling
The smiles returning to the faces
Little darling
I seems like years since it's been here
Here comes the multiverse, do do do do
Here comes the multiverse, and I say
It's all right
Multiverse, multiverse, multiverse, here it comes
Multiverse, multiverse, multiverse, here it comes
Multiverse, multiverse, multiverse, here it comes
Multiverse, multiverse, multiverse, here it comes
Little darling
I feel that ice is slowly melting
Little darling
It seems like years since it's been clear
Here comes the multiverse, do do do do
Here comes the multiverse, and I say
It's all right
Here comes the multiverse, do do do do
Here comes the multiverse
It's all right
It's all right
Comment by stunney — July 1, 2007 @ 2:41 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 3:00 pm
Una vez mas:
It makes no more sense to invoke the fact that mental states apparently depend causally upon brain states, as evidence that mental states just are brain states, than it does to invoke the fact that brain states apparently depend causally upon mental states, as evidence that brain states just are mental states.
First, something that is literally completely devoid of mental states cannot have a living human brain. If one deprived a person of literally all of their mental states, you would deprive that person's brain of its owner"”-that is to say, it would no longer be a living brain.
Second, none of us ever has any epistemic access to the things we call brains, or to anything else for that matter, independently of our mental states.
In other short, there is no such thing as a human 'brain' if there is no such thing as human mental states.
Comment by stunney — July 1, 2007 @ 3:00 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 3:08 pm
Some stunneyism:
It makes no more sense to invoke the fact that digestion apparently depends causally upon certain physiological processes, as evidence that digestion just is these processes, than it does to invoke the fact that certain physiological processes apparently depend causally upon digestion, as evidence that these physiological processes just are digestion.
See? I can be a stunneyist too!
Comment by keiths — July 1, 2007 @ 3:08 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 3:43 pm
Keiths, OBE claims are sporadic and do nothing to establish the existence of a soul as biblically defined. Years of experience with these forums has demonstrated that debunking biblical claims is the motivation of those with views like your own. The point of testing is that the OBE claim is utterly inadaquate to address the main issue of an immaterial soul. It could exist without any OBE evidence. Its debunking is outside the realm of science.
Keiths:
My conception is not a default hypothesis. It is my personal non-scientific view as is your opposing view. Your hypothesis of OBE addresses not even a scintilla of the claim so why take it seriously? What would happen after death is outside the domain of science and as a defender of science I am highlighting those like yourself who would undermine its integrity for metaphysical purposes.
If you cannot deal with this claim and unequivicably resolve it empirically, then all the subsequent theories based on testing are blowing smoke and a waste of valued funding revenue.
No, its like saying if you cannot test a belief by scientific methodology then don't waste time or resources.
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 3:43 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 4:49 pm
mtraven wrote:
You'll need to elaborate for me why you think it can be used to argue that all minds are identical to my brain—-assuming for present purposes that you're no dimmer than a dim ten-year-old.
I think it's you who is amazingly stupid; or else, like a lot of 'brights', you're simply as ignorant as a very ignorant thing, or, to use the technical expression, amazingly ignorant. "For all x, x=x" is a logical truth. It simply states that everything is self-identical. Modalized, it states that everything is self-identical in every possible world in which it exists. I.e. it states that everything is necessarily self-identical. So the argument is this:
1) Every brain is necessarily identical with itself.
2) If every mind M is identical with a brain B, then every mind M is necessarily identical with a brain B.
3) For, necessarily B=B.
and
4) If necessarily a=a, and if a=b, then necessarily a=b.
5) Since M=B ex hypothesi, then necessarily M=B.
C) Hence in every possible world containing minds, those minds would all be brains.
And Kripke's point is this conclusion is extremely improbable, since we can conceive of worlds in which there are minds but no human brains. That is, there's no good reason to accept the consequent in 2. For more, go here.
Comment by stunney — July 1, 2007 @ 4:49 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 5:12 pm
Does anyone doubt that digestion is a physiological process?:roll:
Certainly, it makes no more sense to say that digestion is a specified physiological process, than it does to say that that specified physiological process is digestion.
But the sensations associated with indigestion are a different matter, of course.:roll:
Comment by stunney — July 1, 2007 @ 5:12 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 5:23 pm
mtraven wrote:
Well, the extension of the term 'brain' in the premises is the set of human brains, since that's the reference class of the word 'brain' in the context of the mind-brain identity theories that Kripke's argument is addressing.
If you use 'materialism' to mean something other than such theories, that in no way affects Kripke's argument to the conclusion that those theories are false.
However, many philosophers (including many materialists such as your pal Dennett) do not believe that any genuinely physicalist theories of the mind can legitimately avoid ontological identity between mind and brain, however much our concepts may fail to reflect that identity. And I agree with that, though of course not with their claim that such an identity actually holds true.
Comment by stunney — July 1, 2007 @ 5:23 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 5:40 pm
mtraven asks:
Um, here, for instance:
Comment by stunney — July 1, 2007 @ 5:40 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 5:57 pm
mtraven,
I tossed your comment into the hole. Why? I don't know – my brain made me do it.
Comment by MikeGene — July 1, 2007 @ 5:57 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 5:57 pm
It happened again! Damn brain….
Comment by MikeGene — July 1, 2007 @ 5:57 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 5:58 pm
There goes another one. Hope you're not planning to hold me responsible.
Comment by MikeGene — July 1, 2007 @ 5:58 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 6:45 pm
LOL!
To address mtraven's point about the legal issue of responsibility, I believe it would be a misrepresentation to say that our allowance of the insanity defense is for cases where as mtraven says "their brain made them do it". Rather, I believe the legal question is about whether they were capable of understanding what they did and distinguishing that their actions were wrong.
It has nothing to do with affirming or denying whether their brain is making the choice vs. a mind distinct from a brain. When an insanity defense is used, that is not a claim that someone has entered a state where they no longer have a mind distinct from their brain, while sane people still have minds distinct from brains. They are unrelated issues.
p.s. After posting this, I was genuinely sorry to see mtraven's response to MikeGene's response. I don't know whether Mike actually moved comments or just claimed to, or if he did so because he had other reasons to do so and used the opportunity to make his point. (I find plenty of comments around that Mike and the other moderators likely don't agree with.) But I don't believe the outcome of souring mtraven was the intent.
Comment by eric — July 1, 2007 @ 6:45 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 7:11 pm
mtraven:
I just tossed two more in the hole. It's become a feeding frenzy for which genes expressing proteins used by my brain cells are totally responsible.
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 7:11 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 7:14 pm
C'mon Eric, the irony of it is
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 7:14 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 7:39 pm
Hi Bradford and MikeGene,
You guys are having too much fun.
BTW, I wouldn't have even bothered to read mtravens comments if you guys hadn't thrown it is the memory hole ("Banned in Boston" syndrome).
Then I had to read this thread to see what the heck is going on.
IMO, how the law treats the question of mind and insanity has absolutely no baring on science or reality.
You might as well reference Keller's Catch 22 for the "scientific" insight that any and every sane person would plead insanity to escape the madness of the war. (BTW, the "war" was Keller's metaphor for reality, IMO)
Comment by Thought Provoker — July 1, 2007 @ 7:39 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 7:43 pm
I don't deny the humorous irony of the idea. That's why I really did laugh out loud. Nothing pokes through a hole in an idea like a vivid case in point.
That said, I would want to have a good laugh all together with mtraven included, hoping that he appreciates the irony of the idea as well. I wouldn't enjoy laughing at mtraven, and I was trusting that there was no real prevention of him expressing himself (within the universal requirement of certain Comment Guidelines, etc.).
Comment by eric — July 1, 2007 @ 7:43 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 7:53 pm
I was especially wondering about the writer. Why bring in Descartes' cogito ergo sum at all? Were the scientists really claiming that was relevant or just the writer trying to be clever.
Descartes was contemplating about what we can know. That is a question of epistemology. The question of of the mind / brain distinction is a question of the philosophy of the mind. The author is quite confused about categories, connections, and consequences.
Even if we only think with a brain, and there is no truly distinct mind or soul or spirit, that would not imply we don't think or that we don't exist or that we can no longer know that we exist.
But I also agree that scientists in general have no special aptitude when they step outside their expertise, so the errors in thinking can be just as faulty.
Comment by eric — July 1, 2007 @ 7:53 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 7:57 pm
Eric:
The demonstration is over but it does illustrate something the reality based community needs to heed. By our actions we demonstrate in the clearest way our real beliefs. Yeah, I know about the illusion of free will blah, blah… But just try and use my brain made me do it as an excuse and see how far it gets you. Darwinian extremists can only prevail with heavy reliance on intimidation. I read MG's 'about me' piece which he linked to in responding to bj. The reaction of the profs reminded me of the old Grey Poupon commercial. There are just certain concepts that must not be advanced if one is into the sophisticated veneer thing.
Anyway mtraven, I hope you see the humor in it too.
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 7:57 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 10:14 pm
Bill Vallicella blogged on this same article, and a commenter there brought in an article by J.P. Moreland (pdf). Looks to me like a very strong case that science has no competence on the question of souls. (Sure, it might show that OBEs aren't what they're claimed to be, but so what?) It's just the wrong method of inquiry into the matter.
Comment by TomG — July 1, 2007 @ 10:14 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 10:16 pm
I mean to include the link to that blog, but I forgot. Here it is.
Comment by TomG — July 1, 2007 @ 10:16 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 10:31 pm
This, from Kenneth Miller, just caught my eye. It's at the end of the article:
This bit about "everything we know about the biological sciences…" is typical scientism, and it's still amazing to me that a confessing Catholic would lunge for it the way Miller does. He's implying that everything we know about biology is everything we can know about life; that there is no knowledge except scientific knowledge. That's an unsupportable belief–especially if you try to use the sciences to support it, since it's not at a belief that's susceptible to scientific investigation.
One would expect that as a Catholic he would be open to knowledge from the Bible; if not for something as controversial as evolution, at least for something as basic as the existence of the soul. But he doesn't seem to be looking to Scripture as a source of knowledge about anything at all.
For those readers here who think Scripture is non-informational in general, let me steer you back to the primary point here, which is not a defense of God's revelation. The point is that Kenneth Miller has only one source of information, apparently, which is science. But that view of knowledge went down in philosophical flames long ago.
Comment by TomG — July 1, 2007 @ 10:31 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 10:59 pm
Nor does he seem to accept the fact that the pope specifically identified the point of mind/soul as arising from matter or being epiphenomena as something that is inconsistent with the truth about man, despite his catholicism.
In defense of a fair representation, he does appear to affirm the virgin birth as a miracle in Finding Darwin's God, and IIRC he might also affirm the resurrection.
Yet, why one should accept those and not others is a mystery, given that those he accepts obviously involve recognizing the supernatural.
Comment by eric — July 1, 2007 @ 10:59 pm
July 1st, 2007 at 11:46 pm
Life does operate in accordance with laws of physics and chemistry but that does not signify that such laws are sufficient to account for life's origins. The functional utility of nucleic acids and proteins is attributable to the identity and sequential order of their nucleotides and amino acids. Scramble their order and we still have nucleic acids and proteins (the chemical identity remains) but we lose biological function. There is no law of chemistry predictive of life friendly sequential order arising in a prebiotic environment. Miller's statement, to quote PVM, is vacuous.
Comment by Bradford — July 1, 2007 @ 11:46 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 12:33 am
Hi Eric,
You wrote…
Because Miller embraces NOMA!
Accepting the supernatural in the metaphysical magisterium doesn't cause a conflict for him because he believes you can keep the two separated.
I suggest Miller can accept any supernatural Truth his religion demands.
Just don't ask him to call these Truths "science."
Comment by Thought Provoker — July 2, 2007 @ 12:33 am
July 2nd, 2007 at 1:53 am
On the other hand, there are cases of NDE's where the knowledge has been gained while outside the body. See http://www.near-death.com/expe...
orion
Comment by orion — July 2, 2007 @ 1:53 am
July 2nd, 2007 at 9:51 am
Bradford writes:
Excellent point, Bradford. It is because of this that I continually ask materialists or philosophical naturalists the following question, in various forms:
How has it been established or confirmed scientifically (note the emphasis on science) that the properties of:
(take your pick)
1. the cosmos are such that any apparent design observed in natural systems can not be actual design, even in principle?
2. biological systems are such that any apparent design we observe can not be actual design, even in principle?
3. the cosmos are such that no non-material being (assuming such a being exists) could have any empirically detectable interactions with the material properties and forces of natural systems, even in principle?
4. that the properties of the entire cosmos are such that they could only be the result of the blind, purposeless forces of matter and energy acting through chance and necessity over eons of time?
5. the cosmos would be entirely different if they were the result of the creative act of a non-material entitiy, such as a god or gods? (as claimed by Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion.)
Thanks to the article referenced by Bradford, we can now add to the above:
6. the biochemical processes of the brain are such that no immaterial soul or spirit could either interact with or ennervate them, even in principle?
Of course there are no scientific answers to any of these questions, but there are lots and lots of theological, philosophical and metaphysical ones. However, it appears to be entirely acceptable to cross the scientific boundary into the realm of untestable metaphysical speculation when heading in the direction of naturalism (or something like it); it is entirely unacceptable if one heads in the direction of theism, or worse, a specific type of theism, such as Christianity. Hence, I think the fear raised by Mike Gene is entirely within the realm of possibility…alas!
Comment by DonaldM — July 2, 2007 @ 9:51 am
July 2nd, 2007 at 9:54 am
Orion:
Obviously these people are either mistaken, deluded, or they are lying. Take your pick! Oh it's so easy being a materialist.
Comment by Jean — July 2, 2007 @ 9:54 am
July 2nd, 2007 at 10:07 am
Why do you think you need to "fast-forward a few decades" This is the case today in most departments, both for tenure, hiring, and granting doctorates. . .
Comment by mcromer — July 2, 2007 @ 10:07 am
July 2nd, 2007 at 10:11 am
Most non-crisis OBEs are dreams.
However, OBEs associated with near-death experiences do produce verifiable evidence. Apparently you are unfamiliar with it, I'd recommend you google "Pam Reynolds", and you can read about this case on my blog.
Comment by mcromer — July 2, 2007 @ 10:11 am
July 2nd, 2007 at 10:27 am
Real mature, there, Mike. If you wanted to make this "joke", you could have done it without actually moving mtraven's comments to the Hole.
Grow up.
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 10:27 am
July 2nd, 2007 at 11:24 am
Bradford wrote:
Bradford,
You're not defending science from the soul; you're defending the soul from science. Science has no trouble dealing with testable hypotheses, and is in no way endangered by them. The immaterial soul, on the other hand, has not fared too well in the light of science lately.
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 11:24 am
July 2nd, 2007 at 11:32 am
Keiths:
Keiths, could you kindly point me to the peer reviewed scientific research reports that comfirm (or disconfirm) anything at all about immaterial souls? Stating that the " immaterial soul… has not fared too well in the light of science…" implies that science has indeed tested hypothesis regarding the immaterial soul. I would love to see this research, as I'm sure many others would.
Thanks!
Comment by DonaldM — July 2, 2007 @ 11:32 am
July 2nd, 2007 at 11:37 am
You keep saying this as if it were almost fact. The only thing I've seen you do so far is reference scientists who are (of course) materialists and who firmly believe there is a materialistic answer to the problem of consciousness. Nothing more, nothing less. I've seen others respond to your posts from which an objective observer can only deduce that the problem is far from answered and not nearly as conclusive as you pretend it to be.
Also as Donald said, would you point out the scientific research that has been done regaring "souls" The only study I am aware of that would even come close to that description would be the Lancet NDE study, and that study is hardly evidence for your preconceived materialistic opinion.
Comment by Jean — July 2, 2007 @ 11:37 am
July 2nd, 2007 at 11:47 am
Keiths:
No, I'm attempting to separate pseudoscientific efforts to debunk an immaterial concept from legitimate scientific endeavors.
Then kindly cite a hypothesis whose testing would confirm or negate the concept that a soul exists.
A more accurate statement would be that those believing the foregoing are embarrassing legitimate science but that most conventional thinkers are too timid to take you to task for this.
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 11:47 am
July 2nd, 2007 at 11:57 am
Keiths:
That imperative makes no sense if Mike lacks free will.
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 11:57 am
July 2nd, 2007 at 12:04 pm
I'm a compatibilist, Bradford. I think Mike does have free will.
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 12:04 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 12:12 pm
Donald, Jean –
Anything that the brain does cannot be solely a function of the immaterial soul. Therefore, much brain research is relevant to questions regarding the properties of the soul, if it exists at all.
See this regarding the physicality of the will.
See my link earlier in this thread regarding OBEs.
For the effects of brain damage on personality and morality, see the well-known story of Phineas Gage.
On the physicality of memory, see my response to Joy regarding her medicine wheel.
On the (lack of) unity of the soul, see the research on split-brain patients. I've commented before on this at TT, but I don't have the link at hand; I'll post it later.
There is abundant evidence that cognition, memory, will, pain, pleasure, emotion, humor, and personality are all dependent on the brain. The question for believers in an immaterial soul is this: What does it do? What is the evidence for it, if it can't do any of these things on its own?
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 12:12 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 12:25 pm
Bradford,
Gods, souls, and protons (for that matter) can all be defined in ways that are empirically inconsequential and thus inaccessible to science. They can also be defined in ways that are testable by science.
For example, I've made the point many times at TT that the YEC God, who is held to have created the earth less than 10,000 years ago, is a testable concept (provided that He is assumed not to be deceptive). This God is falsified by all of the evidence from geology, biology, paleontology, and astronomy that indicates that the world is almost a million times older than the YECs believe.
Tell us about your concept of the soul, and then we can decide whether or not it is amenable to scientific investigation. You seem to believe that the will is (at least partially) immaterial, for example. If so, how do you reconcile its existence with the phenomenon of PAP, as exemplified by Mr. M?
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 12:25 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 12:34 pm
Keiths, noone disputes behavoiral influences of brain biochemical changes. The point of the post is to illustrate the silliness of proclamations about the soul based on empirical studies.
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 12:34 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 12:45 pm
keiths, thanks for speaking up. I was kind of hoping stunney would also, since it was our argument that was interrupted, letting him "win" by default, but perhaps that was expecting too much. Anyway, I'm out of here; arguing with crackpots is pretty much a waste of time, and it's certainly a waste of time if my postings are going to be subject to arbitrary censorship by dimwits with a childish sense of humor. I've learned a bit from your postings and others.
Comment by mtraven — July 2, 2007 @ 12:45 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 12:54 pm
mtraven,
I'm sorry to see you go.
The diehards may be immovable, but I suspect that more than a few lurkers benefitted from your lucidity.
Best wishes,
Keith S.
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 12:54 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 12:59 pm
Bradford wrote:
But empirical studies do have something to say about the existence of a soul, provided that the concept of the soul in question has empirical consequences.
The YEC God has empirical consequences, and science falsifies them. That is a perfectly legitimate use of science. It's not silly at all.
I maintain that the soul, as envisioned by most believers, also has empirical consequences that are addressed by science.
Look at your concept of the soul and ask yourself a few questions. Do you believe that the immaterial soul is the seat of the will? Do you believe that the soul is morally responsible for a person's actions? If so, how do you reconcile your beliefs with the scientific observations regarding Mr. M's predicament? Regarding moral responsibility, what about Phineas Gage?
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 12:59 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 1:12 pm
Keiths:
Yet you have not specified the related testable hypothesis asked for.
The age of the universe is an empirical claim. Where is the hypothesis about souls?
Thanks for your personal view. Where's that hypothesis?
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 1:12 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 1:23 pm
keiths, when I read this,
I couldn't help thinking of the immortal line at the close of The Pirates Who Don't Do Anything: "You just don't get it."
You say that the concept of the soul has empirical consequences, but are those scientific empirical consequences? What is the strictly empirical test? Have you studied the papers on the topic? Have you noticed that they all rely on philosophy rather than science to make their major points? (Compare the J.P. Moreland paper [pdf] I previously referred to on this.)
You won't get anywhere with this bunch unless you can show us in very specific ways that this is an empirical problem, with relevant empirical research in the literature, that pays proper attention to the unavoidable philosophical aspects of the issue. If you do that, you will be the first ever; I recommend you publish someplace more prominent and better paying than a blog (no offense to the TT blog-meisters).
The reason it hasn't been done seems to be because it cannot be done.
Comment by TomG — July 2, 2007 @ 1:23 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 2:02 pm
Keiths (along with the article) is still conflating Cartesianism with traditional Christian metaphysics on the soul.
He therefore also doesn't get that the data he keeps citing in relation to the dependency of mind and will on the brain is consistent with both materialism and non-materialism; and therefore can not be evidence for either of them.
Comment by Brian Killian — July 2, 2007 @ 2:02 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 2:24 pm
I'm reminded about a conversation between the Dalai Lama and Carl Sagan. Sagan asked the Dalai Lama what he would do if science proved that reincarnation was false. The Dalai Lama responded that they would immediately send out a message to all Buddhist adherents suggesting they change their beliefs. The Dalai Lama then asked Sagan how science could go about proving that. Sagan was silent.
Comment by Steve Petermann — July 2, 2007 @ 2:24 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 2:47 pm
Not as if it would matter to Keith.
Obviously, his philosophical ideas constitute "evidence", whereas your philosophical ideas are not. Thus speaketh the materialist.
Comment by Jean — July 2, 2007 @ 2:47 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 2:50 pm
Yeah you guys are so bright, you could light up an entire country.
No seriously, the above comment betrays your true intent. You're here to "convert", not to discuss.
Comment by Jean — July 2, 2007 @ 2:50 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 3:05 pm
Lots of schadenfreude over mtraven's tragic departure, but no answers to keiths' very pertinent questions:
Let's hear it. The onus is on the believers.
Comment by Raevmo — July 2, 2007 @ 3:05 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 3:41 pm
There is no onus on me or anyone else to supply answers that were written thousands of years ago. It matters not to me if you continue to disbelieve them. That's your right. What you or Keith do not have a right to is asserting false empirical claims. As I said to Keiths and am still waiting an answer on, if you have a scientific hypothesis whose testing and results negate the concept of a soul then come forth with it. Since Keiths is making empirical claims my request is very reasonable.
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 3:41 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 3:49 pm
Hi Raevmo,
I wouldn't claim to be a believer in many of the defintions of the "soul", per se, but the ultimate question is "what constitutes reality". Sure if you take an antidepressant and you feel better then is there any doubt that the "mind" is effected by the chemical? No, in my opinion but that really doesn't answer the deep question. The materialist may claim that what constitutes reality are "little things" with intrinsic properties that interact. This leads to a picture of the universe as a mindless, "soulless" process. The problem with this approach is that it doesn't fit with mainstream physics, at least standard models. What physics is telling us is that the little things don't have intrinsic properties. Instead what we have are relationships and relata. The Buddhists came up with this notion over 2000 years ago in the concept of sunyata and dependent co-arising. If this is true the "mater"ialist doesn't have much to hang her hat on. What does this all have to do with the question of soul? Ideas about the soul or spirit all point to ultimate reality and apparently what science is telling us according to many physicist's is that the universe looks more like a thought than a machine (astronomer Sir James Jeans and others). And many prominent physcists (Schroedinger, Tipler, Bohm, Raisch, Mohrhoff, etc) also see an ultimate unity in the differentiation of the cosmos.
So if the ultimate constitution of the universe is the psychē "life, spirit, consciousness" then it does everything.
Comment by Steve Petermann — July 2, 2007 @ 3:49 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 3:52 pm
Bradford:
We do have that right, but I think we're not exercising it. What false claims do you mean?
Obviously there's no way to disprove the immaterial soul if the adherents to that notion refuse to specify what its properties are. Isn't it fair to ask that you be more specific?
Comment by Raevmo — July 2, 2007 @ 3:52 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 3:54 pm
I would not say that there is an "immaterial soul", because that sounds too much like another objective view of subjectivity, but there is a lot of evidence that consciousness is not limited to brains:
1) psi phenomena (precognition, telepathy, and the like)
brain plasticity after injury
2) communications at the time of death to the living (example — seeing one's son who just died in war overseas in a vision)
3) legitimate mediums studied through scientifically
4) OBEs associated with near-death experiences
5) inability of materialism to come up with any plausible explanation for consciousness.
6) inability of neuroscience to find a location where memory is actually "stored" in the brain
7) introspection into the nature of consciousness
Comment by mcromer — July 2, 2007 @ 3:54 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 3:56 pm
Raevmo:
Read the post.
As for answers, they were there long before I was born and notions about the soul are freely available on the net. When was the last time you tested something immaterial?
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 3:56 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:05 pm
Basically Keiths pretends that evidence like this does not exist, as he never ever answers any questions about these kinds of studies.
Comment by mcromer — July 2, 2007 @ 4:05 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:10 pm
mcromer,
These points you list aren't really evidence that the brain isn't responsible for those things. I'm not dismissing those points. It could be that a material brain is capable of a lot more than some people would like to give it credit for. I just don't believe that there's something left after the brain dies.
Comment by Raevmo — July 2, 2007 @ 4:10 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:12 pm
After hearing Johnson, Behe and Dembski all calling for the abrogation of methodological naturalism, it's quite amusing to have a threadful of ID supporters insisting that the immaterial is beyond the reach of science.
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 4:12 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:16 pm
Keiths:
What I've actually been requesting is information from you as to how you would test your claim of empirical consequences.
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 4:16 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:20 pm
Raevmo,
I put "mediumship research" on the list. That means talking to dead people after their brains are dead. Also if someone is perceiving and seeing things happening during surgery when their brain is shut down that's pretty convincing evidence that consciousness doesn't always depend on the brain.
Comment by mcromer — July 2, 2007 @ 4:20 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:23 pm
mtraven,
Sorry to see you go. You had some good contributions here. Hope you enjoy chapter 3 of Irreducible Mind I sent. . .
Comment by mcromer — July 2, 2007 @ 4:23 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:24 pm
Bradford:
I did. Those claims don't strike me as false at all. Granted, they overstate their case, but when you declare them outright falsehoods you are overstating your case. I believe those claims have the benefit of being economical, and that's why I stick with them for the time being.
Give me a break. We are here to discuss and exchange ideas, not to point to the internet for ready answers. We all know how to navigate the internet and yet we ended up here.
You claim the existence of the immaterial without specifying what it is. Why should I test it? If you tell me exactly what it is, I might be inclined to test it.
Comment by Raevmo — July 2, 2007 @ 4:24 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:26 pm
Keiths:
I disagree with the conclusion you draw here. YEC is separate from any question of God. What's being tested is the hypothesis that observations on earth are best explained if the earth is 10,000 years old or so. That hypothesis is, as you say, falsified (at least for the moment — given science's historical track record, the possibility of new evidence yielding a different conclusion is always on the table). That does not have a thing to do with falsifying God.
Comment by DonaldM — July 2, 2007 @ 4:26 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:29 pm
Actually Steve that's a pretty poor example to pick. See this study indicating that two thirds or more of the effect of antidepressants is a placebo effect, for example. . . However your point is still valid.
Comment by mcromer — July 2, 2007 @ 4:29 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:30 pm
Bradford writes:
Under your nose. I wrote:
Here's another one: that the immaterial will is unified; one person, one will.
How do you reconcile that with observations of split-brain patients showing that after the corpus callosum is severed, there are two wills in the same skull where there was formerly one, causing bizarre behavior like one hand buttoning up a shirt while the other unbuttons it, or even one arm striking the other in frustration?
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 4:30 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:33 pm
Raevmo, to Bradford:
That's just it. Bradford doesn't want you or anyone to test it, because he is frightened of what the answer might be.
He'd prefer to keep believing something that was "written thousands of years ago", as if age somehow guaranteed truth.
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 4:33 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:35 pm
That being the case, then perhaps you or Keiths could explain Keith's claim that the immaterial soul hasn't fared too well lately in science…implying that science has somehow both tested and falsified any notion of the existence of souls. Keiths must have some insight into those properties you speak of, since he's quite sure they haven't "fared too well" at the hands of science. Though, I'd still like to see the citations for the peer reviewed scientific research studies upon which he bases the claim.
Or perhaps Keiths or you can simply admit that you're drawing a philosophical conclusion from what you take to be scientific facts…which is a very different thing. Its all the point we've all been making!
Comment by DonaldM — July 2, 2007 @ 4:35 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:39 pm
Raevmo:
Which is fine, as long as you understand that this is your belief and not something that science has demonstrated to be the case.
Comment by DonaldM — July 2, 2007 @ 4:39 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:41 pm
Keiths:
There is nothing to reconcile Keiths. Noone, other than atheist ideologues, have made the claim that the brain and the soul are mutually exclusive. All you have demonstrated is something everyone already agrees on namely, a link between brain biochemistry and behavoir.
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 4:41 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:45 pm
Keiths:
Bradford replies:
The abrogation of MN is not at issue here. What is at issue is what Bradford just asked for. It is Keiths and not Bradford or anyone else making the claim in one form or another that the existence of the immaterial soul has been tested and found wanting. We just want to see the studies. Please cite them.
Comment by DonaldM — July 2, 2007 @ 4:45 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 4:46 pm
Keiths:
Actually Keiths, I'd like a continuation of your empirical claims as they are extremely foolish and illustrate, not only the real motivations of ID critics, but also the code of silence that keeps other Darwinian "lovers of science" from criticizing your empirical claims.
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 4:46 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 5:09 pm
mtraven wrote:
Whoa! Hold on. I'm innocent until proven guilty. And I won't be proven guilty, because I'm innocent.
I do not know what you said in the comments that were removed since I never saw them. Hence I did not know from the ones by others which I did see what it was exactly that led to comments of yours being removed.
From what I did see, it looked like Mike Gene was simply playing a prank to make a point, and that the point was related to something you had posted about mental illness and criminal law. I assure you that whatever MG did, it had nothing to do avec moi. The comments were already removed by the time I saw anything about it. Believe it or not, I do not read this blog 24/7. (I know, shame on me.)
And as for you thinking that I ought to have 'spoken up', that suggests that I was somehow remiss. But there was nothing I saw that indicated your comments were directly following on from, or directly related to, any earlier exchanges between, the two of us specifically. Hence, there was nothing I saw that indicated you were being treated unfairly in any 'morally robust' sense of 'unfairly' as regards our particular dialectic.
If you change your mind about not posting at TT, I am ready to resume the debate. However, I want to say something first.
The issue we were arguing about is, it must be said, a very technical, though also a very central one in the philosophy of mind, namely the Kripkean arguments against mind-brain identity theories. Those arguments depend on the idea which is now (thanks to Kripke) a commonplace in contemporary philosophy, and which is of central relevance to the mind-body debate, to wit, the concept of rigid designators. I am confident I presented the essence of Kripke's argument accurately; which is that if mind-brain identity is true, then it must be necessarily true—-in other words, true in all possible worlds. And Kripke's point (and mine) is that it is extremely implausible that it is true in all possible worlds, and hence it's extremely implausible, for reasons directly related to fundamental modal logic, that it's true at all.
I'm also confident that in the 35 years since Kripke's Naming and Necessity revolutionized the entire world of analytic philosophy with its stunning arguments about modality, that the basic argument of that book as it relates to mind-brain identity has not been refuted, though not for the lack of trying. The literature is simply gargantuan by this point.
Because of Kripke (followed soon after by Putnam's famous arguments about Brains in a Vat and Twin Earth; which led to a great deal of interest about 'externalist' theories about mental content which was also inspired by Kripke's work; and then Jackson's, Nagel's, Block's, and Levine's famous arguments about qualia, again stemming from Kripke; and more recently Chalmers' hugely discussed The Conscious Mind which is likewise clearly in debt to Kripke), the upshot is that identity theories and older versions of functionalism have suffered very damaging, and probably fatal blows. Who says there's no progress in philosophy?
Those who still believed in mind-brain identity strictu sensu became ontologically committed to some form of eliminativism, with the hope that Kripke-style arguments could then not even be mounted (because there would then be no mentalistic rigid desgnator). That's just a historical fact about the enormous impact Kripke's modal argument against materialism (the pain and c-fiber one) has had in the philosophy of mind. The focus on consciousness in the years since has been, if you'll pardon the pun, phenomenal.
While I believe these and related issues in philosophy of mind (such as the Problem of Other Minds) are of absolutely crucial importance to the ID debate, I don't think it's worth rehearsing them without all sides being familiar with the technicalities, and it would probably bore everyone else to argue over the minutiae of those here. But if I have to convince you or anyone else that Kripke's argument is not obviously flawed—and, given the enormous impact that argument has had since its publication, it's obvious that it's not obviously flawed—–and if I have to convince you that I didn't present its essence properly, then I'd have to tell you very frankly that it's not worth the time and effort on my part. Naming and Necessity is arguably the single most influential book in the history of analytic philosophy. I'm serious.
Now, if you want to avoid the conclusion of that argument, all any materialist needs to do as a technical matter is abandon the identity theories and advocate some form of functionalism instead. And that's what most philosophers who didn't want to be dualists did. However, functionalism has its troubles too. (A pretty standard starting point in teaching philosophy students is Ned Block's well known piece "Troubles with Functionalism"). Probably the most important 'trouble' is qualia—-hence Dennett's (intellectually honest, imo) attempt at 'Quining' them. Hence the radical eliminativism of the Churchlands.
When you say, rather airily as you tend to do, that materialists do not need to go that far, again I feel that this kinda misses what has actually been going on in philosophy of mind for the last 20 years or so. The eliminativist spectre (embodied by the logical implications of Dennett's work especially) looms over the whole subject. The impact of both that spectre and of Kripke's modal argument can be seen in the evolution of the top ranked philosophers of mind in the world—people like Colin McGinn, John Searle, Galen Strawson, David Chalmers, and Jaegwon Kim, and has really dominated debate within philosophy in recent years. Incidentally, though Searle denies the charge, most philosophers of mind think Searle's position is actually a version of property dualism. And I doubt very much that Dennett would ever have dared to write something like 'Quining Qualia' if Naming Necessity or a very similar work had never been published. So, since philosophy is my shtick, if someone tells me that Kripke's most famous and most influential argument as regards the whole subsequent course of philosophical debate is 'obviously flawed', I feel the way a biologist might feel if someone told him that the ideas of Stephen Jay Gould or Richard Lewontin were 'obviously flawed'. Uh-uh. It's not obviously flawed at all, provided you understand it.
I take eliminativism very seriously because the arguments of Dennett are very troubling, or ought to be, not for anti-materialists, but for all physicalists who don't like the radically reductionist ontological implications of a book like Consciousness Explained, but also don't wish to lose what they perceive to be the intellectual respectability of physicalism by jumping ship and becoming property dualists like Chalmers and, in the perception of most philosophers other than himself, Searle.
If Dennett is right, the consequences are in fact very radical and very far-reaching not only for philosophy, but for the entire future of humanity. But if, as I believe to be the case, Kripke is right, then those far-reaching consequences will have been based on a falsehood.
Comment by stunney — July 2, 2007 @ 5:09 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 5:42 pm
stunney:
What does that mean? I think (but I might be wrong) earlier you said that all minds must necessarily be human in all possible worlds. How do you arrive at such a conclusion? It's not exactly self-evident.
Comment by Raevmo — July 2, 2007 @ 5:42 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 6:16 pm
DonaldM:
I understand that. As much as I would like to believe there's life after death, I've seen no credible evidence so far. So I don't believe it. I think that's the most honest position to take, given what I know.
Comment by Raevmo — July 2, 2007 @ 6:16 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 6:37 pm
Bradford wrote:
Bradford,
You're doing the Web equivalent of covering up your ears and repeating "La la la la I can't hear you la la la la…"
I challenged you on another thread with the split-brain evidence. You had no response.
Let's try again:
keiths Says:
May 9th, 2007 at 5:43 pm |
Bradford,
If every human has a single immaterial soul, how do you explain the following phenomena?
A thick bundle of fibers known as the corpus callosum connects the left and right hemispheres of the brain. Certain epileptic patients, known as split-brain patients, have had the corpus callosum surgically severed in order to control their seizures (although I believe there are better treatments now, so that the operation is no longer practiced).
While they seem, at least superficially, to be normal, these patients exhibit some bizarre characteristics when tested.
Recall that the left hemisphere of the brain controls the right half of the body, and vice-versa. Also recall that the left hemisphere receives visual input from the right half of the visual field and the right nostril; for the right hemisphere, it is reversed. Finally, remember that the left hemisphere dominates speech.
These facts allow certain very interesting tests to be performed on split-brain patients. A word or image flashed in the left half of the visual field is only visible to the right hemisphere, and vice-versa. In the same way, a smell directed into the left nostril will be perceived only by the right hemisphere.
In a normal person, this matters very little, because the hemispheres constantly share information via the intact corpus callosum. In a split-brain patient, however, there is no way for the information to get from one hemisphere to the other. The left hemisphere literally does not know what the right hemisphere is thinking, and vice-versa.
Torin Alter describes some split-brain phenomena:
Susan Blackmore describes "anarchic hand" syndrome:
Bradford, what is the immaterial soul doing in all of these cases? Does the soul smell the garlic or not? Does it see a pen or a knife? Does it want to undo the button, or to do it up?
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 6:37 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 6:45 pm
Keiths, brain damage leads to physical impairments. What does this have to do with disproving the existence of souls?
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 6:45 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 7:05 pm
Bradford,
It's simple. If you believe in an immaterial soul, and believe that the soul is the seat of the will, and believe that there is one soul, and one will, per person, then the split-brain evidence provides a challenge to your position.
The split-brain patients don't exhibit mere "physical impairments", as you put it. They show the symptoms of having not only a split brain, but a split will as well.
If there were only a single unified will, how could one hemisphere want to button up a shirt while the other hemisphere wants to unbutton it?
Does the soul smell the garlic or not? Does it see a pen or a knife?
How do you reconcile your concept of the soul with the scientific evidence? If you can't, then the scientific evidence amounts to evidence that the soul, as you conceive of it, does not exist.
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 7:05 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 7:17 pm
stunney:
OK, I take back any implications that your actions were any less than honorable.
The deleted responses may be found here. My opinion still stands — there are at least two giant flaws in Kripe's reasoning (as presented by you)
that are completely obvious to me. So either:
- I'm just confused,
- you have misrepresented Kripke, or
- analytical philosophers have spent 35 years crawling up their own bunghole rather than doing useful work.
I vote for the third option — and I hope that will be last word on the subject.
Comment by mtraven — July 2, 2007 @ 7:17 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 7:24 pm
Sheesh you sound like he could have done something different. This also sounds like you think Mike "ought"to have behaved in a certain way.
But Mtraven doesnt. BTW what will are you speaking of that you think is free…brain matter? Would it be more correct that Mike has free brain matter?
Vivid
Comment by Vividbleau — July 2, 2007 @ 7:24 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 7:51 pm
Vivid,
I tend to doubt your sincerity, given that I explained compatibilism to you on another thread, with references, and your only reply was a stunningly witty "Do rocks have wills?"
By the way, for others reading this, that thread contains a discussion of why the "brain as receiver" model does not successfully explain the neuroscientific evidence.
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 7:51 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 7:57 pm
Keiths:
There is no challenge in this nonsense. Bodily impairment is no challenge to the concept of a soul. You need a vacation Keiths.
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 7:57 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 7:59 pm
Well I am sincere. What will are you referring to? If everything is matter then will is another term for matter… call it what it is "free matter"
Vivid
Comment by Vividbleau — July 2, 2007 @ 7:59 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 8:05 pm
Bradford,
Your bravado is belied by the fact that you can't answer my questions.
Can you reconcile your view of the soul with the scientific evidence, or do you ignore the evidence and accept it on faith?
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 8:05 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 8:10 pm
Vivid,
If you're sincere, then read the articles on compatibilism at Wikipedia and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
After you've done so, I'll be happy to engage you on the topic.
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 8:10 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 8:16 pm
I am familiar with compatibalism and have read the definitions….I am interested in exactly what you are referring to as a will and what determines it.
Vivid
Comment by Vividbleau — July 2, 2007 @ 8:16 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 8:17 pm
Keiths:
Keiths, you have no evidence of the non-existence of a soul. What you have is evidence of a physical malady that you stupidly insist is evidence against my view of the soul.
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 8:17 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 9:08 pm
Keiths, you spend message after message arguing same. Obviously the examples you mentioned suggest there is a relation between brain damage and conscious/unconscious behavior and how people perceive things. It does not tell us at all wether consciousness itself survives after physical death.
You have not mentioned a single word about NDEs and the scientific studies which have been done. Can you reconcile your materialistic view of the brain and consciousness with those results, or do you ignore the evidence and accept it on faith?
Comment by Jean — July 2, 2007 @ 9:08 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 9:25 pm
Keiths, it is remarkably rich for you to complain about other people ducking questions and refusing to read the evidence. After all, I offered to send you a copy of part of the academic press imprint Irreducible Mind at my own expense, and you refused to send me an address so I could drop it in the mail, nor did you ever give the slightest response to any of my repeated offers. I wonder why that is. . .
I suppose you are not interested in dozens of pages of inarguable evidence that your reductionistic materialism is mistaken. That offer still remains open to you and anyone else (so far, mtraven has taken me up on it). As for ducking questions, I haven't heard you respond yet to this repeated question I addressed to you: if materialism is true, how come people in complete cardiac arrest and total unconsciousness are able to report resuscitation procedures accurately when they have a near-death experience and leave their body?
I agree with you that simplistic ideas of a single personal soul controlling each brain / body are incongruent with the facts. Are you equally willing to agree that psi phenomena and accurate visual observations made when the brain is unconscious make your reductionist beliefs untenable? Or will you continue to ignore evidence that doesn't fit with your materialist belief system?
Comment by mcromer — July 2, 2007 @ 9:25 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 9:41 pm
Bradford wrote:
Then it should be easy — trivial, in fact — for you to reconcile your view of the soul with the evidence I've presented regarding split-brain patients.
When half of the brain wants to button a shirt, and the other half of the brain wants to unbutton it, what does the soul want?
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 9:41 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 10:00 pm
The soul wants to be healed of this malady.
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 10:00 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 10:02 pm
Bradford obviously can't answer the question.
Any other takers?
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 10:02 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 10:03 pm
Of course he can't.
Why do you think he ignores these questions every time they are raised? Why do you think he refuses to read a copy of part of a recently published academic book investigating evidence that consciousness cannot be explained through materialism, even though I publicly offered to send him these pages at my own expense?
He hasn't investigated the scientific evidence that mind is more than the brain, and that consciousness might survive the death of the body, because he is rigidly certain that it is all nonsense, and at some level he just doesn't want to know that he might be wrong about that belief.
Pulitzer prize-winning author Deborah Blum got it right — many scientists and their fellow-travellers are simply afraid to investigate certain extremely well-reported and established phenomena. Those kinds of investigations are taboo, and we "know" they are simply nonsense, so why waste our time with them. . .
Comment by mcromer — July 2, 2007 @ 10:03 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 10:05 pm
I told you the soul wants to be cured of the malady. If you don't like the answer too bad. Find some other thread on which to dump your garbage.
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 10:05 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 10:11 pm
Being a "person" is an illusion, a dream.
In fact, there is only consciousness (or Consciousness if you prefer), and the dream of being a person manifests itself through the brain and senses within the world. But in fact everything is made out of consciousness itself, even brains and atoms (ie David Chalmers. . .)
So if the brain is split, the illusion of being one person can also be split and two dreams can form where there was one before.
This accounts for all the facts of neuroscience, as well as all the facts of psi phenomena, near-death experiences, and the like. Unlike materialism which simply ignores a great many facts which don't fit with its belief system. Throwing out facts that don't fit is not science, but rather dogmatism.
Comment by mcromer — July 2, 2007 @ 10:11 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 10:14 pm
Moderators, please help. One of my posts is stuck in the moderation queue, and I didn't say anything objectionable AFAIK. . .
Comment by mcromer — July 2, 2007 @ 10:14 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 11:10 pm
Raevmo wrote:
No, that's not it at all. I agree, though, that the key point is not self-evident, though it becomes self-evident once you think about it, because it follows from the self-evident logical truth that for any x, x=x. But seeing this is not going to be false just because two different terms are used to refer to x, is indeed not self-evident. It takes careful thought, and in particular careful analysis of what sorts of terms are doing the referring or designating. Designating terms can be rigid, or, um, flaccid.
It's easier to grasp if we take a look at a classic Kripke/Putnam example of why true identity statements of the form A = B where both expressions are rigid designators are, if true at all, necessarily true.
Why? Let me elucidate. The word 'water' is the word we use to refer to THAT kind of stuff we find in oceans, etc. Nothing about our linguistic practices CAN HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE ACTUAL CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF THAT KIND OF STUFF. Hence, if THAT KIND OF STUFF also exists in any other logically possible world, and if that kind of stuff REALLY IS IDENTICAL WITH H20, then it will also be identical with H20 in those other worlds too; AND there will be NO POSSIBLE WORLD in which the exact same kind of stuff exists but isn't H20.
In other words, IF WATER REALLY IS H20, THERE ARE NO POSSIBLE WORLDS CONTAINING WATER THAT ISN'T H20.
Hence if "Water is H20" is true, it is necessarily true.
And, as Putnam put it in his classic paper, The Meaning of 'Meaning', meanings just ain't in the head. And that's a considerable problem, as it turns out, for mind-brain identity theories. But let's return to Kripke.
Now, the question to think very carefully about is this one: what is it that I'm referring to by the word 'minds'? Let's say you're not sure. One might sill reasonably give this answer: 'Oh, I don't really know, hmm—mindstuff, whatever that stuff turns out to be'.
Next step: let's suppose we make a hypothesis that each instance of what we're referring to by the convenient label 'mindstuff' is IDENTICAL to one of the material objects we call brains. And we'll just use 'minds' as an abbreviation of 'mindstuff'.
OK. Now substitute 'minds' for water, and 'brains' for H20.
See also Twin Earth and Swampman, and the debates about externalism.
Why is this stuff important? It's important because it addresses the logical heart of all rational inquiry, which is: the relation between Thought and Reality. Are they identical, as Berkeley believed? Is there really no such thing as Thought, or is it merely illusory in some significant sense? And if both previous questions are answered negatively, then is the relation between the two a completely physical connection, or is there something about 'mindstuff' that's irreducibly different from, i.e., non-identical with the material objects we call brains, and if so what is it?
Functionalism is one type of answer, but it's extremely hard to explicate qualia completely in terms of function, and it's extremely hard to explicate intentional content—-the 'stuff' our thoughts are thoughts of—in functional terms, because it has turned out to be nigh impossible to reduce the meanings of our thoughts to physically observable objects in a way that is really convincing.
And here's why: "The Morning Star is the Evening Star"; or if you prefer, "Phophorus is Hesperus"; or if you prefer, "See that light in the sky over there—that is Venus.
Six terms all designating the same physical object, in this case a particular planet of our solar system. But people did not always know that these terms picked out the same object. It was later discovered that Hesperus and Phosphorus referred to one planet, the one most English speakers call Venus. Previously people thought they were referring to two different celestial objects by these different names. It is thus a posteriori knowledge, due to astonomical science, that we know the same planet is being thought of or referred to by these different names.
But here's the thing. That planet has always been, and is necessarily, identical with itself. It's identical with itself in every possible world in which it, that very planet, exists; and there are NO possible worlds containing the actual thing we call the Morning Star in which it is not identical with the actual thing we call the the Evening Star, or Venus, or 'That over there', or 'Ese planeta en el cielo', etc. What is true of that object cannot depend on human linguistic behavior. (Brief Interlude: Most 1st year philosophy students get confused at this point. Here's an example to straighten out one's thinking. Suppose use of the word 'donkey' was by theocratic government decree restricted so that it could only be used to refer to atheists. Ten generations thereafter, how many legs would horses have?)
Likewise, if minds REALLY ARE identical with brains, it follows by parity of reasoning that there is no possible world in which a mind exists and it's not identical with a brain.
Both Kripke and I regard this as a reductio ad absurdum. For what it entails is that neuroscience, by empirical investigation, could discover that there is no possible world in which God or some other immaterial mind exists. And knowledge of what is true of all other possible worlds is not something neuroscience or any physical science can possibly come to possess. Yet if it's true that minds are the selfsame thing as brains, logically entails.
It follows from the reductio argument, then, that it's not true at all. It follows, in other words, that minds are not in fact identical with brains.
QED
Comment by stunney — July 2, 2007 @ 11:10 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 11:30 pm
Bradford wrote:
That's not an answer; it's a dodge.
Does the soul want to button the shirt?
Does the soul want to unbutton the shirt?
Both?
Neither?
Is there still one soul?
Are there two souls?
If the latter, why does cutting the corpus callosum create a second soul, if souls are immaterial?
And so forth.
If you can't answer, why not admit it, rather than pretending that the challenge is illegitimate?
Comment by keiths — July 2, 2007 @ 11:30 pm
July 2nd, 2007 at 11:44 pm
This may be a challenge worthy of a drunken chat but it is pseudoscience unless you are able to first define, with scientific rigor, what a soul is and provide empirical supporting evidence for your answer.
Comment by Bradford — July 2, 2007 @ 11:44 pm
July 3rd, 2007 at 12:02 am
You would know all about dodging, wouldn't you? Of course, I did answer your "oh so difficult" question you posed to Bradford, but you continue to dodge mine.
Step up to the plate, Keiths. Admit that you believe that all evidence of psi phenomena is faulty memory, delusion, or coincidence. State clearly for the record that psi phenomena can't possibly exist, because materialism is true. Tell everyone that Berkeley neuroscientist David Presti was clearly losing his mind when he wrote the following about Irreducible Mind: "This is an extraordinary book. In the arena of neuroscience of mind, it is the most exciting reading to have crossed my path in years." After all Keiths knows far more about neuroscience than Dr. Presti, and Keiths is refusing to read pages from that book provided by me, free of charge.
Great advice. You can certainly dish it out, but you can't follow your own admonitions. Sooner or later that cognitive dissonance is going to catch up with you. . .
Comment by mcromer — July 3, 2007 @ 12:02 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 12:11 am
Keiths:
Keiths, I asked you to define, with scientific rigor, what a soul is and provide empirical supporting evidence for your answer. If your only response to this legitimate request is the above then take your pseudoscience elsewhere.
Comment by Bradford — July 3, 2007 @ 12:11 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 12:28 am
Correction needed! I wrote:
'horses' should be replaced by 'donkeys'.
Or is it 'atheists'? Hmmmmm….:smile:
And one more:
last clause should read: "this is what it logically entails."
MS wreaks havoc with fingers sometimes.:neutral:
Comment by stunney — July 3, 2007 @ 12:28 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 12:35 am
Keiths, I must say that for a smelly bag of chemicals, you seem awfully keen to get other smelly bags of chemicals to change their configuration so that they can falsely claim to have the "experience" of "thinking" like "you".
Oh, and I read some stuff on compatiblism. Do people actually get paid to come up with this? "Things are determined, except when we say they aren't , but not really… or something…" Modern philosophy seems to be it's own best proof for it's contention that humans are not thinking beings. Every day, in every way, I'm more and more glad I dropped out of Grad School…
Comment by jimbo — July 3, 2007 @ 12:35 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 1:44 am
People will things, using their capacity for willing.
People do not = their capacity for willing.
People do not = their hearts.
The laws of psychophysical connections (as intelligently designed by a designer intent on creating spatiotemporal, embodied, rational and moral agents) do not say that wills = brain or other body parts. Neither do they say that the functioning of wills is causally independent of people's brain or other body parts. Causal connections do not, however, amount to numerical identity of cause and effect, ever.
Hence, if a person is shot through the heart, this will regularly be followed by a disruption of the normal causal connections between the person's capacity for willing and the person's body.
If the person's brain is monkeyed around with, this too will regularly be followed by a disruption of the normal causal connections between the person's capacity for willing and the person's body.
The capacity for willing is not the same as the capacity for signaling one's will. A body can be severely disabled in its signaling capacity, and the will be wholly intact.
People have known all this since time immemorial. Which is one reason people have tried to disrupt these psychophysical causal connections in their enemies since time immemorial.
But disruption of a causal connection between A and B need not result in the non-existence of either A or B. This can be seen in the relation between matter in one part of the universe and another, through the epoch of inflation. It can also be seen in cases where a given effect is overdetermined by a set of causes each of which is sufficient for the effect. Maybe there's no difference in a mental effect if a patch of green in my visual field overlaps with my becoming color-blind, even though the two brain states causing the qualitatively seamless visual experience are quite distinct.
Another example would be disrupting the causal connection between a person's brain and expressing a willingness that they are given food and water even if they have a severe stroke and are unable to speak, etc. This one reaon why some peope make 'living wills'. They fear that the causal connection between signaling their will might become disrupted, etc. But it would be crazy (and immoral) to say that as soon as the stroke incapacitated their signaling capacity, they ceased to have a will, or can be safely assumed to be revoking prior acts of will. See also, drunk men wandering the streets of Glasgow in a snowstorm. They cannot be safely assumed to be willing that they not reach home but rather perish from hyopthermia.
And Dostoevsky told family and friends to absolutely ensure he was dead before burial so great was his fear of being buried alive. It is safe to assume that this was his will even when he wasn't thinking about his demise. And if he had jumped out of his coffin in a furious panic just prior to an overly hasty burial, it would not have been a good excuse for his family to have said, "Well, don't blame us. The causal connection between your body and your will was severed, so we just assumed your will had ceased to exist."
Comment by stunney — July 3, 2007 @ 1:44 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 3:14 am
jimbo wrote:
I enjoy getting the word out about what modern neuroscience tells us about ourselves. Even among the scientifically literate segment of the population, relatively few people understand the extent to which science paints us as wholly physical creatures.
I can be particularly persistent when someone like Bradford dishonestly tries to whitewash the problems these modern findings present to his worldview.
If that's the extent of your understanding of compatibilism, then I think you made the right choice. Grad school was not the place for you.
Comment by keiths — July 3, 2007 @ 3:14 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 3:28 am
stunney wrote:
Yes, but that is not what is happening in the case of someone like Mr. M.
Read what I wrote to Matthew (mcromer) on a previous thread:
Matthew,
The "brain as TV receiver" analogy doesn't work.
In that model, the immaterial will/soul is "broadcasting" to the TV receiver/brain. As long as the receiver continues to operate properly, it receives the signal and everything is fine. If the receiver/brain is damaged, then things stop working, even though the broadcast signal is still good.
Now let's apply this model to Mr. M, sitting on the bottom of his pool, drowning. If the brain-as-TV-receiver model is correct, then the immaterial will is screaming at Mr. M's brain, "Kick your way to the surface! If you stay down here you'll die!" The problem is that Mr. M's brain/receiver is broken, it doesn't receive the signal correctly, and so he stays quietly at the bottom of the pool until his daughter rescues him.
Perfectly plausible, right? Wrong.
Once his daughter shocks him out of his lethargy, he is able to get out of the pool. He tries to explain to his family what happened.
Now, if you were Mr. M's will, and you had just been frantically sending a signal to Mr. M's brain, telling him to get to the surface of the water before he died, what would you say to your family? (Remember, Mr. M's will controls what he says and does in this model. The part of the brain/receiver that gets speech instructions from the will is not broken.)
You'd say, "That was terrifying! I could feel myself drowning, and I desperately wanted to live, but even though I tried and tried to get my body to go to the surface, it wouldn't respond. It was like I was paralyzed."
Recall what he actually said:
Clearly, the problem is with the will itself, and not with the brain/receiver. But the doctors found tumors near the basal ganglia. How can tumors in the physical brain cause the immaterial will to break? It doesn't make sense.
Now look at it from the materialist angle. If the will is a function of the brain, and Mr. M's brain was damaged in the area that produces the will, then it makes perfect sense that he didn't want to swim to the surface, and his later explanation to his family also makes perfect sense. It wasn't a question of a garbled signal; he really did not want to swim.
Comment by keiths — July 3, 2007 @ 3:28 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 3:50 am
One more thing, Keiths. I'm sure we all recognize moments were we think one thing but do another. I suppose that's suggestive of multiple personalities too, eh? What you consider to be "the will" might be conditioned unconscious behavior interfering.
It makes perfect sense to me. Apparently Keith believes strongly that – if there was a soul – brain damage would not hinder a person's conscious thoughts in the slightest. Now _that_ doesn't make sense. Has Keith proven there is a second "will" interfering? No. The only thing this evidence suggests is that the retrieval of information and data processing in the brain can get screwed up.
Suggesting it is evidence against immaterial consciousness is like saying antidepressives prove there is no consciousness, because how can medicine affect the state of mind and the supposedly immaterial soul? Keith draws plenty conclusions which the evidence does not allow and ignores the evidence which does not fit into his picture.
Comment by Jean — July 3, 2007 @ 3:50 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 4:04 am
Jean wrote:
Jean,
We're talking about one hand buttoning up a shirt while the other one simultaneously unbuttons it.
That's never happened to me or anyone I know.
If it has happened to you, please consider volunteering for a research study, because you're one in a million.
Comment by keiths — July 3, 2007 @ 4:04 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 5:19 am
Pretty easy really…neither one.
Vivid
Comment by Vividbleau — July 3, 2007 @ 5:19 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 6:05 am
Obviously the shirt example is an extreme example.
Last time I wanted to fill the coffee machine, I opened and closed the lid on the coffee box without filling up the coffee machine. Do I have two different personalities? Did one tell me to open it, and the other one to close it? As I said, your examples merely suggest that damage to the brain causes processing errors and corresponding unconscious behavior. What you have not shown is that this behavior is the result of two different sets of consciousness present in the brain.
None of this is prima facie evidence for your proposition. As I mentioned above, drugs influence mental states as well. Do we conclude from this that, since one can influence emotional outbursts and behavior with medicine, that emotions clearly rest in the brain and are not part of nor driven by external consciousness? That conclusion finds no support in evidence. Regardless of wether consciousness is separate or an emerging property from matter, if the brain gets scrambled you get weird results. I fail to see how you can conclude that consciousness should remain pristine in acting externally in the former and how this should be recognizable even in a damaged brain.
And why do you fail to engage the arguments against a materialistic interpretation? It seems you have no intention for example of reconciling NDE experiences with your point of view. Is this because you do not consider those experiences worhwhile? Answer me this Keith, are those people lying, mistaken, or deluded? Which option will it be?
Comment by Jean — July 3, 2007 @ 6:05 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 9:21 am
If, in virtue of a psychophysical law designed by a creator of embodied rational agents, there's a causal relation between such creatures' capacity for willing and part 123 of their brains, and if part 123 of the brain of one such creature, Mortimer, is damaged, then it makes perfect sense that his capacity for willing is disrupted or even wholly disabled.
For example, Mortimer is scuba diving in the ocean while the surf gets really big and he is then swept below and crashes his head against a jagged rock, damaging part 123 of his brain. As a result, his capacity for willing is disabled. His wife Mirabella spots him sitting down on the sea bed and, like Pamela Anderson, pulls him ashore, thus saving his life.
Later, he describes what it felt like. His explanation to Mirabella makes perfect sense. It wasn't a question of his wanting to swim to safety but not being able to do so. Rather, he simply did not want to swim to safety.
This is easily explained if part 123 of Mortimer's brain was damaged, and there is a psychophysical causal law connecting that brain part and the part of a person we refer to as the person's capacity for willing. As with all causal relations, each term of the relation is distinct.
Three years later, Mirabella shoots Mortimer. Her secret lover Montgomery, a neurosurgeon, rushes out from hiding in the bedroom closet when he hears the shots. There, on the landing of the luxurious staircase, he spots with professional pride, a dying man, part of whose skull has been blasted out, with the cavity revealing quite clearly Mortimer's partially damaged brain part 123. As expected by Montgomery, Mortimer's capacity to will much of anything is severely disabled.
Just before Mortimer expires, however, he mumbles to Montgomery the following last words:
"Montgomery, I just want you to know—your wife Monica and I have been having an affair ever since you chose me to be Best Man at your wedding. So there."
And with that, Mort dies. Montgomery grabs the gun from Mirabella and rushes home and shoots Monica. Then he commits suicide.
To clear her mind of these tragic events, Mirabella goes scuba diving, only to be dragged underwater where she hits her head against that same jagged rock that Mortimer hit. She too sits on the sea bed, unable to will much of anything due to the knock on the head and the jarring of brain part 123….
WILL THE HANDSOME YOUNG LIFEGUARD AND GIGOLO MIKE SPOT MIRABELLA IN TIME TO SAVE HER? (OF COURSE HE WILL YOU IDIOTS)
WILL MORT'S WILL TURN OUT TO BE WORTH MUCH TO MIRABELLA?
WILL MIRABELLA'S STRONG WILLED 17-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER MIRIAM TRY TO USE ALL HER WILES TO STEAL RICK FROM MIRABELLA?
TUNE IN FOR NEXT WEEK'S EXCITING FINALE OF "MALIBU MINDS"!
Comment by stunney — July 3, 2007 @ 9:21 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 11:06 am
Keiths:
Keiths, you are either incompetent or dishonest yourself. Any findings that are claimed to negate the existence of x must define x in a scientifically comprehensible manner that eliminates uncertainty and ambiguity as to what is being tested.
Comment by Bradford — July 3, 2007 @ 11:06 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 11:15 am
It's also one that lacks attention to relevant details. Is the patient aware of his medical condition and is he distressed by it? The scientific impact of the example flounders on an imprecise empirical understanding as to what a soul is.
Comment by Bradford — July 3, 2007 @ 11:15 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 11:43 am
Jean:
Keith picks and chooses through research for 'evidence' with which to prop his a priori beliefs about whatever he believes. As do most people, since the annals of research and observation contain plenty of stuff that could be used to support anyone's chosen metaphysical beliefs. That's okay, so long as his preference for only SOME research/observation isn't used as a bludgeon with which to beat others against the head in an effort to force them to acknowledge the superiority of his personal metaphysics.
Since his idea of 'soul' is a scarecrow, he can burn it easily with a single torch of chosen case history and believe his metaphysics is proven true. If others don't buy it hook, line and stinker, he's then free to lob anti-scientific assertions like…
"The immaterial soul, on the other hand, has not fared too well in the light of science lately."
"How do you reconcile your concept of the soul with the scientific evidence? If you can't, then the scientific evidence amounts to evidence that the soul, as you conceive of it, does not exist."
Or direct projections such as…
"Can you reconcile your view of the soul with the scientific evidence, or do you ignore the evidence and accept it on faith?"
Or even self-contradictions like…
"Clearly, the problem is with the will itself, and not with the brain/receiver. But the doctors found tumors near the basal ganglia."
Nothing to see here, folks… move along…
From all I've been able to grock of this behavior, there can be no 'winners' or 'losers' in this debate. Keith will believe what he chooses to believe, and have zero success at making others believe it. Others will believe what they choose to believe, and have zero success at changing keiths' mind. What's the point?
If the point is simply to illustrate graphically the problems engendered when science is applied outside its intelligently designed boundaries, it's been done.
Comment by Joy — July 3, 2007 @ 11:43 am
July 3rd, 2007 at 12:07 pm
Hi Keiths,
Reading this I was thinking of the movie "All of Me" with Steve Martin and Lilly Tomlin.
Comment by Doug — July 3, 2007 @ 12:07 pm
July 3rd, 2007 at 12:57 pm
Yeah, or Dr. Strangelove.
Comment by keiths — July 3, 2007 @ 12:57 pm
July 3rd, 2007 at 1:58 pm
Except when those modern findings gore your own sacred cow, like the veridical NDE report from the Lancet study. In that case you are perfectly willing to pick up the brush and start whitewashing your own worldview.
Comment by mcromer — July 3, 2007 @ 1:58 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 11:09 am
It seems fairly clear from reading the exchange between Keiths and Bradford that all Keiths cares about is preserving his worldview at all costs. He commits one logical fallacy after another, and when they're pointed out to him, instead of admitting error, he vainly attempts to turn the tables.
So, I'm going to make this real simple for you Keiths. All you have to do is provide a scientific answer to this one simple question:
How has it been established (or confirmed) scientifically that the biochemical processes and properties of the human brain are such that no immaterial soul or spirit could either interact with or ennervate them, even in principle?
To answer this simple question, all you have to do, Keiths, is cite the peer reviewed scientific research studies where this hypothesis or something like it has been tested and the results reported. Who did the study? Under what controls and conditions? How might it be falsified?
We're not the least bit interested in your theological, philosophical, or metaphysical musings on this subject…just the science, please.
Comment by DonaldM — July 4, 2007 @ 11:09 am
July 4th, 2007 at 3:39 pm
DonaldM wrote:
Here's another question:
How has it been established (or confirmed) scientifically that the biochemical processes and properties of the human brain are such that no person could either interact with or ennervate them, even in principle?
And another:
How has it been established (or confirmed) scientifically that the biochemical processes and properties of the human brain are such that no person's capacity for willing could either interact with or ennervate them, even in principle?
And another:
Assuming the argument being presented for the non-existence of immaterial souls or spirits is valid, then persons and their capacity for willing either don't exist, or they are material objects or processes. If the latter is true, then how can material objects/processes make empirical observations, make rational inferences, have true beliefs, or experience heartfelt desires to become, say, a neurosurgeon upon which these material objects/processes decide to act?
Comment by stunney — July 4, 2007 @ 3:39 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 5:08 pm
I'm not surprised that the body (and the brain) undergoes excitation when a person experiences feelings. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if there are excitations during abstract thoughts as well. Well, woop the poopy do, New York Times.
I'll call your brain excitation with regard to feelings and raise you this: Let's not monkey around by splitting up the perceptions into categories. Let's take the whole ball of wax. Perceptions are perceptions, period.
When a person perceives a thing, is it because the thing is a perceived thing, or is it because the person is perceiving it? For instance a ball (using a physical object, to better underscore my point). When I perceive the ball, is it because the ball is a perceived thing, or is it because I am perceiving it? I maintain that, in the list of properties of the ball, perceivable is one of them. Perceived thing is not. So the ball is being perceived because I am perceiving it.
But how can I perceive if the concept of perception does not already pre-exist prior to my perception? Without the pre-existance of the concept, there would be no perception, because it is the concept that gives the perception meaning. Even if you want to say that it is the brain that is perceiving.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — July 4, 2007 @ 5:08 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 5:31 pm
And (yet) another:
How has it been established (or confirmed) scientifically that the biochemical processes and properties of the human brain are such that no [insert vague term/s] could either interact with or enervate them, even in principle?
What do I win?
Comment by BoZ3MaN — July 4, 2007 @ 5:31 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 5:47 pm
You win a free pass to never come back here again.
Seems like a fitting gift, considering that you rarely ever engage anyone in discussion and prefer to resort to innane non-responses like the one I'm currently addressing.
Comment by Doug — July 4, 2007 @ 5:47 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 6:09 pm
me:
The main point I wanted to make was implied rather than stated. Not about the soul specifically but about immaterialability. That the act of perception requires the pre-existance of the immaterial concept of perception.
When a person experiences anger, and the ensuing brain activity is monitored, what is being observed is the acting out of the concept of anger. The concept itself is invisible and immaterial. The behavior is not the thing, in other words.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — July 4, 2007 @ 6:09 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 6:31 pm
Doug,
Who designed the designer?
Comment by BoZ3MaN — July 4, 2007 @ 6:31 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 6:39 pm
AnaxagorasRules, I also think concepts are immaterial. Abstract thoughts do not consist of mass even if the brain cells associated with their generation do.
Doug, I think it is revealing how members of the anti-ID (pro-science:roll:) crowd are so eager to embrace the belief that science falsifies metaphysical beliefs. Then again what would one expect of disciples of Dawkins, PZ…
Comment by Bradford — July 4, 2007 @ 6:39 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 6:42 pm
Bozman, who designed the universe? Don't tell us the mass and energy, of which it is composed, are eternal and without a cause.:shock:
Comment by Bradford — July 4, 2007 @ 6:42 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 7:08 pm
Bradford,
The universe isn't designed.
Comment by BoZ3MaN — July 4, 2007 @ 7:08 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 7:17 pm
BoZ3MaN:
Then what are you doing here where people believe that it IS designed, Bozeman? Are you trying to convince us?
Comment by Joy — July 4, 2007 @ 7:17 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 7:19 pm
We're all entitled to our opinions Bozman. Have you figured out how it came into existence?
Comment by Bradford — July 4, 2007 @ 7:19 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 7:23 pm
Joy
Well Joy, maybe he has some scientific evidence proving the universe is not designed.:wink:
Comment by Bradford — July 4, 2007 @ 7:23 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 7:41 pm
Who caused an uncaused?
Comment by Doug — July 4, 2007 @ 7:41 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 8:01 pm
From someone I once knew, who some of you might recognize so I won't say…
A hand full of nothing is all that I need
It contains plus and minus everything.
It's the odd combinations that serve to make up
The world that you see before you.
Odd combinations. Everything else is Perfect Symmetry.
Comment by Joy — July 4, 2007 @ 8:01 pm
July 4th, 2007 at 9:25 pm
Hi, Bradford,
I'm surprised that I didn't get some opposition. I was going to ask any scientific guru that came my way the question, "Just what is matter made of anyway?" When I open up my trusty physics book, I read about particles called quarks with names like up, down, strange, charmed, bottom, and top, each with a magnitude and polarity. So, vector quantities are matter? Hmm…number and direction. So Pythagoras was right? The universe is number? The universe is a metaphysical concept? Hmm:mrgreen:
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — July 4, 2007 @ 9:25 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 1:49 am
BoZ3MaN wrote:
This is only true if the universe was generated as part of a multiverse. But unfortunately for the atheist, a multiverse-generator capable of producing one universe with parameters conducive to life would have to designed, for it would have to have a number of components all working in complex harmony.
Robin Collins explains why:
Comment by stunney — July 5, 2007 @ 1:49 am
July 5th, 2007 at 4:00 am
Doug,
"Who caused an uncaused?"
The designer, of course…or space aliens…
Comment by BoZ3MaN — July 5, 2007 @ 4:00 am
July 5th, 2007 at 6:28 am
BoZ3MaN:
Nobody!
It's a known fact that matter and energy have special properties which under right conditions can produce intelligence. Apparently, human beings with a 100% material brain (no immaterial soul involved) are intelligent beings. In a multiverse, a place where trillions of universes co-exist side by side, it is very probable that there are some universes where matter, energy and the intelligence are exclusively interconnected. i.e. some rare and very special arrangement of matter and energy can bear configurations which in some sense are intelligent beings. After billions of years of evolution some of those intelligent beings have become so advanced that they extended their area of influence to the other universes. We call them designers!
Comment by Farshad — July 5, 2007 @ 6:28 am
July 5th, 2007 at 8:11 am
How do you know that the brain is, by itself, completely responsible for human intelligence, and that no "immaterial" factors are involved?
Tell me more about the multiverse? How did you discover it?
Comment by mcromer — July 5, 2007 @ 8:11 am
July 5th, 2007 at 8:37 am
Thanks for asking pertinent questions. Being an ID proponent myself, I totally agree with you. I just tried to demonstrate how loose and shallow a multiverse hypothesis can be. To avoid confusion, next time I'll enclose my comment in proper tags: [satire]…[/satire]
Comment by Farshad — July 5, 2007 @ 8:37 am
July 5th, 2007 at 12:15 pm
Sorry I missed the sarcasm Farshad.
Comment by mcromer — July 5, 2007 @ 12:15 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 3:14 pm
Bradford:
I refer to my earlier post where I asked: How do we know scientifically that the properties of the cosmos are such that any apparent design can not be actual design, even in principle?
If anyone has a philosophically-theologically-metaphysically free scientific answer to that question [Boz3man? Keiths?], I'm all ears!!
Comment by DonaldM — July 5, 2007 @ 3:14 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 3:18 pm
stunney:
Good additions! Thanks!!
Keiths seems to have disappeared. I'd think he'd be eager to answer my simple little question, since he's so sure he's right! Well, I'll give him the benefit of the doubt: perhaps he's at the library looking up those citations I requested!!:shock:
Comment by DonaldM — July 5, 2007 @ 3:18 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 4:40 pm
DonaldM wrote:
It's not time to gloat just yet, Donald. I'm working on a longish comment that lays out my position and handles anticipated objections in some detail.
Comment by keiths — July 5, 2007 @ 4:40 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 5:04 pm
http://www.seedmagazine.com/ne...
Comment by BoZ3MaN — July 5, 2007 @ 5:04 pm
July 5th, 2007 at 9:57 pm
Keiths:
That wasn't gloating; it was bemused puzzlement. I'll be most interested to see your longish comment laying out your position. I'm sure others will as well.
Comment by DonaldM — July 5, 2007 @ 9:57 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 2:28 am
BoZ3MaN wrote:
[Emphases added]
Yup. This is what I've maintained all along—Ockham's Razor is a double-edged sword.
Physics has now reached the nadir of positing, in a desperate and amusingly ironic attempt to explain the empirical data, a practically infinite number of physically unobservable entities as part of an untestable hypothesis, so as to avoid positing one unobservable transcendent reality endowed with reason, and responsible for the existence of the universe, us, the precise mathematical order that governs both, and the authentic moral and religious experience of humankind.
Can anyone say, Ockham's Razor?
Comment by stunney — July 6, 2007 @ 2:28 am
July 6th, 2007 at 3:58 am
stunney,
Yes, I see Ockham's Razor beheading your 'unobservable transcendent reality endowed with reason'.
Ah…the wonderful self-refuting nature of ID.
Comment by BoZ3MaN — July 6, 2007 @ 3:58 am
July 6th, 2007 at 4:52 am
Bozoman,
Are you good at arithmetic? If so, perhaps you can answer this question:
Which is a bigger number of unobservable entities:-
a) one of them
or
b) an infinity of them
I know it's a tough one, but go on, take a guess.
No, it's not a. Have another shot at it.
You're still not sure? Ok. The correct answer is, in fact, b.
Yes, b. Yes, Bozoman, I know, it was a tough one.:roll:
Science of course posits loads of unobservable entities. They're called theoretical entities. For example, quarks, the electromagnetic field, gravity, and so forth. Lots of atheists seem to be unaware of this fact. Ockham doesn't tell us not to posit unobservable entities. Lots of atheists misunderstand that fact. Ockham tells not to posit any entities beyond necessity. And, in the context of explaining the observed order of the universe, multiverse proponents are positing an infinite number of unobserved entities as being necessary to explain, as part of an untestable hypothesis, the apparently fine-tuned design and intelligible order of this universe, rather than posit just one designer, in a desperate and amusingly
ironic attempt to explain the empirical data.
That's why theists laugh at those proponents, Bozoman. They're ridiculous. Just like you.
Comment by stunney — July 6, 2007 @ 4:52 am
July 6th, 2007 at 5:25 am
stunney,
which is a bigger number of entities:
(a) The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
or
(b) One model
Even you should be able to answer that.
Comment by Raevmo — July 6, 2007 @ 5:25 am
July 6th, 2007 at 6:52 am
Gentlemen, Ockham's Razor is not applicable to metaphysical speculations.
Comment by Bradford — July 6, 2007 @ 6:52 am
July 6th, 2007 at 8:27 am
Raevmo asks:
Sunshine, your question is like asking which is the bigger number of apples:
a) three apples
or
b) one orange
Catholic theology doesn't regard God as an entity, or as a being. Nor does Catholic theology regard the Persons of the Trinity as three entities, or as three beings, or three substances, or as three minds, or as three intellects, or as three wills, or as three individual consciousnesses.
Imagine your self speaking a mental word that fully expressed your entire being and communicated it perfectly as your own conscious knowledge of your entire being. You would still be one reality.
Now imagine your self as loving perfectly the perfect consciousness that your self had generated, and imagine that perfect consciousness loving your self. You would still be one reality.
Now imagine the love that proceeded from your self and from your consciousness perfectly uniting in harmonious love your self with your consciousness. You would still be one reality, Indeed, you could never be more one, utterly harmonious being, than at such a moment.
God is not made of parts. God is not an entity. God is not a being. God is what infinite self-communicating information, i.e. Being, actually Is, namely Knowing and Loving.
One cannot Know or Love unless one Is. One cannot Be, unless one Knows. One cannot Know unless one Loves. One cannot Love unless one Knows. So Being, Knowing, and Loving are intrinsically united in God. You can't have what is referred to by one of these terms without having what is referred to by the other two terms (which I'm capitalizing to indicate that they name one dynamic and infinite act of being/knowing/loving) . Think of one infinite circle of never-ending, eternal act of Being/Knowing/Loving. Or think of eternal, unlimited Information eternally generating unlimited and hence self-experiencing Consciousness, from which there eternally flows unlimited Value, whose essence is Love.
Try not to think of the Trinity as three individual 'things', but rather as what Aquinas called 'subsistent relations' within, and which together constitute, one divine Essence. Aquinas' idea of the divine Persons can be put this way:
Father = the relation of generating
Son = the relation of being generated
Spirit = the relation of perfect love that proceeds from those two relations.
The word 'Person' comes from the Latin (persona) translation of the Greek prosopon, which is very difficult to translate into a simple English word, but it does not have the same sense as 'person' normally has. 'Manner of acting' might render the sense of 'Person' better in the context of the Trinity. The normal English usage of 'person' refers instead to an individual center of consciousness. But there are not three such centers in God, for each divine Person—that is, each divine 'manner of acting'—shares perfectly in the one divine consciousness, the consciousness which the Father generates, and which is the Son, and from which the Spirit proceeds as the love between Father (generating) and Son (generated). The reason these inner relations are subsistent is that they are real and distinct. But they also necessarily imply one another and so constitute one reality.
We sometimes say a human person just is, or is constituted by, personal relations to other persons, but we mean this in a loose and limited way. Not so in God. Nothing is held back in the divine Personal relations. Each of the divine Persons just is, and is constituted by, their unlimited, perfect Personal relating. Their relations constitute the entirety of their Personhood. The Father generates the Son not in a limited way but by giving the totality of 'being Father'. The Son is generated not in a limited way but by giving the totality of 'being Son'. And the Spirit proceeds from those two unlimited 'relatings' not in a limited way, but by giving the totality of 'being the relation of love that proceeds from being Father and being Son', which is 'being Holy Spirit'. Those three terms thus name God's intrinsic 'manners of acting' within the one divine essence.
Comment by stunney — July 6, 2007 @ 8:27 am
July 6th, 2007 at 8:31 am
Hi Bradford,
You wrote…
Good one!
Now, do you see how this results in someone like me accepting multiple Truths as equally valid?
Comment by Thought Provoker — July 6, 2007 @ 8:31 am
July 6th, 2007 at 8:58 am
Bradford:
That's definitely not what Ockham thought. The principle is still invoked in philosophical debates. But maybe you're right and it shouldn't be.
However my point would still stand. Multiverses are unobservable infinities. So attacking theists for positing one unobservable infinity is inconsistent with positing gazillions of them oneself.
Comment by stunney — July 6, 2007 @ 8:58 am
July 6th, 2007 at 10:24 am
Bradford:
Well, there is the school of thought that Ockham's meat cleaver isn't practically applicable to much of anything. As the famous line from "Pirates of the Carribean" says: "its more like a guideline" (just like the pirates code!) Sherlock Holmes's dictum: "when everything else has been eliminated, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth!" And, as any reader of Sherlock Holmes would know, sometimes the correct answer is the more complex (contra Ockham), not the most parsimonious. Just a thought!
Comment by DonaldM — July 6, 2007 @ 10:24 am
July 6th, 2007 at 12:28 pm
Stunney and DonaldM, I should have indicated that before one gets to applying the razor one should decide as to whether or not the choices themselves are adaquate. In the case of a philosophical argument, advanced as the basis for a scientific critique, there is more than Ockham to be concerned with.
Comment by Bradford — July 6, 2007 @ 12:28 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 12:52 pm
DonaldM wrote:
Donald,
This is a common misunderstanding. Ockham's Razor doesn't hold that simpler explanations are always best. A complex explanation that fits the facts is better than a simple one that doesn't.
When two explanations fit the facts equally well, then Ockham advises us to choose the simpler one. Even then, the preference is provisional. The more complex explanation may turn out to fit better as new facts come to light.
Ockham's Razor is particularly pertinent to the topic of this thread. The idea that we are strictly physical beings is simpler than the idea that we possess both bodies and immaterial souls.
To those who believe in them, what evidence justifies the inclusion of immaterial souls in our model? (I know mcromer will mention the Lancet NDE study. Anything else?)
Comment by keiths — July 6, 2007 @ 12:52 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 12:58 pm
Keiths:
Even more relevant to the thread is the adaquacy of physical data to argue for metaphysical claims.
Comment by Bradford — July 6, 2007 @ 12:58 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 1:02 pm
Bradford,
If immaterial souls exist — particularly souls of the kind that most people envisage — then there are testable empirical consequences.
Comment by keiths — July 6, 2007 @ 1:02 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 1:05 pm
I suppose I'll have to await the specifics related to an actual proposed empirical study.
Comment by Bradford — July 6, 2007 @ 1:05 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 1:24 pm
Regarding Occam's Razor and competing theories, in which each theory makes predictions which are borne out in tests, it is the theory with the least number of assumptions and the best predictive power that gets the nod. This winning model is dubbed aesthetic and truer. Complexity is not an issue, unless there are assumptions in the complex assertions.
Comment by AnaxagorasRules — July 6, 2007 @ 1:24 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 1:45 pm
Hi all,
"entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity"
It is a simple, but important concept in logic. Occam was focused on NECESSITY not simplicity.
If either a simple or complex suggestion doesn't answer the question, it is discarded before applying Occam's razor.
Occam's razor is then applied to assumptions of successful suggestions that are UNNECESSARY to answer the question.
For example…
This nominally answers the question of why fire is hot but the yellow color is an unnecessary assumption. Occam's razor cuts it off.
Not because it makes the answer simpler, but because the assumption was unnecessary.
Occam says nothing about choosing between a simple "The LORD God formed the man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life" and a very complicated quantum mechanical and evolutionary explaination.
They are both answers. However, Occam would have something to say about presuming the existance of unnecessary angels as an additional assumption for either suggestion.
Comment by Thought Provoker — July 6, 2007 @ 1:45 pm
July 6th, 2007 at 1:55 pm
Keiths:
Why is that "simpler" I'd argue that it makes things far more complex, because now we have to account for a whole range of attributes in strictly physical (i.e. material) terms. I find that far more complex than the simple concept that every living human has a soul.
Comment by DonaldM — July 6, 2007 @ 1:55 pm
July 7th, 2007 at 4:37 am
DonaldM wrote:
Because it's easier for dims to understand.
When I say 'understand', what I mean is that it's easier for dim brains to process inputs which mechanically produce material expressions of outputs in the class of outputs that include the terms "I UNDERSTAND", where 'class' refers to all outputs that include the term, "CLASS".
Uh oh. We seem to have a self-referential thingie here. Just how do material entities refer to themselves?
Comment by stunney — July 7, 2007 @ 4:37 am
July 7th, 2007 at 5:25 am
Donald:
Just by giving a simple meaningless name to a complex phenomenon doesn't make it simple. Only the deluded can believe such crackpottery.
Comment by Raevmo — July 7, 2007 @ 5:25 am
July 7th, 2007 at 6:41 am
Raevmo wrote:
What makes you think that the phenomenon of willing is complex? Don't you will your actions just by willing them, using your capacity for willing, rather than identifying and instructing your inner morons, sorry, neurons to begin certain specified mechanical operations?
Are you calling yourself a deluded crackpot? Surely you mean your neurons resemble a cracked pot?
Comment by stunney — July 7, 2007 @ 6:41 am
July 8th, 2007 at 12:25 am
To those who were following the discussion of souls on this thread: the debate has now moved to a new thread.
Comment by keiths — July 8, 2007 @ 12:25 am
July 8th, 2007 at 10:25 am
stunney:
I wasn't calling myself a deluded crackpot. That would be silly. But my neurons do feel like a cracked pot at this time. I blame it on last night's Belgian beer. Just 4 bottles of Duvel is all it takes.
Comment by Raevmo — July 8, 2007 @ 10:25 am
July 8th, 2007 at 11:09 am
Raevmo wrote:
Duvel is good stuff. I used to imbibe it on day-trips to Brugge/Bruges. At least, I think I did, and I think it was good.:shock:
Have you tried Chimay? I had some of that this past week.
Comment by stunney — July 8, 2007 @ 11:09 am
July 8th, 2007 at 12:18 pm
Mmmm… Chimay Bleue. Good stuff.
Comment by keiths — July 8, 2007 @ 12:18 pm
July 8th, 2007 at 12:49 pm
stunney:
Damned good stuff too. In my neck of the woods (not quite as picturesque as Brugge, but close enough) every drinkery serves Belgian brews (some places quite literally hundreds of different brands, it's amazing). Hmmm, while I write this an email is coming in with subject "Your insatiable chick will be full of pleasure!" It's true of course but how did the sender know this? Could it be that God sent me an email?
Comment by Raevmo — July 8, 2007 @ 12:49 pm