Reply to Rosenhouse - Methodological Naturalism
by machtJason Rosenhouse replied to my long, boring post. My point in that post was to point out that there are two different understandings of what "Methodological Naturalism" is. I believe that that the most common understanding of methodological naturalism (I'll call it MN-1) is the one I outlined in my original post:
Methodological naturalism is a recent term for the rule that science must be restricted to natural processes or the rule that science cannot refer to the supernatural or the rule that scientists, while doing science, must act as if the supernatural does not exist. Keep in mind that this is very often claimed to be part of the very definition of science. It is a rule that has to be followed in order for something to be science.
I didn't really argue for that being the standard view of what MN-1 is because I've always understood it to be a pretty standard definition. In the comments I did point to Del Ratzsch's paper here (Section 4). Ratzsch cites a good half dozen or so people (from Michael Ruse to Richard Lewontin to Euginie Scott) that hold this position.
Rosenhouse's paper was primarily devoted to putting forth the idea that science is essentially a pragmatic enterprise with the goal of understanding the workings of nature. Because of it's pragmatic nature, "[a]ny investigative technique that brings us closer to this goal can reasonably be considered part of science." Under this view, Rosenhouse says that methodological naturalism (I'll call this view MN-2) would be better understood as a "pragmatic rejection of supernatural hypotheses."
It is clear that MN-2 does not imply MN-1 in that MN-2 is a "pragmatic convention for doing science" and could change at some point in the future, should some pragmatic convention come along that scientists feel is better. MN-1 is a rule that tells us what is and isn't science - it's part of the very definition of science - and thus it isn't merely a convention. This distinction between MN-1 and MN-2 is what I was referring to when I wrote:
"But Rosenhouse goes on to say that IDists think "MN is nothing but an arbitrary rule used to exclude ID from its place at the table." But I think he misunderstands those who are against MN. They aren't arguing against the "preference for natural causes" nor are they arguing against the "pragmatic rejection" of supernatural causes. What they are arguing against is when people take this preference, this convention, this pragmatic rejection and make it into a "rule" or make it part of the very definition of science. They are saying that if a well-tested, prediction-making theory came along that was useful to scientists, then despite any rules you put forth, scientists are probably going to go with what works. That's all (most) MN critics are saying."
Rosenhouse provided three quotes by Steve Fuller, Phillip Johnson, and William Dembski that don't really have any bearing on what I wrote above. It is clear they are all rejecting the concept of MN-1, not MN-2. They think that imposing a strict rule that would restrict the supernatural from science (even if it was useful) is arbitrary. This is why I said "They aren't arguing against the "preference for natural causes" nor are they arguing against the "pragmatic rejection" of supernatural causes." Because they aren't. They are arguing against making MN-1 part of the definintion of science.
Rosenhouse is correct that there are philosophers of science who think that the labels of science and non-science are arbitrary. The point I was trying to make was more along the lines that no philosophers think that the things that have traditionally been put forth as demarcation criteria (falsification, testable predictions, consistency, etc.) are arbitrary. But I was pretty unclear in what I was saying there.
I also pointed out that Rosenhouse's view that "science and non-science are opposite ends of a continuum, as opposed to rigidly defined categories" is inconsistent with "those who think there are strict rules that one must follow in order for their theories to be called 'scientific.'" This is pretty much common sense. If you think science and non-science are on opposite ends of the spectrum and aren't rigidly defined categories, then it follows that there aren't any strict rules that one must follow in order for something to be called scientific. This is equivalent saying that being a child and being an adult are two parts of the same spectrum and aren't rigidly defined categories. It follows from this that there aren't any strict rules about what a child is and what an adult is. We can, however, give a list of the most common characteristics of children and adults and in many cases it becomes fairly easy to tell children from adults. I would say the same thing about science and non-science. There aren't any strict rules but we can come up with a pretty good list of criteria (falsifiability, testability, elegence, consistency, etc.) and see if our theory meets a lot of these criteria. In most cases, it is pretty easy to tell science from non-science. But there aren't any strict rules that tell us so.
Rosenhouse's reading of Plantinga is still dead wrong and the last sentence of the paragraph he quoted doesn't contain the syllogism he provided, no matter how much he tries to flesh it out. I agree that that last sentence isn't ambiguous, though, in that it is saying exactly what I said Plantinga was saying. Namely, "that "being a science stopper" is not a strict rule that disqualifies something from being science." Rosenhouse says that Plantinga's statement "only makes sense if you view science as consisting of precisely those statements about the natural world that are true." That isn't true, though. Plantinga could easily be saying that science says true things about the world, not that science consists of precisely those statements about the world that are true (or as he said in his syllogism - that "Science encompasses all that is true."). Plantinga clearly wasn't saying that. Here's Plantinga's argument:
1) If something is true, it may be part of science.
2) "Science stoppers" may be true.
3) Therefore, "science stoppers" may be part of science.
May 23rd, 2006 at 11:11 pm
MN2 is a convention that tells us what science is ?
MN1 is a rule that tells us what science is ?
MN1 and MN2 share the idea that science seeks to explain nature and only differ in that one says rule the other says convention "¦ assuming the rule (like the convention) is human and not divine I don't see the difference here"¦
Unless rules like Gods are never changing and never wrong"¦ but that would make MN1 (if it isn't MN2, really) seem absurd.
Does any MN1er really think that science is the only thing in creation that fails to evolve "“ it just poofed into existence fully formed and fully valid "“ a MN1-miricale!
Anyway, MN1 (if it is not MN2) sounds mythical like the tooth-fairy or Richard Dawkins"¦ nothing so absurd could really exist.
But, MN2 still tells us what science is - it just "˜seems' to make it almost human. the problem, I'd say, is that in order to know what is "˜working' MN2 needs a reliable guide to reality itself (is it naturalism?) otherwise the MN2er ends up being a Real pragmatist (lacking the transcendent measuring stick)"¦ shunning notions like "˜how nature really works' and just making due with human (rather than godlike) goals"¦ or admitting they have a rule that defines science "“ the absurd version of MN1 again.
I just don't know how MN2 can tell when theories are working (given their definition of working) unless they mean becoming more naturalistic "“ which ends up being MN1.
So I think there is really just MN - and I'm sortof suspicious of the M too"¦
Comment by de_nacisse — May 23, 2006 @ 11:11 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 1:03 am
MN2 simply says that we shouldn't follow supernatural causes because they have historically been unfruitful, not because they are unscientfic by definition.
MN1 says that supernatural causes are simply not part of science.
My personal take is that most of the confusion arises simply because of the word "science" and everyone wants a piece of it. I think we could reduce the confusion dramatically by removing the word "science" from our vocabulary, and talk about precisely what it is that we are doing. Then let individuals choose how much epistemic weight to give to the different things that we do.
For example, if I'm testing out whether or not gene X changes to gene Y under certain controlled circumstances, I'm doing experimental biochemistry. Is that science? WHO CARES!!!!! If I define a framework for classifying biological function, I'm doing theoretical biology. Is that science? WHO CARES!!!!!
I think having this one term, "science", for which so much epistemic weight gets associated with it, is what the true problem is, not what the definition of science is.
I think the historical problem is that the pragmatic ideas of science got confused with the investigational process of science, and they got conflated into a single term. There is much that "scientists" do that is not pragmatic or empirical. If someone tells you otherwise they are simply lying to you. However, the pragmatic concept got tied to the whole operation, and therefore the public assumes that the whole enterprise of "science" carries equal weight and authority, without regard to the limitations of both the pragmatics themselves as well as the limitted use of pragmatics within scientific investigation.
For example, let's pretend that the fossil record goes from low complexity at the bottom to high complexity at the top, with the complexity doubling every 20 feet of rock. If someone then claims "the modern organisms evolved from the lower ones at a rate of doubling their complexity for every 20 feet of rock laid down", they are NOT making an empirical claim. In fact, almost any time you include a process in something, you have ceased to make an empirical claim. In the above hypothetical scenario, the only empirical claim available is that, for a complexity of X at depth d, X(d) = 2 * X(d+20). That's it. You cannot involve mechanism, because mechanism is a theoretical, not an empirical/pragmatic, claim. Once you step beyond a numerical relationship, you are no longer doing empirical studies (and even those rely on essentially non-empirical notions of reality).
All of this to say that much of the issue would go away if we stopped using "science" as a substitute for "real", "truthful", "solid", or any other idealized information-gathering mechanism. In fact, if "science" went away altogether and we spoke of things themselves instead of lumping them into vague categories, we would probably make even more headway.
Comment by johnnyb — May 24, 2006 @ 1:03 am
May 24th, 2006 at 1:38 am
Can I suggest the key is analysing the word "supernatural" in a bit more detail. (I raised this point on Jason's blog but I think I can articulate it better now).
What makes quarks a natural explanation for events and a poltergeist a supernatural explanation? Neither can be observed directly. Both explain a wide variety of otherwise inexplicable events. You can say the poltergeist is in some sense "outside nature" - but what does that mean? People who believe in them have no problem saying where the poltergeist is - even which house it inhabits.
I propose that they key reasons we call the poltergeist supernatural are
the poltergeist is supposed to have a mind of its own
there is no explanation about how it achieves its supposed ends
and thus there are no clear rules about what it can and can't do.
This makes it into an ad hoc explanation that can be hauled out to explain anything. And that is what is unscientific about it.
Comment by Mark Frank — May 24, 2006 @ 1:38 am
May 24th, 2006 at 2:07 am
Hi Mark,
I think the primary difference between quarks and poltergeists is that quarks have a large body of scientific evidence in favor of them, whereas poltergeists don't. If we had as much evidence for poltergeists as we had fr quarks, people would start calling poltergeists a natural phenomenon.
Comment by Krauze — May 24, 2006 @ 2:07 am
May 24th, 2006 at 3:29 am
From the original article:
Can anyone show me any evidence that anything considered to be supernatural does exist?
Comment by Odd Digit — May 24, 2006 @ 3:29 am
May 24th, 2006 at 4:00 am
Johnnyb,
So you're saying MN2 gives a reason for it's exclusion of non-naturalistic causes (unfruitfulness) whereas MN1 just excludes without any attempt at justification (just out of distain, maybe)? Most people who talk about MN at all (like Rosenhouse) try to backup their case with reasons about why science is run by MN. I think those positions really (in reality) collapse into one.
What is meat by "˜unfruitful' and how would the MN judge it, really? Rosenhouse talks about understanding nature (which he measures with a combination of Popper/Sade). But he gives no justification for these criteria over others (and he doesn't show that they support naturalism). He seems to be just picking vague terms to justify MN as a doctrine.
Rosenhouse claims (like MN2) that there are real goals and techniques that make-up science (i have no idea how that could be - it sounds queer/mystical) and that these goals/techniques have excluded non-natural causes. MN1 (I think) says that there are real rules (goals and techniques) that make-up science and these rule(s) (goals/techniques) exclude non-natural causes. Sounds the same "¦
In reality neither position is true to science (so i would probably agree with you in that) there are no rules or goals given in science (but the ones we make up). Both MN1 and 2 are fictions that are used in the same way for the same end — not the understanding of nature!
Comment by de_nacisse — May 24, 2006 @ 4:00 am
May 24th, 2006 at 5:05 am
Greater philosophical engagement with the terms 'natural' and 'supernatural' is an extreemely important part of moving the debate forward.
Comment by BenK — May 24, 2006 @ 5:05 am
May 24th, 2006 at 5:47 am
Krauze
There are plenty of observations of mysterious bangings, broken plates etc which can be "explained" by a poltergeist. I suspect that there are less recorded events which have been explained by quarks. The difference is in the quality of the explanation - which is my point. I can explain almost anything with a poltergeist.:twisted:
Comment by Mark Frank — May 24, 2006 @ 5:47 am
May 24th, 2006 at 6:36 am
A good example of what I'm talking about is provided by "skblllzzzz" in the comments at Evolutionblog, where he says that "if some modern scientist happened to introduce something supernatural into science and it was testable", it would "lose the 'super' and become 'natural'."
Comment by Krauze — May 24, 2006 @ 6:36 am
May 24th, 2006 at 7:16 am
Krauze
We probably agree, but as Ben says it is important to examine the philosophical implications of "supernatural" in detail and to me that means examining words like "explain" and "testable" in detail. A lot of stuff is said about "methodological naturalism" and "can science include the supernatural" without getting to grips with what is natural and what is supernatural.
For example, in what sense can't I test for the existence of a poltergeist? A believer can list the kind of things that poltergeists do and a group of observers can spend the night, or several nights, in a supposedly haunted house and pronounce whether or not there were any such goings-on. (In fact a group did just this in mother's cellar last year, although they were looking for a ghost!) So have they tested the hypothesis "there was a poltergeist" Why not?
(I don't believe ID is science and it should not be taught as such, but it is educational to have to work out why it isn't science and an excellent case study for a philosophy of science course).
Comment by Mark Frank — May 24, 2006 @ 7:16 am
May 24th, 2006 at 7:20 am
[...] Krauze continues to debate "Methodological Naturalism" over at Telic Thoughts. Can you see the problem in his analysis? I believe that that the most common understanding of methodological naturalism (I'll call it MN-1) is the one I outlined in my original post: Methodological naturalism is a recent term for the rule that science must be restricted to natural processes or the rule that science cannot refer to the supernatural or the rule that scientists, while doing science, must act as if the supernatural does not exist. Keep in mind that this is very often claimed to be part of the very definition of science. It is a rule that has to be followed in order for something to be science. [...]
Pingback by Heaven is not the sky » Blog Archive » Supernaturalism vs. Methodological Naturalism — May 24, 2006 @ 7:20 am
May 24th, 2006 at 8:02 am
Looks like Mark Nutter of "Heaven is not the sky" thinks I wrote Macht's post. I guess that since one can't correctly infer the identity of the designer based on the contents of the post, the post wasn't designed.
Comment by Krauze — May 24, 2006 @ 8:02 am
May 24th, 2006 at 8:29 am
One of the fundamental problems in the debate over design is the vagueness of the terms "natural" and "supernatural." What exactly are natural or supernatural entities? Is a natural entity simply something which is part of the space-time universe and a supernatural entity something which transcends this universe?
If so, then those cosmologists wrestling with theories about "other worlds" are really doing theology, not science. If, however, we wish to consider the theorizing of cosmologists legitimate science then we have to say that excluding theorizing about an extra-cosmic designer from science is an arbitrary and unwarranted step.
For all we know, the designer could be a denizen of one of those universes or it could be the "generator" which manufactures those universes.
The concept of other worlds effectively erases the natural/supernatural distinction and greatly expands the purview of science.
The question then becomes not whether talk of a designer is scientific or not but whether there is reason to think that our universe and the living things in it show evidence of intention and intelligent engineering.
Dick at http://www.wscleary.com/pov/ho...
Comment by Dick — May 24, 2006 @ 8:29 am
May 24th, 2006 at 9:32 am
I find the term "supernatural" to be unhelpful and it is not a concept I have any use for, or even find meaningful.
Phenomena are what they are, and attaching a label of "natural" or "supernatural" to them seems largely a way to dismiss investigation into those labelled as "supernatural".
As for scientific evidence for phenomena frequently mislabeled as "supernatural", I write a blog focused on that.
Comment by MatthewCromer — May 24, 2006 @ 9:32 am
May 24th, 2006 at 10:44 am
de_nacisse:
I think the issue is that if it is a _methodological_ naturalism, then it is really equivalent with a philosophical naturalism. However, there are many who have not found reason to use explanations beyond naturalism, who fall under MN2, though that is not really _methodological_ naturalism. There's nothing about the methods or tools of science that say X must be natural.
As I was trying to point out in my post above, but think I may have left out explicitly, is that many people take empirical results as being necessarily counter to supernatural causes. However, empiricism cannot tell us the _reason_ for a cause. It could be that gravity operates because God has precisely dictated that angels intervene in every case. It could be that gravity operates based entirely on material principles (whether or not God was the ultimate cause). The _equation_ of gravity DOESN'T GIVE YOU EITHER ONE.
I somewhat agree with Krauze that the natural/supernatural distinction is somewhat invalid anyway. I know of several young-earth creationists who think that supernatural is a false category. Here is a quick explanation of the reasoning:
1) People are considered natural
2) I can purposefully choose my own movements within the constraints of physics
3) My movements do not violate the laws of nature, but merely works within them
4) My own influence over nature is restricted to my physical body
5) If our influencing our own body's movement is considered natural, provided it stays within the boundaries of physics, there is no reason to consider God's actions over the whole of nature as supernatural, provided His interaction does not violate physical laws
6) There is no evidence to suggest that God has manipulated nature to the extent of violating physical law
Anyway, it's a rather large subject, and I don't think I've done justice to either the questions raised by others or my own explanations, though I think I've done the best I can at the moment.
Comment by johnnyb — May 24, 2006 @ 10:44 am
May 24th, 2006 at 12:01 pm
This doesn't mean that some of the poltergeist explanations aren't good.
Imagine that I went around attributing every event to Jeeves, the butler. Every time something happens that I can't explain, I declare "The butler did it!" The fact that I do this doesn't mean that "the butler did it" can't be a good explanation for some event. For example, "Who killed Col. Mustard?" "The butler did it, in the conservatory, with the lead pipe." What would make this a good explanation? It would be a good explanation if there there was good evidence for the fact that the butler did it in the conservatory with the lead pipe. What would make this a bad explanation? It wouldn't be a bad explanation because of the fact that I can "explain everything" with the butler. The reason it would be a bad explanation is if it had no evidence to back it up.
Comment by macht — May 24, 2006 @ 12:01 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 12:18 pm
Supernatural entities are those things that people don't want to be part of science. And if the supernatural thing ends up providing good explanations, is testable, makes predictions, then it becomes natural (because … well … supernatural things can't be part of science… yeah, that's the ticket).
Comment by macht — May 24, 2006 @ 12:18 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 12:18 pm
Strictly speaking, this:
Is not a valid syllogism.
*"Science stoppers" may be true* is NOT equivalent to *"something" IS true.*
Comment by Julian — May 24, 2006 @ 12:18 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 1:35 pm
You should read 3) as:
"3) Therefore, (true) "science stoppers" may be part of science."
Premise 2 is just there to point out that science stoppers are possibly true
Or I suppose I could change it to:
Comment by macht — May 24, 2006 @ 1:35 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 1:46 pm
Hi Macht,
Something that might illustrate this from the other side of the aisle:
If the genetic code is nothing but a frozen accident, science will be unable to figure out a functional reason to that particular relation of nucleotide triplets to amino acids. In other words, it's a science-stopper. Yet the "frozen accident" hypothesis could still be true.
Comment by Krauze — May 24, 2006 @ 1:46 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 2:12 pm
Ratzsch's argument on "science stoppers" boils down to this: If proposition P speaks on scientific matters (which, by definition, a "science stopper" must), and if proposition P is true, then P may be part of science. This is both obvious and undebatable, unless someone actually holds that science ought to promulgate falsehoods rather than admit truths that might limit it, in order to maintain an illusion that it hadn't reached a limitation.
Comment by Deuce — May 24, 2006 @ 2:12 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 2:30 pm
Hi Macht,
Macht, what are the examples of entities previously thought to be supernatural which were subsequently reclassified as natural?
Comment by Aagcobb — May 24, 2006 @ 2:30 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 3:02 pm
Depending on your definition of "supernatural" (which again I find to be a vacuous concept):
Ball lightening
Meteorites
Comment by MatthewCromer — May 24, 2006 @ 3:02 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 3:30 pm
Hi Matthew,
I'm still curious to hear Macht's examples, yours seem kind of mundane; just electricity and rocks, nothing like the ID.
Comment by Aagcobb — May 24, 2006 @ 3:30 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 3:56 pm
I've already given one - action at a distance. Mechanists of the day wouldn't accept it because it was magical and too mystical and spooky (they believed that action requires physical contact).
Comment by macht — May 24, 2006 @ 3:56 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 4:19 pm
Thanks, macht,
Can you see a difference between this and the activities of inhuman intelligent agents?
Comment by Aagcobb — May 24, 2006 @ 4:19 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 4:34 pm
I'm sure there are plenty of differences. I'm not sure there are relevant differences to this discussion, though.
Comment by macht — May 24, 2006 @ 4:34 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 5:09 pm
Forget natural or supernatural. What I'm interested in as an agnostic is whether a given biological mechanism is designed or not. Simple as that. If science cannot answer that question, then it's implications should form no basis for any overarching philosophical view of reality.
A simple question: if i modified a genomes (or species) to have a particular, heretofore unknown feature or function, how would anyone else, upon examination, be able to discern whether or not the feature was designed or not? NeoDarwinist ideologues would simply assume that random mutation and natural selection did the job because that's what their a priori idology prescribes for everything. But I would know (as the designer) they are, to use common man's vernacular, full of crap.
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 24, 2006 @ 5:09 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 6:25 pm
It is certainly true that if you modified a genome, making changes that are of the same kind that naturally arise by mutation, it would be very hard to prove later on that it did not evolve naturally. On the other hand, there are lots of changes that you could make that would be a real problem for evolution. You could design proteins from scratch, rather than using variants of existing proteins. You could use a different set of amino acids and/or a completely different genetic code. You could use a different form of information storage than DNA or RNA. You could design the cells with a whole different set of organelles, etc., etc.
Comment by trrll — May 24, 2006 @ 6:25 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 6:59 pm
None of these would be a real problem for evolution.
Comment by Mung — May 24, 2006 @ 6:59 pm
May 24th, 2006 at 9:49 pm
Well put, kornbelt888.
Mung wrote:
Mung's sarcasm is well-placed, due to the infinite flexibility of evolutionary thinking.
To dig down to the next level, however, I think it would be fair to say that none of the examples would be a problem for a designer either, as the designer would have the flexibility, in principle, to employ any of these approaches. As a result, what are we left with? In imagining some future hypothetical system we have to fall back on the discussion that is already occurring, namely, what is the inference to the best explanation for the biological systems we see today?
Comment by Eric Anderson — May 24, 2006 @ 9:49 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 3:06 am
Mung says:
I disagree.
Comment by Odd Digit — May 25, 2006 @ 3:06 am
May 25th, 2006 at 3:22 am
Without a viable candidate for a designer - i.e. one with evidence for their existance - then there is no reason to conclude design.
There's very few scientists who do use science in this way. I'm a scientist and I don't use science as the 'basis for any overarching philosophical view of reality'. Science is not a philosophy, it's a method.
It depends if you were being obvious. A few simple point mutations would almost certainly be undetectable. If however you introduce a working gene from one (genetically well known) organism into another distantly related (and also genetically well known) organism - for example introducing a whale or human gene into e-coli - then we would have reason to suspect that someone might have been tampering. And we would also have a candidate for the designer as well - a human being. At last, a justifiable design inference!
No, scientists don't have an 'a priori ideology'. We do have a considerable body of evidence - and repeatably tested scientific theories - that we can use as a basis for making testable predictions.
The only candidate for a designer (that we have evidence for the existance of) is us - human beings. So unless you're suggesting that human beings were around 3 billion years or so ago in order to design a bacterial flagellum - and later design ourselves - then you seem to be out of candidates for designers. If there's no designer, there's no reason to even infer design, yet alone conclude it.
Comment by Odd Digit — May 25, 2006 @ 3:22 am
May 25th, 2006 at 9:05 am
Hi macht,
Well, you said supernatural entities had been reclassified as natural, but the only example you have given is action at a distance, which isn't an entity, its something subatomic particles do, and as far as I know, noone ever suggested those particles were supernatural.
Its also relevant because, after all, the whole point of this blog is that the activities of an undetectable inhuman intelligence can be scientifically investigated. While the nano world is strange, there is a huge difference between a photon and the ID. Photons don't think, and experiments show quantum mechanics can give an accurate mathematical account of their behavior, and they certainly don't design complex biological structures.
Comment by Aagcobb — May 25, 2006 @ 9:05 am
May 25th, 2006 at 9:22 am
Hi kornbelt888,
This article explains how a company detects genetically modified organisms. When dealing with an actual genetic engineer, rather than an imaginary one, scientists can detect design!
Comment by Aagcobb — May 25, 2006 @ 9:22 am
May 25th, 2006 at 10:50 am
Design Theory 101:
Design is not a conclusion, it is an inference. One does not need to have X in hand in order to make in inference with regard to the effects of X.
As an example, the discovery of Neptune, I think it was.
Comment by Mung — May 25, 2006 @ 10:50 am
May 25th, 2006 at 12:08 pm
Odd Digit wrote:
Odd Digit needs go back and brush up on the basics.
http://www.idthink.net/back/id...
http://www.idthink.net/back/id...
Comment by Eric Anderson — May 25, 2006 @ 12:08 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 12:23 pm
Mung writes:
You should read my whole point first. I also said:
Comment by Odd Digit — May 25, 2006 @ 12:23 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 12:39 pm
Eric Anderson said:
I know all that. Yawn. You can say "we don't need to identify the designer to infer design" until you go blue in the face if you like. You still won't get taken seriously by any proper scientists.
Without at least one plausible candidate for a designer - and some ideas of how they might have done it - and some ideas about why they might have done it - you're still stuck with a vague hypothesis and 'golly it looks complicated to me'.
The only places where I have ever seen a working design inference have also had known candidates for designers (human beings), of known capabilities, motivations that can be at least guessed at, and who were known to be present at the time.
Nice quote I heard:
20 years and counting and that's all you've got so far. Excuse me for not stopping the presses yet.
Comment by Odd Digit — May 25, 2006 @ 12:39 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 1:11 pm
Abiogenesis, it had to have occured=therefore it did
Oh I forgot - abiogenesis has nothing to do with evolutioanry theory. yawn
Comment by samohth — May 25, 2006 @ 1:11 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 1:33 pm
Hi samohth,
The key difference between abiogenesis and ID is that abiogenesis researchers actually develop hypotheses about the origin of life and conduct research to test them; Behe's hypothesis about the IC structures is that they "poofed" into existence, and as far as I know, noone is researching the "poof" hypothesis.
Comment by Aagcobb — May 25, 2006 @ 1:33 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 1:56 pm
Never mind ID 101. You need to go back to Logic 101. You can yawn all you want, but you have not provided any cogent response to Mike's essays, nor shown why he is wrong. If you do not understand the basic argument of design and do not understand how a design inference can logically exist without identification of all the trappings you personally think design should be able to answer, then further discussion is fruitless.
Comment by Eric Anderson — May 25, 2006 @ 1:56 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 2:00 pm
Aagcobb wrote:
Ah, yes, "imaginary." Now that we know Aagcobb is limited by his own a priori philosophy, it is easier to understand the apparent inability to objectively analyze the possibility of design.
Comment by Eric Anderson — May 25, 2006 @ 2:00 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 2:07 pm
You shouldn't take what I say so literally. I was talking about supernatural phenomena in general.
It is? I'd say it has a lot more to do with the word (i.e., "telic") in the banner of this blog.
As I said, I agree there are huge differences the two. I still don't see the relevant differences, though. For example, you said "Photons don't think," but so what? What relevance does that have? Is this somehow going to stop it from being reclassified as natural? I really don't see how. You also say we have an accurate mathematical account of photon's behavior but this is exactly my point! If we had accurate scientific theories of (what we now think of as) some supernatural phenomenon, scientists would think of it as natural. Why? Because the supernatural can't be part of science, by definition, obviously.
But this all goes back to my main point - science isn't concerned with how some phenomenon is classified (natural, supernatural, paranormal, magical, etc.). It's concerned with things like testability, predictability, elegence, consistancy with other scientific theories, etc.
Comment by macht — May 25, 2006 @ 2:07 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 2:18 pm
Odd Digit says: "If there's no designer, there's no reason to even infer design, yet alone conclude it."
I think you have the cart before the horse. Why would anyone go looking for the designer of an object without first having good reason to suspect the object was designed? We haven't discovered anything on Ganymede that looks designed, therefore, no one is looking for the designer of anything found on Ganymede. But if a structure like Mount Rushmore was discovered on Ganymede wouldn't scientists infer it was designed? Only after making a design inference would they research how the structure was designed and who did the designing.
Comment by Jack — May 25, 2006 @ 2:18 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 2:30 pm
Hi aagcobb,
I happened to have wandered over to MikeGene's link and just read here:
http://www.idthink.net/back/in...
click on " ID Theorists can learn lessons from OOL research" .
If you read the article and we might have something more useful to talk about concerning this subject.
Comment by samohth — May 25, 2006 @ 2:30 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 2:35 pm
"Methodological Naturalism" is just another invocation of the rejection of the supernatural, a label which apparently means anything currently rejected by the majority of NAS members, as a way to keep scientists in line upon penalty of ridicule, cold shoulders among your peer group, the drying-up of funding, research paper rejection, denial of tenure and never getting your PhD in the first place. . .
Comment by MatthewCromer — May 25, 2006 @ 2:35 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 2:42 pm
Eric says,
Give me something to analyze which isn't one of the same old recycled creationist arguments which have been beaten to death, like that "survival of the fittest is a tautology" nag you trotted out.
Comment by Aagcobb — May 25, 2006 @ 2:42 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 2:57 pm
Hi samohth,
So far it doesn't seem like IDists have had much interest in engaging in speculation about how design could have occurred. It would be interesting to see them come up with some ideas which could be researched.
Comment by Aagcobb — May 25, 2006 @ 2:57 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 3:39 pm
None of these would be a real problem for evolution.
Really? Well, since you are clearly an expert on evolution, perhaps you will put your money where your mouth is. You discover that an organism uses a completely different genetic code than other organisms, and that this genetic code is encoded in a molecule other than DNA or RNA. Provide a plausible pathway for its step-by-step evolution from known species.
Comment by trrll — May 25, 2006 @ 3:39 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 3:45 pm
Except that they don't have a general method for inferring design–they have the molecular biological equivalent of a computer virus filter that recognizes particular viruses by searching for specific code. That is, they use genetic technology to search for the presence of known modifications. Their method will not detect a novel GMO–like a virus filter, it requires constant updates.
Comment by trrll — May 25, 2006 @ 3:45 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 3:55 pm
Hi trrll,
Exactly, science doesn't have a general method for inferring design, Dembski's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. Science can only detect design when it can identify an actual designer with known technologies and motives!
Comment by Aagcobb — May 25, 2006 @ 3:55 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 4:18 pm
Nomination for clueless comment of the week:
Known technologies? Motives? Heaven help the archeologists, SETI scientists, forensic scientists and others! We cannot detect design without knowing the designer's motives? Please. It is clear that we are not dealing with objective analysis of the idea of design, but rather a close-minded, knee-jerk antipathy. Nothing to see here folks, move along, move along . . .
Comment by Eric Anderson — May 25, 2006 @ 4:18 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 5:18 pm
Eric writes:
There's nothing in any Mike's stuff that's in any way original. It's the same tired old ID arguments that have been shown to be scientifically vacuous several times over. I'll at least give Mike credit for writing something down as an argument, which you don't seem to be capable of Eric.
The basic argument for design is 'it looks designed to me'. Not hard to understand. Not however evidence for design. Why not? Because there are many things that look designed and aren't. And there are many things that don't look designed and are. So the appearance of design is not a reliable detector for design. Logic 101.
If you want to make an inference of design you need more than just the appearance of design, because that alone is not reliable. So you need a designer, or at least a candidate for one. We're still on Logic 101 here.
Archeology, candidate designers = humans
Forensic Scientists, candidate designers = humans
Mount Rushmore, candidate designers = humans
SETI, candidate designers = anyone who can produce artifical radio waves the same as humans can.
Spotting a trend here, Mr. Logic?
Bacterial flagellum, candidate designer… er… well… em… can't be humans I don't think… erm… so…
I agree with this. You Eric haven't posted anything remotely original whatsoever. Even vaguely interesting would be a nice start.
Comment by Odd Digit — May 25, 2006 @ 5:18 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 5:59 pm
Why? Having a plausible pathway for step-by-step evolution from a known species has never been a requirement of MET, so the lack of one in no way falsifies MET.
Comment by Mung — May 25, 2006 @ 5:59 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 7:11 pm
I'm not sure what you mean by "MET," but evolutionary theory most certainly requires that a plausible step-by-step pathway exist for evolution from prior species. I don't know of any biologist who would consider the scenario that I described consistent with evolution (or at least evolution on earth; I think that most biologists, confronted with such an evolutionarily impossible beast would presume it to be extraterrestrial in origin).
It is worth noting that plausible step-by-step pathways have been proposed for development of systems that others have claimed to be "irreducibly complex" such as the immune system, the eye, and the bacterial flagellum. But there is simply no plausible way that something as fundamental as the genetic code or the fundamental building blocks of proteins could be modified by individual genetic mutations or evolutions to result in such an outcome. Even something as simple as building proteins from the opposite enantiomer–d-amino acids instead of l-amino acids (which should work perfectly well) would be inconsistent with evolutionary theory. It would also be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for evolutionary theory to accomodate if similarity at the genetic sequence level were not in at least general agreement with the postulate evolutionary family try. If you disagree, then put your money where your mouth is and suggest how such a creature could have evolved according to evolutionary theory.
There have been many, many opportunities for evolution to be falsified; every time a new genome is sequenced, it is a new test of the theory. But so far, it has passed every such test with remarkable success. Considering that evolutionary theory predates knowledge of genetics, mutation, or DNA, this is perhaps the most remarkable example in the history of science of observational and experimental confirmation of a theory's predictions.
Comment by trrll — May 25, 2006 @ 7:11 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 9:28 pm
I disagree, but you the miss point entirely, which is if NeoDarwinists were unable to detect that I added designed features to a genome, their typical default assumption would be that the features were not designed, instead of being rightfully agnostic on the question. In short, they would be WRONG. And they would have no choice but to be wrong, because of their own ideological box.
Whenever you have opinions rendered on a matter when there is no clear evidence, it is a manifestation of ideology. "I don't know" is the proper scientific answer in such cases. Darwinists should employ it much more than they do.
(Whether or not anyone could identify me personally as the designer is a side issue of no importance whatsoever to the question of detecting my design.)
Comment by kornbelt888 — May 25, 2006 @ 9:28 pm
May 25th, 2006 at 10:54 pm
Hi Aagcobb,
I'm not sure what you mean here? Do you mean did a designer "poof" something into existience? I'm open to that. I'm led to believe that the universe was formed in a big poof.
If they can't, does that make it false? Is scientific research the only way to discover truth or is there truth beyond the reach of science? I have posted a quote here from a "founding father" saying ID needs a theory in order to direct research and I have heard others express doubt as to its qualification as science so the criticism you raise has not escaped them. I'm always curious as to why many who say there is no confilict between religion and science seem so desperate to kill ID in the cradle.
Comment by samohth — May 25, 2006 @ 10:54 pm
May 26th, 2006 at 1:49 am
kornbelt888 writes:
Good point. Consider the way Philosopher of Science Del Ratzsch puts it in his article Design Theory and Its Critics: Monologues Passing in the Night. Commenting on an essay by Phillip Johnson, Ratzsch writes
A bit later on Ratzsch writes:
There really isn't much wiggle room for hard core defenders of MN here. Either accept a skewed picture of reality and pretend it is fact or toss the stipulation of MN into the Mississippi River.
Comment by DonaldM — May 26, 2006 @ 1:49 am
May 26th, 2006 at 3:29 am
kornbelt888 says:
There is no default assumption that features are not designed. There is no ideological box either. Until very recently there was never any need to suspect design in a genome, because there was no known designer with the capabilities to alter a genome. Nowadays there is one. Humans.
And finding a functioning human insulin gene in a bacterium would indeed lead any scientist to suspect design - human design. Asking around, they could then find the lab and the researchers that put it there. But that's a pretty obvious change. If all you did was introduce a couple of point mutations, then that would be indistinguishable from the normal mechanisms of random mutation, and would therefore be undetectable as 'design'.
If I introduced a mutation in a bacterium by creating a new copy of an existing bacterial gene next to the original copy, would you be able to detect that I'd done it? I suspect not, because that kind of mutation happens all the time without the intervention of a human designer.
When we are talking about something like a bacterial flagellum however, the situation is entirely different. We are talking of something that appeared long before the only known category of potential genome designer we know about appeared on the scene. So who's your candidate for designing a flagellum? There is no evidence for one. None. So while the flagellum looks vaguely like something that might have been designed, without a candidate for the designer that is as far as we can go. Was the flagellum designed? Not as far as we can tell, no.
Comment by Odd Digit — May 26, 2006 @ 3:29 am
May 26th, 2006 at 3:49 am
DonaldM says:
There is plenty because the whole thing is one big strawman argument based on a series of logical fallacies.
For example:
Only one of these is a non-naturalistic concept and that is the supernatural. All of the others are demonstable in the natural world and therefore amenable to scientific investigation.
So Johnson and Ratzsch start by basing their argument on a fallacy, and a pretty big one at that.
The only constaint is empirical evidence. If you have empirical evidence then you can scientifically test something. The supernatural is generally considered to be outside of science because there is no empirical evidence for science to work with.
You wouldn't be talking about (gasp!) God would you? And here I was reading all the propaganda from the DI that ID is not about religion…
It's very telling that Behe admits that the plausibility of ID as a (cough, hack) 'scientific theory' depends on your beliefs in a higher power. If you believe in a god or gods then ID seems more plausible. If you don't then it isn't plausible at all. I can't think of any real scientific theory that suffers from this problem.
Comment by Odd Digit — May 26, 2006 @ 3:49 am
May 26th, 2006 at 9:23 am
Hi samohth,
No, that doesn't make it false, and scientific research isn't the only way to discover truth. Its the IDists at the DI who insist that IDism is scientific, and the truth of IDism can be discovered through scientific research. Theistic evolutionists, of whom there are many, believe in God, they just recognize that evolutionary theory is the best explanation of the evidence, and God doesn't have to intervene in the universe in a scientifically detectable manner in order for his will to be done. Don't buy the propoganda that evolutionary theory is inherently atheistic; its no more atheistic than meteorology, which can't scientifically falsify or validate Pat Robertson's hypothesis that Katrina was God's judgment on New Orleans.
Comment by Aagcobb — May 26, 2006 @ 9:23 am
May 26th, 2006 at 10:12 am
It doesn't follow that he is restricted from doing that and why would a theistic evolutionist insist on it or care whether it was detectable or not? Just asking.
I like to believe I have sensitive propaganda sensors and, while I don't think evolutionary theory is inherently atheistic, this notion comes from both sides of the big ditch.
Comment by samohth — May 26, 2006 @ 10:12 am
May 26th, 2006 at 10:32 am
samohth
Actually it's not evolution you should be worried about. Gravity is the scientific theory that is the most atheistic. Or is it quantum mechanics? Gaaah, I've forgotton again. Where did I put my 'scale of atheism in science'? I should know this stuff.
Hang on just a second though. I'm sure I've heard someone say somewhere (not far from this very blog) recently that evolution is an ideology and requires belief. Wouldn't that make evolution theistic? i.e. the exact opposite of atheistic?
Now I'm really confused.
Comment by Odd Digit — May 26, 2006 @ 10:32 am
May 26th, 2006 at 1:20 pm
"Methodological naturalism" is a euphemism for "philosophical naturalism." (Per the definitions proffered above.) And "philosophical naturalism" is rooted in "theological naturalism." And what does any of that have to do with science? Or design?
Philosophical naturalism has its roots in Western civilization in the ancient Greek philosophers (or that's the "standard" account), and of course, their philosophies as transmitted and filtered down through the ages to us, mostly through the hands of Christian (and Muslim) theologians and philosophers.
(That must seem bizarre and unthinkable to persons deriving their knowledge of science and philospphy from the latest posts on the "InternetInfidels" and "Answers in Genesis" websites.)
Via that process of transmission and filtration, modern philosophical naturalism has evolved out of theological naturalism, which is also truly ancient, but comes to us directly via scholastic controversies (particularly over the impetus theory) from the Twelfth Century Renaissance. There is nothing new in philosophy. And just like everything else in Western civilization it has been substantively and subtly influenced by religiously inspired thinkers. That includes science.
Recall that what we would consider "scientists" weren't even commonly called scientists until near the end of the 19th century (due to Whewell?"”a religiously inspired "scientist" and philosopher of science). Scientists were called natural philosophers, and by that was meant that they believed and practiced the "experimental philosophy." (The "scientific method," And everyone does, don't they?)
Around the end of the 19th century the scientific community itself made that demarcation between science and philosophy by self-consciously referring to themselves as scientists and no longer as natural philosophers. (And the transition from "philosophers" and mathematicians to "natural philosophers" occurs earlier. In the century between Copernicus and Newton.)
If "methodological naturalism" is just the methods of science (And I've seen nothing in the various definitions proffered that indicates otherwise.), and if the program of philosophical naturalism is, as many philosophers say, to render philosophy wholly and consistently scientific, then it must be true that philosophers of naturalism practice "methodological naturalism," in which case they aren't philosophers at all but scientists!
So there neither is a such a thing as "methodological naturalism" or "philosophical naturalism," there is just science! (Philosophers have science-envy just as biologists have been accused of having physics-envy. No doubt! Scientific achievements are to be "envied." And just like Cool-Mo-Dee has his "posse" of hangerson, enviers and other "parasites," so science has its erstwhile "posse," the "philosophical naturalists.")
But it ain't science we're arguing about"”its philosophy! And we are arguing about it because philosophers of naturalism (or philosophers of "methodological naturalism") have not rendered their philosophy wholly and consistently scientific. They can't. Because they are philosophers not scientists.
Comment by Rock — May 26, 2006 @ 1:20 pm
May 28th, 2006 at 3:38 am
Rock says:
No it isn't. Rest of screed ignored.
Comment by Odd Digit — May 28, 2006 @ 3:38 am