The Quiet Revolution
by Steve PetermannMuch is being made of the Intelligent Design "revolt" against a scientific materialist worldview. With the Dover trial, articles and op-ed pieces in the press, and even the US President coming out for discussion in schools, public awareness of this worldview "battle" has been heightened.
Apparently, however, there is another quiet "revolution" going on along the same lines that most people may not be aware of. It is happening in philosophy, the philosophy of mind. Unlike the frenzied mess of emotion, spin, and often questionable tactics within the ID debate, this debate has all the earmarks of an open, rigorous but civil discourse. It has this despite the presence of strong challenges to a strict materialist metaphysics.
So what is happening? According to David Chalmers' blog another eminent philosopher of mind, Jaegwon Kim is shifting away from a strict physicalist(materialist) view towards some form of dualism in his new book Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. From the blog:
This book is full of interesting arguments about the mind-body problem. But it is especially notable for the fact that Kim, often seen as an arch-reductionist, comes out of the closet as a dualist. In the last couple of pages of the book, he embraces epiphenomenalist property dualism about qualia, combined with functionalist reductionism about intentional states.
Is this just another instance of a trend towards anti-materialism with respect to consciousness? Chalmers seems to think so.
Tone aside, this makes at least three prominent materialists who have abandoned the view in the last few years. Apart from Kim, there's Terry Horgan and Stephen White (balanced, of course, by Frank Jackson moving the other way). One still sometimes sees the claim that almost everyone these days is a materialist (e.g. in Peter Carruthers' new book, p. 5: "Just about everyone now working in this area is an ontological physicalist, with the exception of Chalmers (1996) and perhaps a few others"). I don't think one can get away with saying this any more. Apart from the four counterexamples just mentioned, here are a few other contemporary anti-materialists about consciousness who come quickly to mind: Joseph Almog, Torin Alter, George Bealer, Laurence BonJour, Paul Boghossian, Tyler Burge, Tim Crane, John Foster, Brie Gertler, George Graham, W.D. Hart, Ted Honderich, Steven Horst, Saul Kripke, Harold Langsam, E.J. Lowe, Kirk Ludwig, Trenton Merricks, Martine Nida-Rumelin, Adam Pautz, David Pitt, Alvin Plantinga, Howard Robinson, William Robinson, Gregg Rosenberg, A.D. Smith, and Richard Swinburne. There are plenty of others, and then at least as many again agnostics. If I had to guess, I'd guess that the numbers within philosophy of mind are 50% materialist, 25% agnostic, 25% dualist.
Isn't it strange that with this movement of prominent thinkers away from materialism and the profound implications there is no uproar, no delimiting of discussion, no ostracizing of individuals. Perhaps it is because the religious implications of anti-materialism are never brought up. Or maybe unlike biology, philosophy has never been afraid to talk about religion.
I think there is also another remarkable parallel of this philosophical discussion with that of ID. Apparently to a large extent this movement away from materialism is based on the inability of materialist explanations to account for consciousness(example). Sound familiar? Isn't this a negative argument that ID critics are always complaining about. Are philosophers following the logic wherever it leads? What a concept!
Only time will tell if this is a true revolution in philosophy. If it is, its effects could spill over into the ID debate. At the very least, perhaps something could be learned from this quiet revolution in how to address issues that have profound metaphysical implications.
October 5th, 2005 at 4:07 pm
Hi, Steve, I've been kind of interested in the trends in Philosophy of Mind myself. Jaegwon Kim's move is pretty big news in that arena. Imo, intentional states and rationality turn out to actually be harder problems for materialism than Chalmer's "hard problem" when you really sit and think about them, though qualia are more "in your face" and more difficult to ignore, and seem to be what have pushed more philosophers toward dualism of one sort or another. I don't think the "dualistic qualia/reductionistic intentional states" position is really consistent or tenable, but it at least partly comes to terms with one major philosophical problem, and I think it's easier to really consider the other one once you've taken that step.
I also wouldn't be too surprised if the PhoM debate eventually spills over into the ID debate. It's difficult, imo, if not impossible, to integrate any kind of dualism, but particularly full-fledged mental realism, into a Darwinian outlook that is undiluted. I wouldn't be surprised if that's got at least something to do with why some philosophers have been reticent about going the dualist route (There's certainly a relationship there in the thinking of some, like Daniel Dennet).
Comment by Deuce — October 5, 2005 @ 4:07 pm
October 5th, 2005 at 8:59 pm
Steve,
Yes it is strange that there is not an uproar. Dennett, Pinker and others don't seem to want to listen to any non-material theoris of the mind, but they are in a minority.
This is sort of like the development of the Big Bang theory in the last century. Some stood against it basically because of its religous implications, but for the most part the Big Bang was accepted pretty calmly. Maybe we can learn something from that debate too, and it's a debate that's pretty much over with.
Comment by Stuart Harris — October 5, 2005 @ 8:59 pm
October 5th, 2005 at 11:16 pm
One factor that may contribute to the lack of any uproar is that no one is trying to get a dualist perspective taught in the public school rooms. Without the socio-political movement focused on the public school classroom, I'm not sure there would be as much heat surrounding the issue of ID.
Comment by MikeGene — October 5, 2005 @ 11:16 pm
October 5th, 2005 at 11:33 pm
And also, nobody is trying to get the materialist perspective, or evo-psych, taught either (at least not that I'm aware of), nor are they taught already. It's a debate which is taking place mostly outside the normal public sphere on both sides, which I think helps keep things cool.
Comment by Deuce — October 5, 2005 @ 11:33 pm
October 6th, 2005 at 11:38 am
Hey Mike,
I think you're probably right. One wonders if things like the Gonzalez debacle would have ever happened if ID hadn't been prominent in the mainstream media. Then the other question, of course, is if the courts eventually settle the high school issue against ID in the Post-Wedge World will things settle down in the universities. I doubt it. Judging from the recent challenges to academic freedom, looks like ID is a hot potato in academia as well. It might take the loss of a series of law suits to make deans and university presidents back off.
Comment by Steve Petermann — October 6, 2005 @ 11:38 am
October 6th, 2005 at 3:00 pm
Thanks for the link to Chalmers' blog, Steve. There is of course every reason to believe that what happens in the current multidisciplinary quest for consciousness will impact biology and evolutionary theory. Just as developments in fundamental physics will be impacted by this quest, and in turn also impact biology and evolutionary theory. Funny how all this science and philosophy ties together, n'est ce pas?
What has long amazed me is how reluctant the materialist meme is to let go of its grip on science even though it could be well-argued that it lost the philosophical battle a century ago. I mean, just look at all the young 'upstart' materialists in the philosophical ranks who act as if their metaphysic wasn't rendered obsolete when the LAST revolution in fundamental physics occurred! I guess they still hope that materialist reaction at the turn of the last century against a view of reality in which everything manifest manifests via an intervening medium [aether] will eventually come up with something better than intrinsic uncertainty and mere probability. As if the 'new' science was unable to escape the 'old' science's necessary requirement for "wiggle room" that leaves way too much leeway for transcendency to operate. That's the reason even the quantum vanguard fought evidence of the Big Bang for nearly 40 years tooth and nail while they labored to erect their theoretical edifice. Too much aid and comfort to the "enemy."
I've always held the opinion that what's 'real' is 'real' regardless of what scientists and philosophers say about it. And what's 'real' inevitably boils down to what human beings experience AS 'real' – a phenomenological question entirely. Experience of reality is different from beliefs about reality. This is made glaringly obvious by how the leftover materialist meme manages to overcome all evidence against it by sheer force of "belief-in." That this "belief-in" likes to call itself 'Science' is either laughable or pitiful depending on how seriously one cares to consider the difference between experience and beliefs about experience.
I'll try to work up a blog about another of Chalmers' observations as I have time. That one deals specifically with phenomenology and beliefs. Thanks again!
Comment by Joy — October 6, 2005 @ 3:00 pm