Yesterday, Krauze brought a very interesting quote to our attention. The quote was from philosopher Philip L. Quinn and Stephen Jones provides a longer excerpt.

Let's have a look.

It sometimes happens that the best arguments one can give in support of a view are not going to be effective and the most effective arguments one can give are not going to be good. After all, decision- makers are sometimes too busy to master complex arguments. Then, too, they can be prejudiced or even stupid. When one is aware that this is the situation-and I suspect this is rather common-then one confronts the philosopher's dilemma. One horn looks roughly like this. Convinced of the overall rightness of ones position, one opts to present the effective bad argument. Each time one does this, one's hands get a little bit dirtier. At first one is painfully sensitive to even small compromises that one knows to be violations of one's intellectual integrity, but gradually numbness of conscience sets in. At last, when presenting the effective bad argument has become easy and habitual-second nature, as it were-one's hands have become dirty beyond all cleansing and one suffers from a thoroughgoing corruption of mind. The other horn looks roughly like this. Concerned to preserve one's integrity at all costs, one resolves never to present the effective bad argument. One always presents the best argument one can for the position one thinks most nearly right, and one's hands remain clean. But frequently these good arguments fail to persuade or carry the day, and gradually one's credibility and effectiveness wane. At last, when one has an established track record of failure, the decision-makers conclude that one is of no use to them, and one is unceremoniously cast aside. … Maybe this is a way in which we could manage to have our cake and eat it too. For a short period one might engage in giving bad effective arguments without being thoroughly corrupted. Then one could retreat back to the academy to wash one's moderately soiled hands. After having one's intellectual integrity restored and reinforced, one might then be ready to repeat the cycle. … So there may well be circumstances in which only the bad effective argument will work against them [the creationists] in the political or legal arenas. If there are, then I think, though I come to this conclusion reluctantly, it is morally permissible for us to use the bad effective argument, provided we continue to have qualms of conscience about getting our hands soiled. But I also believe we must be very careful not to allow ourselves to slide all the way down the slippery slope to intellectual corruption. Perhaps, if we divide up the labor so that no one among us has to resort to the bad effective argument too frequently, we can succeed in resisting effectively without paying too high a price in terms of moral corruption." (Quinn P.L., "Creationism, Methodology, and Politics," in Ruse M., ed., "But is it Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy," Prometheus Books: Amherst NY, 1996, pp.397-398)

It is encouraging to see that Quinn recognizes the moral dimension to all of this. When he comes before a "decision-maker," he does not come as some guy named Philip Quinn. He comes before them as the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, having published over 100 articles and reviews in various areas of philosophy, the author of Divine Commands and Moral Requirements and The Philosophical Challenges of Religious Diversity as well as the co-editor of A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, and as one who held a number of leadership positions in the American Philosophical Association over two decades, including being president of the Central Division and chair of the National Board of Officers.

In other words, the decision-makers trust that he will speak and behave as all his credentials and awards would indicate. They would trust that he was speaking as a scholar and give them good arguments. But Quinn admits a willingness to manipulate them with bad arguments. In other words, he is willing to misuse his authority for political reasons. The end justifies the means. He even thinks it is "morally permissible." Why? Provided we continue to have qualms of conscience about getting our hands soiled. In other words, as long as he knows he is doing something immoral, it is moral to do so because it serves a higher purpose. You just have to be careful not to do it so much that your conscience becomes numb to it.

Amazing.

Y'know, those of us on the internet are sometimes criticized for "hiding" behind a pseudonym. Yet thanks to Quinn, you can now see how named people can hide, perhaps more insidiously, behind the walls of the Ivory Tower while hiding their misdeeds behind their professional status, credentials, and awards. Likewise, their colleagues can help hide them as long as they are doing their immoral deeds for The Good Cause or The Consensus.

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